It sounds like Aristotle didn't have too much to go on in terms of the natural world and of course, we can't blame him for that since he lived so long ago. I think that back then, the conclusion most would come to is that matter stays the way it is, and only forces of nature could change how matter is. This is their, "form" the way that matter is. They never considered that molecules could combine because there is no way they could have observed it. For them, a rock was a rock, and it was a rock because a volcano (a force of nature) spewed it out of the ground. Now a rock could be an igneous rock with traces of all sorts of minerals, and for us, a rock is that because we have observed a phenomenon and dubbed it so.

Even as recently as the 1700s, people didn't think that things like life could be made in a lab. They didn't understand that the rules the universe goes by could be used by us because they didn't understand the rules. I think that matter to Aristotle was the building blocks of the world, only changeable by the will of the gods. (or for Aristotle specifically, the "Prime Mover") For an old Greek guy without the thousands of years of scientific inquiry that we have, I think that is a pretty good answer.

I agree that we shouldn't waste time wondering why Aristotle's metaphysics seems empirically false, but I am still curious to know how Aristotle would answer that question.

Suppose that a sculptor uses his tools and creates a statue of himself.
The formal cause is the statue.
The final cause is whatever the sculptor had intended.
The efficient cause is the sculptor.
The material cause is the marble...

However, what makes the material cause "marble" is certainly another form- the form of marble! And whatever that is is made of another form and so on and so on!

but I am still curious to know how Aristotle would answer that question. — Walter Pound

My speculation above is all I can provide. It's a shame we can't ask him.

What exactly is matter in Aristotle's eyes? — Walter Pound

A way to think of it is that we don't perceive form or matter (edit: as independent things), we perceive substances (like apples, people, etc.) Those substance have properties (form) that can be identified. But a substance is more than a formalism, it is also material - the substance pushes back when you push on it. This is Aristotle's hylomorphism.

Matter itself has no properties (the substance does) and can do nothing (it is the substance that acts or is acted upon). There's debate over whether Aristotle accepted the existence of prime matter. And it's difficult to see what sense can be made of it if it has no properties and cannot act.

Hope that helps.

Yes, I understand that Aristotle would say that an oak tree is a composite of form and matter and, while I think I have an understanding of what a form is, I still have a hard time understanding what matter is. Is there anything that distinguishes matter in the hylomorphic composite of a tree or that of gold? Or is there nothing about matter that distinguishes the matter in the substance of an apple or that of gold?

What can be said of the matter that isn't just, "well, it is part of a substance..." or "its the part of the substance that makes the form feel solid..."

It seems that matter has no features of its own and,... — Walter Pound

MU is going to find you and eat you! But until he arrives with the exactly correct view, I will summarize what I read - I no longer have the book in hand. Aristotle apparently didn't say much about matter. It seems matter is imperfectly realized form. If the τελος of a kitten is to become a cat, then the part of a kitten that is not yet a cat is matter - imperfect form - and the part that is cat is not matter, but cat. When the kitten becomes a cat, then the cat is not matter, but the form that is cat. Perfectly clear?

MU?

MU is going to find you and eat you! — tim wood

Is MU an Aristotelian die hard or fanboy?

. If the τελος of a kitten is to become a cat, then the part of a kitten that is not yet a cat is matter - imperfect form - and the part that is cat is not matter, but cat. — tim wood

Why should matter have anything to do with whether a kitten has the potential to become a cat? Sure, matter may come along and be part of the cat substance, but matter only does what the form of the cat impels the matter to do.

A way to think of it is that we don't perceive form or matter, we perceive substances (like apples, people, etc.) Those substance have properties (form) that can be identified. But a substance is more than a formalism, it is also material - the substance pushes back when you push on it. This is Aristotle's hylomorphism. — Andrew M

A problem with this is we perceive properties. So if properties are form, we perceive form. Also "pushes back when you push on it" is a property, a property that we perceive.

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It sounds like Aristotle didn't have too much to go on in terms of the natural world and of course, we can't blame him for that since he lived so long ago. I think that back then, the conclusion most would come to is that matter stays the way it is, and only forces of nature could change how matter is. — TogetherTurtle

He did have access to the writings of the atomists, right? I think their reasoning was superior, but lost out for other reasons.

He did have access to the writings of the atomists, right? — Marchesk

Perhaps he did. It's hard for experts to get a grasp on what the people of the past knew, let alone doofuses on the internet like me. Maybe he was proposing a counter to that or maybe his argument built upon it. I don't have a clue.

Is there anything that distinguishes matter in the hylomorphic composite of a tree or that of gold? Or is there nothing about matter that distinguishes the matter in the substance of an apple or that of gold? — Walter Pound

The matter is only distinguished by its specific form in a substance. For example, a house can materially be made of either brick or wood (or both). But bricks and wood also have formal properties. And bricks can materially be made of clay or concrete. And so on until you get to the basic elements (which were notably very different for Aristotle than for us today). So matter is an abstraction over bricks, wood, clay, gold, etc.

Perhaps a useful analogy here is with shape. A square could be morphed into a trapezium by a suitable transformation, i.e., its form can change. And they are distinguishable shapes. But there are no shapes independent of any form. Shape is an abstraction over squares and trapeziums.

What can be said of the matter that isn't just, "well, it is part of a substance..." or "its the part of the substance that makes the form feel solid..." — Walter Pound

I think that about covers it. The intended distinction is between the form of a house (which might also be captured in a blueprint, or as an idea in our minds) and the house itself, which is a material instance of that form.

A problem with this is we perceive properties. So if properties are form, we perceive form. Also "pushes back when you push on it" is a property, a property that we perceive. — Terrapin Station

I should have said that we don't perceive form or matter as independent things. I agree that we perceive that grass is green, etc.

What exactly is matter in Aristotle's eyes? — Walter Pound

Consider that in Aristotle`s physics, matter is the aspect of a thing which does not change when change occurs to a thing. It is therefore the principle which provides for the reality of the temporal continuity of existence. Imagine a changing thing. At one moment it is assumed to have a definite form, and at the next moment it is assume to have a slightly different definite form. Strictly speaking, from a logic of formal identity, at the second moment it is not the same thing as it was at the first moment. The idea that it is logically necessary that these are two distinct things, provided fodder for sophistry and paradoxes of infinite regress. So Aristotle wanted a law of identity which would corroborate our observed experience, and allow that one and the same thing could have temporal extension despite the fact that changes occur to that thing during the time of its existence. So he posited "matter" as the underlying thing which does not change, providing for the observed temporal continuity of existence of a thing, despite the fact that the thing's form is continually changing.

I am having a hard time following Aristotle's philosophy so I would be grateful if you could help see where I go wrong in here. I decided to reply sentence by sentence so that you could pinpoint what I get wrong. Additionally, could you recommend me either videos or books on Aristotle that can help explain his thought to me? Thanks!

matter is the aspect of a thing which does not change when change occurs to a thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

This tells me what matter does and not what matter is.

It is therefore the principle which provides for the reality of the temporal continuity of existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, this is what matter does in regard's to Aristotle's metaphysical framework; this doesn't tell me what matter is.

Imagine a changing thing. At one moment it is assumed to have a definite form, and at the next moment it is assume to have a slightly different definite form. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the form is not material, then why suppose that the form changes at all when time passes? We don't see how immaterial entities behave and we don't see how forms behave alone as Aristotle believed matter and form must exist together. Recall that the relationship between matter and form is asymmetrical, so when I see a kitten become a cat I should conclude that the form is responsible for this changing state of matter.

Strictly speaking, from a logic of formal identity, at the second moment it is not the same thing as it was at the first moment. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let us suppose that a toddler has a Rubik's cube in her hands and that the toddler messes with the Rubik's cube and alters the arrangement of the Rubik's cube, for a period of time. Because the arrangement of the matter at t2 is not identical to the arrangement of matter at t1, we should conclude that, after the toddler is tired of messing with the arrangement of the Rubik's cube, a new Rubik's cube is in the hands of the toddler,? Given that the substance of the Rubik's cube is a composite of form and matter and that the matter is the only thing that we see change, why should the Rubik's cube change its identity when it is being altered? Unless we start qualifying what it means for a substance's matter to be a substance's matter, why does the spatial arrangement of the Rubik's cube's "matter" determine whether the Rubik's cube is the same as it was before the toddler's manipulation?

The idea that it is logically necessary that these are two distinct things, provided fodder for sophistry and paradoxes of infinite regress — Metaphysician Undercover

Form and matter are not identical to each other so, in regards to each other, they are distinct things, but they both are part of a substance and make up the substance. However, from your previous sentence, it seems that Aristotle wanted to say that although a thing's matter changed, such as Theseus' ship, it does not mean that the thing itself was altered. Although it may be counter-intuitive to say that a thing does not persist as time passes, just because it sounds unintuitive to deny the identity of the ship, as it changes its matter, that does not sound like a good reason to conclude that the ship is the same ship. What other, hopefully, more rigorous argument does Aristotle give?

So Aristotle wanted a law of identity which would corroborate our observed experience, and allow that one and the same thing could have temporal extension despite the fact that changes occur to that thing during the time of its existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, it looks like my suspicion was correct. It looks like Aristotle operates on the most naive form of experientialism. Why assume that our experience of the actual state of affairs is an accurate representation of the actual state of affairs?

So he posited "matter" as the underlying thing which does not change, providing for the observed temporal continuity of existence of a thing, — Metaphysician Undercover

When you say, "does not change" do you mean to say that matter does not come into or out of being or that matter is static? I have heard that Aristotle subscribed to a relational theory of time and if Aristotle really believed that matter did not change, then that would suggest that matter is timeless.

despite the fact that the thing's form is continually changing. — Metaphysician Undercover

If an apple is a substance, and a substance is a composite of matter and form, then I only experience a change in the substance's matter when I cut the apple in half with a knife. I don't experience a change in the substance's form.

Do you think modern physics has undermined the matter of Aristotle? I gave an example of how matter itself alter's the nature of matter (e.g. shoot protons into a carbon atom and you will get an atom with different behavior)?

For Aristotle, what makes a gold nugget a gold nugget is the form of gold and what makes the silver nugget a silver nugget is the form of silver, but what can be said specifically about matter in Aristotle's metaphysics? — Walter Pound

Aristotle's forms seems to be that which distinguishes one substance from another.

Could Aristotle's form be translated as the atomic number of elements, by extension, the molecular constituents of compounds and ratios of mixtures?

I don't think so since forms make matter what it is.
In modern science, matter is not impotent and matter itself determines its behavior. Consider when a magnet attracts some metal only when the metal is magnetized, this is a change of matter's behavior using only matter.

I don't think so since forms make matter what it is. — Walter Pound

Aristotle: Form makes matter
Science: Atomic number makes matter

So isn't Form = Atomic number?

Form makes matter behave a certain way. Atomic number is just a linguistic label for the number of protons in an atom, but are physical and so both should be considered matter.

Additionally, could you recommend me either videos or books on Aristotle that can help explain his thought to me? Thanks! — Walter Pound

I really can't recommend anything to you here, because I see so much variance in interpretation. The best is to read Aristotle yourself, but there is so much material it takes a long time.

This tells me what matter does and not what matter is. — Walter Pound

The problem with this question is that we really cannot say "what" matter is. This is because the "whatness" of a thing is its form. So any statement of what a thing is, is a formula, a statement of a thing's form.

If the form is not material, then why suppose that the form changes at all when time passes? We don't see how immaterial entities behave and we don't see how forms behave alone as Aristotle believed matter and form must exist together. — Walter Pound

The shape, size, colour, etc., all the descriptive terms which we use to explain what a thing is, are referring to the thing's form. All that we see, and in anyway perceive of the thing is its form. So we do see a thing's form changing.

Given that the substance of the Rubik's cube is a composite of form and matter and that the matter is the only thing that we see change, why should the Rubik's cube change its identity when it is being altered? — Walter Pound

The problem isn't quite the same today, as it was in Aristotle's time, because logic has progressed, and Aristotle did a lot for that. At his time, a thing was identified by the description of "what" it is, its form. So, the Rubik's cube at one moment, has a different description from the description that it has at the next moment, therefore the two instances of existence, are instances of two distinct things, the identity of a thing being given by its description.. Aristotle's law of identity is designed to avoid this problem. But the assumption is that the matter, of which the cube is composed, remains the same, therefore the cube's material identity remains the same, while the form of it changes.

Unless we start qualifying what it means for a substance's matter to be a substance's matter, why does the spatial arrangement of the Rubik's cube's "matter" determine whether the Rubik's cube is the same as it was before the toddler's manipulation? — Walter Pound

Under the logic in use at Aristotle's time a thing's identity was its description. Therefore if the cube had one description at one time, and another description at another time, these two instances could not be instances of "the same" thing.

However, from your previous sentence, it seems that Aristotle wanted to say that although a thing's matter changed, such as Theseus' ship, it does not mean that the thing itself was altered. — Walter Pound

The thing's matter does not change, the form changes, that's the point. Theseus' Ship is a more complex issue which mixes the two forms of identity.

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When you say, "does not change" do you mean to say that matter does not come into or out of being or that matter is static? I have heard that Aristotle subscribed to a relational theory of time and if Aristotle really believed that matter did not change, then that would suggest that matter is timeless. — Walter Pound

Yes, that's the whole point, matter itself does not change.

If an apple is a substance, and a substance is a composite of matter and form, then I only experience a change in the substance's matter when I cut the apple in half with a knife. I don't experience a change in the substance's form. — Walter Pound

When you cut the apple, you have change its form, by dividing it in two. All the matter remains as the same matter, but it is now in a different form.

Is matter eternal in the sense that it is timeless or is matter eternal in the sense that matter has always existed in the infinite past?

This is because the "whatness" of a thing is its form. — Metaphysician Undercover

Isn't the "whatness" a thing's essence?

The shape, size, colour, etc., all the descriptive terms which we use to explain what a thing is, are referring to the thing's form. All that we see, and in anyway perceive of the thing is its form. So we do see a thing's form changing. — Metaphysician Undercover

All those things that we experience seem to be features of objects. If so, then what reason does Aristotle give that there are actual objects of which they are the features; given that there is nothing that can be said about matter in itself, then why not just say that features are all there is- the bundle theorists could explain our experience without leaving things unexplained. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundle_theory

Is matter eternal in the sense that it is timeless or is matter eternal in the sense that matter has always existed in the infinite past? — Walter Pound

Matter cannot be eternal, Aristotle demonstrates this with the cosmological argument. Matter is placed in the category of potential, as being the potential for change in relation to the forms of things, which actually change. According to the cosmological argument, anything eternal must be actual. This means that there is no such thing as prime matter, matter without form, as the idea of prime matter, is unintelligible.

Isn't the "whatness" a thing's essence? — Walter Pound

Yes, essence is a form. And we need to distinguish "form" in two distinct senses. The thing's essence is the form of the thing, what human beings have within their minds, the abstracted essence. But each particular thing has a form proper to itself, in its material existence, making it the thing that it is rather than something else. The difference is that the form of the thing, which is proper to the thing itself, in its material existence, includes accidentals, whereas the essence of the thing, the form in the human mind, does not include accidentals.

then why not just say that features are all there is- the bundle theorists could explain our experience without leaving things unexplained. — Walter Pound

This leaves us with the problem of temporal continuity in a changing thing. At one moment the thing is "X" according to its features, and at the next moment the thing is something different, "Y", according to its features. These are two distinct things. Aristotle posits "matter" as an underlying thing which doesn't change, to allow for temporal continuity. At both times, the thing is the same thing "X", but having different features at each moment of existence.

These two posts in my opinion are models of clarity, thank you for that! But a question. In both you attribute motive to Aristotle

So Aristotle wanted a law of identity which would corroborate our observed experience.... So he posited "matter" as the underlying thing which does not change, providing for the observed temporal continuity of existence of a thing, despite the fact that the thing's form is continually changing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Aristotle's law of identity is designed to avoid this problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

My reading of Aristotle. thin enough to be nearly transparent, did not cover anything so deliberate and conscious as his identifying such a problem and trying to resolve it tactically. I'm not arguing here or even asking for citation. But can you expand even a little on that part of Aristotle's thinking? I think of him as mainly an observer and secondarily a thinker about what he has observed.

I think you're confusing metaphysics with physics. Matter and form are metaphysical principles that explain the structure, not the details of reality. The metaphysical theory of matter and form is not intended as a substitute for modern chemistry or physics, but constitute the framework that provides the intellectual preconditions for all inquiry. When it comes to chemical compounds, the material constituents (protons, electrons, etc.) are the "matter", whereas the particular arrangement of those constituents are the "form" of the compound. In this sense, matter and form can be seen as relative concepts that can be arranged hierarchically. An individual proton is "matter" with respect to a chemical compound, but is a substance (with it's own substantial form) in it's own right with regard to the quarks that make it up. Aristotle does posit an absolute concept of matter, called prime matter, which is pure potentiality, and absolute form/actuality was posited as God.

In fact, since Aristotle assigned potentiality to matter that forms actualize, it is worth examining whether there is good empirical data to support that view of matter. Empirical data demonstrates that matter is not as impotent as Aristotle imagined and that matter itself determines the behavior of matter. Suppose that you have a scientist insert 4 protons into a carbon atom, the behavior of the new atom (Ne atom) is unreactive and will not form bonds that carbon atoms would have; this new behavior is determined by other parts of matter and not by forms.

Matter cannot be eternal, Aristotle demonstrates this with the cosmological argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

Aristotle thought that matter was eternal and that there was a prime mover that made matter change.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eternity_of_the_world

Suppose that you have a scientist insert 4 protons into a carbon atom, the behavior of the new atom (Ne atom) is unreactive and will not form bonds that carbon atoms would have; this new behavior is determined by other parts of matter and not by forms. — Walter Pound

No, the behavior is partially at least partially determined by the form or arrangement of the particles within the atom. The particles taken as a group themselves behave differently depending on how they are arranged, so that behavior cannot be determined only by the particles themselves.

The particles arrangement is determined by the particles inherent physical nature. A particle with an electric charge will head towards a particle with an opposite charge and so on. This all can be explained with matter alone.

No, you also need the laws that describe how the particles arrange themselves upon interaction. You cannot deduce the behavioral properties of the whole from an analysis of the parts alone.

you also need the laws that describe how the particles arrange themselves upon interaction. — Theorem

Laws are descriptions of the regularities of nature; they are not prescriptive. They are not entities in themselves.

I didn't say that they are prescriptive. I said you need to invoke the arrangement of the parts in order to explain the behavior of the whole. A material analysis of the parts is not sufficient.