• Bob Ross
    2k


    Gregory, you keep jumping all over the place. I keep addressing your points and then you just move on to different point without engaging and then you circle back to the original point I already addressed.

    E.g.,:

    The gears coukd have eternally moved by gravity if they are on a slant

    I already demonstrated that gravity doesn't work like that and that your counter-example using it does not provide any rejoinder to the argument from composition; and even if it did it wouldn't negate anything I said to Philosophim. The 'thing' which would be actualizing the potential for the gears to move would, like I pointed out, be external to the series. In this case, you are positing it is some sort of gravity.
  • Philosophim
    2.8k
    But nothing about the OP is mystical nor does it cite anything mystical. I challenge you to show me which premise in the OP is making an argument from ignorance.Bob Ross

    To clarify, I'm addressing my personal opinions on infinite existence. This actually wasn't a criticism of your point. :)

    Like I said before, the problem is that you are positing an infinite series which is contradicted by what we know exists; so it is impossible. The idea of such an infinite series ceteris paribus, to your point, is possible.Bob Ross

    I think you misunderstand still. I'm noting that if you apply the same approach to your idea of a simple being being the start of it all, you run into the same impossibility. If that is so, and you are noting that something impossible is possible, then an infinite series is equally impossibly possible.

    The OP is just establishing that an absolutely simple being must be the underpinning (ultimately) for the actualization (composition) of the composed being: how it scientifically works is separate question that digresses from the OP.Bob Ross

    Its not a scientific question, its a question of what an absolutely simple being would be. Are you just inventing a word placeholder or does it have some concrete functionality? Again, you're coming up with specifics in an infinite regressive causality of gears, then noting its impossible, but you're not doing the same for this one part interacting with a finite set of gears to power them. What you're saying is there is essentially one gear that gets powered, then powers all the others. How can that be 'perfectly simple'? What does that mean?

    Wouldn't a part of the immutable being need to interact with that part?

    No, because there is no parts to the simple being; but, yes, it does ‘interact’ with what it actualizes insofar as it keeps it in existence.
    Bob Ross

    This makes no sense then. If a single gear powers the others, it powers it by transferring energy from itself to the rest of the gears. If not, then how does it transfer? If there are no parts, how does it push the first gear in the series? Again, its holding this example to the same standard of the infinite gears.

    No, because there is no parts to the simple being; but, yes, it does ‘interact’ with what it actualizes insofar as it keeps it in existence.Bob Ross

    If only a part of it interacts with the rest of the gears, then it is not purely simple. If its entire being interacts with the first gear, then what separates it from the gear itself? In which case what separates an entire infinite simple being from interacting with an infinite set of gears all at once for eternity?

    Energy is just the ability to do work; so I am not following what you mean here. Energy doesn’t have parts just as much as space itself has no parts; however, it is worth noting that they are not absolutely simple concrete beings.Bob Ross

    Energy is the entire impetus of anything. No energy and we have timeless matter without movement. Energy is transferred between matter, like energy starts the first gear in a line of gears. If there is a simple thing that started the first gear, it must have transferred energy right?

    I don’t see why it couldn’t in principle. By partless, we are talking about in concreto parts. My feeling of sadness and my thought about maybe eating ice cream later are not parts of my (in concreto) being.Bob Ross

    They actually are. You can tie those feelings to your brain, which is many multiple parts. A person can be lobotimzed to the point that they cannot think about ice cream nor feel sad anymore.

    I am more than happy to discuss that in this thread if you want or in that thread; but the same issues I have voiced before still seem to be there. E.g., the term ‘cause’ is being used entirely too loosely.Bob Ross

    Not a worry, it was only referenced if it would help you to understand what I was getting at. I wrote it specifically to detail 'cause' more, so I am a bit disappointed you think its not detailed enough. After were done here it would be kind if you would point out where you think its still lacking.

    Here’s a simple way of demonstrating my point with the gears:

    I have learned how you think enough at this point that you are missing my point and I don't think explaining my side again would help. Not a worry, let me go back to your original premises at this point as I think talking in your thought process will help communicate the issue better.
    Bob Ross
    8. An uncomposed being (such as an uncomposed part) is purely simple, since it lacks any parts.
    9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts.
    10. Two purely simple beings do not have any different parts (since they have none).
    11. Therefore, only one purely simple being can exist.
    Bob Ross

    Lets address what a simple being is. Just because we can piece two words together in a sentence, it does not meant its a coherent existent example.

    What is a being? It is something existent. We are able to divide in into parts. You believe its possible there is a being that cannot be divided. I have no issue with that. As you noted.

    Nothing which is spatiotemporal can be absolutely simple (i.e., an ‘aristotelian atom’); for everything in space and time is divisible.Bob Ross

    So we know this thing cannot exist in space or time. You also noted:

    for a part is a word which refers to a thing’s relation to another thing and not what some other thing may be in relation to itBob Ross

    Further, using the gears analogy, I believe we can represent the first gear being powered by the simple being. This would entail that the simple being was a part of the entire chain of gears, the start which powered it all. But how can something which does not exist in space or time power the first gear? Is it powering all the gears at once? But how is that any different from there being an infinite regression of gears being powered all at once?

    Now lets address 9. Two beings are distinguishable from each other's parts, not from their own parts within themselves. A simple part is mono, meaning it cannot be multiple. Meaning we can have two different monoparts. They would be distinguishible because one mono part would not be the other monopart.

    Can you give an example of a monopart that exists apart from space and time yet is able to interact with the space and time of a gear to start it all? Of course not, its impossible, yet we say its possible anyway. And once we start saying the impossible is possible, we can no longer say, "That impossibility is possible, while this other one isn't."

    10 and 11 also doesn't conclude. A monopart is one, therefore there is nothing preventing another separate one from being. They don't have any parts in themselves, but they are separate beings. They could interact and become part of something else.

    Let me know what you think.
  • Gregory
    4.8k
    The 'thing' which would be actualizing the potential for the gears to move would, like I pointed out, be external to the seriesBob Ross

    No. Many scientists would disagree with you. The 5 ways are just the thing physicists like to think about: how to move the series through the laws of nature alone.
  • Gregory
    4.8k
    you circle back to the original point I alreadyBob Ross

    Then i address it

    already demonstrated that gravity doesn't work likeBob Ross

    Where?

    You can't form some generic argument about potential and actuality and say this is beyond science. This is about specific scientific principles thst science has been working on since Newton. These arguments you present are very tangled and many many physicists would disagree with them
  • tim wood
    9.4k
    Fair enough; fairly said. It devolves to whatever is presupposed in the metaphysical argument; and that, rendered, is God as presupposition. That is, we presuppose God exists, therefore God exists: sound theology, not very good philosophy, and nothing scientific at all.

    As to your "generic existence," maybe a separate topic. But it seems to me that given your "generic existence," then it is difficult - actually impossible - to think of anything that does not exist. Yes? No?
  • Banno
    26.2k
    The general form of the contingency argument is:

    • Here is a series
    • That series has some prime item on which it is based
    • And this we call god.

    Now I don't find that argument at all convincing. Nor significantly different to the various other cosmological arguments.

    Why is it not convincing? Well, for lots of reasons, but one not considered here yet may be interesting. It seems we cannot construct a formal argument that is valid and has as its conclusion that something exists. You can read up on this in the SEP article on Free Logic. There are two ways to think about this result. The first is that formal logic is just incapable of displaying the structure of such existential arguments. The second, that any argument that claims to show that something exists has the assumption of existence hidden in its premises. So taking an example from the SEP article, in order to say that ‘Whatever thinks exists’ we already have supposed that there is something that thinks, that the domain of thinking things is not empty. That is, that ‘Whatever thinks, exists’ is the same as the truism ∃x(x=y). The cosmological argument hinges on the premise that there is something rather than nothing, the non-emptiness of the domain of being. If we assume that, then of course we can conclude that something exists. At issue then is the nature of that something.

    Anyway, that's my suggestion for another way to think about such arguments. They don't prove that god exists, but if you already supose that god exists, they might go someway to explaining how to think about god in a coherent fashion.

    There's also the more obvious problem that god is both simple and yet has parts - will, intelligence, and so on. The quick retort is that these are all one, that god's will, intelligence and so on are all the very same. That's quite a stretch, since for the purposes of the argument they are each separated out. Faith is a powerful force. Yet if one begins with a contradiction, anything is provable.

    And the last step is a puzzle, Aquinas' "And this we all call god". That things exist is for many a source of perplexity. In the end the argument just names that feeling.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    I'm noting that if you apply the same approach to your idea of a simple being being the start of it all, you run into the same impossibility. If that is so, and you are noting that something impossible is possible, then an infinite series is equally impossibly possible.

    So, I want to focus for second on the fact that you believe both a finite series with an absolutely simple first member and an infinite series of rotating gears are impossible.

    I demonstrated here that the latter is impossible as follows:

    1. Change is the actualization of a potential.
    2. A gear cannot change itself.
    3. Rotation is a form of change.
    4. A gear cannot rotate itself.
    5. An infinite series of gears that are interlinked would never, in itself, produce any rotation amongst the gears.
    6. Therefore, if an infinite series of gears that are interlinked are such that they are each rotating, then something outside of that series is the cause of that rotation.

    You still have not demonstrated that the former is impossible. This seems to be the crux of your rejoinder, so what is your argument for that?

    Here’s the closest I saw in your response to an argument:

    Can you give an example of a monopart that exists apart from space and time yet is able to interact with the space and time of a gear to start it all? Of course not, its impossible, yet we say its possible anyway.

    This is a bad argument. You are saying:

    1. There is no example we can give of a being that exists outside of space and time and yet can still interact with things in space and time.
    2. Therefore, it is impossible.

    That is, ironically, an argument from ignorance—that’s a God of the gaps style argument.

    I would like you to focus on providing me with a sound argument for why it is impossible; because that’s the crux of your argument. However, I do want to briefly address some other points you made: feel free to ignore the rest of this response to focus on the above if you need to.

    What you're saying is there is essentially one gear that gets powered, then powers all the others. How can that be 'perfectly simple'?

    The gears example is analogous to the composition argument only insofar as I was demonstrating that an infinite series of beings which lack the power to instantiate a thing and of which exhibit that thing is impossible per se. I am not arguing that there is an absolutely simple being at the beginning of a finite series (or an indefinite series with a starting point—i.e., a potential infinity) of gears moving. As a side note, Aristotle would argue that, by analogy, the gears are an infinite series that are rotating each other and the pure actualizer is the external cause for that rotation. I don’t want to get into his argument from motion because it detracts from the OP (which is about composition).

    My argument is from composition: it is the idea that an absolutely simple being that is purely actual is the start of the chain of causality for the existence of things in terms of their composition. Think of it more like the atom composes the apple, and not the apple is thrown by the person.

    This makes no sense then. If a single gear powers the others, it powers it by transferring energy from itself to the rest of the gears. If not, then how does it transfer?

    This doesn’t matter if the OP succeeds in demonstrating that an absolutely simple being needs to exist to account for the existence of contingent beings. Again, you keep shifting the goalpost to questions about how this absolutely simple being actualizes the existence of things instead of whether or not the OP succeeds at proving there is such a being that actualizes them. These are separate questions.

    They actually are. You can tie those feelings to your brain, which is many multiple parts. A person can be lobotimzed to the point that they cannot think about ice cream nor feel sad anymore.

    I agree that consciousness can be reduced to our bodies; but that is a red herring to what I said. It is uncontroversially true that your thoughts have no concrete, proper parts.

    You could try to argue that the absolutely simple being cannot be absolutely simple if it has thoughts because thoughts require physical parts to arise; but I am going to deny that because the OP demonstrates such a being must exist; so it must be the case that not all forms of intelligence are reducible to physical parts. Again, that’s why I keep trying to get you to address the OP; because if it succeeds then these points you are making are good but irrelevant.

    But how can something which does not exist in space or time power the first gear?

    Again, this doesn’t entail it is impossible. This is an argument from ignorance.

    Two beings are distinguishable from each other's parts, not from their own parts within themselves. A simple part is mono, meaning it cannot be multiple. Meaning we can have two different monoparts. They would be distinguishible because one mono part would not be the other monopart.

    If a thing has parts, then it can be distinguished from other things. An absolutely simple being has no parts, so it is impossible that this ‘mono’ thing you referred to as having ‘their own parts within themselves’ is absolutely simple.

    Likewise, you just blanketly asserted that we can have two different ‘monoparts’ when that’s literally what are supposed to be providing an argument for. You basically just said:

    1. An absolutely simple being is ‘mono’.
    2. There can be two different monoparts.
    3. Therefore, it is false that two absolutely simple beings cannot exist.

    That just begs the question.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    Also I forgot to mention:

    Not a worry, it was only referenced if it would help you to understand what I was getting at. I wrote it specifically to detail 'cause' more, so I am a bit disappointed you think its not detailed enough. After were done here it would be kind if you would point out where you think its still lacking.

    Sorry, I am not trying to disappoint you; and I will re-read your OP and respond in that thread sometime soon so we can discuss that as well.
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    Is it essentially the idea that the esse (viz., the parts) depend also on the essence (viz., the whole)?Bob Ross

    Well in the first place esse != parts and essence != whole. Esse/essence is not the part/whole relationship.

    I agree with this insofar as living beings aren’t just composed like non-living beings: they have a form that has to do with a process of maintaining and developing as an organism. Is that what you are referring to by “substantial form”?Bob Ross

    Sure, that’s part of it. So for example, if you place all of the parts of a frog together in the correct configuration, there will still be no frog. The frog as a whole is something that the parts cannot effect.

    I guess I am not seeing the issue. I would say that a form is instantiated by way of the parts arrangement in such-and-such manners; and so the essence is not strictly reducible to the parts which comprise the being which has it; but this doesn’t seem to negate the fact that the essence itself is contingent for its existence on the parts.Bob Ross

    Sure, there is some sense in which the whole depends on the parts, although not all the parts. If a cat loses an ear or a dog loses a leg it has lost a part but the cat or dog still exists.

    The problem begins in premise (4), where you imply that there is an existence in the parts that is not in the whole, and thus we are upbuilding existence from parts to whole. Your idea is something like, “Parts are what primarily exist, and because they exist wholes exist. The existence of wholes is generated by the existence of parts.”

    That’s fair, and I hadn’t thought of that. I think this OP, if true, would necessitate that the universe is finite and that matter is not eternal; or at least that matter is eternal only insofar as it subsists in being (from God).

    We can also, I would say, object in a similar manner to time, space, and natural laws. None of these have parts themselves, and so they would be immune to the OP; but my point would be that the OP establishes the requirement for God, and establishes the nature of God sufficiently to know that these kinds of things which have no parts themselves must be only in existence through God as well. I would say this because nothing can affect a purely actual being (since it lacks passive potency), granted such a being exists, and given natural laws (or time or space itself—if you are a realist about those) would be a medium which does affect such a being’s ability to actualize, it follows that no such purely transcendent natural laws (or time or space) can exist; for God must be more fundamental than them, as their own actualization. They equally have a potential to exist or not, and God actualizes that potentiality.
    Bob Ross

    Okay, that’s fair enough.

    That is fair, but my thing would be that Aristotelian idea of ‘motion’ is misleading for modern people; and makes them be too dismissive of the argument.Bob Ross

    Why do you say that? It seems to me that motion is more generally accepted than the essence/existence distinction. Of course when Aristotle talks about motion he is also talking about any kind of change, but change too is generally accepted to exist.

    Think about it this way: is it easier for someone to deny the essence/existence distinction, or is it easier for them to deny that existence of motion/change?
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    and that, rendered, is God as presupposition.

    Not at all. God is not a presupposition of the argument in the OP.

    That is, we presuppose God exists, therefore God exists:

    This is a blatant straw man: did you read the OP?

    sound theology, not very good philosophy, and nothing scientific at all.

    If the philosophy is unsound, then so too is the theology unsound.

    But it seems to me that given your "generic existence," then it is difficult - actually impossible - to think of anything that does not exist. Yes? No?

    No. On the contrary, if you are a pluralist, then two things can exist in two or more different kinds of being itself. So X may exist in type A being, and not exist in type B being.

    The question arises, how does X interact with type B existent things? Hence, a problem of interaction arises; and of which only establishing a communal type of existence will solve it. The, we end up with an argument of parsimony for monism; because why would we posit three (or more) types of existences when you still need to posit one generic type that they all inherit???
  • Gregory
    4.8k
    The parts which make up the whole actualize the potential for the whole to existBob Ross

    So in answer to Zeno Aristotle says the whole is prior to the parts. So is the whole prior to the parts or the parts prior to the whole? That's really a silly question. There this part, that, and together, the whole. What else is there to say?

    the slide cannot be composed of an infinite per se series of parts and, thusly, God must existBob Ross

    But it does as Zeno shows.

    gravity is the displacement of space-time fabric which is relative to a relationship between the two objects effectedBob Ross

    The question is of the first movement in time. How did it start? Motion, caused by gravity, allows time to flow. Without the caused motion there is no time. Without time there is no creator
  • Philosophim
    2.8k
    So, I want to focus for second on the fact that you believe both a finite series
    with an absolutely simple first member and an infinite series of rotating gears are impossible.
    Bob Ross

    Sure, I'm not saying they aren't impossible generally, and I definitely am not a fan of infinite regress, but I think they are impossible with the examples given here so far. I've agreed with you since the beginning that the infinite gear regress is impossible. What I'm noting is your example of a simple being outside of time and space powering 'the first gear', is also impossible.

    1. There is no example we can give of a being that exists outside of space and time and yet can still interact with things in space and time.
    2. Therefore, it is impossible.

    That is, ironically, an argument from ignorance—that’s a God of the gaps style argument.
    Bob Ross

    1. There is no example we can give of an infinite regress of reality being powered by itself.
    2. Therefore, its is impossible.

    How is the argument I noted any different?

    I would like you to focus on providing me with a sound argument for why it is impossible; because that’s the crux of your argument.Bob Ross

    Because what is possible must be known at least once. Plausible is something we can think might be true, like a horse with a horn on its forehead. But it doesn't mean its possible.

    Just like the infinite regress defies everything we know in physics, therefore we declare it to be impossible, a simple being that exists outside of time and space cannot interact with time and space. To affect time and space, the thing must touch time and space, and must be in it at the point of interactivity. Its simple physics, just like it is simple physics that an infinite regress of gears cannot power itself. You can't apply known physics in one example, then not allow it to apply in another.

    I am not arguing that there is an absolutely simple being at the beginning of a finite series (or an indefinite series with a starting point—i.e., a potential infinity) of gears moving. As a side note, Aristotle would argue that, by analogy, the gears are an infinite series that are rotating each other and the pure actualizer is the external cause for that rotation. I don’t want to get into his argument from motion because it detracts from the OP (which is about composition).Bob Ross

    But you use the argument from motion to show the infinite regress of gears is impossible. Again, the same standards must be applied to both arguments. And if you're not arguing that there is a simple being powering the first gear of regress, I don't understand what you're trying to say.

    My argument is from composition: it is the idea that an absolutely simple being that is purely actual is the start of the chain of causality for the existence of things in terms of their composition.Bob Ross

    How is this any different from a simple being starting the first gear in the chain of causality? Are you just noting, "There is a first cause"? When you get specific with the idea of a simple being, then this specific first cause needs to make within the chain of causality.

    This doesn’t matter if the OP succeeds in demonstrating that an absolutely simple being needs to exist to account for the existence of contingent beings. Again, you keep shifting the goalpost to questions about how this absolutely simple being actualizes the existence of things instead of whether or not the OP succeeds at proving there is such a being that actualizes them.Bob Ross

    It doesn't succeed in demonstrating this because you need a simple being to be understood in terms of real causality just like the gear example. Without understanding what a simple being is, and how it could begin this causal chain, you can't prove your OP. You already brought the real world into it with the gear analogy. You can't suddenly remove physics and physical examples when you want an alternative outcome. Otherwise I could simply state that an infinite simple regress has existed forever and powers itself, and by consequence explains everything else. Put the gears analogy in, and it shows it doesn't work. Same with your simple singular being argument.

    I agree that consciousness can be reduced to our bodies; but that is a red herring to what I said. It is uncontroversially true that your thoughts have no concrete, proper parts.Bob Ross

    Its not a red herring, its to show that thoughts are parts. If I think of the color red, then green, are these not two parts of my entire thought? A simple thought would just be red, and nothing else. A simple being would be like that, 'red' and nothing else. I can't be an intelligent thinking being that designs things, as an intelligent being if it has thoughts, has parts.

    but I am going to deny that because the OP demonstrates such a being must exist; so it must be the case that not all forms of intelligence are reducible to physical parts.Bob Ross

    The correct statement here is that forms of intelligence reduce to physical parts, so there is a flaw in your OP.

    20. Intelligence is having the ability to apprehend the form of things (and not its copies!).
    21. The purely simple and actual being apprehends the forms of things. (19)
    22. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being must be an intelligence.
    Bob Ross

    21 doesn't make any sense. Thoughts are parts, therefore a simple being cannot have thoughts. A thought, an aspect, etc. But not multiple. This means a simple being cannot be intelligent.

    If a thing has parts, then it can be distinguished from other things. An absolutely simple being has no parts, so it is impossible that this ‘mono’ thing you referred to as having ‘their own parts within themselves’ is absolutely simple.Bob Ross

    I never said a monobeing has parts within them. I noted that two mono beings would be different, and could be parts of something greater. A simple being of red, a simple being of green for example. If a being has both green and red, it is no longer simple. If a being can think, it is no longer simple. You're noting a simple being, and a simple being would have severe limitations because it has no parts within it. A god of intelligence in no manner of logical thought is simple.

    Likewise, you just blanketly asserted that we can have two different ‘monoparts’ when that’s literally what are supposed to be providing an argument for. You basically just said:

    1. An absolutely simple being is ‘mono’.
    2. There can be two different monoparts.
    3. Therefore, it is false that two absolutely simple beings cannot exist.

    That just begs the question.
    Bob Ross

    This was in reply to your assertion that only one simple being can exist. A simple being is one, it has no other parts. There could be another simple being that also has no parts, and that would not contradict the first simple being. Therefore it is not true that two simple beings cannot exist.

    Sorry, I am not trying to disappoint you; and I will re-read your OP and respond in that thread sometime soon so we can discuss that as well.Bob Ross

    No rush, your ideas first. :)
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    So, it seems like you are saying:

    1. An absolutely simple being causing (ultimately) the existence of all things violates physics.
    2. Therefore, it cannot exist.

    How does it violate physics?

    1. There is no example we can give of an infinite regress of reality being powered by itself.
    2. Therefore, its is impossible.

    How is the argument I noted any different?

    I didn’t argue that: that would also be an argument from ignorance. I specified exactly why it is impossible.

    What I'm noting is your example of a simple being outside of time and space powering 'the first gear', is also impossible.

    I didn’t give an example of that. As I said before, the example of the gears was to demonstrate that your idea of an infinite series explaining the causality of composition is impossible.

    Because what is possible must be known at least once.

    This is standardly false. Right now, we are discussing actual possibility; but even if we keep it more generic possibility in principle refers to something which may not have ever happen but can happen. What you just described by possibility is not a modality: it is historicity.

    Even if you disagree, I am using the term ‘possibility’ foremost in its common sense definition of being the modality of what can happen; and more specifically in terms of what can happen relative to physics. It is actually impossible (and impossible in the common sensical definition) for an infinite set of moving gears to exist by themselves; it is not actually impossible—or at least you still haven’t demonstrated why it is impossible—for an absolutely simple being to the transcendent grounds for physics itself by way of demonstrating, first and foremost, that the composition of objects entails such a being in the first place.

    a simple being that exists outside of time and space cannot interact with time and space. To affect time and space, the thing must touch time and space, and must be in it at the point of interactivity. Its simple physics

    It is commonly accepted that time and space, assuming they are real, are not fundamental to reality. E.g., Einstein’s space-time fabric implies a block time whereby the relations of things must be determined in ways independent of a strict temporal succession like we intuit.

    Your point here requires that space and time are real substances which every existent thing is in and of; and I don’t see why that is case nor how science backs that. On the contrary, quantum physics and einsteinien physics demonstrate that they are not fundamental at all.

    But you use the argument from motion to show the infinite regress of gears is impossible. Again, the same standards must be applied to both arguments. And if you're not arguing that there is a simple being powering the first gear of regress, I don't understand what you're trying to say

    I am saying that an infinite series of rotating gears ceteris paribus is impossible; and analogously an infinite series of composition for an object is impossible. If it is impossible for a composed object to be infinitely composed, then there must be a first member; and that member must be uncomposed—which means it is absolutely simple.

    How is this any different from a simple being starting the first gear in the chain of causality?

    Because I don’t think that this simple being is the cause of the composition of objects analogously to a thing perpetually moving the first gear in a series. Moving a gear in a series would require something physical moving it, at least immanently (directly). Again, I do find Aristotle’s argument from motion convincing, but that’s a separate argument that runs on separate lines of thought.

    If you wanted to make it analogous, then you would have to posit that there is an infinite series of gears (in the manner we discussed) but that the movement is supplied to each gear equally from some aspect of their own composition; which would, as you can guess, make them ‘magic gears’. The analogy falls apart if we try to make it analogous in that sense.

    It doesn't succeed in demonstrating this because you need a simple being to be understood in terms of real causality just like the gear example.

    Which premise fails?

    Without understanding what a simple being is, and how it could begin this causal chain, you can't prove your OP.

    That’s false. If all the premises are true, then the conclusion in the OP logically follows. How it causes the existence of things is a separate question.

    Its not a red herring, its to show that thoughts are parts.

    A thought does not have parts. Your brain has parts. Are you arguing that somehow your brain has parts and your thoughts have parts?

    A simple being would be like that, 'red'

    Red in the sense of the phenomena or the wavelength? If the former, then it doesn’t have parts and is absolutely simple but is not a concretely existent thing; and if the latter, then it is made of parts but is a concretely existent thing. Either way, it isn’t an example of an absolutely existent thing in concreto (viz., ontologically).

    The correct statement here is that forms of intelligence reduce to physical parts, so there is a flaw in your OP.

    What’s the proof you have of this?

    A simple being of red, a simple being of green for example. If a being has both green and red, it is no longer simple. If a being can think, it is no longer simple. You're noting a simple being, and a simple being would have severe limitations because it has no parts within it. A god of intelligence in no manner of logical thought is simple.

    Again, you are using the term ‘part’ too loosely. A part is something which contributes to the composition of a whole in concreto. A thought; a feeling; the phenomenal experience of a color; the taste of pizza; etc. do not have parts and are not concrete objects.

    A simple being is one, it has no other parts. There could be another simple being that also has no parts, and that would not contradict the first simple being. Therefore it is not true that two simple beings cannot exist.

    Again, you just argued by way of begging the question. I have no good reasons so far to accept that you are right that two simple beings can exist. I already provided a proof that that is impossible. If two things lack parts, then they cannot exist separately from each other; for a thing can only be concretely distinguished from another thing by way of its parts. There would be no boundaries between two absolutely simple things because they have no parts to allow for such limitations.
  • 180 Proof
    15.6k
    What is an unbound surface?Bob Ross
    A surface without edges.

    Can you give a concrete example of that?
    Earth.

    What is a fractal? Ditto.
    Consider this article ...

    https://fractalfoundation.org/resources/what-are-fractals/

    Real number series are not concrete entities, so they are not a valid rejoinder to the argument from the composition of concrete entities.
    None of the premises of your argument refer to "concrete entities" – goal post-shifting fallacy, Bob. Here's what I'm addressing that you've repeatedly referred to:
    1. Composed beings ...Bob Ross
    Numbers¹ are "composed beings" (i.e. sets²
    [whole [integer [rational [real [complex ...]]]]] – "composed" being synonymous with divisible), what A. Meinong refes to as sosein (i.e. being-so, or essence).

    https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_types_of_numbers [1]

    https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuum_hypothesis [2]

    [A]n infinite regress of contingent beings is actually impossible.
    False (e.g. negative integers, fractals).

    How would you define change?
    Impermanence, flow (i.e. flux), becoming, transformation, energy (i.e. activity) ...

    How would you define causality?
    By causality³ I understand non-random (i.e. conditional-constrained) sequential patterns of events (i.e. effects).

    https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_causes#Efficient_cause [3]
  • MoK
    972
    Ok, here is my take on your argument:

    8. An uncomposed being (such as an uncomposed part) is purely simple, since it lacks any parts.Bob Ross
    What do you mean by purely simple? Why an uncomposed thing must be purely simple?

    9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts.Bob Ross
    Correct if two beings are composed. We can distinguish uncompsed beings by their attributes though.

    10. Two purely simple beings do not have any different parts (since they have none).Bob Ross
    I don't see how this follows. Two uncomposed beings just do not have parts.

    11. Therefore, only one purely simple being can exist.Bob Ross
    I don't see how this follows either. Two uncomposed beings can have different attributes so there can be more than one.

    12. The purely simple being would have to be purely actual—devoid of any passive potency—because passive potency requires a being to have parts which can be affected by an other.Bob Ross
    What do you mean by purely actual? Why cannot an uncomposed thing have potency?

    14. Therefore, there can only be one purely actual being which is also purely simple. (11 & 12 & 13)Bob Ross
    This does not follow to me as I don't understand the previous premises and conclusion.

    19. Therefore, the forms of the composed beings must exist in the purely simple and actual being.Bob Ross
    What do you mean by this?

    20. Intelligence is having the ability to apprehend the form of things (and not its copies!)Bob Ross
    Yes, if the form of things can be manifested as thoughts.

    21. The purely simple and actual being apprehends the forms of things. (19)Bob Ross
    That does not follow to me as I don't understand what do you mean by (19).

    24. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is omniscient.Bob Ross
    Yes, if all possible forms of composed beings exist. Otherwise, the purely simple and actual being lacks omniscience.

    27. To be good is to lack any privation of what the thing is.Bob Ross
    To me, good is just a feature of our experiences and has nothing to do with privation.

    28. The purely simple and actual being cannot have any privations, since it is fully actual.Bob Ross
    That does not follow since I disagree with the definition of good.

    35. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is omnipotent.Bob Ross
    The omnipotent is the ability to actualize all possible forms. It is not sure whether all possible forms exist and whether they are only caused by a purely simple being.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    Well in the first place esse != parts and essence != whole. Esse/essence is not the part/whole relationship.

    That’s fair. I am starting to think my OP isn’t even arguing from Aquinas’ essence vs. esse distinction; so maybe this isn’t a Thomistic argument afterall.

    What I am really doing, by my lights, is making an argument from contingency and necessity as it relates to composition; basically by way of arguing that an infinite series of composition is impossible because it would be an infinite series of contingent things of which each lacks the power to exist themselves.

    , if you place all of the parts of a frog together in the correct configuration, there will still be no frog

    Yes and no. If you were to take a dead frog and “sew it back to together”, then yes you are right; but if you configure the frog’s pieces to be exactly as it were when it was alive; then it must now be alive again….no?

    If a cat loses an ear or a dog loses a leg it has lost a part but the cat or dog still exists

    I agree.

    The problem begins in premise (4), where you imply that there is an existence in the parts that is not in the whole, and thus we are upbuilding existence from parts to whole. Your idea is something like, “Parts are what primarily exist, and because they exist wholes exist. The existence of wholes is generated by the existence of parts.”

    What’s the problem with that? Are you saying that it doesn’t account for a soul?

    Why do you say that?

    Think about it this way: is it easier for someone to deny the essence/existence distinction, or is it easier for them to deny that existence of motion/change?

    That’s true, but I say that because Aristotle’s proof only works if we think of a thing having the potential to remain the same through time and that potential being actualized through time. Otherwise, the argument fails to produce a being that would fit classical theism which is the perpetual sustainer of everything; instead, we just get a kind of ‘kalam cosmological argument’ where this being starts everything off moving.

    By ‘motion’, Aristotle is not just talking about, e.g., an apple flying in the air: he is talking about the change which an apple that is just sitting there is undergoing by merely remaining the same. That’s the only reason, e.g., Ed Feser’s “Aristotelian Proof” gets off the ground in the first place.
  • Philosophim
    2.8k
    1. An absolutely simple being causing (ultimately) the existence of all things violates physics.
    2. Therefore, it cannot exist.

    How does it violate physics?
    Bob Ross

    Something outside of space and time cannot affect space and time. Physics is all about contact and transference. We also have no evidence of anything existing out of space and time. If you're going to bring physics into infinite regress, you can't suddenly forbid it for finite regress. You're talking about a simple being with one continuous characteristic that has no parts having to interact with space and time in a way to create the complexity of the universe. According to known physics, that's impossible.

    1. There is no example we can give of an infinite regress of reality being powered by itself.
    2. Therefore, its is impossible.

    How is the argument I noted any different?

    I didn’t argue that: that would also be an argument from ignorance. I specified exactly why it is impossible.
    Bob Ross

    Lets remember that the gear analogy is representative of an infinitely existing universe. The only reason why the infinitely regressive gear example is considered impossible is because we don't have an example of one Bob. Can you point to an infinitely regressive set of gears and demonstrate that it is impossible that it not power itself? No.

    Let me give you the only thing you could reasonably conclude. If you proved an infinite regress is impossible then a finite regress is the only option we have. But claiming, "X" is the finite regress is going to require a bit more. A simple being cannot have parts, therefore it cannot have thoughts (which are parts) or the ability to contact points of space and time (which are parts). And if you're saying they aren't parts, then it seems like you have an arbitrary definition of parts that is being shaped to fit a conclusion instead of a solid definition that necessarily leads to that conclusion.

    Because what is possible must be known at least once.

    This is standardly false. Right now, we are discussing actual possibility;
    Bob Ross

    Except that we have discovered an infinite regress of gears. We've never discovered a unicorn. What if they are actually possible? What if we just don't know it? That's why we have to talk about possible things that we have known at least once. Its known possibilities. Our knowledge of physics could be completely wrong Bob, and it actually is possible for an infinite regress of self-powered gears to exist.
    Once you start using knowledge to define possibility, then you're stuck with known possibilities.
    Once you introduce unknown possibilities, they could be anything, therefore they invalidate any claim of what is impossible.

    Your point here requires that space and time are real substances which every existent thing is in and of; and I don’t see why that is case nor how science backs that.Bob Ross

    You noted earlier when I said, "Does this mean that an atom can have a front, side, and back?" you replied, "No, this being is outside of space and time." So that means you're stating a being without a front, side, or back was able to touch a part of its partless self to the first gear in time and space that does have a front, side, or back. How is that possible?

    If it is impossible for a composed object to be infinitely composed, then there must be a first member; and that member must be uncomposed—which means it is absolutely simple.Bob Ross

    And I don't have any disagreement with this. My disagreement is the fact that you are not giving an example of a simple being that you have defined that makes any sense. For example, "A smallest particle appears/exists without any prior cause. It is so small, that there is nothing smaller that can be used to divide it into a part, nor is it composed of any other parts." This works. You saying this simple being has a vastness of intelligence and power to suddenly create and power the entire universe with moral intent is no longer a simple being.

    Because I don’t think that this simple being is the cause of the composition of objects analogously to a thing perpetually moving the first gear in a series. Moving a gear in a series would require something physical moving it, at least immanently (directly).Bob Ross

    Ok, this is where I'm confused then. I assumed we're talking about infinite vs finite regressive causality. If there is a finite causality, then yes, the 'first' thing would be entirely simple and the beginning of causality. What is this simple being in the causal chain if not this?

    Without understanding what a simple being is, and how it could begin this causal chain, you can't prove your OP.

    That’s false. If all the premises are true, then the conclusion in the OP logically follows. How it causes the existence of things is a separate question.
    Bob Ross

    Again, its passable if you want to argue for a simple being, but once you introduce specifics further than that and claim its a cause of existence you can't back out. You're claiming its an intelligent moral being, yet also somehow partless. That's a contradiction.

    A thought does not have parts. Your brain has parts. Are you arguing that somehow your brain has parts and your thoughts have parts?Bob Ross

    Lets say 'a' thought does not have parts. But when you have more than one thought, you now have parts of 'thought'. A simple being cannot have more than 'a' thought, and in fact it must be 'that' thought.
    For if it was some thing that had a thought, a thought would be a part of itself. That doesn't allow for complex thinking.

    Red in the sense of the phenomena or the wavelength? If the former, then it doesn’t have parts and is absolutely simple but is not a concretely existent thing;Bob Ross

    Right, because that was the best example I could give of something that was purely simple. You have not provided a workable example to demonstrate the reality of your abstract. Give me an example of something purely simple and concrete, even in theory.

    Again, you are using the term ‘part’ too loosely. A part is something which contributes to the composition of a whole in concretoBob Ross

    Remember when I asked what a part was earlier and you said you defined it vagely intentionally because you didn't think it needed detail? If you make it loose it gives you wiggle room for what you want, but it also gives someone else wiggle room for what you don't want. I think its time for you to define what a part is in concreto, then give a hypothetical example of a purely simple part that is the origin of the finite regression of the universe. If its in concreto, then its tangible. What is tangible outside of space and time that can affect space and time?

    Again, you just argued by way of begging the question. I have no good reasons so far to accept that you are right that two simple beings can exist. I already provided a proof that that is impossible. If two things lack parts, then they cannot exist separately from each other; for a thing can only be concretely distinguished from another thing by way of its parts.Bob Ross

    Bob, if something is simple, then it can be a part of something else. It itself has no parts, but there is nothing proven at all that states it cannot be the part of something larger. You said it exists concretely, therefore it has a limit. Not having parts except its own existence doesn't mean another of the same type can't be. That's just nonsense. The only thing you've proven so far is a lot of words that don't have clear definitions, and don't fit into reality with the assertion that it all somehow works.

    If it helps, whenever we write an argument for something tangible it must be falsifiable. It doesn't mean it is false, but it does mean that "If X is true, then Y is false." If you've constructed a definition or language that cannot be falsifiable, then you're not speaking about reality. You claim there exists an absolutely simple being that somehow is so complex that it can create the entire universe with intelligence and moral intent. This is sounding a lot like an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient being that is omnisimple. I applaud the creativity, but I would go back to your definition of simple, being, simple being, and what it would look like if it were tangible. Because without this, nothing you're saying makes sense apart from what you're imagining in your own mind.
  • tim wood
    9.4k
    It devolves to whatever is presupposed in the metaphysical argument; and that, rendered, is God as presupposition.tim wood

    Not at all. God is not a presupposition of the argument in the OP.Bob Ross
    38. A being which is absolutely simple, absolutely actual, eternal, immutable, all-loving, omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent, all-good, one, unique, and necessary just is God.Bob Ross
    42. Therefore, God exists.Bob Ross

    If not a presupposition, how does "God" come into the argument?
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    As you quoted, the OP reaches God's existence as the conclusion of it. So I am confused why you think it is presupposed. The argument outlines why composition entails God's existence without presupposing God's existence to begin with.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    I think we are jumping all over the place in our discussion, and that’s equally my fault. I can tell from your response that we disagree at pretty much every level even in terms of our understanding of how to approach understanding reality. Let me try to reign in the conversation without derailing.

    The two core ideas that I think we need to focus on is (1) the metaphysics of a part and (2) the establishment of an absolutely simple being simpliciter.

    With respect to #1, it is worth admitting that I do need to provide a clearer conception of its metaphysics (although I think its definition given before is perfectly adequate); and you are right to point this out. I still stand firm that a part is something which contributes to the composition of the whole—as its definition—but there are many prima facie issues with this definition that I need to address and resolve.

    First, one may object that a thing could have parts which is not a concrete object (which I overlooked)—e.g., a singular feeling of disgust spanning 3 seconds, the parts of a word in a thought, numbers, etc.—and that such non-spatial (but yet temporal) things could legitimately be called divisible (going along with the idea that divisibility is related to the the idea of having parts such that one can divvy up the whole into them). To this, I say that the OP is talking about divisibility as it relates to concrete objects—that is, spatiotemporal objects. E.g., a singular feeling of disgust that spans 3 seconds is divisible in time—and thusly has parts—but not in a spatial—and thusly not in a concrete—sense; for a feeling does not exist in space (even if it can be causally explained in terms of brain processes). These kind of phenomena have parts but are immune to my OP’s argument because the OP is centered around spatiotemporal (i.e., concrete) beings when it outlines its premises. I therefore will refer to the parts which are relevant to the OP—and of which refer to spatiotemporal divisibility of objects—as ‘concrete parts’ to avoid confusion.

    Second, one may object that, in the case of @Mww, space and time are pure a priori modes of our cognition and, thusly, exist but are not real; so a ‘concrete object’ would not refer to something that is spatiotemporal and yet there would be a clear distinction between what our cognition represents in time alone vs. what it represents in space and time—the latter being exactly what I am referring to by ‘concrete’ objects. In a view like transcendental idealism, all concrete objects would be non-spatiotemporal (or at least wouldn’t exist in the space and time which our brains attribute to them). To this, I respond that these non-spatiotemporal concrete objects would still be divisible and have parts in the relevant sense to the OP because we have to trust our senses and cognition to tell us that they are ‘other’ than us; and the way our brain’s do that is by representing that which is ‘other’ as separate. So, these objects—whatever they are in-themselves, even if it be non-spatiotemporal—must be divisible and have ‘concrete’ parts. I only refer to this objection to be thorough, as I don’t believe you accept the non-reality of space and time, but for now I think we can both establish concrete entities as simply defined in the sense in the first objection (i.e., as spatiotemporal objects).


    With respect to #2, the OP argues for God’s existence in multiple steps; and I think we keep jumping around where you disagree about something midway in the argument when you don’t agree about something which is required for that part of the argument to work. So, let’s start at the basics and see what you are disagreeing with:

    1. Composed beings are made up of parts.
    2. A composed being exists contingently upon its parts in their specific arrangement.
    3. A part of a composed being is either composed or uncomposed.
    4. A part that is a composed being does not, in turn, exist in-itself but, rather, exists contingently upon its parts and their specific arrangement.
    5. An infinite series of composed beings for any given composed being (viz., a composed being of which its parts are also, in turn, composed and so on ad infinitum) would not have the power to exist on their own.
    6. Therefore, an infinite series of composed beings is impossible.
    7. Therefore, a series of composed beings must have, ultimately, uncomposed parts as its first cause. (6 & 3)

    By ‘composed being’ above, I am referring to a concrete object (as defined above) which has concrete parts (as defined above). Do you agree with 1-7? I am guessing you will disagree with 5.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    None of the premises of your argument refer to "concrete entities" – goal post-shifting fallacy, Bob.

    You are not being charitable. I am admitting that I used the term 'composed being' to refer to a 'concretely existent being which has parts' without realizing that it was too vague. I concede your point, which is valid, and am noting to you that the OP is only targeting concretely existent objects. The argument clearly makes no sense if it were to target non-spatial(temporal) beings like numbers, feelings, thoughts, etc.
  • 180 Proof
    15.6k
    ... the OP is only targeting concretely existent objects.Bob Ross
    So then your conclusion ...
    41. The composed beings must subsist through an absolutely simple and actual being.
    42. Therefore, God exists.
    Bob Ross
    ... means that "God" is a "concretely existing object", which contradicts both theistic and deistic conceptions (Aristotle, B. Pascal, P. Tillich).
  • tim wood
    9.4k
    38. A being which is absolutely simple, absolutely actual, eternal, immutable, all-loving, omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent, all-good, one, unique, and necessary just is God.Bob Ross
    As you can see, #38 posits a being with some certain characteristics (never mind that all-good/loving and omnipotent are contrary), and then concludes that such a being "just is God." So my question: where does "God" come from, if not presupposed?
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    So, what I am trying to say is that the composed beings that are concrete are either composed of an infinite regress of concrete things or there must be a first cause which is not concrete.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    Ah, I see. So a being that is all-loving, omniscient, omnibenevolent, omnipotent, absolutely simple, purely actual, eternal, unique, one, immutable, and eternal is the thesis of classical theism. That kind of being is what is traditionally referred to as God. That's what theology centrally revolved around traditionally for a long time. There is nothing being presupposed there: it is just noting that what we just proved exists, is what we use the term (traditionally) "God" to refer to you. No different than how we can prove a car exists and then note that the thing we just proved exists is traditionally called a 'car'.
  • MoK
    972
    Hi Bob Ross. Are you going to reply to my objections here?
  • Philosophim
    2.8k
    I think we are jumping all over the place in our discussion, and that’s equally my fault.Bob Ross

    Bob I know that the art of any good discussion is the art of thinking, and it is difficult for a good thinking session to be perfectly organized. I too am uncertain if I have conveyed my points properly, no foul from me. :)

    I still stand firm that a part is something which contributes to the composition of the whole—as its definition—Bob Ross

    I too think this is solid on its own.

    To this, I say that the OP is talking about divisibility as it relates to concrete objects—that is, spatiotemporal objects. E.g., a singular feeling of disgust that spans 3 seconds is divisible in time—and thusly has parts—but not in a spatial—and thusly not in a concrete—sense; for a feeling does not exist in space (even if it can be causally explained in terms of brain processes).Bob Ross

    I love the idea, but I'm not sure if it works. Feelings do exist in space if you think about your own self. Do you have a feeling in the living room while you're in the kitchen? Your feelings are local to you and your body. Anxiety isn't just a thought, its a feeling that can travel to your muscles and your stomach.

    Remove parts of the brain and you remove capabilities of thought. There is a brain damage condition where a person can only see in black and white for example. Certain brain conditions limit how a person can think and function. Thoughts do not exist in some dimension unbound to the physical realm, they are expressions of the physical realm.

    Even communication like writing is physical. The words needs to be present in a location where you are. The words do not come unbidden, but through a pen or keyboard. Light beemed over your computer to your eyes.

    Intelligence and thoughts are also limited to the bodies they inhabit. "Oh, that's an intelligent crow. That dog isn't very smart is he?" We notice that the complexity of the brain allows complexity of thought. So there are too many examples with what we know that indicate thoughts are tied to physical creatures and not from some other dimension that gets zipped into ours. Even at best, lets say this is what happened. It would still be identifiable as parts in the existent realm like the experience of colors and the thought that I need to fix my roof.

    I only refer to this objection to be thorough, as I don’t believe you accept the non-reality of space and time, but for now I think we can both establish concrete entities as simply defined in the sense in the first objectionBob Ross

    Fair enough. That does lead me back to my original question however. Once something is in space and time, even if it has no parts can we zoom in on it and say it has a front, back, and side? Can I say, "that is a section of that indivisible existence?

    5. An infinite series of composed beings for any given composed being (viz., a composed being of which its parts are also, in turn, composed and so on ad infinitum) would not have the power to exist on their own.

    I do disagree with five, but mostly in the wording. The only thing you can note from your previous premises is that it would necessarily be composed of parts. Saying, "It would not have the power to exist on its own." wasn't built up to by any of the previous premises. How does part composition relate to power? What is it for something to exist on its own, versus exist on something else? Because your previous points lead us to the potential that every part in existence is composed of other parts, but nothing more.

    Good discussion Bob!
  • tim wood
    9.4k
    omnibenevolent, omnipotent,Bob Ross
    Corollary point: how can a being be both? If God is omnipotent, he can do anything. If omnibenevolent, then ony good things. And then, of course, since God is absolute, what exactly is an absolutely good thing - are not good things good with respect to something?

    No different than how we can prove a car exists and then note that the thing we just proved exists is traditionally called a 'car'.Bob Ross
    The point is the proof of the OP is just an exercise in word games which only works if the required understandings are already in place and accepted, I.e., presupposed.

    Even going back to the first premise, how can I be composite? I am identical with myself: if of parts, then wherein do I exist? And if a part removed, then no longer myself but someone/thing different. (This developed by @Metaphysician Undercover, here, https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/953495 and worth the read.)
  • substantivalism
    311
    9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts.
    10. Two purely simple beings do not have any different parts (since they have none).
    11. Therefore, only one purely simple being can exist.
    Bob Ross

    I assert that its conceptually possible for there to be two distinct extended simples which both lack further proper parts and are numerically distinct being merely separated by the void.

    This
    . . . checks out in my head.
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