The question again: can you stipulate some thing which is neither temporally delimited nor composed of parts? I suggest not.

either there is a foundation, or there's a vicious infinite regress of ever-deeper layers of reality - which I reject. — Relativist

So you acknowledge that science can’t say what the foundation is, but you nevertheless claim, presumably as an act of faith, that if there is a foundation, then it must be material in nature.

At some stage in history materialism might have been able to claim that the atom was imperishable and eternal - which was, after all, the basis of materialism in Greek philosophy - but that is no longer considered feasible. Fundamental particles, so-called, have an intrinsically ambiguous nature, and they seem to be at bottom to be best conceived as an excitation of fields, however fields might be conceived.

I personally reject deism because it depends on an infinitely complex intelligence, with magical knowledge, just happening to exist by brute fact. — Relativist

That’s a Richard Dawkins argument - that whatever constructs must be more complex than what is constructed by it. But in the classical tradition, God is not complex at all, but is simple. And the best analogy I can think of for that is - you! Your body comprises billions upon billions of cells, the brain is the most complex natural phenomenon known to science with more neural connections than stars in the sky (or so I once read). And yet, you yourself are a simple unity. That, I think is the meaning (or one meaning) of ‘imago dei’.

The question again: can you stipulate some thing which is neither temporally delimited nor composed of parts? I suggest not. — Wayfarer

Even a God is temporally delimited if the past is finite. He simply exists at all times. The same is true of a material foundation. Regarding parts:why assume something exists without parts? I gave a good reason to believe the past is finite and there's a bottom layer of reality. I've never encountered a reason to assume the foundation of existence lacks parts. If there is, then it would be easy to stipulate that, and then build an ontology based on it.

So you acknowledge that science can’t say what the foundation is, but you nevertheless claim, presumably as an act of faith, that if there is a foundation, then it must be material in nature. — Wayfarer

Not an act of faith: an inference to best explanation. I see no reason to think anything immaterial exists. An immaterial foundation adds no explanatory power, so it's unparsimonious. A 3-omni God is unparsimonious to the extreme.

At some stage in history materialism might have been able to claim that the atom was imperishable and eternal - which was, after all, the basis of materialism in Greek philosophy - but that is no longer considered feasible. Fundamental particles, so-called, have an intrinsically ambiguous nature, and they seem to be at bottom to be best conceived as an excitation of fields, however fields might be conceived. — Wayfarer

Sure. Quantum field theory proposes that quantum fields (perhaps a single quantum field- in a sense, one "part") may constitute the bottom layer of reality.

Regardless, there are good reasons to believe the world is fundamentally quantum mechanical, and an implication is that our intuitions (which are the primary tool of metaphysics) are problematic for developing a reliable metaphysical theory.

That’s a Richard Dawkins argument - that whatever constructs must be more complex than what is constructed by it. But in the classical tradition, God is not complex at all, but is simple. — Wayfarer

I didn't assert there to be some metaphysical rule that, "whatever constructs must be more complex than what is constructed by it". Rather, I pointed to the complexity of God's knowledge. Divine simplicity seems a rationalization, one that depends on treating knowledge as a magical property. Every verifiable fact points to knowledge being composed of data, and data being encoded. The assumption of a 3-omni God is treated as a carte blanche magical answer to any question, and theists never address the prima facie implausibility of omniscience.

the brain is the most complex natural phenomenon known to science with more neural connections than stars in the sky (or so I once read). And yet, you yourself are a simple unity. — Wayfarer

When we look at a picture of a triangle, how many things do we see? We see 4 things: the sides, and the triangle. The triangle is a "unity" (a single thing) but is more than just 3 lines (contrast it with 3 unconnected lines on a page). So a triangle is more complex than the individual lines that composed it, just like I am more complex than the particles that comprise me. So I accept calling me a "unity", but not simple.

But this means, that if physicalism is true, and strings are the bottom layer, then everything is "nothing but" strings - so nothing has an identity other than the strings. This makes no sense. Composite objects, such as rocks and horses, exist. — Relativist

Yes, if physicalism is true, then everything is nothing but strings. But I don't think it would be absurd. Take a pile of sand for example. Most people would agree this is not an object in itself, but rather it is just grains of sand piled together due to laws of nature like the wind. If so, we could say the same for a rock: a bunch of molecules piled together due to laws of nature. Then the word "rock" only refers to the structure as a whole.

Sure, horses are ontological objects. No objects that we define as horses existed prior to some earlier specific point of time. Although we can say "horses didn't have existence prior to that point of time", it doesn't mean there's a metaphysical object "horse" that sometimes exists and sometimes doesn't. — Relativist

I think the fact that we can say it without contradiction is sufficient for our current purpose. In contrast, we could not say "horses and rocks were not physical prior to that point of time", because horses and rocks are inherently physical things.

So, an 'existent thing' is the label for something that exists. Now, by definition something that exists, exists. Everything that exists is an existent thing - there. Have I just explained everything? No, of course not. I've explained precisely nothing. — Clearbury

There is a difference between an existing thing and a thing with inherent existence. An existing thing could have not existed in the past or future. A thing with inherent existence could not have.

As any logic system is built on axioms, which are assumptions taken to be true, no one logic system exists necessarily. — RussellA

As the axioms do not contradict each other, it is still true that logic is one coherent system. And that logical system is evidently correct: Based on it, we build planes that fly.

You are circling the drain. Repeating the same claims as if they are truths. — Fooloso4

Very well. If we are not making any progress, then we can leave the conversation here. Thanks for the chat!

As the axioms do not contradict each other, it is still true that logic is one coherent system. — A Christian Philosophy

Axioms are assumptions taken to be true.

As there is no logical necessity that assumptions don't contradict each other, there is no logical necessity that axioms don't contradict each other.
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Based on it, we build planes that fly. — A Christian Philosophy

We also build planes that crash.

Yes, if physicalism is true, then everything is nothing but strings. But I don't think it would be absurd. Take a pile of sand for example. Most people would agree this is not an object in itself, but rather it is just grains of sand piled together due to laws of nature like the wind. If so, we could say the same for a rock: a bunch of molecules piled together due to laws of nature. Then the word "rock" only refers to the structure as a whole. — A Christian Philosophy

You previously asked:

Would a horse count as an ontological object? If so, then we can still say that before horses existed, then they did not have existence. If not, then what do you consider as objects? — A Christian Philosophy

Per your paradigm, if physicalism is true, then horses are just strings not ontological objects in their own right. There is no point in time at which the strings didn't exist.

Doesn't this mean that your view of essence is contingent upon physicalism being false? Understand that I don't claim to prove physicalism is true. I'm just pointing out that "proving" a God exists based on essentialism entails circular reasoning.

If we are not going to agree on the validity of the laws of logic, then unfortunately I don't think we can have a common ground to make progress in this discussion. We can just end the conversation here.

Per your paradigm, if physicalism is true, then horses are just strings not ontological objects in their own right. There is no point in time at which the strings didn't exist. Doesn't this mean that your view of essence is contingent upon physicalism being false? — Relativist

Even if physicalism is true, it still means that strings have their own identity or essence, and thus their own essential properties. Since strings would exist necessarily, it means that their existence is an essential property.

I have other reasons to believe that physicalism is not true, but I don't think it is relevant to our current discussion on essences.

Regarding parts:why assume something exists without parts? — Relativist

@Wayfarer
I thought I'd chime in on this. The First Cause is traditionally seen to be without parts or without multiple properties. This is because, if a being is composed of multiple properties, then there must be a sufficient reason for the properties to "stick together" in the same being. But the First Cause has no prior causes, by definition. So, the only explanation for the supposed multiple properties to stick together is that they do so inherently, that is, all properties are in fact one and the same. Thus, the First Cause is not composed of multiple parts or properties.

Even if physicalism is true, it still means that strings have their own identity or essence, and thus their own essential properties. Since strings would exist necessarily, it means that their existence is an essential property. — A Christian Philosophy

You implied that, in this physicalist scenario, ONLY strings have an identity (and only strings have an essence). If only one thing has an identity and essence, why bother with considering identity and essence at all?

Although the bottom layer of reality (strings, in this scenario) exists necessarily, this is de dicto necessity - not an intrinsic property. My impression is that essentialists consider essence to be intrinsic.

You also referred to "essential properties". Doesn't this imply there are also UNessential properties?

I thought I'd chime in on this. The First Cause is traditionally seen to be without parts or without multiple properties. This is because, if a being is composed of multiple properties, then there must be a sufficient reason for the properties to "stick together" in the same being. But the First Cause has no prior causes, by definition. So, the only explanation for the supposed multiple properties to stick together is that they do so inherently, that is, all properties are in fact one and the same. Thus, the First Cause is not composed of multiple parts or properties. — A Christian Philosophy

A first cause exists as a brute fact: without cause or reason, because there is nothing causally prior, nor is it ontologically dependent upon something else. This does not imply it lacks multiple properties - it has whatever properties it happens to have. Intrinsic properties are inseparable from the objects that have them - not something that "sticks" onto the object (unless you stipulate that in an ontology). So it doesn't follow that it lacks multiple properties.

The PSR implies there are no brute facts. But I infer the first cause has to be a brute fact, because it is uncaused and autonomous (no ontological dependency). Making more stipulations about the ontology in order to force fit it to the PSR makes the ontology more ad hoc, and therefore less credible.

You implied that, in this physicalist scenario, ONLY strings have an identity (and only strings have an essence). If only one thing has an identity and essence, why bother with considering identity and essence at all? — Relativist

There would be more things if some things are not physical. E.g. souls or the power of free will. There is also anything that is man-made if man has free will. E.g. a paper-cutter. It is a man-made device designed to cut paper. "Being able to cut paper" is its identity because this is how we identify a thing as being a paper-cutter.

Although the bottom layer of reality (strings, in this scenario) exists necessarily, this is de dicto necessity - not an intrinsic property. My impression is that essentialists consider essence to be intrinsic. — Relativist

I know we disagree on this point, but to me, existence would be an intrinsic (or inherent or essential) property of strings. This is to fulfill the PSR and avoid brute facts.

You also referred to "essential properties". Doesn't this imply there are also UNessential properties? — Relativist

Yes. Take the paper-cutter example again. Since its identity is to cut paper, then any property that enables it to cut paper (e.g. a blade) is an essential property, and any property it has that does not serve to cut paper (e.g. its color) is a non-essential property. When it comes to strings, having a mass is probably an essential property, whereas having a specific position in space and time would probably be a non-essential property.

Intrinsic properties are inseparable from the objects that have them — Relativist

That's what I meant by properties "sticking to an object". In other words, there must be a reason why a particular set of properties belongs to an object.

There is also anything that is man-made if man has free will. E.g. a paper-cutter. It is a man-made device designed to cut paper. "Being able to cut paper" is its identity because this is how we identify a thing as being a paper-cutter. — A Christian Philosophy

This contradicts what you said earlier:

if physicalism is true, then everything is nothing but strings. — A Christian Philosophy

It's also absurd to claim that a function that an object can perform is its identity. It certainly doesn't uniquely identify a specific object, so this isn't an individual identity. It sounds more like a sortal, for identifying a set (the set of all objects which can cut paper; this would include box cutters, scizzors, knives...).

Yes. Take the paper-cutter example again. Since its identity is to cut paper, then any property that enables it to cut paper (e.g. a blade) is an essential property, and any property it has that does not serve to cut paper (e.g. its color) is a non-essential property. — A Christian Philosophy

So if I have a paper cutter whose blade has become too dull to cut paper, it has lost its identity?! Is this identity lost suddenly at some particular level of sharpness? What if a second function is found for a functional paper cutter (e.g. it can function as a torture device to cut off fingers). Does possessing this newly discovered function give it a new identity?

That's what I meant by properties "sticking to an object". In other words, there must be a reason why a particular set of properties belongs to an object. — A Christian Philosophy

In my view, an object has its properties necessarily, per Leibniz' law (identity of the indiscernibles). IOW, 100% of the object's properties must be present for it to constitute that particular object. An essentialist might point to a subset of the objects properties that are necessary and sufficient for being that object - so that sunset of properties are present necessarily. But you've claimed it is an object's function, rather than its properties, that give it an identity.

Frankly, I think you've gone down a blind alley.

This contradicts what you said earlier: — Relativist

Sure. So to correct my view: If physicalism is true, then everything that is not man-made is nothing but strings - this is because every complex natural object is not designed but caused accidentally by the laws of nature. And if man has free will, then everything that is man-made has its identity from its function - this is because man-made things are designed, and what is designed is always designed for a function.

It certainly doesn't uniquely identify a specific object, so this isn't an individual identity. — Relativist

True; there are many paper-cutters. But they are all identified as paper-cutters; that's why we call all these unique devices "paper-cutters", and do not give them unique names like we do with people. And only the fact that they are made of unique molecules (and this uniqueness is a non-essential property) makes them unique.

So if I have a paper cutter whose blade has become too dull to cut paper, it has lost its identity?! Is this identity lost suddenly at some particular level of sharpness? What if a second function is found for a functional paper cutter (e.g. it can function as a torture device to cut off fingers). Does possessing this newly discovered function give it a new identity? — Relativist

A paper-cutter that can no longer cut paper is indeed no longer a paper-cutter. This is reflected in our common language when we speak of those things. It has a new identity which is simply to be a physical object like other non man-made things.

What if a second function is found for a functional paper cutter (e.g. it can function as a torture device to cut off fingers). Does possessing this newly discovered function give it a new identity? — Relativist

I have not encountered that question before, so I'm thinking out loud here. I'd say only if its creator designed it with that function in mind. It is the designer that gives the man-made object its identity - that's the reason why it exists.

IOW, 100% of the object's properties must be present for it to constitute that particular object. — Relativist

If I cut my hair, I have changed some of my properties. Does it follow that I have a different identity? I'd say that fundamentally, I am still me. It would also seem that any change that any object encounters, no matter how small, would give them a wholly new identity. Thus there would be no change; only substitutions from one identity to another at any point in time.

IOW, 100% of the object's properties must be present for it to constitute that particular object.
— Relativist
If I cut my hair, I have changed some of my properties. Does it follow that I have a different identity? I'd say that fundamentally, I am still me. It would also seem that any change that any object encounters, no matter how small, would give them a wholly new identity. Thus there would be no change; only substitutions from one identity to another at any point in time. — A Christian Philosophy

As you said, everything supervenes on the ultimate foundation of physical reality. That doesn't strictly depend on physicalism being true, it just depends on there being an ultimate foundation to physical reality. Every individual identity is just a concept. We can speak of a device, like a paper cutter, and consider it to have an enduring identity- in our minds. We may use it every day, and not notice the microscopic changes that occur with each use. So in our minds, it's the same device. Even if we replace parts on it, we'll still regard it as the same paper cutter (the one we own). Over the years, we could end up replacing 100% of the parts, while meanwhile always considering it the same device from each day to the next. Or we could arbitrarily decide that it has a new identity after X% of the parts are replaced, or X% of the mass has been replaced; or consider the identity to be associated with the serial number that is present on one specific part. There's no intrinsically correct answer, because an enduring identity isjust a concept.

With living organisms, we can avoid arbitrariness by defining an identity in a way that is unique from everything else that exists. IMO, perdurance is the best way to do that: your identity is associated with the temporal-causal chain that is associated with "you" from one instant to the next. There is exactly one such "you" associated with "your" unique temporal-causal chain. This definition satisfies Leibniz' law, and I don't think any other definition can do so. Still, there's no metaphysical mandate to use this definition - it's still fundamentally conceptual, but I don't think there's a better one - unless you make metaphysical assumptions.

It certainly doesn't uniquely identify a specific object, so this isn't an individual identity. — Relativist

True; there are many paper-cutters. But they are all identified as paper-cutters; that's why we call all these unique devices "paper-cutters", — A Christian Philosophy

In terms of essentialism, you're treating function as something like a natural kind, although you're not basing it on anything natural. My problem with natural kinds also applies to your definition: all you've done is identify a set of objects (paper cutters). This is a conceptual compartmentalizing out of the full set of objects of existence, so it's arbitrary. You could have categorized it in many different ways (office tools, manufactured devices, sharp objects, objects you own...). But the biggest problem is that you haven't addressed the issue of individual identity.. You haven't touched on that at all.