The nature of the causal relationship is physical. — wonderer1

So you say.

Along with the majority of philosophers of mind.

So you say.

The meaning arises as a brain (containing neural networks trained to recognize the written language the book is written in) detects patterns in the writing which are associated by that brain with the meaning that arises. — wonderer1

What about this causal relationship is physical? How is it explainable in physical or molecular terms? How do physical interactions cause or give rise to semiotic processes? Those are the precise questions that the quotes you referred to as ‘red herrings’ are seeking to address.

A pretty poor post, I have to say. — Wayfarer

:rofl: Nice try, but I'm not biting. Desperation breeds denigration it seems.

Just because something can be attributed to neurobiology, doesn't necessarily mean it can be understood solely through a physicalist lens. — Wayfarer

And I haven't anywhere said that it definitely can or that it definitely cannot. One thing I know is that the way perceptual experience might seem to us cannot be explained in terms of a mechanical model of physicality. @Apokrisis always said it can be understood in terms of a semiotic model of physicality, if I read him right. I don't have the background to properly assess the soundness of Apo's posts, and I freely admit that.

As you kind of admit, the problem is that to question the physicalist account is to open the door to - well, what, exactly? — Wayfarer

If you wish to question the neurological account, which is a physicalist account insofar as it looks for explanations in terms of neural patterns and activity, then you need to come up with a compelling alternative.

That is what you have constantly failed to do. Instead, you say proponents of physicalism are suffering from fear of religion. Your view is so skewed that you cannot see the possibility that other find religious explanations simply uncompelling.,

Your anachronistic mechanistic model of physicalism is merely the pet strawman you love to keep knocking down. I know all the kinds of arguments you marshal—for years I used to deploy them myself against physicalism. Eventually I came to see that those arguments are merely reactive, not constructive. They don't proceed from a desire to know the truth, but from a need to destroy what threatens to undermine what you wish to be the case.

It really is a staggering irony that you want to dismiss physicalist's arguments by attempting to denigrate them as being psychologically motivated by a fear of something which you obviously desperately need, and need to justify, and they don't—namely religion. Your arguments are motivated by a fear of letting go of religion. I have an open mind, which you obviously do not.

If you wish to question the neurological account, which is a physicalist account insofar as it looks for explanations in terms of neural patterns and activity, then you need to come up with a compelling alternative. — Janus

I'm saying the neurological account is not necessarily physicalist. It's a leap from saying that there are neurological processes involved, to materialist philosophy of mind.

Instead, you say proponents of physicalism are suffering from fear of religion. — Janus

Because you often express it. You said it in the post I responded to - 'what are we to do, believe there is "another realm?"

What's the alternative? Posit the existence of another realm? — Janus

So get this clear - you believe that to question physicalism requires positing of another realm? You said it: do you believe it?

I'm saying the neurological account is not necessarily physicalist. — Wayfarer

It deals with the brain, which is physical and uses physical methods to study it.

Because you often express it. You said it in the post I responded to - 'what are we to do, believe there is "another realm?" — Wayfarer

So what? I have no fear of other realms. I love imagining them, but I don't count such creative imaginings as anything more than fiction. What's wrong with fiction? Nothing in my book.

However, if we are to be justified in thinking that such imaginings are anything more than fictions then we need some substantive evidence or compelling reason for thinking so. That is just what you apparently cannot provide.

Being personally convinced of something does not constitute any good reason for others to believe what you do. You apparently find that hard to understand. It actually seems to be a kind of narcissism, when it blinds you to the fact that others can disagree with you while understanding your position. I don't see you understanding that. It's a shame.

Apokrisis always said it can be understood in terms of a semiotic model of physicality, if I read him right. I don't have the background to properly assess the soundness of Apo's posts, and I freely admit that. — Janus

I learned a lot from Apokrisis, including the whole field of biosemiotics, which I've read quite a bit about by now. But I also learned that he tended to dismiss the idealistic philosophy of C S Peirce on the grounds of him being 'a man of his times' and obviously not able to benefit from later scientific discoveries. After many earnest and open discussions with Apokrisis, I believe he too expresses a certain fear of religion. It means that if you question the naturalist account with its physicalist underpinnings, then you're opening the door to ideas associated with religion or philosophical idealism, which no self-respecting scientist should admit.

However, if we are to be justified in thinking that such imaginings are anything more than fictions then we need some substantive evidence or reason for thinking so. — Janus

Our willingness to accept scientific claims that are against common sense is the key to an understanding of the real struggle between science and the supernatural. We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door. — Richard Lewontin, Review of Carl Sagan Candle in the Dark

It (neuroscience) deals with the brain, which is physical — Janus

I dispute that the brain is physical. The human brain, in context, is the most complex natural phenomenon known to science, with more neural connections than stars in the sky.

substantive evidence or reason — Janus

See the original post.

I'm saying the neurological account is not necessarily physicalist. It's a leap from saying that there are neurological processes involved, to materialist philosophy of mind. — Wayfarer

There is a leap from any empirical account to any metaphysical claim. We really ought to suspend judgement in the absence of any firm metaphysical ground at all. If we wish to make a leap it ought to be what is considered to be the inference to the best explanation. Of course for whatever reasons we are not all going to agree what is the best inference. I'm merely telling you that if I am pressed to say which I think is the best inference, then I'll choose physicalism, but I'm not wedded to it. My natural inclination is to suspend judgement and in my day to day life that is just what I do, because the issue is of little or no importance—little relevance to how I live my life.

So get this clear - you believe that to question physicalism requires positing of another realm? You said it: do you believe it? — Wayfarer

Physicalism is the claim that the fundamental nature of everything is energy. Physics understands matter and energy to be one and the same. What is the other alternative to the realm of the physical? I would say it is the realm of the mind. But we know nothing of mind beyond our own introspective intuitions about our own minds. Of the physical we know a whole world which, being investigated, has yielded a vast body of coherent and consistent scientific knowledge.

Science tells us the universe existed long before humans. I see no reason to doubt that. If that is so, then mind cannot be fundamental unless something like panpsychism is true, or there is a god or universal mind that keeps what appears to us as the [physical world in place. I just don't find those explanations rationally compelling, although I am attracted to them in an imaginative way.

I learned a lot from Apokrisis, including the whole field of biosemiotics, which I've read quite a bit about by now. — Wayfarer

Yeah, I've read some of Salthe and some of Deacon and some of Hoffmeyer and others over the last ten years or so since first encountering Apo. But I don't count myself as an expert. I can understand the arguments, but I don't have the background to assess their veracity. so I maintain an open mind. I don't recall any of them questioning naturalism or physicalism. If you can cite some passages from those writers or others that do then I'll certainly consider them.

What is the alternative to physicalism to explain the fact that we share a world with each other and the animals other than the old "universal mind" model? Nothing else works, even Kastrup admits that. I am not completely close-minded to the possibility of that, but I honestly do see it to be of much less plausibility than naturalism. I'd actually rather believe in the universal mind model, but unfortunately, I just don't find it compelling enough.

To me the Lewontin passage is tendentious babble—nothing substantive to be found there.

I dispute that the brain is physical. The human brain, in context, is the most complex natural phenomenon known to science, with more neural connections than stars in the sky. — Wayfarer

The criterion of what is physical is that its activities have measurable effects. The brain ticks that box. I get that our experience doesn't intuitively seem to be physical. Intuitive understanding is not always a good guide to the nature of things,

substantive evidence or reason — Janus

See the original post. — Wayfarer

I read it before, and I just looked at it again, I know all those arguments like the proverbial back of my hand. They are trivial truisms—they simply say that without the mind, without percipients, there would be no world appearing. How could I take issue with such a tautology, other than to point out its vacuity.

If you think that because no world would appear to humans if humans didn't exist that it follows that human consciousness is fundamental to reality, I can only wonder what has happened to your critical thinking skills. Maybe they have become buried beneath your confirmation bias.

Brandolini's law, also known as the bullshit asymmetry principle, is an internet adage coined in 2013 by Alberto Brandolini, an Italian programmer, that emphasizes the effort of debunking misinformation, in comparison to the relative ease of creating it in the first place. The law states:

The amount of energy needed to refute bullshit is an order of magnitude bigger than that needed to produce it.

I like that. It reminds me of an injunction sometimes attributed to Mark Twain and other times to George Carlin (roughly paraphrased): " Never argue with a fool because they will bring you down to their level and then beat you with experience".

In philosophy, to equate mental with physical is a category error. — Gnomon
Brandolini's law : bullshit — wonderer1

Speaking of BS. Your interpretation of my post was based on a Category Error. I was talking about Philosophy, not Science ; Meta-physics, not Physics.

The Category Error I referred to is not Descartes' notion of two different "substances"*1, but the relationship of a physical system and it's metaphysical function. A mathematical "function" is the output X that is dependent on the numerical values in the equation. None of those math values is physical, nor is the function. The function of your automobile is transportation, which is a concept, not a physical object. The function of your computer is Information Processing, not just displaying letters on a screen.

The function of a brain is control of "thought, memory, emotion, touch, motor skills, vision, breathing, temperature, hunger and every process that regulates our body". All of those are immaterial Functions, not material Organs. And a Process is a logical step by step procedure, not a substantial object. Yet, each function is typically associated with an organ : as Brain is associated with Thought, Emotion, Memory, etc. None of which is a substantial, tangible, massive material object. What is the mass of an Idea? To Associate : "connect (someone or something) with something else in one's mind."

In Aristotelian terms, the categories I refer to are "Substance" and "Essence or Form"*2. In this case, the Substance is matter (neural tissue of brain), and the Essence is the meaning or referent (rose), but the Form is the symbolic Idea (roseness), a Qualia that colors both Essence and Substance. The material Substance is tangible, but immaterial/intellectual Form & Essence are only inferrable & intelligible by reasoning minds. Are you familiar with those subtle philosophical distinctions? :smile:

*1. Cartesian Mind/Body distinction :
This means the “clear and distinct” ideas of mind and body, as mutually exclusive natures, must be false in order for mind-body causal interaction to occur. Hence, Descartes has not adequately established that mind and body are two really distinct substances.
https://iep.utm.edu/descartes-mind-body-distinction-dualism/

*2. Theory of Forms :
Essence is what makes a thing that particular thing. In other words, essence is what makes “that chair.”
Substance is what makes a thing a general thing.
Form is what makes the idea of a thing, without which the thing would not be intelligible. In other words, form is what makes “that idea of a/that chair.
https://o-g-rose-writing.medium.com/essence-substance-and-form-81c2b707c0d8

I get that our experience doesn't intuitively seem to be physical. — Janus

It's not about intuition. It's a lack of physical characteristics. Physical properties combine in many ways, but the results are always physical. We can measure the size of physical objects in three physical dimensions. We can measure mass, weight, volume. We can measure hardness.

We can measure things about physical processes. Like how far something moves, and how long it took to move that distance. We can measure how things change speed and direction when moving. We can measure the speed of light.

We can measure how much energy something uses to move, or grow. We can calculate what percentages of particles are moving at what speed, given the temperature of a cylinder of air. We can measure events that take place in a millionth of a second. We can tell the age of things by how much of a radioactive isotopes it contains.

All of these things can be seen to be the result of the physical properties of the particles that make up everything.

Not a word of any of that applies to consciousness. It has no physical aspect, despite the fact that the examples of it we are aware of exist within a physical medium. And everything we know of the properties of particles "seem completely disconnected from anything remotely like subjective experience."

That's a little more substantial than "vague intuitions."

Some of us suggest the possibility that our physical sciences cannot answer every question about reality.

What you say is not true. We can measure neural activity. Of course, you will say that isn't consciousness, but that is just an assumption—assuming what is to be proved.

Or think of energy itself—it can only be measured in terms of its effects. If it cannot be directly observed and measured, will you say it is non-physical?

Some of us suggest the possibility that our physical sciences cannot answer every question about reality. — Patterner

I agree if by science you mean physics. I think there are many questions about for example human and animal behavior that cannot be answered by physics. Different paradigms. But questions about animal behavior can be answered by ethology and questions about human behavior can be answered by anthropology, sociology and psychology and even chemistry. Do you think of those as sciences?

Just as a matter of interest do you care whether consciousness is physical or not? Personally, I'd rather it wasn't physical because then there might be some hope that this life is not all we get. I've made my peace with the idea that this life is most probably all we get, but whatever the case is, I don't think it matters what I think about it. What will be will be.

Beyond those kinds of concerns do you think the answer to whether consciousness is physical or not could matter for any other reason?

What you say is not true. — Janus

He’s :100: right.

Beyond those kinds of concerns do you think the answer to whether consciousness is physical or not could matter for any other reason? — Janus

You say it doesn’t matter, but you sure as hell love arguing about it. The question @Patterner is asking is a perfectly valid one - how can we be affected by the meaning of words when meaning, itself, is not physical. That is the central question of Terrence Deacon’s book Incomplete Nature, which you mention. He certainly doesn’t question naturalism but extends it to account for what he describes as ‘absentials’—things that have no material existence but have causal roles in all sentient life. It’s an intriguing argument, though not one I’ve fully mastered.

Physical properties combine in many ways, but the results are always physical. We can measure the size of physical objects in three physical dimensions. We can measure mass, weight, volume. We can measure hardness — Patterner

Are such properties inherent in objects or are they the products of historically formed ways of organizing our relation to the world? Heidegger has argued that we never just see a hammer with its properties and attributes. We understand what a hammer is primordially in what we use it for and how we use it, and in terms of the larger associated context of relevance. The hammer as a static thing with properties is derived from our prior association with it as something we use for a purpose.

Husserl showed how the empirical notion of object that you’re describing emerged in the era of modern sciences with Galileo. The Egyptians and Greeks first developed the concept of a pure ideal geometric form (perfect triangle, circle, square, etc) as the modification of actual interactions with real , imperfect shapes in nature. Armed with such pure mathematical idealizations as the straight line and perfect circle, it occurred to Galileo that the messy empirical world could be approach using these ideal geometries as a model. Now everything we observe in the actual world could be treated as an approximation of a geometrically describable body.

The notions of scientific accuracy and calculative measurement were made possible by thinking of actual things as imperfect versions of pure genetic bodies. The point Im making is that the physicalism you’re describing (self-identical things with mathematically describable properties and attributes) is not a product of the world as it supposedly is in itself. It is a human invention that depends on ignoring the contribution of subjective practical use and relevance to our perception of the world.

Once we recognize this it is no longer necessary to posit a distinction between an outer world of mathematically measurable things and an inner world of subjective consciousness. And the subject here is not to be understood according to traditional idealism and an internal realm The subject is just as much produced though pragmatic interaction in an environment as the objects of the world it interacts with.

↪Patterner What you say is not true. We can measure neural activity. Of course, you will say that isn't consciousness, but that is just an assumption—assuming what is to be proved. — Janus

Neural activity is electrical and chemical signals moving along the neurons. That is consciousness? Photon hits retina, rhodopsin changes shape, concentration of ions changes, signal is sent along optic nerve, (skipping a thousand other steps), signal arrives in specific area of the brain. That is a description of my subjective experience of red? That, presumably added to other signals hitting the brain, is a description of my brain's awareness of itself?

Or think of energy itself—it can only be measured in terms of its effects. If it cannot be directly observed and measured, will you say it is non-physical? — Janus

Energy is particles in motion. We know which particles move in which medium. We can measure how fast they move. It's all physical.

I agree if by science you mean physics. — Janus

It all reduces to physics. We can't follow every particle of air. But we know what they are all doing statistically, and can think of the total in terms of the laws of thermodynamics. But the laws of thermodynamics do not exist exactly as they are for any reason other than the way particles Interact.

The same is true of the way oxygen works in our cells. Electron shells, electron sharing, etc. Everything reduces to physics.

I have not heard an explanation for how consciousness reduces to physics.

Just as a matter of interest do you care whether consciousness is physical or not? Personally, I'd rather it wasn't physical because then there might be some hope that this life is not all we get. I've made my peace with the idea that this life is most probably all we get, but whatever the case is, I don't think it matters what I think about it. What will be will be. — Janus

It's ironic that you think consciousness is entirely physical, but would like it to be otherwise in the hopes of an afterlife, while I think consciousness has a non-physical component, but don't want an afterlife. But, of course, you're right. What will be will be.

Beyond those kinds of concerns do you think the answer to whether consciousness is physical or not could matter for any other reason? — Janus

You ask this in a philosophy forum?? :grin: Knowledge for knowledge's sake is reason enough for most anything, imo. But the true nature of our Selves, and the explanation for how various chunks of matter can subjectively experience, be aware that they are subjectively experiencing, and be aware that they are aware that they are subjectively experiencing?? That's freakin' fascinating beyond anything else!

The meaning arises as a brain (containing neural networks trained to recognize the written language the book is written in) detects patterns in the writing which are associated by that brain with the meaning that arises.
— wonderer1

What about this causal relationship is physical? — Wayfarer

Everything. Words are patterns of physical vibrations propagating through the air, or physical text. Neural networks in your brain which recognize words and their semantic associations are physical. The semantic elements in your stream of thought are physically detectable.

How is it explainable in physical or molecular terms? — Wayfarer

There is an enormous amount of science to study to reach a complete account at the molecular level. Can you be more specific about what it is that you don't understand?

How do physical interactions cause or give rise to semiotic processes? — Wayfarer

Reading Peter Tse's Criterial Causation might provide a clue. Before reading Tse, I used an analogy of locks and keys, where in the scenario of reading written language, letters, words, phrases, etc. play the roles of keys, and neural nets trained in written language recognition play the role of locks. Of course I don't expect that to make any sense to anyone so unwilling to consider physicalism charitably as yourself.

Reading Peter Tse's Criterial Causation might provide a clue. Before reading Tse, I used an analogy of locks and keys, where in the scenario of reading written language, letters, words, phrases, etc. play the roles of keys, and neural nets trained in written language recognition play the role of locks — wonderer1

Does Tse discuss complex dynamical systems approaches
to free will and causation? I’m thinking of Alicia Juarrero’s Dynamics in Action:Intentional Behavior as a Complex System.

I'm not familiar with Alicia Juarrero’s perspective, but what I've gathered from looking at the Amazon page for her book sounds generally compatible with Tse's thinking. FWIW, I searched my Kindle copy of Tse's book for any citation of Alicia Juarrero, and didn't find any. I'm planning to borrow a copy of Juarrero’s book, so perhaps I can let you know more later.

Physicalism is the claim that the fundamental nature of everything is energy. Physics understands matter and energy to be one and the same. What is the other alternative to the realm of the physical? I would say it is the realm of the mind. — Janus

I too, prefer the label "Physicalism" (cause) to "Materialism" (effect) as the ultimate Reality. Matter is merely the clay that Energy shapes into the things that we perceive with the eye and conceive with the mind. Descartes imagined the material aspects of reality as one realm, and the mental aspects as a separate realm. But I view the world holistically, as one reality with several different departments. {see Triad illustration below}

FWIW, my personal worldview equates Energy (causation) with Mind (knowledge of forms), in order to explain how mental functions*1 could emerge from eons of material evolution. So, I agree that Energy (EnFormAction)*2 is the fundamental "nature" of everything. But, for human philosophers, Meaning is more important than Matter. My thesis and blog go into scientific details to support the conclusion that everything is EnFormAction. :smile:

*1. Mental Functions :
The most important cognitive functions are attention, orientation, memory, gnosis, executive functions, praxis, language, social cognition and visuospatial skills.
https://neuronup.us/areas-of-intervention/cognitive-functions/
Note --- "Gnosis" is the Greek word for the ability to know, to conceptualize what we sense. We know by informing the physical brain into a cognitive mind.

*2. Energy :
Scientists define “energy” as the ability to do work, but don't know what energy is. They assume it's an eternal causative force that existed prior to the Big Bang, along with mathematical laws. Energy is a positive or negative relationship between things, and physical Laws are limitations on the push & pull of those forces.
So, all they know is what Energy does, which is to transform material objects in various ways. Energy itself is amorphous & immaterial. So if you reduce Causation to its essence of information, it seems more akin to mind than matter & energy. Energy is Causation, and Form is Meaning. Together I call them : EnFormAction : the power to give meaningful/knowable form to malleable matter.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page8.html

*3. The fundamental triad of energy/matter/information :
This essay is based on the thesis that information is as fundamental as matter and energy in the fabric of reality,
https://www.researchgate.net/
Note --- The image below is just some scientist's illustration of how he conceives the interrelationships of Energy & Matter & Mind. Don't take it too literally. ResearchGate is a social network site for scientists and researchers. I may not agree with all of their publications. I have my own illustrations on my website.

Neural activity is electrical and chemical signals moving along the neurons. That is consciousness? — Patterner

That is the question. It's not how we intuitively think of consciousness of course. Hence the conundrum. We know what consciousness feels like. But that is a different question than what it actually is. Probably cannot ever be definitively answered.

Energy is particles in motion. We know which particles move in which medium. We can measure how fast they move. It's all physical. — Patterner

We cannot see particles, we can only measure their effects. We don't even really know excatly what electrons are. Are they what constitutes fields or are they merely excitations of a field? How will we find out?

I have not heard an explanation for how consciousness reduces to physics. — Patterner

If consciousness is neural activity, then it reduces to physics or at least chemistry. How can we ever be sure about that? It doesn't seem possible, because there is no way to observe consciousness being reducible to physics. So we are left with inference. Much of science is like this. You no coubt know the well worn Humean point about causation itself being impossible to directly observe.

It's ironic that you think consciousness is entirely physical, but would like it to be otherwise in the hopes of an afterlife, while I think consciousness has a non-physical component, but don't want an afterlife. But, of course, you're right. What will be will be. — Patterner

I don't want an afterlife. I just want as much of life as I can get. I also think one measure of a good life is being able to die well. Clinging to anything is not a good idea. I don't cling to the idea of consciousness being physical, it just seems the most likely to me. Somone earlier mentioned Peirce's "matter is effete mind". He nonetheless believed that the universe existed prior to humans. He was basically a kind of panpsychist. I don't think that position is incompatible with thinking that consciousness is a physical phenomenon.

You ask this in a philosophy forum?? :grin: Knowledge for knowledge's sake is reason enough for most anything, imo. — Patterner

Philosophy is defined as love of wisdom. Is it wise to simply accumulate knowledge for its own sake? That almost sounds like accumulating money for its own sake. What is the point of knowledge you cannot use?

Words are patterns of physical vibrations propagating through the air, or physical text. — wonderer1

The original claim was:

All of Greene's books....consist of paper and ink. Is that all they are? How does the meaning they convey arise from the combination of ink and paper? — Wayfarer

The point I am making is not that ink and paper aren't essential to the physical nature of the book but that semantic content exists on a different level from its physical form. Words may be encoded as sounds or written letters in various languages, yet the same information can be encoded in entirely different symbolic systems—whether in different languages, Braille, or even Morse code—and still retain its meaning. This demonstrates that semantic content is independent of the specific physical medium in which it is expressed.

A book 'contains meaning' only insofar as it is read and understood by a subject capable of interpreting its content. Furthermore, different readers may interpret the same information in diverse ways, highlighting the subjective and contextual nature of meaning-making. The meaning is not an inherent property of the physical text itself but arises through the interaction between the symbolic representation and the mind of the reader.

So language has a physical aspect, but it can't be accounted for by physical principles alone.

The reason I introduced biosemiotics to the conversation is because a similar principle is operative at every level of organic life. Biosemiotics depicts the operations of cellular life as language-like rather than machine-like. I mentioned it, because it too challenges physicalism on a fundamental level.

The idea that life evolved naturally on the primitive Earth suggests that the first cells came into being by spontaneous chemical reactions, and this is equivalent to saying that there is no fundamental divide between life and matter. This is the chemical paradigm, a view that is very popular today and that is often considered in agreement with the Darwinian paradigm — Marcello Barbieri, What is Information?

That in essence is the materialist view. However the author goes on to say:

but that is not the case. The reason is that natural selection, the cornerstone of Darwinian evolution, does not exist in inanimate matter. In the 1950s and 1960s, furthermore, molecular biology uncovered two fundamental components of life—biological information and the genetic code—that are totally absent in the inorganic world, which means that information is present only in living systems, that chemistry alone is not enough and that a deep divide does exist between life and matter. This is the information paradigm, the idea that ‘life is chemistry plus information’.

That is consistent with Norbert Weiner's oft-quoted aphorism, 'Information is information, not matter or energy. No materialism which does not admit this can survive at the present day.'

Of course I don't expect that to make any sense to anyone so unwilling to consider physicalism charitably as yourself. — wonderer1

Physicalism is a proper methodological principle but philosophical materialism is a different matter.
At issue is the claim that a brain is 'nothing but' atoms, or that life can be understood in solely physical or chemical terms, or that living beings are 'simply' organisations of the elements of the periodic table and no different in kind from inorganic matter. There are other levels of meaning and organisation - not a mysterious 'something else' as any kind of vital spirit or secret sauce, but higher level organisational principles that appear throughout organic life that are not reducible to physics. That is the point of From Physical Causation to Organisms of Meaning. But I don't expect that to make sense to anyone so unwilling to consider challenges to philosophical materialism as yourself.

The semantic elements in your stream of thought are physically detectable. — wonderer1

Do you believe in God, or is that a software glitch?

A book 'contains meaning' only insofar as it is read and understood by a subject capable of interpreting its content. Furthermore, different readers may interpret the same information in diverse ways, highlighting the subjective and contextual nature of meaning-making. — Wayfarer

Of course. Different neural networks will interact with books in different ways. Why would you expect it to be otherwise? Even different LLMs produce their own unique and unpredictable thoughts, and they are not even conscious in the way we naively think of ourselves as being conscious.

At issue is whether this is or is not reducible to physical causation.

By "this" you mean consciousness? We don't even fully understand or definitely know what causation, or anything else, is. We have a "folk" understanding of what we think consciousness is. There is not only a naive realism, but also a naive idealism. How are we going to find out the truth of these matters? Even scientific theories are defeasible.

The point I am making is not that ink and paper aren't essential to the physical nature of the book but that semantic content exists on a different level from its physical form. Words may be encoded as sounds or written letters in various languages, yet the same information can be encoded in entirely different symbolic systems—whether in different languages, Braille, or even Morse code—and still retain its meaning. This demonstrates that semantic content is independent of the specific physical medium in which it is expressed. — Wayfarer

The thing is, your 'point' is a mystification of what is a relatively simple and clear physical picture.

There is no need for a 'different level' for semantic content to exist on. Semantic content is attributed to linguistic media (letters, Braille, Morse code, etc.) by neural nets which have been trained to attribute semantic content to such media. Such attribution of semantic content to linguistic media is a function of the physical state of systems capable of doing such decoding.

A book 'contains meaning' only insofar as it is read and understood by a subject capable of interpreting its content. Furthermore, different readers may interpret the same information in diverse ways, highlighting the subjective and contextual nature of meaning-making. The meaning is not an inherent property of the physical text itself but arises through the interaction between the symbolic representation and the mind of the reader. — Wayfarer

Right. This is completely consistent with the straightforward physical picture outlined above.

So language has a physical aspect, but it can't be accounted for by physical principles alone. — Wayfarer

And yet you rely on LLMs. :roll:

If you actually understand that language has an aspect that can't be accounted for by physical principles, I'd expect you could come up with a way of falsifying any physicalist account of language. That would be a serious philosophical achievement. Go for it!

The thing is, your 'point' is a mystification of what is a relatively simple and clear physical picture. — wonderer1

It is not. It is well-accepted science which your physicalist blinders won't allow you to ackowledge.

There is no need for a 'different level' for semantic content to exist on. Semantic content is attributed to linguistic media (letters, Braille, Morse code, etc.) by neural nets which have been trained to attribute semantic content to such media. — wonderer1

Neural networks which are created by humans to fulfil their requirements according to specifications. There are no such systems existing spontaneously as a consequence of physical causation.

And yet you rely on LLMs — wonderer1

I use them as a reference source and I see no incongruity in so doing. I'm not a Luddite.

I'd expect you could come up with a way of falsifying any physicalist account of language. — wonderer1

What do you mean by physicalism? What are you arguing for? I've presented a couple of sources that call the physicalist view into account, you won't even acknowledge them, so what's the point of continuing?

Perhaps we just don't understand the physical well enough. What's the alternative? Posit the existence of another realm? — Janus

I will circle back to this earler comment, because I think it underlies a lot of what is being said. Objectivity was crucial to the emergence of early modern science, which distinguished it from the intuition-based, introspective theorizing of the medieval and ancient world. So it is not coincidental that the first uses of the word 'objectivity' began to appear in the early 1600s. This emerged alongside Galileo's new physics, and his conceptual division between the primary and secondary qualities of objects - the primary being figure (or shape), size, position, motion, and quantity, while the secondary included color, taste, aroma, and sound. Descartes further entrenched this model with the separation of mind (res cogitans) and body (res extensa), set against the backdrop of a universe devoid of teleology (action for a purpose). Right knowledge becomes the mathematically precise description of data in space-time.

In effect this divides the world into separate realms. There's the physical domain - objective, quantifiable, tractable to empirical analysis - and the subjective domain - the inner world, personal and private, the domain of values. We respect the right of individual conscience and the importance of values but they're not real in the same sense as objective facts. You yourself say this frequently. So you're saying there's the scientific view, maybe it's not perfect, but it's all we have, but to question that is to 'posit the existence of another realm'. And that's because the Cartesian division is implicit in 'the grammar of our worldview'. That's how it has been set up for us. We see the external, material, real world, and the private, ineffable, knowing subject as separated realms.

See these episodes of John Vervaeke, 'Awakening from the Meaning Crisis' for a detailed analysis.

Ep 20 - Galileo and the Death of the Cosmos
21 - Martin Luther and Descartes
22 - Descartes vs Hobbes

I will make one more comment, and then I'm logging out for a time, as I'm going away with my dear other and I've promised not to spend too much time on the forum talking to my 'invisible friends' as she puts it (sometimes through gritted teeth.)

I will conclude for now by making the observation that nothing is 'purely' or 'only' physical. That has been made abundantly clear by physics. It is not an appeal to 'quantum woo', as I've studied the issue closely, from a philosophical perspective. It is beyond dispute that at the most fundamental level, we can no longer conceive of reality in terms of particulate matter, of energetic particles obeying deteministic laws. Determinism went out the window with the uncertainty principle, and it's not going to be revived. Particles are now understood to be excitations of field states. And what field states are is far from obvious.

But nothing about that statement vitiates or calls into question science. I'm in awe of science, technology, computers (where I've made a living for the last two decades as a technical writer) and medicine. It's constantly evolving and endlessly fascinating. What I reject is the leftover view that the world and everything in it can be understood on the basis of physical principles and physical causation.

The reason physics is paradigmatic in modern thought, is because it encapsulates the very idea of scientific certainty and precision. In creating the Cartesian vision, physics excludes whatever can't be described and predicted by the mathematical laws of bodies and forces. But it has to be recalled that all of this rests on three fundamental steps: idealisation (i.e. the 'ideal bodies' 'ideal planes' etc), abstraction (i.e. abstracting away all of those attributes that can't be predicted according to physical principles) and objectification. Because of the immense prestige and success of physical science over the last two centuries, this is extended to serve a paradigm for life and everything it entails. But it cannot be that.

The scientific revolution of the 17th century, which has given rise to such extraordinary progress in the understanding of nature, depended on a crucial limiting step at the start: It depended on subtracting from the physical world as an object of study everything mental – consciousness, meaning, intention or purpose. The physical sciences as they have developed since then describe, with the aid of mathematics, the elements of which the material universe is composed, and the laws governing their behavior in space and time.

We ourselves, as physical organisms, are part of that universe, composed of the same basic elements as everything else, and recent advances in molecular biology have greatly increased our understanding of the physical and chemical basis of life. Since our mental lives evidently depend on our existence as physical organisms, especially on the functioning of our central nervous systems, it seems natural to think that the physical sciences can in principle provide the basis for an explanation of the mental aspects of reality as well — that physics can aspire finally to be a theory of everything.

However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.

So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. Further, since the mental arises through the development of animal organisms, the nature of those organisms cannot be fully understood through the physical sciences alone. Finally, since the long process of biological evolution is responsible for the existence of conscious organisms, and since a purely physical process cannot explain their existence, it follows that biological evolution must be more than just a physical process, and the theory of evolution, if it is to explain the existence of conscious life, must become more than just a physical theory. — Thomas Nagel, The Core of Mind and Cosmos

From this I have formed the view that as soon as life appears then you have the appearance of something which is not reducible to physics or chemistry. Because it is the beginning of the appearance of perspective, and, as argued at the outset, without perspective nothing can be said to exist (see How Time Began with the First Eye Opening.)

And with that, bye for now. :party:

It may not mean much, but I have found your ongoing conversation on this matter very interesting. It's been quite a display of endurance. Ultimately, it seems to be down to whether one finds the arguments convincing or not, as inferences don't always lead us all to the same conclusions.

We don't even fully understand or definitely know what causation, or anything else, is. We have a "folk" understanding of what we think consciousness is. There is not really a naive realism, but also a naive idealism. How are we going to find out the truth of these matters? Even scientific theories are defeasible. — Janus

I think this is sensible. I personally can't rule out idealism, but I have no good reason as yet to accept it as true. But who here actually has any expertise in this matter? Are we just unsophisticated yokels sounding off about ideas we find most appealing emotionally?

I will conclude for now by making the observation that nothing is 'purely' or 'only' physical. That has been made abundantly clear by physics. It is not an appeal to 'quantum woo', as I've studied the issue closely, from a philosophical perspective. It is beyond dispute that at the most fundamental level, we can no longer conceive of reality in terms of particulate matter, of energetic particles obeying deteministic laws. Determinism went out the window with the uncertainty principle, and it's not going to be revived. Particles are now understood to be excitations of field states. And what field states are is far from obvious. — Wayfarer

It's a case well put. But how do we rule out a different approach and model all together? Does it have to be physicalism versus idealsim? Is dualistic thinking all we have to resolve our biggest quesions? I'd be interested to hear more from a rigorous, post-modern perspective assessing the foundational axioms or presuppositions that may be propping up our confusions. And if the world is entirely mind created and contingent, how do we know anything for certain about either metaphysical position?

Philosophy is defined as love of wisdom. Is it wise to simply accumulate knowledge for its own sake? That almost sounds like accumulating money for its own sake. What is the point of knowledge you cannot use? — Janus

I can't imagine you mean this the way I'm taking it. But I don't know how else to take it, so I'll respond to it that way.

Yes, absolutely, knowledge for its own sake. Do you use every bit of knowledge you attain? Do you even try to? Of course not. It's impossible. Have you ever read about something you were not planning to use? I would imagine so. Probably most of the things any of us learn about the topics here. How many of use make a living with such knowledge?

Learning is one of the defining characteristics of our species. The drive to learn is another. We can learn. It's inconceivable that we not bother. All of us not attempt to learn anything that doesn't have a practical purpose?

What's the point of gazing out over the world from the top of a mountain, or the Grand Canyon, or watching an aurora borealis? What's the point of listening to Bach's Brandenburg Concertos or Beethoven's string quartets? What's the point of reading Dune or The Malazan Book of the Fallen? What's the point of Monet, Michaelangelo, or Escher? What's the point of learning?

It's all joy.

When I say "use" I count interest, creativity and joy as uses. I was referring to accumulating factoids for the sake of impressing others or winning arguments. We don't have time in our lives to take in more than the tiniest fraction of the sum of human knowledge, so it's wise to be selective.

As to the question of the nature of consciousness—we have the scientific studies on one hand and the naive "folk" understanding on the other. As to which to rely on, I will choose the former because I don't think intuition is an especially reliable guide to understanding the nature of things. But that's just me—others will make up their own minds, hopefully being as free from confirmation bias as possible.