It's a case well put. But how do we rule out a different approach and model all together? Does it have to be physicalism versus idealsim? Is dualistic thinking all we have to resolve our biggest quesions? I'd be interested to hear more from a rigorous, post-modern perspective assessing the foundational axioms or presuppositions that may be propping up our confusions. And if the world is entirely mind created and contingent, how do we know anything for certain about either metaphysical position? — Tom Storm

Just when I thought I was out......

I explained above the 'Cartesian divide' and the source of the mind-matter division. Ever since, Western philosophy has vacillated between materialism (the objective is real, everything arises from matter) and idealism (the subject and mind alone is real). You're right in saying that is a dualism, but there are many layers of meaning. Bernardo Kastrup points out that materialism - that the basic constituents of reality are material in nature - and idealism - that reality is experiential in nature - are incommensurable types of explanations. It's not a contest between different kinds of constituents, but a completely different perspective. Idealism, in the way that I intend it, and I think in the sense in which it is meaningful, is not about what 'things are made of'. It is about the nature of reality as experienced. It's not positing 'mind' as a kind of building block or constituent in the way that materialism did with atoms. It is pointing out that whatever is real, is meaningful only insofar as it is meaningful for a subject. Materialism attempts to arrive at certainty with reference to an ostensibly mind-independent physical reality. Idealism as I understand it points out that this is an oxymoronic conception, as whatever is known of matter, is known by the mind through perception of objects. So the idea of a mind-independent object is self-contradictory.

But it's very important not to make an object out of 'spirit' or 'mind'. Nishijima-roshi puts it like this:

The Universe is, according to philosophers who base their beliefs on idealism, a place of the spirit. Other philosophers whose beliefs are based on a materialistic view, say that the Universe is composed of the matter we see in front of our eyes. Buddhist philosophy takes a view which is neither idealistic nor materialistic; Buddhists do not believe that the Universe is composed of only matter. They believe that there is something else other than matter. But there is a difficulty here; if we use a concept like spirit to describe that something else other than matter, people are prone to interpret Buddhism as some form of spiritualistic religion and think that Buddhists must therefore believe in the actual existence of spirit. So it becomes very important to understand the Buddhist view of the concept spirit.

I am careful to refer to spirit as a concept here because in fact Buddhism does not believe in the actual existence of spirit. So what is this something else other than matter which exists in this Universe? If we think that there is a something which actually exists other than matter, our understanding will not be correct; nothing (physical) exists outside of matter. Buddhists believe in the existence of the Universe. Some people explain the Universe as a universe based on matter. But there also exists something which we call value or meaning. A Universe consisting only of matter leaves no room for value or meaning in civilizations and cultures. Matter alone has no value. We can say that the Universe is constructed with matter, but we must also say that matter works for some purpose.

So in our understanding of the Universe we should recognize the existence of something other than matter. We can call that something spirit, but if we do we should remember that in Buddhism, the word "spirit" is a figurative expression for value or meaning. We do not say that spirit exists in reality; we use the concept only figuratively. — Three Philosophies, One Reality

Compare:

The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have no value.

If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental.

What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.

It must lie outside the world. — Wittgenstiein

//

Learning is one of the defining characteristics of our species. The drive to learn is another. We can learn. It's inconceivable that we not bother. All of us not attempt to learn anything that doesn't have a practical purpose? — Patterner

Quite so. 'Man desires to know', said Aristotle. Philosophy is the pursuit of an understanding that is worth having for its own sake.

Idealism, in the way that I intend it, and I think in the sense in which it is meaningful, is not about what 'things are made of'. It is about the nature of reality as experienced. — Wayfarer

Yes. I can see this. And I like this more sophisticated framing of the idea.

Buddhist philosophy takes a view which is neither idealistic nor materialistic; Buddhists do not believe that the Universe is composed of only matter. They believe that there is something else other than matter. But there is a difficulty here; if we use a concept like spirit to describe that something else other than matter, people are prone to interpret Buddhism as some form of spiritualistic religion and think that Buddhists must therefore believe in the actual existence of spirit. So it becomes very important to understand the Buddhist view of the concept spirit. — Three Philosophies, One Reality

Cool. Noted.

Fuck, there's a lot to remember is this caper...

Have a restful break.

As to the question of the nature of consciousness—we have the scientific studies on one hand and the naive "folk" understanding on the other. As to which to rely on, I will choose the former because I don't think intuition is an especially reliable guide to understanding the nature of things. — Janus

I wouldn't be so dismissive of people like Chalmers and Nagel. Their positions are far from naive, and are the result of far more than intuition. They have spent countless hours, I suspect at least as many as anyone here, studying the available material on consciousness, trying to come up with theories that fit all the data, and organizing their thoughts writing books about it all.

Bernardo Kastrup points out that materialism - that the basic constituents of reality are material in nature - and idealism - that reality is experiential in nature - are incommensurable types of explanations… Buddhist philosophy takes a view which is neither idealistic nor materialistic; Buddhists do not believe that the Universe is composed of only matter. They believe that there is something else other than matter. — Wayfarer

Kant correctly recognized that taking a strictly materialist stance depends on an idealism, since the very notion of a mind-independent object covertly smuggles in all the subjective apparatus needed to have an object appear before a subject. So realism and idealism are not opposites but versions of the same subject -based thinking. With regard to a Buddhist claim that there is something ‘else’ besides matter, I can’t see this as anything other than a reformulation of a dualist idealism.

Some people explain the Universe as a universe based on matter. But there also exists something which we call value or meaning. A Universe consisting only of matter leaves no room for value or meaning in civilizations and cultures. Matter alone has no value.

if you want to get beyond the realism-idealism, fact-value split, you have to be able to see value WITHIN matter , not separate from it and alongside it. Chalmers tries to pull the former trick by starting from spirit and matter as separate entities and then mixing them together like ingredients of a pie (panpsychism). To arrive at a thinking which transcends the traditional ideal-realism binary, you have to turn to phenomenological and poststructuralist perspectives.

Joshs, I don't understand your point.

Physical properties combine in many ways, but the results are always physical. We can measure the size of physical objects in three physical dimensions. We can measure mass, weight, volume. We can measure hardness
— Patterner

Are such properties inherent in objects or are they the products of historically formed ways of organizing our relation to the world? Heidegger has argued that we never just see a hammer with its properties and attributes. We understand what a hammer is primordially in what we use it for and how we use it, and in terms of the larger associated context of relevance. The hammer as a static thing with properties is derived from our prior association with it as something we use for a purpose. — Joshs

I can stumble upon something I've never seen before, that doesn't resemble anything I've seen before, and whose purpose or function I can't guess. But I can still measure its dimensions and weigh it.

Husserl showed how the empirical notion of object that you’re describing emerged in the era of modern sciences with Galileo. The Egyptians and Greeks first developed the concept of a pure ideal geometric form (perfect triangle, circle, square, etc) as the modification of actual interactions with real , imperfect shapes in nature. Armed with such pure mathematical idealizations as the straight line and perfect circle, it occurred to Galileo that the messy empirical world could be approach using these ideal geometries as a model. Now everything we observe in the actual world could be treated as an approximation of a geometrically describable body. — Joshs

No matter how anyone views these matters, people were measuring and altering stone and wood to make buildings and bridges long before Galileo.

The notions of scientific accuracy and calculative measurement were made possible by thinking of actual things as imperfect versions of pure genetic bodies. The point Im making is that the physicalism you’re describing (self-identical things with mathematically describable properties and attributes) is not a product of the world as it supposedly is in itself. It is a human invention that depends on ignoring the contribution of subjective practical use and relevance to our perception of the world.

Once we recognize this it is no longer necessary to posit a distinction between an outer world of mathematically measurable things and an inner world of subjective consciousness. And the subject here is not to be understood according to traditional idealism and an internal realm The subject is just as much produced though pragmatic interaction in an environment as the objects of the world it interacts with. — Joshs

I've read this a few times. I'll keep trying. I just don't see how this changes the fact that physical things are measurable in various ways, but consciousness is not. In what physical terms can we discuss consciousness? What is its speed? How much does it weigh? What are it's physical dimensions? Does it have mass or charge? We can say an awful lot about the physical world with our physical sciences, but our physical sciences can't say anything about consciousness.

↪Patterner
What you say is not true. We can measure neural activity. Of course, you will say that isn't consciousness, but that is just an assumption—assuming what is to be proved.
Or think of energy itself—it can only be measured in terms of its effects. If it cannot be directly observed and measured, will you say it is non-physical? — Janus

For the purposes of my philosophical thesis, I make a distinction between "physical" (the study of nature as a system) and "material" (the study of matter as an object). So, measurements of "neural activity"*1 are observing the material effects of energy exchanges, not invisible Energy*2 per se. Therefore, "if it cannot be directly observed and measured" I would say that the "activity" is immaterial, not non-physical. Hence, "neural activity" is a process-of-change in a material substrate, not a material object itself.

That distinction is based on current scientific evidence that Energy is causal*3, not material ; the agent of change, not the substance being changed*4. When a sculptor (the causal agent) molds clay into a statue, his inputs are both intentional and energetic, and the output is a new material shape. :smile:

*1. Neural activity is the electrical and chemical signals that occur in neurons, the brain's primary cells, and is vital for brain function. ___Google AI overview
Note --- Signals (semiology) are communications between minds, not the material substrate that is used to make the signals sensable. For example, Indian smoke signals are the meaning, not the smoke.

*2. Yes, energy is invisible; you cannot see it directly because it is not a physical object, but rather a concept describing the ability to do work, and its presence is only observed through its effects like movement, heat, or light. ___Google AI overview

*3. Yes, in the context of physics, energy is considered causal, meaning that the transfer of energy between objects is generally seen as the mechanism behind a cause-and-effect relationship; where the "cause" is the application of energy, and the "effect" is the resulting change in the system due to that energy transfer. ___Google AI overview

*4. Energy is potential for form-change in Matter. The Matter/Energy Equivalence of E=MC^2 is a mathematical relationship, knowable by logical inference, not an object knowable by physical senses. Reference : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass%E2%80%93energy_equivalence

AGENT AND EFFECT

I can stumble upon something I've never seen before, that doesn't resemble anything I've seen before, and whose purpose or function I can't guess. But I can still measure its dimensions and weigh it — Patterner

You can only measure dimensions and weight of something which is presumed to remain qualitatively the same over the course of the quantitative measuring and weighing. Any calculation of differences in degree presupposes no difference in kind during the process. Otherwise one is dealing with a new thing and has to start over again. The world doesn’t consist of objects with attributes and properties which remain qualitatively the same from one moment to the next. We invented the concept of object as a qualitatively self-same thing so that we could then proceed to perform calculative measurements. Obviously, this works out well for us, but it doesn’t mean that ‘physical’ objects exist out there in the world rather than in the abstractions that we perform on the continually changing data we actually experience in our interactions with the world.

So in our understanding of the Universe we should recognize the existence of something other than matter. We can call that something spirit, but if we do we should remember that in Buddhism, the word "spirit" is a figurative expression for value or meaning. We do not say that spirit exists in reality; we use the concept only figuratively. — Three Philosophies, One Reality

Right, but it is obvious that value and meaning are felt, in their various ways, by sentient beings. No one can sensibly deny that fact. We might be deterministic organisms, but we will never feel ourselves to be so, and it what we feel about ourselves and our lives that counts when it comes to quality of life.

Also we don't know and can never know the truth about whether or not we are deterministic beings, so the question is of little importance except perhaps in the moral domain. In that connection itt can be argued that the libertarian model of free will leads to unnecessary and unwarranted feelings of guilt and pride and blame and a desire for revenge against those who transgress moral codes

I wouldn't be so dismissive of people like Chalmers and Nagel. — Patterner

I'm not dismissive of them. I've read both years ago. I just don't find their arguments as compelling as I once did. Wayfarer wonders why I spend time arguing about things I say "don't matter". What I'm arguing against is the idea that the truth of idealism is obvious and that physicalism is inconsistent or incoherent. Such facile attempts to dismiss opponent's views and the lack of ability to recognize that others can be totally familiar with the same arguments as you are and yet disagree about what they demonstrate is what I argue against. And what often goes together with that attitude: the assumption that if the other disagrees then the other must not really understand the arguments, is also what I continually argue against.

Therefore, "if it cannot be directly observed and measured" I would say that the "activity" is immaterial, not non-physical. Hence, "neural activity" is a process-of-change in a material substrate, not a material object itself. — Gnomon

I wouldn't use that terminology, but I don't disagree with what I take to be the thrust of what you are saying.

What I'm arguing against is the idea that the truth of idealism is obvious and that physicalism is inconsistent or incoherent. — Janus

I think you may mis-interpret 's arguments. He doesn't say that "physicalism is inconsistent" as a scientific approach. But that it is incomplete as a philosophical approach. For example in his quotation from "— Three Philosophies, One Reality", the point seems to be that the "something else", traditionally called "Spirit", is our mental evaluation of material reality : an Idea or mental model or mode of thought, or Reality as conceived by a Mind. This is the same observation that the Quantum Physics pioneers found strange-but-undeniable in their attempts to study the foundations of material reality*1*2*3. The "something else" or "missing element" in pre-quantum physics was the observing Mind : the "mental evaluation". :nerd:

*1. "What we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning".
___ Werner Heisenberg

*2. “Consciousness cannot be accounted for in physical terms. For consciousness is absolutely fundamental. It cannot be accounted for in terms of anything else.” ___ Erwin Schrödinger

*3. Dear Schrödinger, You are the only contemporary physicist, besides Laue, who sees that one cannot get around the assumption of reality—if only one is honest. Most of them simply do not see what sort of risky game they are playing with reality—reality as something independent of what is experimentally established. ___ A. Einstein

Therefore, "if it cannot be directly observed and measured" I would say that the "activity" is immaterial, not non-physical. Hence, "neural activity" is a process-of-change in a material substrate, not a material object itself. — Gnomon
I wouldn't use that terminology, but I don't disagree with what I take to be the thrust of what you are saying. — Janus

What terminology would you use in place of "immaterial" or "non-physical" on a philosophy forum? Spiritual or Mental or Ideal or???? I've been looking for a less-prejudicial term for years.
How would you phrase the "thrust" of what I'm saying, regarding The Mind-Created World? :smile:

He doesn't say that "physicalism is inconsistent" as a scientific approach. But that it is incomplete as a philosophical approach. — Gnomon

Non-reductive and/ or non-eliminative physicalism are not incomplete, any more than any metaphysical hypothesis is incomplete. The Churchlands argue consistently and extensively for eliminative physicalism, and they are professional philosophers, so it cannot be ruled out as a philosophical approach either. The reality is that we don't and can't know what the case is when it comes to metaphysics,

What I'm arguing against is the idea that the truth of idealism is obvious and that physicalism is inconsistent or incoherent. Such facile attempts to dismiss opponent's views and the lack of ability to recognize that others can be totally familiar with the same arguments as you are and yet disagree about what they demonstrate, and the assumption that the if they disagree the other must not understand the arguments, that goes with that attitude is what I continually argue against. — Janus

Calling the view you disagree with 'naive "folk" understanding' and 'vague intuition' is not arguing against that attitude. It literally is that attitude.

You can only measure dimensions and weight of something which is presumed to remain qualitatively the same over the course of the quantitative measuring and weighing. Any calculation of differences in degree presupposes no difference in kind during the process. Otherwise one is dealing with a new thing and has to start over again. The world doesn’t consist of objects with attributes and properties which remain qualitatively the same from one moment to the next. We invented the concept of object as a qualitatively self-same thing so that we could then proceed to perform calculative measurements. Obviously, this works out well for us, but it doesn’t mean that ‘physical’ objects exist out there in the world rather than in the abstractions that we perform on the continually changing data we actually experience in our interactions with the world. — Joshs

Whatever the true nature of what we call the physical is, my point is that there has never been any suggestion that consciousness has any of its characteristics.

Calling the view you disagree with 'naive "folk" understanding' and 'vague intuition' is not arguing against that attitude. It literally is that attitude. — Patterner

It's no different than referring to commonsense realism as "naive realism". I think naive realism is the default pre-critical attitude which we all have to the world. At the same time, I think naive idealism ( in the sense of anti-physicalism) is the default pre-critical attitude we all have towards the nature of mind and consciousness. Probably people are pre-critically naive dualists in that they hold to naive realism about the world and naive idealism about the mind. It is only once critical thought is brought to bear on that unexamined dualism that the "interaction problem" gives us pause.

Whatever the true nature of what we call the physical is, my point is that there has never been any suggestion that consciousness has any of its characteristics. — Patterner

This is only so as long as you hold to the naive understanding of consciousness. Once you admit, even though consciousness does not intuitively seem to be a physical phenomenon, the possibility that it might nonetheless really be nothing more than that, then you open your mind to possibilities other than what simply seems intuitively obvious.

All that said, the real problem is that we have no way of testing any metaphysical hypothesis, whether that be physicalism or idealism or whatever. We have no way of determining whether any of our hypotheses have any real bearing on the ultimate nature of reality, or even whether the very idea of questioning the ultimate nature of reality is coherent given that a determinable answer seems to be impossible in principle.

So, perhaps we are reduced to just trying to address what is the most useful or interesting way to talk about things. How do you imagine we might go about finding out whether consciousness is non-physical or not? Do you believe there is some fact of the matter we might one day discover?

Whatever the true nature of what we call the physical is, my point is that there has never been any suggestion that consciousness has any of its characteristics. — Patterner

Sure there has. You just have to read phenomenology.

Many philosophers have argued that there seems to be a gap between the objective, naturalistic facts of the world and the subjective facts of conscious experience. The hard problem is the conceptual and metaphysical problem of how to bridge this apparent gap. There are many critical things that can be said about the hard problem, but what I wish to point out here is that it depends for its very formulation on the premise that the embodied mind as a natural entity exists ‘out there' independently of how we configure or constitute it as an object of knowledge through our reciprocal empathic understanding of one other as experiencing subjects. One way of formulating the hard problem is to ask: if we had a complete, canonical, objective, physicalist account of the natural world, including all the physical facts of the brain and the organism, would it conceptually or logically entail the subjective facts of consciousness? If this account would not entail these facts, then consciousness must be an additional, non-natural property of the world.

One problem with this whole way of setting up the issue, however, is that it presupposes we can make sense of the very notion of a single, canonical, physicalist description of the world, which is highly doubtful, and that in arriving (or at any rate approaching) such a description, we are attaining a viewpoint that does not in any way presuppose our own cognition and lived experience. In other words, the hard problem seems to depend for its very formulation on the philosophical position known as transcendental or metaphysical realism. From the phenomenological perspective explored here, however — but also from the perspective of pragmatism à la Charles Saunders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, as well as its contemporary inheritors such as Hilary Putnam (1999) — this transcendental or metaphysical realist position is the paradigm of a nonsensical or incoherent metaphysical viewpoint, for (among other problems) it fails to acknowledge its own reflexive dependence on the intersubjectivity and reciprocal empathy of the human life-world. ( Evan Thompson)

Here's a problem:

One way of formulating the hard problem is to ask: if we had a complete, canonical, objective, physicalist account of the natural world, including all the physical facts of the brain and the organism, would it conceptually or logically entail the subjective facts of consciousness? If this account would not entail these facts, then consciousness must be an additional, non-natural property of the world.

Consciousness is a natural thing. Anything in the universe is natural. The problem is the belief that there cannot be any aspect of the universe that is not in the purview of our physical sciences. As Nagel says in Mind and Cosmos:

...intellectual humility requires that we resist the temptation to assume that tools of the kind we now have are in principle sufficient to understand the universe as a whole. — Thomas Nagel

How have we concluded that we have so great a grasp of things that we can rule out any possibility that something exists outside of that understanding? The last sentence should be:
"If this account would not entail these facts, then consciousness must be an additional, non-physical property of the world."

Not being willing to consider that possibility means never attempting non-physicalist methods. So, if the answer is outside such methods, it will never be found.


In any event-

Whatever the true nature of what we call the physical is, my point is that there has never been any suggestion that consciousness has any of its characteristics.
— Patterner

Sure there has. You just have to read phenomenology. — Joshs

I don't see any suggestions of physical characteristics of consciousness in your quote. I'm not suggesting there is a spacial element. Consciousness is not an object. But we can discuss physical properties of other processes, and see how they come about due to the physical properties of particles. Electron shells explain redox reactions, which are a vital part of metabolism. What can we say about consciousness?

How do you imagine we might go about finding out whether consciousness is non-physical or not? Do you believe there is some fact of the matter we might one day discover? — Janus

Nothing about the physical properties and laws of physics suggests subjective experience. That's from an expert in the field of physical properties and laws of physics. But I realize that's very broad, and, obvious as it is to me, I understand why you don't see it. We need to observe something, something small and specific, that cannot be explained completely by physical properties and laws of physics. Something that would be explained if consciousness is causal. If I'm right about consciousness, we'll see such a thing one day. If I'm wrong, we won't. If we do, more people will start thinking in ways that could help solve the puzzle.

If we don't see such a thing, it could be we simply haven't seen it yet. Which is the same thing I often hear from physicalists, on TPF and elsewhere.

Consciousness is a natural thing. Anything in the universe is natural. The problem is the belief that there cannot be any aspect of the universe that is not in the purview of our physical sciences. As Nagel says in Mind and Cosmos:
...intellectual humility requires that we resist the temptation to assume that tools of the kind we now have are in principle sufficient to understand the universe as a whole.
— Thomas Nagel
How have we concluded that we have so great a grasp of things that we can rule out any possibility that something exists outside of that understanding? — Patterner

I agree that consciousness is a natural process, but understanding this natural process can give us a new way to understand the concept of the natural that bypasses the limitations of traditional physicalism. For instance, recent scientific models of consciousness see it as a synthetic organizing process which is not strictly in the head , but consists of exchanges and reciprocal activities that move between the brain, the body and an environment , which is itself co-defined by the patterns of interaction between it and the organism. Understanding consciousness in this naturalistic way allows us to see how intersubjectively formed concepts developed in a social community on the basis of real discursive and material interactions in a human-built environment have led to theories about the nature of the world such as physicalism, the idea that there are such things as properties of the world independent of our conceptual interactions with that world, and we have direct, unmeditated access to such properties. Such a theory has been quite useful for technological progress, but it is a woefully inadequate theory when it comes to explaining the organization of living systems, consciousness and human cognition and affectivity.

There are competing approaches to naturalism, and the underlying assumptions guiding what we now call the physical sciences don’t remain static. I assume that within a generation or two physics, which has already in the past 125 years substantially altered its concepts of the physical, will come closer to where the biological and embodied cognitive sciences have arrived on this issue.

He doesn't say that "physicalism is inconsistent" as a scientific approach. But that it is incomplete as a philosophical approach. — Gnomon
Non-reductive and/ or non-eliminative physicalism are not incomplete, any more than any metaphysical hypothesis is incomplete. The Churchlands argue consistently and extensively for eliminative physicalism, and they are professional philosophers, so it cannot be ruled out as a philosophical approach either. The reality is that we don't and can't know what the case is when it comes to metaphysics, — Janus

I was not familiar with those terms. But based on the definitions below*1, I assume that and I would generally agree with such inclusive concepts. However, there might still be some variation in how the role of Mind is conceived*2. Specifically, A> the notion that a human mind creates its own mental world (a worldview), or B> the more extreme possibility that our temporary cosmos (The World) was actually created from scratch by a pre-cosmic Mind. The latter idea could be food for further argumentation. Although, as you said, "we can't know what is the case"*3, as philosophers, not scientists, our job is to speculate & conjecture & rationalize about what might be the case. What if Mind, not Matter, is the explanation for everything in the world? :smile:


*1. Non-eliminative physicalism is a metaphysical view that all things are physical, but some aspects of the mental are not reducible to physical states. . . .
Non-eliminative physicalism is a way to preserve physicalism while still acknowledging that mental phenomena can't be reduced to physical phenomena by scientific laws. ___ Google AI overview
Note --- That all material objects (things) are physical is not controversial. But some eliminative-materialists (is that an actual position?) might disagree with the "not-reducible" part. I suppose, because non-reducible Mind could knock all-powerful Matter off the metaphysical throne as the creator of our world.

*2. Metaphysical materialism is a philosophical view that all mental, emotional, conscious, and philosophical states are a result of the physical or material world. This means that everything can be explained by looking at matter, or "the real world". ___ Google AI overview

*3. In philosophy, "the case" refers to a specific, detailed scenario or situation presented as a thought experiment to explore a particular philosophical concept or problem, often designed to elicit a judgment or reaction from the reader about the situation, thereby illuminating the underlying philosophical issue at hand; essentially, it's a hypothetical example used to analyze a philosophical idea. ___ Google AI overview
Note --- "The Case" is a hypothesis, not a verified fact. We can Believe, but not Know for sure, what is the absolute case. But when has that ever stopped philosophers from deducing from the available evidence what seems to be the all-inclusive Case/Truth?

physical things are measurable in various ways, but consciousness is not. In what physical terms can we discuss consciousness? — Patterner

You can only measure dimensions and weight of something which is presumed to remain qualitatively the same over the course of the quantitative measuring and weighing. Any calculation of differences in degree presupposes no difference in kind during the process. Otherwise one is dealing with a new thing and has to start over again. The world doesn’t consist of objects with attributes and properties which remain qualitatively the same from one moment to the next. We invented the concept of object as a qualitatively self-same thing so that we could then proceed to perform calculative measurements. — Joshs

Nathan Widder offers an interesting account of overcoming the gap between physical things and consciousness. He considers Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche.

“While mechanism correctly locates knowledge in quantity, through its uncritical assumption
of unity (the atom), it reduces quality directly to quantity and establishes an absolute division
between knowledge (what can be ‘objectively’ quantified) and value (the ‘subjective’
interpretation or assessment of this ‘objective’ reality). Units enable counting and calculation,
but they also abstract away constitutive relations. Thus on a concrete level where no unities
or things pre-exist their relations, quantity cannot be a number but only a relation. As
Deleuze declares: ‘Quantity itself is therefore inseparable from difference in quantity’. This
difference in quantity is intensive, an ordinal relation of more or less. Nietzsche calls it an
‘order of rank’, which is also an order of power, of strength and weakness. As an intensive
difference, it cannot be measured along a fixed numerical scale that could reduce difference
between forces to equality: as Deleuze maintains, ‘to dream of two equal forces…is coarse
and approximate dream, a statistical dream in which the living is submerged but which
chemistry dispels’. Difference in quantity thereby designates a fundamental heterogeneity
within force relations. However, although the world of forces is one of differences in quantity that are only later organized into unities, Nietzsche maintains that this quantitative difference is never
experienced as such, but instead is felt in terms of quality. ‘Our “knowing” limits itself to establishing quantities; but we cannot help feeling these differences in quantity as qualities…we sense bigness and smallness in relation to the conditions of our existence…with regard to making possible our existence we sense even relations between magnitudes as qualities’” (Widder, ‘From duration to eternal return’)

This quote means that our values are inseparable from our qualitative evaluations of relations of forces. On the other hand, relations of forces and their evaluations are embedded within our procedures of quantitative measurements. While qualities remain heterogeneous to quantities, they are not merely subjective interpretations of an objectively independent reality. They compose an integral part of the perspective plane of the will to power.

I wouldn't use that terminology, but I don't disagree with what I take to be the thrust of what you are saying. — Janus
What terminology would you use in place of "immaterial" or "non-physical" on a philosophy forum? Spiritual or Mental or Ideal or???? — Gnomon

In 's post above, he quotes from a talk on Buddhism :
"So in our understanding of the Universe we should recognize the existence of something other than matter. We can call that something spirit, but if we do we should remember that in Buddhism, the word "spirit" is a figurative expression for value or meaning. We do not say that spirit exists in reality; we use the concept only figuratively". — Three Philosophies, One Reality

Traditionally, in most world cultures, their philosophies & religions used terms like "spirit" to distinguish the material world from our mental models of it. Some of those models involve Ghosts as reified dead people, but for moderns the "spirit" is obviously a production of the observing mind (apparition or hallucination), not an actual person. That's why I try to avoid a term that is offensive to some on this forum, who have a low opinion of religion in particular, or philosophy in general. For example, I use "Self" in place of "Soul". But what substance is a Self made of?

The notion of walking spirits is based on the ancient philosophical concept of the Mind or Consciousness or Soul of a person, as something meta-physical (non-physical or mental) that can be known only by inference or imagination or sixth sense, not by physical senses. Therefore, the "something other" we call Spirit is our mental evaluation of material reality, in which Mind matters and Intellect makes sense. Reality as conceived by a Mind, not as perceived by the visual organ. :smile:

Note --- Even those who believe that there is life beyond the grave, are aware that this second life is immaterial or semi-material. That's why ghosts are portrayed as wispy or translucent. And they have even invented a semi-material substance, ectoplasm, to serve as a semi-scientific term for something that is real but not material. Would "Ideal" be a more philosophical term for that neither-fish-nor-fowl meaning? Do you have a better idea of term for a conceptual object?

There are competing approaches to naturalism, and the underlying assumptions guiding what we now call the physical sciences don’t remain static. I assume that within a generation or two physics, which has already in the past 125 years substantially altered its concepts of the physical, will come closer to where the biological and embodied cognitive sciences have arrived on this issue. — Joshs

Yes, very interesting things will be happening in there near future, I'm sure! :grin:

Nothing about the physical properties and laws of physics suggests subjective experience. — Patterner

I agree. But why should anything about physical properties and the laws of physics suggest subjective experience? They are different areas of investigation. I don't believe physics or neuroscience will ever be able to explain how the physical gives rise to experience, because experience cannot be rigorously observed together with observing neural processes. We cannot observe neural processes in vivo, we can only measure their effects via fMRI and EEG technologies etc.

To me the lack of explainability of experience in physical terms is not a central criterion in deciding whether experience and consciousness of that experience is just a manifestation of physical processes . QM shows us physical phenomena which are not explainable in terms of our macro physical concepts, and it just isn't the right tool for explaining something like consciousness beyond underpinning neuroscientific investigations of the physical properties and functions of the brain.

The real question is as to what else consciousness could be if not physical. You can say it's mental, but then does not the mental as far as we know supervene on the physical? We can imagine the logical possibility that the mental is somehow completely independent, but that is just a logical possibility we seem to have no evidence to believe in. And that logical possibility seems vacuous unless mind is posited as another substance, and then we have dualism.

If we posit one (neutral) substance that manifests both physical and mental attributes that might make more sense. But to assert that mind is ubiquitously inherent in or alongside matter from the beginning doesn't eliminate the problem of imagining what that mind looks like. It could not be anything like the intuitive introspectively derived notion we have of our own minds. The problem I've always had with panpsychism (such as Strawson postulates) is that I can get no idea of what it looks like.

What if Mind, not Matter, is the explanation for everything in the world? :smile: — Gnomon

Leaving aside the possibility that such a mind is an omniscient, omnipotent God who will judge us and accordingly determine the nature of our life after this one, what difference do you think it would make to how we live our lives?

what difference do you think it would make to how we live our lives? — Janus

Agree. I've often said that idealism really doesn't change anything. There is nothing I do now that would change.

That said, for others there seem to be at least two reasons for change. For some folk, this idea appeals to their vanity. 1) They want to know more about this 'secret' ontology and be special in some way. 2) They believe that a judgement is coming, as you say - [quote="Janus;953617" that such a mind is an omniscient, omnipotent God who will judge us[/quote]. Then people might fall over themselves in a vain attempt to anticipate how they might be judged.

I find it interesting that some secular philosophers, like AC Grayling, have left behind the word physicalism these days and use the term naturalism. Any thoughts on this word? The problem for me is that how do we draw a distinction between a natural and a supernatural world if physicalism isn't a distinguishing factor? If idealism is true than this is part of naturalism?

Kant correctly recognized that taking a strictly materialist stance depends on an idealism, since the very notion of a mind-independent object covertly smuggles in all the subjective apparatus needed to have an object appear before a subject. So realism and idealism are not opposites but versions of the same subject -based thinking. — Joshs

But critical idealism will recognise that in a way that metaphysical realism, like most here, would not. Acknowledging the unavoidably subjective nature of knowledge is in direct contradiction to metaphysical realism. And also Bernardo Kastrup questions that idealism and materialism are opposites at all. Idealism is not positing 'mental stuff' as a constituent of reality, in the way that materialism does. Materialism attempts to explain the primary datum of experience (consciousness) in terms of inferred, abstract constructs (matter). This makes materialism dependent on a speculative leap that is ungrounded in direct experience.

if you want to get beyond the realism-idealism, fact-value split, you have to be able to see value WITHIN matter, not separate from it and alongside it. — Joshs

Idealism is perfectly compatible with realism, but not scientific or philosophical materialism. But I agree that Husserl and Heidegger performed a valuable service by returning to the 'things themselves' and the actualities of embodied existence which is not found in Kant.

"So in our understanding of the Universe we should recognize the existence of something other than matter. We can call that something spirit, but if we do we should remember that in Buddhism, the word "spirit" is a figurative expression for value or meaning. We do not say that spirit exists in reality; we use the concept only figuratively". — Three Philosophies, One Reality — Gnomon

I should say something more about that. Gudo Nishijima was a Sōtō Zen master, who died about 12 years ago. He was not a monk, he had a career in the banking industry in Tokyo. He elaborated a philosophical system based on the teaching of Dogen who was the founder of Sōtō Zen. His 'three philosophies and one reality' can be summarised as follows - human understanding unfolds through a dialectical process involving stages.

Idealism: This stage corresponds to subjective and theoretical thinking. It represents abstract ideas and the way humans interpret reality through their minds. However, idealism alone leads to suffering due to the inability to reconcile these ideas with the material world.

Materialism: This is the objective view focusing on the material, external world. It considers reality purely in terms of physical phenomena and disregards subjective experience. This perspective, while useful, obscures something fundamental to human existence.

Realism (Synthesis): This phase integrates the subjective (idealistic) and objective (materialistic) views, forming a more balanced and practical understanding. It emphasizes the role of action and experience as a way to unify these perspectives.

Reality Itself: The ultimate stage transcends philosophical frameworks. It is the direct experience of reality through practice, particularly Zazen (sitting meditation). Dogen highlights that reality cannot be fully captured in words or intellectual concepts; it must be lived and experienced.

All this is laid out in his book To Meet the Real Dragon.

what difference do you think it would make to how we live our lives? — Janus

Someone on another site has this sig:
If you can't tell the difference, what difference does it make?

Excellent saying.

Of course, it applies to quite a few topics around here. But here we all are. :grin:

Deleuze grapples with the issue of the relation between an implicit creative dimension of sense and an explicitly logical, extensive field of actuality by proposing to think the two aspects together in a transcendental-empirical synthesis.The transcendental dimension is represented by an anonymous, pre personal field of reciprocally interacting differences from which emerge singularities and intensities. These structures are actualized on the empirical dimension as wholes and parts, qualities and extensities. Deleuzian intensities are external to actualized extensity and quality as their generative cause and impetus of transformation. Intensities affirm the paradoxical, the heterogeneous, the singular, the incompossible, the Eternal Return of the different, the indeterminate, the non-sensical, the roll of the dice within sense, the object=x as difference in general, the virtual event of sense as intensity, the verb underlying the sleight of hand of the axiomatic , converging, referential functions of actualizing predication. Deleuze(1987) aligns his intensive-extensive duality with Bergson's distinction between duration and the empirical multiplicity of magnitude.

“Bergson presents duration as a type of multiplicity opposed to metric multiplicity or the multiplicity of magnitude. Duration is in no way indivisible, but is that which cannot be divided without changing in nature at each division.'On the other hand, in a multiplicity such as homogeneous extension, the division can be carried as far as one likes without changing anything in the constant object; or the magnitudes can vary with no other result than an increase or a decrease in the amount of space they striate. Bergson thus brought to light "two very different kinds of multiplicity," one qualitative and fusional, continuous, the other numerical and homogeneous, discrete. It will be noted that matter goes back and forth between the two; sometimes it is already enveloped in qualitative multiplicity, sometimes already developed in a metric "schema" that draws it outside of itself.”

In Deleuze’s distinction between the unseparated implicit multiplicity of the transcendental field and explicit logical patterns, the latter are generated within the former but are heterogeneous to it and outside of it. Logic and extension by degree are developments and explications (secondary degradations) of the implicit (Virtual). The illusion is confusing the implicit and the explicit , the intrinsic and the extrinsic. For Deleuze, the implicit intensities (Eternal Return) generate the logical , conceptual, theoretical, lawful principles for empirical domains, and then are held steady in the background, beyond the reach of the conceptual and logical patterns, which cancel them by freezing and isolating them.

“The transcendental principle does not govern any domain but gives the domain to be governed to a given empirical principle; it accounts for the subjection of a domain to a principle. The domain is created by difference of intensity, and given by this difference to an empirical principle according to which and in which the difference itself is cancelled. It is the transcendental principle which maintains itself in itself, beyond the reach of the empirical principle. Moreover, while the laws of nature govern the surface of the world, the eternal return ceaselessly rumbles in this other dimension of the transcendental or the volcanic spatium.” (Deleuze 1994)

What if Mind, not Matter, is the explanation for everything in the world? :smile: — Gnomon
Leaving aside the possibility that such a mind is an omniscient, omnipotent God who will judge us and accordingly determine the nature of our life after this one, what difference do you think it would make to how we live our lives? — Janus

Idealism or Deism would make no material difference in your life. But it might make a philosophical difference. What difference does your participation in a philosophical forum make in how you live your life? Personally, I have no ambition to change the world, just myself . . . . to change my mind, and the meaning of my life. :smile:

Karl Marx
Philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it",
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theses_on_Feuerbach

Difference is understood to be constitutive of both meaning and identity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Difference_(philosophy)

I find it interesting that some secular philosophers, like AC Grayling, have left behind the word physicalism these days and use the term naturalism. Any thoughts on this word? The problem for me is that how do we draw a distinction between a natural and a supernatural world if physicalism isn't a distinguishing factor? If idealism is true than this is part of naturalism? — Tom Storm

How to make a distinction between natural and supernatural—it seems to come down to the idea that over and above the natural visible world is an invisible spiritual world. I have long wondered whether the latter is imagined on account of dreams. The standard story seems to be that the invisible world of the supernatural (gods, demons, spirits and other immaterial entities) is imagined as an explanation for what would have seemed to the early humans to be invisible forces, and that idea seems reasonably plausible too.

If the supernatural is an invisible world, then it seems to follow that it can be accessed (although modern thinking would say peopled) only by the imagination. Being imagined as an invisible world would seem to lead to the idea of immateriality as well. So I think you are right. The association between a natural visible world and physicalism, and the association between a supernatural invisible world and ant-physicalism both seem natural.

Should we follow our intuitions, our natural imaginative inclinations in deciding what is a valid and/ or plausible ontology? Or should we apply critical thought and the correctives of logical and empirical knowledge to our pre-critical inclinations? That is the question, and the further question is ' does it matter?'.

When people take their own ideas, what seems self-evident to them, too seriously it seems that culture wars are looming. For some on both sides this is can become a moral crusade. To my way of thinking that is definitely a negative—it is social consequences that matter, and divisive thinking is that last thing needed toady IMO.

Good response, thanks.

When people take their own ideas, what seems self-evident to them, too seriously it seems that culture wars are looming. For some on both sides this is can become a moral crusade. — Janus

Indeed, binary or dualistic thinking like this is certainly responsible for many unnecessarily conflicts.

I have often thought that one of the reasons people are attracted to superphysical ideas is their aesthetic appeal. It perhaps seems more harmonious to imagine that there is a transcendent realm, something grander and more meaningful beyond the physical world. I have noticed how often advocates of the transcendent describe the physicalist position as an ugly worldview - stunted, disenchanted, devoid of mystery, limiting.