Why is experience not physical? I agree that things "outside the mind" - outside consciousness itself are physical things and hence mediated through experience. What I don't quite get is why experience is not physical? — Manuel

Because physical by definition refers to stuff that exists in the world, such as a chair, a cup, etc. The experience however is defined as a conscious event that contains information. For example, when you look at a rose you have certain experiences, like the redness of the rose, its form, etc. The rose itself however is physical. So experience cannot be physical given the definition of physical and experience.

Why is experience not physical? I agree that things "outside the mind" - outside consciousness itself are physical things and hence mediated through experience. What I don't quite get is why experience is not physical? — Manuel

Might I add that one can easily portray sensory experience as physical, in that it can be understood in terms of physical stimuli and physiological responses. We possess five primary senses - touch, sight, hearing, smell and taste - and they can be understood through cognitive science and physiology. What I think @MoK is getting at, is what David Chalmers describes as the problem of consciousness (usually called 'the hard problem') - that even though all of these processes can be described in physical terms, the experience of them - what it is like to see red, smell a rose, hear a sound - is not so amenable to physical description, because it has an experiential quality.

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.

It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does. — Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, David Chalmers

Personally, I think the solution lies in the problem, which is that physical science has always bracketed out or excluded the subject, as I've presented in another thread. I hope I'm correct in saying that this is what MoK is driving at, as the 'hard problem' has been mentioned previously. So that while experiential states have a physical aspect, the subjective experience can't be completely explained in physical terms.

Yes, good summary. The question of how experience, or subjectivity, can be "in the world" if the world is understood physically is currently unanswerable. But if I had to bet on the next Copernican Revolution (let's check back in 200 years), it would consist of a completely different understanding of what terms like "physical," "mental," "subjective" et al. mean. The "hard problem," I think, has all the hallmarks of a question that has to have been stated incorrectly, though it's the best we can do at the moment . . . we shall see.

Because physical by definition refers to stuff that exists in the world, such as a chair, a cup, etc. The experience however is defined as a conscious event that contains information. For example, when you look at a rose you have certain experiences, like the redness of the rose, its form, etc. — MoK

Definition? I mean there is standard use "physical thing", sure, that usually means something we can touch.

But in epistemology it means "physical stuff", the stuff of the world. The mind is a part of the world, the part we know with most confidence, but I don't see the necessity of saying that physical has to be stuff you can touch.

s what David Chalmers describes as the problem of consciousness (usually called 'the hard problem') - that even though all of these processes can be described in physical terms, the experience of them - what it is like to see red, smell a rose, hear a sound - is not so amenable to physical description, because it has an experiential quality. — Wayfarer

As you know, calling it the hard problem is misleading, because it suggests every other problem is easy. So free will is easy, brain science is easy, physics is easy, sociology is easy, but we know that's not true.

Free will is a really hard problem. As was motion for most of the great 17th century philosopher/scientists. We never understood motion, we just proceeded to do theories about it without understanding it.

I think you can say that it is a hard problem, yes, but not the only one.

If by physical, you mean physicSal, then of course, the qualitative character is not described by physics or chemistry. But if you are biologist or an architect, you bet you are going to use qualitative character to explain the phenomena.

As you know, calling it the hard problem is misleading, because it suggests every other problem is easy. So free will is easy, brain science is easy, physics is easy, sociology is easy, but we know that's not true. — Manuel

Chalmers was contrasting his "hard problem of consciousness" with what he called "the easy problem of consciousness": finding the places in the brain that correspond to various subjective experiences. This, as we know, is indeed getting easier.

I am arguing that physicalism is false because it cannot explain awareness/experience — MoK

"Cannot" implies it is impossible. That's a strong claim that needs to be supported with a proof. Provide it using only mutually acceptable premises.

The reality is that you simply can't imagine how physicalism could account for awareness and m-experience. You're committing the fallacy argument from incredulity, also referred to as "argument from lack of imagination". This is the underlying problem with what you're doing, and it entails reversing the burden of proof - that I must prove to you that physicalism CAN account for something. I will accept that burden if I choose to try and make a persuasive argument for physicalism. But this is your thread, your argument, and your burden.

If you think that physicalism is not false then you have to deal with the Hard problem of consciousness, epiphenomenalism, and other problems that I discussed in detail but you didn't reply to it. You cannot resolve these problems. Could you? — MoK

I will deal with those if I choose to argue physicalism is true. In this thread, you have the burden of showing you have a coherent theory, since you put forth a proof.

Experience refers to a phenomenon that has a very clear definition in the philosophy of the mind, namely my definition. — MoK

In philosophy, "experiences" correspond to what I've defined as m-experiences. It most certainly does not entail being non-physical. Here's an extract from the definition of experience in the Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy:

Experience: In philosophy,experience is generally what we perceive by the senses (sensory experience), what we learn from others, or whatever comes from external sources or from inner reflection....in philosophy, the relation between experience as a state of consciousness and independent objects of experience becomes a focus of debate. There must be something given
in experience, yet the status of the given is very controversial. Different answers respectively ground
positions such as realism, idealism, and skepticism. The different ways of understanding the given also
involve different ways of understanding the notion of sense-data. There is also debate about the relation between experience and theory.

There is no part of this that is inconsistent with physicalism. Further proof that your wrong: over 52% of phillosphers "accept or lean toward" physicalism. See this 2020 survey of philosophers. A 2009 survey had similar results

This should give you some pause in thinking physicalism is so obviously false.

I don't agree that there is p-experience or m-experience — MoK

I defined m-experience as mental experience. If you don't believe there are mental experiences then your entire line of argument is dissolved.

Functionally. Compare it to the function of a car: the parts of the car cannot function individually as a car. It is their arrangement that produces the function.
— Relativist
Now you are confusing weak and strong emergence here. — MoK

Non-sequitur, and you're ignoring that I answered your question. I regret indulging your reversal of your burden of proof.

Our brains hold memories. Beliefs are memories that dispose us to behave a certain way. Awareness is the development of short term beliefs about some state of affairs or activity, caused by our sensory input.
— Relativist
No, we already agreed on the definition of awareness which is a state in which we are conscious of mental activities, — MoK

I was indulging you by giving a physicalist ACCOUNT of awareness. The account is consistent with the defintion of awareness.

I've now concluded that I shall stop indulging you. I've given you enough to know that physicalists can account for things you didn't think possible. If you are reasonable, you'll now understand why I say you're making a fallacious argument from incredulity.

Then what caused MoK's brain at t1? There was no explanation "above". Give me an account of all the causal factors (that's what I was doing with my statement,"MoK's brain t1 was caused by [MoK's brain at t0 + other factors].
— Relativist
I already explained that to you two times if not more. The Mind causes MoK's brain at t1 given the fact that it experiences MoK's brain at t0 plus other factors — MoK

But you also made this seemingly contradictory statement:

MoK's brain t1 was not caused by MoK's brain at t0 + other factors. — MoK

Mind would qualify as "other factors". Explain this apparent contradiction. I'll defer re-asking the other related questions until you reconcile this.

The question of how experience, or subjectivity, can be "in the world" if the world is understood physically is currently unanswerable. — J

So is "experience, or subjectivity" embodied or disembodied? Seems to me easily answerable.

If embodied (i.e. mine/yours), then "experience, or subjectivity" is physical (i.e. affected by my/your interactions with our respective local environments).

If, however, "experience, or subjectivity" is disembodied, then how do we know – soundly demonstrate – this? I don't see how we can ...

MoK, the problem with your argument is that it ignores basic science about the brain. Your mind is caused by your brain. That's a pretty well established fact at this point in history. Philosophy has to be constructed on the science and current understanding of the day or else its just logical fiction. — Philosophim

:100:

If embodied (i.e. mine/yours), then "experience, or subjectivity" is physical (i.e. affected by my/your interactions with our respective local environments). — 180 Proof

This assumes that the only way to be "mine" or "yours" is to be embodied, doesn't it?

Moreover, a mind can be affected by our interactions with the local environment without itself being part of that environment, surely. This is what the supervenience concept is trying to get at, I think. We can postulate a one-for-one mapping between brain and mind/subjectivity without also postulating causality.

This assumes that the only way to be "mine" or "yours" is to be embodied, doesn't it? — J

Yes.

But then doesn't that prejudge the question of whether there could be anything else other than embodiment that characterizes a self and its attributes? Something that is mine would not necessarily be embodied, if I myself am not (entirely).

I think you can say that it is a hard problem, yes, but not the only one. — Manuel

He didn't say it was. In fact, the paper is called 'Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness'. It only came to be called THE hard problem later.

Demonstrable evidence of "disembodied" subjects / agents? If not, you're merely fantasizing rather than philosophizing.

Very well said! The Hard Problem of consciousness is not the only problem that physicalism suffers from. For example, we also have the problem of Epiphenomenalism. We are sure that our mental activities correlate with physical activities. For example, I can explain my thoughts by typing the words. So the typing is due to having certain thoughts. This is however a vertical causation which is different from horizontal causation which physicalists believe that physical change according to it. There is a problem of memorization of events as well. Our experiences are stored in the brain and that also requires vertical causation. For all these reasons I think that vertical causation is a correct view to explain reality rather than horizontal causation. That is the material that supports P2 in the first argument.

Definition? I mean there is standard use "physical thing", sure, that usually means something we can touch.

But in epistemology it means "physical stuff", the stuff of the world. The mind is a part of the world, the part we know with most confidence, but I don't see the necessity of saying that physical has to be stuff you can touch. — Manuel

Please let's put the mind aside until we reach an agreement that experience and physical refer to two different phenomena. Within physicalism, the physical is believed to change on its own based on the laws of physics without any need for experience. Given this, I think we can agree that the experience is not physical since physicalism cannot accommodate experience as a physical thing. The existence of experience and mental phenomena challenged physicalists for a long time. Some physicalists even deny the existence of experience and mental phenomena!

"Cannot" implies it is impossible. That's a strong claim that needs to be supported with a proof. Provide it using only mutually acceptable premises.

The reality is that you simply can't imagine how physicalism could account for awareness and m-experience. You're committing the fallacy argument from incredulity, also referred to as "argument from lack of imagination". This is the underlying problem with what you're doing, and it entails reversing the burden of proof - that I must prove to you that physicalism CAN account for something. I will accept that burden if I choose to try and make a persuasive argument for physicalism. But this is your thread, your argument, and your burden. — Relativist

Then please read on the Hard Problem of consciousness. The problem to me is related to a belief that the strong emergence is possible. By this, I mean that a system can have a property that is not a function of the properties of parts or it is not reducible to the properties of parts. I have an argument against strong emergence. I am planning to open a new thread on the topic of strong emergence but I am very busy now so I leave this to the early future when I am done with my current threads. Anyhow if we accept that the Hard Problem of consciousness is not a problem and one day we can resolve it we are still left with the problem of Epiphenomenalism which I already discussed with you and you didn't provide any input on it. There are other problems too that I discussed with you.

I will deal with those if I choose to argue physicalism is true. In this thread, you have the burden of showing you have a coherent theory, since you put forth a proof. — Relativist

Then please read the OP and let me know what you think of it. The proof is there.

In philosophy, "experiences" correspond to what I've defined as m-experiences. It most certainly does not entail being non-physical. Here's an extract from the definition of experience in the Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy:

Experience: In philosophy,experience is generally what we perceive by the senses (sensory experience), what we learn from others, or whatever comes from external sources or from inner reflection....in philosophy, the relation between experience as a state of consciousness and independent objects of experience becomes a focus of debate. There must be something given
in experience, yet the status of the given is very controversial. Different answers respectively ground
positions such as realism, idealism, and skepticism. The different ways of understanding the given also
involve different ways of understanding the notion of sense-data. There is also debate about the relation between experience and theory. — Relativist

What is perception here? It is not defined. The rest does not provide anything significant that helps us to understand what experience is. Anyhow, I think we agree on the definition of awareness so let's start from that. See below.

There is no part of this that is inconsistent with physicalism. Further proof that your wrong: over 52% of phillosphers "accept or lean toward" physicalism. See this 2020 survey of philosophers. A 2009 survey had similar results

This should give you some pause in thinking physicalism is so obviously false. — Relativist

Physicalists are wrong. The fact that the majority of philosophers believe in physicalism does not prove anything.

I was indulging you by giving a physicalist ACCOUNT of awareness. The account is consistent with the defintion of awareness. — Relativist

Please let's stick to my definition of awareness as I put too much effort into convincing you that it is a correct definition. Physicalism cannot explain the awareness. This is related to the Hard Problem of consciousness. The consciousness is a strong emergence. The strong emergence is impossible (I have an argument against strong emergence). Therefore consciousness is not a strong emergence.

I've now concluded that I shall stop indulging you. I've given you enough to know that physicalists can account for things you didn't think possible. If you are reasonable, you'll now understand why I say you're making a fallacious argument from incredulity. — Relativist

I simply disagree.

But you also made this seemingly contradictory statement:
MoK's brain t1 was not caused by MoK's brain at t0 + other factors. — Relativist

No, it is not contrary at all. MoK's brain at t1 is due to MoK's brain + other factors at t0 but the MoK's brain at t1 was not caused by MoK's brain + other factors at t0. MoK's brain at t1 was caused by the Mind after experiencing MoK's brain + other factors at t0.

Mind would qualify as "other factors". Explain this apparent contradiction. I'll defer re-asking the other related questions until you reconcile this. — Relativist

There is no contradiction. See above.

I missed to reply to this.

Non-sequitur, and you're ignoring that I answered your question. I regret indulging your reversal of your burden of proof. — Relativist

You need to read about the strong and weak emergence to see that the example of the car is a weak emergence whereas consciousness is a strong emergence.

Let's slow it down a little. I think you're assuming that the binary "embodied/disembodied" is clear enough to cover all the cases we're interested in. But self-reflection shows me that, in fact, I would find it very difficult to answer the question, "Is J embodied or disembodied?" I want to say, "Neither. It's a type of category mistake. In one sense, I'm embodied, since as far as I know, I need my body in order to be here. But in another equally important sense, I'm not embodied at all. My mind or self seems to have almost nothing in common with what I understand the physical to be. I supervene on my body, perhaps, but is that obviously the 'embodied' part of the embodied/disembodied' binary?"

Now this is a problem, not an explanation. I'm only trying to suggest that "being disembodied" doesn't have to mean being a ghost, or a ghost in the machine. We should use the most charitable interpretations possible when we try to understand why this problem isn't dissolved by physicalism (sorry, Dan Dennett!).

The reality is that you simply can't imagine how physicalism could account for awareness and m-experience. You're committing the fallacy argument from incredulity, also referred to as "argument from lack of imagination". — Relativist

It seem worth noting that a scientifically informed physicalism explains MoK's incredulity.

With the understanding that MoK's intuitions are a function of the training of the neural networks in MoK's brain, and that MoK clearly hasn't done any deep investigation into physical causality, it is unsurprising that MoK's intutions result in incredulity as they do.

You need to read about the strong and weak emergence to see that the example of the car is a weak emergence whereas consciousness is a strong emergence. — MoK

You had asked, "How could you accommodate awareness in physicalism?" My answer: "functionally". I'm defending physicalism, which can either be reductive physicalism or non-reductive. The former entails epistemological emergence, the latter allows for ontological emergence.

The relevant points are:
1) I answered your question;
2) the burden is on you to prove physicalism is false;
3) an argument from lack of imagination is a fallacy.

:snicker:

You didn't reply to me but since you attacked me and my knowledge then I challenge you!

It seem worth noting that a scientifically informed physicalism explains MoK's incredulity. — wonderer1

Then please provide a solution to the Hard Problem of consciousness. Please explain how the mental could have causal power on the physical considering the problem of Epiphenomenalsim.

With the understanding that MoK's intuitions are a function of the training of the neural networks in MoK's brain, and that MoK clearly hasn't done any deep investigation into physical causality, it is unsurprising that MoK's intutions result in incredulity as they do. — wonderer1

Couldn't you wonder that it could be you who doesn't have the proper knowledge to comprehend the MoK's argument?

You had asked, "How could you accommodate awareness in physicalism?" My answer: "functionally". — Relativist

I was not talking about the functionality of the brain which in fact can be explained by the laws of physics. I was talking about the awareness that as we agreed is a state of being conscious of perceptions, thoughts, feelings, etc. You gave the example of the car but a car is a weak emergence whereas awareness is a strong one. If you cannot understand the difference between the two then I cannot help you. It is due to you to study the topic of weak and strong emergence.

I'm defending physicalism, which can either be reductive physicalism or non-reductive. The former entails, the latter allows for ontological emergence. — Relativist

I think all sorts of physicalism are false. Please see above.

1) I answered your question; — Relativist

You certainly didn't. See my first comment.

Then please read on the Hard Problem of consciousness — MoK

No. You're reversing the burden of proof. Provide a formal proof that physicalism is impossible, with clearly stated premises.

Then please read the OP and let me know what you think of it. — MoK

OK.

P1) Physical and experience exist and they are subject to change
Physical THINGS exist and engage in physical ACTIVITIES. Anything that changes is no longer the same thing (including any nonphysical objects that may exist). But your statement makes more sense if we treat objects as having both essential and contingent properties. Change would then entail the object's set of contingent properties changing.

"Experience" can refer to an act, or to the effect of an act. An act occurs; it is not an existent. SoI conclude you're referring to the effect: the memory.

I can't go further in your argument until you confirm or correct my interpretation.

Physicalists are wrong. The fact that the majority of philosophers believe in physicalism does not prove anything. — MoK

It implies that it is highly unlikely that physicalism is provably false.

Physicalism cannot explain the awareness — MoK

Prove it.

But you also made this seemingly contradictory statement:
MoK's brain t1 was not caused by MoK's brain at t0 + other factors.
— Relativist
No, it is not contrary at all. MoK's brain at t1 is due to MoK's brain + other factors at t0 but the MoK's brain at t1 was not caused by MoK's brain + other factors at t0. MoK's brain at t1 was caused by the Mind after experiencing MoK's brain + other factors at t0. — MoK

Then it's true that (MoK's brain at t1) is caused by (Mok's brain at t0 + other factors), because "other factors" includes mind's experience of Mok's brain at t0.

You had asked, "How could you accommodate awareness in physicalism?" My answer: "functionally".
— Relativist
I was not talking about the functionality of the brain which in fact can be explained by the laws of physics. I was talking about the awareness that as we agreed is a state of being conscious of perceptions, thoughts, feelings, etc. — MoK

I know you weren't talking about functionalism, but it IS the answer to your question - and to many other objections to physicalism. It means you can't simplistically deny physicalism on the basis that mental phenomena aren't exhibited by simple objects (rocks; particles). You need to consider functional entities.

I think all sorts of physicalism are false — MoK

Then let's agree to disagree. It can neither be proven nor disproven. We each draw our conclusions about it on subjective grounds. Your fundamental error is in thinking your subjective grounds are objective facts.

No. You're reversing the burden of proof. Provide a formal proof that physicalism is impossible, with clearly stated premises. — Relativist

I cannot prove it to you unless you understand the difference between the weak and strong emergence. Therefore, it is due to you that study emergence first.

Physical THINGS exist and engage in physical ACTIVITIES. Anything that changes is no longer the same thing (including any nonphysical objects that may exist). But your statement makes more sense if we treat objects as having both essential and contingent properties. Change would then entail the object's set of contingent properties changing. — Relativist

Sure. Anything that changes is no longer the same thing. And sure, physical are subject to change since they have a set of properties.

"Experience" can refer to an act, or to the effect of an act. An act occurs; it is not an existent. SoI conclude you're referring to the effect: the memory. — Relativist

Please replace experience with awareness since you are not happy with my definition of experience. Again, by awareness, I mean being conscious of thoughts, feelings, perceptions, etc.

It implies that it is highly unlikely that physicalism is provably false. — Relativist

It is. Think of the example of Galileo Galilei!

Prove it. — Relativist

Please read on the weak and strong emergence first.

Then it's true that (MoK's brain at t1) is caused by (Mok's brain at t0 + other factors), because "other factors" includes mind's experience of Mok's brain at t0. — Relativist

No, MoK's brain is directly caused by the Mind and not by MoK's brain in former time.

I cannot prove it to you unless you understand the difference between the weak and strong emergence. — MoK

I do know the difference. Proceed with your proof.

Anything that changes is no longer the same thing. And sure, physical are subject to change since they have a set of properties..Please replace experience with awareness. — MoK

Rephrase your argument accordingly.

Then it's true that (MoK's brain at t1) is caused by (Mok's brain at t0 + other factors), because "other factors" includes mind's experience of Mok's brain at t0.
— Relativist
No, MoK's brain is directly caused by the Mind and not by MoK's brain in former time. — MoK

Are you saying the Mind recreates MoK's brain ex nihilo at every instant of time, rather than effecting a change to MoK's brain?!

I know you weren't talking about functionalism, but it IS the answer to your question - and to many other objections to physicalism. — Relativist

If so, then why did you bring up the example of a car that is a weak emergence?

It means you can't simplistically deny physicalism on the basis that mental phenomena aren't exhibited by simple objects (rocks; particles). You need to consider functional entities. — Relativist

I am talking about the emergence of awareness which is a strong emergence.

Then let's agree to disagree. It can neither be proven nor disproven. We each draw our conclusions about it on subjective grounds. Your fundamental error is in thinking your subjective grounds are objective facts. — Relativist

Cool. Let's agree to disagree.

I know you weren't talking about functionalism, but it IS the answer to your question - and to many other objections to physicalism.
— Relativist
If so, then why did you bring up the example of a car that is a weak emergence? — MoK

Because it was an example of a functional entity.

I am talking about the emergence of awareness which is a strong emergence. — MoK

Prove it.

Cool. Let's agree to disagree — MoK

Sure. I hope you can now recognize that your argument depends on assumptions that reasonable people can disagree about. Such is the problem with trying to prove God's existence.

I do know the difference. Proceed with your proof. — Relativist

The emergence of a car: Weak or strong? The emergence of awareness: Weak or strong?

Rephrase your argument accordingly. — Relativist

I don't need to rephrase my argument. All I need to accept is that physical and awareness/experience are subject to change.

Are you saying the Mind recreates MoK's brain ex nihilo at every instant of time, rather than effecting a change to MoK's brain?! — Relativist

I already mentioned that physical including MoK's brain does not exist in the future. Therefore, physical must be created to allow a change in physical. And by creation, I don't mean the creation ex nihilo. The Mind in fact experiences physical in time first to create/cause physical later.

Because was an example of a functional entity. — Relativist

But I was talking about the emergence of awareness which is a strong emergence.

Prove it. — Relativist

So you think it is a weak emergence?