We may be at an impasse, so please feel free, if you see nothing new or noteworthy to add to my response here, to just have us agree to disagree. That is not to say that I don’t want to continue discussing, and I will, but I just don’t want you feel that you have to keep circling back and reiterating (if that starts to happen, as I suspect it might).
They are not. Someone who does something right is someone who is capable of moral acts. Similarly, someone who does something wrong (or immoral) is someone who is capable of moral acts.
I understand, but the problem is you said:
At this point I'm getting impatient because you're not even reading my responses.
…
Thus someone who does something right (and not wrong) is a moral agent who is in no way culpable, and therefore it is flatly false to claim that moral agents are necessarily culpable
Which implied that by ‘moral agent’, you are referring to not merely an agent
capable of moral action but, rather, one that does
right action. See what I mean?
If it is that you just mean the former, then I was right in thinking that ‘moral agent’, for you, is an agent capable of moral action and, thusly, one which can be held responsible for their actions (which, for you, is one which has deliberate actions). OR, if you mean that a ‘moral agent’ is the latter, then it is not true, and patently incoherent, to posit that anyone capable of moral action is a ‘moral agent’ (because they also, in order to meet the definition, must be doing the
right acts, not just acts of which they are capable of being held responsible).
The interesting thing, is that I think you are using the adjective ‘moral’ in multiple senses, which is normal and fine,
without realizing it. This would explain the seeming incongruence here.
There are two broad, traditional senses of the adjective ‘moral’, which you even expounded in your OP, which are a signification of (1) what is within moral discourse and (2) what is actually good. If this is the case, then it is perfectly coherent for you to posit the phrase ‘moral agent’ in both senses you noted, because one sense would be a ‘moral agent’
merely in the sense that the agent,
qua agent, is within the sphere of moral discourse (viz., they are capable of being held, in action, accountable, as per the dictates of morality, for what they do) and the other sense would be a ‘moral agent’ in the more
strict sense that the agent is not only ‘moral’ in the former sense but also doing the right actions (viz., doing what, as per the dictates of morality, is right). See what I mean?
I would like you to know, although I am not quoting it (for the sake of brevity), that I did read the SEP article and am familiar with it. Although I prefer using adjectives uniformly, I have, upon further reflection, no problem with the distinction of ‘natural’ vs. ‘moral’ evil, as incoherent as that may sound to you (relative to my view), because I know that the adjective ‘moral’ is being used yet in another sense (than the other two I already expounded). Here’s a rundown of all three:
1. ‘moral’ in the sense of within moral discourse (e.g., whether or not to rape someone is a
moral matter [which is not to make a comment on if it is immoral or not]).
2. ‘moral’ in the sense of morally right (e.g., being kind is moral, being mean is immoral).
3. ‘moral’ in the sense of moral responsibility (e.g., you have a moral duty to not rape people, tornadoes are not moral agents, etc.).
These are all senses, I would argue, you are using; and they are divergent in meaning (and I see nothing wrong with this): I just need you to acknowledge and see these senses at work in your own theory.
By ‘moral evil’ in ‘natural vs. moral evil’, one is denoting with the adjective ‘moral’ what is evil in a deliberate sense: it is to use ‘moral’
in all three senses. The first because ‘moral evil’ is within the sphere of moral discourse; the second because ‘moral evil’ is NOT JUST what is in the sphere of moral discourse (such a statement like “whether or not to rape someone is a
moral matter”) but also that it IS morally wrong; and the third because it is not just that it is morally wrong but also that it was deliberate (intentional).
So, let me break down what I mean by way of my dog example:
1. Dogs are not moral agents. ‘Moral’ is being used in the first (and consequently also in the third) sense. This is NOT to say that they are
immoral agents, because ‘immoral’ here is being used in the second sense.
2. The act of rape is immoral. ‘Immoral’ is being used in the second sense.
3. A dog raping another dog is immoral. ‘Immoral’ is being used in the second sense, and is not referencing whether or not the dog is itself a ‘moral agent’ in the first (and consequently third) sense.
I guess, I view the adjective ‘moral’ as, for intents and purposes hereon, plural in meaning; and I see clearly that you are using it the same way (and correct me if I am wrong).
If the dog is not a moral agent then it is not capable of committing immoral acts, such as rape.
Correct, because by ‘moral’ and ‘immoral’ you are referring here to the first and third sense and not the second: you are mentioning that the agent is not capable of being held responsible, and, in this sense, their actions are not within the sphere of moral talk which pertains to talk about moral responsibility.
This doesn’t negate the fact that rape, being committed by the dog, is ‘immoral’ in the second sense—i.e., that it is morally wrong/bad.
Then it's high time you defined what you mean by an immoral act.
I was meaning ‘morally bad’, which to me is ‘to be intrinsically bad or relate to something intrinsically bad such that it bad relative to it’, and this is in the second sense (I mentioned above). I am not commenting on whether or not, by saying it is an ‘immoral’ act in this manner, this act is within the ‘moral reality’ of moral responsibility talk—I just mean that it is morally bad.
Think of it this way, for my view, you can just, in this sense of ‘immoral’ (i.e., the second), just substitute ‘immoral’ for ‘evil’ (although I do think that ‘evil’ is specifically moral badness
to an extreme, but that doesn’t matter for now).
If you think evil just means immoral then you didn't read or understand the SEP articles, because they clearly distinguish moral evil from natural evil.
Correct me if I am wrong, but all I got out of the SEP was that they are making a distinction between two general types of
moral badness: those which are natural, and those which are done purposefully. The latter they use the adjective ‘moral’ to describe, and I don’t see how this negates the other traditional meanings of it.
Do you think that the adjective ‘moral’ has one meaning?--and specifically that it refers only to the sense it is used in the SEP?
If so, then you have issues with your usages in the OP of the adjective. Just as some examples:
What is the breadth of the moral sphere? The common view is that some acts are moral, such as giving a starving man food or committing murder, and some acts are non-moral, such as taking one’s dog for a walk.1 You should immediately notice that by “moral” I do not mean morally good; by “moral” I am not talking about the opposite of immoral. Instead, when I use the term “moral act” I am referring to an act that belongs to the species of moral-and-immoral-acts; or an act that belongs to the species of good-and-bad-acts. More simply, I am referring to an act that is susceptible to (moral) scrutiny, evaluation, or judgment. A moral act is an act that can be legitimately (and, thus, morally) judged good or bad; a non-moral act is an act that cannot.
The underlined portion admits at least two of the senses I described.
In order to understand why all human acts are moral acts we must understand the difference between applying scrutiny to an act and applying moral scrutiny to an act
“moral scrutiny” is being used in the first and third sense, and not the second; which is
completely different from how it is used in the natural vs. moral evil distinction. By your own admission, “moral” in “moral scrutiny” is not referring to something morally right nor wrong: “moral” in “moral evil” is referring to something morally wrong, deliberate, and in the sphere of moral discourse.
What do you suppose it means to be an amoral or non-moral reality? You may as well say that non-colored realities can be red.
By ‘moral reality’, I am assuming you mean ~”a society (or perhaps framework) comprised of beings capable of moral responsibility”. Is that not what you mean?
Given the way you use words like "culpable" and "immoral," I think what you are in need of is a dictionary.
I apologize, by ‘moral agents’ that are culpable for their actions; I meant
capable of being culpable for their actions. I see now how that was confusing. But I don’t see anything wrong with my use (so far) of ‘immoral’.
Hopefully my expounding of the terms helps.
Bob