It’s never clear what you’re arguing for but I do know that you enjoy an argument, regardless. ;-) — Wayfarer

You just ignore any point that tells against your position. I've already said that I am arguing against the idea that because everything cannot be explained in terms of physics it follows that physicalism is false.

Address this (The first word there "they" referring to)

abstract reasoning, language, art, scientific invention, moral reflection, symbolic thought, and awareness of mortality — Wayfarer

They are not explained by it (physics), just as history, evolutionary theory itself, sociology, etc, etc are not because they are all different paradigms of inquiry. Physicalism is a metaphysical standpoint and just like the other metaphysical standpoints does not explain the abovementioned. — Janus

I'll also add that although physicalism (like physics itself), does not explain those things evolutionary theory can produce explanations for those things. Theoretical explanations are not provable of course, but it is equally true that they are not provably false. Such explanations may be counted as false if it can be definitively shown that they cannot possibly explain what they purport to. Nothing you have presented has shown that.

All our experience of a world of uncountable physical constraints supports the conclusion that we inhabit a world that is basically energetic in nature. Do you really believe that the Universe would not exist without us or that it is not most basically a field of energetic relations and interactions?

Do you really believe that the Universe would not exist without us? — Janus

I've just fielded that question in the mind-created world thread. It would be better to discuss it there.

Such explanations may be counted as false if it can be definitively shown that they cannot possibly explain what they purport to. — Janus

I think Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism and Victor Reppert's version of the argument from reason are both plausible arguments against evolutionary materialism. In evolutionary theory, the mind and capacity to reason are presented in terms of biological adaption. However if the mind and reason are reduced to these terms, then this undermines the sovereignty of reason. We can discuss the details of that if you like.

However if the mind and reason are reduced to these terms, then this undermines the sovereignty of reason. We can discuss the details of that if you like. — Wayfarer

What do you mean by the "sovereignty of reason"? Reason by itself delivers no knowledge. As I understand it the main principles are the LNC and validity. I think the LNC features in the demand for validity or consistency. That in any example of valid reasoning the conclusion must be entailed by the premises. Obviously premises which contradict one another or the conclusion will not pass muster.

What is the actual argument for why accepting the evolution of reason would undermine those principles?

What do you mean by the "sovereignty of reason"? Reason by itself delivers no knowledge. — Janus

But it delivers considerable capacity to gain knowledge, surely you would agree. H.sapiens by dint of reason is able to do many things which animals can not. (There have been interminable, and to my mind pointless, arguments about this in the Rational Thinking Human and Animal thread.)

What is the actual argument for why accepting the evolution of reason would undermine those principles? — Janus

The 'argument from reason' is that reasoned inference must convey facts that are internal to reason. Seeking to justify such reasons with reference to the extent to which they provide an adaptive or evolutionary advantage undermines the sovereignty of reason by saying that it's claims have some grounds other than their self-evident nature. As Thomas Nagel puts it:

The only form that genuine reasoning can take consists in seeing the validity of the arguments, in virtue of what they say. As soon as one tries to step outside of such thoughts, one loses contact with their true content. And one cannot be outside and inside them at the same time: If one thinks in logic, one cannot simultaneously regard those thoughts as mere psychological dispositions, however caused or however biologically grounded. If one decides that some of one's psychological dispositions are, as a contingent matter of fact, reliable methods of reaching the truth (as one may with perception, for example), then in doing so one must rely on other thoughts that one actually thinks, without regarding them as mere dispositions. One cannot embed all one's reasoning in a psychological theory, including the reasonings that have led to that psychological theory. The epistemological buck must stop somewhere. By this I mean not that there must be some premises that are forever unrevisable but, rather, that in any process of reasoning or argument there must be some thoughts that one simply thinks from the inside--rather than thinking of them as biologically programmed dispositions. ...

The reliance we put on our reason implies a belief that even though the existence of human beings and of ourselves in particular is the result of a long sequence of physical and biological accidents, and even though there might never have come to be any intelligent creatures at all, nevertheless the basic methods of reasoning we employ are not merely human but belong to a more general category of mind. — Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion, from The Last Word, Thomas Nagel

But it delivers considerable capacity to gain knowledge, surely you would agree. H.sapiens by dint of reason is able to do many things which animals can not. (There have been interminable, and to my mind pointless, arguments about this in the Rational Thinking Human and Animal thread.) — Wayfarer

I would say not by dint of reason but by dint of symbolic language. Symbolic language enables collective learning and perceived history. I believe animals do possess reason, but of course if they do not possess symbolic language, it would seem they do not possess symbolically augmented reason or in other words they would not be capable of abstract reasoning.

The 'argument from reason' is that reasoned inference must convey facts that are internal to reason. Seeking to justify such reasons with reference to the extent to which they provide an adaptive or evolutionary advantage undermines the sovereignty of reason by saying that it's claims have some grounds other than their self-evident nature. — Wayfarer

It is not the fact (if it be such) that reason has evolved that "justifies" reason. Reason is never justified it is merely valid or invalid, consistent or inconsistent, As I already said this has to do with the LNC as I see it. That law is integral to our worldly experience. Something cannot both be and not be itself for example. Or for another example, something cannot be a round square or both red and blue all over I believe that (some) animals (for example dogs) show by their behavior that they instinctively comprehend this.

You said somewhere recently that Vervaeke's "relevance realization" operates at all levels of life. What could this be but some kind of understanding (however) rudimentary) that something is of whatever significance it is for the organism". A predator is a predator not a prey, Perhaps the LEM also comes into play here as well as the LNC. As I replied before this is the root of both meaning and reason.

You said somewhere recently that Vervaeke's "relevance realization" operates at all levels of life. What could this be but some kind of understanding (however) rudimentary) that something is of whatever significance it is for the organism". — Janus

Agree. But Vervaeke would also say that h.sapiens have greater horizons of being than do other animals, because of reason, language, self-awareness, and all that this entails. So what is relevant for human existence has greater scope than for non-human animals, although that aspect of his work is more concerned with philosophy than biology, per se, whereas relevance realisation is something characteristic of organisms in general. But this is where evolutionary biology tends to be reductionist as its criteria are chiefly concerned with the requirements for adaptation and survival. As a Dawkins or a Crick would put it, you are ' robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes' or 'You, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of identity and free will are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules'. Nothing buttery, as it has been called.

But Vervaeke would also say that h.sapiens have greater horizons of being than do other animals, because of reason, language, self-awareness, and all that this entails. — Wayfarer

I would put that a little differently since I believe animals (to varying degrees of course) do non-symbolic or non-abstract reasoning and have non-symbolic or non-abstract self-awareness and I believe it is on account of symbolic language (and the opposable thumb) that humans have "greater horizons of being" or in other words collective and accumulative learning and culture.

As a Dawkins or a Crick would put it, you are ' robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes' or 'You, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of identity and free will are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules'. — Wayfarer

The first quote is a ridiculous anthropomorphism. The second quote is perhaps true in the sense that we can be understood that way, but it is only one among many possible perspectives, so the "nothing but" part is not true.

It's supported by an argument based on the double-slit experiment. That argument is that the interference exhibits the same wave-like pattern even if photons are fired one at a time. — Wayfarer

Nothing about that inherently suggests anything about subjectivity. There are quantum interpretations with a mathematical basis from which you can build models showing particles going through slits and forming interference patterns one at a time in an objective way, even if the wavefunction may not be real in these interpretations.

Nothing about that inherently suggests anything about subjectivity. — Apustimelogist

That wasn’t the point at issue, which was that Ψ is outside of spacetime. (Among the interpretations are subjectivist ones like QBism, which makes sense to me.)

Anyway - I had the realisation the other day, when challenged with ‘name one thing that is outside space and time’ that the wavefunction fits that description, and yet is also at the heart of the success of modern physics.

That wasn’t the point at issue — Wayfarer

It was because you were saying quantum theory undermines objectivity, to which I say - not necessarily.

‘name one thing that is outside space and time’ that the wavefunction fits that description, and yet is also at the heart of the success of modern physics. — Wayfarer

But this can be in the trivial sense of the wavefunction being a predictive construct without explicit physical instantiation. There are many other constructs in physics and science that fit that description.

Are there any domains (I'm thinking of ethics) where you think methodological naturalism would not be instructive, or would you recommend it as a complete and holistic approach for understanding all of reality?

There are many other constructs in physics and science that fit that description. — Apustimelogist

Right. Like the standard model of particle physics itself. Something which physicalism tends to overlook. But the main point is, I think the non-physical nature of the wavefunction mitigates against 'objective collapse' theories like Penrose's. As I said in the essay I wrote on it, his theories, like Einstein's, are based on the conviction that the universe *should* be deterministic. But that is a philosophical, not a scientific, argument.

It applies only to science and ethics isn't a science, so it wouldn't apply to that.

Follow-up question: when we say "ethics isn't a science" do we mean ethics does not require any kind of scientific knowledge and can be applied through a kind of a priori cognition/intuition? Or do we mean that the kind of knowledge that science supplies is either insufficient for ethics or does not apply to ethics at all?

I myself can be sympathetic to the view that scientific knowledge may be applicable-but-insufficient for ethics due to something like a normativity objection.

I also tend to think scientific knowledge is unnecessary for ethics even though it may be able to provide evidence concerning moral facts.

I think we more or less agree. E.g. The claim "abortion is wrong" obviously doesn't allow for direct application of the scientific method---it's not a scientific hypothesis---but scientific knowledge can certainly be (and certainly is) used both to support and oppose it.

It seems to me that science may not be very good at defining an act as right or wrong. On the other hand, I think it may be quite good at saying what is good or bad (for an organism). "Cigarettes cause cancer" is a scientifically established fact.

Perhaps it may be asked whether what is bad for an organism is morally bad, but, to my eyes, the answer seems to be "yes."

Drinking coffee is morally wrong? Sitting too much is morally wrong? How about, spending countless hours without sleep tirelessly working on a suicide helpline is morally wrong? Or hurting one's elbow on a rock while jumping into a pond to save a drowning child is morally wrong?

You get the idea...

Insofar as the things you mentioned are objectively bad for the organism, I would argue that they are morally bad, or are at least morally worse than a situation wherein the organism was not so harmed.

Ok, well, feel free to start a thread on that unorthodox position on ethics. We've rather veered off topic here.

Right. Like the standard model of particle physics itself. Something which physicalism tends to overlook. — Wayfarer

Not sure what you mean by this.

I really meant in a much more trivial way that doesn't threaten physicalism tbh. The fact that some constructs in science don't represent real physical objects doesn't imply anything about physicalism vs. alternatives.

The fact that some constructs in science don't represent real physical objects doesn't imply anything about physicalism vs. alternatives. — Apustimelogist

...the inherent difficulties of the materialist theory of the atom, which had become apparent even in the ancient discussions about smallest particles, have also appeared very clearly in the development of physics during the present century.

This difficulty relates to the question whether the smallest units are ordinary physical objects, whether they exist in the same way as stones or flowers. Here, the development of quantum theory...has created a complete change in the situation. The mathematically-formulated laws of quantum theory show clearly that our ordinary intuitive concepts (of existence) cannot be unambiguously applied to the smallest particles. All the words or concepts we use to describe ordinary physical objects, such as position, velocity, color, size, and so on, become indefinite and problematic if we try to use them of elementary particles. I cannot enter here into the details of this problem, which has been discussed so frequently in recent years. But it is important to realize that, while the behavior of the smallest particles cannot be unambiguously described in ordinary language, the language of mathematics is still adequate for a clear-cut account of what is going on.

During the coming years, the high-energy accelerators will bring to light many further interesting details about the behavior of elementary particles. But I am inclined to think that the answer just considered to the old philosophical problems will turn out to be final. If this is so, does this answer confirm the views of Democritus or Plato?

I think that on this point modern physics has definitely decided for Plato. For the smallest units of matter are, in fact, not physical objects in the ordinary sense of the word; they are forms, structures or — in Plato's sense — Ideas, which can be unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics. — Werner Heisenberg, The Debate between Plato and Democritus (i.e. between idealism and materialism)

Well this is not really the context of what I was talking about and I dont agree with his sentiment anyway.

Physicalism is reductionist by definition. Why? Because it methodically excludes or reduces what may be deemed anything other than the physical to the physical. Physicalism is 'the view that all phenomena, including complex processes like consciousness, emotions, and social behaviors, can be explained without residue in terms of physical components and laws—typically those of physics and chemistry—without requiring additional principles or explanations'. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure where you got that definition.
I haven't looked up the fitting definition for this purpose. But it certainly isn't what you define as physicalism. Reductionism by design denies other existents except for one thing. Whatever that one thing is. That is not what physicalism suggests. I already mentioned this before -- physicalims doesn't deny gravity and consciousness or the subjective experience. It denies that there is an unexplained gap between the physical and the intangible, subjective experiences.

It is of course true that when it comes to phenomena such as gravity and the composition of massive bodies, then physicalism is a sound assumption (which is the 'methodological' aspect). But the extension of that methodology to the problems of philosophy is what is objectionable about it. — Wayfarer

I see where your objection is -- that physicalism implies that there's only one explanation for both the celestial bodies and our consciousness (which is rightly the domain of philosophy). It doesn't. There are types of matter, just as there are types of existents. What physicalism denies is that there is no explanation at all for the mind or the consciousness.

Actually, I was thinking of mereological nihilism, that there are no true part whole relations, and that arrangements of them are ultimately arbitrary. Thus, the world contains no cats, trees, stars, etc. These only exist in the mind. There are only a few fundemental fields (perhaps unifiable, in which case there is just one thing). This seems to make "saying true things about things" virtually impossible. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, you can hold this view, but it doesn't undermine physicalism. I wrote above to Wayfarer that physicalism can be all inclusive, except for the belief that there is this divide between our consciousness and our body composition.

My guess, which is mostly based on how other "problems in the sciences," have progressed, is that the terms currently applied need to be radically rethought. That's just a guess though. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree with this.

I'm not sure where you got that definition. — L'éléphant

Physicalism is, in slogan form, the thesis that everything is physical. The thesis is usually intended as a metaphysical thesis, parallel to the thesis attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Thales, that everything is water, or the idealism of the 18th Century philosopher Berkeley, that everything is mental. The general idea is that the nature of the actual world (i.e. the universe and everything in it) conforms to a certain condition, the condition of being physical. Of course, physicalists don’t deny that the world might contain many items that at first glance don’t seem physical — items of a biological, or psychological, or moral, or social, or mathematical nature. But they insist nevertheless that at the end of the day such items are physical. — SEP

It denies that there is an unexplained gap between the physical and the intangible, subjective experiences... — L'éléphant

It takes more than a denial, it takes an argument. The 'explanatory gap' is similar to the 'hard problem of consciousness', which is basically that physical descriptions fail to properly depict or describe the subjective sense of being, for which there is no analogy in physical terms.

What physicalism denies is that there is no explanation at all for the mind or the consciousness. — L'éléphant

What it denies is that there can't be a physical explanation for the mind. A physical explanation for the mind must be given in terms proper to physics, such as mass, velocity, number, composition, and other attributes of matter, otherwise it's not a physicalist explanation.