I didn't ask for your definition of awareness — MoK

Yes, you did:

What is awareness to you? — MoK

Given your insult, I now gather that you weren't asking me for a definition, but that wasn't clear. Communication is a 2-way street. Accept responsibility for conveying what you mean, and that your words may not be interpreted in the way you have in mind.

You need to pay attention to my argument and definition of words — MoK

I just demonstrated that I pay close attention.

So again, why don't your brain's physical processes go in the dark? You are aware of thoughts, sensations, feelings, beliefs, etc. By aware here I mean that the opposite of the dark. You are not living in a dark state. Are you? You are aware of things. You can report what you are aware of too. — MoK

I answered that:

Absolutely things can happen to us, and/or to our brains, without our being aware of it. Examples:
-surgery under general anasthesia
-Developing cancer prior to symptoms
-hair growth
-brain damage caused by sudden trauma. — Relativist

If that wasn't what you meant, then CLARIFY, instead of insulting me for failing to read your mind.

Any physical including the brain does not exist in the immediate future. Phsycail exists at now. The subjective time however changes and this change is due to the Mind (please read my second argument in OP if you are interested). So there is a situation where the immediate future becomes now. Physical however does not exist in the immediate future so it cannot exist in the situation when the immediate future becomes now, therefore the Mind causes/creates the physical at now. — MoK

You're alluding to some particular theory you have about the nature of individual identity, and to a presentist conception of time. That would be fine, but it impedes communication when you make statements that allude to some theory you haven't described. In this case, it seems possible we largely agree, but maybe not -since you haven't explained. I'll nevertheless try, but contain your anger if my basis isn't consistent with yours. Instead, respond by explaining what you mean.

I embrace presentism, but also recognize that a past existed and that it caused the present, and that there will be a future that will come into being as a consequence of the present. In terms of the identity of objects, I embrace the identity of the indiscernibles: A and B are the SAME object (same individual identity) IFF they have the exact same set of properties (both intrinsic and relational). It follows from this that MoK's brain at time t0 is not identical to Mok's brain at time t-1. Nevertheless, it is also true that MoK's brain at t0 was caused by (MoK's brain at t-1 + other factors). We can identify MoK's brain as a "perduring identity": a temporally connected series of point-in-time MoK's brain. A point-in-time MoK's brain can also be considered a "state" of MoK's brain; hence my issue.

#2 referred to your statement "I am not saying that the brain is caused to do something" Are you saying you were wrong? — Relativist

You need to read the rest of my sentence: "I am not saying that the brain is caused to do something but the brain is caused." This was a response to you that you said the brain is caused to do something.. — MoK

Then your response didn't answer the question I asked. I haven't disputed that "the brain is caused", but I'm pointing out that the brain @t0 was casused by the brain @t-1 + other factors. Was the mind among the "other factors" or not?

The cause and effect in the case of Mind is the experience of physical and causation of physical. — MoK

This is vague. Be specific as to what is both the cause and the effect, and define what you mean by "experience" in this context - including how an unchanging Mind has experiences.

TBy this, I mean that the experience in the Mind is due to the existence of the physical. — MoK

What does "experience in the Mind" MEAN? It's unchanging, unaffected by anything going on in the world.

The existence of the physical is however due to the existence of the Mind since that is the Mind that causes physical in the subjective time. — MoK

Ah! The mind is causing something after all! Be specfic: what is it causing? Just saying "physical" is too vague. So rephrase this in more specific terms. Also explain how something that is unchanging has selective temporal points of interference - and how they are selected -given that the mind isn't learning or anticipating, since it's unchanging.

I question whether you can provide a coherent account, because you may be treating time inconsistently: from both a presentist viewpoint and a block-time viewpoint. But that's just a guess. It's your burden to make sense of it.

So we are dealing with vertical causation by this I mean that the physical in the state S1 causes an experience in the Mind. The Mind then causes physical in the state S2. The Mind then experiences physical in the state of S2 and causes physical in the state S3, etc. — MoK

Suppose there's a rock sitting under my living room sofa. It is present when I sit on the sofa, and when I get up. It has no causal role and isn't changed during my sitting and changing. How does an unchanging mind with no causal role differ from the rock? — Relativist

Any physical changes even those that seem to be unchanging. The rock is on Earth, Earth is moving so the rock. The particles that make an object are in constant motion even if the object is in space and has no motion. The Mind is Omnipresent in spacetime so it is changeless as I argued in my third argument. — MoK

The rock at t1 was caused by (the rock at t0 + other factors). Those other factors did not include my sitting and rising from the sofa. If the mind is existing outside spacetime, it is not "experiencing" events in space time. What exactly is its relation to spacetime? From its perspective, does spacetime exist as a 4-dimensional block? Alternatively, does the mind exist like a photon traveling at the speed of light - from its perspective, it exists simultanously along all spacetime points along its path - but also with no intereractions with anything else along that path (an interaction would entail a termination of the path).

MoK, the problem with your argument is that it ignores basic science about the brain. Your mind is caused by your brain. — Philosophim

Within physicalism, the mind is equated to the brain or the brain process. What is the definition of mind to you and how could be caused by the brain? How the mind can affect the brain if it is caused by the brain?

That's a pretty well established fact at this point in history. Philosophy has to be constructed on the science and current understanding of the day or else its just logical fiction. — Philosophim

I think it is the opposite. That is the philosophy that guides science to see what would be the subject of focus.

Within physicalism, the mind is equated to the brain or the brain process. What is the definition of mind to you and how could be caused by the brain? How the mind can affect the brain if it is caused by the brain? — MoK

No, the mind is a result of the brain, not equal to it. Is a fire equal to the sticks its on? But a fire must have a medium to burn and cannot exist without oxygen. Once you start a flame, does the flame not spread to the other sticks? You have to understand that neuronal activity results in a picture, and then your adjustment based on that picture is more neuronal activity. The computer you use is completely run on electrical gates that turn on and off. And yet from that, you're able to interact with and change what you see on the screen. Don't make the mistake of assuming that complex events cannot come from the build up of many simple things.

I think it is the opposite. That is the philosophy that guides science to see what would be the subject of focus. — MoK

I wouldn't call that the opposite, but how philosophy contributes to science. You cannot contribute to modern day science without first learning and understanding it.

We have experience, we infer the rest, call it what you will. I don't see why they both can't have an underlying cause, outside stipulation: physical things only change physical things, mental things only change mental things.

Why leads you (or anyone) to say that we know enough of either (physical or mental) to conclude that they can't include each other?

Inferring meaning is not uncaused. It is caused by our interaction with the world. Meaning entails a "word to world" relationship, where "world" is our internalized world-view, that evolves during our lives.

It begins in our pre-verbal stage, based on our sensory input (including our bodily sensations). Our natural pattern recognition capabilities provides a nascent means of organizing the world that's perceived facilitating interaction with it. Pattern includes appearance and function and associations to other things (eg spoon-food-hunger-taste-smell). These associations are the ground floor of meaning. Associations grow over time, thus gaining additional meaning.

Verbal language entails associating pattern of sounds with prior established visual patterns. Written words are associations with the verbal

Nascent inference is again pattern recognition (if x happens, y will follow). With language, it becomes more developed, and we can recognize patterns in the language - that there is a generalized "if x then y — Relativist

Nothing I've said contradicts that. What I'm questioning is that the physicalist framework and, more generally, empiricist philosophy (the principle that all knowledge is acquired through experience) provides an adequate account of its basis. I'm arguing that the relationship of ideas is real in its own right independently of physical processes. 'The vast flow of perceptions, ideas, and emotions that arise in each human mind is something that actually exists as something other than merely the electrical firings in the brain that gives rise to them—and exists as surely as a brain, a chair, an atom, or a gamma ray' ~ Review of Thomas Nagel 'Mind and Cosmos'. Whereas it is commonly believed that the physical basis of mind is understood, when it is not. It explains the tendency to believe that whatever is real must be physical or based on the physical. But as I keep saying, what we consider to be physical also involves judgement (which is why physics is constantly evolving.) Causation is not only bottom-up.

Basic math entails patterns between quantities, leading to counting and then learning the general relations of arithmetic. — Relativist

Many will say that arithmetic is a natural function of the mind, leading to the ability to count and form abstract concepts. The abilities of the Caledonian Crow are often referred to in this context. But the fact is, were human minds not able to form and grasp foundational concepts, such as 'equals', it would be impossible for us to learn and practice arithmetic, let alone mathematics. It is an ability the human mind alone has.

this doesn't address the issue that we have to rely on such semantic relations to establish what is ontological - what is, for example, the nature of the physical, and how or if it is separate from the mind.
— Wayfarer

I'm not sure I understand the objection, but I'll try to address.

Nature of the physical: We start considering the physical to be anything we can touch, or seems touchable. We only recognize that air (and other gases) are physical after scientific study. By that same token, we don't naturally recognize elements of the mind as physical, but we come to learn of clear physical dependencies - like memories, that can be lost due to disease and trauma. — Relativist

Note again the passage I quoted earlier.

In fact, what we regard as the physical world is “physical” to us precisely in the sense that it acts in opposition to our will and constrains our actions. The aspect of the universe that resists our push and demands muscular effort on our part is what we consider to be “physical”. On the other hand, since sensation and thought don’t require overcoming any physical resistance, we consider them to be outside of material reality. It is shown in the final chapter (Mind, Life and Universe) that this is an illusory dichotomy, and any complete account of the universe must allow for the existence of a nonmaterial component which accounts for its unity and complexity. — Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order: How the Mind Creates the Features & Structure of All Things, and Why this Insight Transforms Physics (p. 6)

My argument is, the basis of the physicalism that you're advocating can be traced back to Descartes' dualism. As the above says, what we consider 'physical' is precisely that 'which acts in opposition to our will and constrains our actions.' Mind is then depicted as 'res cogitans', the 'thinking subject' which is purportedly not extended in space and time. Over the ensuing centuries, the dualist model was retained, but the idea of res cogitans withered away, especially because science and engineering was able to accomplish so much with reference only to the so-called 'extended properties' of matter.

This is the 'cartesian division' which underlies so much of modern culture - it is, as John Vervaeke says, part of our 'cultural grammar'. Pinter's final chapter refers to information theory, semiotics, and other scientific developments that call the primacy of the physical into question.

the mind - reason - is able to peer into the realms beyond the physical and to bring back from it, things that have never before existed
— Wayfarer

The patterns in nature existed before us. Our intellect is based on our pattern recognition skills. — Relativist

That is not an adequate account of the power of reason. Mathematical regularities and symmetries are far more than repetitive patterns. Reason has enabled us to estimate the age and size of the Universe. Don't sell yourself short ;-)

Yes, you did: — Relativist

Ok, mistake on my part.

Given your insult, I now gather that you weren't asking me for a definition, but that wasn't clear. Communication is a 2-way street. Accept responsibility for conveying what you mean, and that your words may not be interpreted in the way you have in mind. — Relativist

I didn't mean to insult you at all. I am very sorry if my words hurt your feelings but I didn't intend to do so. When I ask you what is the experience you answer that as a set of processes in the brain. Please call a set of processes in the brain another thing since the experience refers to another phenomenon I tried my best to explain it to you but you constantly denied it. When I discuss whether Rock experience as well, then you changed experience in the case of the brain to mental experience. The physical processes are governed by the laws of physics whether it is in a brain or a rock. What makes a brain different from a rock is the composition and arrangement of physical, so one is neuroplastic and another solid. And now we are discussing awareness. I think I was clear with what I mean by awareness by now. I mean the opposite of darkness where the physical processes go into the dark. We can distinguish between the state of anesthesia and awareness, in the first case we are not aware of anything at all while in the second we are not only aware of things but we can also report things.

I just demonstrated that I pay close attention. — Relativist

Thanks for the clarification. I hope that this discussion will be fruitful for both of us, mate!

Absolutely things can happen to us, and/or to our brains, without our being aware of it. Examples:
-surgery under general anasthesia
-Developing cancer prior to symptoms
-hair growth
-brain damage caused by sudden trauma. — Relativist

I didn't ask for examples of cases that we are not aware of things. I was trying to reach an agreement that what awareness is when we are in a normal state. Anyhow, I am glad that you brought up the example of anesthesia. Have you ever been under anesthesia? If yes, then you realize what I mean by awareness here. Are you aware of anything at all when you are under anesthesia? Sure not. That is what I mean by being unaware. Opposite of the state of unawareness is the state of awareness. So, could we agree that there is a difference between being unaware and aware? To me, awareness refers to a state in which we are conscious of mental activities, such as perceptions, thoughts, feelings, etc.

You're alluding to some particular theory you have about the nature of individual identity, and to a presentist conception of time. That would be fine, but it impedes communication when you make statements that allude to some theory you haven't described. In this case, it seems possible we largely agree, but maybe not -since you haven't explained. I'll nevertheless try, but contain your anger if my basis isn't consistent with yours. Instead, respond by explaining what you mean. — Relativist

I already mentioned in OP that the argument is dense and long. I agree that I didn't define the experience, physical, change, etc. in OP. These concepts, such as experience, physical, and change are however well known. I agree that some people may not be familiar with these concepts. The purpose of this thread is to discuss things in depth so we can fill the gap in the knowledge and reach an agreement if that is possible.

I embrace presentism, but also recognize that a past existed and that it caused the present, and that there will be a future that will come into being as a consequence of the present. In terms of the identity of objects, I embrace the identity of the indiscernibles: A and B are the SAME object (same individual identity) IFF they have the exact same set of properties (both intrinsic and relational). It follows from this that MoK's brain at time t0 is not identical to Mok's brain at time t-1. Nevertheless, it is also true that MoK's brain at t0 was caused by (MoK's brain at t-1 + other factors). We can identify MoK's brain as a "perduring identity": a temporally connected series of point-in-time MoK's brain. A point-in-time MoK's brain can also be considered a "state" of MoK's brain; hence my issue. — Relativist

That is the part that I disagree. That is true that MoK's brain at time t is related to Mok's brain at time t-1 plus other factors but that does not mean that MoK's brain at time t-1 plus other factors causes MoK's brain at time t. I think there are three issues here: 1) The Hard Problem of consciousness, 2) Epiphenomenalism, and 3) The fact that change in the physical is due to experience (we have to agree with what it is meant by experience or awareness first).

First issue: The Hard Problem of consciousness refers to the problem of how physical that it is intrinsically unconscious could become conscious in certain configurations such as what we find in the brain. By consciousness, I mean a state in which we can have any sort of experience. I think that philosophers of mind agree with this definition.

Second issue: Accepting that we can one day find an answer to the Hard Problem of consciousness, we are still dealing with the problem of epiphenomenalism. Epiphenomenalism in simple words states that consciousness has no causal power when it comes to the real world since the state of the physical at one time defines the state of the physical later. We however observe a fantastic correlation between conscious state and physical. For example, you know for sure that there is a correlation between your thoughts and what you are typing. This is something that physicalism fails to answer. If the state of matter is defined to change by the laws of nature then typing meaningful words should happen on its own and you could have any sort of conscious state which is not related to physical.

Third issue: We know for sure that experience affects physical. For example, if someone punches me in the face then I say Ouch. That means that feeling the pain is the cause of saying Ouch. And not only that. If you asked me whether I was punched in the face because of the inflammation you see on my face, I can report yes, I remember the person, the reason why he punched me, etc. That means that what I experienced is registered in my brain without experience I could not possibly report any of these and I could not say Ouch too. For this, we need to agree on my definition of experience though.

These issues if not more are serious threats to physicalism. My formulation which is a new form of substance dualism answers all issues simply.

Then your response didn't answer the question I asked. I haven't disputed that "the brain is caused", but I'm pointing out that the brain t0 was casused by the brain @t-1 + other factors. Was the mind among the "other factors" or not? — Relativist

The Mind causes the change in the physical. If we accept that physical causes physical then we have to deal with the above-mentioned issues.

Ah! The mind is causing something after all! — Relativist

I mentioned that in OP. Please see the C2 in the first argument.

Be specfic: what is it causing? — Relativist

The Mind causes physical, and by causing I mean the Mind creates physical.

So rephrase this in more specific terms. Also explain how something that is unchanging has selective temporal points of interference - and how they are selected -given that the mind isn't learning or anticipating, since it's unchanging. — Relativist

That is a very good question! The Mind is unchanging. It however experiences the state of physical at now and that is the only thing that the Mind experiences. Let's say, that physical changes by this I mean physical state changes from one state to another state, S1 and S2 respectively. It is the S1 state that dictates what the S2 state should be. The Mind cannot interfere with what the state of S2 should be. The only thing that it does is to experience S1 and cause S2 and for this, the Mind does not need to have any knowledge of what time is.

I question whether you can provide a coherent account, because you may be treating time inconsistently: from both a presentist viewpoint and a block-time viewpoint. But that's just a guess. It's your burden to make sense of it. — Relativist

I discuss the block time, what I call objective time, and subjective time in my second and third arguments. I don't know what you don't understand and what is your issue with it. Please let me know and I would be happy to answer.

The rock at t1 was caused by (the rock at t0 + other factors). Those other factors did not include my sitting and rising from the sofa. If the mind is existing outside spacetime, it is not "experiencing" events in space time. — Relativist

The Mind exists within spacetime. Please see my third argument, C3 to be very specific.

From its perspective, does spacetime exist as a 4-dimensional block? — Relativist

The mind exists within spacetime, a 4D block in other words. Things are moving and exist in the Mind.

Alternatively, does the mind exist like a photon traveling at the speed of light - from its perspective, it exists simultanously along all spacetime points along its path - but also with no intereractions with anything else along that path (an interaction would entail a termination of the path). — Relativist

No, the Mind exists within spacetime. The Mind only experiences things, physical and subjective time, at now because they exist at now.

No, the mind is a result of the brain, not equal to it. — Philosophim

Could you please define the mind?

You have to understand that neuronal activity results in a picture, and then your adjustment based on that picture is more neuronal activity. — Philosophim

When we are talking about the mind we are also talking about consciousness. If we accept that the neural process is merely a physical process then no room is left for consciousness. Could you deny consciousness and its contribution to how a conscious agent does? If not, how consciousness could be causally efficacious if the laws of physics determine the physical process?

The computer you use is completely run on electrical gates that turn on and off. And yet from that, you're able to interact with and change what you see on the screen. — Philosophim

The computer is a weak emergence. There is no explanatory gap in understanding a computer and how it functions. When it comes to consciousness, there is an explanatory gap, so-called the Hard Problem of consciousness. The problem is related to the fact that how something intrinsically is unconscious, electrons, quarks, atoms, molecules, etc. could become conscious when they form a brain.

Don't make the mistake of assuming that complex events cannot come from the build up of many simple things. — Philosophim

Are you talking about weak or strong emergence here? Weak emergence is possible, but strong emergence is not possible.

We have experience, we infer the rest, call it what you will. I don't see why they both can't have an underlying cause, outside stipulation: physical things only change physical things, mental things only change mental things. — Manuel

That is a version of parallelism. The problem is how physical and mental correlate with each other to such a fantastic precision. Some believe that God made it happen. Some believe that it is a coincidence! etc.

Why leads you (or anyone) to say that we know enough of either (physical or mental) to conclude that they can't include each other? — Manuel

What do you mean?

No, the mind is a result of the brain, not equal to it.
— Philosophim
Could you please define the mind? — MoK

A mind is a resulting process of sensory inputs and decisions. The mind can be intelligent, unintelligent, conscious, or unconscious.

When we are talking about the mind we are also talking about consciousness. If we accept that the neural process is merely a physical process then no room is left for consciousness. — MoK

Merely physical? :) Everything is physical MoK. Do you have your consciousness in another room or your head? Is your mind in your head or in your feet? Its tied to a physical location, therefore is physical itself. "Merely" does not diminish the amazing quality of a mind either. Physical reality is amazing.

The computer is a weak emergence. There is no explanatory gap in understanding a computer and how it functions. — MoK

That is because we fully understand a computer. We still have yet to fully understand how the brain works.

When it comes to consciousness, there is an explanatory gap, so-called the Hard Problem of consciousness. The problem is related to the fact that how something intrinsically is unconscious, electrons, quarks, atoms, molecules, etc. could become conscious when they form a brain. — MoK

No, that's not the hard problem at all. The hard problem is figuring out objectively what its like to have a subjective experience. I can objectively be classified as being in pain, but what is it like being in pain subjectively? We can evaluate brain states and objectively determine certain areas of consciousness. How else do you think we created anesthesia?

We also don't fully know what its like to subjectively be a molecule, quark, etc. Including what it is subjectively like to be a computer program like an ai. The hard problem is how do we objectively prove, duplicate, evaluate, and replicate subjective experience for scientific enquiry.

Are you talking about weak or strong emergence here? Weak emergence is possible, but strong emergence is not possible. — MoK

I'm not talking about either. Weak or strong doesn't matter.

I didn't mean to insult you at all. I am very sorry if my words hurt your feelings but I didn't intend to do so. When I ask you what is the experience you answer that as a set of processes in the brain. Please call a set of processes in the brain another thing since the experience refers to another phenomenon I tried my best to explain it to you but you constantly denied it. When I discuss whether Rock experience as well, then you changed experience in the case of the brain to mental experience — MoK

In all cases I was simply responding to you. In my very first post, I brought up the issue of how "experience" is defined, noting that one COULD define it in a way that included a boulder rolling down the mountain. You later seemed to want to limit the discussion to MENTAL experiences, so at that time I began focusing solely on mental experiences. But you defined mental experiences as non-physical, which precludes physicalism with a definition.

I'm fine with applying different terms to mental experiences (m-experiences) and non-mental experiences (nm-experiences). Let's also define non-physical experiences (np-experiences), because you are claiming that m-experiences=np-experiences. Your burden is to show this is necessarily the case.

My contention is that there are no np-experiences, because physicalism can account for m-experiences just fine. You put forth an argument that entails physicalism being false, so you have the burden to show that it is impossible for physicalism to be true. You would presumably do that by proving there are np-experiences.

To me, awareness refers to a state in which we are conscious of mental activities, such as perceptions, thoughts, feelings, etc. — MoK

Agreed. I hope you can recognize that it would have been easier if you had simply said that in the first place, instead of asking.

That is true that MoK's brain at time t is related to Mok's brain at time t-1 plus other factors but that does not mean that MoK's brain at time t-1 plus other factors causes MoK's brain at time t. ...
1) The Hard Problem of consciousness, 2) Epiphenomenalism,
...These issues if not more are serious threats to physicalism. — MoK

You're deflecting. This part of the discussion dealt with your theory of mind, which I pointed out seemed incoherent.

I anticipate that you're strategy is to make an argument from ignorance: find a reason to reject physicalism, and then conclude "...therefore dualism must be true". No, you have to show you have a superior alternative. An incoherent theory is not superior. You DENY that it's incoherent, but you haven't been able to address my objections.

You seemed to agree that MoK's brain @t1 was caused by (MoK's brain at t0 + other factors). The question is: is the mind one of those other factors. Please answer it. I anticipate that either answer will contradict something you've already said, but we'll see. After you've shown your theory is coherent, then we can further discuss your issues with physicalism.

A clarification about my previous post, in respect of this particular statement:

any complete account of the universe must allow for the existence of a nonmaterial component which accounts for its unity and complexity. — Charles Pinter

In this passage, an explicit appeal to a 'nonmaterial component' is made, so it might be useful to look specifically at that remark. The natural question that would follow is: what would a 'nonmaterial component' be? What would you look for or expect? If Pinter is to challenge physicalism, then he must be able to answer that question.

My response is that it's very important how the question is framed. The 'nonmaterial component' is not anything objectively existent. It manifests in our experience as the act of judgement. It is the faculty of the mind which grasps meaning, and also the faculty which is at work in the brain stitching together the unified sense of self-and-world that comprises our sense of reality.

That's why framing the question properly is so important. We assume that what is real is what is objectively the case; what is measurable, objectifiable, able to be represented conceptually or mathematically. So we will naturally say, if this capacity is real, it must be based on the physical, because of the assumption that:

Everything is physical — Philosophim

What is subjective, on the other hand, is assumed to be private, internal and specific to the person. It is what is real 'for you'. Liberal philosophy allows this a kind of inherent worth ('the dignity of the individual') but denies it objective status. (Hence, 'moral relativism'.)

But the capacity of the mind which discerns meaning (i.e. reason) is not strictly personal either, and in that sense, not simply subjective. It is transpersonal, as it is characteristic of any subject of experience, not this or that subject. It is intrinsic to the structure of consciousness, and, therefore, experience.

So: understanding the 'immaterial' is recognition of the mind as the ground of rational intelligence. But that requires a perspective shift, a meta-cognitive insight. The mind is not an object of cognition, so neither is this 'immaterial component' - which is why you keep thinking I'm arguing for absolute skepticism or metaphysics. For us, only what is objective is real, and to deny the primacy of the objective threatens our sense of what is real. That is the perspective shift that is required. We are exclusively oriented to the objective world, the sensory world, such that anything that calls this orientation into question is automatically rejected.

(This is something that Continental philosophy understands, in a way that much Anglo philosophy does not.)

I understand this is a hard argument to grasp - it's a transcendental argument, along Kantian lines. Transcendental arguments are concerned with what must be so, in order for experience to be as it is. They are different to both empirical arguments and scientific arguments. But in this particular context, they're important. Otherwise, confusion ensues, as is evident in this and many other threads about philosophy of mind.

Nothing I've said contradicts that. — Wayfarer

I was responded to your suggesting I had not demonstrated physicalism was coherent, because I hadn't accounted for things like meaning. You felt my previous comment about semantics was insufficient, so I expanded on that.

The rest of your comments seems to be justification for what you believe, not really showing my theory is incoherent. I already explained I'm not trying to prove either that you are wrong, or that physicalism is true.

Whereas it is commonly believed that the physical basis of mind is understood, when it is not. — Wayfarer

Not one neuroscientist or philosopher of mind makes that claim! Rather, physicalists seek to account for the uncontroversial facts in a way consistent with physicalism. All this can do is show that physicalism is possible. In the context of physicalism, that's sufficient - because every other uncontroversial fact is unarguably a natural fact.

But the fact is, were human minds not able to form and grasp foundational concepts, such as 'equals', it would be impossible for us to learn and practice arithmetic, let alone mathematics. It is an ability the human mind alone has. — Wayfarer

So what? Uniqueness doesn't imply physicalism is false.

That is not an adequate account of the power of reason. Mathematical regularities and symmetries are far more than repetitive patterns. Reason has enabled us to estimate the age and size of the Universe. — Wayfarer

You previously said that referring to "semantics" was inadequate to account for meaning. Then when I went into more detail, it made no difference. I'm not going to indulge you again. I've accounted for basic reason; that's a building block. You seem to expect a complete neurolgical framework, seemingly because "it is commonly believed that the physical basis of mind is understood".

The question is: can you identify any uncontroversial fact about mental activity that you can prove impossible under physicalism?

I have not challenged your view, so there's no need to continue to justify it.

The question is: can you identify any uncontroversial fact about mental activity that you can prove impossible under physicalism? — Relativist

I'm sure I have. But then you say:

I already explained I'm not trying to prove ...that physicalism is true. — Relativist

In which case, what are we talking about? I'm arguing against physicalist views that your posts are representing, only for you to say 'well, I'm not really advocating them.'

You seem to expect a complete neurolgical framework — Relativist

If physicalism claims that propositional content can be equated with a brain-state, then it must be able to provide such a basis. (In fact, I think brain-mind identity views are pretty much superseded nowadays largely on the difficulties that this presents, but it's a difficulty any form of physicalism needs to acknowledge.)

Anyway - thanks for the discussion. I very much appreciate your evenness of tone even if we disagree.

In which case, what are we talking about? I'm arguing against physicalist views that your posts are representing, only for you to say 'well, I'm not really advocating them.' — Wayfarer

I explained several posts ago:

I absolutely am not trying to convince you physicalism is true. This thread was about an alleged proof that physicalism is false. I've been explaining why the argument fails. That doesn't entail proving physicalism is true; it entails establishing that it is possible — Relativist

I've been explaining why the argument fails... — Relativist

If you mean, why my arguments against physicalism have failed, I don't believe you have demonstrated that they do, but I'll save you the trouble of starting over.

I was referring to the argument in the Op (I referred to an "alleged proof). Regarding your arguments, you haven't proven physicalism is impossible - and it being POSSIBLE is the only thing I've been defending.

I’ve argued that it’s not feasible, for reasons that you haven’t refuted. But I will admit, my engagement in this thread was addressed to the series of arguments you gave in the post I responded to, rather than the OP itself.

Subjective judgement, but why don't you start a thread describing your metaphysical theory so we can judge its feasibility.

Good idea, it’s the subject of an essay I’ve written recently.

In all cases I was simply responding to you. In my very first post, I brought up the issue of how "experience" is defined, noting that one COULD define it in a way that included a boulder rolling down the mountain. You later seemed to want to limit the discussion to MENTAL experiences, so at that time I began focusing solely on mental experiences. — Relativist

I am aware of that. However, I have a problem with it because, to me, physical processes, whether they occur in your brain or a stone, are governed by the laws of physics. Objects however have different properties these properties are the result of the composition and arrangement of physical in objects.

But you defined mental experiences as non-physical, which precludes physicalism with a definition. — Relativist

I didn't define mental experience at all. That is your definition. I just defined experience. I agree that the experience or awareness precludes physicalism given my definition of experience. See below.

I'm fine with applying different terms to mental experiences (m-experiences) and non-mental experiences (nm-experiences). — Relativist

There is only one sort of physical process and that is governed by laws of physics.

Let's also define non-physical experiences (np-experiences), because you are claiming that m-experiences=np-experiences. Your burden is to show this is necessarily the case. — Relativist

I cannot agree with your definition of np-experience, m-experience, and p-experience since to me there is only one sort of experience that I equate to awareness. I am not claiming that m-experience=np-experience so there is no burden on me.

My contention is that there are no np-experiences, because physicalism can account for m-experiences just fine. You put forth an argument that entails physicalism being false, so you have the burden to show that it is impossible for physicalism to be true. You would presumably do that by proving there are np-experiences. — Relativist

I equate experience to awareness. It was your misuse of terms that caused us all trouble. You define experience as the process in physical. The experience as I mentioned is related to another phenomenon that has a clear definition in the philosophy of the mind.

Agreed. I hope you can recognize that it would have been easier if you had simply said that in the first place, instead of asking. — Relativist

Cool. So we finally agree on awareness (presence of experience) and unawareness (absence of experience). How could you accommodate awareness in physicalism considering the basic ingredients of any objects, electrons, quarks, etc. are unaware?

You're deflecting. This part of the discussion dealt with your theory of mind, which I pointed out seemed incoherent. — Relativist

I am not evading at all. I am talking about problems that cannot be addressed in physicalism. Could you address them? Yes or no? If yes, please address the problems. If not, that is you who are ignoring the mentioned problems. By the way, I developed another argument against physicalism last night. You can find the argument here. Please feel free to discuss the argument in the related thread.

I anticipate that you're strategy is to make an argument from ignorance: find a reason to reject physicalism, and then conclude "...therefore dualism must be true". No, you have to show you have a superior alternative. An incoherent theory is not superior. You DENY that it's incoherent, but you haven't been able to address my objections. — Relativist

Please see above.

You seemed to agree that MoK's brain t1 was caused by (MoK's brain at t0 + other factors). The question is: is the mind one of those other factors. Please answer it. I anticipate that either answer will contradict something you've already said, but we'll see. After you've shown your theory is coherent, then we can further discuss your issues with physicalism. — Relativist

MoK's brain t1 was not caused by MoK's brain at t0 + other factors. Please see above.

I am following your posts and reading them carefully. I think we can agree that experience is a phenomenon that cannot be explained within physicalism. Therefore, there exists a mind with the capacity to experience. I however don't think that thinking is a faculty of the mind.

A mind is a resulting process of sensory inputs and decisions. — Philosophim

What is sensory input to you?

The mind can be intelligent, unintelligent, conscious, or unconscious. — Philosophim

You are talking about consciousness here. How consciousness is possible if we accept that only the physical exists and the physical intrinsically unconscious?

Merely physical? :) Everything is physical MoK. Do you have your consciousness in another room or your head? Is your mind in your head or in your feet? Its tied to a physical location, therefore is physical itself. "Merely" does not diminish the amazing quality of a mind either. Physical reality is amazing. — Philosophim

See above.

No, that's not the hard problem at all. — Philosophim

The Hard Problem of consciousness is the philosophical question of how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience.

We can evaluate brain states and objectively determine certain areas of consciousness. — Philosophim

That only means that there is a correlation between neural processes in the brain and experience. The correlation does not necessarily mean that the neural processes are the cause of experience.

We also don't fully know what its like to subjectively be a molecule, quark, etc. — Philosophim

According to physicalism physical process is governed by the laws of physics. Within physicalism physical does not experience anything at all. That is why the Hard Problem of consciousness becomes relevant. Are you saying that electrons, quarks, etc. can have experience? How something can be an object and subject at the same time?

What is sensory input to you? — MoK

Things like sights and sounds.

You are talking about consciousness here. How consciousness is possible if we accept that only the physical exists and the physical intrinsically unconscious? — MoK

Because the physical is obviously capable of being conscious. You are conscious and physical. Therefore the physical can be conscious. To say the opposite is absurd. :)

The Hard Problem of consciousness is the philosophical question of how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience. — MoK

But why? Because we have no way of objectively classifying subjective experience. Its important you understand the why behind that statement and not interpret it as if subjective experience isn't the result of physical processes.

That only means that there is a correlation between neural processes in the brain and experience. The correlation does not necessarily mean that the neural processes are the cause of experience. — MoK

Decades of brain science and anasthesia would beg to differ. That's like saying, "When I walk I move, but that's just a correlation with my legs and mobility."

According to physicalism physical process is governed by the laws of physics. — MoK

I don't ascribe to physicalism or any other ism. Those are summaries of certain ideas that allow simple digests of concepts. They are not ideas in themselves, and should never be ascribed to in themselves.

Are you saying that electrons, quarks, etc. can have experience? — MoK

I am saying we cannot currently know. That's the hard problem. What is it objectively like to be a quark? Is it like something to be a quark? What is it like to be you? Is it like something to be you? They are both the exact same problem for the exact same reason.

How something can be an object and subject at the same time? — MoK

We don't know exactly how, but we know it can. That's because each of us are subjects and objects. There is this strange insistence from people that there must be something else when we are the most clear evidence that an object can be a subject.

What do you mean? — MoK

Why do you think mind cannot be matter or the opposite? This needs to be argued for, not asserted. If the argument holds, then we can talk about the issue in a more productive manner.

. I agree that the experience or awareness precludes physicalism given my definition of experience. — MoK

So your "proof" that physicalism is false is based on the assumption that physicalism is false. Circular reasoning.

You may believe physicalism is false because you can't imagine how it can account for some phenomenon, but that is not a proof. I don't care what you believe, so I have no burden to explain or defend physicalism. I know physicalism to be coherent and to be more explanatorially complete than alternatives, and this is sufficient basis for me to reject your argument. I have no burden to prove this to you. You assumed a burden by posting an argument that you presumably think should have the power to persuade. If your argument depends on your unproven assumption that physicalism is false, you should add that as a premise to your argument.

I cannot agree with your definition of np-experience, m-experience, and p-experience since to me there is only one sort of experience that I equate to awareness. — MoK

You asked me this:

Please call a set of processes in the brain another thing — MoK

That's what I did. The definitions refer to concepts. Accepting the definitions doesn't commit you to agreeing the concept applies to anything in reality. The difference among the 3 concepts are the nature of our disagreement. Based on those 3 concepts, our disagreement is about whether m-experiences are np-experiences or p-experiences. The definition you gave entails ASSUMING m-experiences are np-experiences. If you don't accept the burden to prove this, then your argument fails because it is circular.

I equate experience to awareness. It was your misuse of terms that caused us all trouble. You define experience as the process in physical. The experience as I mentioned is related to another phenomenon that has a clear definition in the philosophy of the mind. — MoK

I didn't misuse terms. I made it clear in my first post that the definition of experience was relevant, and I subsequently rejected your definition because it assumed, not proved, that experiences were non-physical. The discussion did get confusing because we hadn't agreed to a definition. I've addressed this by defining the 3 concepts. If you aren't willing to accept the possibility that m-experiences are p-experiences, then the discussion is at an end because your reasoning is circular.

I'll clarify one point: to say m-experiences are p-experiences means that m-experiences are due to physical processes, and thus consistent with physicalism. I'm not reifying an abstract description. You are greatly mistaken if you think physicalist philosopher's of mind would accept your definition.

How could you accommodate awareness in physicalism considering the basic ingredients of any objects, electrons, quarks, etc. are unaware? — MoK

Functionally. Compare it to the function of a car: the parts of the car cannot function individually as a car. It is their arrangement that produces the function.

Our brains hold memories. Beliefs are memories that dispose us to behave a certain way. Awareness is the development of short term beliefs about some state of affairs or activity, caused by our sensory input.

I am not evading at all. I am talking about problems that cannot be addressed in physicalism — MoK

You're ignoring the context of this part of the discussion. You had given an incoherent account of the mind-body relationship. This is fatal to your argument. You presented this argument in your op, which gives you the burden to defend it. If you can't show that account is coherent, you've failed - irrespective of whether or not physicalism is true.

I anticipate that you're strategy is to make an argument from ignorance: find a reason to reject physicalism, and then conclude "...therefore dualism must be true". No, you have to show you have a superior alternative. An incoherent theory is not superior. You DENY that it's incoherent, but you haven't been able to address my objections.
— Relativist
Please see above. — MoK

So you aren't denying that you're making an argument from ignorance.

You seemed to agree that MoK's brain t1 was caused by (MoK's brain at t0 + other factors). The question is: is the mind one of those other factors. Please answer it. I anticipate that either answer will contradict something you've already said, but we'll see. After you've shown your theory is coherent, then we can further discuss your issues with physicalism.
— Relativist
MoK's brain t1 was not caused by MoK's brain at t0 + other factors. Please see above. — MoK

Then what caused MoK's brain at t1? There was no explanation "above". Give me an account of all the causal factors (that's what I was doing with my statement,"MoK's brain t1 was caused by [MoK's brain at t0 + other factors].

Because the physical is obviously capable of being conscious. You are conscious and physical. Therefore the physical can be conscious. To say the opposite is absurd. :) — Philosophim

I am sure you are familiar with the concept of anesthesia. How physical which is intrinsically conscious could possibly become unconscious?

But why? Because we have no way of objectively classifying subjective experience. Its important you understand the why behind that statement and not interpret it as if subjective experience isn't the result of physical processes. — Philosophim

Which one do you pick: 1) Physical is not conscious and becomes conscious as a result of neurobiological activity in the brain or 2) Physical is intrinsically conscious? In the first case we are dealing with the Hard Problem of consciousness and in the second case, we have anesthesia that cannot be explained.

Decades of brain science and anasthesia would beg to differ. That's like saying, "When I walk I move, but that's just a correlation with my legs and mobility." — Philosophim

You believe in anesthesia and at the same time think that physical is intrinsically conscious. Don't you see a contradiction in this statement?

I am saying we cannot currently know. That's the hard problem. What is it objectively like to be a quark? Is it like something to be a quark? What is it like to be you? Is it like something to be you? They are both the exact same problem for the exact same reason. — Philosophim

But you said that physical is conscious. Therefore, quarks, electrons, etc. must be conscious as well.

We don't know exactly how, but we know it can. That's because each of us are subjects and objects. There is this strange insistence from people that there must be something else when we are the most clear evidence that an object can be a subject. — Philosophim

But the object and subject cannot be the same thing. We have physical and experience of physical. These two are not identical and refer to two different things.

Why do you think mind cannot be matter or the opposite? — Manuel

Because we have physical and experience of physical. These two are not identical. Physical exists whether you experience it or not. We have certain experiences when our subject of focus is on an object though. Therefore, the physical and the experience of the physical are not identical. What is the mind is subject to the understanding that the physical and the experience of the physical are not identical.

This needs to be argued for, not asserted. If the argument holds, then we can talk about the issue in a more productive manner. — Manuel

Let's see if we can agree on the difference between the physical and the experience of the physical.

So your "proof" that physicalism is false is based on the assumption that physicalism is false. Circular reasoning. — Relativist

No, I am arguing that physicalism is false because it cannot explain awareness/experience and that is not the only problem that physicalism suffers from.

You may believe physicalism is false because you can't imagine how it can account for some phenomenon, but that is not a proof. I don't care what you believe, so I have no burden to explain or defend physicalism. I know physicalism to be coherent and to be more explanatorially complete than alternatives, and this is sufficient basis for me to reject your argument. I have no burden to prove this to you. You assumed a burden by posting an argument that you presumably think should have the power to persuade. If your argument depends on your unproven assumption that physicalism is false, you should add that as a premise to your argument. — Relativist

If you think that physicalism is not false then you have to deal with the Hard problem of consciousness, epiphenomenalism, and other problems that I discussed in detail but you didn't reply to it. You cannot resolve these problems. Could you?

I didn't misuse terms. I made it clear in my first post that the definition of experience was relevant, and I subsequently rejected your definition because it assumed, not proved, that experiences were non-physical. The discussion did get confusing because we hadn't agreed to a definition. — Relativist

You misused terms. Experience refers to a phenomenon that has a very clear definition in the philosophy of the mind, namely my definition.

I've addressed this by defining the 3 concepts. If you aren't willing to accept the possibility that m-experiences are p-experiences, then the discussion is at an end because your reasoning is circular. — Relativist

I don't agree that there is p-experience or m-experience even if I grant you that experience is a set of processes. There is only one sort of process in the physical governed by the laws of nature whether the physical is a brain or a rock.

... You are greatly mistaken if you think physicalist philosopher's of mind would accept your definition. — Relativist

Yes, there are philosophers of the mind who even deny consciousness/awareness/experience.

Functionally. Compare it to the function of a car: the parts of the car cannot function individually as a car. It is their arrangement that produces the function. — Relativist

Now you are confusing weak and strong emergence here.

Our brains hold memories. Beliefs are memories that dispose us to behave a certain way. Awareness is the development of short term beliefs about some state of affairs or activity, caused by our sensory input. — Relativist

No, we already agreed on the definition of awareness which is a state in which we are conscious of mental activities, such as perceptions, thoughts, feelings, etc. The awareness is used for the case that we know certain things as well but please let's focus on the first definition otherwise we get nowhere.

You're ignoring the context of this part of the discussion. — Relativist

I am not ignoring the context at all. I brought the problems that cannot be explained within physicalism but my version of substance dualism.

You had given an incoherent account of the mind-body relationship. This is fatal to your argument. — Relativist

It is not incoherent at all. Our discussion in OP deviated from the point that we didn't agree on the definition of experience. I am happy to replace experience with awareness and see whether you can find a flaw in my argument.

You presented this argument in your op, which gives you the burden to defend it. If you can't show that account is coherent, you've failed - irrespective of whether or not physicalism is true. — Relativist

What is your problem with my argument? I think the discussion regarding the problems of physicalism is relevant because cause and effect in physicalism are horizontal whereas in my case the cause and effect is vertical. Horizontal causation cannot explain many phenomena whereas vertical causation can, basically P2 in the first argument.

So you aren't denying that you're making an argument from ignorance. — Relativist

Sure not. My argument is sound and valid. Please read it and let me know if you have any problems with the premises and conclusions. For now, let's focus on the first argument. You need to replace experience with awareness if you are not happy with my definition of experience.

Then what caused MoK's brain at t1? There was no explanation "above". Give me an account of all the causal factors (that's what I was doing with my statement,"MoK's brain t1 was caused by [MoK's brain at t0 + other factors]. — Relativist

I already explained that to you two times if not more. The Mind causes MoK's brain at t1 given the fact that it experiences MoK's brain at t0 plus other factors.

I am following your posts and reading them carefully. I think we can agree that experience is a phenomenon that cannot be explained within physicalism. Therefore, there exists a mind with the capacity to experience. — MoK

:up:

Because we have physical and experience of physical. These two are not identical. Physical exists whether you experience it or not. We have certain experiences when our subject of focus is on an object though. Therefore, the physical and the experience of the physical are not identical. What is the mind is subject to the understanding that the physical and the experience of the physical are not identical. — MoK

Why is experience not physical? I agree that things "outside the mind" - outside consciousness itself are physical things and hence mediated through experience. What I don't quite get is why experience is not physical?