:up:

I appreciate your input, Relativist. Let’s see if we can find common ground.

knowledge = organized data;
data entails encoding;
encoding entails parts;
Therefore omniscience would entail parts.

It is vital to understand that omniscience in the pre-medieval sense does not entail a being with knowledge like a person has: God is not a person. Omniscience, rather, in this classical sense, would be knowledge in the sense of apprehending the abstract forms of things (being its first cause). Now this doesn’t negate your point per se, but I do need to prefix my response with this.

Now, I would say that I reject that encoding entails that a being must have parts; or that, perhaps, knowledge entails the requirement to encode/decode it. I think you are thinking of something like an AI or human brain, when God is disanalogous to this. God is pure will and being. Willing requires knowledge, but not knowledge necessarily in the sense of computation. In fact, I think that you are right to conclude that a being which computes cannot be absolutely simple.

A being with one property is simpler than a being with multiple properties, even if cannot be decomposed into more fundamental parts.

So, although you are right that a being with one property is simpler than a being with more than one; my rebuttle is that God’s properties are reducible to each other. Pure goodness is the same thing as pure actuality; pure power is the same as pure actuality; and pure actuality is the same as pure willing; and pure willing is the same as volition in correspondence with knowledge.

God doesn’t have multiple properties other than analogically.

non-sequitur. Two identical beings could exist, and a set of multiple "simple" beings (no parts) could exist with non-identical properties. Because of this, both of the following are non-sequitur:

But then you are saying that two things which are have absolutely no ontological differences are ontologically distinct!

This depends on Thomist metaphysics which I see no reason to accept (e.g. that an ontological object can have "actual" and "potency" as intrinsic properties).

I didn’t make an argument from change: I didn’t import that part of Thomistic metaphysics. My argument is from the contingency relations of composition.

:kiss:

Consider: when someone dies we can transplant their organs into other bodies, but we cannot give them an organ transplant to resuscitate them. For example, a heart transplant requires a living body, and will not work on a body that has only recently died.

I see your point; but I am thinking that wouldn’t the ‘being alive’ be a result of those parts interacting with each other properly? Viz., if you give a dead person an organ transplant and get their neurons to start firing again and what not then wouldn’t they be alive? A part of the physical constitution of a thing is the process which is has (e.g., you can have an engine with all the parts in the right place and yet it isn’t burning fuel [i.e., on], but if you know how to start it up then it starts working properly).

Well it’s not Aristotelian (or Thomistic). It misses what Oderberg calls reverse mereological essentialism. Or: yes, it doesn’t “account for” a soul.

Why would we need to posit one for this “reverse mereological essentialism”?

Do you have references to the places in Aristotle and Feser you are thinking of?

Here is Ed Feser discussing change: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sl3uoCi9VjI starting at 25:15.

What I would say is that the argument from motion begins with the premise, “Things are in motion,” and it concludes with an Unmoved Mover. What is unmoved would apparently “remain the same through time.”

Yes, but by ‘motion’ the medieval’s and pre-medieval’s meant any actualization of a potential and not locomotion. If you think about it, this would make sense; since for Aristotle (and Ed Feser) God keeps us in existing right now: they are not arguing merely for a being which started the locomotion at the beginning of the universe (or something like that). That would require this idea of a “hierarchical series” which is a per se series of composition which is analyzed in terms of what causes each thing to remain the same (e.g., Ed Feser likes to use the example of H20: the atoms that make up that molecule don’t themselves have any reason to be H2O—something else actualizes that and keeps it that way [and its the keeping it that way that seems to break the law of inertia]).

My point stands that there can be no conclusion to what necessarily must be the origin of the universe without finding direct evidence.

But that’s what philosophy also engage in. Metaphysics is reasoning about evidence—which can be empirical.

By reason, the OP proves that none of them are absurd or incoherent. No prior cause means no limitations
…
Its not moot at all because I demonstrate that their claim to God is no longer necessary, and that it has no more reason to be the origin then any other origin someone else can think of.

Again, this is an equivocation. When we discuss cosmology, it is about what needs to be explained (i.e., the things around us: the universe) and NOT the totality of what we end up having to posit. You are shifting goal post and then trying to claim to be at the original goal post: that’s not valid.

The conclusions I've put forward are from pure logic and reason. Can you demonstrate at what point my conclusions aren't?

The more I think about it, I think you are right that this argument—if I am understanding it correctly—is an a priori style argument; for you are noting that reason dictates that irregardless of if there is a first cause, infinite causality, etc. that the totality of what is real must be uncaused. So I recant my position on this point.

Again, try it. Put something forward that demonstrates a necessary origin and refutes the conclusions of the OP.

We have don’t have to try to give a counter-argument to know this argument is fallacious. You saying:

1. The totality of what exists could have a first cause, be self-caused, etc.
2. The totality of what exists, being such that nothing can exist outside of it, must be uncaused.
3. Therefore, whether or not the totality of what exists has a first cause, is self-caused, etc. are all equally probable.

The underlined portion is where the equivocation happens that is pivotal to your argument working and of which you are implicitly asking the reader to conflate (with each other); and, I for one, am not willing to. They are not referring to the same thing; and, not to mention, it is patently incoherent (for if this totality is uncaused then it is impossible for it to have a first cause, etc.).

EDIT: I think demanding an argument for the nature of the the cosmos is a red herring, but if you want one, here's a basic one:

1. Per se contingent beings lack the power to exist themselves.
2. An infinite series of contingent beings all lack the power to exist themselves.
3. Therefore, it is impossible for the cosmos to be an infinite series of contingent beings.
4. Therefore, there must be at least one necessary being.

The point is not that you need to accept that argument, it's that your OP doesn't negate anyone from validly engaging in this type of metaphysics.

Philosophy is more often then not the logical construction of concepts. Science is the test and application of those concepts

The definition of philosophy is a tricky and interesting one.

“Philosophy” literally translates to “the love of wisdom”, and wisdom (traditionally) is the absolute truth of the nature of things (with an emphasis on how it impacts practical life as a whole and in terms of practical judgment). Thusly, philosophy dips its toes in every subject-matter; for every subject at its core is the study of the nature of something. Nowadays, people like to distinguish philosophy from other studies akin to distinguishing, e.g., history from science; but the more I was thinking about this (in preparation of my response to your comments) I realized this is impossible. Philosophy is not analogous to history, science, archaeology, etc. It transcends all studies as the ultimate study which gives each study life—so to speak. For without a yearning for the understanding of the nature of things, which is encompassed in the love of wisdom, then no subject-matter is sought after—not even science.

Some might say philosophy is the study of self-development, but this clearly isn’t true (historically). It includes self-development but is not restricted to just that domain. E.g., logic is not an area itself within the study of self-development and yet it is philosophical.

Some might say, like you, that philosophy is the application of pure reason (viz., the study of what is a priori); but is is equally historically false. E.g., cosmological arguments are typically a posteriori. Most disputes in philosophy have and will continue to be about reasoning about empirical data to abstract what is mostly likely the nature of things (and how to live life properly in correspondence with that knowledge).

This would entail that science is philosophy at its core, but is a specific branch that expands on how to understand the nature of things; and so science vs. philosophy is a false dichotomy.

The problem I have with your understanding of philosophy vs. science is that it seems to be very verificationistic. The vast majority of what we know with the most credence cannot be scientifically verified. E.g., the nature of a proposition being a statement that is truth-apt; 1 + 1 = 2; a = a; !(a && !a); the nature of truth being such that it is the correspondence of thought with reality; the law of causality; etc.

The truth is that most of our knowledge is not scientific: they are evidence-based reasoning. They are probabilistic based off of our experiences; and this is not science proper—nor is it an imitation of science.

I would challenge you to demonstrate how science proves that a proposition cannot be both true and false; or that 1 = 1; or that knowledge is a JTB; or that every change has a cause; etc.

But there is no philosophical discovery at that point. There would be the discovery of whether there was a first cause, or infinite regress.

We can still do the exact same philosophical questioning of causes: your OP just notes that if we take the totality of what we posit as existing then that totality cannot have a cause; which is a trivial note. We still have up for grabs whether or not an infinite regress of causes is absurd; whether a first cause is arbitrary; whether a self-cause is incoherent; whether ….

Nothing about this OP negates any of this. You seem to be equivocating the totality of things which need explaining with the thing being used to explain it. E.g., the theist says there must be a first cause to explain the totality of these things which exist, and you come around and point out that God + those things is now the new totality which is uncaused—this is a mute point (by my lights).

The only logical conclusion is that we cannot know.

Ontology and metaphysics is largely not about a priori proofs; and so they have not been primarily about arguments from pure logic or reason. You seem to think that’s not the case…

If the OP is correct, then you cannot prove it to be impossible.

See, this is where you are equivocating. No, your OP does not entail that an infinite regress vs. a first cause of composition is equally probable: it demonstrates that irregardless of which one we think is most probable because the whole of things we posit (which includes that regress or first cause) cannot have a cause itself. Which is, dare I say, obviously true but not relevant to the debate.

When we debate cosmology, we are debating the comsos—the whole of what immediately needs explaining; and NOT the whole of what we end up having to posit as real. You are conflating these two.

The scientific ontological argument is still on

This is a contradiction in terms: ontology is philosophy, not science. Science cannot get at ontology, being merely the study of the relation of things and not the nature of things.

Is it the big bang? A God that made a big bang? Etc.

Yes, this is metaphysics which rides closely with science; as it should be. Most scientists are also metaphysicians whether they like it or not.

The different is it requires evidence, reason, testing, and confirmation

This is true of the vast majority of philosophy.

Try it. Try to show that any particular origin is philosophically necessary if the OP is true and see if it works.

What do you mean by "philosophically necessary"?

In my OP, e.g., I am considering actual impossibility as that modality relates to an infinite series of composition. Are you saying if a first cause, infinite series of causes, etc. cannot be proven to be logically necessary then it must be outside the purview of philosophy?

Let me take another stab at this: let me know if this is what you are saying. I think here's basically your argument:

1. Reality must be uncaused.
2. Therefore, whether or not the universe is a series of infinite causality or has a first cause is equally probable.

Is that it?

If so, here's my thoughts:

1. Ceteris paribus, it is correct that two or more things are equally probable if those things equally have no explanation for their existence; however, the probability of one or the other changes given our understanding of the universe.

2. Philosophy does not engage in merely pure reason; and so ontology and metaphysics certainly is engaging in reasoning based off of empirical evidence (to some large extent) and this is perfectly valid for it to. (I say this just because you seem to think philosophy would be mute on this study of causation since it requires empirical data to determine)

3. Philosophy, particularly metaphysics, is still the proper study of the nature of causality and as it relates to the totality of physical things. Science can't determine if the universe is just an infinite relation of causality, has a first cause, etc. because in principle there is no scientific proof which can be afforded; given that science presupposes that every change has a cause for the sake of doing science (and so every scientific experiment already presupposes the law of causality in the first place) and an infinite regress would be impossible to experimental 'sniff out' since each causal member would merely entail that causal relation and not the causal relation of the nth member.

The result means that it is philosophically impossible to conclude that any of these ideas are necessarily existent or impossible.

Why? I don't see how that follows from the OP. Again, all the OP seems to be saying is that totality of what exists is uncaused; but the debate is about the totality of the world in which we live (viz., the physical world).

The classical debate about the totality of the world in which we live is completely unaffected by your point.

Another way of thinking about, if you will, is that you are thinking of the totality of what exists too loosely and what needs to be explained in terms of causation is stricter sense of the things which exist in nature and in the universe.

The only way to discover if something was infinitely or finitely regressive is to actually discover this using science.

But I thought in the above that you were claiming that your OP has resolved the question about first causes, infinite causation, arbitrary causation, etc. as it relates to the universe---no? If so, then this is incoherent with that point; as science wouldn't be required to solve anything.

Anything could have been possible, but what actually happened can only be discovered by looking at our universe and determining by fact how it did.

Again, this contradicts the idea that you have resolved the debate about causation by pointing out that reality has no cause.....

I see what you are going for, but this entirely sidesteps the discussion of causality in metaphysics and ontology. When philosophers discuss whether all these things that exist are just infinitely causally related, self-caused, or have a first cause (or first causes); they are discussing the totality of what exists and how to explain them. You are jumping in noting something trivial, which is that irregardless of which philosopher is right the totality of existent things has no cause because that would include the first cause, self-caused things, or the infinite causality. No one disputes this, and this does not help further the discussion on whether or not causality is infinite, there are self-caused things, there are arbitrarily existent things, or/and there are first causes.

For example, taking my OP, my argument for a first cause---assuming for a second it is valid---is equally compatible with your idea that reality itself is uncaused just as much as a person who believes that causality is infinite.

EDIT: all your OP does, then, as far as I can tell, is forces the philosopher to be more precise with what they mean by the "reality" that one is trying to explain.

I guess my question would be: how does this help resolve any of the debates about first causes, infinite causality, arbitrary causes, and the like? Is there something about this that I am missing?

I don't think the self is made up of concrete parts: I think it is an emergent property of processes of the brain. Unless you are positing some sort of absolutely simple soul, then I don't think this is any issue for the OP.

The suggestion that an abstract¹ – "not concrete" – being has a causal property, or causal relation to anything concrete (e.g. is "a first cause"), is a reification fallacy and thereby a misconception of an abstract (i.e. "not concrete") being.

I don’t see how I’m committing a fallacy. God is real, but non-spatiotemporal. You are saying here that anyone who believes in anything non-spatiotemporal that relates to spatiotemporal things is a reification fallacy. So, I guess time itself existing is a reification fallacy?

A Third Option – in fact, demonstrated by quantum field theory (QFT) to be the case at the planck scale – that "composed beings" are effects of a-causal, or randomly fluctuating, events (i.e. excitations of vacuum² energy) as the entire planck-radius³ universe – its thermodynamically emergent constituents of "composed concrete beings" – happened to be at least c14 billion years ago.

I am not follow about this, but this sounds like it still has parts unless you are saying it literally remains existing by its smaller parts popping in and out of existence—is that the idea?

I assert that its conceptually possible for there to be two distinct extended simples which both lack further proper parts and are numerically distinct being merely separated by the void.

That's patently incoherent. You just said that two things exist separately in non-existence (i.e., a void).

Corollary point: how can a being be both? If God is omnipotent, he can do anything. If omnibenevolent, then ony good things. And then, of course, since God is absolute, what exactly is an absolutely good thing - are not good things good with respect to something?

Did you read the OP? I feel like you didn’t read it; because I outlined exactly what I mean by omnipotence and omnibenevolence and they are perfectly compatible with each other.

The point is the proof of the OP is just an exercise in word games which only works if the required understandings are already in place and accepted, I.e., presupposed.

If the OP is word games, then every argument is a word game. This makes no sense.

Even going back to the first premise, how can I be composite? I am identical with myself: if of parts, then wherein do I exist? And if a part removed, then no longer myself but someone/thing different

Without getting into identity over time, the point is that your body is made up of parts. If you disagree with this, then I can’t help you: it’s painfully obviously true.

The only thing is that the universe has no cause. I don't argue for a finite starting point, as time is only one aspect of cause. Its very plausible that an infinitely regressive universe has always existed. Why has it always existed? Did an X cause it to be that way? No, it simply does.

Got it; but doesn’t this entail that you believe that there are existent things which exist outside of time and of which interact, to some degree, with temporal things; given that the death of a previous universe to “fuel” the big bang would require “moments” where there is no time? Also, if time is reduced to a real entity in the universe (like the big bang theory does), then wouldn’t there have to be aspects to the universe which transcend it (or at least are on par with it)?

The universe did not come 'from nothing'. Nothing did not create anything. It doesn't come 'from' anything. It simply was not, then it was

This is incoherent. Either the universe arbitrarily came into being—which is what it sounds like you are saying here—and it came from nothing or it has always been: those are the two options for the position that the universe has no cause.

If it “simply was not, then it was”, then you are saying—to be clear—that it there was nothing and then there was something; which is exactly to say that it poofed into existence from nothing. The reason most people won’t get on board with this is because it is absurd. Something cannot just poof into existence from nothing: there cannot be nothing and then magically something out of nothing.

It simply was not, then it was. Or its always been

Which one are you arguing for? These are two incompatible claims.

The term 'first cause' in the previous paper was always to get attention to the topic when I was knew on these forums years ago, and really was a bending of the term to mean, "no cause". I rewrote this with the same conclusions without the attention getting terminology.

Fair enough.

Incorrect. Most of us look at only one side of the point that the universe formed without limitations. We often think about what can, but then still have some notion that somehow there is a 'can't' Why can't it Bob? If there is no X -> U, then there is also no X -> ~U.

To be honest, I didn’t follow this at all. Can you reword it? What do you mean (X → U) → (X → !U)? I am not following the relevance of that statement.

. There is nothing the prevents a God from existing, then that God creating the rest of the universe.

Yes there is under your view. The two options you have spelled out is that (1) the universe arbitrarily came into being (from nothing) or (2) the universe has always existed; and both entail that God cannot exist, since God is an unlimited being which creates the universe. In #1, God wouldn’t be creating the universe; and in #2 God would simply not be God since this being would be some sort of limited being within the universe (if we assume traditional theism, which is widely accepted as the standard of what God is in a mono-theistic sense). In #2, only a demi-god could exist as a mere being among beings in the universe, who may have much greater being than we do.

Why is there any more or less reason for a universe with an eternal God to exist then a universe with eternal rocks to exist? There isn't any

That’s going to depend on your theological commitments. Just briefly relating this to my OP, if one finds arguments convincing that God is required to explain the universe, then there are better reasons, all else being equal, to believe God exists as the necessary and eternal being than positing the universe itself.

Because there is no outside reason for any of those possibilities to exist or not exist. If it exists, it simply does.

Yes, in principle any being or series which is necessary and brute has equally no explanation for its existence; but the burden is on your OP to demonstrate why we should believe that the universe came into existence out of nothing or always existed. I am not sure what the argument is here. Going back to what I said earlier:

If you are claiming that the universe began to exist, then you cannot categorically encompass all of reality in the universe; unless you are saying it came from nothing—which I would say is just an absurdity (no offense).

Your argument in the OP seemed to be that we are just defining everything as in the universe; so there can’t be anything outside of it to cause it to exist. But this is just an equivocation: the universe usually refers to the natural world we live in and not the totality, per se, of existent things.

A theist could easily piggy-back off of your point and say that the ‘universe’ as you mean it is really ‘reality’ and reality, which includes God, has no reason for its existence but it is not a necessary being since it is just the abstract representation of the whole of God and God’s creation.

If this is what you mean by “the universe has no cause”—viz., reality has no cause—then that is true but trivially true and is detracts from any conversation about necessary beings. No matter if the universe, in the standard sense, needs a cause or not; it will still be true that the totality of things has no cause itself—irregardless if there’s an infinite series of causes or a finite series that bottoms out at God. Likewise, this would sidestep my objections above because God would not be limited by reality, since reality is just God’s infinite nature in addition to what God created (namely the universe).

Feelings do exist in space if you think about your own self.

The problem with your analysis of consciousness is that you are ignoring the phenomenal nature of it due to it being ontologically grounded in physical things. Hence why when I say a thought is non-spatiotemporal you respond noting that it is grounded in the brain.

Now, phenomenally, you are right that a feeling can be represented as linked to something in space (e.g., the pain in my arm); but the feeling is not itself in space. If you deconstruct, e.g., my arm, then you will surely not find the phenomenal pain which I am describing there—you will find neurons and such.

Once something is in space and time, even if it has no parts can we zoom in on it and say it has a front, back, and side?

That is impossible; for something outside of space has no sides. A side is an inherently spatial concept—no?

Also, ‘zooming in/out’ is also an inherently spatial concept.

Saying, "It would not have the power to exist on its own." wasn't built up to by any of the previous premises.

That is true, it wasn’t meant to be.

How does part composition relate to power?

Let me outline a brief argument for 5: let’s call it A5. As always, by “composed being” I am meaning a “concretely composed being”.

A5-1. A composed being is contingent on its parts to exist.
A5-2. Therefore, a composed being cannot exist by itself or from itself.
A5-3. Therefore, a part which is a composed being cannot exist by itself or from itself.
A5-4. An infinite series of composition, let’s call it set C, of a composed being would be an infinite series of beings which cannot exist by themselves or from themselves.
A5-5. In order for a composed being to exist, it must be grounded in something capable of existing itself.
A5-6. C has no such member as described in A5-5.
A5-7. Therefore, the existence, ceteris paribus, of C is (actually) impossible.

What is it for something to exist on its own, versus exist on something else?

Good question. For a thing to have the power to exist would be for it to be necessary—that is, not contingent on something else. For if it is contingent on something else, then it only exists insofar as it “borrows” being from that which it is contingent upon (insofar as we are talking about per se causation).

Hello again! I had some time to re-read the OP and give it the proper attention it deserves. Here’s my thoughts.

A cause is a combination of factors which explain why a state of reality is the way it is.
...
If we understand the full abstract scope, then the solution becomes clear. First, in terms of composition, if we're talking about composition that caused the universe, this would requires something outside of the universe. But because we've encompassed 'the entire universe' there is nothing outside of the universe which could cause it. In terms of composition, the universes cause would simply be what it is, and nothing more.

I don’t have a problem with your definition of a cause; but the problem is you seem to equivocate it quite frequently. I would like to clarify that, if you believe the the universe—as a whole—just is what it is with no explanation then the universe is not caused. It is not self-caused, it is not caused, and it is has no first cause.

Maybe I am misreading this OP, but I get the inkling that you are arguing—in various disparate spots—that the universe has no cause, it is self-caused, and it has a first cause. None of these are compatible with your claim that the universe just simply is.

The nature of something being uncaused by anything outside of itself is a new venue of exploration for Ontology.

Just as a side note, this historically is false. Many different fields of philosophy have been analyzing the nature of a necessary being and arbitrarily existent beings—such as theology, metaphysics, and ontology.

If it formed, there would be no prior cause for why it formed, and no prior cause for what it should not have formed. Meaning it could form, or could not form
…
But if Y formed in 'that way' without a prior cause of X, then it is not necessary that Y formed in that way, it 'simply did'.

It sounds like you are claiming that the universe did begin to exist and yet its beginning to exist has no cause—is that right?

In my mind, I thought originally you were claiming that the universe is just eternal and immutable itself with no cause.

These are two very different conceptions.

If we understand the full abstract scope, then the solution becomes clear. First, in terms of composition, if we're talking about composition that caused the universe, this would requires something outside of the universe. But because we've encompassed 'the entire universe' there is nothing outside of the universe which could cause it.

If you are claiming that the universe began to exist, then you cannot categorically encompass all of reality in the universe; unless you are saying it came from nothing—which I would say is just an absurdity (no offense).

If you are claiming that the universe never began to exist (viz., never ‘formed’), then it has always been; and this would entail no first cause.

4. But what about a God?

Yes, it is logically possible that a God could exist

Irregardless of which of the previous theses I mentioned you are going for, it is clear that God cannot exist in your view of the universe; for if the universe has no first cause then there are no necessary beings (which includes God) and if the universe just poofed into existence out of nothing then there cannot be any God which was prior to it which created it nor sustains it.

The only kind of God which would exist in your worldview here—dare I say—is a demi-god.

Ah, I see. So a being that is all-loving, omniscient, omnibenevolent, omnipotent, absolutely simple, purely actual, eternal, unique, one, immutable, and eternal is the thesis of classical theism. That kind of being is what is traditionally referred to as God. That's what theology centrally revolved around traditionally for a long time. There is nothing being presupposed there: it is just noting that what we just proved exists, is what we use the term (traditionally) "God" to refer to you. No different than how we can prove a car exists and then note that the thing we just proved exists is traditionally called a 'car'.

So, what I am trying to say is that the composed beings that are concrete are either composed of an infinite regress of concrete things or there must be a first cause which is not concrete.

None of the premises of your argument refer to "concrete entities" – goal post-shifting fallacy, Bob.

You are not being charitable. I am admitting that I used the term 'composed being' to refer to a 'concretely existent being which has parts' without realizing that it was too vague. I concede your point, which is valid, and am noting to you that the OP is only targeting concretely existent objects. The argument clearly makes no sense if it were to target non-spatial(temporal) beings like numbers, feelings, thoughts, etc.

I think we are jumping all over the place in our discussion, and that’s equally my fault. I can tell from your response that we disagree at pretty much every level even in terms of our understanding of how to approach understanding reality. Let me try to reign in the conversation without derailing.

The two core ideas that I think we need to focus on is (1) the metaphysics of a part and (2) the establishment of an absolutely simple being simpliciter.

With respect to #1, it is worth admitting that I do need to provide a clearer conception of its metaphysics (although I think its definition given before is perfectly adequate); and you are right to point this out. I still stand firm that a part is something which contributes to the composition of the whole—as its definition—but there are many prima facie issues with this definition that I need to address and resolve.

First, one may object that a thing could have parts which is not a concrete object (which I overlooked)—e.g., a singular feeling of disgust spanning 3 seconds, the parts of a word in a thought, numbers, etc.—and that such non-spatial (but yet temporal) things could legitimately be called divisible (going along with the idea that divisibility is related to the the idea of having parts such that one can divvy up the whole into them). To this, I say that the OP is talking about divisibility as it relates to concrete objects—that is, spatiotemporal objects. E.g., a singular feeling of disgust that spans 3 seconds is divisible in time—and thusly has parts—but not in a spatial—and thusly not in a concrete—sense; for a feeling does not exist in space (even if it can be causally explained in terms of brain processes). These kind of phenomena have parts but are immune to my OP’s argument because the OP is centered around spatiotemporal (i.e., concrete) beings when it outlines its premises. I therefore will refer to the parts which are relevant to the OP—and of which refer to spatiotemporal divisibility of objects—as ‘concrete parts’ to avoid confusion.

Second, one may object that, in the case of @Mww, space and time are pure a priori modes of our cognition and, thusly, exist but are not real; so a ‘concrete object’ would not refer to something that is spatiotemporal and yet there would be a clear distinction between what our cognition represents in time alone vs. what it represents in space and time—the latter being exactly what I am referring to by ‘concrete’ objects. In a view like transcendental idealism, all concrete objects would be non-spatiotemporal (or at least wouldn’t exist in the space and time which our brains attribute to them). To this, I respond that these non-spatiotemporal concrete objects would still be divisible and have parts in the relevant sense to the OP because we have to trust our senses and cognition to tell us that they are ‘other’ than us; and the way our brain’s do that is by representing that which is ‘other’ as separate. So, these objects—whatever they are in-themselves, even if it be non-spatiotemporal—must be divisible and have ‘concrete’ parts. I only refer to this objection to be thorough, as I don’t believe you accept the non-reality of space and time, but for now I think we can both establish concrete entities as simply defined in the sense in the first objection (i.e., as spatiotemporal objects).


With respect to #2, the OP argues for God’s existence in multiple steps; and I think we keep jumping around where you disagree about something midway in the argument when you don’t agree about something which is required for that part of the argument to work. So, let’s start at the basics and see what you are disagreeing with:

1. Composed beings are made up of parts.
2. A composed being exists contingently upon its parts in their specific arrangement.
3. A part of a composed being is either composed or uncomposed.
4. A part that is a composed being does not, in turn, exist in-itself but, rather, exists contingently upon its parts and their specific arrangement.
5. An infinite series of composed beings for any given composed being (viz., a composed being of which its parts are also, in turn, composed and so on ad infinitum) would not have the power to exist on their own.
6. Therefore, an infinite series of composed beings is impossible.
7. Therefore, a series of composed beings must have, ultimately, uncomposed parts as its first cause. (6 & 3)

By ‘composed being’ above, I am referring to a concrete object (as defined above) which has concrete parts (as defined above). Do you agree with 1-7? I am guessing you will disagree with 5.

As you quoted, the OP reaches God's existence as the conclusion of it. So I am confused why you think it is presupposed. The argument outlines why composition entails God's existence without presupposing God's existence to begin with.

Well in the first place esse != parts and essence != whole. Esse/essence is not the part/whole relationship.

That’s fair. I am starting to think my OP isn’t even arguing from Aquinas’ essence vs. esse distinction; so maybe this isn’t a Thomistic argument afterall.

What I am really doing, by my lights, is making an argument from contingency and necessity as it relates to composition; basically by way of arguing that an infinite series of composition is impossible because it would be an infinite series of contingent things of which each lacks the power to exist themselves.

, if you place all of the parts of a frog together in the correct configuration, there will still be no frog

Yes and no. If you were to take a dead frog and “sew it back to together”, then yes you are right; but if you configure the frog’s pieces to be exactly as it were when it was alive; then it must now be alive again….no?

If a cat loses an ear or a dog loses a leg it has lost a part but the cat or dog still exists

I agree.

The problem begins in premise (4), where you imply that there is an existence in the parts that is not in the whole, and thus we are upbuilding existence from parts to whole. Your idea is something like, “Parts are what primarily exist, and because they exist wholes exist. The existence of wholes is generated by the existence of parts.”

What’s the problem with that? Are you saying that it doesn’t account for a soul?

Why do you say that?
…
Think about it this way: is it easier for someone to deny the essence/existence distinction, or is it easier for them to deny that existence of motion/change?

That’s true, but I say that because Aristotle’s proof only works if we think of a thing having the potential to remain the same through time and that potential being actualized through time. Otherwise, the argument fails to produce a being that would fit classical theism which is the perpetual sustainer of everything; instead, we just get a kind of ‘kalam cosmological argument’ where this being starts everything off moving.

By ‘motion’, Aristotle is not just talking about, e.g., an apple flying in the air: he is talking about the change which an apple that is just sitting there is undergoing by merely remaining the same. That’s the only reason, e.g., Ed Feser’s “Aristotelian Proof” gets off the ground in the first place.

So, it seems like you are saying:

1. An absolutely simple being causing (ultimately) the existence of all things violates physics.
2. Therefore, it cannot exist.

How does it violate physics?

1. There is no example we can give of an infinite regress of reality being powered by itself.
2. Therefore, its is impossible.

How is the argument I noted any different?

I didn’t argue that: that would also be an argument from ignorance. I specified exactly why it is impossible.

What I'm noting is your example of a simple being outside of time and space powering 'the first gear', is also impossible.

I didn’t give an example of that. As I said before, the example of the gears was to demonstrate that your idea of an infinite series explaining the causality of composition is impossible.

Because what is possible must be known at least once.

This is standardly false. Right now, we are discussing actual possibility; but even if we keep it more generic possibility in principle refers to something which may not have ever happen but can happen. What you just described by possibility is not a modality: it is historicity.

Even if you disagree, I am using the term ‘possibility’ foremost in its common sense definition of being the modality of what can happen; and more specifically in terms of what can happen relative to physics. It is actually impossible (and impossible in the common sensical definition) for an infinite set of moving gears to exist by themselves; it is not actually impossible—or at least you still haven’t demonstrated why it is impossible—for an absolutely simple being to the transcendent grounds for physics itself by way of demonstrating, first and foremost, that the composition of objects entails such a being in the first place.

a simple being that exists outside of time and space cannot interact with time and space. To affect time and space, the thing must touch time and space, and must be in it at the point of interactivity. Its simple physics

It is commonly accepted that time and space, assuming they are real, are not fundamental to reality. E.g., Einstein’s space-time fabric implies a block time whereby the relations of things must be determined in ways independent of a strict temporal succession like we intuit.

Your point here requires that space and time are real substances which every existent thing is in and of; and I don’t see why that is case nor how science backs that. On the contrary, quantum physics and einsteinien physics demonstrate that they are not fundamental at all.

But you use the argument from motion to show the infinite regress of gears is impossible. Again, the same standards must be applied to both arguments. And if you're not arguing that there is a simple being powering the first gear of regress, I don't understand what you're trying to say

I am saying that an infinite series of rotating gears ceteris paribus is impossible; and analogously an infinite series of composition for an object is impossible. If it is impossible for a composed object to be infinitely composed, then there must be a first member; and that member must be uncomposed—which means it is absolutely simple.

How is this any different from a simple being starting the first gear in the chain of causality?

Because I don’t think that this simple being is the cause of the composition of objects analogously to a thing perpetually moving the first gear in a series. Moving a gear in a series would require something physical moving it, at least immanently (directly). Again, I do find Aristotle’s argument from motion convincing, but that’s a separate argument that runs on separate lines of thought.

If you wanted to make it analogous, then you would have to posit that there is an infinite series of gears (in the manner we discussed) but that the movement is supplied to each gear equally from some aspect of their own composition; which would, as you can guess, make them ‘magic gears’. The analogy falls apart if we try to make it analogous in that sense.

It doesn't succeed in demonstrating this because you need a simple being to be understood in terms of real causality just like the gear example.

Which premise fails?

Without understanding what a simple being is, and how it could begin this causal chain, you can't prove your OP.

That’s false. If all the premises are true, then the conclusion in the OP logically follows. How it causes the existence of things is a separate question.

Its not a red herring, its to show that thoughts are parts.

A thought does not have parts. Your brain has parts. Are you arguing that somehow your brain has parts and your thoughts have parts?

A simple being would be like that, 'red'

Red in the sense of the phenomena or the wavelength? If the former, then it doesn’t have parts and is absolutely simple but is not a concretely existent thing; and if the latter, then it is made of parts but is a concretely existent thing. Either way, it isn’t an example of an absolutely existent thing in concreto (viz., ontologically).

The correct statement here is that forms of intelligence reduce to physical parts, so there is a flaw in your OP.

What’s the proof you have of this?

A simple being of red, a simple being of green for example. If a being has both green and red, it is no longer simple. If a being can think, it is no longer simple. You're noting a simple being, and a simple being would have severe limitations because it has no parts within it. A god of intelligence in no manner of logical thought is simple.

Again, you are using the term ‘part’ too loosely. A part is something which contributes to the composition of a whole in concreto. A thought; a feeling; the phenomenal experience of a color; the taste of pizza; etc. do not have parts and are not concrete objects.

A simple being is one, it has no other parts. There could be another simple being that also has no parts, and that would not contradict the first simple being. Therefore it is not true that two simple beings cannot exist.

Again, you just argued by way of begging the question. I have no good reasons so far to accept that you are right that two simple beings can exist. I already provided a proof that that is impossible. If two things lack parts, then they cannot exist separately from each other; for a thing can only be concretely distinguished from another thing by way of its parts. There would be no boundaries between two absolutely simple things because they have no parts to allow for such limitations.

and that, rendered, is God as presupposition.

Not at all. God is not a presupposition of the argument in the OP.

That is, we presuppose God exists, therefore God exists:

This is a blatant straw man: did you read the OP?

sound theology, not very good philosophy, and nothing scientific at all.

If the philosophy is unsound, then so too is the theology unsound.

But it seems to me that given your "generic existence," then it is difficult - actually impossible - to think of anything that does not exist. Yes? No?

No. On the contrary, if you are a pluralist, then two things can exist in two or more different kinds of being itself. So X may exist in type A being, and not exist in type B being.

The question arises, how does X interact with type B existent things? Hence, a problem of interaction arises; and of which only establishing a communal type of existence will solve it. The, we end up with an argument of parsimony for monism; because why would we posit three (or more) types of existences when you still need to posit one generic type that they all inherit???

Also I forgot to mention:

Not a worry, it was only referenced if it would help you to understand what I was getting at. I wrote it specifically to detail 'cause' more, so I am a bit disappointed you think its not detailed enough. After were done here it would be kind if you would point out where you think its still lacking.

Sorry, I am not trying to disappoint you; and I will re-read your OP and respond in that thread sometime soon so we can discuss that as well.

I'm noting that if you apply the same approach to your idea of a simple being being the start of it all, you run into the same impossibility. If that is so, and you are noting that something impossible is possible, then an infinite series is equally impossibly possible.

So, I want to focus for second on the fact that you believe both a finite series with an absolutely simple first member and an infinite series of rotating gears are impossible.

I demonstrated here that the latter is impossible as follows:

1. Change is the actualization of a potential.
2. A gear cannot change itself.
3. Rotation is a form of change.
4. A gear cannot rotate itself.
5. An infinite series of gears that are interlinked would never, in itself, produce any rotation amongst the gears.
6. Therefore, if an infinite series of gears that are interlinked are such that they are each rotating, then something outside of that series is the cause of that rotation.

You still have not demonstrated that the former is impossible. This seems to be the crux of your rejoinder, so what is your argument for that?

Here’s the closest I saw in your response to an argument:

Can you give an example of a monopart that exists apart from space and time yet is able to interact with the space and time of a gear to start it all? Of course not, its impossible, yet we say its possible anyway.

This is a bad argument. You are saying:

1. There is no example we can give of a being that exists outside of space and time and yet can still interact with things in space and time.
2. Therefore, it is impossible.

That is, ironically, an argument from ignorance—that’s a God of the gaps style argument.

I would like you to focus on providing me with a sound argument for why it is impossible; because that’s the crux of your argument. However, I do want to briefly address some other points you made: feel free to ignore the rest of this response to focus on the above if you need to.

What you're saying is there is essentially one gear that gets powered, then powers all the others. How can that be 'perfectly simple'?

The gears example is analogous to the composition argument only insofar as I was demonstrating that an infinite series of beings which lack the power to instantiate a thing and of which exhibit that thing is impossible per se. I am not arguing that there is an absolutely simple being at the beginning of a finite series (or an indefinite series with a starting point—i.e., a potential infinity) of gears moving. As a side note, Aristotle would argue that, by analogy, the gears are an infinite series that are rotating each other and the pure actualizer is the external cause for that rotation. I don’t want to get into his argument from motion because it detracts from the OP (which is about composition).

My argument is from composition: it is the idea that an absolutely simple being that is purely actual is the start of the chain of causality for the existence of things in terms of their composition. Think of it more like the atom composes the apple, and not the apple is thrown by the person.

This makes no sense then. If a single gear powers the others, it powers it by transferring energy from itself to the rest of the gears. If not, then how does it transfer?

This doesn’t matter if the OP succeeds in demonstrating that an absolutely simple being needs to exist to account for the existence of contingent beings. Again, you keep shifting the goalpost to questions about how this absolutely simple being actualizes the existence of things instead of whether or not the OP succeeds at proving there is such a being that actualizes them. These are separate questions.

They actually are. You can tie those feelings to your brain, which is many multiple parts. A person can be lobotimzed to the point that they cannot think about ice cream nor feel sad anymore.

I agree that consciousness can be reduced to our bodies; but that is a red herring to what I said. It is uncontroversially true that your thoughts have no concrete, proper parts.

You could try to argue that the absolutely simple being cannot be absolutely simple if it has thoughts because thoughts require physical parts to arise; but I am going to deny that because the OP demonstrates such a being must exist; so it must be the case that not all forms of intelligence are reducible to physical parts. Again, that’s why I keep trying to get you to address the OP; because if it succeeds then these points you are making are good but irrelevant.

But how can something which does not exist in space or time power the first gear?

Again, this doesn’t entail it is impossible. This is an argument from ignorance.

Two beings are distinguishable from each other's parts, not from their own parts within themselves. A simple part is mono, meaning it cannot be multiple. Meaning we can have two different monoparts. They would be distinguishible because one mono part would not be the other monopart.

If a thing has parts, then it can be distinguished from other things. An absolutely simple being has no parts, so it is impossible that this ‘mono’ thing you referred to as having ‘their own parts within themselves’ is absolutely simple.

Likewise, you just blanketly asserted that we can have two different ‘monoparts’ when that’s literally what are supposed to be providing an argument for. You basically just said:

1. An absolutely simple being is ‘mono’.
2. There can be two different monoparts.
3. Therefore, it is false that two absolutely simple beings cannot exist.

That just begs the question.

Where?

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/961602

Gregory, you keep jumping all over the place. I keep addressing your points and then you just move on to different point without engaging and then you circle back to the original point I already addressed.

E.g.,:

The gears coukd have eternally moved by gravity if they are on a slant

I already demonstrated that gravity doesn't work like that and that your counter-example using it does not provide any rejoinder to the argument from composition; and even if it did it wouldn't negate anything I said to Philosophim. The 'thing' which would be actualizing the potential for the gears to move would, like I pointed out, be external to the series. In this case, you are positing it is some sort of gravity.

I don't believe that existence has different types because I am a monist about it; so a thing either exists or it doesn't in the sense of generic existence.

God would exist supernaturally, because God would be the basis of nature but transcends it.

In terms of proof, it is always worth mentioning that no philosophical argument is a strict proof; but I would say the OP "proves" that God exists from composition, and it is an inherently philosophical (namely metaphysical) argument.

Its more than that. Its a reference to creating an argument of mysticism to fill in when there's a problem that's difficult to solve. I find the belief in the infinite mystical, and used to dodge the question of universal origin.

But nothing about the OP is mystical nor does it cite anything mystical. I challenge you to show me which premise in the OP is making an argument from ignorance.

If it were an absolutely simple being, no parts, then how does it power a thing that has parts?

The OP is just establishing that an absolutely simple being must be the underpinning (ultimately) for the actualization (composition) of the composed being: how it scientifically works is separate question that digresses from the OP.

Is this what you are referring to by ‘mysticism’? The OP doesn’t need to demonstrate how it scientifically works for us to know that it must exist.

Wouldn't a part of the immutable being need to interact with that part?

No, because there is no parts to the simple being; but, yes, it does ‘interact’ with what it actualizes insofar as it keeps it in existence.

Energy itself is a part, so it would have to impart some to another thing.

Energy is just the ability to do work; so I am not following what you mean here. Energy doesn’t have parts just as much as space itself has no parts; however, it is worth noting that they are not absolutely simple concrete beings.

The problem is a definition of a partless immutable entity powering everything else contradicts how causation and power work.

What do you mean by power? I was just using it loosely to refer to actualization.

How does it contradict how causation works? Causation is just the actualization of potentials.

That would be an infinite regress by time though. This is the same as an infinitely existing bar spinning itself. What powers this infinite existing being?

It is not in time.

It also can't be partless if it is to have agency, intelligence, and infinite existence.

I don’t see why it couldn’t in principle. By partless, we are talking about in concreto parts. My feeling of sadness and my thought about maybe eating ice cream later are not parts of my (in concreto) being.

No, absolutely simple and something like a God do not fit. God is complex and can be identified in parts by expression at the least. Something perfectly simple would have no parts, no expression, and agency, no will.

I demonstrated the exact opposite is true in the OP: please feel free to contend with any of the relevant premises.

Such a thing is not bound by logic in its existence.

That doesn’t follow from what you said so far. A necessary being could, in principle, be bound by logic such as the law of identity.

. But if this is the case, there is no logic preventing an infinite regress from existing either, as it too would have no rules or reason for its origination of existence.

That misses the point. Like I said before, the problem is that you are positing an infinite series which is contradicted by what we know exists; so it is impossible. The idea of such an infinite series ceteris paribus, to your point, is possible.

The problem I'm trying to note is that you need to apply the same criticism against an infinite series of no outside origin to a finite series of no outside origin. I posted a rewrite of my "Probability of a God" example a few days back where I cover this concept. You don't have to post there, but a quick read may clarify what I'm talking about. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/961721

I am more than happy to discuss that in this thread if you want or in that thread; but the same issues I have voiced before still seem to be there. E.g., the term ‘cause’ is being used entirely too loosely.

Since we've already injected an eternal energy force without prior explanation, its not any less absurd to note the gears run infinitely regressive and share the infinite energy source which makes them run without prior origin.

Here’s a simple way of demonstrating my point with the gears:

1. Change is the actualization of a potential.
2. A gear cannot change itself.
3. Rotation is a form of change.
4. A gear cannot rotate itself.
5. An infinite series of gears that are interlinked would never, in itself, produce any rotation amongst the gears.
6. Therefore, if an infinite series of gears that are interlinked are such that they are each rotating, then something outside of that series is the cause of that rotation.

There is no analogous argument that an absolutely simple being cannot actualize things.

My point is that if we're positing that one thing can exist that seems impossible can exist without prior cause, we draw the line at another thing that seems impossible but can exist without prior cause?

As shown above, one is impossible; the other you are blanketly asserting is impossible, and of which I deny.

Why does it need to be immutable?

That’s in the OP:

15. The purely actual being is changeless (immutable), because it lacks any passive potency which could be actualized.

If the initial push was strong enough, the pusher doesn't need to be there anymore.

This argument is not about temporal causation nor per accidens causation: it is about per se causation; which entails that this example you gave does not apply since it is an example of the former. If the atoms in the apple cease to exist, then so immediately does the apple itself: this is not like begetting children where the son can beget children even after his father dies (or a person pushed doesn’t cease to exist when the person who pushed them does).

Does an infinite God which is entirely simple have the ability to move itself?

No, and this does not make Him lesser than omnipotent (in my view).

Leontiskos reply suffices to answer your question: please let me know if you need me to provide more clarification.

I agree that makes sense but it's inconsistent with Thomism. How can God be perfectly simple yet have thoughts that are not him?

It makes no sense under any theory to say that a being is identical to its thoughts. That’s like saying you are identical to your thoughts: no, you think.

Secondly, that God is perfectly simple is not to say that God is conceptually simple: it is that God has no parts. God still has a will, intellect, etc. without having parts; and God is not ‘simple’ in the sense that God is like one singular atom.

:roll:

But how is it properly reconciled with the 'macro' world?

So I personally do not like the idea of an infinite regress, and view it as a 'god of the gaps' argument

A god of the gaps argument is an argument for God’s existence by appeal to ignorance. Nothing about the OP’s argument does that; so it can’t be a god of the gaps argument.

But for this argument in particular how is this any less 'impossible' then something that has no prior cause having the energy to start and power everything else that comes after it?

This ‘energetic and powerful’ entity which has no prior cause that keeps things existent would be the absolutely simple being. As the OP demonstrates, the existence of composed objects necessitates an absolutely simple being at the bottom.

In other words, whatever being you are positing here as having the energy to power everything would have to be absolutely simple; and then you end up looping back around to the idea God exists (:

2. Infinite regressive causality has no prior cause. Yet it somehow has all the energy to power infinity to A which powers B which powers C.

This is absurd, and not actually possible. Again, go back to the gear example: you are saying that an infinite series of gears moving each subsequent gear is possible because “somehow the infinite series is such that each can do that”; but if you understand what a gear is, then you no that no member of this infinite series would be capable of initiating the change. Something outside of that infinite series would, at the least, have to initiate the movement.

Likewise, if you have an infinite regress of members which do not have the power to keep the next member existing and yet each depends on the other, then something outside of that series is powering it.

Infinite regressive causality has no prior cause.

An infinite series itself cannot be treated like an object: it would not have any ability to do anything, because it is just itself a series.

If something can appear without prior cause that powers everything,

I do not hold that a thing can appear and then actualize everything: I hold that there is an eternal and immutable being which is absolutely simple and purely actual.

why is it not possible for an infinite series of 'gears' for example that has infinite power spread all over itself to power it all at once?

Because what I think you are missing is that the gears don’t have the ability to move themselves; so this “infinite power” would have to come from something outside of that series which affects the series. Right now, you are positing that an infinite series of powerless things have infinite power coming from nothing. Something does not come from nothing.

Its good to chat with you again!

You too!

I don't know, a lot of this quantum physics stuff I think gets misinterpreted into voodoo; or, worse, tries to force us to disband from the truths about macros things that I am certainly not willing to give up. We still have no reconciliation of QP with newtonian nor einsteinien physics; and this indicates that we are getting some stuff wrong here.

Like real numbers series (i.e. continuum), like unbounded surfaces, like fractals ...

What is an unbound surface? Can you give a concrete example of that?

What is a fractal? Ditto.

Real number series are not concrete entities, so they are not a valid rejoinder to the argument from the composition of concrete entities.

"Exist" is not a predicate of any subject but instead is merely a property (indicative) of existence like wet is a property (indicative) of water (such that whatever is in contact with water is also wet).

I don’t understand your point here: could you elaborate?

The compositional beings exist for sure, but they are contingent; and an infinite regress of contingent beings is actually impossible.

conflates his abstract map(making) with concrete terrains.

I don’t know what this means.

Okay, and yet another anachronistic metaphysical generalization abstracted from pseudo-physics – of no bearing on contemporary (philosophical) usage of "causality" ...

How would you define change? How would you define causality?

If he is his thoughts he cannot move his mind but if he doesn't move his mind than he cannot move. To have thoughts mean movement.

Like I said in that quote, God is not his thoughts and God doesn't move himself; so nothing you said here has any bearing to my response that you, ironically, quoted.

Also, as a side note, to have thoughts does not imply movement: movement is physical, thoughts are mental.

It means that a being which is complex, which has composition, has parts which comprise it.