That wasn't a scientific definition of blue. I was just listing what things pop to mind and therefore are related to what people understand the concept of blue as related to it.

Those have to serve as a part of the conceptual foundation of the concept of blue even if they do not exhaust it.

THAT IS WHY I LISTED CONSCIOUSNESS after you all those SCARY science terms and left in the phrase ETC!

It seems your philosophical views are clouding you judgements here.

I don’t understand what you are really objecting to. I originally was noting that blueness cannot be defined just like temporality and space. You objected that we can and should give proper definitions of these; and I used blueness as an analogous example. You now are agreeing with me that blueness cannot be defined—right? It seems like you are noting that we can describe it to some extent—I wasn’t disputing that.

This response was merely a random rant that introduced nothing substantive into the conversation.

I don't think it is necessary and actually I think premise 7 depends on premises 3 and 5, not 3 and 6.

I completely agree. I realized, after making this argument, that I am really just arguing:

P1. Reality is either an infinite series of contingent beings or a series that contains at least one necessary being.
P2. Reality as an infinite series of contingent beings cannot exist (for each member lacks the ability to subsistently exist).
C: Therefore, reality must contain at least one necessary being.

Then we can determine it is one, absolutely simple, purely actual, etc. in the same manner.

I also realized that I am committed to the idea that there are infinite series’ of contingent beings because I believe that the representation of objects in space and time—by our brains—indicates (or at least suggests) that each object is infinitely divisible into smaller parts.

To say more, the argument necessitates either A. a simple part, or B. something other than the parts that the composed composition is composed of that is itself simple. In that case, any composed composition having infinite parts would itself require something other than itself, or its parts, for its existence, namely God.

Very true.

Blue is difficult to define. . . but it has to do with certain brain states, wavelengths of light, biological/physical interactions, consciousness, etc.

A scientific definition of blueness is not a valid definition of blueness. I does not account for the phenomenal property of blue: see Mary’s room thought experiment.

Define wisdom. . .

Here’s a quote of myself that elaborates on that:

“Philosophy” literally translates to “the love of wisdom”, and wisdom (traditionally) is the absolute truth of the nature of things (with an emphasis on how it impacts practical life as a whole and in terms of practical judgment). Thusly, philosophy dips its toes in every subject-matter; for every subject at its core is the study of the nature of something. Nowadays, people like to distinguish philosophy from other studies akin to distinguishing, e.g., history from science; but the more I was thinking about this (in preparation of my response to your comments) I realized this is impossible. Philosophy is not analogous to history, science, archaeology, etc. It transcends all studies as the ultimate study which gives each study life—so to speak. For without a yearning for the understanding of the nature of things, which is encompassed in the love of wisdom, then no subject-matter is sought after—not even science.

Some might say philosophy is the study of self-development, but this clearly isn’t true (historically). It includes self-development but is not restricted to just that domain. E.g., logic is not an area itself within the study of self-development and yet it is philosophical.

Some might say, like you, that philosophy is the application of pure reason (viz., the study of what is a priori); but is is equally historically false. E.g., cosmological arguments are typically a posteriori. Most disputes in philosophy have and will continue to be about reasoning about empirical data to abstract what is mostly likely the nature of things (and how to live life properly in correspondence with that knowledge).

This would entail that science is philosophy at its core, but is a specific branch that expands on how to understand the nature of things; and so science vs. philosophy is a false dichotomy.

Do you not have such a purpose in mind?
…
If your premises only seem possible, then your conclusion is still only possible- you won't move the needle of belief one bit.

My purpose is, indeed, to sway minds and to hear critiques of my position; but my point was that you were invalidly implying that my premises in the OP are proven merely as possibilities, which makes no sense. Every premise of every argument that is a proposition is possible (in some mode of thought); and so this is trivially true.

You're reversing the burden of proof.

I don’t have the burden of proof to demonstrate how knowledge can exist in something absolutely simple: like I said before, the OP demonstrates that knowledge must exist in something absolutely simple—not how that happens.

Wrong. The argument I stated explicitly referred to God.

Yes, that is true; but that “God” being imported in was just the absolutely simple being I was referring to before.

My position is that it is most likely metaphysically impossible and I explained why

That’s fine, and I think, for what it is worth, is a reasonable rejoinder. My point is that it sidesteps the discussion.

Think about it, if you are right that a being with knowledge cannot be absolutely simple; then one of my premises in the OP—which does not argue for how it works—must be false; but yet you have never once pointed to what premise or premises that is or are.

acknowledged it's logically possible, but possibility is cheap. You need to provide a compelling reason to think it is metaphysically possible.

It is right here:

20. Intelligence is having the ability to apprehend the form of things (and not its copies!).
21. The purely simple and actual being apprehends the forms of things. (19)
22. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being must be an intelligence.

It is physically impossible to store complex data without parts.

First of all, what is complex data? That suggests that there is a sort of simple data that can be stored without parts (:

Secondly, I agree that it is physically impossible...that just means it cannot happen in accordance with things governed by physics. God is beyond physics.

all the premises need to be true - including the unstated ones
…
8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17 - not sure of, 18, 20 21, 23, 27, 28, 34. I also disagree with the inferences in 11,14, 19, 24, 29, 31 32, 35, 38,
39, 41, and 42 because they are based on false premises.

I understand what you are saying, and I see that the idea of knowledge being imparted to an absolutely simple being epistemically counts against the theory for you; but that’s too many premises for me to talk in one response! Pick one, and we will dive in.

all existing objects have properties, so it follows from this that it cannot exist.

I already demonstrated this is false. This is non sequitur: you cannot say that something is impossible because we have no example of it. That’s illogical. Impossibility is a mode of thought whereby something violates some principle determinable relative to that mode. Lacking examples is not a violation of that mode.

I said two objects could have the same intrinsic properties

Which, again, makes them non-simple.

I said essentially the same thing in my first post: every argument depends on questionable metaphysical assumptions. Since you more or less agree, why bother presenting it?

Because that is nonsense. That could be posited for every argument for everything: do you say “why bother” for everything else?

You didn't need to introduce a new set, as everything was in the U1 and U2 sets.
…
U1 = A -> B -> C
U2 = infinite regress -> C
…
This is the set of all causal relations in the the universe Bob, not set of all things.

The universe is not itself identical to the the set of all things nor the set of all causality per se: which are you referring to, if either?

Assuming we are talking about the universe, then we are talking about cosmology; which is about whether or not we think the universe itself is contingent or not (ultimately). The minute you abstract further than that—which is required for your proof in the OP—one ends up in a broader discussion of ontology which will result in discussion the sets that I was discussing before.

I'm noting that if you extend the causality to its entire scope, you will reach a point where it is inevitably uncaused

The problem is that you are not clearly defining to yourself what you are quantifying over in this set. You said it was the universe, and now you are saying it is the entirety of causal things—which is C in my abstractions and not A. You are still conflating A and C; but you are adding into the mix U which is irrelevant to the discussion. U itself is not in principle identical to C or A, and it does not allow for any discussion of the totality of causes (C).

A set of infinitely regressive causality could itself be just as real and lack any explanation for its existence as a set of finite regressive causality.

The members would be real, the set would not; and your argument depends on the set itself being treated as real like its members. Again, and to which you never responded, the members sufficiently explaining each other makes the entire set sufficiently explained; and, thusly, the set itself is not uncaused in the sense of causing the members.

But I am not saying R is A, so I don't think this applies. Remove A from the notion, which I am not including, and I'm not sure my abstraction is invalid. Try again without A being involved and see if your claim still holds.

I never said you did.

The problem is that either U (1 or 2) is a member of C and A; or is a member of only A. There is no third option, Philosophim; viz., either this ‘universe’ is contingent and a member of the set of causal things, C, or it is not contingent and is a member of the totality of things, A, but is not a member of the set of causal things, C. Your idea of U just muddies the waters, since you are trying to argue that ontologically we can determine that all causal things are uncaused by way of abstraction of the totality of caused things (C).

There is a problem with the argument I stated: it assumes God exists.

It presupposes that we are talking about an absolutely simple being—that’s it. You asked about how an absolutely simple being could have properties (like omniscience) which presupposes in the very question that we are talking about such a being.

To then use the conclusion to support an argument for God's existence entails the circularity I was referring to

The argument I was commenting on was your argument, which was:

1.God is omniscient (possesses all possible knowledge)
2. God is simple;
3. Therefore knowledge doesn't entail parts

This argument you gave is not circular: it does not presuppose the conclusion in any of its premises. Likewise, my OP’s argument never presupposes God’s existence as a premise—not even in part.

You brought up the fact that it's possible knowledge can exist without parts or complexity.

It is logically possible because it violates nothing in logic; it is actually possible because it violates nothing in physics; and it is metaphysically possible because it does not violate the natures of things.

The problem is that you are saying it is impossible; and that requires that you demonstrate why it violates one of these three aforesaid modalities (or pick your own modality if you will).

The question is whether or not the argument in your Op provides good reason to think it's more than merely possible.

First of all, this negates your first point, because you are implying that the OP gives good reasons to believe that is possible (which you said was problematic before).

The OP doesn’t argue for the possibility of God’s existence: it argues that God does exist.

Consider that it's possible that physicalism is true: would you consider an argument for physicalism compelling if it's premises were based on entailments of physicalism?

That depends on what you mean by “entailments of physicalism”. Every argument comes in with metaphysical assumptions: I don’t think physicalism is any different in this regard. What I would do is provide counter arguments to the premises that I disagree with and perhaps for the assumptions that I disagree with so that I could have a productive conversation with them.

In this OP, it is demonstrated that it is possible for a being to not have parts and have knowledge only insofar as it was demonstrated that an absolutely simple being exists and that it must apprehend the forms of things (in abstracta).

Someone could come around and offer a rejoinder that we have good reasons to believe that a being which has knowledge must have parts; and I am more than happy to entertain that. However, my problem with you is that the closest argument I have gotten from you for this is essentially:

P1. If every example we have of A requires B, then A always requires B.
P2. Every example we have of a being with knowledge has parts (which facilitate its capacity to know).
C: Therefore, A being with knowledge must have parts.

I deny P1. Impossibility—in whichever modality we are referring to—is demonstrated by showing that the existence of the thing would entail a violation of that mode (e.g., it is actually impossible to jump to the moon from earth because it violates physics, it is logically impossible for a proposition to be both true and false because it violates the LNC, etc.). That we don’t have any other examples of a thing, does not entail that it is impossible for it to exist.

This is also a cop-out, because this absolutely simple being is unique: so there literally can’t be other examples!

Since you're presenting an argument, you have the burden of defending your premises

Give me the premise you are disagreeing with! Your critiques have not been about any of my premises: you are noting that you believe we have separate good reasons to believe something that is incompatible with the conclusion of the OP.

If your premises only seem possible, then your conclusion is still only possible- you won't move the needle of belief one bit.

That’s not how arguments work. Either one agrees with the premise or they don’t. To say it is possible that the premise is true is trivial to most arguments: that just means it is a proposition.

You're rationalizing your theistic framework, not making a compelling argument. I described the way knowledge (and willing) exists in the real world - there is a physical basis.

I am explaining to you how this being has no properties proper; and that just because we have no examples of something other than itself, it does not follow that it cannot exist.

This just shows that your argument depends on a specific ontological model.

What premise do you deny in the OP? The argument is pretty clear.

My key point is that you've given no reason to think multiple properties is equivalent to a single property.

Ah, yes, I have not; because they aren’t multiple properties and I have been focusing on getting you to see the issues with your critiques before trying to explain in detail how these analogical properties of God’s are identical with himself. I’ll do that once we find common ground with the above.

Every particular has at least one part. Everything that exists is a particular:

A part is something that makes up the whole; so it cannot be identical to the whole; and your argument here assumes that they can be identical. A part that is identical to the whole is not a part: it is just the itself.

It's a relational property, not an intrinsic property. Again: we're applying different metaphysical assumptions.

That’s fine, as long as you explain what you mean by your terminology.

I'm just pointing out that your argument depends on your preferred metaphysical system being true

Literally every argument for anything is guilty of this: that is a trivial note and I never argued to the contrary.

Irrelevant. I believe there has to be a bottom layer of reality, consisting of indivisible objects. You should at least agree this is logically possible- that's all I've claimed

Ehhh, it might be logically possible; but it is definitely not actually possible.

Considering the first cause would be the first part of causality, A -> B, isn't A part of the set of causality?

No. The set contains all caused things. Now, like I said before in the other thread, you could quantify over the set of all things simpliciter and then your argument would work but be trivial.

But what I'm doing is looking at the entire set. In the case of U1, the first cause is the first part of the set. So when I ask, "What caused U1?", the answer is that the first cause existed without prior causation, then caused other things

What you are describing is not the set of causality (viz., of caused things) but, rather, the set of all things; and you are right that this set, U1, is uncaused.

The reason you end up with a trivial conclusion is that you are abstracting like this for other options for causal series (such as infinite regression) and conflating it with explaining the set of caused things.

How is my abstraction invalid?

Let’s call the set of caused things C, the set of all things A, a first cause to C F, an infinite circularity O, a self-cause of C S, a necessary cause of C N, and an infinite regression R.

The debate in metaphysics, ontology, which your OP claims to solve, is about C not A. What needs be explained is the causality which we see around us and so we abstract out how this causality would work; so we ask “is there a first cause?” and what not, but this refers to the abstraction of the set of caused things—hence C. Subsequently, you end up with all sorts of positions about C; such as C being identical to R, being identical to a O, C requiring F, F being O, F being N, etc.

What you are doing is conflating A with C. You are noting that irregardless of who is right about how causality works, the totality, A, of all things is uncaused; and this is trivially true and has nothing to do with the debate. Moreover, more specifically, you are conflating a being that is uncaused with a set being uncaused: F, assuming it is of type N, is certainly not uncaused in the same sense as A nor R—for a set is not a being. A being that is uncaused is something which is real and lacks any explanation for its existence; whereas a set of real things is not itself real and lacks the ability to require any explanation in the first place—for what needs explaining are the things in the set of real things and not a mental abstraction of the totality of them. Thusly, if we say that R is A, then it necessarily follows that every real thing has an explanation for its existence—there is nothing uncaused in the sense of a real thing lacking any explanation for its existence. Saying that the set is uncaused is just to equivocate, because if we were to say it is uncaused then we mean it in a disanalogous sense of needing no explanation for why it is because it is itself not real.

Think about it, if every real thing has a cause, then every real thing has a reason for its existence; the abstraction of every real thing into a totality does not introduce a real thing which is uncaused: that contradict that every real thing has a cause (which we presupposed in the first place).

That is because you fail to actually define 'spatial' or 'temporal' so that is part of the problem.

They refer to extension and temporality respectively: they are pure intuitions—there is no way to define that properly, no different than defining the color blue.

As regards 'i', that is how all of philosophy including your own is constructed. You make something up and see if it makes intuitive sense or if its unintuitive how might you still intuitively motivate it.

This is a baseless assertion.

Philosophy is about extensive creativity and making stuff up without any requirement that it have anything to do with reality.

Philosophy is the objective study of wisdom.

:fire:

If I feel them in space, aren't they in that space?

No. Again, you cannot locate the pain in your finger in a literal sense. You are confusing the spatial reference in the phenomena of pain with the physical constitution of it.

My understanding though is that gravity is a bending of space from matter. So there is some interaction at the touch point of matter that spreads out.

My point is just that interaction—causation—is not strictly about physical touch. E.g., convincing someone to do something with mere words, electromagnetism, etc.

Can you give an example of how a being outside of time and space creating existence would work?

Of course not! It is impossible for humans to discuss in any substantive sense a thing which is non-spatiotemporal because we cognize in space and time. Also, it is worth nothing that if this OP succeeds, then this being—God—is uniquely in this position to create things from the standpoint of eternity….so asking for a different example is an impossible task.

We can invent any combination of words and concepts we desire. The only way to know if these words and concepts can exist outside of our imagination is to show them being applied accurately to reality.

I provided a proof of the existence of such a being in the OP. What you are asking is for, beyond a proof of its existence, an complete understanding of its nature; and I don’t think that is possible.

This is the point of the unicorn mention. There is nothing that proves the concept of a unicorn is incoherent

Yes there is; but let’s assume you are right: the difference is that the OP demonstrates why God exists—it does not merely claim that the concept of God is internally coherent.

A magical horse with a horn that cannot be sensed in anyway passes as a logical amalgamation in the mind.

This is just a straw man; for the OP gives an argument for how we can prove God exists from empirical data—so this is not analogous to an undetectable unicorn.

You're telling me an A exists and creates a B by essentially magic.

No, the OP is saying that B is composed fundamentally by A; and A is such that it must be the ultimate cause of B existing. I am not claiming to know how A is able to subsistently keep things in existence nor how it creates them. I don’t know how anyone could know that.

Again, you keep saying that any interaction between non-spatiotemporal and spatiotemporal things is ‘magic’ without any argumentation: you are just making an argument from ignorance. Likewise, I don’t believe you even believe this, because I think you would agree that physics has shown that space and time are not fundamental; so there must be things which are not in space and time which influences things within them.

Correct, its formation would be outside of causality. However, what it caused next would be within causality

Correct. So, going back to your OP, it cannot be that this is the same as an infinite series of causality which has no cause: that series having no cause cannot be equivocated with a first cause to a series (which is outside of it).

The point here is that once such a being formed, how do we reconcile that the universe necessarily came from this being?

A reconcilation implies that there is an incoherence, and you still haven’t demonstrated any incoherence. You keep blanketly asserting that ~”I don’t see how it could happen, therefore magic” or ~”I don’t think any of us knows how that works, so it must be impossible or incoherent”.

At that point we need causality, and we need some explanation for how A caused B

A causing B does not entail that A is caused; so there’s nothing incoherent going on here. A necessary being causing something contingent does not entail that it is contingent on that contingent thing.

A simple thing by itself does not constitute a whole. Therefore, in order to constitute a whole, the simple thing must subordinate itself to the composition of the whole in order to function as a constituent thing.

To say that the part is subordinate to the whole is to admit that the whole is real and independent of the parts; and I am not willing to accept that (I don’t think). It seems like, to me, parts make up wholes.

In order to relate the contingent to the necessary the necessary must be part in a relation. This is the dialectic of the master and slave seen in Hegel. The master needs the recognition of the slave in order to be master, which reduces him to a slave of recognition itself.

That’s different, I would say, because Hegel is talking about relations between two different beings (e.g., master and slave, individual and society, etc.) and NOT the composition of beings themselves. To say the whole influences the part is to accept some kind of realism about forms that I am now hesitant to admit.

U1 = A -> B -> C
U2 = infinite regress -> C

I don’t know what this is supposed to represent.

If there is a first cause, F, then it would be outside of the set of causality. If you were to say something like “why F has no reason for its existence: it is necessary”, then you would be correct; and there’s nothing about it that is similar to an infinite regress: a regress would entail that there is an infinite series of sufficient explanations.

I think you think such an infinite series of sufficient explanations doesn’t have a sufficient explanation because you are invalidly abstracting out the entire series and treating it like an object.

I apologize for the belated response: I intended to respond earlier but got busy and forgot.

1.God is omniscient (possesses all possible knowledge)
2. God is simple;
3. Therefore knowledge doesn't entail parts

I don’t see anything unreasonable about this argument. You seem to be noting that all the examples we have of beings with knowledge also have parts: that is true. However, this does not entail that a being could not exist which has knowledge and doesn’t have parts. The problem I have is that you are presupposing that a being with knowledge must have parts without giving any sort of argumentation for that.

You've identified no "primitive knowledge" that exists independent of a physical medium. My willing entails physical processes (e.g. neurons firing in a sequence based on action potentials that could be established either by learning, or be "hard wired") in a brain

That is why God is attributed—or more accurately just is—these properties analogically. I am not claiming that God has, e.g., a will the same as ours.

You seem to be doing a literal equivocation between the usages of these properties when the OP is outlining analogical equivocation—nothing more.

A plant certainly isn't making a decision - it's growth is entirely a result of its physiological mechanisms, expending energy in the most entropically favorable way.

I was using it as an example of willing in a more primitive sense: the plant is willing—just not in the sense of willing like a human.

I claimed there was circular reasoning in your statement,"although you are right that a being with one property is simpler than a being with more than one; my rebuttle is that God’s properties are reducible to each other." And you're correct that you haven't stated a strictly circular argument (I'm making an assumption that you chose to equate multiple properties with a single property to rationalize your claim that God is "simple")

That’s still not what circular reasoning is! Even if I ad hoc rationalized my position by saying God’s properties are identical, that would not imply that I am presupposing the truth of the conclusion in a premise.

You've given no argument at all, and haven't articulated the rationalization I assumed. So I can certainly be wrong.

If the OP succeeds, then we know there is an absolutely simple being with these attributes (insofar as we analogize it); and so it follows that this being’s attributes must be literally identical. God cannot be said to “have omniscience” or “be omnipotent” but, rather, is omniscience or is omnipotence; for an absolutely simple being cannot have parts and to have literally separate properties is to imply a thing has parts—a simple being is one and the same with itself with no real distinctions.

To be clear, I'm referring to intrinsic properties, not just attributes we talk about.

I am not sure what you mean by “intrinsic properties”, but assuming you mean something like “properties a thing has independently of what we say it has” then I would say God has no properties: that’s the whole point of being absolutely simple.

No, it doesn't. It just assumes individual up-quarks exist as particulars, and that (generically) "up-quark" is a universal (it exists in multiple instantiations)

Think about it: how can a being which has no parts exist as a particular? That would imply that it has some property which is distinct from any others of that particular; and this implies it has parts (for no absolutely simple thing can have properties proper—since it is literally one thing with no distinctions). What I am trying to get you to see, is that this philosophically makes no sense even if we posit it for the sake of science—just as much as the square root of -1 is not a real number but we use it in math anyways.

Individual up-quarks are distinguishable at a point of time by their spatial location.

That is a property that one has that the other doesn’t; which implies it has parts. Likewise, anything in space and time is infinitely divisible, which implies that all spatiotemporal things are made up of parts.

Moreover, yes, I do not see any contradiction with the idea that a composed being which is spatiotemporal must be infinitely divisible and yet ontologically be comprised ultimately by one singular non-spatiotemporal thing. (:

Then you have an incorrect understanding. They are part of the standard model of particle physics, which is an active field of research. I'm not insisting they are actually the most fundamental level of reality (quantum field theory treats them as disturbances in fields), but all macro objects in the universe have quarks as part of their composition.

Sure, but we also thought atoms were absolutely simple and it was very attractive at the time. Science uses models to map reality—irregardless if the model is actually true.

Again:

No, the uncaused thing would be the limit inside of that totality.

I will quote myself from the previous thread:

Anytime you get to a point in which there is something which has no prior causation for its being, then it is outside of causality.


I am glad you said this, because this was what I was going to point out in the other thread discussion we are having, as I wasn’t sure if you agreed or not. If there is a first cause, then it has no prior causation for its being; so, by your own logic, it resides outside of the totality of causal things (viz., outside of causality). Your argument in your OP you said is arguing that there is no cause for the totality of causal things and that a first cause would be in that totality; but this contradicts what you just said above.

But you feel them in space.

We are talking about if they are in space—not if you feel them in space.

The definition of interaction is a touch from one thing to another

Ok, then you are using the term ‘interaction’ much more strictly than I was. E.g., the gravitational pull of the sun on the earth is an interaction (in a looser sense) without there being touch.

Again, I don't know of any definition of interaction that is not some connection and imparting between two things.

Yes, that is true; and I am saying you haven’t demonstrated why it is incoherent to believe that something outside of space and time cannot have some connection with things which are spatiotemporal. You just keep blanketly asserting it; and this sort of interaction does not imply physical touch (as seen above in my sun example).

or something that has never been discovered before like a unicorn.

This is a straw man. We have no evidence that a unicorn exists and it would blatantly defy physics: nothing about God is analogous to that.

A -> B, A is necessary for B to exist

Material implication does not create a biconditional: A → B just means that when A is true, then B is true as well—it does not mean that when B is true A must be true.

Anytime you get to a point in which there is something which has no prior causation for its being, then it is outside of causality.

I am glad you said this, because this was what I was going to point out in the other thread discussion we are having, as I wasn’t sure if you agreed or not. If there is a first cause, then it has no prior causation for its being; so, by your own logic, it resides outside of the totality of causal things (viz., outside of causality). Your argument in your OP you said is arguing that there is no cause for the totality of causal things and that a first cause would be in that totality; but this contradicts what you just said above.

First, I'm not using the phrase, "The totality of what exists" in the argument. I'm saying the entire scope of causality.

Well, that’s a huge difference! An argument that the totality of what exists has no cause is true (trivially) because any cause—be itself caused or not—would be included in such totality; however, that the totality of caused things has no cause does not follow these lines of thinking—for an uncaused thing would be outside of that totality. You would have to provide some further argument—and perhaps I missed it—for why there would be no cause to such a series.

And if it cannot have a prior cause itself, what does that logically lead to next? The realization that no origin is necessary for existence or can be impossible. If I say, "X origin cannot be possible," there is a reason prior why it would be impossible. Is there anything prior which could make it impossible, then of course it would mean there was a prior cause. A cause not only tells us what is possible, but also impossible. — Philosophim

If anything could happen, and there is no cause which would make any one thing be more likely than the other to happen, then they all had equal chance of happening.

I am not following: I think you are conflating causality a lot. Let me just explain what I am thinking about your position and correct me where I’m getting it wrong.

If we are talking about the total series of caused things, then your OP is arguing that such a series is either infinite or self-caused; but it cannot argue that there is a first cause. A first cause would exist outside of the series of caused things.
If it is infinite, then each member has a reason for its existence from the previous member.

If it is self-caused (notwithstanding how patently incoherent this concept is itself), then the being has its own existence explained through itself.

Either way, nothing is equally probable in the sense you described; for either the ultimate cause explains itself (viz., is contingent upon itself) or there is an infinite series of sufficient explanations.

If you posit a necessary being, then you would be positing a first cause; and this would exist outside of the series of caused things and would have no cause itself. This also would not entail an equal chance of things happening, for it simply would entail the existence of whatever it causes and it would be the sufficient explanation of those causes.

We can invent the concept of an infinite set of contingent beings. But that set is not contingent on anything else.

That doesn’t matter. That’s like saying an infinite series of gears rotating is possible because we can conceptually posit it and the whole series does not require rotation. The set itself is not an entity that you can manipulate like that. The set itself of contingent members is just a bunch of contingencies abstracted into a set: the set is not a necessary being.

Like I said before, the argument is on ontological parts. That could be in time and space or not; it doesn't matter to me. Some of the OP would have to be adjusted though, but I think most people are realists about space and time (so I'll leave it how it is).

So you assume some magical sort of knowledge is metaphysically possible in order to prove there exists a being who has it. Circular reasoning.

Circular reasoning is when a premise presupposes the conclusion as true: I didn’t do that. Also, why would it have to be magical?

Just think about how you will, and how this willing—even without what we stereotypically refer to as rational deliberation—is correspondence with at least primitive knowledge. Think of a plant growing towards the sunlight. I am just noting that we can see—by analogy—how a being can have knowledge and yet not be computating like a human brain or AI would.

More circular reasoning.

You clearly don’t know what circular reasoning is…

Every up-quark is identical to every other, except in its external relations to other particles, and they're certainly ontologically distinct.

This argument necessitates that an up-quark is not comprised of anything else and is non-spatiotemporal. Ok. But then there would be only one since there’s nothing ontologically distinguishing them. What you are doing is talking about separate quarks and thinking that since they are simple that they are absolutely simple.

Now, I understand they say quarks have no parts in science, but I don’t take that literally; as they used to say atoms were like that. Scientifically, we posit things as absolutely simple for the sake of science until we discover smaller parts. Philosophically, we can know that it is impossible for there to be a thing ontologically distinguishable from another thing which has no parts. That is absurd.

So what? You made assumptions that would entail a God. To be effective as an argument, you would need to use mutually agreed premises. You're just rationalizing something you already believe.

I was an atheist before this style of argumentation found its way onto my desk; so, you are grossly making assumptions here. Every premise is pretty clear and follows from what has been said (albeit a psuedo-syllogism).

Sorry, missed this reply initially.

No worries, and sorry for the belated response on my end!

Using the term phenomenal does not deny that feelings are located in our body and not outside of them.

What I am saying is that they are not in space like objects: if you cut open your arm, you will not find this feeling that is spread throughout your body. You are right that feelings can have spatial references to them, but they are not in space; for you would be able to find them in space like your neurons if that were the case.

True, but if something non-spatial is to interact with something spatial, it must at that moment of interaction become spatial. A purely non-spatial being cannot interact with space

Why? What’s the argument for that? Do you think everything, or at least everything that can interact with ordinary objects, is in space and time then? What kind of metaphysics of time and space are you working with here?

Saying it can is the same as saying a unicorn exists

We have no solid evidence that a unicorn exists, but if we did then we would be justified in believing it. The problem I’m having is that you are not contending with the argument in the OP, but instead are asserting that non-spatiotemporal beings cannot interact with spatiotemporal ones—what’s the argument for that?

I believe we're discussing this in the other thread now, but once you introduce the possibility of something capable of existing itself, you open the doors open to anything being possible.

So this is the same as saying that if it is possible for something to be necessary, then anything is possible. Why?

:up:

I appreciate your input, Relativist. Let’s see if we can find common ground.

knowledge = organized data;
data entails encoding;
encoding entails parts;
Therefore omniscience would entail parts.

It is vital to understand that omniscience in the pre-medieval sense does not entail a being with knowledge like a person has: God is not a person. Omniscience, rather, in this classical sense, would be knowledge in the sense of apprehending the abstract forms of things (being its first cause). Now this doesn’t negate your point per se, but I do need to prefix my response with this.

Now, I would say that I reject that encoding entails that a being must have parts; or that, perhaps, knowledge entails the requirement to encode/decode it. I think you are thinking of something like an AI or human brain, when God is disanalogous to this. God is pure will and being. Willing requires knowledge, but not knowledge necessarily in the sense of computation. In fact, I think that you are right to conclude that a being which computes cannot be absolutely simple.

A being with one property is simpler than a being with multiple properties, even if cannot be decomposed into more fundamental parts.

So, although you are right that a being with one property is simpler than a being with more than one; my rebuttle is that God’s properties are reducible to each other. Pure goodness is the same thing as pure actuality; pure power is the same as pure actuality; and pure actuality is the same as pure willing; and pure willing is the same as volition in correspondence with knowledge.

God doesn’t have multiple properties other than analogically.

non-sequitur. Two identical beings could exist, and a set of multiple "simple" beings (no parts) could exist with non-identical properties. Because of this, both of the following are non-sequitur:

But then you are saying that two things which are have absolutely no ontological differences are ontologically distinct!

This depends on Thomist metaphysics which I see no reason to accept (e.g. that an ontological object can have "actual" and "potency" as intrinsic properties).

I didn’t make an argument from change: I didn’t import that part of Thomistic metaphysics. My argument is from the contingency relations of composition.

:kiss:

Consider: when someone dies we can transplant their organs into other bodies, but we cannot give them an organ transplant to resuscitate them. For example, a heart transplant requires a living body, and will not work on a body that has only recently died.

I see your point; but I am thinking that wouldn’t the ‘being alive’ be a result of those parts interacting with each other properly? Viz., if you give a dead person an organ transplant and get their neurons to start firing again and what not then wouldn’t they be alive? A part of the physical constitution of a thing is the process which is has (e.g., you can have an engine with all the parts in the right place and yet it isn’t burning fuel [i.e., on], but if you know how to start it up then it starts working properly).

Well it’s not Aristotelian (or Thomistic). It misses what Oderberg calls reverse mereological essentialism. Or: yes, it doesn’t “account for” a soul.

Why would we need to posit one for this “reverse mereological essentialism”?

Do you have references to the places in Aristotle and Feser you are thinking of?

Here is Ed Feser discussing change: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sl3uoCi9VjI starting at 25:15.

What I would say is that the argument from motion begins with the premise, “Things are in motion,” and it concludes with an Unmoved Mover. What is unmoved would apparently “remain the same through time.”

Yes, but by ‘motion’ the medieval’s and pre-medieval’s meant any actualization of a potential and not locomotion. If you think about it, this would make sense; since for Aristotle (and Ed Feser) God keeps us in existing right now: they are not arguing merely for a being which started the locomotion at the beginning of the universe (or something like that). That would require this idea of a “hierarchical series” which is a per se series of composition which is analyzed in terms of what causes each thing to remain the same (e.g., Ed Feser likes to use the example of H20: the atoms that make up that molecule don’t themselves have any reason to be H2O—something else actualizes that and keeps it that way [and its the keeping it that way that seems to break the law of inertia]).

My point stands that there can be no conclusion to what necessarily must be the origin of the universe without finding direct evidence.

But that’s what philosophy also engage in. Metaphysics is reasoning about evidence—which can be empirical.

By reason, the OP proves that none of them are absurd or incoherent. No prior cause means no limitations
…
Its not moot at all because I demonstrate that their claim to God is no longer necessary, and that it has no more reason to be the origin then any other origin someone else can think of.

Again, this is an equivocation. When we discuss cosmology, it is about what needs to be explained (i.e., the things around us: the universe) and NOT the totality of what we end up having to posit. You are shifting goal post and then trying to claim to be at the original goal post: that’s not valid.

The conclusions I've put forward are from pure logic and reason. Can you demonstrate at what point my conclusions aren't?

The more I think about it, I think you are right that this argument—if I am understanding it correctly—is an a priori style argument; for you are noting that reason dictates that irregardless of if there is a first cause, infinite causality, etc. that the totality of what is real must be uncaused. So I recant my position on this point.

Again, try it. Put something forward that demonstrates a necessary origin and refutes the conclusions of the OP.

We have don’t have to try to give a counter-argument to know this argument is fallacious. You saying:

1. The totality of what exists could have a first cause, be self-caused, etc.
2. The totality of what exists, being such that nothing can exist outside of it, must be uncaused.
3. Therefore, whether or not the totality of what exists has a first cause, is self-caused, etc. are all equally probable.

The underlined portion is where the equivocation happens that is pivotal to your argument working and of which you are implicitly asking the reader to conflate (with each other); and, I for one, am not willing to. They are not referring to the same thing; and, not to mention, it is patently incoherent (for if this totality is uncaused then it is impossible for it to have a first cause, etc.).

EDIT: I think demanding an argument for the nature of the the cosmos is a red herring, but if you want one, here's a basic one:

1. Per se contingent beings lack the power to exist themselves.
2. An infinite series of contingent beings all lack the power to exist themselves.
3. Therefore, it is impossible for the cosmos to be an infinite series of contingent beings.
4. Therefore, there must be at least one necessary being.

The point is not that you need to accept that argument, it's that your OP doesn't negate anyone from validly engaging in this type of metaphysics.

Philosophy is more often then not the logical construction of concepts. Science is the test and application of those concepts

The definition of philosophy is a tricky and interesting one.

“Philosophy” literally translates to “the love of wisdom”, and wisdom (traditionally) is the absolute truth of the nature of things (with an emphasis on how it impacts practical life as a whole and in terms of practical judgment). Thusly, philosophy dips its toes in every subject-matter; for every subject at its core is the study of the nature of something. Nowadays, people like to distinguish philosophy from other studies akin to distinguishing, e.g., history from science; but the more I was thinking about this (in preparation of my response to your comments) I realized this is impossible. Philosophy is not analogous to history, science, archaeology, etc. It transcends all studies as the ultimate study which gives each study life—so to speak. For without a yearning for the understanding of the nature of things, which is encompassed in the love of wisdom, then no subject-matter is sought after—not even science.

Some might say philosophy is the study of self-development, but this clearly isn’t true (historically). It includes self-development but is not restricted to just that domain. E.g., logic is not an area itself within the study of self-development and yet it is philosophical.

Some might say, like you, that philosophy is the application of pure reason (viz., the study of what is a priori); but is is equally historically false. E.g., cosmological arguments are typically a posteriori. Most disputes in philosophy have and will continue to be about reasoning about empirical data to abstract what is mostly likely the nature of things (and how to live life properly in correspondence with that knowledge).

This would entail that science is philosophy at its core, but is a specific branch that expands on how to understand the nature of things; and so science vs. philosophy is a false dichotomy.

The problem I have with your understanding of philosophy vs. science is that it seems to be very verificationistic. The vast majority of what we know with the most credence cannot be scientifically verified. E.g., the nature of a proposition being a statement that is truth-apt; 1 + 1 = 2; a = a; !(a && !a); the nature of truth being such that it is the correspondence of thought with reality; the law of causality; etc.

The truth is that most of our knowledge is not scientific: they are evidence-based reasoning. They are probabilistic based off of our experiences; and this is not science proper—nor is it an imitation of science.

I would challenge you to demonstrate how science proves that a proposition cannot be both true and false; or that 1 = 1; or that knowledge is a JTB; or that every change has a cause; etc.

But there is no philosophical discovery at that point. There would be the discovery of whether there was a first cause, or infinite regress.

We can still do the exact same philosophical questioning of causes: your OP just notes that if we take the totality of what we posit as existing then that totality cannot have a cause; which is a trivial note. We still have up for grabs whether or not an infinite regress of causes is absurd; whether a first cause is arbitrary; whether a self-cause is incoherent; whether ….

Nothing about this OP negates any of this. You seem to be equivocating the totality of things which need explaining with the thing being used to explain it. E.g., the theist says there must be a first cause to explain the totality of these things which exist, and you come around and point out that God + those things is now the new totality which is uncaused—this is a mute point (by my lights).

The only logical conclusion is that we cannot know.

Ontology and metaphysics is largely not about a priori proofs; and so they have not been primarily about arguments from pure logic or reason. You seem to think that’s not the case…

If the OP is correct, then you cannot prove it to be impossible.

See, this is where you are equivocating. No, your OP does not entail that an infinite regress vs. a first cause of composition is equally probable: it demonstrates that irregardless of which one we think is most probable because the whole of things we posit (which includes that regress or first cause) cannot have a cause itself. Which is, dare I say, obviously true but not relevant to the debate.

When we debate cosmology, we are debating the comsos—the whole of what immediately needs explaining; and NOT the whole of what we end up having to posit as real. You are conflating these two.

The scientific ontological argument is still on

This is a contradiction in terms: ontology is philosophy, not science. Science cannot get at ontology, being merely the study of the relation of things and not the nature of things.

Is it the big bang? A God that made a big bang? Etc.

Yes, this is metaphysics which rides closely with science; as it should be. Most scientists are also metaphysicians whether they like it or not.

The different is it requires evidence, reason, testing, and confirmation

This is true of the vast majority of philosophy.

Try it. Try to show that any particular origin is philosophically necessary if the OP is true and see if it works.

What do you mean by "philosophically necessary"?

In my OP, e.g., I am considering actual impossibility as that modality relates to an infinite series of composition. Are you saying if a first cause, infinite series of causes, etc. cannot be proven to be logically necessary then it must be outside the purview of philosophy?

Let me take another stab at this: let me know if this is what you are saying. I think here's basically your argument:

1. Reality must be uncaused.
2. Therefore, whether or not the universe is a series of infinite causality or has a first cause is equally probable.

Is that it?

If so, here's my thoughts:

1. Ceteris paribus, it is correct that two or more things are equally probable if those things equally have no explanation for their existence; however, the probability of one or the other changes given our understanding of the universe.

2. Philosophy does not engage in merely pure reason; and so ontology and metaphysics certainly is engaging in reasoning based off of empirical evidence (to some large extent) and this is perfectly valid for it to. (I say this just because you seem to think philosophy would be mute on this study of causation since it requires empirical data to determine)

3. Philosophy, particularly metaphysics, is still the proper study of the nature of causality and as it relates to the totality of physical things. Science can't determine if the universe is just an infinite relation of causality, has a first cause, etc. because in principle there is no scientific proof which can be afforded; given that science presupposes that every change has a cause for the sake of doing science (and so every scientific experiment already presupposes the law of causality in the first place) and an infinite regress would be impossible to experimental 'sniff out' since each causal member would merely entail that causal relation and not the causal relation of the nth member.

The result means that it is philosophically impossible to conclude that any of these ideas are necessarily existent or impossible.

Why? I don't see how that follows from the OP. Again, all the OP seems to be saying is that totality of what exists is uncaused; but the debate is about the totality of the world in which we live (viz., the physical world).

The classical debate about the totality of the world in which we live is completely unaffected by your point.

Another way of thinking about, if you will, is that you are thinking of the totality of what exists too loosely and what needs to be explained in terms of causation is stricter sense of the things which exist in nature and in the universe.

The only way to discover if something was infinitely or finitely regressive is to actually discover this using science.

But I thought in the above that you were claiming that your OP has resolved the question about first causes, infinite causation, arbitrary causation, etc. as it relates to the universe---no? If so, then this is incoherent with that point; as science wouldn't be required to solve anything.

Anything could have been possible, but what actually happened can only be discovered by looking at our universe and determining by fact how it did.

Again, this contradicts the idea that you have resolved the debate about causation by pointing out that reality has no cause.....

I see what you are going for, but this entirely sidesteps the discussion of causality in metaphysics and ontology. When philosophers discuss whether all these things that exist are just infinitely causally related, self-caused, or have a first cause (or first causes); they are discussing the totality of what exists and how to explain them. You are jumping in noting something trivial, which is that irregardless of which philosopher is right the totality of existent things has no cause because that would include the first cause, self-caused things, or the infinite causality. No one disputes this, and this does not help further the discussion on whether or not causality is infinite, there are self-caused things, there are arbitrarily existent things, or/and there are first causes.

For example, taking my OP, my argument for a first cause---assuming for a second it is valid---is equally compatible with your idea that reality itself is uncaused just as much as a person who believes that causality is infinite.

EDIT: all your OP does, then, as far as I can tell, is forces the philosopher to be more precise with what they mean by the "reality" that one is trying to explain.

I guess my question would be: how does this help resolve any of the debates about first causes, infinite causality, arbitrary causes, and the like? Is there something about this that I am missing?

I don't think the self is made up of concrete parts: I think it is an emergent property of processes of the brain. Unless you are positing some sort of absolutely simple soul, then I don't think this is any issue for the OP.

The suggestion that an abstract¹ – "not concrete" – being has a causal property, or causal relation to anything concrete (e.g. is "a first cause"), is a reification fallacy and thereby a misconception of an abstract (i.e. "not concrete") being.

I don’t see how I’m committing a fallacy. God is real, but non-spatiotemporal. You are saying here that anyone who believes in anything non-spatiotemporal that relates to spatiotemporal things is a reification fallacy. So, I guess time itself existing is a reification fallacy?

A Third Option – in fact, demonstrated by quantum field theory (QFT) to be the case at the planck scale – that "composed beings" are effects of a-causal, or randomly fluctuating, events (i.e. excitations of vacuum² energy) as the entire planck-radius³ universe – its thermodynamically emergent constituents of "composed concrete beings" – happened to be at least c14 billion years ago.

I am not follow about this, but this sounds like it still has parts unless you are saying it literally remains existing by its smaller parts popping in and out of existence—is that the idea?

I assert that its conceptually possible for there to be two distinct extended simples which both lack further proper parts and are numerically distinct being merely separated by the void.

That's patently incoherent. You just said that two things exist separately in non-existence (i.e., a void).

Corollary point: how can a being be both? If God is omnipotent, he can do anything. If omnibenevolent, then ony good things. And then, of course, since God is absolute, what exactly is an absolutely good thing - are not good things good with respect to something?

Did you read the OP? I feel like you didn’t read it; because I outlined exactly what I mean by omnipotence and omnibenevolence and they are perfectly compatible with each other.

The point is the proof of the OP is just an exercise in word games which only works if the required understandings are already in place and accepted, I.e., presupposed.

If the OP is word games, then every argument is a word game. This makes no sense.

Even going back to the first premise, how can I be composite? I am identical with myself: if of parts, then wherein do I exist? And if a part removed, then no longer myself but someone/thing different

Without getting into identity over time, the point is that your body is made up of parts. If you disagree with this, then I can’t help you: it’s painfully obviously true.

The only thing is that the universe has no cause. I don't argue for a finite starting point, as time is only one aspect of cause. Its very plausible that an infinitely regressive universe has always existed. Why has it always existed? Did an X cause it to be that way? No, it simply does.

Got it; but doesn’t this entail that you believe that there are existent things which exist outside of time and of which interact, to some degree, with temporal things; given that the death of a previous universe to “fuel” the big bang would require “moments” where there is no time? Also, if time is reduced to a real entity in the universe (like the big bang theory does), then wouldn’t there have to be aspects to the universe which transcend it (or at least are on par with it)?

The universe did not come 'from nothing'. Nothing did not create anything. It doesn't come 'from' anything. It simply was not, then it was

This is incoherent. Either the universe arbitrarily came into being—which is what it sounds like you are saying here—and it came from nothing or it has always been: those are the two options for the position that the universe has no cause.

If it “simply was not, then it was”, then you are saying—to be clear—that it there was nothing and then there was something; which is exactly to say that it poofed into existence from nothing. The reason most people won’t get on board with this is because it is absurd. Something cannot just poof into existence from nothing: there cannot be nothing and then magically something out of nothing.

It simply was not, then it was. Or its always been

Which one are you arguing for? These are two incompatible claims.

The term 'first cause' in the previous paper was always to get attention to the topic when I was knew on these forums years ago, and really was a bending of the term to mean, "no cause". I rewrote this with the same conclusions without the attention getting terminology.

Fair enough.

Incorrect. Most of us look at only one side of the point that the universe formed without limitations. We often think about what can, but then still have some notion that somehow there is a 'can't' Why can't it Bob? If there is no X -> U, then there is also no X -> ~U.

To be honest, I didn’t follow this at all. Can you reword it? What do you mean (X → U) → (X → !U)? I am not following the relevance of that statement.

. There is nothing the prevents a God from existing, then that God creating the rest of the universe.

Yes there is under your view. The two options you have spelled out is that (1) the universe arbitrarily came into being (from nothing) or (2) the universe has always existed; and both entail that God cannot exist, since God is an unlimited being which creates the universe. In #1, God wouldn’t be creating the universe; and in #2 God would simply not be God since this being would be some sort of limited being within the universe (if we assume traditional theism, which is widely accepted as the standard of what God is in a mono-theistic sense). In #2, only a demi-god could exist as a mere being among beings in the universe, who may have much greater being than we do.

Why is there any more or less reason for a universe with an eternal God to exist then a universe with eternal rocks to exist? There isn't any

That’s going to depend on your theological commitments. Just briefly relating this to my OP, if one finds arguments convincing that God is required to explain the universe, then there are better reasons, all else being equal, to believe God exists as the necessary and eternal being than positing the universe itself.

Because there is no outside reason for any of those possibilities to exist or not exist. If it exists, it simply does.

Yes, in principle any being or series which is necessary and brute has equally no explanation for its existence; but the burden is on your OP to demonstrate why we should believe that the universe came into existence out of nothing or always existed. I am not sure what the argument is here. Going back to what I said earlier:

If you are claiming that the universe began to exist, then you cannot categorically encompass all of reality in the universe; unless you are saying it came from nothing—which I would say is just an absurdity (no offense).

Your argument in the OP seemed to be that we are just defining everything as in the universe; so there can’t be anything outside of it to cause it to exist. But this is just an equivocation: the universe usually refers to the natural world we live in and not the totality, per se, of existent things.

A theist could easily piggy-back off of your point and say that the ‘universe’ as you mean it is really ‘reality’ and reality, which includes God, has no reason for its existence but it is not a necessary being since it is just the abstract representation of the whole of God and God’s creation.

If this is what you mean by “the universe has no cause”—viz., reality has no cause—then that is true but trivially true and is detracts from any conversation about necessary beings. No matter if the universe, in the standard sense, needs a cause or not; it will still be true that the totality of things has no cause itself—irregardless if there’s an infinite series of causes or a finite series that bottoms out at God. Likewise, this would sidestep my objections above because God would not be limited by reality, since reality is just God’s infinite nature in addition to what God created (namely the universe).

Feelings do exist in space if you think about your own self.

The problem with your analysis of consciousness is that you are ignoring the phenomenal nature of it due to it being ontologically grounded in physical things. Hence why when I say a thought is non-spatiotemporal you respond noting that it is grounded in the brain.

Now, phenomenally, you are right that a feeling can be represented as linked to something in space (e.g., the pain in my arm); but the feeling is not itself in space. If you deconstruct, e.g., my arm, then you will surely not find the phenomenal pain which I am describing there—you will find neurons and such.

Once something is in space and time, even if it has no parts can we zoom in on it and say it has a front, back, and side?

That is impossible; for something outside of space has no sides. A side is an inherently spatial concept—no?

Also, ‘zooming in/out’ is also an inherently spatial concept.

Saying, "It would not have the power to exist on its own." wasn't built up to by any of the previous premises.

That is true, it wasn’t meant to be.

How does part composition relate to power?

Let me outline a brief argument for 5: let’s call it A5. As always, by “composed being” I am meaning a “concretely composed being”.

A5-1. A composed being is contingent on its parts to exist.
A5-2. Therefore, a composed being cannot exist by itself or from itself.
A5-3. Therefore, a part which is a composed being cannot exist by itself or from itself.
A5-4. An infinite series of composition, let’s call it set C, of a composed being would be an infinite series of beings which cannot exist by themselves or from themselves.
A5-5. In order for a composed being to exist, it must be grounded in something capable of existing itself.
A5-6. C has no such member as described in A5-5.
A5-7. Therefore, the existence, ceteris paribus, of C is (actually) impossible.

What is it for something to exist on its own, versus exist on something else?

Good question. For a thing to have the power to exist would be for it to be necessary—that is, not contingent on something else. For if it is contingent on something else, then it only exists insofar as it “borrows” being from that which it is contingent upon (insofar as we are talking about per se causation).

Hello again! I had some time to re-read the OP and give it the proper attention it deserves. Here’s my thoughts.

A cause is a combination of factors which explain why a state of reality is the way it is.
...
If we understand the full abstract scope, then the solution becomes clear. First, in terms of composition, if we're talking about composition that caused the universe, this would requires something outside of the universe. But because we've encompassed 'the entire universe' there is nothing outside of the universe which could cause it. In terms of composition, the universes cause would simply be what it is, and nothing more.

I don’t have a problem with your definition of a cause; but the problem is you seem to equivocate it quite frequently. I would like to clarify that, if you believe the the universe—as a whole—just is what it is with no explanation then the universe is not caused. It is not self-caused, it is not caused, and it is has no first cause.

Maybe I am misreading this OP, but I get the inkling that you are arguing—in various disparate spots—that the universe has no cause, it is self-caused, and it has a first cause. None of these are compatible with your claim that the universe just simply is.

The nature of something being uncaused by anything outside of itself is a new venue of exploration for Ontology.

Just as a side note, this historically is false. Many different fields of philosophy have been analyzing the nature of a necessary being and arbitrarily existent beings—such as theology, metaphysics, and ontology.

If it formed, there would be no prior cause for why it formed, and no prior cause for what it should not have formed. Meaning it could form, or could not form
…
But if Y formed in 'that way' without a prior cause of X, then it is not necessary that Y formed in that way, it 'simply did'.

It sounds like you are claiming that the universe did begin to exist and yet its beginning to exist has no cause—is that right?

In my mind, I thought originally you were claiming that the universe is just eternal and immutable itself with no cause.

These are two very different conceptions.

If we understand the full abstract scope, then the solution becomes clear. First, in terms of composition, if we're talking about composition that caused the universe, this would requires something outside of the universe. But because we've encompassed 'the entire universe' there is nothing outside of the universe which could cause it.

If you are claiming that the universe began to exist, then you cannot categorically encompass all of reality in the universe; unless you are saying it came from nothing—which I would say is just an absurdity (no offense).

If you are claiming that the universe never began to exist (viz., never ‘formed’), then it has always been; and this would entail no first cause.

4. But what about a God?

Yes, it is logically possible that a God could exist

Irregardless of which of the previous theses I mentioned you are going for, it is clear that God cannot exist in your view of the universe; for if the universe has no first cause then there are no necessary beings (which includes God) and if the universe just poofed into existence out of nothing then there cannot be any God which was prior to it which created it nor sustains it.

The only kind of God which would exist in your worldview here—dare I say—is a demi-god.

Ah, I see. So a being that is all-loving, omniscient, omnibenevolent, omnipotent, absolutely simple, purely actual, eternal, unique, one, immutable, and eternal is the thesis of classical theism. That kind of being is what is traditionally referred to as God. That's what theology centrally revolved around traditionally for a long time. There is nothing being presupposed there: it is just noting that what we just proved exists, is what we use the term (traditionally) "God" to refer to you. No different than how we can prove a car exists and then note that the thing we just proved exists is traditionally called a 'car'.

So, what I am trying to say is that the composed beings that are concrete are either composed of an infinite regress of concrete things or there must be a first cause which is not concrete.

None of the premises of your argument refer to "concrete entities" – goal post-shifting fallacy, Bob.

You are not being charitable. I am admitting that I used the term 'composed being' to refer to a 'concretely existent being which has parts' without realizing that it was too vague. I concede your point, which is valid, and am noting to you that the OP is only targeting concretely existent objects. The argument clearly makes no sense if it were to target non-spatial(temporal) beings like numbers, feelings, thoughts, etc.