• Philosophim
    2.8k
    I guess my question would be: how does this help resolve any of the debates about first causes, infinite causality, arbitrary causes, and the like? Is there something about this that I am missing?Bob Ross

    Yes. The result means that it is philosophically impossible to conclude that any of these ideas are necessarily existent or impossible. The discussion is in effect over for philosophy. The only way to discover if something was infinitely or finitely regressive is to actually discover this using science. Anything could have been possible, but what actually happened can only be discovered by looking at our universe and determining by fact how it did.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    The result means that it is philosophically impossible to conclude that any of these ideas are necessarily existent or impossible.

    Why? I don't see how that follows from the OP. Again, all the OP seems to be saying is that totality of what exists is uncaused; but the debate is about the totality of the world in which we live (viz., the physical world).

    The classical debate about the totality of the world in which we live is completely unaffected by your point.

    Another way of thinking about, if you will, is that you are thinking of the totality of what exists too loosely and what needs to be explained in terms of causation is stricter sense of the things which exist in nature and in the universe.

    The only way to discover if something was infinitely or finitely regressive is to actually discover this using science.

    But I thought in the above that you were claiming that your OP has resolved the question about first causes, infinite causation, arbitrary causation, etc. as it relates to the universe---no? If so, then this is incoherent with that point; as science wouldn't be required to solve anything.

    Anything could have been possible, but what actually happened can only be discovered by looking at our universe and determining by fact how it did.

    Again, this contradicts the idea that you have resolved the debate about causation by pointing out that reality has no cause.....
  • Philosophim
    2.8k
    Why? I don't see how that follows from the OP.Bob Ross

    We're close. The point I'm making is the philosophical ontological argument is now complete. The only logical conclusion is that the entirety of existence has no prior reason for its existence, and therefore could have been anything. No philosophical proposal is necessary ontologically, therefore there is no more debate or consideration.

    The scientific ontological argument is still on. Is it the big bang? A God that made a big bang? Etc. The different is it requires evidence, reason, testing, and confirmation. That is outside the realm of philosophy. Try it. Try to show that any particular origin is philosophically necessary if the OP is true and see if it works.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    Let me take another stab at this: let me know if this is what you are saying. I think here's basically your argument:

    1. Reality must be uncaused.
    2. Therefore, whether or not the universe is a series of infinite causality or has a first cause is equally probable.

    Is that it?

    If so, here's my thoughts:

    1. Ceteris paribus, it is correct that two or more things are equally probable if those things equally have no explanation for their existence; however, the probability of one or the other changes given our understanding of the universe.

    2. Philosophy does not engage in merely pure reason; and so ontology and metaphysics certainly is engaging in reasoning based off of empirical evidence (to some large extent) and this is perfectly valid for it to. (I say this just because you seem to think philosophy would be mute on this study of causation since it requires empirical data to determine)

    3. Philosophy, particularly metaphysics, is still the proper study of the nature of causality and as it relates to the totality of physical things. Science can't determine if the universe is just an infinite relation of causality, has a first cause, etc. because in principle there is no scientific proof which can be afforded; given that science presupposes that every change has a cause for the sake of doing science (and so every scientific experiment already presupposes the law of causality in the first place) and an infinite regress would be impossible to experimental 'sniff out' since each causal member would merely entail that causal relation and not the causal relation of the nth member.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    The scientific ontological argument is still on

    This is a contradiction in terms: ontology is philosophy, not science. Science cannot get at ontology, being merely the study of the relation of things and not the nature of things.

    Is it the big bang? A God that made a big bang? Etc.

    Yes, this is metaphysics which rides closely with science; as it should be. Most scientists are also metaphysicians whether they like it or not.

    The different is it requires evidence, reason, testing, and confirmation

    This is true of the vast majority of philosophy.

    Try it. Try to show that any particular origin is philosophically necessary if the OP is true and see if it works.

    What do you mean by "philosophically necessary"?

    In my OP, e.g., I am considering actual impossibility as that modality relates to an infinite series of composition. Are you saying if a first cause, infinite series of causes, etc. cannot be proven to be logically necessary then it must be outside the purview of philosophy?
  • Philosophim
    2.8k
    1. Ceteris paribus, it is correct that two or more things are equally probable if those things equally have no explanation for their existence; however, the probability of one or the other changes given our understanding of the universe.Bob Ross

    Correct. This would be science or discovery of new facts.

    2. Philosophy does not engage in merely pure reason; and so ontology and metaphysics certainly is engaging in reasoning based off of empirical evidence (to some large extent) and this is perfectly valid for it to.Bob Ross

    But there is no philosophical discovery at that point. There would be the discovery of whether there was a first cause, or infinite regress. I hesitate to include this point at this time as I want to make sure you understand this first, but it might be impossible to truly discover the origin scientifically if the OP is true. But for now, lets say it is. It would be measurements, recordings, and conclusions. Where does philosophy fit in?

    Science can't determine if the universe is just an infinite relation of causality, has a first cause, etc. because in principle there is no scientific proof which can be afforded;Bob Ross

    Then the debate is truly finished. The only logical conclusion is that we cannot know.

    The different is it requires evidence, reason, testing, and confirmation

    This is true of the vast majority of philosophy.
    Bob Ross

    I do not find this to be true. Philosophy is more often then not the logical construction of concepts. Science is the test and application of those concepts. Does the reality of the situation match the philosophical conclusion? Then it is scientifically sound.

    What do you mean by "philosophically necessary"?Bob Ross

    I mean that there is no logical construct which can ever be proven to be ontologically necessary as the origin of the universe. The only way we can discover it is by working up the chain of causality which is the hard work of science.

    In my OP, e.g., I am considering actual impossibility as that modality relates to an infinite series of composition.Bob Ross

    If the OP is correct, then you cannot prove it to be impossible. If anything could have been, then nothing is impossible ontologically. It can only be proven to be impossible or possible from within the causal chains of existence that we have to work through step by step.

    Are you saying if a first cause, infinite series of causes, etc. cannot be proven to be logically necessary then it must be outside the purview of philosophy?Bob Ross

    No, its a fun type of origin to think about. My point is there is no way to prove that any one of them is logically more likely to be than the other based on reason alone. The only way to discover what the actual origin is, is through science.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    Philosophy is more often then not the logical construction of concepts. Science is the test and application of those concepts

    The definition of philosophy is a tricky and interesting one.

    “Philosophy” literally translates to “the love of wisdom”, and wisdom (traditionally) is the absolute truth of the nature of things (with an emphasis on how it impacts practical life as a whole and in terms of practical judgment). Thusly, philosophy dips its toes in every subject-matter; for every subject at its core is the study of the nature of something. Nowadays, people like to distinguish philosophy from other studies akin to distinguishing, e.g., history from science; but the more I was thinking about this (in preparation of my response to your comments) I realized this is impossible. Philosophy is not analogous to history, science, archaeology, etc. It transcends all studies as the ultimate study which gives each study life—so to speak. For without a yearning for the understanding of the nature of things, which is encompassed in the love of wisdom, then no subject-matter is sought after—not even science.

    Some might say philosophy is the study of self-development, but this clearly isn’t true (historically). It includes self-development but is not restricted to just that domain. E.g., logic is not an area itself within the study of self-development and yet it is philosophical.

    Some might say, like you, that philosophy is the application of pure reason (viz., the study of what is a priori); but is is equally historically false. E.g., cosmological arguments are typically a posteriori. Most disputes in philosophy have and will continue to be about reasoning about empirical data to abstract what is mostly likely the nature of things (and how to live life properly in correspondence with that knowledge).

    This would entail that science is philosophy at its core, but is a specific branch that expands on how to understand the nature of things; and so science vs. philosophy is a false dichotomy.

    The problem I have with your understanding of philosophy vs. science is that it seems to be very verificationistic. The vast majority of what we know with the most credence cannot be scientifically verified. E.g., the nature of a proposition being a statement that is truth-apt; 1 + 1 = 2; a = a; !(a && !a); the nature of truth being such that it is the correspondence of thought with reality; the law of causality; etc.

    The truth is that most of our knowledge is not scientific: they are evidence-based reasoning. They are probabilistic based off of our experiences; and this is not science proper—nor is it an imitation of science.

    I would challenge you to demonstrate how science proves that a proposition cannot be both true and false; or that 1 = 1; or that knowledge is a JTB; or that every change has a cause; etc.

    But there is no philosophical discovery at that point. There would be the discovery of whether there was a first cause, or infinite regress.

    We can still do the exact same philosophical questioning of causes: your OP just notes that if we take the totality of what we posit as existing then that totality cannot have a cause; which is a trivial note. We still have up for grabs whether or not an infinite regress of causes is absurd; whether a first cause is arbitrary; whether a self-cause is incoherent; whether ….

    Nothing about this OP negates any of this. You seem to be equivocating the totality of things which need explaining with the thing being used to explain it. E.g., the theist says there must be a first cause to explain the totality of these things which exist, and you come around and point out that God + those things is now the new totality which is uncaused—this is a mute point (by my lights).

    The only logical conclusion is that we cannot know.

    Ontology and metaphysics is largely not about a priori proofs; and so they have not been primarily about arguments from pure logic or reason. You seem to think that’s not the case…

    If the OP is correct, then you cannot prove it to be impossible.

    See, this is where you are equivocating. No, your OP does not entail that an infinite regress vs. a first cause of composition is equally probable: it demonstrates that irregardless of which one we think is most probable because the whole of things we posit (which includes that regress or first cause) cannot have a cause itself. Which is, dare I say, obviously true but not relevant to the debate.

    When we debate cosmology, we are debating the comsos—the whole of what immediately needs explaining; and NOT the whole of what we end up having to posit as real. You are conflating these two.
  • Philosophim
    2.8k
    This would entail that science is philosophy at its core, but is a specific branch that expands on how to understand the nature of things; and so science vs. philosophy is a false dichotomy.Bob Ross

    My reference to philosophy and scientific separation are meant to be layman here. As for our discussion, if you wish to define philosophy in this particular way I have no objection. My point stands that there can be no conclusion to what necessarily must be the origin of the universe without finding direct evidence. It is not something which can be reasoned to, but factually concluded.

    We still have up for grabs whether or not an infinite regress of causes is absurd; whether a first cause is arbitrary; whether a self-cause is incoherent; whether ….Bob Ross

    By reason, the OP proves that none of them are absurd or incoherent. No prior cause means no limitations. Anything is possible as an origin, possibility and impossibility can only be found within what already is.

    the theist says there must be a first cause to explain the totality of these things which exist, and you come around and point out that God + those things is now the new totality which is uncaused—this is a mute point (by my lights).Bob Ross

    Its not moot at all because I demonstrate that their claim to God is no longer necessary, and that it has no more reason to be the origin then any other origin someone else can think of.

    Ontology and metaphysics is largely not about a priori proofs; and so they have not been primarily about arguments from pure logic or reason.Bob Ross

    The conclusions I've put forward are from pure logic and reason. Can you demonstrate at what point my conclusions aren't?

    No, your OP does not entail that an infinite regress vs. a first cause of composition is equally probable: it demonstrates that irregardless of which one we think is most probable because the whole of things we posit (which includes that regress or first cause) cannot have a cause itself.Bob Ross

    And if it cannot have a prior cause itself, what does that logically lead to next? The realization that no origin is necessary for existence or can be impossible. If I say, "X origin cannot be possible," there is a reason prior why it would be impossible. Is there anything prior which could make it impossible, then of course it would mean there was a prior cause. A cause not only tells us what is possible, but also impossible.

    Meaning that only within the causality we have right now can we work our way up to the actual origin of our universe. That cannot be done with reason alone, but with actual discovery. Again, try it. Put something forward that demonstrates a necessary origin and refutes the conclusions of the OP.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    My point stands that there can be no conclusion to what necessarily must be the origin of the universe without finding direct evidence.

    But that’s what philosophy also engage in. Metaphysics is reasoning about evidence—which can be empirical.

    By reason, the OP proves that none of them are absurd or incoherent. No prior cause means no limitations

    Its not moot at all because I demonstrate that their claim to God is no longer necessary, and that it has no more reason to be the origin then any other origin someone else can think of.

    Again, this is an equivocation. When we discuss cosmology, it is about what needs to be explained (i.e., the things around us: the universe) and NOT the totality of what we end up having to posit. You are shifting goal post and then trying to claim to be at the original goal post: that’s not valid.

    The conclusions I've put forward are from pure logic and reason. Can you demonstrate at what point my conclusions aren't?

    The more I think about it, I think you are right that this argument—if I am understanding it correctly—is an a priori style argument; for you are noting that reason dictates that irregardless of if there is a first cause, infinite causality, etc. that the totality of what is real must be uncaused. So I recant my position on this point.

    Again, try it. Put something forward that demonstrates a necessary origin and refutes the conclusions of the OP.

    We have don’t have to try to give a counter-argument to know this argument is fallacious. You saying:

    1. The totality of what exists could have a first cause, be self-caused, etc.
    2. The totality of what exists, being such that nothing can exist outside of it, must be uncaused.
    3. Therefore, whether or not the totality of what exists has a first cause, is self-caused, etc. are all equally probable.

    The underlined portion is where the equivocation happens that is pivotal to your argument working and of which you are implicitly asking the reader to conflate (with each other); and, I for one, am not willing to. They are not referring to the same thing; and, not to mention, it is patently incoherent (for if this totality is uncaused then it is impossible for it to have a first cause, etc.).

    EDIT: I think demanding an argument for the nature of the the cosmos is a red herring, but if you want one, here's a basic one:

    1. Per se contingent beings lack the power to exist themselves.
    2. An infinite series of contingent beings all lack the power to exist themselves.
    3. Therefore, it is impossible for the cosmos to be an infinite series of contingent beings.
    4. Therefore, there must be at least one necessary being.

    The point is not that you need to accept that argument, it's that your OP doesn't negate anyone from validly engaging in this type of metaphysics.
  • Philosophim
    2.8k
    The more I think about it, I think you are right that this argument—if I am understanding it correctly—is an a priori style argument; for you are noting that reason dictates that irregardless of if there is a first cause, infinite causality, etc. that the totality of what is real must be uncaused.Bob Ross

    Yes, that's what I intended to convey.

    1. The totality of what exists could have a first cause, be self-caused, etc.
    2. The totality of what exists, being such that nothing can exist outside of it, must be uncaused.
    3. Therefore, whether or not the totality of what exists has a first cause, is self-caused, etc. are all equally probable.
    Bob Ross

    First, I'm not using the phrase, "The totality of what exists" in the argument. I'm saying the entire scope of causality.

    Second, you're missing the step I introduced that leads to 3 as a conclusion.

    And if it cannot have a prior cause itself, what does that logically lead to next? The realization that no origin is necessary for existence or can be impossible. If I say, "X origin cannot be possible," there is a reason prior why it would be impossible. Is there anything prior which could make it impossible, then of course it would mean there was a prior cause. A cause not only tells us what is possible, but also impossible.Philosophim

    If anything could happen, and there is no cause which would make any one thing be more likely than the other to happen, then they all had equal chance of happening.

    1. Per se contingent beings lack the power to exist themselves.
    2. An infinite series of contingent beings all lack the power to exist themselves.
    3. Therefore, it is impossible for the cosmos to be an infinite series of contingent beings.
    4. Therefore, there must be at least one necessary being.
    Bob Ross

    Premise two is incorrect. A contingent being lacks the the power to exist without another being existing which supports it, true. We can invent the concept of an infinite set of contingent beings. But that set is not contingent on anything else. Just like I can have a finite set of contingent beings, but that set is not contingent on anything else. You've already agreed with me on this. There would be no prior reason which causes a finite set of causality to occur, and there would be no prior reason for an infinite set of causality to occur. Therefore both are equally as likely to happen if we do not know what actually happened.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    First, I'm not using the phrase, "The totality of what exists" in the argument. I'm saying the entire scope of causality.

    Well, that’s a huge difference! An argument that the totality of what exists has no cause is true (trivially) because any cause—be itself caused or not—would be included in such totality; however, that the totality of caused things has no cause does not follow these lines of thinking—for an uncaused thing would be outside of that totality. You would have to provide some further argument—and perhaps I missed it—for why there would be no cause to such a series.

    And if it cannot have a prior cause itself, what does that logically lead to next? The realization that no origin is necessary for existence or can be impossible. If I say, "X origin cannot be possible," there is a reason prior why it would be impossible. Is there anything prior which could make it impossible, then of course it would mean there was a prior cause. A cause not only tells us what is possible, but also impossible. — Philosophim

    If anything could happen, and there is no cause which would make any one thing be more likely than the other to happen, then they all had equal chance of happening.

    I am not following: I think you are conflating causality a lot. Let me just explain what I am thinking about your position and correct me where I’m getting it wrong.

    If we are talking about the total series of caused things, then your OP is arguing that such a series is either infinite or self-caused; but it cannot argue that there is a first cause. A first cause would exist outside of the series of caused things.
    If it is infinite, then each member has a reason for its existence from the previous member.

    If it is self-caused (notwithstanding how patently incoherent this concept is itself), then the being has its own existence explained through itself.

    Either way, nothing is equally probable in the sense you described; for either the ultimate cause explains itself (viz., is contingent upon itself) or there is an infinite series of sufficient explanations.

    If you posit a necessary being, then you would be positing a first cause; and this would exist outside of the series of caused things and would have no cause itself. This also would not entail an equal chance of things happening, for it simply would entail the existence of whatever it causes and it would be the sufficient explanation of those causes.

    We can invent the concept of an infinite set of contingent beings. But that set is not contingent on anything else.

    That doesn’t matter. That’s like saying an infinite series of gears rotating is possible because we can conceptually posit it and the whole series does not require rotation. The set itself is not an entity that you can manipulate like that. The set itself of contingent members is just a bunch of contingencies abstracted into a set: the set is not a necessary being.
  • Philosophim
    2.8k
    Well, that’s a huge difference! An argument that the totality of what exists has no cause is true (trivially) because any cause—be itself caused or not—would be included in such totality; however, that the totality of caused things has no cause does not follow these lines of thinking—for an uncaused thing would be outside of that totality.Bob Ross

    No, the uncaused thing would be the limit inside of that totality.

    Either way, nothing is equally probable in the sense you described; for either the ultimate cause explains itself (viz., is contingent upon itself) or there is an infinite series of sufficient explanations.Bob Ross

    There would still be the scope of, "What caused there to be an infinite series of sufficient explanations?" And this would be uncaused.

    The set itself of contingent members is just a bunch of contingencies abstracted into a set: the set is not a necessary being.Bob Ross

    No, its not a necessary being, only uncaused. Feel free to look at it again with the limit being inside of the totality.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    Again:

    No, the uncaused thing would be the limit inside of that totality.

    I will quote myself from the previous thread:

    Anytime you get to a point in which there is something which has no prior causation for its being, then it is outside of causality.


    I am glad you said this, because this was what I was going to point out in the other thread discussion we are having, as I wasn’t sure if you agreed or not. If there is a first cause, then it has no prior causation for its being; so, by your own logic, it resides outside of the totality of causal things (viz., outside of causality). Your argument in your OP you said is arguing that there is no cause for the totality of causal things and that a first cause would be in that totality; but this contradicts what you just said above.
  • Philosophim
    2.8k
    Your argument in your OP you said is arguing that there is no cause for the totality of causal things and that a first cause would be in that totality; but this contradicts what you just said above.

    No contradiction. Let me see if this helps.

    U1 = A -> B -> C
    U2 = infinite regress -> C

    What caused U? In both cases the answer is, "Nothing". There is no prior cause for U1 or U2. But the causality within U1 and U2 are true. U1 has a first cause, A. U2 does not. U2 simply exists like A simply exists in U1.

    If nothing caused U1, and nothing caused U2, then there is nothing which would prevent their formation either. Since there is an equal weight for both for or against the U's existing, both U1 and U2 have an equal chance of being or not being.
  • Count Timothy von Icarus
    3.2k


    Where am I wrong?

    Arguments from brute facts in cosmology are almost always extremely ad hoc. Yours is no exception. "It just is, for no reason at all," could be applied to any phenomena at all. So, for instance, given the principle of indifference, the extremely low entropy of the early universe is almost unfathomably unlikely. It's the sort of thing that cries out for explanation.

    The brute fact explanation is only thrown out when a better explanation isn't available. It's ad hoc. If it is acceptable at all, it should be equally acceptable for "why does water dissolve salt," and yet no one would accept a brute fact explanation here because better explanations exist.

    No doubt, if Penrose's hypothesis for why the entropy of the early universe was so low, or any of the others, was borne out by more evidence and became the consensus opinion of cosmologists, it would not make sense to rebut the new theory by stating: "no, it's just is. No explanation is possible."

    Likewise, presumably you are going off the assumption that the universe does have a begining because that is the majority opinion in cosmology. But this wasn't always so, most cosmologists used to think the universe was without beginning or end. The Big Bang, and then a period of Cosmic Inflation prior to the Big Bang, were both posited to help explain phenomena that seemed vanishingly unlikely to have occured by chance. However, from the perspective of the brute fact view, there was absolutely no reason to go looking for these explanations, and no reason to prefer them. If "it just is," is actually as good of an explanation as any other, all sorts of now dominant theories in cosmology are unnecessary. We didn't need to explain the curvature of space: "it just is."

    And yet no one actually does appeal to "it just is" when solid explanations exist. Hence, it is just an ad hoc appeal for those who cannot countenance mystery.

    Consider: if new stars appeared across the sky tonight that clearly spelled out "Allah is the greatest," would that be evidence of a creator? Well, on the brute fact view the emergence of the new stars, and the timing of their light reaching Earth, is all just the result of brute fact laws and initial conditions. If the advocates of such a view are consistent, they will declare: "We cannot assume that this happening is any more or less probable than anything else, since the laws and initial conditions just are, for no reason at all."

    But this seems implausible. If stars spelling out Koran verses appeared across the night sky tonight, we would have epistemic warrant for thinking something special was going on.

    Of course. That's what it is to exist. The Universe is everything. It doesn't mean that there can't be other dimensions, or that it exists in a way that is currently foreign to us. But you can't exist and be outside of existence. Perhaps there are other 'universes' or things that exist separately from the total causality of our pocket of reality. But if the two ever met, then they would intertwine in causality. A God, if it ever interacts with this universe, is part of this universe...

    People say a lot of things. If they have logic and reason on their side, great. But a lot of things that are said and believed do not have logic and reason on their side. A history or large number of people who hold such beliefs do not lend any more weight to their truth.


    Do you not see how "well other people might not have logic and reason on their side, because people sometimes have irrational beliefs," is not a good response to: "We reject the premise of the univocity of being."

    Like I said, a good argument anticipates objections. "I don't need to anticipate objections because they could be irrational" is not a compelling resolution. This is particularly true of brute fact appeals because, if they are ever compelling, they are only compelling because they have shown that no other explanation is possible. Yet all you have shown is that, provided we accept the brute fact explanation, we will have accepted a brute fact explanation.

    Second, it's worth pointing out that:

    A. Cosmologists are in no way unanimous that the universe even has a beginning. Cyclical theories are still posited.

    B. The philosophers of the Abrahamic tradition and many Pagan philosophers agree that nothing is temporally prior to creation. Space and time do not exist prior to creation. God is not in space or time. God is not a being. As St. Augustine puts it, God is "within everything but contained in nothing." God is cause and first principle of the universe as ground, not as temporally prior efficient cause. So arguing that "it doesn't make sense to speak of a time prior to time or changes prior to change," isn't really addressing the most popular theologies at all.
  • Count Timothy von Icarus
    3.2k


    We're close. The point I'm making is the philosophical ontological argument is now complete. The only logical conclusion is that the entirety of existence has no prior reason for its existence, and therefore could have been anything. No philosophical proposal is necessary ontologically, therefore there is no more debate or consideration.

    The scientific ontological argument is still on. Is it the big bang? A God that made a big bang? Etc. The different is it requires evidence, reason, testing, and confirmation. That is outside the realm of philosophy. Try it. Try to show that any particular origin is philosophically necessary if the OP is true and see if it works.

    Sure, you are correct. Provided that we accept that "it just is, for no reason at all," is as good an explanation of things as any other, this would indeed render any other explanation "unnecessary," and imply that there "[should] be no more debate or consideration." After all, such an explanation can be proffered for literally anything we might inquire about. "Why is grass green?" It just is. "Why does the caged bird sing?" It just does. "Why did Hitler declare war on the USA?" He just did. "How to words refer?" They just do. "Why do some people prefer their cucumbers pickled?" That is just the way of the world.

    Whether it would be wise to affirm such misology is another question.
  • Philosophim
    2.8k
    Arguments from brute facts in cosmology are almost always extremely ad hoc. Yours is no exception.Count Timothy von Icarus

    Normally I would agree with you. It is an exception here because we're talking about a rational limit to causality. If I'm wrong, point out where in the argument my point fails please.

    No doubt, if Penrose's hypothesis for why the entropy of the early universe was so low, or any of the others, was borne out by more evidence and became the consensus opinion of cosmologists, it would not make sense to rebut the new theory by stating: "no, it's just is. No explanation is possible."Count Timothy von Icarus

    I understand your concern, but that's not what I'm trying to do here. This is not an attempt to shut down further examination into why things work the way they do in our universe. This is not to shut down the causality that exists. Learning these things can only be helpful and should be encouraged. My point is 'the limit'. One day we may, or may not find the limit. But logically, we can determine there is one. Ultimately that limit is something that is uncaused by something else.

    Knowing this we can determine that any proposal to a necessary universal origin without evidence is 100% wrong. If the limit is something uncaused, then necessarily anything could be the limit in an ontological theory. This doesn't mean it actually is anything we can imagine, only that without knowing the origin, we know this at least must be true. Thus we are left without any other means of discovering the actual origin besides science, research, and evidence.

    Consider: if new stars appeared across the sky tonight that clearly spelled out "Allah is the greatest," would that be evidence of a creator? Well, on the brute fact view the emergence of the new stars, and the timing of their light reaching Earth, is all just the result of brute fact laws and initial conditions. If the advocates of such a view are consistent, they will declare: "We cannot assume that this happening is any more or less probable than anything else, since the laws and initial conditions just are, for no reason at all."Count Timothy von Icarus

    No. Within existence we have causality. There would be a reason why the stars aligned that way. Anyone who said, "It can't be Allah" should be dismissed. Same with anyone who said, "Maybe its aliens or a government trick." The only way to determine the truth would be through evidence. My point is not that 'everything is arbitratry', my point is that the origin of the universe is ultimately uncaused. That doesn't mean things within aren't caused by other things within it.

    Do you not see how "well other people might not have logic and reason on their side, because people sometimes have irrational beliefs," is not a good response to: "We reject the premise of the univocity of being."Count Timothy von Icarus

    My point was only intended to criticize the notion that a unity of people believing something leads any credence to the accuracy of that belief. It is not intended to convey anymore than that.

    A. Cosmologists are in no way unanimous that the universe even has a begining. Cyclical theories are still posited.Count Timothy von Icarus

    And my conclusion determines this is a viable possibility, as is anything.

    Space and time do not exist prior to creation. God is not in space or time. God is not a being.Count Timothy von Icarus

    God is an uncaused being. But I've noted that if something can be uncaused, there is no limit as to what could be uncaused as an origin. Meaning rocks being uncaused is just as possible as a God being uncaused. My point does note that a God is a possibility, but it is only one of an infinite amount of options, and not logically necessary.

    Sure, you are correct. Provided that we accept that "it just is, for no reason at all," is as good an explanation of things as any other, this would indeed render any other explanation "unnecessary," and imply that there "[should] be no more debate or consideration." After all, such an explanation can be proffered for literally anything we might inquire about.Count Timothy von Icarus

    The grass is green because light bounces off grass at a particular wavelength that we interpret as green. It is not, "Just because". Again, my argument is talking about the very specific scenario that the ultimate cause of our universe is uncaused. Everything else within it follows from the causality of its integrated existence. So not only am I not specifically saying this argument can be applied to everything, I'm pointing out it would be wrong to.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    U1 = A -> B -> C
    U2 = infinite regress -> C

    I don’t know what this is supposed to represent.

    If there is a first cause, F, then it would be outside of the set of causality. If you were to say something like “why F has no reason for its existence: it is necessary”, then you would be correct; and there’s nothing about it that is similar to an infinite regress: a regress would entail that there is an infinite series of sufficient explanations.

    I think you think such an infinite series of sufficient explanations doesn’t have a sufficient explanation because you are invalidly abstracting out the entire series and treating it like an object.
  • Philosophim
    2.8k
    If there is a first cause, F, then it would be outside of the set of causality.Bob Ross

    Considering the first cause would be the first part of causality, A -> B, isn't A part of the set of causality?

    If you were to say something like “why F has no reason for its existence: it is necessary”, then you would be correct; and there’s nothing about it that is similar to an infinite regress: a regress would entail that there is an infinite series of sufficient explanations.Bob Ross

    But what I'm doing is looking at the entire set. In the case of U1, the first cause is the first part of the set. So when I ask, "What caused U1?", the answer is that the first cause existed without prior causation, then caused other things. In the second case there is no first cause, but there is still the question of "What caused U2?" The answer is that its entire infinitely regressive existence exists without prior causation.

    I think you think such an infinite series of sufficient explanations doesn’t have a sufficient explanation because you are invalidly abstracting out the entire series and treating it like an object.Bob Ross

    Lets focus on this part then. How is my abstraction invalid? If I'm expanding the scope of the universal evaluation to include everything, don't the U1 and U2 examples each capture this accurately?
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    Considering the first cause would be the first part of causality, A -> B, isn't A part of the set of causality?

    No. The set contains all caused things. Now, like I said before in the other thread, you could quantify over the set of all things simpliciter and then your argument would work but be trivial.

    But what I'm doing is looking at the entire set. In the case of U1, the first cause is the first part of the set. So when I ask, "What caused U1?", the answer is that the first cause existed without prior causation, then caused other things

    What you are describing is not the set of causality (viz., of caused things) but, rather, the set of all things; and you are right that this set, U1, is uncaused.

    The reason you end up with a trivial conclusion is that you are abstracting like this for other options for causal series (such as infinite regression) and conflating it with explaining the set of caused things.

    How is my abstraction invalid?

    Let’s call the set of caused things C, the set of all things A, a first cause to C F, an infinite circularity O, a self-cause of C S, a necessary cause of C N, and an infinite regression R.

    The debate in metaphysics, ontology, which your OP claims to solve, is about C not A. What needs be explained is the causality which we see around us and so we abstract out how this causality would work; so we ask “is there a first cause?” and what not, but this refers to the abstraction of the set of caused things—hence C. Subsequently, you end up with all sorts of positions about C; such as C being identical to R, being identical to a O, C requiring F, F being O, F being N, etc.

    What you are doing is conflating A with C. You are noting that irregardless of who is right about how causality works, the totality, A, of all things is uncaused; and this is trivially true and has nothing to do with the debate. Moreover, more specifically, you are conflating a being that is uncaused with a set being uncaused: F, assuming it is of type N, is certainly not uncaused in the same sense as A nor R—for a set is not a being. A being that is uncaused is something which is real and lacks any explanation for its existence; whereas a set of real things is not itself real and lacks the ability to require any explanation in the first place—for what needs explaining are the things in the set of real things and not a mental abstraction of the totality of them. Thusly, if we say that R is A, then it necessarily follows that every real thing has an explanation for its existence—there is nothing uncaused in the sense of a real thing lacking any explanation for its existence. Saying that the set is uncaused is just to equivocate, because if we were to say it is uncaused then we mean it in a disanalogous sense of needing no explanation for why it is because it is itself not real.

    Think about it, if every real thing has a cause, then every real thing has a reason for its existence; the abstraction of every real thing into a totality does not introduce a real thing which is uncaused: that contradict that every real thing has a cause (which we presupposed in the first place).
  • jufa
    12
    Posted: 29 Jun 2007 17:14

    There is no logic for existence - Julius Fann Jr

    There is no logic for anything in this universe to exist. To be more precise, there is logic to existence. Now this means that all that exists in the universe should not be, and therefore, dealing with the effect will always lead one to deduce that which has no meaning.

    Let me step back and offer a personal analysis and interpretation by asking myself, what is? In asking, the answer was pulled out of thin air and fell at my feet, saying there is no logic to creation; therefore, there is no logic to the universe nor humanity. Being such, that which occupies the universe as a mind filler has no logic to exist, inclusive of man, which is the reason no human mind can find intellectual cognitive fillers to anything beyond the eyelid. No philosophy, spiritual, nor reasoning comprehensible has ever given reasoning for creation to exist. Such dialogue, as here then, is pure assumption for that which should not be for humanity to worship that which should not exist - materialism.

    Regardless of one's belief in the logic or illogic of creation, belief alone is not enough, and does not overarch the truth as articulated by the Apostle Paul: "I perceive that in all things ye are superstitious. For as I passed by, and beheld your devotion, I found an altar with this inscription, TO THE UNKNOWN GOD. WHOM THEREFORE YE IGNORANTLY WORSHIP, HIM DECLARE I UNTO YOU. God is the world and things therein, seeing that He is Lord of heaven and earth figuratively, dwelleth not in temples made with hands, neither is he worshiped with men's hand, as though he needed anything, seeing he giveth to all life, breath, and all."

    Now for this writer, this alone nullifies any metaphysical, or scientific, or attempt to speak one cause and effect, being they ae of the mindset of laws dealing with human speculations, religion or other teaching which has rules and by-laws dealing with materialism and human mind cognition. Furthermore, it nullifies the belief that there is another god of this world who has dominion over inner Spirit, Christ, whose altar no human is attentive. At this point, it must be emphasized that mere belief is not sufficient to make one a true believer, as the supposed god this world, whom some call Satan, also believes in God. Yet, considering the impact of his beliefs on the world, should a Satan indeed be real.

    In short, there is no logic to the universe because there is no logic for existence, with one exception, and that is found in Rev.4:11, "Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honor and power; for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created." - jufa
  • Philosophim
    2.8k
    We seem to be going round and round on this one Bob. :)
    How is my abstraction invalid?

    Let’s call the set of caused things C, the set of all things A, a first cause to C F, an infinite circularity O, a self-cause of C S, a necessary cause of C N, and an infinite regression R.
    Bob Ross

    You didn't need to introduce a new set, as everything was in the U1 and U2 sets.

    The debate in metaphysics, ontology, which your OP claims to solve, is about C not A.Bob Ross

    But I'm not including the set of all things in the U1 and U2 comparison.

    U1 = A -> B -> C
    U2 = infinite regress -> C

    This is the set of all causal relations in the the universe Bob, not set of all things.

    What you are doing is conflating A with C. You are noting that irregardless of who is right about how causality works, the totality, A, of all things is uncaused; and this is trivially true and has nothing to do with the debate.Bob Ross

    I'm not conflating A, because A does not belong in the above example. I'm noting that if you extend the causality to its entire scope, you will reach a point where it is inevitably uncaused. In the case of U1, its A. In the case of U2, its discovering there is an infinite regress of causality. What caused there to be a universe that had infinitely regressive causality? Nothing. What caused there to be a universe with finite causality? Nothing. There is no prior cause at the end of the causal chain of discovery, therefore it is impossible to note that a finitely regressive causality is anymore necessary then an infinitely regressive causality.

    A being that is uncaused is something which is real and lacks any explanation for its existence; whereas a set of real things is not itself real and lacks the ability to require any explanation in the first placeBob Ross

    A set of infinitely regressive causality could itself be just as real and lack any explanation for its existence as a set of finite regressive causality.

    Thusly, if we say that R is ABob Ross

    But I am not saying R is A, so I don't think this applies. Remove A from the notion, which I am not including, and I'm not sure my abstraction is invalid. Try again without A being involved and see if your claim still holds.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    You didn't need to introduce a new set, as everything was in the U1 and U2 sets.

    U1 = A -> B -> C
    U2 = infinite regress -> C

    This is the set of all causal relations in the the universe Bob, not set of all things.

    The universe is not itself identical to the the set of all things nor the set of all causality per se: which are you referring to, if either?

    Assuming we are talking about the universe, then we are talking about cosmology; which is about whether or not we think the universe itself is contingent or not (ultimately). The minute you abstract further than that—which is required for your proof in the OP—one ends up in a broader discussion of ontology which will result in discussion the sets that I was discussing before.

    I'm noting that if you extend the causality to its entire scope, you will reach a point where it is inevitably uncaused

    The problem is that you are not clearly defining to yourself what you are quantifying over in this set. You said it was the universe, and now you are saying it is the entirety of causal things—which is C in my abstractions and not A. You are still conflating A and C; but you are adding into the mix U which is irrelevant to the discussion. U itself is not in principle identical to C or A, and it does not allow for any discussion of the totality of causes (C).

    A set of infinitely regressive causality could itself be just as real and lack any explanation for its existence as a set of finite regressive causality.

    The members would be real, the set would not; and your argument depends on the set itself being treated as real like its members. Again, and to which you never responded, the members sufficiently explaining each other makes the entire set sufficiently explained; and, thusly, the set itself is not uncaused in the sense of causing the members.

    But I am not saying R is A, so I don't think this applies. Remove A from the notion, which I am not including, and I'm not sure my abstraction is invalid. Try again without A being involved and see if your claim still holds.

    I never said you did.

    The problem is that either U (1 or 2) is a member of C and A; or is a member of only A. There is no third option, Philosophim; viz., either this ‘universe’ is contingent and a member of the set of causal things, C, or it is not contingent and is a member of the totality of things, A, but is not a member of the set of causal things, C. Your idea of U just muddies the waters, since you are trying to argue that ontologically we can determine that all causal things are uncaused by way of abstraction of the totality of caused things (C).
  • Philosophim
    2.8k
    Your idea of U just muddies the waters, since you are trying to argue that ontologically we can determine that all causal things are uncaused by way of abstraction of the totality of caused things (C).Bob Ross

    If I understand this correctly, I think the only problem you have is with the idea that an infinite regress of causality has no cause for its being.

    A set of infinitely regressive causality could itself be just as real and lack any explanation for its existence as a set of finite regressive causality.

    The members would be real, the set would not; and your argument depends on the set itself being treated as real like its members. Again, and to which you never responded, the members sufficiently explaining each other makes the entire set sufficiently explained; and, thusly, the set itself is not uncaused in the sense of causing the members.
    Bob Ross

    We also seem to have a mix up between my example and your example. Lets pull this back into a better abstract as the specifics aren't communicating the issue that I'm trying to point out. The knowledge of the infinite regress does not make the entire set of causality sufficiently explained. What caused that particular set of infinite regresses? I think a better way to fold it all together Bob, "Why is there anything at all?"

    The answer is that its uncaused. Even a God right? And if there is no prior cause for anything, whether that 'anything' start with a God, a pile or rocks, or has infinite minor causes running back forever, then there is no origin that is logically necessary for the universe to exist.

    If there is no cause which explains why the universe is here, then it didn't need to be here. It could have just as easily not been. It could be that there are other universes. Why not? When we realize the ultimate cause for why there is any existence at all is 'uncaused' there are no limits as to what could have been.

    No matter what you discover about your universe, it will never change this fact. Discovering those origins can tell you a lot about your universe as is, but it will never indicate why it is. It simply is. It did not require anything necessary for it to be, it just is. Therefore if one does not know the full causal chain of their universe by scientific proof it is impossible to philosophically argue by reason alone that any one possible causal origin of that universe was necessary or impossible. Necessary and impossible imply an inviable causality, and since there is none, there is no limit.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    The problem is that you are not explaining which set you are quantifying over; and I suspect you are switching back and forth between C and A. Sometimes you say you are talking about the totality of caused things, and then say it is the totality of what exists. Which is it?

    The knowledge of the infinite regress does not make the entire set of causality sufficiently explained. What caused that particular set of infinite regresses?

    Causality is outside the purview of a set of all caused things. The set of all caused things, C, is literally the encapsulation of all caused things; so it doesn't make sense to ask what caused C since that conflates C with being one of its members.

    EDIT: in other words, asking "is C caused?" presupposes that C could be a caused thing which would entail it is not C but rather a member of C (viz., it is not the set of caused things but, rather, a caused thing that is in that set).
  • Philosophim
    2.8k
    Sometimes you say you are talking about the totality of caused things, and then say it is the totality of what exists. Which is it?Bob Ross

    I am talking about the scope of causality that encompasses all things. You cannot talk about the totality of call causes without the totality of all existence. In the case of an infinite regress of causality, the scope would be capturing everything causally. Its no different from a finite set. The difference is in the locus of the question. In a finite set we ask, "What caused A to be?" and there is no prior causality. In a finite set we ask, "What caused this infinite regressive set to be?" and there is no prior causality.

    Another way to answer this is, "The first cause is explained by itself." "An infinite set of causality is explained by itself." There is functionally no difference between these two at the last scoped question of causality which is essentially, "What caused the set to exist?"

    Again I think the infinite set is the only issue you have. Lets say we have one universe A that is a set of causal interactions between diamonds. That's all the universe is. There is a starting point we call the Gem God. Now there is a universe B which is a universe of cobalt. There is a starting point we call the cobalt God.

    Now imagine the same universes, only there is no gem or cobalt God. Its just a cascading series of gems causing other gem states in C, and just a cascading series of cobalt causing other cobalt states in D. What caused universe C to exist instead of universe D? What caused A or B? Nothing. There is a scope of causality that when we fully extend out, cannot be found. There is no outside force, because anything outside is included in the set. But this last question when the full scope of any universe is reached always has the same answer. Nothing caused that particular universe to be. It simply is if it exists.

    EDIT: in other words, asking "is C caused?" presupposes that C could be a caused thing which would entail it is not C but rather a member of C (viz., it is not the set of caused things but, rather, a caused thing that is in that set).Bob Ross

    'C' is the scope of all causality. And yes, when you extend the scope of causality out, we ask the last question, "What caused all of this other causality to exist apart from what we can discover?" And the answer IS inside of C Bob. The answer is, "Its uncaused". Its the final piece of any universal set of causality. We find we always come to a question we cannot answer, therefore the only answer is, "Its uncaused." And if its uncaused, then all the other consequences I noted follow.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    I am talking about the scope of causality that encompasses all things. You cannot talk about the totality of call causes without the totality of all existence

    So, is your answer that you are talking about A and A = C?

    In the case of an infinite regress of causality, the scope would be capturing everything causally

    But this isn’t true for a first cause, F, of C; such that if there is a first cause then C != A.

    In a finite set we ask, "What caused A to be?" and there is no prior causality

    This “A” that you refer to here—which is an existent thing and not a set—cannot be a member of C if it is uncaused.

    Also, that there is a first cause does not entail that the set is finite. It could be a set of infinite sets, like [F, C]. Where C is a set of an infinite amount of caused things. You seem to be implying, although I may be mistaken, that a first cause would entail a finite set which has the first cause as a member of C.

    Another way to answer this is, "The first cause is explained by itself." "An infinite set of causality is explained by itself."

    Sets are not caused—ever. The members of the sets may be caused. Again, you are conflating sets with real things. Sets are not real.

    Again I think the infinite set is the only issue you have. Lets say we have one universe A that is a set of causal interactions between diamonds.

    I am not sure how a diamond causing other diamonds and how that could be identical to a universe, but let’s roll with it.

    Let’s call the set of the totality of caused diamonds in diamond universe D; and let’s call the set of the totality of caused cobalt in the cobalt universe T. Here’s have comments I would have:

    1. The Gem God would not be a member D; nor is the Cobalt God a member of T.

    2. One cannot quantify causally over a set itself like a member.These universes, if they have no first cause(s), are not uncaused. Either:

    A. Each previous member sufficiently causes the next member; or
    B. There is a member or members which caused itself and thereafter caused the other members; or
    C. There is a point where the causal series circles around.

    There is no situation in this case where anything that exists is uncaused. Your response is: “but what about the set itself?”. The set isn’t real. It is not a real thing which is caused or uncaused.

    3. What causes T to exist as opposed to D is to, again, ask what caused a set; and this is fallacious reasoning. Sets are not real. E.g., if T is an infinite regression of caused cobalt, then the reason each cobalt exists is explained by the previous leaving no room to need to explain anything else. It would be, contrary to D existing, because such-and-such cobalt caused this cobalt to be cobalt and that cobalt caused such-and-such cobalt to be cobalt because of this other cobalt ad infinitum. There is nothing left unexplained in this type of analysis.

    'C' is the scope of all causality. And yes, when you extend the scope of causality out, we ask the last question, "What caused all of this other causality to exist apart from what we can discover?" And the answer IS inside of C

    That is incoherent. You either are not asking if the totality of caused things is caused by shifting the goal post and saying that the totality of caused things is not this total that you are evaluating; or you are asking if the totality of caused things is caused and this leads to a set of first causes.

    It can’t be the case that F causes C and that F is a member of C
  • Philosophim
    2.8k
    So, is your answer that you are talking about A and A = C?Bob Ross

    No, I'm noting that C involves A, but they are not the same thing. You're the one who introduced A, not me. :)

    In the case of an infinite regress of causality, the scope would be capturing everything causally

    But this isn’t true for a first cause, F, of C; such that if there is a first cause then C != A.
    Bob Ross

    The scope captures everything causally because C != A. I've never claimed that it was equal.

    In a finite set we ask, "What caused A to be?" and there is no prior causality

    This “A” that you refer to here—which is an existent thing and not a set—cannot be a member of C if it is uncaused.
    Bob Ross

    Yes it can, because one of the answers to something causally is that it is uncaused. You seem to be putting this answer outside of causality, when I'm noting its one of the answers.

    Sets are not caused—ever. The members of the sets may be caused. Again, you are conflating sets with real things. Sets are not real.Bob Ross

    We're in complete agreement that sets aren't real. I'm just using it to give a better understanding of what I was trying to get across. This has seemed to add more confusion, so I gave you another example, "What caused existence period?" I never said 'the set' itself is caused, only its members. I am not conflating anything here Bob, I think that's just you.

    1. The Gem God would not be a member D; nor is the Cobalt God a member of T.Bob Ross

    Incorrect. They are part of the causality of that universe, therefore they are part of the scope of causality in that universe. There is no logic in separating them from the causal chain of the universe when they are part of the chain. I think you are misunderstanding what the causal scope is. Take a re-read of the scope section if you need to so that you understand it is not a chain of 'all things' but 'the full scope of causality'.

    There is no situation in this case where anything that exists is uncaused. Your response is: “but what about the set itself?”. The set isn’t real. It is not a real thing which is caused or uncaused.Bob Ross

    No, I'm referring to the chain we've found in the set itself up to the point where we increase the scope to include the question, "What caused existence at all?" Can you answer that question Bob? My answer is, "Its uncaused." Why am I wrong?

    E.g., if T is an infinite regression of caused cobalt, then the reason each cobalt exists is explained by the previous leaving no room to need to explain anything else.Bob Ross

    No, because there's still the question, "What caused there to be existence at all?" Further this ignores the question of other possible universes. What caused universe 1 to exist instead of universe 2 once you go up the causal chain within that universe? There is nothing outside of that universe that caused it to be, therefore it is uncaused.

    It can’t be the case that F causes C and that F is a member of CBob Ross

    The answer is not that F causes C. Its that C is uncaused. Which again, we're having problems with the set here instead of you addressing the plain question. "What caused existence?" You didn't reply to this very specific question from the last post Bob, so I think you're avoiding it to refocus on the sets that I've already told you are just a tool to convey this notion. Drop the sets if they aren't helpful to you, I don't care. This question is the question that only has one answer, 'Its uncaused."
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    You're the one who introduced A, not me. :)

    I am trying to give you the tools to provide clarity on your position. You still keep conflating them and talking about unclear sets.

    If you have your own sets that you want me to work with, then please provide them in an analogous way to how I provided mine.

    The scope captures everything causally because C != A. I've never claimed that it was equal.

    If there is an infinite regress of causal things, then it would have to be. For if every real thing is a member of C, which is the case if every real thing is sufficiently explained in an infinitely regressive fashion, then there is no real thing which is not a member of C; and therefore no real thing which is not a member of C and A; so C = A.

    Yes it can, because one of the answers to something causally is that it is uncaused. You seem to be putting this answer outside of causality, when I'm noting its one of the answers.

    We are not quantifying over answers—and purposefully so (because it muddies the waters and leads to issues in inferences as seen in your OP)—but, rather, real things; and C is the enumeration of all of those real things that are also caused.

    What I was noting is that if something caused C, when taken as its members, and is not itself caused then that thing is not a member of C; and this is patently true because C contains only real things that are caused—which precludes things that are not caused. A, ceteris paribus, assuming there’s nothing else to consider but the two, would look like: A = [F, C] – not C = [F, <…>] = A.

    We're in complete agreement that sets aren't real. I'm just using it to give a better understanding of what I was trying to get across

    This is crucial though to my point; because you keep asking questions that assume they are real. For example, you keep asking “what caused C?”. C is a set: it is not real. When we ask colloquially “what caused C?”, we charitably meant to ask “do the members of C sufficiently explain each other’s existences or not?”. Crucially, an infinite regress proper would be such that each member would suffice to explain the next member and so on; and, therefore, there is nothing required to explain the members outside of that set. There is nothing uncaused in this!!! The set being outside of the purview of causality is not the same as it being a real thing that is uncaused.

    "What caused existence period?"

    This is too vague. The only valid way to translate this, as far as I can tell, is to assume you mean “what caused these real things to exist?”, then, again, an infinite regression explanation would dictate that there nothing uncaused: each real thing is explained by the next or the previous or what not.

    Existence itself is not a property like other properties: you can’t ask “why is there being?” like “why is there red things?”.

    They are part of the causality of that universe, therefore they are part of the scope of causality in that universe.

    Let me just grant your point here. Let’s say there’s a first cause, F, to the set C and the set W = [F, C]. Ok, fair enough. How does this change anything? An infinite regression would entail that there is no F and C just has an infinite amount of members which explain each others’ existences; and C itself is not caused or uncaused.

    "What caused existence at all?" Can you answer that question Bob?

    If I take it literally, then it is an invalid question. Existence is not a proper property. In terms of why do things exist, the question in an infinite regress would be that each one explains the other: that’s no problem to answer.

    As you know, I would say that God is the explanation. The issue is that your argument tries to determine a priori that each cogent solution results in the idea of everything being uncaused; and this is simply not true UNLESS you conflate a set as a real entity.

    What caused universe 1 to exist instead of universe 2 once you go up the causal chain within that universe?

    The infinitely regressive set would be identical to the universe: again, you are treating the set as if it is real because you substituted the word ‘set’ for ‘universe’ here. There’s no extra-beyond ‘universe’ from the infinite collection of sufficiently explained real things if the person arguing for an infinite regress is right. Your question here assumes that there is still something real, namely the universe itself, which has not been answered; but all the ‘universe’ is here, in your argument, is the set of the all the real things. Hence, your question is just falsely framed.

    This is different, per se, from asking about our universe and what caused it because we aren’t necessarily stipulating that the universe is just a set of all caused, e.g., cobalts.

    The answer is not that F causes C. Its that C is uncaused.

    If you agree that sets aren’t real, then you must concede that C cannot be caused or uncaused.

    "What caused existence?" You didn't reply to this very specific question from the last post Bob, so I think you're avoiding it to refocus on the sets that I've already told you are just a tool to convey this notion

    Hopefully my above response suffices to answer this. However, it doesn’t matter: that is the introductive question to the solutions (e.g., infinite regressions, infinite circularities, first causes, etc.) that your proof is supposed to demonstrate all of them leading back to everything being uncaused; and so if there is even on solution that doesn’t lead back to that, then your thesis is void. An infinite regression is one such example.
  • ucarr
    1.6k


    If you are claiming that the universe began to exist, then you cannot categorically encompass all of reality in the universe; unless you are saying it came from nothing—which I would say is just an absurdity (no offense).Bob Ross

    Bob Ross appears to imply that a universe with a beginning not incepted from nothing must have been predated by existences outside itself, and thus such a universe cannot encompass total existence.

    You can. U = a -> b ->c Why does it matter if the chain is really long? U = a -> b -> c -> a Why does it matter if the chain loops? U = infinite letters -> a -> b -> c -> infinite letters Why does it matter if it captures infinite?

    The universe did not come 'from nothing'. Nothing did not create anything. It doesn't come 'from' anything. It simply was not, then it was. Or its always been. Either way, nothing made it into being or restricted what could have come into being. That is the only logical conclusion.Philosophim

    Philo counters by arguing – by implication – the possibilities for creation of a universe are infinite.

    ucarr Interpretation

    The implication of a total existence from infinite possibilities is that non-existence is actually unlimited possibility. There’s an idea that nothingness equals no restrictions. But no-restrictions is a something; it’s a restriction, viz, it’s a specification.

    How is it that unlimited possibility dovetails – Venn diagrams – with non-existence?

    Is there a way to conceptualize unlimited possibility as a member of the set of non-existence?

    We know the null set is a proper subset of every non-null set. It is not, however, a member of any set. Since the empty set does not contain the empty set, which is to say the empty set is not even a member of itself, we see that the null set as representative of non-existence cannot get beyond itself, i.e., it cannot get beyond its non-existence, and therefore we infer that, likewise, non-existence itself cannot get beyond itself, i.e., cannot get beyond its non-existence.

    Of course. That's what it is to exist. The Universe is everything. It doesn't mean that there can't be other dimensions, or that it exists in a way that is currently foreign to us. But you can't exist and be outside of existence. Perhaps there are other 'universes' or things that exist separately from the total causality of our pocket of reality. But if the two ever met, then they would intertwine in causality. A God, if it ever interacts with this universe, is part of this universe.Philosophim

    Philo establishes with his own words bolded above that existence, like non-existence, cannot go outside itself. Given thus that both non-existence and existence cannot go outside themselves, we can ask how non-existence, being self-contained, can do other than persist as non-existence. On the other side of the coin, we can ask, how existence, being self-contained, can do other than persist as existence.

    This reasoning suggests that non-existence and existence cannot be sequenced. They are both eternal. If they are both eternal, then they are also mutually exclusive.

    Since we believe we exist, we must believe existence eternal and non-existence non-existent.

    Non-existence being non-existent being a paradox, and thus being existent as non-existence, we see more evidence that existence cannot go outside of itself.

    If we understand the full abstract scope, then the solution becomes clear. First, in terms of composition, if we're talking about composition that caused the universe, this would requires something outside of the universe. But because we've encompassed 'the entire universe' there is nothing outside of the universe which could cause it. In terms of composition, the universes cause would simply be what it is, and nothing more.Philosophim

    Here Philo says the universe is self-caused.

    Now we have two posits about the origin of the universe: a) the universe is eternal; b) the universe is self-caused.

    Is the question of one or the other undecidable?

    Self-causation of all existence to the exclusion of non-existence implies eternal existence. Since existence cannot go outside itself, and thus we, as existents, can't experience non-existence, we must doubt we can know non-existence, and thus we must also doubt: The universe did not come 'from nothing'. Nothing did not create anything. It doesn't come 'from' anything. It simply was not, then it was.

    This leaves us preferring to see the universe as self-caused and eternal.

    Is there faulty reasoning in the path to this conclusion? For example: If the universe is self-caused and contains the totality of existence, then all of the parts of existence are contemporaneous with each other. Does this suggest: a) there is no causation; b) causation has no temporal component?

    On the other hand, do the conservation laws support no causation and thus imply only endless change of forms?

    Does this tilt us toward Neo-Platonism?
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