• Count Timothy von Icarus
    3.2k


    I do not agree. Berkeley takes "matter" in very much the way of Aristotle. That's how he manages to conceive of substance without matter.


    I believe that Berkeley is actually demonstrating the incorrectness of this 'new' way of conceiving of "matter" by showing how these ideas that people have about "matter" do not hold up if we adhere to principles.

    Where does Berkeley lay out an alternative theory of matter? I mostly recall him being fairly adamant about wholly eliminating matter ("immaterialism"), even for non-representationalists (in the Dialogues).

    In any event, I was thinking of the "matter" of those he spends most of his time criticizing (e.g. Locke).

    [/quote]




    On the upside, science itself has seemed remarkably resilient in the face of this drum beat. I worked at a place that specialized in glaucoma for a while and the doctors would make pitches about "fully understanding the causes of this disease." Likewise, physicists have not been deterred from subtitling their books things like: "the quest for the ultimate nature of reality," or "what is real?" etc.
  • Wayfarer
    23.6k
    The quote you provided seems to agree with me. Berkeley was criticizing the 'new' conception of matter.Metaphysician Undercover

    Yes, I'll concede that, but there's nothing in Berkeley's philosophy that corresponds with the 'morphe' of Aristotle's hylomorphism. But you're correct in saying that he is targetting the conception of matter held by the other early modern philosophers.
  • Wayfarer
    23.6k
    physicists have not been deterred from subtitling their books things like: "the quest for the ultimate nature of reality," or "what is real?" etc.Count Timothy von Icarus

    I have a number of such books, although they're by science writers rather than physicists (Manjit Kumar, David Lindley, Adam Becker.) But the fact that it's still a question is rather in Berkeley's favour, don't you think?
  • Mww
    5k
    As usual, you present interesting stuff, to which I like to think out loud about. To think out loud should not be construed to mean criticism, which would be pretty foolish of me, considering your superior level of academia.

    …..with David Hume and the advent of modern philosophy, the whole concept of natural causation is thrown into question.Wayfarer

    I’d chalk that natural causation question up to QM rather than philosophy. Whether the cause/effect principle is resident in the human intellect, such that natural causation is comprehensible, that I would attribute to a changing philosophical agenda.

    To conflate what comes first in time with what is most fundamental in being is to mistake the descriptive for the ontological.Wayfarer

    Absolutely. Hence the Kantian dictate that both are equally necessary conditions for empirical knowledge. The antinomies prove one can be nonetheless thought as ulterior or antecedent to the other.

    The logical relations and causal connections we discern in the world are only possible because the world is idea—a representation shaped by the mind.Wayfarer

    The logical relations and causal connections we discern are a product of our intellectual capacity and only possible therefrom, having to do only with existent objects in relation to each other, or to ourselves. When the world as idea is thought as a universal concept, it is not necessary for us to discern the logical relations of its particular content.
    ————-

    But the world as idea… only appears with the opening of the first eye.'Wayfarer

    It bothers me that world as idea…only appears. The world may indeed be an idea, a universal object of reason, re: that in which are found all possible objects but is not itself an object, but world as idea isn’t that which appears to an eye. Only existences appear, the world, as pure transcendental object, isn’t an existence.

    I’m sorry, but “opening of the first eye” is absurd, if such is meant even remotely literal. To reconcile the absurdity, we are forced to admit the metaphor merely represents some arbitrary initial impact on a fully developed rational intelligence. The problem for humans then reduces to the opening of the first eye may not have even been human, but the world as idea is predicated on it anyway, which is a contradiction. Nothing’s solved by attributing first eye to humanity in general, nor to individual human subjects therein.
    ————-

    How is the ding as sich not just as “outside” as the objective world? The “inner kernel” of an outside thing is just as outside as that of which it is internal.
  • Mww
    5k
    Zeno's paradoxes, and the idea of infinite divisibility, had cast doubt toward the reality of spatial continuity.Metaphysician Undercover

    Hmmm….dammit, you’re right, I forgot about that. In the strictest possible sense of spatial continuity, yours is the stronger for being deferred to the temporal, but for the common understanding of the ordinary man…of which there are decidedly many more than philosophers per se….that a thing is in his way is very much more apparent than the notion that if he waits long enough, it won’t be.
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    13.5k
    Where does Berkeley lay out an alternative theory of matter? I mostly recall him being fairly adamant about wholly eliminating matter ("immaterialism"), even for non-representationalists (in the Dialogues).

    In any event, I was thinking of the "matter" of those he spends most of his time criticizing (e.g. Locke).
    Count Timothy von Icarus

    I didn't say that he lays out a new theory. I said that by adhering to the Aristotelian (traditional) principles, for understanding "matter", he shows how the divergent conception of matter, what you called "subsistent substrate", is misdirected. "Matter" in this sense is conceived as necessary, while the traditional conception classed it as potential. Hume, I believe had a similar approach. "Matter" in his philosophy would be an inductive concept, therefore lacking in necessity.

    Maybe Wayfarer is more accurate, and Berkeley was showing problems with that 'new' concept of matter without any understanding of the Aristotelian concept, but he seems to have at least a fundamental grasp on the classical understanding of contingency which is Aristotelian based.

    I believe the shift away from Aristotelianism, in the way that "matter" is conceived, is derived from the physicists. They were the first to drop Aristotle as a principal source for higher education, while his logic was still taught in schools, and philosophers would still study Aristotle.

    Newton assigned to bodies, the fundamental property of inertia, with his first law of motion. This effectively replaced Aristotelian "matter", as what provides for the substance of a body. The logical consequence of this, which is unseen without critical analysis, is that "inertia" is a property, while "matter" in the traditional sense is in a separate category, properties being formal. So "inertia" cannot really replace "matter". Therefore it was assumed to be implicit within that conception of inertia, that inertia is a property of matter. But that leaves matter as something itself, subsistent. I believe that this is how the divergent concept of matter, as "subsistent substrate".

    A similar, but more substantial issue has developed with the concept of "energy". Strictly speaking, "energy" refers to a property. However, when it comes to things like electromagnetic energy, radiation, people often speak of "energy" as if it is a thing itself. This leaves energy as a property without a substance. We cannot assign "matter" as the subsistent substrate which energy is a property of, so that logically, this concept is left unsubstantiated. This is the result of moving from Aristotelian "substance" which is the fundamental property of individuals, particulars, to allowing that "movement" is what is fundamental to particulars. Movement is allowed to replace substance, but in doing so the need for something which is moving is lost.

    Yes, I'll concede that, but there's nothing in Berkeley's philosophy that corresponds with the 'morphe' of Aristotle's hylomorphism.Wayfarer

    I think, that at Berkeley's time, modern philosophy was extremely underdeveloped. There was Cartesian "mind", and Hume was discussing "ideas", but very little in the way of extensive understanding of metaphysics and ontology as there was with the Scholastics. The reason I believe is that popular focus had turned to physics, and a rapidly evolving understanding of motion. Attention was turned in this direction, so the primary focus of philosophy was actually the mathematics required to support the new physics.

    Berkeley, I believe noticed that physicists were doing strange things with the conception of "matter", and he wanted to bring attention to this. However, he does not appear to have had any extensive training in classical philosophy.

    Hmmm….dammit, you’re right, I forgot about that. In the strictest possible sense of spatial continuity, yours is the stronger for being deferred to the temporal, but for the common understanding of the ordinary man…of which there are decidedly many more than philosophers per se….that a thing is in his way is very much more apparent than the notion that if he waits long enough, it won’t be.Mww

    It's more than just the ordinary man who believes in the priority of spatial relations over temporal. Modern physics has reduced time to being an aspect (dimension) of space. This is due to the fact that with empirical science we assign importance to sense observation in understanding the reality of substance. Sense observation is of the external, therefore producing principles of spatial separations and movements. "Time" as being understood through internal reflection, and logical comparisons, is secondary.
  • Mww
    5k
    Sense observation is of the external, therefore producing principles of spatial separations and movements. "Time" as being understood through internal reflection, and logical comparisons, is secondary.Metaphysician Undercover

    So what happened to spatial movements making the concept of time necessary, rather than merely secondary?

    Where can I read about the reducing of time to an aspect of space?
  • Gnomon
    3.9k
    What I'm trying to say here is that the "appearance of solidity", and the sensation of weight, and the visual image of a rock, are all mental functions. If you see a gray mass, and you believe it to be solid & massive, you will refrain from kicking it. Unless, of course, you are trying to demonstrate that something is there "that is not solely mental". You know from personal experience that your mind/body requires a door in order to "pass through a wall". — Gnomon
    Eddington's Two Tables
    Wayfarer
    Yes. There's only one table, but there are two different ways of looking at, or thinking about, the table. One perspective is scientific (particles & forces in space) and the other philosophical (appearances & phenomena). Scientists use artificial extensions of human senses in order to study the hidden world beyond surface appearances. Philosophers use the scientific information to look inside the human mind, and to imagine how meta-physical ideas relate to physical reality. :smile:

    PS___Since I often get negative feedback for my unconventional use of the term Metaphysics, here's a more modern definition :

    Mental Meta-Physics : Beyond the physical :
    Metaphysics, by definition, deals with concepts that go beyond the physical world, so "metaphysical mental" implies examining the mind in a way that isn't solely limited to its neurological functions
    ___Google A.I. Overview
  • Gnomon
    3.9k
    I do agree the world is a construction of the mind. We don't even need metaphysics to establish this,Manuel
    Yes. Biology & Physics give us a look inside the skull of an observer. From those facts we can construct a mechanical model of how the brain produces ideas. However, there remains an unexplained gap, between neuronal networks and mental functions, that Meta-physics can bridge with reasoning & imagination*1. :smile:
    Note --- See the modern definition of Metaphysics and Wayfarer's link Eddington's Two Tables in my post above.


    *1. In philosophy, reasoning with imagination is a type of reasoning that uses imagination to draw conclusions from existing evidence. It's a distinct way of reasoning that's not the same as reasoning with doxastic {belief} states
    ___Google A.I. Overview
  • DifferentiatingEgg
    269
    The inherent limitations of logic allow for it to collapse inwards upon itself forming a self-referential (fractal, more or less) cave (Godel). I'm of the mind Berkeley was a bit of a fan of Heraclitus and his doctrine of opposites.

    Logic can't produce evidence but it can rationalize it. Immaterialism is a practice of the mind's ability to rationalize. For Berkeley, this was more of a way to do mental push ups to strengthen his ability with empirisism. Berkeley doesn't consider the external world any less real. The people who take it that far and get frustrated by it fall in to his little mental game/exercise and I could rightly see him chuckling to himself in a fit similar to a mischievous child pranking the minds who perceived his works on immaterialism too literally. Berkeley's immaterialism was an exercise in overcoming of oneself in their opposite in my opinion. Much like Nietzsche and Zarathustra...

    Have I made myself clear? ... The overcoming of morality by itself, through truthfulness, the moralist's overcoming of himself in his opposite—in me—that is what the name Zarathustra means in my mouth — Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, Why I am a Fatality § 3
    .

    Isn't this where the colloquial "go kick rocks" comes from? We say it to those who don't "get the picture" in otherwords. Absolutely hilarious to me picturing Berkeley in his jamjams muttering and cackling to himself "go kick rocks..." as he's writing down some ideas he knows will put a twist in someone's britches...

    Though, interesting to me is that it seems Berkeley focused heavily on the opposite ends of the Apollonian spectrum. Where as Nietzsche's balance was between the Apollonian and Dionysian.
  • Wayfarer
    23.6k
    I’m sorry, but “opening of the first eye” is absurd, if such is meant even remotely literal. To reconcile the absurdity, we are forced to admit the metaphor merely represents some arbitrary initial impact on a fully developed rational intelligence.Mww

    It is common knowledge that in the cosmic scheme, h.sapiens has only existed for the merest sliver of time, and mammals and higher animals generally relatively recent arrivals. That is a matter of temporal sequence, but again the observing mind provides the framework within which that is intelligible. And as I've brought Schopenhauer in, I'll double down:

    Since all imaginable characteristics of objects depend on the modes in which they are apprehended by perceiving subjects, then without at least tacitly assumed presuppositions relating to the former (subject) no sense can be given to terms purporting to denote the latter (object). In short, it is impossible to talk about material objects at all, and therefore even so much as to assert their existence, without the use of words the conditions of whose intelligibility derive from the experience of perceiving subjects. — Bryan Magee, Schopenhauer's Philosophy

    So, while it is an empirical fact that universe pre-existed conscious beings, the way in which it exists outside of, or before, conscious beings is unknowable as a matter of principle, as the knowledge we have of it, which is considerable, is still held within that intellectual framework. That is why the great Kant could say that one could be both an empirical realist AND transcendental idealist and see no contradiction between them.

    Isn't this where the colloquial "go kick rocks" comes from?DifferentiatingEgg

    No, it comes from the Samuel Johnson anecdote, which is described in the OP.

    I believe the shift away from Aristotelianism, in the way that "matter" is conceived, is derived from the physicists.Metaphysician Undercover

    Plainly, the death knell for Aristotelianism was the advent of Galilean science and the collapse of the 'medieval synthesis.' And Descartes and all the early moderns took great pains to differentiate themselves from 'the schoolmen', on the not unreasonable grounds that it had become stultifyingly dogmatic. (Actually I still remember an anecdote from the very first lecture in philosophy I attended, by Alan Chalmers, author of What is this Thing called Science? He related the story of group of monks who fell into an argument about how many teeth horses had. They all scurried off to the library, but alas, when they reconvened, they reported that as this fact wasn't in Aristotle, then it couldn't be known. When one fellow suggested going and actually looking in a horses mouth, he was ridiculed.)
  • DifferentiatingEgg
    269
    No, it comes from the Samuel Johnson anecdote, which is described in the OP.Wayfarer

    I was referring to that event in the OP. Apologies for the poor clarity there.
  • Janus
    16.8k
    Since all imaginable characteristics of objects depend on the modes in which they are apprehended by perceiving subjects, then without at least tacitly assumed presuppositions relating to the former (subject) no sense can be given to terms purporting to denote the latter (object). In short, it is impossible to talk about material objects at all, and therefore even so much as to assert their existence, without the use of words the conditions of whose intelligibility derive from the experience of perceiving subjects. — Bryan Magee, Schopenhauer's Philosophy

    This is a conflation between our ability to discern characteristics of things and the characteristics themselves.
  • Mww
    5k
    So, while it is an empirical fact that universe pre-existed conscious beings, the way in which it exists outside of, or before, conscious beings is unknowable as a matter of principleWayfarer

    Agreed; couldn’t be otherwise. I’m a little particular about descriptions of what there is to work with, those necessary conditions, and how they are treated.
  • DifferentiatingEgg
    269
    So, while it is an empirical fact that universe pre-existed conscious beings, the way in which it exists outside of, or before, conscious beings is unknowable as a matter of principle, as the knowledge we have of it, which is considerable, is still held within that intellectual framework.Wayfarer

    What does this imply about the body then?
  • Wayfarer
    23.6k
    Very interesting question!

    Again I'm impressed with Schopenhauer's attitude (although recognizing the thread is about Berkeley).

    Schopenhauer sees the body as the one phenomenon we know from both the first-person (inside) and third-person (external) perspectives. Unlike other objects, which are only known to us as representations, our body is directly felt as Will. Accordingly, bodily actions are not caused by will in a mechanistic sense; rather, they manifest the will. When I move my arm, it is not that my will causes the movement—it is the movement. In this respect the body provides an analogy for understanding the nature of a larger reality: things appear as representations, but in their essence, they are Will.

    That is similar to how analytical idealist Bernardo Kastrup puts it:

    If you are sad – very sad inside, to the point of despair – and you look at yourself in the mirror, you may be crying. So you will see tears flowing down your face and contorted muscles, but not for a moment would you think that those tears and contorted muscles are the whole story. You know that behind those tears, there is the thing in itself – the real thing – which is your sadness. So the tears and the muscles are the extrinsic appearance, the representation of an inner reality.Mind over Matter
  • DifferentiatingEgg
    269

    I appreciate that answer as it gives quite an informative reference towards Nietzsche's "Will to Power," and what he had been considering.
  • Wayfarer
    23.6k
    I think Schop was a major influence wasn’t he? (Although I generally shy away from discussion of Neitszche.)
  • DifferentiatingEgg
    269
    He was, but I'm not very read on him, so it was an interesting insight. I'll be getting around to writing a large piece about Nietzsche here soon that will actually break down some of his trains of thought on certain topics in a pretty straight forward fashion.
  • DifferentiatingEgg
    269
    I literally just used what you taught me in conversation... someone throwing a red herring in a debate because I mispoke on an accusation but didn't change the outcome of the conclusion either way...

    Guy tried to say
    "It's hard to have basic consistency with you, I'll be Kantian by the time I'm done."

    I responded with "You're throwing out red herrings because you're afraid of answering the question cause you'll invariably have to use what I said originally and you tried to refute... and I had a discussion today that allows me to smh at your perception of Kant..."
    And proceeded to dunk on him some more with what I mentioned on Berkeley and what you mentioned about Kant. That was a lot of fun ty!
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    13.5k
    So what happened to spatial movements making the concept of time necessary, rather than merely secondary?Mww

    Spatial movements are what make 'the concept' of time necessary. But don't you believe that there is something real which the concept represents? This would be what we know as "the passing of time". Aristotle distinguished two senses of "time". The primary sense is "time" as a measurement, a number assigned to a motion in measurement. This would be 'the concept' of time. But he also explained how in another sense, "time" refers to the thing measured.

    So for example, "it took an hour for me to drive to work today" would indicate the primary sense, a measurement. But "an hour past while I was driving to work today" indicates the secondary. Notice the difference? In the first there is a measurement and this measurement assigns "an hour" as the duration of that act. In the second, there is a chunk of time which passed, measured, and this is called "an hour". In the first, the thing measured completely drops out of the picture as irrelevant, because all that matters is the measurement.

    Where can I read about the reducing of time to an aspect of space?Mww

    This is relativity theory. It's known as spacetime, in which time becomes the fourth dimension of space.
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spacetime
  • Mww
    5k
    So what happened to spatial movements making the concept of time necessary, rather than merely secondary?
    — Mww

    Spatial movements are what make 'the concept' of time necessary.
    Metaphysician Undercover

    Ok. That’s all I was asking.
    ————-

    Where can I read about the reducing of time to an aspect of space?
    — Mww

    This is relativity theory. It's known as spacetime, in which time becomes the fourth dimension of space.
    Metaphysician Undercover

    “…. In order to have a complete description of the motion, we must specify how the body alters its position with time; i.e. for every point on the trajectory it must be stated at what time the body is situated there…”
    (Einstein, Relativity….., 1. 3., 1916, in Lawson, 1920)

    I don’t find the justification for the given “alters position with time”, with your “fourth dimension of space”. Besides not needing to delve into non-Galilean parameters.
  • Manuel
    4.2k
    that Meta-physics can bridge with reasoning & imagination*1.Gnomon

    I've read Eddington's book, it's very good and very much readable even today.

    But I'd say this is more closely associated with epistemology than metaphysics. There is always going to be a metaphysical component in epistemology, but it's quite small.

    One of the two tables is certainly a part of metaphysics. They everyday table, less so.
  • Tom Storm
    9.4k
    There is always going to be a metaphysical component in epistemology, but it's quite small.Manuel

    Doesn't epistemology rely upon metaphysical commitments for it to make sense? I'm not sure one can meaningfully talk about what we can know unless we have resovled what there is and somehow we continually end up in a tail chasing discussion about whether an external world exists outside our perception and what it is. Not to mention the quesion of time and space - are they products of the cognitive apparatus of human minds, or do they exist? Don't scientists subscribe to a massive metaphysical commitment, that reality can be understood?
  • wonderer1
    2.2k
    Don't scientists subscribe to a massive metaphysical commitment, that reality can be understood?Tom Storm

    Is that a massive commitment? It seems to me a matter of rather routine observations.
  • Tom Storm
    9.4k
    It seems to me a matter of rather routine observations.wonderer1

    Well that makes sense if you believe in scientific realism - that there is a reality which can be understood and studied. This assumption isn't demonstrable by science but is taken as a foundational premise that makes scientific investigation possible.

    Note, I am not saying science can't provide us with pragmatic and useful interventions in the world. I would just never mistake if for absolute truth. I think of science as more instrumental or pragmatic.
  • Wayfarer
    23.6k
    Don't scientists subscribe to a massive metaphysical commitment, that reality can be understood?Tom Storm

    The scientific method relies heavily on limiting the kinds of questions it tackles to those that can be meaningfully addressed within a defined scope. Consider for example the laws of motion and Galileo's definitions of physics in terms of the measurable attributes of bodies. Galileo made revolutionary discoveries in the understanding of motion, including the concept of inertia (that objects in motion tend to stay in motion unless acted upon by a force).  Galileo emphasized observation and experimentation, laying the groundwork for the scientific method. Newton took these ideas further and formalized them into his three laws of motion, which are fundamental to classical mechanics, meticulously following Galileo's method in collecting data and formulating theories based on evidence. This is why they are considered two foundational figures in modern science. But note that this already relies on some fundamental assumptions and axioms, notably idealisation and abstraction. The practice of physics assume ideal forms, frictionless planes, dimensionless points, and bodies with precisely measurable attributes and behaviours. On the one hand, this proves incredibly powerful in control and prediction within its domain, which is universal in principle, but on the other, it is limited in practice by the fact that the real world does not actually comprise ideal forms and measurable forces, although this method also enables fantastically high levels of approximation. And of course there's no question of its power - you're literally looking at its results!

    But notice that among what this excludes is - the subject! There is no conceptual space in all of this for the actual scientist. Which in some sense is what Bishop Berkeley is attempting to restore. He's saying something like, look, unless this is real for someone, then what kind of reality does it have? Phenomenology was to bring all of this out and make it explicit, but the germ of the idea is there in Berkeley (and Descartes for that matter, who is often credited as the forefather of phenomenology.)
  • Wayfarer
    23.6k
    I’ve been thinking about a way to express Berkeley’s esse est percipi without the theological commitment to an all-seeing God or even the (Brahman-like) cosmic intelligence of Kastrup’s Mind at Large. A philosophically neutral alternative is simply to say that what is real, is real for a mind—or even just for 'the observer'. For those who are able to hold to a theistic interpretation, then the Divine Intellect will fulfill that role, but that isn’t strictly necessary for the paradigm to make sense.

    If we then ask how to define this mind, the answer is that it cannot be defined in objective terms—because it is not an object. Mind does not appear to us as a phenomenon, but appears as the observer. It is the first-person to whom all experience occurs, meaning that it is never something we can stand outside of and conceptualize as we do with other objects (on any scale). As the old Hindu saying has it, to do so is like the hand trying to grasp itself, or the eye trying to see itself. This is why materialists like Dennett, recognizing that mind cannot be an objective entity, attempt to eliminate it altogether rather than acknowledge its unique status, which undermines their core tenet of the supremacy of objectivity.

    This brings us back to Berkeley’s critique of materialism, the assumption that only observed phenomena—the measurable and quantifiable—is real. Because mind itself is never an observed phenomenon, the materialist concludes that mind must be either an illusion or an emergent property of physical processes. This, however, is an assumption, not a conclusion1. If anything, the inverse is true: the very concept of an objective, external reality depends on the presence of an observer for whom reality appears in the first place.

    This position doesn’t entail a theistic framework—it’s simply the recognition that experience always occurs for a mind, hence the indispensability of the subject. Whether one frames this in terms of Berkeley’s God, Kastrup’s ‘Mind at Large,’ or Husserl’s transcendental subject, or even contemporary enactivist approaches to cognition, the underlying point remains the same: the world appears only as structured within awareness or consciousness, within which which the subject of experience is an ineliminable pole.

    ----

    1. 'The world is not conclusion/a species stands beyond/invisible as music/but positive as sound' ~ Emily Dickinson.
  • Manuel
    4.2k
    Doesn't epistemology rely upon metaphysical commitments for it to make sense? I'm not sure one can meaningfully talk about what we can know unless we have resovled what there is and somehow we continually end up in a tail chasing discussion about whether an external world exists outside our perception and what it is. Not to mention the quesion of time and space - are they products of the cognitive apparatus of human minds, or do they exist? Don't scientists subscribe to a massive metaphysical commitment, that reality can be understood?Tom Storm

    They do - there is a world to which epistemology aims to establish knowledge claims of. But if we take metaphysics to mean, narrowly, the nature of the (mind-independent) world, then making claims about ordinary objects like tables or chairs are not metaphysical claims.

    These pertain to the mode of our cognition.

    Yes, science is metaphysics - in large part, not entirely - because it tries to tell us what that nature is.

    In any case, we do not - and cannot - go beyond appearance.
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