By "actual thoughts" I meant real-time brain events, not the content of those thoughts. It's very plausible that the thought "2+2 = 4", understood as content or proposition, is timeless, or at least not to be identified with any particular time-based instantiation. But the event of such a thought occurring in my brain is something that happens in time, at a particular T1, since everything at all that happens in the physical world, happens in time. So my question about the Cogito was, Which sort of "thought" is it?

But it'd be an argument against what Sartre is saying, I think, if you could argue that the cogito was no longer active, due to this move, and so existence is thrown back into doubt -- that'd be an interesting skeptical response. — Moliere

Yes, but it does feel like a "move," and I wasn't suggesting it seriously.

So [Sartre on the Cogito] fits in that funny place phenomenology often does -- between metaphysics, but then sort of drifts into psychology. — Moliere

Good observation. I think that philosophers who are hostile to phenomenology want this liminal place to be a mistake, an inability to be clear about what the topic is. A more sympathetic reading, starting with Husserl, is that the distinction between metaphysics and psychology must be put into doubt as a first step toward a new conception of doing philosophy in the first person.

One example where it does create confusion, though, is what I tried to straighten out with @frank, above. He quite reasonably wanted to know why a thought must occur in time, which leads us into the two common meanings of the term "thought." One is psychological, the other metaphysical. And see Frege on psychologism.

"It's very plausible that the thought "2+2 = 4", understood as content or proposition, is timeless, or at least not to be identified with any particular time-based instantiation." :chin: Maybe the thought exists outside of time even though it is co-instantiated by a phenomenal event that is conditioned by time. Thought is noumenal? Thought is direct access linking being-as-it-is and being as-it-appears.

Similarly, the resolution of an appearance by thought is thought contending with the contradictions inherent in its own systematic approach where understanding is the return of thought to itself, self-sameness, being-as-it-is.

From the SEP

"Third, the certainty of the cogito depends on being formulated in terms of cogitatio – i.e., my thinking, or awareness/consciousness more generally. Any mode of thinking is sufficient, including doubting, affirming, denying, willing, understanding, imagining, and so on (cf. Med. 2, AT 7:28). My bodily activities, however, are insufficient. For instance, it’s no good to reason that “I exist, since I am walking,” because methodical doubt calls into question the existence of my legs. Maybe I’m just dreaming that I have legs. A simple revision, such as “I exist, since it seems I’m walking,” restores the anti-sceptical potency (cf. Replies 5, AT 7:352; Prin. 1:9)." — SEP

Also:

"Second, a present tense formulation is essential to the certainty of the cogito. It’s no good to reason that “I existed last Tuesday, since I recall that I was thinking on that day.” For all I know, I’m now merely dreaming about that occasion. Nor does it work to reason that “I’ll continue to exist, since I’m now thinking.” As the meditator remarks, “it could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I should totally cease to exist” (Med. 2, AT 7:27, CSM 2:18). The privileged certainty of the cogito is grounded in the “manifest contradiction” (AT 7:36, CSM 2:25) of trying to think away my present thinking." — SEP

Descartes sort of invented the idea of nerves because through dissecting bodies, he saw the "strings" that go from the central nervous system out to the muscles. He thought that these strings are plucked in some way so that the body moves like a puppet. He also famously concluded that the soul must be in the pineal gland. I think it's pretty clear from the Meditations that he isn't defining "thought" as an event in the brain, though. It's more of a first person thing.

I think it's pretty clear from the Meditations that he isn't defining "thought" as an event in the brain, though. It's more of a first person thing. — frank

Fair enough, but is the first-person thing an event that happens from T1 - Tn?

"So my question about the Cogito was, Which sort of "thought" is it?"

For Descartes it may only be the former, for Sartre it may be both. Though for Sartre I would say that the latter is "cogito" only in a way that is mediate; that is, present but only through phenomenal "glasses." Not to say that such glasses are not needed for the rendering of the phenomenal in terms of thought (it (the phenomenal realm) contains a kind of solution to the problem that it (the phenomenal) posed in the first place when consciousness encountered otherness (read: the other, opposition, negation of self) and the phenomenal became "a reality" to consciousness.

In other words, when thought discovers someone as-they-are through phenomenal encounter, the phenomenal collapses into noumenality. But this is the same as the noumenal encountering the noumenal.

Fair enough, but is the first-person thing an event that happens from T1 - Tn? — J

The answer to that depends on your hinge propositions. If you believe time is an illusion and the soul resides in eternity, then you would say no.

Is Sartre worth reading? I've only ever read his novel Nausea, which was really good.

I find his phenomenology (the bits I've read) dubious, but you've quite likely read more than me.

Your answers are interesting because they help me realize that I'm not speaking precisely enough. Sorry. I wasn't asking about the 1st person thing/soul as an entity in itself (or not, as the case may be), but rather the experience it undergoes when it has a thought, which you said you believed Descartes was defining as a "1st-person thing." That was what I was asking about when I asked if this 1st-person thing, aka thought, occurred during a specifiable time period. The soul as such . . . of course, that depends.

Become aware now of the sights and sounds around you. Do you detect a beginning or ending to the experience?

Is Sartre worth reading? — Manuel

He would not be on my shortlist. If someone is interested, however, I would recommend Existentialism is a Humanism

In this work he says:

... there are two kinds of existentialists. There are, on the one hand, the Christians, amongst whom I shall name Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel, both professed Catholics; and on the other the existential atheists, amongst whom we must place Heidegger as well as the French existentialists and myself. What they have in common is simply the fact that they believe that existence comes before essence – or, if you will, that we must begin from the subjective.

Yes.

Yes. — J

Really? That's wild. What's that like?

Well, I open my eyes and see a bird, and think, "Huh, a bird" and then I close them and the experience has ended.

I know this isn't what you mean, but it's what I mean when I ask about a temporal slot for a particular thought, understood not psychologically as a brain event but some other way. Brain or no brain, isn't it still an event in time?

Well, I open my eyes and see a bird, and think, "Huh, a bird" and then I close them and the experience has ended. — J

Like a curtain coming down. You just need some credits rolling. :grin:

I know this isn't what you mean, but it's what I mean when I ask about a temporal slot for a particular thought, understood not psychologically as a brain event but some other way. Brain or no brain, isn't it still an event in time? — J

Yes, probably. You're kind of stomping all over the existentialism with your intellectual observations, tho.

I find foundationalism problematic, and so Descartes problematic on this point.

Subjectivity comes up too often for me to think the cogito, or the philosophical subject/self, is a mistake to attempt to articulate, though. "What is it that makes an individual what they are?" strikes me as a perfectly sensible question, and even Descartes' desire for certainty -- given all the falsehoods he now knows he's believed -- makes a good deal of sense to all of us. It's nice to be certain.

But I see no reason to start with methodical doubt to find certain propositions -- and even if I were to begin with the cogito I'd still build towards a world with knowledge and such that's part of it. Or at least I'd like those things to be addressed in a given philosophy.

Descartes gets out of the solipsistic hole through God, and you have no problem with admitting that all knowledge is faith-based, except perhaps for the certain knowledge of your own existence when thinking the thought "I think". Do you follow Descartes in putting God into the rational frame, though? That's what I think is missed with Descartes, frequently: he's not a skeptic, but a Rationalist who, through a priori reasoning -- due to the power of Reason in Man, to link this to our narrative of the Enlightenment -- deduces the foundations of knowledge. So, given his arguments -- at face value -- he knows God exists, rather than it being faith-based.

How does faith get us out of the cogito?

It’s material composition, whatever it may be. — Mww

I vote for time being a necessary condition for the cogito to make sense of anything thought about, which is the same as any thought in general, which is the same as thought itself. I am, after all, nothing but my thoughts. — Mww

Am I to infer that the cogito's material composition is thought, then? So when I think about the cogito the object of my thought is thought and the composition of the thought thinking about thought is thought.

Wouldn't this analysis apply to the objects thought about, no matter what? Is the material composition of what is thought about itself always thought, and Time is what seperates out the object thought about from the thought which is directed towards the object?

The notion of past, future and therefore time itself, would be necessary regarding that which I think about, iff it is the case thoughts are always and only singular and successive. — Mww

Also, I'm not sure I'd sign up for the notion that thoughts are always and only singular and successive, which would put me in trouble.

Yes, but it does feel like a "move," and I wasn't suggesting it seriously. — J

Heh. I don't mind things that feel like "moves" -- they all feel like that, really! It's just which move feels right to the reader which chooses what Descartes really meant. :D

In general I like the skeptical hypotheses, so I'd be open to an argument like that. I'm not fully committed to the notion that there even is a self -- so that would be like a nihilism of the cogito -- but it comes up often enough that I think worth thinking about.

Good observation. I think that philosophers who are hostile to phenomenology want this liminal place to be a mistake, an inability to be clear about what the topic is. A more sympathetic reading, starting with Husserl, is that the distinction between metaphysics and psychology must be put into doubt as a first step toward a new conception of doing philosophy in the first person. — J

Yeah. I actually like the move, but because some of it is obscure or has multiple interpretations or just isn't mathematical enough to taste it's easier to designate that side of philosophy as meaningless wankers cosplaying as sages while saying nothing but poetic drivel** while the serious logicians clarify what we utilize everyday and so cannot help but be really right -- language and science and the language of science and the logic that governs such talk.

Though, to be real, it was always about competition over employment. Philosophy isn't given enough budget to fund a whole two different ways of doing it.
:D

One example where it does create confusion, though, is what I tried to straighten out with frank, above. He quite reasonably wanted to know why a thought must occur in time, which leads us into the two common meanings of the term "thought." One is psychological, the other metaphysical. And see Frege on psychologism.

Yeah there's a lot of confusion at first, but I think that's part of what makes it philosophy. Eventually there's a certain clarity even while there are more than one way to interpret the texts.

What the other side says about the Clear Hard Thinkers is that they are clearly lazy navel gazers because they obsess over language and refuse to learn even 2 different languages**.

** Though I roast both because I find that distinction hilarious, and really probably not so relevant now so the roast shouldn't even sting.

And see Frege on psychologism. — J

I'd be interested in hearing more from you on this comment. (I've read some of Husserl's anti-psychologist arguments and found them amenable, but not Frege's)

To be clear on my end -- by the cogito, even if there is a psychological theory of it, I explicitly mean a philosophical theory. (For some there's no distinction, but for thems that there is one -- pick the philosophy side)

I don't see anything wrong with saying an experience ends. Some experiences are episodic.

But I don't think the cogito, even with the structure of temporality -- even though consciousness is being described -- is even at the level of an individuals' experience (at least in the story so far). The structure of reflection is, but the relationship between the general structure of reflection and even a being-for-itself -- which I'd read as still a general category rather than an individual, only more specific than simply being-for-itself -- isn't specified yet. And the individual hasn't even shown up on the scene.

So I'd say that our personal reflections, while we'll be using them to relate to the phenomenological description, are not themselves yet relevant. They are "too close", as it were.

Yes, probably. You're kind of stomping all over the existentialism with your intellectual observations, tho. — frank

I'd disagree here. The flow of time is being presented in a manner which is a flow, but the various existential writers are attempting to be very precise about their topics in the exact way that philosophers have always done -- they have their own particular meanings and such, but it's still very intellectual.

How does faith get us out of the cogito? — Moliere

I'm not sure I understand what you're asking. I was saying faith gets us out of solipsism, which is the net result of the Cartesian method of complete skepticism. The cogito leaves us with just knowing that the single mind of the single doubter is all that exists. To get beyond that, you have to have faith. That's what Descartes indicated by his reliance upon God.

But maybe I didn't fully understand your question.

I'm just going to state my confusion and see where that takes us instead of trying to rephrase the question:

I'm tempted by the exegetical hole again -- I want to at least do a side-by-side interpretation with yours.

I see what you're saying as a reasonable interpretation; and to restate it in my own words to see if I have it right: the ontological argument is thrown in there but given its weakness to persuade those who are not already convinced this indicates that Descartes was relying on God. (At least, that seems like something you could say to excuse why the argument is in the text on reasonable grounds)

The interpretation I'm relying upon is to treat the Meditations at its face value -- and at its face value we start with doubt and, through the power of Man's Reason alone, find true and certain knowledge of the self, God, and the world.

So I see Descartes as claiming not faith but knowledge of God's existence -- and this need not even counter faith. Especially at the time scientists and theologians weren't far apart. In a way I'm trying to bring out "the spirit of the times" by focusing on the prima facie meaning to put Descartes in the context of the Enlightenment.

This I think you'd find amenable because of your reliance on Kant. I see a strong through-line to Kant here where a disagreement is clearly spelled out (though in the abstract).

But Kant wouldn't say that knowledge requires faith, either. So I'm left wondering how to interpret you with respect to these two interpretations of the prima facie Descartes and Kant.

Sorry. My fault. I don’t want to work that hard unpacking your posts.

No apology needed, you did nothing wrong. You're good!

but it's still very intellectual. — Moliere

I don't think so. Kierkegaard is the beginning of existentialism. His point was that the the more fully you become lost in the landscape of the intellect, the more disconnected and alienated you'll be from the knowledge that's most direct and intimate: the knowledge of what it feels like to be alive.

I don't know if you saw my SEP quotes, but Descartes also points to this as what he meant by "cogito": he is talking about awareness, which is only sometimes of ideas.

I don't think so. Kierkegaard is the beginning of existentialism. His point was that the the more fully you become lost in the landscape of the intellect, the more disconnected and alienated you'll be from the knowledge that's most direct and intimate: the knowledge of what it feels like to be alive. — frank

Yeah, but Kierkegaard also took up several writing personas to demonstrate a kaleidoscope of thoughts (one I do not claim to understand). Nietzsche wrote a parody of the Bible to expand on original philosophical concepts. These aren't exactly acts of becoming lost in what it feels like to be alive.

Or, more properly, they are -- but they are also acts of intellect.

I don't know if you saw my SEP quotes, but Descartes also points to this as what he meant by "cogito": he is talking about awareness, which is only sometimes of ideas. — frank

I've now read them, and am including them here for reference in the conversation -- but I'm not sure what I've said that disagrees with them.

"Third, the certainty of the cogito depends on being formulated in terms of cogitatio – i.e., my thinking, or awareness/consciousness more generally. Any mode of thinking is sufficient, including doubting, affirming, denying, willing, understanding, imagining, and so on (cf. Med. 2, AT 7:28). My bodily activities, however, are insufficient. For instance, it’s no good to reason that “I exist, since I am walking,” because methodical doubt calls into question the existence of my legs. Maybe I’m just dreaming that I have legs. A simple revision, such as “I exist, since it seems I’m walking,” restores the anti-sceptical potency (cf. Replies 5, AT 7:352; Prin. 1:9)."
— SEP

Also:

"Second, a present tense formulation is essential to the certainty of the cogito. It’s no good to reason that “I existed last Tuesday, since I recall that I was thinking on that day.” For all I know, I’m now merely dreaming about that occasion. Nor does it work to reason that “I’ll continue to exist, since I’m now thinking.” As the meditator remarks, “it could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I should totally cease to exist” (Med. 2, AT 7:27, CSM 2:18). The privileged certainty of the cogito is grounded in the “manifest contradiction” (AT 7:36, CSM 2:25) of trying to think away my present thinking."
— SEP — frank

Or, more properly, they are -- but they are also acts of intellect. — Moliere

Yea. Existentialists tell you to pay attention to your first person experience, but they do it in an intellectual way. Kind of contradictory. :grin:

Some additional thoughts on why Kant is relevant to the question of the cogito, and at least Sartre.

The ontological argument is one of the big targets of Kant's epistemology. I'd say the ontological argument Kant criticizes is more Leibniz's version than Descartes, but close enough to count for concepts.

Broad strokes here but with respect to the cogito the differences that pop out to me for each thinker are:

Descartes: existence is a genuine predicate of logic.
Kant: Existence is not a genuine predicate of logic, but is given.
Sartre: The meaning of being is different from what either Descartes or Kant are talking about, and Existence precedes essence. Descartes' reflection is correct, and there's more apodeictic knowledge that comes with it.

Interesting to note, at least to me, is how Kant's cogito is de-emphasized from Descartes', which makes a kind of sense since he's trying to protect the belief in the immortality in the soul from scientific knowledge -- limiting knowledge to make room for faith.

Whereas Sartre has no problem denying such things. Though, simultaneously, isn't coming from a strictly scientific perspective either.

Sartre: The meaning of being is different from what either Descartes or Kant are talking about, and Existence precedes essence. — Moliere

With Descartes, existence and essence are the same. For Sartre there is a divide between the two, hence our situation as humans. Maybe everything is supernatural for Descartes, while Sartre keeps it as an illusion out of distance, focusing on material problems

Maybe everything is supernatural for Descartes, while Sartre keeps it as an illusion out of distance, focusing on material problems — Gregory

I'd say that neither believe in the supernatural -- and even if we mean "supernatural" in the sense of "outside of nature" Descartes still believes in nature -- res extensa is just as real as res cogitans, and while God may sit outside of nature and we have knowledge of his existence nature still exists.

And, on the other hand, I believe some would be inclined to call Sartre's notion of being-for-itself, and its radical freedom, a superstition in the modern, scientistic use of that term.

Though I believe both are doing philosophy in the sense that they're appealing to reason.