I said you need to invoke the arrangement of the parts in order to explain the behavior of the whole. — Theorem

And I said that the arrangement of matter can be explained with matter and gave an example of charge attraction. Forms seem superfluous.

For example, the arrangement of H20 is unlike the arrangement of CH4 and the behaviors of a large collection of H20 or CH4 are also different, but this can be explained with modern physics and matter.

I'm not denying that modern physics can explain the differences between H20 and CH4. I'm saying that the concept of formal cause is implicit even within modern science despite the denial of those who don't really understand what it means. Insofar as modern science appeals to concepts such organization, arrangement, regularity and structure it is invoking formal causation. It is part of what accounts for the difference between having H20 and just having two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom.

Insofar as modern science appeals to concepts such organization, arrangement, regularity and structure it is invoking formal causation. — Theorem

These words are only names for whatever is observed. They are all names of what matter is or does. You want to suggest that "arrangement," "regularity" and "structure" are not exhausted by matter and that these things must be evidence for something beyond matter and there is no reason for that conclusion.

It is part of what accounts for the difference between having H20 and just having two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom. — Theorem

A carbon atom has in itself the kind of charge that attracts the charges of four hydrogen atoms and an oxygen atom has in itself the kind of charge that attracts two hydrogen atoms; however, a Helium atom has no such charge that could attract hydrogen atoms and all this is inherent to matter and no "forms" are necessary to explain the behavioral differences between carbon atoms and oxygen atoms.

I'm saying that the concept of formal cause is implicit even within modern science despite the denial of those who don't really understand what it means. — Theorem

Aristotle describes matter as only possessing potential and it is the forms that actualize those potentials, but modern physics demonstrates that matter is not a hapless impotent part of reality, but an active participant in why matter behaves as it does; matter has causal powers that
determines how matter behaves.

These words are only names for whatever is observed. They are all names of what matter is or does. You want to suggest that "arrangement," "regularity" and "structure" are not exhausted by matter and that these things must be evidence for something beyond matter and there is no reason for that conclusion. — Walter Pound

The difference between the modern view and Aristotle's view is that in the modern view, matter implicitly subsumes form (which is what talk of structure, properties and behavior relates to). Whereas Aristotle makes the distinction between matter and form explicit in his definition of substance.

So the same world is being described, but they are two different frameworks for understanding it. On an Aristotelian view, an independent carbon atom is a hylomorphic substance and, as such, has identifiable characteristics and behavior. But note also that carbon is matter relative to a carbon-dioxide molecule, itself a hylomorphic substance that, in turn, has identifiable characteristics and behavior.

This is also what Theorem was explaining earlier. The main point to keep in mind is that the term matter is being used differently in the Aristotelian and modern frameworks.

The difference between the modern view and Aristotle's view is that in the modern view, matter implicitly subsumes form (which is what talk of structure, properties and behavior relates to). Whereas Aristotle makes the distinction between matter and form explicit in his definition of substance. — Andrew M

The difference is that a substance is a composite of matter and form instead of reality being composed of just matter.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/

On an Aristotelian view, an independent carbon atom is a hylomorphic substance and, as such, has identifiable characteristics and behavior. But note also that carbon is matter relative to a carbon-dioxide molecule, itself a hylomorphic substance that, in turn, has identifiable characteristics and behavior. — Andrew M

The problem is that few today argue that carbon is a composite of matter and form; instead, anything that extends in space is considered to be part of the physical world and is classified as matter. Additionally, few today will say that matter's potential is "actualized" by forms and that matter has no causal power of its own- this is why I referenced electric charges and chemical bonds as examples of how Aristotle got matter wrong.

So this statement:

So the same world is being described, but they are two different frameworks for understanding it. — Andrew M

is not correct since Aristotle suggests that "matter" is impotent and can only ever be under the influence of a form. There is an asymmetric relationship between form and matter that I can't imagine most physicalists subscribing to.

You want to suggest that "arrangement," "regularity" and "structure" are not exhausted by matter and that these things must be evidence for something beyond matter and there is no reason for that conclusion. — Walter Pound

Sure there is. If the arrangement of the atoms was simply identical with the atoms themselves then all arrangements would be identical. That's obviously not the case.

A carbon atom has in itself the kind of charge that attracts the charges of four hydrogen atoms and an oxygen atom has in itself the kind of charge that attracts two hydrogen atoms; however, a Helium atom has no such charge that could attract hydrogen atoms and all this is inherent to matter and no "forms" are necessary to explain the behavioral differences between carbon atoms and oxygen atoms. — Walter Pound

The behavioral differences are due to the number and arrangement of sub-atomic particles. The number and arrangement of the particles just is the form of each element. The matter is the particles, the form is the way that they're arranged. The arrangement and the particles cannot be identical, as discussed above.

Aristotle describes matter as only possessing potential and it is the forms that actualize those potentials, but modern physics demonstrates that matter is not a hapless impotent part of reality, but an active participant in why matter behaves as it does; matter has causal powers that determines how matter behaves. — Walter Pound

This is just a simple case of using the same words in different ways. Aristotle does not deny that material objects have intrinsic causal powers. In fact, this is exactly what he does claim! However, for Aristotle all material objects are hylemorphic compounds of matter and form. Matter doesn't exist in its own right. Form doesn't exist in its own right. Only material objects (i.e. substances) exist in their own right. To say that modern physics contradicts Aristotle's is just to misunderstand Aristotle's metaphysics.

If the arrangement of the atoms was simply identical with the atoms themselves then all arrangements would be identical. — Theorem

Again, what matter does is not what matter is. Suppose that there is a Hydrogen atom and that the hydrogen atom combines with another Hydrogen atom so that h2 is produced, the word "arrangement" is just a linguistic tool to describe what physical reality is doing, but what physical reality does is not what physical reality is.

The number and arrangement of the particles just is the form of each element. The matter is the particles, the form is the way that they're arranged. The arrangement and the particles cannot be identical, as discussed above. — Theorem

This is how Aristotle may try to interpret modern sub-atomic particles and atoms, but he would argue that forms of carbon actualize the potential of matter and this is so because of Aristotle's metaphysical framework where matter is just potential that is only ever actualized by forms. The question is why subscribe to this metaphysical framework in the first place? The debate isn't whether Aristotle's metaphysical framework can be made compatible with modern physics, but whether we have a good reason to even accept it when there are more parsimonious alternatives available.

This is just a simple case of using the same words in different ways. Aristotle does not deny that material objects have intrinsic causal powers. In fact, this is exactly what he does claim. — Theorem

Whatever is in actuality has causal power over whatever is in potentiality. Substances that are composed of matter and form have causal power over potentialities. This is not at all like stating that physical reality has causal power since physicalism does not entail hypomorphic composites.

However, for Aristotle all material objects are hylemorphic compounds of matter and form. Matter doesn't exist in its own right. Form doesn't exist in its own right — Theorem

So we agree that Aristotle is not simply stating that matter has causal power.

Only material objects (i.e. substances) exist in their own right. — Theorem

What you just called "material objects" are hylomorphic composites, but "material objects" can be defined as anything that extends in space. A planet is a material object, Methane is a material object and so on.

To say that modern physics contradicts Aristotle's is just to misunderstand Aristotle's metaphysics. — Theorem

If you assume that H2O is a hylomorphic compound or that protons and Carbon atoms are hylomorphic compounds, then you would be correct to say that modern physics does not contradict Aristotle; however, this would be begging the question. What reason is there to suppose that a proton is a composite of form and "matter?" Assuming that Aristotle is correct, then whatever one imagines matter to be, it cannot be protons, or quarks or electrons or any fundamental particle or fundamental force, since those things are all composites of form and some nebulous thing called "matter." What informatively can be said of Aristotle's matter is that it is a "thing" that is impotent and exists as a potential for which forms actualize and exists in an asymmetric relationship with forms since matter does not act on forms, but forms do act on matter.

The difference is that a substance is a composite of matter and form instead of reality being composed of just matter.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/ — Walter Pound

Yes, but the materialist is simply including the characteristics of substances (i.e., their form) in his definition of matter. It's only a semantic difference.

The problem is that few today argue that carbon is a composite of matter and form; instead, anything that extends in space is considered to be part of the physical world and is classified as matter. Additionally, few today will say that matter's potential is "actualized" by forms and that matter has no causal power of its own- this is why I referenced electric charges and chemical bonds as examples of how Aristotle got matter wrong. — Walter Pound

He didn't get matter wrong, he simply defined it differently. For Aristotle, the same empirical observations find their explanation at the substance level, not the material level. To a first approximation, a materialist's matter just is Aristotle's substance.

So this statement:
So the same world is being described, but they are two different frameworks for understanding it.
— Andrew M
is not correct since Aristotle suggests that "matter" is impotent and can only ever be under the influence of a form. There is an asymmetric relationship between form and matter that I can't imagine most physicalists subscribing to. — Walter Pound

Maybe. There exist substances (rocks, trees, people, particles) and we observe that they interact, change, and can be created and destroyed. In Aristotelian terms, this is a transition of matter from one form to another. Time is a measure of that, the direction of which is also asymmetric. So think of it as a state transition. The state (or form) of a physical system at one moment in time determines what will happen at the next moment in time.

My reading of Aristotle. thin enough to be nearly transparent, did not cover anything so deliberate and conscious as his identifying such a problem and trying to resolve it tactically. I'm not arguing here or even asking for citation. But can you expand even a little on that part of Aristotle's thinking? I think of him as mainly an observer and secondarily a thinker about what he has observed. — tim wood

Aristotle is more famous for his principles of logic than anything else. Long after his observational works were replaced by the modern sciences of physics and biology, his logic remained a respectable subject of study

There's a number of concepts involve in what I wrote, and the relationships between them are best explained in his Metaphysics. To begin with, there's at least a couple distinct places, one in his logic, Categories I believe, and another in his Metaphysics where he discusses the incompatibility between being and becoming, this is a problem outlined by Plato. If reality only consists of "what is", and "what is not" being and not being, then change, or becoming is unintelligible, as it escapes the logical principles of being and not being. When there is change, what is at one moment is different from what is at the next. You might say that change is in between. At each moment we have what is, and what is not, and this is different at each consecutive moment of change. If, when we posit something between the two states of being to account for the "becoming" (changing), we posit another state of being, then we have the same problem all over again, and we set up an infinite regress, never able to account for what happens between two states of being. What happens between is becoming, or change. Aristotle complained that sophists had taken advantage of this problem to prove the reality of ridiculous scenarios.

He discusses two possible resolutions. One would be to allow for violation of the law of non-contradiction to account for becoming. The thing could be, some sort of unity of what it is at t1, and what it is at t2, and also what it is not at t1, and what it is not at t2, all together, when it is changing from the first state of being to the second. The other possible resolution is to allow for violation of the law of excluded middle. He pushes for the latter option through development of the concept of potential. "Potential" refers to what neither is nor is not, it may or may not be. It is a concept derived from the way that we understand future events which may or may not be. It is not acceptable to assign true or false to a future event which may or may not occur (there is the famous sea battle tomorrow example). And, even if it comes to pass that the event occurs, it is unacceptable to look back, and say that before the event occurred, it was true that the event will occur. There is simply neither truth nor falsity to the subject, and I believe this is the basis for modern modal logic. Aristotle's might be a firm denial of eternalism. But positions like eternalism make change completely unintelligible, whereas Aristotle allows some fundamental principles in an attempt to bring becoming and change into the realm of intelligibility. Some modern positions like dialethism, and dialectical materialism, move to dismiss the law of non-contradiction, to deal with the reality of becoming. This stems from Hegel's dialectic of being, in which being and not-being are subsumed within, so as to co-exist within the concept of becoming.

So in Aristotle's physics, matter is placed in the category of potential. As the potential for change, it gives reality to, as the foundation for understanding, that which neither is nor is not, in the physical world. And, in his logic, the reality of a thing's inherent material element is implicit in his law of identity. His law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. Those who misunderstand the importance of this principle will dismiss it as a useless tautology. But this principle of identity removes a things identity from what we say it is (that's what contributes to the sophistry), and dictates that each thing has its own identity proper to itself. It's the grounding for realism. And, the particular thing, the individual, the material object, is what substantiates all logic. "Substance', in its most fundamental use of the term refers to the material individual, so that when it's not grounded in the reality of material particulars, logic loses its substance. However, the material element of the particulars, and this might be characterized as the accidentals, leaves a part of the particular as fundamentally unintelligible to logic.

Aristotle thought that matter was eternal and that there was a prime mover that made matter change. — Walter Pound

The unmoved mover is an eternal form, circular motion. He introduced this idea after the demonstration, in his Metaphysics, that anything eternal must be actual, formal. It is a faulty idea because the circular motion requires something which is moving, matter. An eternal motion without anything which is actually moving is incoherent. Then the matter (potential) which is moving would also be eternal, and this contradicts his own conclusion that anything eternal must be actual.

but what physical reality does is not what physical reality is. — Walter Pound

Right, they are distinct, which is exactly the point! Using your lingo, what a thing "does" (the way it's arranged) is just as real as what it "is" (the particles themselves). Look, if you want to deny the reality of form, go ahead, but you're just unwittingly throwing out all of modern physics with it. Modern physics is just maths after all.

The debate isn't whether Aristotle's metaphysical framework can be made compatible with modern physics, but whether we have a good reason to even accept it when there are more parsimonious alternatives available. — Walter Pound

Yes, there are good reasons. We've been discussing them already.

Whatever is in actuality has causal power over whatever is in potentiality. Substances that are composed of matter and form have causal power over potentialities. This is not at all like stating that physical reality has causal power since physicalism does not entail hypomorphic composites. — Walter Pound

Your mangling Aristotle’s metaphysics through your misunderstanding. Aristotle would not have denied that entities such as hydrogen and oxygen atoms have their own causal powers. It just that Aristotle had the good sense to realize that you can’t eliminate form from your ontology without courting absurdity. When Aristotle says that matter is the principle of potentiality he means something very specific. Hydrogen and oxygen are concrete, material particulars with their own causal powers. And yet, taken individually, hydrogen and oxygen atoms are only potentially a water molecule. That's what it means to say that they are the material cause of the water molecule. They play the role of matter with respect to the molecule H20 because something else is required in order for them to actualize a water molecule. The number and arrangement of atoms plays the role of formal cause with respect to the water molecule because the it is what the makes the molecule a water molecule as opposed to some other type of molecule. The physical interaction between the atoms that leads to the actualization of the molecule plays the role of efficient cause, and the physical laws that govern the behavior of the atoms plays the role of final cause, reliably “directing” the interaction toward a particular outcome.

If you assume that H2O is a hylomorphic compound or that protons and Carbon atoms are hylomorphic compounds, then you would be correct to say that modern physics does not contradict Aristotle; however, this would be begging the question. What reason is there to suppose that a proton is a composite of form and "matter?" — Walter Pound

Because denying it leads to absurdity.

Assuming that Aristotle is correct, then whatever one imagines matter to be, it cannot be protons, or quarks or electrons or any fundamental particle or fundamental force, since those things are all composites of form and some nebulous thing called "matter." What informatively can be said of Aristotle's matter is that it is a "thing" that is impotent and exists as a potential for which forms actualize and exists in an asymmetric relationship with forms since matter does not act on forms, but forms do act on matter. — Walter Pound

Sorry, but you’re just wrong. Aristotle’s definition of matter and form are functional in nature. As such, something counts as matter or form based on the role it plays with respect to something else. We saw this with the H20 example above. Hydrogen and oxygen are matter with respect to H20 because when combined into a particular arrangement/structure they form H20. Hydrogen and oxygen are only potentially H20, they need to be arranged in a certain way to actually become H20.

This really shouldn’t be controversial and only seems controversial because you’re failing to distinguish between physics and metaphysics (as I mentioned in my first post). Matter and form are metaphysical principles, not empirical entities. To treat them as empirical concepts is to commit a basic category error.

Right, they are distinct, which is exactly the point! Using your lingo, what a thing "does" (the way it's arranged) is just as real as what it "is" (the particles themselves). — Theorem

That does not follow at all; please google nominalism if you are confused about other possibilities.

Look, if you want to deny the reality of form, go ahead, but you're just unwittingly throwing out all of modern physics with it. Modern physics is just maths after all. — Theorem

Modern physics goes on fine without dubious metaphysics.

Yes, there are good reasons. We've been discussing them already. — Theorem

Your arguments fail since you conflate the is of identity with the is of prediction.

Your mangling Aristotle’s metaphysics through your misunderstanding. — Theorem

You are misinformed.

Aristotle would not have denied that entities such as hydrogen and oxygen atoms have their own causal powers. — Theorem

Aristotle would deny that matter, by itself, has causal power over forms; Aristotle would argue that the form of hydrogen actualizes the potential of matter. The hydrogen in the scientist's lab is not "matter" for Aristotle, but a hylomorphic compound!

It just that Aristotle had the good sense to realize that you can’t eliminate form from your ontology without courting absurdity. — Theorem

Question begging.

When Aristotle says that matter is the principle of potentiality he means something very specific. — Theorem

Agreed, as Aristotle interpreted matter and form, respectively, as potentiality and actuality. What a substance, the hylomorphic compound of form and matter, is is its actuality, but the substance has an ability to become its potentiality- for example, an actual caterpillar is a potential butterfly.

Hydrogen and oxygen are concrete, material particulars with their own causal powers. — Theorem

For Aristotle, hydrogen and oxygen are NOT "concrete, material particulars with their own causal powers." Aristotle believed that the essence of a thing was its substance and necessarily composed of matter and form; therefore, Aristotle would describe an atom, such as hydrogen and oxygen, as a hylomorphic compound of matter and form.

And yet, taken individually, hydrogen and oxygen atoms are only potentially a water molecule. That's what it means to say that they are the material cause of the water molecule. — Theorem

You want to identify the MATERIAL cause of the water molecule as hydrogen and oxygen atoms, but it is a FORM that makes something hydrogen and oxygen; indeed, it seems that all of what one would ordinarily consider as the properties of things are aspects of the form of the thing. Given this fact, what makes the cause "material?" Furthermore, you mention that atoms are potentially molecules, but surely what a thing is "potentially" depends on what it is ACTUALITY like and depends on the properties (or the aspects of the FORM) of the thing- again, I don't see what role matter plays here...

They play the role of matter with respect to the molecule H20 because something else is required in order for them to actualize a water molecule. — Theorem

Again, you just repeat yourself and you confuse the Aristotlean understanding of matter with a physicalist understanding of matter. No physicalist will agree with you that hydrogen and oxygen are just a piece of something like prime matter; that wouldn't make any sense...

The number and arrangement of atoms plays the role of formal cause with respect to the water molecule because the it is what the makes the molecule a water molecule as opposed to some other type of molecule. — Theorem

As stated already, what one might think of as the properties of a thing are aspects of the form of the thing. This really should show you that there is no way to ever tell when matter is present and when matter is not present- it just has to be asserted as the case. In truth, it appears that its forms all the way down to the most basic substances that make up reality.

The physical interaction between the atoms that leads to the actualization of the molecule plays the role of efficient cause, and the physical laws that govern the behavior of the atoms plays the role of final cause, reliably “directing” the interaction toward a particular outcome. — Theorem

Again, whatever one might think of as an efficient cause, say the electrons of hydrogen and oxygen, are themselves hylomorphic form/matter composites and it is the form of the electrons that determines what electrons are like; what a thing is potentially depends on what it is actually like so it depends on the properties (aspects of the form) of the thing. Your last point about the final cause is contingent on the truth of other parts of Aristotle's metaphysical framework, but that is the very thing in question and there little convincing reason to buy into Aristolean metaphysics.

Because denying it leads to absurdity. — Theorem

Aristotle's metaphysics is no help in avoiding absurdity.

Sorry, but you’re just wrong. Aristotle’s definition of matter and form are functional in nature. As such, something counts as matter or form based on the role it plays with respect to something else. We saw this with the H20 example above. Hydrogen and oxygen are matter with respect to H20 because when combined into a particular arrangement/structure they form H20. Hydrogen and oxygen are only potentially H20, they need to be arranged in a certain way to actually become H20. — Theorem

This is a nice sounding story.

This really shouldn’t be controversial and only seems controversial because you’re failing to distinguish between physics and metaphysics (as I mentioned in my first post). Matter and form are metaphysical principles, not empirical entities. To treat them as empirical concepts is to commit a basic category error. — Theorem

Not controversial? I am willing to bet that the majority of philosophers reject Aristotle's metaphysics and they clearly know that metaphysics can do well if it is empirically informed with science.

I am willing to bet that the majority of philosophers reject Aristotle's metaphysics and they clearly know that metaphysics can do well if it is empirically informed with science. — Walter Pound

All right then, how do your resolve the being/becoming paradox?

That does not follow at all; please google nominalism if you are confused about other possibilities. — Walter Pound

Lol...you were the one who said that what physical reality does is distinct from what a physical reality is. Perhaps it's you who is confused.

Modern physics goes on fine without dubious metaphysics. — Walter Pound

Still conflating physics with metaphysics, I see.

Your arguments fail since you conflate the is of identity with the is of prediction. — Walter Pound

Assertion. Feel to actually demonstrate this.

Question begging. — Walter Pound

No, I've offered reasons, you just haven't understood them yet.

For Aristotle, hydrogen and oxygen are NOT "concrete, material particulars with their own causal powers." — Walter Pound

Yes, they are.

Aristotle believed that the essence of a thing was its substance and necessarily composed of matter and form; therefore, Aristotle would describe an atom, such as hydrogen and oxygen, as a hylomorphic compound of matter and form. — "Walter

Right, and hylomorphic compounds (i.e. material substances) are concrete material particulars. For Aristotle, concrete, material/physical objects are hylemorphic compounds of matter and form. As it says in the very first sentence in the SEP article on matter and form:

Aristotle famously contends that every physical object is a compound of matter and form. — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

You want to identify the MATERIAL cause of the water molecule as hydrogen and oxygen atoms, but it is a FORM that makes something hydrogen and oxygen; indeed, it seems that all of what one would ordinarily consider as the properties of things are aspects of the form of the thing. Given this fact, what makes the cause "material?" Furthermore, you mention that atoms are potentially molecules, but surely what a thing is "potentially" depends on what it is ACTUALITY like and depends on the properties (or the aspects of the FORM) of the thing- again, I don't see what role matter plays here... — Walter Pound

You are once again overlooking the fact that matter and form are functional concepts. Hydrogen is itself a hylemorphic compound of matter and form, but it can also play the role of matter within higher-order hylemorphic compounds.

Again, you just repeat yourself and you confuse the Aristotlean understanding of matter with a physicalist understanding of matter. No physicalist will agree with you that hydrogen and oxygen are just a piece of something like prime matter; that wouldn't make any sense... — Walter Pound

Great, because that is not what I claimed.

Sorry, somehow I posted my response before I was finished. The remainder will follow in a second post below...

As stated already, what one might think of as the properties of a thing are aspects of the form of the thing. This really should show you that there is no way to ever tell when matter is present and when matter is not present- it just has to be asserted as the case. In truth, it appears that its forms all the way down to the most basic substances that make up reality. — Walter Pound

No, it can't be forms all the way down, or there would be no potentiality, and thus no change. There must be a principle of pure potentiality. I'm not sure what you mean when you say "there is no way to ever tell when matter is present". For material substances, matter is always present by definition. And we're not "just asserting it to be the case", we postulate prime matter because the alternative - no change - is absurd.

Aristotle's metaphysics is no help in avoiding absurdity. — Walter Pound

Yes it is.

This is a nice sounding story. — Walter Pound

I'm glad you enjoyed it.

Not controversial? I am willing to bet that the majority of philosophers reject Aristotle's metaphysics and they clearly know that metaphysics can do well if it is empirically informed with science. — Walter Pound

I willing to bet that the majority of philosophers have not studied Aristotelian metaphysics in any depth because if they had they'd realize that Aristotelian metaphysics has much more going for it than modern materialism, especially with respect to the empirical sciences. Having completed an undergraduate thesis in philosophy myself, I can attest to the fact that Aristotle's thought was not well understood by the majority of the faculty, mostly because they simply never took the time to seriously consider it (and I attended a university with a prestigious philosophy department). However, Aristotelian metaphysics is making a come-back within professional philosophy, mostly due to the recognition of the multitudinous difficulties facing modern materialistic/physicalistic metaphysics.

No, it can't be forms all the way down, or there would be no potentiality, and thus no change — Theorem

Change obtains because things are in motion. It could also obtain acausally or indeterministically.

Possibilities simply amount to a state not being impossible given contingent facts. "Potential" is often used with a more limited connotation a la possibilities that are statistically more probable than other possibilities.

Things like "principles of pure potentiality" don't exist outside of our thought.

Mighty fine! A model, again, of clarity. Thank you! Everyone should as in ought to read it. I think you're packing several weeks of a course on Aristotle into a few paragraphs. I accept it as ground for thinking about Aristotle's thought on this topic.

But I wonder if you are satisfied with it. Never mind what anyone knows or thinks they know 2300+ years after the fact.

As I understand your representation of his argument, it goes something like this:
"This thing here, this "X," I called X yesterday and I call it X today. Yet clearly today's X is not the same as yesterday's X. If not the same, then it changed. But if it changed, then what was X is no longer X."

On its face this seems merely a naming problem. Whether the kitten that becomes a cat or Theseus's boat, what they are called is a matter of convention and the understanding of language in context. I'm not telling or arguing, I am instead supposing that Aristotle would have figured this aspect out faster than it takes to write it.

(There is an interesting tangential discussion of his language. Greek tends to reify things. That is, I think that whatever his language gave him, it also presented some obstacles, but I imagine he surmounted them.)

Supposing Aristotle dismissed the naming - language - aspect of the paradox as trivial (which I think it is), that leaves his problem of accounting for change. No doubt he observed and was sensitive to change all around him: he could not have questioned the sheer fact of change. In standing beside a mountain stream he would have observed himself captivated by the turbulent inexorability of change flowing and splashing at his feet!

I'm going to make a jump, here, and suppose that he was not adequately cognizant of distinctions between continuous and discrete processes, although the mountain stream ought to have been suggestive. Your representation has Aristotle struggling to "get" from time t1 to time t2 in a "reasonable" way without falling into the abyss between them.

At this point I rule out any consideration of science after his time. To argue nuclear physics or quantum theory or the like as touchstones for understanding Aristotle's thinking I hold not an argument from ignorance, but rather from stupidity. But I digress.

It seems to me that invoking a concept of continuous process gets Aristotle from t1 to t2 in complete safety, sophists notwithstanding and in any case mere annoyances (maybe large annoyances, but annoyances nonetheless). The sparkling stream a his feet, the smooth movement of dancers, the wind even in his face, or his kitten that became cat; all these must have been suggestive: why didn't he take on their instruction?

If reality only consists of "what is", and "what is not" being and not being, then change, or becoming is unintelligible, as it escapes the logical principles of being and not being. — Metaphysician Undercover

As astute a mind as Aristotle's must have grasped this. Indeed did, inasmuch as he recognized a problem that he tried to solve. But his solution I find peculiar in that he retreated to metaphysics, the thinking about the thinking, and then apparently tried to make the μετα, the about which, the real. Had he remained in the physics of the thing, I think he would have buried the problem for all time. I wonder why he didn't.

Of course we have his problem's difficult descendant in quantum theory, in which the continuity of the discontinuity of things is resolved in probability.

Change obtains because things are in motion. — Terrapin Station

That's practically vacuous, like saying "things change because things change", for motion is just a type of change. What accounts for motion if potentiality is unreal?

Things like "principles of pure potentiality" don't exist outside of our thought. — Terrapin Station

Prime matter (pure potency) is postulated in order to explain substantial change. It's not clear to me how to explain substantial change without it. In my experience, appealing to "motion" won't get us very far.

What accounts for motion if potentiality is unreal? — Theorem

What happened to this part: "Possibilities simply amount to a state not being impossible given contingent facts. "Potential" is often used with a more limited connotation a la possibilities that are statistically more probable than other possibilities"?

C'mon, man, you've got to read.

Sure, that's fine. So you accept the reality of possibility as "a state of not being impossible given contingent facts", but you deny the reality of a "principle of pure potentiality". You think all change can be explained in terms of "things in motion". I disagree. I doubt that you can explain substantial change, the unity and identity of material objects, life, sensation or cognition in terms of "things in motion". I'd be happy to discuss any of these if you'd like, though you'd have to clarify your position by getting more explicit about what "things are motion" really means (e.g. what "things" are in motion, and what is "motion"?).

Furthermore, you asserted:

Things like "principles of pure potentiality" don't exist outside of our thought. — Terrapin Station

but never actually offered a reason for believing this. And please don't reply that "there's no empirical evidence" because that is just a category mistake, as was already discussed.

You think all change can be explained in terms of "things in motion". — Theorem

I don't think it needs to be explained.

At any rate, there's no way I'd get into a "Does this work/count as an explanation" discussion without you first giving your general criteria for explanations.

I doubt that you can explain substantial change, the unity and identity of material objects, life, sensation or cognition — Theorem

You'd have to make most of those terms not just gobbledygook first.

but never actually offered a reason for believing this — Theorem

The only reason we need is that there's zero evidence of extramental principles, or extramental abstracts period. That's not a category mistake. If something exists, there's evidence available of it.

I don't think it needs to be explained. — Terrapin Station

Okie dokie.

At any rate, there's no way I'd get into a "Does this work/count as an explanation" discussion without you first giving your general criteria for explanations. — Terrapin Station

Nah, I'll pass. I'm more interested in discussing the topic in the OP.

You'd have to make most of those terms not just gobbledygook first. — Terrapin Station

Those are all standard topics of metaphysics.

The only reason we need is that there's zero evidence of extramental principles, or extramental abstracts period. That's not a category mistake. If something exists, there's evidence available of it. — Terrapin Station

No sorry, it's a category mistake to expect empirical evidence for metaphysical entities.

No sorry, it's a category mistake to expect empirical evidence for metaphysical entities. — Theorem

The bulk of metaphysics is ontology. It's a mistake to expect empirical evidence of existents?

matter is the aspect of a thing which does not change when change occurs to a thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, not matter: substance.

It's a mistake to expect empirical evidence of existents? — Terrapin Station

No. In metaphysics, sometimes non-empirical entities are postulated because the denial of their existence leads to absurdities. It's a mistake to ask for empirical evidence for those.

I think you're packing several weeks of a course on Aristotle into a few paragraphs. I accept it as ground for thinking about Aristotle's thought on this topic. — tim wood

The truth is, I've had more than one course on Aristotle, and have written numerous papers on his work. There's a heck of a lot there to study.

As I understand your representation of his argument, it goes something like this:
"This thing here, this "X," I called X yesterday and I call it X today. Yet clearly today's X is not the same as yesterday's X. If not the same, then it changed. But if it changed, then what was X is no longer X."

On its face this seems merely a naming problem. Whether the kitten that becomes a cat or Theseus's boat, what they are called is a matter of convention and the understanding of language in context. I'm not telling or arguing, I am instead supposing that Aristotle would have figured this aspect out faster than it takes to write it. — tim wood

It's not just a naming problem though, it's a problem of getting an epistemology which is consistent with one's ontology. If it was just a naming problem we'd say that yesterday it was X and today it is Y. But this means that we have two distinct objects, X and Y. But we really believe, and our ontology follows our belief, that X and Y are one and the same object with temporal continuity, despite having changed. So for the sake of epistemology we want to say that it is two distinct objects, name them as distinct objects, and get it over with. But our ontology, and true belief, is that there is a temporal continuity, one object which is changing.

Supposing Aristotle dismissed the naming - language - aspect of the paradox as trivial (which I think it is), that leaves his problem of accounting for change. No doubt he observed and was sensitive to change all around him: he could not have questioned the sheer fact of change. In standing beside a mountain stream he would have observed himself captivated by the turbulent inexorability of change flowing and splashing at his feet! — tim wood

it is clear that Aristotle had great respect for the reality of change, that's why it was such an important part of his physics. The problem is that we understand "change" in a way such that some aspect changes, while another aspect stays the same. We do not understand it as a complete ending of what was at one moment, with a completely new beginning at the next. We understand that something persists, and stays the same through the change. So we have contradictory principles within the concept of change, one aspect stays the same as it was, while another aspect is not the same as it was.

It seems to me that invoking a concept of continuous process gets Aristotle from t1 to t2 in complete safety, sophists notwithstanding and in any case mere annoyances (maybe large annoyances, but annoyances nonetheless). The sparkling stream a his feet, the smooth movement of dancers, the wind even in his face, or his kitten that became cat; all these must have been suggestive: why didn't he take on their instruction? — tim wood

The problem is that "continuous process" was fundamentally unintelligible to the logic of his time. That's evident in Zeno.s paradoxes. And, I would argue that quantum physics demonstrates that continuous process remains fundamentally unintelligible. Aristotle posited "matter" as the aspect of reality which gives us the appearance of continuity. The problem is that this concept really tells us very little. It tells us that we observe a certain temporal continuity, but this temporal continuity is fundamentally unintelligible. Nevertheless, he posited "matter" to account for the temporal continuity which appears to us. Newton described the temporal continuity with what we call inertia, and now the inertia of mass has been replaced by the conservation of energy. But continuous process remains fundamentally unintelligible.

As astute a mind as Aristotle's must have grasped this. Indeed did, inasmuch as he recognized a problem that he tried to solve. But his solution I find peculiar in that he retreated to metaphysics, the thinking about the thinking, and then apparently tried to make the μετα, the about which, the real. Had he remained in the physics of the thing, I think he would have buried the problem for all time. I wonder why he didn't. — tim wood

The thinking about thinking is central to his ethics. The problems of metaphysics were far from solved, as they remain today, but Aristotle figured contemplation, thinking about thinking was the most virtuous activity.
,

Of course we have his problem's difficult descendant in quantum theory, in which the continuity of the discontinuity of things is resolved in probability. — tim wood

Right, the problem of continuity remains, but it is now in an evolved state. Probability is not a resolution though, because it cannot replace explanation.. Mathematics with probability brings us to the point of prediction. But being able to predict is far from understanding. Consider that Thales predicted a solar eclipse far before the heliocentric model was proposed. That's the power of mathematics, we can predict without understanding. The spatiotemporal map gives us the capacity to follow patterns, but it doesn't give us the principles behind the patterns..

No. In metaphysics, sometimes non-empirical entities are postulated because the denial of their existence leads to absurdities. It's a mistake to ask for empirical evidence for those. — Theorem

If they exist, then empirical evidence would be available for them--even if we haven't discovered it yet.

At any rate, what would you take to be an example of this?

If they exist, then empirical evidence would be available for them--even if we haven't discovered it yet. — Terrapin Station

No it wouldn't. You're just begging the question.

At any rate, what would you take to be an example of this? — Terrapin Station

Prime matter and substantial form.

No it wouldn't. You're just begging the question. — Theorem

Theyd have properties, right?

Prime matter and substantial form. — Theorem

What is it with there being so many Aristotelians on this board? Both "prime matter" and "substantial form" are nonsense, as is most Aristotle.

Theyd have properties, right? — Terrapin Station

They have characteristics, yes, but not empirically measurable properties.

What is it with there being so many Aristotelians on this board? Both "prime matter" and "substantial form" are nonsense, as is most Aristotle. — Terrapin Station

Yawn. More assertions and ad homs.

I'm all done here.

What’s missing in this debate (with some exceptions) is an appreciation of the historical dimension of the question. Aristotle’s philosophy was framed in the context of a different epoch. That doesn’t make it correct or incorrect, but what it requires is the effort to understand it on its own terms. Otherwise it’s being criticised on the wrong grounds - like, "horses are really dreadful motor vehicles".

What is not being appreciated, is that the OP is written 'post Descartes'. Descartes divided the whole issue along completely different lines to Aristotle. So from a post-Cartesian point of view, of course Aristotle's conception of matter doesn't make sense. But the question uncritically operates from a post-Cartesian point of view, which of course we nowadays all embody, without understanding what that shift in perspective really entails. In order to properly critique the Aristotelian conception of 'hyle' requires an understanding of the context in which such an idea made sense.