Yes. I like that view, it's a spin on one of Aristotle's proofs of God. — frank

But Sartre doesn't like it.

In other words, we aren't using any writings of Descartes as the limit to the discussion. — frank

Sartre references Descartes and the infinitesimal instant. The passage from Descartes is about that. Sartre says:

... the cogito, must not be limited to the infinitesimal instant. Moreover this conclusion could be drawn from the fact that thought is an act which engages the past and shapes it outline by the future. — Being and Nothingness, p 156

In other words, Sartre is saying that thought is not a series of discreet infinitesimal instants. The thinker, the cogito, according to Descartes essentially a thinking thing and not simply a thing that thinks, is then not a series of discreet moments created anew .

An infinitesimal is part of a continuum, though. It involves the idea of a limit. I don't think Descartes would have used that idea.

I'm still in the middle of reading it, but yeah the in-itself is not who I am but a kind of facticity (or, at least, historicity -- I'm thinking these things are on the same plane, ie. the in-itself, but I could turn out wrong): the familiar objects of the world but without any synthetic relation which the for-itself brings (though there's a twist, here, because consciousness, the for-itself, is nothing). The for-itself brings its past along but the speaking of my past as an event that I partake in is to make of myself an in-itself, as I understand it.

I'm cool with introducing jargon and technicalities and revisiting these themes. In large part I've been looking for a good quote for entry to force myself to go back over the text from where I'm at and respond to various objections people might bring up with what I've read so far of the text to sort of solidify where I'm at.

I just wanted to avoid them so that the barrier to entry was relatively low.

My line of thinking here is if we know something, then at least in that respect we are not deceived. I think the change in outcomes with respect to the thought experiment has to do with emphasizing doubt over certainty -- rather than looking for a certainty that I cannot doubt, and so cannot be decieved by even the evil demon the process of looking for certitude requires I already know things that are uncertain.

To kind of do an inversion here on that line: In some sense we could say that if we accept the certitude of the cogito then we must also accept the certitude of the before-after, and so the self is not this indivisible point-particle that thinks. — Moliere

Is everyone on the same page that Descartes gives an argument for his existence from doubt? (link) Some, like , seem to be missing this. The "shift from certainty to doubt" is not Sartre, it is Descartes, and it is not a shift from certainty so much as an avenue to certainty.

Taking Descartes at face value in the Meditations we end with knowledge of self, God, and world. So the doubt is surely methodical rather than radical. — Moliere

But think about why Descartes responded so vehemently to Gassendi when Gassendi made a similar claim. What you are saying is, "Descartes' wrangling with skepticism wasn't real; it was just a charade." If it wasn't real, if Descartes did not really descend into skepticism and really come out, then his meditation is completely worthless. "Descartes came back up with knowledge, therefore he never seriously entertained skepticism," is a really problematic way to assess Descartes' meditation, and Descartes explicitly rejects this problematic/cynical reading.

Some commentators insist that it does, but I'd have to go on an expedition to find those sources. :smile: — frank

My thinking is that the text and some exegesis is there to give us a little something more to dig into than our own thoughts, but I do mean to ask the question about what it is I or we think about the cogito -- what is it we can infer from stating "I think"? Can you infer "I am" by thinking "I think"?

But I don't know how to interpret Descartes as getting stuck on the evil demon since he moves past the evil demon in the meditations. It seems to me that this is a temptation for modern readers because the solution isn't persuasive to us but the problem, as stated, is.

But Descartes didn't get stuck there.

Well, given that Sartre is talking about radical doubt as being given to us only through time reference (something like Kant's intuitions I feel) there is nothing other to hang experience off of is there?

'Rely' is probably the sticky word here. Sartre likes to make words less like words. — I like sushi

Skepticism is something I'm bringing in to thinking about the subject, or the cogito, but Sartre is not a skeptic.

I think it's correct to assume that we cannot understand the world without reference to time, and so the Cogito must be understood within the context of time.

However, that does not mean that the Cogito proves that time exists, nor does it suggest that Descartes failed in his attempt to be infinitely skeptical by assuming the existence of time. It only means that an understanding of the world is impossible without placing events within time.

This approach I'm arguing is consistent with Kant's view that time does not necessarily exist outside humans because it is a form of intuition necessary for our perception of reality, but not an inherent property of the world itself. — Hanover

The cogito in Kant is interesting since it's just an abstract appendage to every assertion that one could possibly make. It refers to the transcendental ego -- a necessary feature of any assertion prior even to being baptized in the schematism of time.

I think the phenomenological approach gets by Kant's objections (well... not really objections, since the order of argument started with Kant and a lot of the ideas Kant started are "baked in" to phenomenology as a concern. Perhaps better to sya "gets around Kant's conceptions"). Using Chalmer's idea of the philosophy room: In some sense since we're in the phenomenology room when Kant shows up we can point him down the hallway towards the noumenology room where his points will stand. But since we're only speaking of the phenomena we can leave the things-in-themselves and the various noumena behind and underneath the phenomena, forever locked away.

Yeh. Hopefully the above clarified a bit, but to reiterate -- I'm the one bringing in the notion of the skeptic to the notion of the subject by way of Descartes and Sartre. By my understanding, to go towards exegesis (but I'm trying to not fall into a sandpit of exegesis), neither of them are skeptics at all.

Descartes’ mistake: the subject isn’t as much a different substance than the object, as it is differently conditioned than an object. — Mww

What is the substance of the object (and, thereby, the subject by your sentence)? And what is this different conditioning?

Yes! It might take us too far astray, but the notions of continuity are actually deeply related -- the quote here is in the third section on temporality, but the first section on temporality references a definition of mathematical continuity proposed by Poincare as a basis for understanding his ideas about consciousness. He requires a being which is what it is not and is not what it is as its very
being, and he states Poincare's definition as "a=b, b=c, a÷c" -- when I did the dig, because I had no idea what he was on about, what I found was that it's better to read "a÷c" as "a divides from c"; this got along with another rendition of Poincare's definition which made more sense to me: "a=b, b=c, a<c" (where a, b, and c are infinitesimals, which from what could see would be why it's not so popular nowadays since infinitesimals aren't really used anymore, from what I saw)

That "flow" from the past towards the future with a nothing that divides the two as the present is very much what he's getting at rather than a continuous series of instants.

Is everyone on the same page that Descartes gives an argument for his existence from doubt? (link) Some, like ↪frank, seem to be missing this. The "shift from certainty to doubt" is not Sartre, it is Descartes, and it is not a shift from certainty so much as an avenue to certainty. — Leontiskos

By "Shift from certainty to doubt" I mean that Sartre is asking what would remain of doubt if we were only an instant, whereas for Descartes the instant in which one speaks to themself the cogito that is a certainty that even an evil demon could not deceive. Descartes uses doubt, and his doubt is even a genuine exploration, but he's on a search for certainty. Whereas Sartre is trying to explicate the metaphysical structures of a being which can lie to itself, or find itself in bad faith. How is it possible for this seemingly singular unity which flows through time, that seems transparent to itself, can lie to itself? So he focuses on the necessities of doubt in order to divide up the cogito into the tripartite division of time.

But think about why Descartes responded so vehemently to Gassendi when Gassendi made a similar claim. What you are saying is, "Descartes' wrangling with skepticism wasn't real; it was just a charade." If it wasn't real, if Descartes did not really descend into skepticism and really come out, then his meditation is completely worthless. "Descartes came back up with knowledge, therefore he never seriously entertained skepticism," is a really problematic way to assess Descartes' meditation, and Descartes explicitly rejects this problematic/cynical reading. — Leontiskos

Because Gassendi was passing over the important part to his argument. I'm not saying that Descartes' methodological decision is a charade, only that if we keep reading the meditations we eventually get out of skeptical doubt and find knowledge.

That "flow" from the past towards the future with a nothing that divides the two as the present is very much what he's getting at rather than a continuous series of instants. — Moliere

I don't want to sidetrack the thread, but Descartes claim of life being divided into separate independent moments seems suspect to me, especially given his claim about the mind or soul being indivisible and immortal. I think it has something to do with his defense against accusations of atheism.

Fair. Yeah, we can do a whole thread on Descartes, and that's already been done too. I realize there's a lot to Cartesian interpretation which I'm fine with bringing in to the question, I just don't want to get bogged down in arguing what Descartes really meant is all.

So I'd be more than happy to grant that Descartes may escape this charge that Sartre is bringing up, when we consider the whole of his work. I think that all the greats are like this when they speak about one another: We can choose one or the other in defending them because they're just that rich of thinkers.

But with something as... airy?... as the philosophical subject I want something to grasp onto in thinking out the concept.

I think, generally speaking, the trap of skepticism which these thoughts can inspire is worth skipping over, but I'm hopping in and just looking at the dimensions of it. Why is this temptation here? What brings people to the Inn of Solipsism as they travel the philosophy road?

:point: an avenue to certainty — Leontiskos

Even the instantaneous cogito? — Moliere

I don't believe there is any instantaneous cogito.

One thing I can infer from thinking "I think" is that I think.

So if I think then I think.

Indubitability is the easy thing to attack, I think, but in some ways this is to give into the Cartesian impulse -- to look for a certain foundation. So it is easy to point out that just because I think "I think" that it does not follow that "I am" in some kind of logically deductive fashion. It's just something that makes sense: in order for me to do I must be.

The part that doesn't follow from all this is that the "I think" refers to the same "I" as the "I am": in the context of the meditations it makes sense because we're presented with a story of a man who goes to his desk and thinks a few things until he gets tired, then comes back the next time to push his thoughts further. But in the context of Being and Nothingness it doesn't immediately follow because the "I think" is the in-itself, whereas the "I am" is the for-itself. (there's no reliance upon "clear and distinct ideas")

Now it seems apparent to me that Descartes and Sartre don't get lost in the cogito, but rather see certain things as equally indubitable or conceptually interdependent -- the turning point for Descartes, as you hinted at @frank, is God -- going further into the Meditation 3:

Wherefore there only Remains the Idea of a God, wherein I must consider whether there be not something included, which cannot possibly have its original from me. By the word God, I mean a[44] certain Infinite Substance, Independent, Omniscient, Almighty, by whom both I my self, and every thing else that is (if any thing do Actualy exist) was created. All which Attributes are of such an high nature, that the more attentively I consider them, the less I conceive my self possible to be the Author of these notions.

From what therefore has been said I must conclude that there is a God; for tho the Idea of substance may arise in me, because that I my self am a substance, yet I could not have the Idea of an Infinite substance (seeing I my self am finite) unless it proceeded from a substance which is really Infinite.

But I don't see it as magical or faith-based -- it seems to follow from the arguments presented.

Though if we're inclined to believe that being cannot be derived, but must be given, then we'd say that Descartes' argument, more or less, is the ontological argument and since existence is not a predicate it does not follow that the idea of infinity, which is not in me, can only come from God.

But having a benevolent God is how I understand we begin to get out of the solipsistic experiment where all that we are is a thinking thing (and not even our body), based upon the method of doubt.

****

It makes me think that the cogito in Sartre does not rely upon ourselves as a thinking thing: If we remove ourselves as a substance which thinks (and is not extended) then there is nothing for the "I think" to refer to -- though "I am" remains true, it's not through the indubitability of the cogito that we come to this. Rather, given that it's phenomenology, existence isn't even attempted to be proven: rather "the things themselves" are described as they are in the phenomenonal capacity


****

A point of contention with Kant here @Hanover is Sarte's notion that Being-in-itself is transphenomenal; but there isn't any of the arguments which Kant tries to bring to bear on separating the noumenal from the phenomenal, and usually if something "has being" then it exists. But with the phenomenological turn the meaning of being is in question, and even non-being has its own being such that when Pierre is not in the room then that absence still has being.

We must understand that this being is no other than the transphenomenal being of phenomena and not a noumenal being which is hidden behind them. Itis the being of this table, of this package of tobacco, of the lamp, more generally the being of the world which is implied by consciousness. It requires simply that the being of that which appears does
not exist only in so far as it appears. The transphenomenal being of what
exists for consciousness is itself in itself. — B&N, lxii

So being is transphenomenal, but he's still relying upon the intuitive move that Kant makes -- he just includes time within phenomena, even though being-for-itself is actively synthesizing being-in-itself. The cogito is respected, it's just given more dimensions than a point-like certainty or than a formal "I think..." which can be appended to any judgment.

I suppose I'm more persuaded by Descartes argument that in the moment of thinking "I think" that seems an indubitable proposition even though I'm thinking the cogito requires more than solipsism, or perhaps invokes more.

In some way the repetition of "I think" allows for our bodies to be entirely different from what we experience, as well as the world, but the proposition of thinking leads to the indubitability of my own existence. I'd go that far with Descartes.

No. It seems as though there is something more to it than the solipsism Descartes allowed in his analysis on the cogito. I think that one can allow skepticism about things like God's intention or even the Will itself. — Shawn

I'm not following how your justifications justify "no" -- I'd almost think you were saying the opposite, even. I've given it a bit to think over but I'm afraid I'm still scratching my head.

(I'm not sure if I'm right to equate pre-reflexion with being-as-such).

An instantaneous cogito implies the structure of doubt, that is, suspension of judgment. But the cogito is committed to more than mere suspension of judgement; it is by necessity interwoven within a time "architecture."

The architecture of doubt is directly mirroring the architecture of the cogito itself, in time, but as a negation.

This architecture is pre-ontological in the sense of not yet truly ontological. That is, it is prior to the formulation of an ontology. The movement from pre-ontological knowing, the cogito, to a pre-reflexive ontology of being-as-such (that is to actually study being), requires transcendence of the cogito, where "doubt" is understood as just the negation of the cogito, ego.

It may be strange for pre-reflective awareness to be after the cogito's pre-ontological mode, but this is just the path of consciousness. Whereas pre-reflection is wholly prior to the cogito, in consciousness it comes after, as it is from the perspective of the negation of the ego that pre-reflection is attainable in a self-conscious way. This is why the saying "I think, therefore I am" is concluded after Descartes' "doubt" meditation. The saying is not the culmination of cogito but its transcendence. — NotAristotle

Can you unpack that more? I've read over a few times and find myself confused lol.

Having said something, one has expressed a distinction that makes a difference.

Descartes' "I exist" is, at best, a tautology; he concludes only what his conclusion already necessarily presupposes. Saying "I exist", therefore, doesn't actually say anything.

Cotard's "I do not exist", a delusion, is a pathology; otherwise, as a statement (rather than a feeling) it's a performative contradiction, which says nothing. — 180 Proof

Do you think anything can be inferred from the cogito, whatsoever? Or is it entirely different from the philosophical subject, or are they one and the same and yet meaningless tautology?

in the context of the meditations it makes sense because we're presented with a story of a man who goes to his desk and thinks a few things until he gets tired, then comes back the next time to push his thoughts further. But in the context of Being and Nothingness it doesn't immediately follow because the "I think" is the in-itself, whereas the "I am" is the for-itself. — Moliere

My question for both Descartes and Sartre is this: Are you offering a psychological story -- that is, a story about actual thoughts -- in which case it must indeed occur in time? Or is the "moment" of the Cogito pointing to a different mode of understanding? I hesitate to use the word "transcendental" because Descartes probably wouldn't know how to respond, and Sartre had his own very special understanding of transcendentality in phenomenology. So I'm struggling for words here. What I'm groping toward is the idea that the indubitability of the Cogito doesn't rest on any account that involves time at all. Suppose we all agreed that it's impossible to experience a present moment. I think many psychologists believe this; it's a version of the Achilles-and-tortoise problem. Would that mean that the Cogito is no longer operative? That, since it doesn't report an actual experience, my existence is thrown back into doubt? That doesn't sound right. I dunno . . . pardon me if this is too murky for response.

Does Sartre say that the for-itself is an object of experience, in addition to being the ground for the possibility of experience? I can't remember.

Are you offering a psychological story -- that is, a story about actual thoughts -- in which case it must indeed occur in time? — J

Why?

- :up:

My question for both Descartes and Sartre is this: Are you offering a psychological story -- that is, a story about actual thoughts -- in which case it must indeed occur in time? Or is the "moment" of the Cogito pointing to a different mode of understanding? — J

I can answer better for Sartre since that's what I'm more mired in at the moment:
tl;dr -- no.

Extended: his is not a psychological story in the sense that he rejects reducing philosophy to psychology and he is pursuing philosophy, and in particular, metaphysics. So knowledge isn't as much the focus, though Sartre relies upon a notion of knowledge (that I'm told is, of course, unique to him -- why make it easy?)

For Sartre the cogito is referring to the three ekstases, which I'm gathering is the past, the present, the future -- but in metaphysical speak. To practice the lingo: I think the cogito temporalizes itself in all three ekstases in any rendition of the cogito. I think therefore I was, am, and will be, and these are not discrete one from another but rather I carry my past into my present towards a future each of which is divided by a nothing.


:D

I hesitate to use the word "transcendental" because Descartes probably wouldn't know how to respond, and Sartre had his own very special understanding of transcendentality in phenomenology. So I'm struggling for words here. What I'm groping toward is the idea that the indubitability of the Cogito doesn't rest on any account that involves time at all. Suppose we all agreed that it's impossible to experience a present moment. I think many psychologists believe this; it's a version of the Achilles-and-tortoise problem. Would that mean that the Cogito is no longer operative? That, since it doesn't report an actual experience, my existence is thrown back into doubt? That doesn't sound right. I dunno . . . pardon me if this is too murky for response. — J

Not too murky at all. This is exactly the sort of thing I'm looking for.

I'm struggling with words too -- it's part of why I've been looking for passages -- to force myself to attempt to explain some of these things to others as a "check" that even I'm understanding my own interpretation as I read :D

I think the cogito would still be operative, it only implies more than the singular indubitability which Descartes rested on -- if we accept the cogito, so I'm gathering Sartre to be saying, then we have all three of the ekstases which are metaphysically equal to the objects which they are about.

But it'd be an argument against what Sartre is saying, I think, if you could argue that the cogito was no longer active, due to this move, and so existence is thrown back into doubt -- that'd be an interesting skeptical response.

Does Sartre say that the for-itself is an object of experience, in addition to being the ground for the possibility of experience? I can't remember. — J

No expertise here, just reading it right now. The for-itself is consciousness, and the thing which makes consciousness what it is is that it is about the in-itself. The in-itself is what it is, and the for-itself is what it is not. The for-itself/in-itself are both modifications of Being as such, so they are written Being-for-itself and Being-in-itself in the English translation. That's part of the puzzle he's working through.

No ground for the possibility of experience type argument seems to be going on here -- that'd put him squarely back into the comprehension of being as a given existent, rather than the expanded notion of being which phenomenology relies upon (or, perhaps, merely chases).

So the in-itself is the object of experience, and the for-itself is about those objects, and the cogito secures being-for-itself, being-in-itself, and the three ekstases through which being-for-itself temporalizes itself.

Back to your question on psychology, though: He starts in metaphysics but the part I'm reading now is dealing with questions of how these metaphysical concepts relate to a very highly abstract psychology. So it fits in that funny place phenomenology often does -- between metaphysics, but then sort of drifts into psychology. What I really like on this front, however, is it gives a solid theoretical foundation for rejecting Freudian analysis -- the id/ego-superego are the in-itself, and it's the psychologist who is crafting this in-itself without access to the for-itself except through their own for-itself.

Do you think anything can be inferred from the cogito, whatsoever? Or is it entirely different from the philosophical subject, or are they one and the same and yet meaningless tautology? — Moliere

No. Yes. Re: the last sentence of my post that you left out of the quote:

In other words, the latter [pathology] cannot be said and the former [tautology] need not be said: neither expresses a distinction that makes a[n ontological] difference. — 180 Proof

Do you think anything can be inferred from the cogito, whatsoever — Moliere

A reasonable inference is that God is necessary in order to avoid solipsism.

That seems to be the larger argument he was making.

The cogito may be thought of as pre-ontological insofar as it is not a study of being-as-such and so lacks ontological dimensionality. Cogito is undetached thinking; it is thinking that has not yet thought itself; it is thought qua thought. It is un-transcendent. This is the mode of being called being-in-itself.

Cogito is still temporal but not understood as temporal; it merely resides within the architecture of temporality; only the process of doubt, a process of negation of cogito (ego) discloses the cogito by standing apart from itself; in other words, from the hill of certainty that has been climbed by “doubt” the cogito sees itself in a separate moment, and from that vantage point has a grasp of itself in time. Similarly, the “doubting” which is again temporal and is the negative mirror of cogito is engrained in this process.

Meanwhile, what is the conclusion of methodological doubt? It is being itself; “therefore, I am.” The assertion is contentless and that being the case it is also pre-reflective; unmediated awareness. And yet, it is an ontological claim; and in that regard it is full of content though perhaps it is undescriptive (being, but what is being?). The “I am” claim is the voice given to being by being itself; self consciousness.

And, the being there posited is instrumental. Not only is being in a sense externalized from itself, but it is instrumentalized as a means for acquiring knowledge; it is foundational. So, being is no longer just being-in-itself, but has become being-for-itself. Both in the sense of self-consciousness and in the sense of it’s use for itself. That’s what I mean by saying that “I think therefore I am” is not the culmination of cogito qua cogito but of the transcendence of itself viz. the externalization of being through the process of “doubting.” Thinking that thinks itself.

Sartre’s critique of Descartes is critique-as-exposition. That is, Satre critiques Descartes not by contradicting what Descartes said, but by saying what Descartes left unsaid.

Here are some of your quotes that I think are consistent and apropos to my remarks.

One thing I can infer from thinking "I think" is that I think. — Moliere

because I think "I think" that it does not follow that "I am" in some kind of logically deductive fashion. It's just something that makes sense: in order for me to do I must be. — Moliere

Sartre does not rely upon ourselves as a thinking thing: If we remove ourselves as a substance which thinks (and is not extended) then there is nothing for the "I think" to refer to -- though "I am" remains true, it's not through the indubitability of the cogito that we come to this. — Moliere

Whereas Sartre is trying to explicate the metaphysical structures of a being which can lie to itself, or find itself in bad faith. — Moliere

But imagine we could derive something.... :D

Okiedokie. That looks like a terminus, though I think there's more to the cogito than that.

A reasonable inference is that God is necessary in order to avoid solipsism.

That seems to be the larger argument he was making. — Hanover

Descartes, you mean?

That's an interesting read, if so -- a theist twist on the interpretation of the Meditations. If I'm entirely wrong on that, well, then I am but to explain myself: I've heard it argued that Descartes' argument for the existence of God is so bad, and Descartes so smart, that there must be some explanation as to why it's in there when the preceding arguments are so crisp and clean.

I'll call this the "Secret Atheist" interpretation: The idea is he must have been an atheist but because the church was so powerful at the time he had to include proofs for the existence of God, given that it's philosophy after all.

So, if I have you right, you're making the argument that he's more targeting atheists in saying that if they do not believe in God then this is all they can know, and given that they know more than that, they ought consider believing in God. Sort of like the Secret Atheist, but instead he's dressing it up for the church while talking to his contemporaries too.

OK Thanks. That one is making much more sense to me. Chewing it over, will post more if I think of something.

So, if I have you right, you're making the argument that he's more targeting atheists in saying that if they do not believe in God then this is all they can know, and given that they know more than that, they ought consider believing in God. Sort of like the Secret Atheist, but instead he's dressing it up for the church while talking to his contemporaries too. — Moliere

I just think that what Descartes did was to doubt all basic foundations and then all he had left was knowledge of his self as a doubting thing. That is a solipsitic conclusion. In order to get himself back to where he could have some knowledge of the world and of other minds, he pulled in God and used God to form the foundation for all knowledge of the world.

If you buy into this approach, God becomes necessary in order to avoid solipsism. It doesn't mean God exists. It just means that you cannot know anything without God's existence (except knowing that you exist as a not knowing thing).

Many find Descartes problematic because they believe he has doubted that which no person would actually doubt and that he has created a fabricated quandary and from that Western philosophy has gone down this road of trying to prove that which no person truly doubts. I don't find Descartes problematic at all because I never doubted that the foundation for our beliefs was faith and that without faith you will have nothing but doubt. Perhaps the opposite of doubt is faith.

What is the substance of the object (…)? — Moliere

It’s material composition, whatever it may be.

And what is this different conditioning? — Moliere

Time.