OK, but since "freedom is restricted" is a blatant contradiction, and you seem to believe that "restricted" represents the truth in this matter, we need to start with the premise that the agent is not free. The agent is restricted. Whether or not you believe in free will is irrelevant now, what you believe is that the agent is restricted, and therefore not free. Now we can proceed to outline the nature of the restrictions.

I believe, as I said earlier, the most important and significant restriction is the nature of time. It is impossible to alter the past. And, it's not the case that this type of restriction is not morally relevant, because this restriction affects everything we do, that which is morally irrelevant, as well as that which is morally relevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you seem to want words to only mean one thing, and they don't.

A free agent is one that has free will. Their freedom (their ability to understand and make their own choices) might be restricted, or it might not. If it is restricted, I would say that was a bad thing. But such a restriction would not stop them being a free agent in the sense of having free will.

I'm not really sure what point you are making in your discussion of the person locked in the room.

This qualification, "that someone has imposed upon you" such and such restriction, is generally insignificant, and unimportant. Consider that you suddenly find yourself locked in a room. And, your desire is to be free. Look at the possibilities for the means to freedom, which I mentioned above. That someone has imposed the restriction on you is completely irrelevant. However, when we look at the memories from the past experience, this qualification may be significant. If you think you might call the person on your phone, and get them to let you out, then it would be important. But this is unlikely, so the qualification that it "is a restriction that someone has imposed upon you", is probably completely irrelevant to your desire for freedom. — Metaphysician Undercover

Whether it is relevant to your escape attempts is a seperate issue to whether the proper way of thinking about it is a restriction inherent to you or a restriction someone has imposed on you.

I'm not entirely sure what points you are making as they seem to bounce around a lot.

Again, you seem to want words to only mean one thing, and they don't. — Dan

That is because I want premises for the purpose of proceeding logically. If we allow the ambiguity of words meaning numerous different things, then we open ourselves to equivocation and logic becomes useless. Then there is no point to proceeding. That's why I'm now looking for some clearly defined terms to provide for us some agreeable premises for logic.

A free agent is one that has free will — Dan

This is self-referential. You define "free agent" with "free will", but nothing tells us what "free" means.

Their freedom (their ability to understand and make their own choices) might be restricted, or it might not. — Dan

Now "freedom" becomes totally meaningless. "Free" to me, as the common dictionary definition indicates, means unrestricted. Now you say freedom might be restricted, or it might not. That leaves "freedom" itself as nothing.

And as I've shown, the "ability to understand and make their own choices" is not freedom at all. Because you qualify "their own choices", with moral principles, this phrase, as you define it, just refers to a type of restriction. And as far as I understand "free", restriction is opposed to "free".

I'm not really sure what point you are making in your discussion of the person locked in the room. — Dan

The point is that you have named a special type of restriction, one which is imposed upon a person by another, and you have singled this out as if it has special moral significance. What my explanation of your "locked in the room" example shows, is that whether or not a restriction is imposed by another person is usually very insignificant relative to the required decision making at that time. If you find yourself locked in a room, the issue of whether or not someone imposed this upon you intentionally ought to have very little significance over the choices you need to make at that time. And in general, in cases where we find ourselves confronted with unwanted restrictions, whether these restrictions are natural, or artificially imposed, ought not have a serious affect on our decisions making. We must work to understand the restrictions, and free ourselves from them, not worry about who, why, or if, someone laid them on us. Therefore "imposed by another" is not a species of "restriction" which is important to distinguish at this time. We need to first understand what "free" and "restricted" mean, in their basic sense.

That is because I want premises for the purpose of proceeding logically. If we allow the ambiguity of words meaning numerous different things, then we open ourselves to equivocation and logic becomes useless. Then there is no point to proceeding. That's why I'm now looking for some clearly defined terms to provide for us some agreeable premises for logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think we can be clear about what we mean even if words have more than one possible meaning.

This is self-referential. You define "free agent" with "free will", but nothing tells us what "free" means. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not self-referential at all. I define "free agent" with reference to free will. I feel like I already explained what I mean by free will but I can do so again if you would like.

Now "freedom" becomes totally meaningless. "Free" to me, as the common dictionary definition indicates, means unrestricted. Now you say freedom might be restricted, or it might not. That leaves "freedom" itself as nothing.

And as I've shown, the "ability to understand and make their own choices" is not freedom at all. Because you qualify "their own choices", with moral principles, this phrase, as you define it, just refers to a type of restriction. And as far as I understand "free", restriction is opposed to "free". — Metaphysician Undercover

First, freedom is not meaningless, it is simply different from being a "free agent" in the sense of an agent with free will. To have free will and to have the freedom to express it are different things.

Second, you haven't shown that. You have insisted it, usually backing it up with a misunderstanding of what I've said or the assertion that I should be using words the way you would prefer. It is freedom to make a certain kind of choices.

Third, I'm not saying that what freedom is could be restricted or not. I am saying that being a "free agent" in the sense of having free will is not the same as having freedom to express that free will (as mentioned above).

The point is that you have named a special type of restriction, one which is imposed upon a person by another, and you have singled this out as if it has special moral significance. What my explanation of your "locked in the room" example shows, is that whether or not a restriction is imposed by another person is usually very insignificant relative to the required decision making at that time. If you find yourself locked in a room, the issue of whether or not someone imposed this upon you intentionally ought to have very little significance over the choices you need to make at that time. And in general, in cases where we find ourselves confronted with unwanted restrictions, whether these restrictions are natural, or artificially imposed, ought not have a serious affect on our decisions making. We must work to understand the restrictions, and free ourselves from them, not worry about who, why, or if, someone laid them on us. Therefore "imposed by another" is not a species of "restriction" which is important to distinguish at this time. We need to first understand what "free" and "restricted" mean, in their basic sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, aside from the fact that someone has acted wrongly in this case, I am generally inclined to agree. But I don't think I ever suggested or implied that someone's freedom being restricted or violated by another person was in some way more significant than it being violated by something else. You said that restrictions were inherent to the person, and I was simply pointing out that this seems like a silly way to conceptualize restrictions. In this case, there was another person involved, but there need not be. We might imagine a similar case where a rock has fallen on your leg and trapped you under it, thereby restricting your freedom. It would be very strange to categorize the rock on your leg as an restriction that is inherent to you or in some sense internal. It is a thing that has happened to you that is restricting your freedom.

This sounds like equivocation to me. Surely you don't mean to equate "force" as in to force someone to do something with "forces" as in the physical forces of the universe. — Dan

I define "free agent" with reference to free will. I feel like I already explained what I mean by free will but I can do so again if you would like. — Dan

Yes, that would be a good idea. I cannot follow what your saying now, so maybe a definition, or even a description of what you think free will is. You said something about libertarian free will, but to me that doesn't seem at all consistent with the principles you are arguing. But maybe you have a different idea from me, about what constitutes libertarian free will.

First, freedom is not meaningless, it is simply different from being a "free agent" in the sense of an agent with free will. To have free will and to have the freedom to express it are different things. — Dan

So are you saying that the "free" in "freedom" has a different meaning from the "free" in "free agent"? I assume also, that since you assert that defining "free agent" with "free will" is not self referential, then the "free" of "free will" has a different meaning from the "free" of "free agent". This is getting very confusing to me, and the likelihood of equivocation is looming large.

I mean, aside from the fact that someone has acted wrongly in this case, I am generally inclined to agree. But I don't think I ever suggested or implied that someone's freedom being restricted or violated by another person was in some way more significant than it being violated by something else. You said that restrictions were inherent to the person, and I was simply pointing out that this seems like a silly way to conceptualize restrictions. In this case, there was another person involved, but there need not be. We might imagine a similar case where a rock has fallen on your leg and trapped you under it, thereby restricting your freedom. It would be very strange to categorize the rock on your leg as an restriction that is inherent to you or in some sense internal. It is a thing that has happened to you that is restricting your freedom. — Dan

You were attempting to make a distinction between the physical forces of the universe, and the force someone uses to force a person to do something. You said: "This sounds like equivocation to me. Surely you don't mean to equate "force" as in to force someone to do something with "forces" as in the physical forces of the universe."

Now, when we analyzed your example, of when a person uses "force" on another, by locking one in a room, there is no significant difference between the restrictions applied by the forces of the universe, and the restrictions applied when someone is locked in a room. In each case, the restrictions are the same, and it is generally insignificant that in one case the force is intentional imposed.

Now that we seem to agree (somewhat) about the nature of restrictions, and "force", we might be able to go back and start from the principal restriction I mentioned, that of the passing of time, and the nature of the past. Do you think so? I'll wait until I see how you define "free will", and "free agent". This might give me an idea of how you understand "free". Your ideas seem totally foreign to me.

though I might say that morality defined thusly (or perhaps very similarly) is the kind worth discussing. — Dan

Ok, bingo. Thank you (no impugning - just that this answers me directly).

Yes, that would be a good idea. I cannot follow what your saying now, so maybe a definition, or even a description of what you think free will is. You said something about libertarian free will, but to me that doesn't seem at all consistent with the principles you are arguing. But maybe you have a different idea from me, about what constitutes libertarian free will. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fair enough. I would suggest that for an agent to have libertarian free will, it must be the case that their actions are caused by the agent themselves and not wholly determined by preceding events (I think I'd also add that they aren't random but that's maybe a debate for another day), and that their actions are in-principle not wholly predictable with 100% accuracy prior to their occurance (Lapse's demon is impossible).

So are you saying that the "free" in "freedom" has a different meaning from the "free" in "free agent"? I assume also, that since you assert that defining "free agent" with "free will" is not self referential, then the "free" of "free will" has a different meaning from the "free" of "free agent". This is getting very confusing to me, and the likelihood of equivocation is looming large. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, I think freedom and free will are different things. As I have said before, I would say that freedom is the ability to understand and make choices (and I would say that the kind of freedom that we should care about morally is the freedom to make one's own choices). To understand and make choices is the use of one's free will and one's rationality. Having free will is not the same as being able to use it to make your choices (since those choices might be restricted in some way). When I talk about a "free agent" I mean an agent possessing free will. I am not making a claim about how restricted or unrestricted their freedom is.

You were attempting to make a distinction between the physical forces of the universe, and the force someone uses to force a person to do something. You said: "This sounds like equivocation to me. Surely you don't mean to equate "force" as in to force someone to do something with "forces" as in the physical forces of the universe." — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, because "forcing" someone to do something means something different than the "forces" of the universe, and I was very confused that you seemed to be using them interchangably.

Fair enough. I would suggest that for an agent to have libertarian free will, it must be the case that their actions are caused by the agent themselves and not wholly determined by preceding events (I think I'd also add that they aren't random but that's maybe a debate for another day), and that their actions are in-principle not wholly predictable with 100% accuracy prior to their occurance (Lapse's demon is impossible). — Dan

OK, so the key phrase is "not wholly determined by preceding events". I would say that "determined" is the type of concept where we would say that an action is either determined by preceding events, or it is not. That's my understanding of "determined". It wouldn't make sense to say that an act was partially determined, because determined is an all or nothing sort of concept. So, I will assume that by "not wholly determined by preceding events" you mean not determined by preceding events.

I mean, I think freedom and free will are different things. As I have said before, I would say that freedom is the ability to understand and make choices (and I would say that the kind of freedom that we should care about morally is the freedom to make one's own choices). — Dan

I would not make the distinction in this way. What I described earlier, is a difference between choosing and acting. I would say that "free will" involves choosing freely, and "freedom" involves acting freely. Notice that this distinction is necessary to account for the reality of cases where people choose to do something, and it ends up that they cannot do it, or they fail for some reason. So for example, if I choose to steal your car, that's a freely made choice, of my own free will, but if you shoot me, or if I'm arrested, then obviously I did not have the freedom to carry out that act.

Having free will is not the same as being able to use it to make your choices (since those choices might be restricted in some way). — Dan

This seems to be similar, to what I said, but I think you really need the distinction between choosing and acting. We need to recognize that distinction because choices are made within one's mind, and the factors which restrict one's choice, lack of education, inattention, rashness, desires, and all sorts of emotional things, are completely different from the factors which restrict ones actions. The things which restrict ones actions are those things which are expressed by the laws of the physical world, the activities in that world.

Because of this difference, one can choose all sorts of fantasy things, which might never come true. So there is often an inconsistency between what one chooses and what one actually receives from the world. But this facet of free choice is very important to theoretical thinking, like pure mathematics, and the creation of scientific hypotheses. The physical world is full of things which appear to us as restrictive, but our ability to transcend all those restrictions, with our minds, allows us to dream up ways around the apparent restrictions. That is the essence of problem solving. This ability to "dream" is what lifts us beyond things which appear to us as physical restrictions to our freedom, but which we may ultimately find a way around because the free will of our minds, to choose, is not restricted by those "apparent" restrictions. Here we have technology.

When I talk about a "free agent" I mean an agent possessing free will. I am not making a claim about how restricted or unrestricted their freedom is. — Dan

I believe this distinction between "free will", which which refers to the capacity of the mind to understand and choose, and "freedom", which refers to the capacity of the human being to act in the world, is very important to maintain in moral philosophy. Once we clearly define this boundary, we see that "freedom" is inherently restricted in many ways which "free will" is not. And since in moral philosophy we must start from the most base level of restriction, the restrictions to free will, as restrictions to the mind's capacity to understand and choose, we need to start with those things I've mentioned, education, deception, and even genetic disposition which is a form of restriction more base than learning.

The most base restrictions are the strongest and most influential restrictions. After this, we can move to the higher levels of restrictions, the restrictions to our freedom. And, the reason for maintaining a distinction between the two, is to allow for interactive relations between them, as a true model needs this separation to allow for reciprocation. These interactive relations are well exemplified by the process known as "trial and error". The mind comes up with an idea (a choice) and has to try it out in the physical world. In science, this is experimentation. Notice how this is representative of different types of free will choices, ones which are based in untried and very uncertain speculations, and ones which are based in proven and very certain principles.

Yes, because "forcing" someone to do something means something different than the "forces" of the universe, and I was very confused that you seemed to be using them interchangably. — Dan

The "forces" which a person applies to another, in forcing that person, are the "forces" of the universe. There is no other type of "force" available to the person, to use when "forcing" another, so the word has the very same meaning. The difference is as I explained, we can be restricted by force, or we can use force to our advantage. In the case of "forcing another", the person is manipulating the forces of the universe to take advantage of another.

However, you use an ambiguous and deceptive phrase, "forcing someone to do something", in order to veil your underlying inconsistency. When a person persuades or coerces another into carrying out an act for them (forces someone to do something), they use words, gestures, or other actions, to influence a person's decision making (to get them to decide to do the thing), they "cause" the person to decide on that act. But your stated principles of libertarian free will do not allow that a free agent's choices can be caused in this way.

Therefore you propose that "force" has a different meaning. This is a type of meaning which allows that a freely willed choice can actually be caused, "forced", by another person. But it's really nothing but contradiction. The free agent's choice is not caused, and cannot be caused. That's what being a free agent means. The proposed use of the word "force" is to signify a cause, which does not qualify as a "cause" because that would negate "free agent". So the word "force" is used instead of "cause", because if you said that a person could cause another person to do something, the contradiction between this and the principles of libertarian free will would be blatant.

This I believe is the most significant problem you've shown to me, in your principles, the above inconsistency. You dismiss all sorts of communications, teaching, deceiving, etc., as not able to have any causal effect on another's choices, because people have "libertarian free will", which means that their choices are not caused. However, then you allow that one person can "force" another to do something. But this proposed type of "force" is nothing other than persuading or coercing through teaching or deceiving, and it's really just an instance of communicating with another.

The glaring problem is that you deny the moral relevance of all sorts of communicative activities, saying that the agent is free, and these activities are not causal. Then, you cannot help but notice the reality that communicative activities really obtain the highest level of moral relevance, so you give this a special name "force someone", and separate it off, as completely distinct. Then you argue as if there is no similarity, no continuity between them, not allowing for some sort of scale of degrees of difference, between teaching, deceiving, and "forcing", all being activities of the same category. This is because of that above mentioned inconsistency. You really want "forcing" to qualify as "causing", and the others not to qualify as "causing". But "causing" cannot be provided for by libertarian free will, so you give it a different name, "forcing", and you speak as if it is something in a completely different category, when really it's nothing other than a matter of influencing a person through the means of communication.

OK, so the key phrase is "not wholly determined by preceding events". I would say that "determined" is the type of concept where we would say that an action is either determined by preceding events, or it is not. That's my understanding of "determined". It wouldn't make sense to say that an act was partially determined, because determined is an all or nothing sort of concept. So, I will assume that by "not wholly determined by preceding events" you mean not determined by preceding events. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think it has to be quite so all or nothing. I'd be open to the idea that certain preceding events were necessary but not sufficient causes of some action being undertaken.

After that, I am going to have to disagree with you that things like lack of education or rashness count as restrictions on one's freedom (and certainly not restrictions on one's free will). But presumably you know that I disagree on that count since we have discussed it quite a lot by this point.

The "forces" which a person applies to another, in forcing that person, are the "forces" of the universe. There is no other type of "force" available to the person, to use when "forcing" another, so the word has the very same meaning. The difference is as I explained, we can be restricted by force, or we can use force to our advantage. In the case of "forcing another", the person is manipulating the forces of the universe to take advantage of another. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you go to a police officer and tell them that you just witnessed someone being forced into a car and they respond with a question about whether you're discussing the weak nuclear force, the strong nuclear, force, magnetism, or gravity, that is not an appropriate understanding of how you are using the word 'force'.

However, you use an ambiguous and deceptive phrase, "forcing someone to do something", in order to veil your underlying inconsistency. When a person persuades or coerces another into carrying out an act for them (forces someone to do something), they use words, gestures, or other actions, to influence a person's decision making (to get them to decide to do the thing), they "cause" the person to decide on that act. But your stated principles of libertarian free will do not allow that a free agent's choices can be caused in this way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Persuading someone to do something is not forcing them to do it. Coercing someone by threatening them could plausibly be considered forcing. What you are doing in such a case is restricting their choices through a threat (for example, give me your money or I will shoot you). This is not inconsistent with thinking that one's actions are not wholly determined by preceding factors or in-principle predictable with 100% accuracy.

This is also fairly obvious in the case where you are literally forcing someone to do something, such as by grabbing them and physically making them do it. This is not the same thing as persauding someone or educating someone.

I am not making any special categories here. Some actions restrict someone's ability to understand and make their own choices and some don't. The use of force is often in the former category, and the use of deception or education is often in the latter. But, again, this is consequentialism. The type of action is not what is important. It is the consequences which determine an actions morality. In cases where education restricts someone's ability to understand and make their own choices (generally this would involve teaching them something incorrect about the nature of those choices or about some threat etc) then that education is morally bad. But, for example, teaching someone how many wives Henry the 8th had does not restrict their ability to understand and make their own choices.

I don't think it has to be quite so all or nothing. I'd be open to the idea that certain preceding events were necessary but not sufficient causes of some action being undertaken. — Dan

We could take that route, but I think it would prove disastrous to consequentialism. Consider that if we maintain such principles, that there are necessary conditions for an effect, but none of these can suffice as the cause of the effect, then we do not have what is required to tie the voluntary act to the consequences, as the cause of those consequences. The circumstances which a human being finds oneself in, are all equally necessary for the resulting consequences, and "causation" has been reduced in this way, such that the voluntary act cannot be said to suffice as "the cause" of the consequences, it is necessary but not sufficient.

Persuading someone to do something is not forcing them to do it. Coercing someone by threatening them could plausibly be considered forcing. What you are doing in such a case is restricting their choices through a threat (for example, give me your money or I will shoot you). This is not inconsistent with thinking that one's actions are not wholly determined by preceding factors or in-principle predictable with 100% accuracy. — Dan

The issue is that threatening is a matter of persuading someone through the use of communication. The question for you, is how is this substantially different from any other form of persuading someone through the use of communication, teaching and deceiving in general?

My criticism is that you employ an arbitrary division whereby sometimes the use of communication is morally relevant, and other times it is not. And the principles you employ in making this division are not based in whether the use of communication is good, bad, or indifferent, as they should be for a true determination of "morally relevant". Your principles are based in harm or benefit to body and property, with complete neglect for harm or benefit to one's mind, even though your claim is that the principles are based in the ability to understand and make one's own choices.

This is also fairly obvious in the case where you are literally forcing someone to do something, such as by grabbing them and physically making them do it. This is not the same thing as persauding someone or educating someone. — Dan

This is nonsense. You cannot grab a person and make them act out a procedure. How could they be performing the request while they are being held? What are you insinuating, that you could grab a person and move their arms and legs like a puppet, making them carry out an act? You are slipping into nonsense Dan.

Some actions restrict someone's ability to understand and make their own choices and some don't. The use of force is often in the former category, and the use of deception or education is often in the latter. — Dan

You really haven't taken a look at what the word "understand" means. If you truly believe that deception and education do not, in general, effect one's ability to understand one's own choices, you have a lot of reading, and thinking, to do.

But, again, this is consequentialism. The type of action is not what is important. It is the consequences which determine an actions morality. In cases where education restricts someone's ability to understand and make their own choices (generally this would involve teaching them something incorrect about the nature of those choices or about some threat etc) then that education is morally bad. But, for example, teaching someone how many wives Henry the 8th had does not restrict their ability to understand and make their own choices. — Dan

You've fallen into a trap. Just last post, you distinguished between "free will" and "freedom". And, I explained how "free will" as you defined it related to decision making, choice, (which is mental), and "freedom" as you separated it from free will, related to (physical) actions in the world. Then, to avoid having to deal with causation in the realm of the mental, decision making, and free will, you proposed a distinction between sufficient and necessary. Now you want to focus on consequentialism, and the world of physical actions, but your proposed distinction between sufficient and necessary, in the terms of causation, completely undermine your consequentialist principles.

We could take that route, but I think it would prove disastrous to consequentialism. Consider that if we maintain such principles, that there are necessary conditions for an effect, but none of these can suffice as the cause of the effect, then we do not have what is required to tie the voluntary act to the consequences, as the cause of those consequences. The circumstances which a human being finds oneself in, are all equally necessary for the resulting consequences, and "causation" has been reduced in this way, such that the voluntary act cannot be said to suffice as "the cause" of the consequences, it is necessary but not sufficient. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, surely we are in a world where events can have multiple necessary but not individually sufficient conditions, aren't we? For example, if you provide the location of an assassin's target and I provide the asssassin with a sniper rifle (assuming they couldn't get either of these things otherwise), and the assassin then assassinates said target with said rifle, surely we all bear some responsibility here. I think we have to accept that responsibility for consequences is often a bit more complicated than we might like.

The issue is that threatening is a matter of persuading someone through the use of communication. The question for you, is how is this substantially different from any other form of persuading someone through the use of communication, teaching and deceiving in general? — Metaphysician Undercover

It is different because in the case of coercion it leaves the person with the choice to do as you say or have their freedom violated in some way.

My criticism is that you employ an arbitrary division whereby sometimes the use of communication is morally relevant, and other times it is not. And the principles you employ in making this division are not based in whether the use of communication is good, bad, or indifferent, as they should be for a true determination of "morally relevant". Your principles are based in harm or benefit to body and property, with complete neglect for harm or benefit to one's mind, even though your claim is that the principles are based in the ability to understand and make one's own choices. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not employ an arbitrary division. The divison I employ is whether the communication in question restricts/violates the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices.

This is nonsense. You cannot grab a person and make them act out a procedure. How could they be performing the request while they are being held? What are you insinuating, that you could grab a person and move their arms and legs like a puppet, making them carry out an act? You are slipping into nonsense Dan. — Metaphysician Undercover

You could grab someone and carry/push/otherwise bundle them into a car. That would be forcing them into a car and different from persauding them to get in. I was thinking more that kind of thing, rather moving someone like a puppet.

You really haven't taken a look at what the word "understand" means. If you truly believe that deception and education do not, in general, effect one's ability to understand one's own choices, you have a lot of reading, and thinking, to do. — Metaphysician Undercover

You can decieve and educate people on a lot of things that aren't the nature of their own choices.

You've fallen into a trap. Just last post, you distinguished between "free will" and "freedom". And, I explained how "free will" as you defined it related to decision making, choice, (which is mental), and "freedom" as you separated it from free will, related to (physical) actions in the world. Then, to avoid having to deal with causation in the realm of the mental, decision making, and free will, you proposed a distinction between sufficient and necessary. Now you want to focus on consequentialism, and the world of physical actions, but your proposed distinction between sufficient and necessary, in the terms of causation, completely undermine your consequentialist principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, pretty much all of that is wrong.

First, freedom isn't related only to the physical. There are mental freedoms also. That is not how I distinguished between free will and freedom.

Second, I didn't introduce a distinction between sufficient and necessary conditions to avoid having to deal with anything. I assumed we were all happy with that distinction already. Further, I simply pointed out that I was open to the possibility, rather than asserting it.

Third, I have been focusing on consequentialism the whole time, and consequentialism is not wholly concerned with "the world of physical actions". As an example (and let me be clear that this is just an example using a different theory of consequentialism and not something I am proposing as true) a utilitarian might say that you ought not to think of things that make you needlessly sad and should instead focus on things that make you happy instead as this will lead to a better outcome.

Fourth, the idea that things can have necessary and/or sufficient conditions for their existence/realizement does not undermine consequentialism. It certainly makes it more complicated than asserting that every event has a single well defined and understood cause, but surely no one would make that assertion because it's pretty obviously wrong. Consequentialism in the world in which we live must by necessity deal with events which multiple people seem to share some responsibility for.

For example, if you provide the location of an assassin's target and I provide the asssassin with a sniper rifle (assuming they couldn't get either of these things otherwise), and the assassin then assassinates said target with said rifle, surely we all bear some responsibility here. — Dan

OK, so now you accept that teaching someone something (providing the location in your example), actually is causal in a morally relevant way. I'm glad you've come to understand that.

Now, you need to justify the boundary you impose between some acts of teaching, and others. Why, for instance is the person who taught the assassin morally responsible, yet the person who taught the arsonist how to light a fire, is not. Your principle of understanding one's own choices seems completely inadequate. The difference to me seems to be a difference of intention.

It is different because in the case of coercion it leaves the person with the choice to do as you say or have their freedom violated in some way. — Dan

I don't see the difference. A threat involves the possibility of having freedom restricted. Likewise,
when someone offers to teach you how to swim, there is the possibility that your freedom will be violated in the future, by drowning, if you choose not to accept the offer. Your claim of a difference is unsubstantiated. The forces of nature are all around us, violating our freedom in many different ways, and learning helps us to make choices which avoid these violations. So I really believe your claim of a difference is completely unjustified.

I do not employ an arbitrary division. The divison I employ is whether the communication in question restricts/violates the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. — Dan

As I said, if these are your claimed principles, you obviously do not know what "understand" means, or you are using the word in a very unusual way.

You could grab someone and carry/push/otherwise bundle them into a car. That would be forcing them into a car and different from persauding them to get in. I was thinking more that kind of thing, rather moving someone like a puppet. — Dan

Kidnapping a person is not forcing them to do something. You were talking about forcing a person to do something, as distinct from persuading or threatening them to cause them to do it. I do not see how anyone could force someone to do something other than by some form of persuasion, such as a threat. But all these are instances of using communication to tell people something. By what principle do you distinguish some cases as morally relevant and others as not?

You can decieve and educate people on a lot of things that aren't the nature of their own choices. — Dan

It's not a matter of learning about the nature of one's own choices, it's a matter of how education effects one's ability to make one's own choices. You seem to have no respect for how a difference in the number of possibilities present to one's mind, at the time of making a decision, affects the person's ability to make decisions. This is what I've been telling you about since the beginning, and why habit makes a significant difference to one's decision making ability. Lack of relevant knowledge makes a choice difficult, decreasing one's ability to make choices. Increased knowledge which is relevant to the situation makes the choice easier, increasing one's ability to make the choice. This has nothing to do with whether the knowledge is about the nature of making a choice.

You need to take a good look at what "the ability to make a choice" means. Clearly the degree of knowledge which is relevant to the circumstances at hand, affects that ability. This is a principle which is applicable to any type of decision making. Now you propose a special type of decision making, making one's own choice, and my principle, "the degree of knowledge which is relevant to the circumstances at hand, affects that ability", is clearly applicable, just like it is applicable to any other type of choosing.

This is knowledge which is relevant to the circumstances, it is not knowledge about the special type of choice you are proposing. Further, there is another type of knowledge which aids a person in determining which knowledge is relevant to the circumstances, and this is where habit is very important. If the person's mind goes only toward some specific information, avoiding other information which is actually relevant, excluding it as irrelevant, this severely restricts the person's ability to make the choice. Therefore, if one were to apply the principle (or habit) that only knowledge about the nature of making one's own decision is applicable, in any set of circumstances where the person wants to make one's own decision, this would actually be extremely restrictive to a person's ability to make one's own decisions. That is what you are proposing, a severe restriction to one's ability to make one's own choices.

Okay, pretty much all of that is wrong. — Dan

Of course it is all wrong. You described for me specific things, like a distinction between "free will" and "freedom", and I proceed on that basis to show inconsistency in your thesis, so now you must take back what you said, as "all of it is wrong".

So let's go back then, and you can try again. Please define "free will", and "freedom", so that I can have some sort of understanding of what you are talking about.

OK, so now you accept that teaching someone something (providing the location in your example), actually is causal in a morally relevant way. I'm glad you've come to understand that.

Now, you need to justify the boundary you impose between some acts of teaching, and others. Why, for instance is the person who taught the assassin morally responsible, yet the person who taught the arsonist how to light a fire, is not. Your principle of understanding one's own choices seems completely inadequate. The difference to me seems to be a difference of intention. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have at no point said that teaching someone something is never morally relevant. Simply that being taught something does (in most cases) not constitute restricting your freedom. "Causal" is a bit of a difficult claim to make here. Rather I would say that it certainly seems to be a contributing factor to the action occuring and it seems like the person who taught the assassin bears some responsibility. The arsonist is a very odd case, as presumably they would have learned to light a fire without that person's intervention so they (the teacher) aren't a necessary condition for them (the arsonist) lighting fires.

Again, it isn't the nature of the action that I am concerned with, it is the consequences.

I don't see the difference. A threat involves the possibility of having freedom restricted. Likewise,
when someone offers to teach you how to swim, there is the possibility that your freedom will be violated in the future, by drowning, if you choose not to accept the offer. Your claim of a difference is unsubstantiated. The forces of nature are all around us, violating our freedom in many different ways, and learning helps us to make choices which avoid these violations. So I really believe your claim of a difference is completely unjustified. — Metaphysician Undercover

I suppose someone is at some threat of being drowned in the future if they don't know how to swim. There are quite a few differences between that and the case of someone pointing a gun at you and saying 'your money or your life' though, don't you think?

As I said, if these are your claimed principles, you obviously do not know what "understand" means, or you are using the word in a very unusual way. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am using the word "understand" regarding a specific thing. Specifically one's own choices. I am not requiring that people understand everything, just what choice they are making and the nature of that choice (assuming that the choice in question belongs to them).

Kidnapping a person is not forcing them to do something. You were talking about forcing a person to do something, as distinct from persuading or threatening them to cause them to do it. I do not see how anyone could force someone to do something other than by some form of persuasion, such as a threat. But all these are instances of using communication to tell people something. By what principle do you distinguish some cases as morally relevant and others as not? — Metaphysician Undercover

Kidnapping someone is absolutely taking them somewhere by force, against their will. It is forcing them to be there.

Again, I would distinguish which actions (of all types) are morally relevant by reference to whether they restricted/violated someone's freedom or not (or removed/prevented some restriction/violation of someone's freedom).

It's not a matter of learning about the nature of one's own choices, it's a matter of how education effects one's ability to make one's own choices. You seem to have no respect for how a difference in the number of possibilities present to one's mind, at the time of making a decision, affects the person's ability to make decisions. This is what I've been telling you about since the beginning, and why habit makes a significant difference to one's decision making ability. Lack of relevant knowledge makes a choice difficult, decreasing one's ability to make choices. Increased knowledge which is relevant to the situation makes the choice easier, increasing one's ability to make the choice. This has nothing to do with whether the knowledge is about the nature of making a choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, I don't think any of that is right. Finding a choice difficult to make because you aren't sure which option will be best for you is not the same thing as being unable to make it.

You need to take a good look at what "the ability to make a choice" means. Clearly the degree of knowledge which is relevant to the circumstances at hand, affects that ability. This is a principle which is applicable to any type of decision making. Now you propose a special type of decision making, making one's own choice, and my principle, "the degree of knowledge which is relevant to the circumstances at hand, affects that ability", is clearly applicable, just like it is applicable to any other type of choosing. — Metaphysician Undercover

No it isn't. I am very capable of investing all my money into some new business. How much I know about that business's future profitability does not affect whether I am able to do so or not. I might like to know that, but not knowing it does not restrict my ability to do so.

Of course it is all wrong. You described for me specific things, like a distinction between "free will" and "freedom", and I proceed on that basis to show inconsistency in your thesis, so now you must take back what you said, as "all of it is wrong".

So let's go back then, and you can try again. Please define "free will", and "freedom", so that I can have some sort of understanding of what you are talking about. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have defined both of these things many times for you. What I have said, each time, is what I meant. I went on to explain why everything you said in that section was wrong in several points.

I suppose someone is at some threat of being drowned in the future if they don't know how to swim. There are quite a few differences between that and the case of someone pointing a gun at you and saying 'your money or your life' though, don't you think? — Dan

Sure, each case has a number of differences from every other. That is why I think your procedure of singling out specific cases and claiming "morally relevant" , and claiming others as "not morally relevant" is unjustified. You have not provided any reasonable principles for making that distinction.

Yeah, I don't think any of that is right. Finding a choice difficult to make because you aren't sure which option will be best for you is not the same thing as being unable to make it. — Dan

I do not see any other possibility for being unable to make a choice, other than that it is too difficult. How else could someone be unable to make a choice?

Sure, each case has a number of differences from every other. That is why I think your procedure of singling out specific cases and claiming "morally relevant" , and claiming others as "not morally relevant" is unjustified. You have not provided any reasonable principles for making that distinction. — Metaphysician Undercover

I haven't singled out cases. I have said that the morality of actions is determined by the extent to which they lead to consequencesthat protect or restrict/violated the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices.

I do not see any other possibility for being unable to make a choice, other than that it is too difficult. How else could someone be unable to make a choice? — Metaphysician Undercover

For example, you might be able to choose to leave the house if you're locked in a room. You might be unable to choose to go for a walk if you've had your legs broken by local mobsters. You might be unable to choose to sell your car if it's been stolen. Lots of things might prevent you being able to make those choices that belong to you.

I haven't singled out cases. I have said that the morality of actions is determined by the extent to which they lead to consequencesthat protect or restrict/violated the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. — Dan

As I've shown, "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices", as explained by you, is not a reasonable principle. This is because you fail to properly account for the meaning of "understand" in your explanation. So you make that principle into something which neglects the moral value of understanding one's choices.

For example, you might be able to choose to leave the house if you're locked in a room. You might be unable to choose to go for a walk if you've had your legs broken by local mobsters. You might be unable to choose to sell your car if it's been stolen. Lots of things might prevent you being able to make those choices that belong to you. — Dan

None of these restrictions provide the force required for your claim. I can still choose to leave the room if I am locked in. Whether or not I am locked in the room only changes the probability of success or failure in carrying out my choice. Likewise, I can still choose to take a walk after my legs are broken. And I can still choose to sell my car even after it's been stolen.

This is what I've been telling you, these physical restrictions which might restrict one's freedom to act do not restrict one's ability to choose. This is very important to understand because it is fundamental to the advancement of science, that we can use our imaginations to hypothesize ways to get around things which appear to be physical restrictions. Look, we can now fly in airplanes, and human beings have gone to the moon. A few centuries ago these things would have seemed impossible due to physical restrictions.

Your examples simply display your failure to recognize the distinction between making a choice, and carrying out the chosen activity. As I told you, it is necessary to maintain this distinction to account for the fact that we often make mistakes or for some other reason do not succeed in carrying out the choices we make. Because of this we must conclude that the choice to act is distinct and separate from the act itself.

Another proof of this separation is the fact that I can choose today, what I will do tomorrow. The act does not necessarily follow directly and immediately from the choice. And in the meantime I might even change my mind, so the original choice is never even acted on. This clearly indicates that there is a separation between the choice, and the act which follows from the choice.

This is all very strong evidence that you misrepresent what it means to understand one's own choices.

As I've shown, "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices", as explained by you, is not a reasonable principle. This is because you fail to properly account for the meaning of "understand" in your explanation. So you make that principle into something which neglects the moral value of understanding one's choices. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have not shown that. You have asserted that. I have properly accounted for understanding.

Very often, you seem to want words to correspond with concepts in the broadest possible sense. For example, when I say that being able to understand and make one's own choices is the measure of moral value, you seem to take that to mean that understanding generally is the measure of moral value. I suggest focusing more closely on the specific claim made.

None of these restrictions provide the force required for your claim. I can still choose to leave the room if I am locked in. Whether or not I am locked in the room only changes the probability of success or failure in carrying out my choice. Likewise, I can still choose to take a walk after my legs are broken. And I can still choose to sell my car even after it's been stolen. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think this discussion was related to force at all, but rather being unable to make a choice.

You seem to be interpretting making a choice as an entirely mental exercise. I don't think it is sensible to say you are able to choose to do something that you cannot do. If you would prefer I use a different word rather than "choice" in deference to your view on choices, feel free to suggest one.

Your examples simply display your failure to recognize the distinction between making a choice, and carrying out the chosen activity. As I told you, it is necessary to maintain this distinction to account for the fact that we often make mistakes or for some other reason do not succeed in carrying out the choices we make. Because of this we must conclude that the choice to act is distinct and separate from the act itself.

Another proof of this separation is the fact that I can choose today, what I will do tomorrow. The act does not necessarily follow directly and immediately from the choice. And in the meantime I might even change my mind, so the original choice is never even acted on. This clearly indicates that there is a separation between the choice, and the act which follows from the choice.

This is all very strong evidence that you misrepresent what it means to understand one's own choices. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, this definitely isn't very strong evidence of anything. I think it is reasonable to say that your choices are limited by not being able to action them and that the way you are using the word "choice" is perhaps a bit nonstandard. Certainly your example of choosing what you will do tomorrow is quite odd, since it seems even in your example that the choice to do the action happens at a later time, and that a better word here might be "planning".

But basically that's all fine. I don't really mind how you're using the word, so long as everyone is being clear with their communication. But, more importantly, my question to you is whether your objection is a normative one or more a linguistic one?

You have not shown that. You have asserted that. I have properly accounted for understanding. — Dan

We obviously disagree on this point.

Very often, you seem to want words to correspond with concepts in the broadest possible sense. For example, when I say that being able to understand and make one's own choices is the measure of moral value, you seem to take that to mean that understanding generally is the measure of moral value. I suggest focusing more closely on the specific claim made. — Dan

I am not saying that by your claim, "understanding" is the only measure of moral value, I am saying that the ability to "understand" must be given equal weight with the ability to "make" one's own choices, by the statement which is your principle. You clearly give preference to the ability to carry out the act which is representative of the choice (because of your consequentialist bias), and when I give you examples concerning a person's ability to understand one's own choices you simply dismiss them as not morally relevant.

Do you not understand, that it is illogical for you to proceed in this direction? You have defined "moral value" with the principle "able to understand and make one's own choices". Therefore any situations which affect a person's ability to understand and make one's own choices are necessarily of moral value. It is contrary to logic (illogical) to then turn around, and approach from your consequentialist moral principles, and say that since this instance of inhibiting a person's ability to understand one's own choices appears to have no consequences in actions it is therefore not morally relevant. Moral relevance has been defined by that principle. So you cannot logically override your definition to say that in these cases, affecting one's ability to understand and make one's own choices is not morally relevant.

This is the problem I've been showing you since the beginning. You have two incompatible principles, moral value based in freedom, and moral value based in consequentialism, and you are trying to display them as being compatible. So you sometimes approach from the side of freedom (the ability to understand and make one's own choices is the measure of moral value), and you sometimes approach from the side of consequentialism (only specific actions are morally relevant), and when you meet in the middle, you annihilate the one side (the side of freedom) in preference of your consequentialist bias.

I think it is reasonable to say that your choices are limited by not being able to action them and that the way you are using the word "choice" is perhaps a bit nonstandard. — Dan

Again, you are displaying gross misunderstanding of the nature of "choice". You are appealing to common usage of the term instead of accepting a rigorous logical analysis of what a choice is.

Consider that any time a free agent initiates an act, the existing physical restrictions are immense. The agent must make a "choice", a selection, as to the nature of the act which will be attempted. This may involve a sort of decision. When the agent makes such a selection, the choice is conditioned by the agent's desires (intention), and the agent's knowledge of the immensity of physical restrictions. The immense physical restrictions, themselves, do not at all play a role in the agent's choice. That's the essence of "free will", the agent's choice is completely free from these physical restrictions. What plays a role in the agent's choice is the agent's understanding of the immense physical restrictions.

It may be the case, that in common usage we simplify the situation, for the sake of efficiency of communication, and say things like "I cannot choose that, because it is impossible to do that", but this is just that, a simplification. What it really means, is "I will not choose that because I understand it to be impossible". Notice that the latter is the true representation. It shows that the choice is made by a free will, which could still make the opposite choice, and it shows that the thing which is viewed as "impossible" is not necessarily impossible in an absolute sense, but is understood as impossible, by the agent making the choice.

Certainly your example of choosing what you will do tomorrow is quite odd, since it seems even in your example that the choice to do the action happens at a later time, and that a better word here might be "planning". — Dan

So what? "Planning" is just a specific type of "choosing".

This is the fault of your way of understanding "understanding" which is clearly deficient. You relate things to the more specific, and claim that this constitutes "understanding". You say to me "you seem to take that to mean that understanding generally is the measure of moral value. I suggest focusing more closely on the specific claim made", and so you fail in your denial of the relevance of the general.

Here's a simple example. Consider what it means to understand what "human being" means. You could point to many specific examples, showing me, those are human beings. But this does not demonstrate an "understanding", because you need to refer to the more general concepts, "mammal", "animal", "living", the concepts which inhere within the concept of "human being", as the defining features, to demonstrate a true understanding.

So when you point to a choice made about what will be done tomorrow, and you say 'that's not a case of making a choice, it's a case of planning', it's like pointing to a child, and saying 'that's not a mammal, it's a human being'. All you do here is demonstrate a gross misunderstanding.

But, more importantly, my question to you is whether your objection is a normative one or more a linguistic one? — Dan

As it is a case of pointing to a true and real separation, according to the concepts involved, (the separation between making a choice, and acting on a choice), my objection is normative. You ought to respect this difference which I have described, in order that we can go forward with our communication, and this discussion.

@Dan
So here's the situation as I see it.

I have been telling you since the beginning, that freedom of choice as the measure of moral value, is incompatible with consequentialist principles as the measure of moral value. This make the challenge of your op irrelevant. You are offering 10k to anyone who can solve a problem which a sound understanding would designate as impossible to solve.

The real issue then, is your motive for doing this. If it is true, as you say, that you've spent close to ten years studying this problem, then by now you should have come to the conclusion that the two are incompatible. This presents the possibility that you are being dishonest, either you did not spend that time studying this problem, or you already know that a solution is impossible and your challenge is a trick of some sort. Another possibility is that you have a disability in relation to your capacity to understand and make your own choices. This would mean that there is some kind of restriction, a force of habit or something similar, which is preventing you from understanding that your choice, to attempt to achieve compatibility between these two, is a choice to do something impossible.

Since intellectual dishonesty is a very serious moral flaw in my mind, I am inclined to stay away from the former possibility, and choose the latter, that you have a disability in your capacity to understand and make your own choices. The two factors are your believe in libertarian free will, and your believe that consequentialism provides the best moral conceptual structure. The former is very intuitive to me, so I accept it readily, but your adherence to consequentialism is not intuitive. So I conclude that your disability is most likely associated with your acceptance of consequentialism. This is what I call your consequentialist bias, it is a force of habit which is restricting your ability to understand and make your own choices.

Based on this assessment, I will ask you to justify your belief in consequentialism as providing the best conceptual structure for moral philosophy. To explain what I mean, consider the following example. Suppose you spent ten years trying to solve the problem of making the conceptual structure of libertarian free will compatible with the conceptual structure of consequentialist morality. In this time you were not able to solve this problem, and your philosophical studies only strengthened your believe in libertarian free will. Why would you continue to believe that the conceptual structure of consequentialism provides the best principles for moral philosophy?

I am not saying that by your claim, "understanding" is the only measure of moral value, I am saying that the ability to "understand" must be given equal weight with the ability to "make" one's own choices, by the statement which is your principle. You clearly give preference to the ability to carry out the act which is representative of the choice (because of your consequentialist bias), and when I give you examples concerning a person's ability to understand one's own choices you simply dismiss them as not morally relevant.

Do you not understand, that it is illogical for you to proceed in this direction? You have defined "moral value" with the principle "able to understand and make one's own choices". Therefore any situations which affect a person's ability to understand and make one's own choices are necessarily of moral value. It is contrary to logic (illogical) to then turn around, and approach from your consequentialist moral principles, and say that since this instance of inhibiting a person's ability to understand one's own choices appears to have no consequences in actions it is therefore not morally relevant. Moral relevance has been defined by that principle. So you cannot logically override your definition to say that in these cases, affecting one's ability to understand and make one's own choices is not morally relevant.

This is the problem I've been showing you since the beginning. You have two incompatible principles, moral value based in freedom, and moral value based in consequentialism, and you are trying to display them as being compatible. So you sometimes approach from the side of freedom (the ability to understand and make one's own choices is the measure of moral value), and you sometimes approach from the side of consequentialism (only specific actions are morally relevant), and when you meet in the middle, you annihilate the one side (the side of freedom) in preference of your consequentialist bias. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not ignore things that affect a persons ability to understand their own choices. You want "understanding one's own choices" to include more than I think it does. I would say that the cases you have presented as problematic simply aren't. I am not annihilating the side of freedom, I am simply pointing out that not having the information you might wish is not the same as being able to understand one's own choice.

So what? "Planning" is just a specific type of "choosing".

This is the fault of your way of understanding "understanding" which is clearly deficient. You relate things to the more specific, and claim that this constitutes "understanding". You say to me "you seem to take that to mean that understanding generally is the measure of moral value. I suggest focusing more closely on the specific claim made", and so you fail in your denial of the relevance of the general.

Here's a simple example. Consider what it means to understand what "human being" means. You could point to many specific examples, showing me, those are human beings. But this does not demonstrate an "understanding", because you need to refer to the more general concepts, "mammal", "animal", "living", the concepts which inhere within the concept of "human being", as the defining features, to demonstrate a true understanding.

So when you point to a choice made about what will be done tomorrow, and you say 'that's not a case of making a choice, it's a case of planning', it's like pointing to a child, and saying 'that's not a mammal, it's a human being'. All you do here is demonstrate a gross misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

Planning to do a thing and choosing to do a thing are different, wouldn't you say? But either way, we seem to be getting bogged down in the words chosen, rather than the meaning thereof.

As it is a case of pointing to a true and real separation, according to the concepts involved, (the separation between making a choice, and acting on a choice), my objection is normative. You ought to respect this difference which I have described, in order that we can go forward with our communication, and this discussion. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have offered to use different language regarding this in deference of exactly this disagreement about what constitutes making a choice. You're welcome to suggest what it is. Would you prefer we discuss "actioning one's choices" would that be more beneficial? I think within the context of this discussion that is likely to mean something close to the same thing in most contexts, so I'm happy to use that language instead if you'd prefer.

I have been telling you since the beginning, that freedom of choice as the measure of moral value, is incompatible with consequentialist principles as the measure of moral value. This make the challenge of your op irrelevant. You are offering 10k to anyone who can solve a problem which a sound understanding would designate as impossible to solve. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree you have been telling me this, but your reasons are unconvincing.

The real issue then, is your motive for doing this. If it is true, as you say, that you've spent close to ten years studying this problem, then by now you should have come to the conclusion that the two are incompatible. This presents the possibility that you are being dishonest, either you did not spend that time studying this problem, or you already know that a solution is impossible and your challenge is a trick of some sort. Another possibility is that you have a disability in relation to your capacity to understand and make your own choices. This would mean that there is some kind of restriction, a force of habit or something similar, which is preventing you from understanding that your choice, to attempt to achieve compatibility between these two, is a choice to do something impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a bizarre claim because it seems to rule out the possibility that I am just wrong, which is a common affliction among us humans. It also doesn't make room for the possibility that you are just wrong, which appears to be the case here.

Based on this assessment, I will ask you to justify your belief in consequentialism as providing the best conceptual structure for moral philosophy. To explain what I mean, consider the following example. Suppose you spent ten years trying to solve the problem of making the conceptual structure of libertarian free will compatible with the conceptual structure of consequentialist morality. In this time you were not able to solve this problem, and your philosophical studies only strengthened your believe in libertarian free will. Why would you continue to believe that the conceptual structure of consequentialism provides the best principles for moral philosophy? — Metaphysician Undercover

Your question relies on the fallacy that if a problem is hard to solve, you should abandon the theory or position that spawned it. This seems fairly obviously not true.

It also relies on the idea that libertarian free will is somehow incompatible with consequentialism or that that is what I have been struggling to solve. Neither is true. I would say that libertarian free will is necessary for consequentialism as I think it is necessary for any moral philosophy since ought implies can do otherwise. What I have been struggling with for the past decade (though I will say that I have been doing other things too, not just sitting in a room trying to solve this problem) is how to determine what to do when freedom to make different choices conflicts.

As to why I think consequentialism is the best approach to moral philosophy, I have a few reasons, but perhaps the most compelling is that I don't think we can make a principled distinction between choosing to make something happen and choosing to let it happen. To put it another way, between acting and allowing. Without such a distinction, consequentialism seems like the only really tenable position. There are other discussions to be had, about why we should think someone's motives should matter and how action-guiding consequentialist theories can be compared to some others, but the lack of a principled reason to draw a distinction between acting and allowing is I think the most compelling reason to be a consequentialist rather than adhere to other intuitively-appealing and seemingly action-guiding types of moral theory.


More generally, I suggest that your approach of assuming I am victim to a bias or indeed a disability may be an instance of engaging in a mode of thought that is perhaps not helpful. It seems, and feel free to disagree, that you are starting with the assumption that I am wrong and preceding from there. I suggest that this may be the cause of the strange understandings of what I mean.

I am simply pointing out that not having the information you might wish is not the same as being able to understand one's own choice. — Dan

Do you recognize the difference between misunderstanding, and understanding? Any time that not having adequate information results in misunderstanding, then there is a case of not being able to understand one's own choice. Therefore any time deception influences one's choice, or any sort of falsity influences one's choice, there is a case of a person not being able to understand one's own choice. Furthermore, since a well educated person has better knowledge about a situation relevant to what the person's education is, than does a not well educated person, and can therefore better understand one's own choice in that situation, then that person is better able to understand one's own choice in that situation. I think it is very clear that having better information is of great consequences in relation to being able to understand one's own choice.

I really cannot understand why you deny this. Is it really the case that your ability to understand your chosen principles is that deficient? Or, do you actually understand this and are simply denying it for some other reason?

Would you prefer we discuss "actioning one's choices" would that be more beneficial? — Dan

This would not help. I believe that moral philosophy is concerned with making choices, and the assumption is that actions naturally follow from the choices accordingly. Focusing only on actions, with complete disregard for the process of decision making, which leads to those actions, would be pointless in relation to moral philosophy because it would ignore the substance of moral philosophy, which is decision making.

This is a bizarre claim because it seems to rule out the possibility that I am just wrong, which is a common affliction among us humans. — Dan

There is always a reason why someone is wrong. It's already become extremely evident that you are wrong, so now I've moved along toward looking at the reasons for your mistakes.

Your question relies on the fallacy that if a problem is hard to solve, you should abandon the theory or position that spawned it. This seems fairly obviously not true. — Dan

That's not the situation here. There are two theories involved, not one, the moral value of freedom and the moral value of consequentialism. It is very obvious that the two theories are incompatible. I pointed that out to you when I first participated in this thread. If, after ten years of studying this subject, you still do not see what is very obvious, then there is a problem with your approach. If you insist that there is only one theory, your theory, that the two are compatible, then the ten years of study should have proven to you that they are not, and that theory is incorrect. I mean, I recognized the incompatibility after less than a half hour of reading your material.

So I am not saying that you should abandon a problem because it is difficult. I am saying that if after ten years of studying something, you cannot see what others see as obvious about that thing, then the problem must be with your approach. The solution to the problem is to change your approach, allow the possibility that the two are incompatible, and understand each of the two separately. It makes no sense to manipulate the concept of "freedom", or "free will", just to make it fit with consequentialism, because all this does is force you into expressing a misunderstanding of "freedom".

As to why I think consequentialism is the best approach to moral philosophy, I have a few reasons, but perhaps the most compelling is that I don't think we can make a principled distinction between choosing to make something happen and choosing to let it happen. To put it another way, between acting and allowing. Without such a distinction, consequentialism seems like the only really tenable position. — Dan

I think I see the problem with much more clarity now. You never learned the distinction between choosing and acting on one's choice. This distinction is necessary to uphold, for the reasons I explained. Because you never learned this distinction, and the great importance and significance of it, you did not have the principles required to make the distinction between choosing to make something happen (choosing to act), and choosing to let something happen (choosing not to act). Not recognizing the distinction between choosing, and acting, has made it impossible for you to understand a choice which is not an act, "choosing to let something happen". Choosing not to act is equivalent to acting for you, because you do not distinguish between choosing and acting..

Because of this misunderstanding, you have chosen consequentialism as the only tenable moral position. Clearly your ability to understand your own choice has been crippled by this misunderstanding. The misunderstanding is that you do not differentiate between choosing and acting. And so you understand your choice of consequentialism, as the only tenable choice, when this is actually a misunderstanding. Your own ability to understand your own choice in this instance, is seriously deficient, due to this misunderstanding.

More generally, I suggest that your approach of assuming I am victim to a bias or indeed a disability may be an instance of engaging in a mode of thought that is perhaps not helpful. It seems, and feel free to disagree, that you are starting with the assumption that I am wrong and preceding from there. I suggest that this may be the cause of the strange understandings of what I mean. — Dan

I am simply employing your primary principle, "the ability to understand and make one's own choices". I am demonstrating how your ability to understand and make your own choice concerning the best moral philosophy, has been compromised by a failure to understand the distinction between choosing and acting.

Do you recognize the difference between misunderstanding, and understanding? Any time that not having adequate information results in misunderstanding, then there is a case of not being able to understand one's own choice. Therefore any time deception influences one's choice, or any sort of falsity influences one's choice, there is a case of a person not being able to understand one's own choice. Furthermore, since a well educated person has better knowledge about a situation relevant to what the person's education is, than does a not well educated person, and can therefore better understand one's own choice in that situation, then that person is better able to understand one's own choice in that situation. I think it is very clear that having better information is of great consequences in relation to being able to understand one's own choice.

I really cannot understand why you deny this. Is it really the case that your ability to understand your chosen principles is that deficient? Or, do you actually understand this and are simply denying it for some other reason? — Metaphysician Undercover

To not have the information you might wish to have is not to misunderstand (or fail to understand) the choice you are making. To borrow and example of Hallie Liberto's paper "Intentions and Sexual Consent", imagine you are wanting to buy a secondhand shirt, but you only want to buy it if it is 100% cotton. Sadly, as it is secondhand, the shirt you like is missing any identifying tags that would tell you this and the person working at the secondhand clothes store doesn't know. If you knew that it was a cotton blend, you wouldn't buy it, but if you choose to buy it without knowing one way or another, you have not misunderstood (or failed to understand) your choice. You are making a choice with incomplete information (which is presumably how we make basically all choices we ever make) but you understand what it is you are choosing and what it means to make that choice, even if you don't know what the consequences will be from it in the future (such as whether you will have a shirt you are happy with).

That's not the situation here. There are two theories involved, not one, the moral value of freedom and the moral value of consequentialism. It is very obvious that the two theories are incompatible. I pointed that out to you when I first participated in this thread. If, after ten years of studying this subject, you still do not see what is very obvious, then there is a problem with your approach. If you insist that there is only one theory, your theory, that the two are compatible, then the ten years of study should have proven to you that they are not, and that theory is incorrect. I mean, I recognized the incompatibility after less than a half hour of reading your material.

So I am not saying that you should abandon a problem because it is difficult. I am saying that if after ten years of studying something, you cannot see what others see as obvious about that thing, then the problem must be with your approach. The solution to the problem is to change your approach, allow the possibility that the two are incompatible, and understand each of the two separately. It makes no sense to manipulate the concept of "freedom", or "free will", just to make it fit with consequentialism, because all this does is force you into expressing a misunderstanding of "freedom". — Metaphysician Undercover

It appears obvious to you, but you are just wrong. You have a lot of strange ideas about consequentialism and freedom which are incorrect. For example, consequentialism is not a "moral value" it is feature of a moral theory, specifically related to how said theory evaluates actions.

I think I see the problem with much more clarity now. You never learned the distinction between choosing and acting on one's choice. This distinction is necessary to uphold, for the reasons I explained. Because you never learned this distinction, and the great importance and significance of it, you did not have the principles required to make the distinction between choosing to make something happen (choosing to act), and choosing to let something happen (choosing not to act). Not recognizing the distinction between choosing, and acting, has made it impossible for you to understand a choice which is not an act, "choosing to let something happen". Choosing not to act is equivalent to acting for you, because you do not distinguish between choosing and acting..

Because of this misunderstanding, you have chosen consequentialism as the only tenable moral position. Clearly your ability to understand your own choice has been crippled by this misunderstanding. The misunderstanding is that you do not differentiate between choosing and acting. And so you understand your choice of consequentialism, as the only tenable choice, when this is actually a misunderstanding. Your own ability to understand your own choice in this instance, is seriously deficient, due to this misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeeeeah, I don't think there is a principle to make a serious moral distinction between choosing to let something happen and choosing to make something happen. I agree that I didn't learn such a principle or recognize it, but I think that's because it doesn't exist. I think you may be suffering under a misapprehension. However, this doesn't prevent you from understanding your own choices, it just makes you wrong.

I am simply employing your primary principle, "the ability to understand and make one's own choices". I am demonstrating how your ability to understand and make your own choice concerning the best moral philosophy, has been compromised by a failure to understand the distinction between choosing and acting. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are very clearly not employing my principle, as mine would certainly not suggest that a) one of my own choices is to know the best moral philosophy, or b) that not understanding what the best moral philosophy is consitutes not understanding my own choices. Also, this is a broader criticism than simply of your most recent post. You seem to proceed from the assumption that I am wrong and also, seemingly, a moron. I suggest that making such an assumption is hindering you from understanding what I am saying. I suggest trying to read what I am saying with the assumption that it is consistent and makes sense, as this will likely cause less confusion if I use ambigious words like "it" in a sentence.

To borrow and example of Hallie Liberto's paper "Intentions and Sexual Consent", imagine you are wanting to buy a secondhand shirt, but you only want to buy it if it is 100% cotton. Sadly, as it is secondhand, the shirt you like is missing any identifying tags that would tell you this and the person working at the secondhand clothes store doesn't know. If you knew that it was a cotton blend, you wouldn't buy it, but if you choose to buy it without knowing one way or another, you have not misunderstood (or failed to understand) your choice. — Dan

This is actually a very good example of a misunderstood choice. The initial choice is to buy a secondhand shirt, but only if it is 100% cotton. The second choice is a changing of the mind, a choice to take a risk on the unknown, instead of adhering to the initial choice, which was only to buy in the case of certitude. So the second choice is the one of concern here. It is representative of a change of attitude, from the attitude of the initial decision to proceed with caution, only if there is certitude that it is 100% cotton, to the secondary decision, to take a risk on the unknown. This choice, to take a risk on the unknown is the one which is misunderstood because it is contrary to the original.

We can see that it is a misunderstood choice, because there is no explanation, no reason given, as to why the change of mind was made. In other words, this choice was made without any reason, and without a reason for it, it cannot be understood. If the example stated a reason, 'it was so cheap it was irresistible', or, 'it looks so good I forfeit the 100% cotton rule, or the person decided that if they bought it and didn't like it they could give it to someone else, then the choice would be understood. But that's not what happened in the example. The person had a clear choice to only buy cotton, then suddenly dismissed that choice and for no reason at all, bought a shirt of unknown material. Since the person did this for no reason at all, it is very clear that the person did not understand one's own choice.

You are making a choice with incomplete information (which is presumably how we make basically all choices we ever make) but you understand what it is you are choosing and what it means to make that choice, even if you don't know what the consequences will be from it in the future (such as whether you will have a shirt you are happy with). — Dan

But the issue of the example is not a matter of making a choice with incomplete information. As you say, we make all choices this way. The issue of the example is that a choice is made without a reason for it. Here's a similar example, which might help you to understand. Imagine that you have decided not to ever buy lottery tickets, because the odds are so bad, you think it's a waste of money. Then, you are in the corner store, and lights are flashing, bells are ringing, and there's a big sign saying $100,000,000 grand prize, and you are suddenly overwhelmed with emotion, and buy five tickets. There is no reason why you went against your rule, you were suddenly overcome with the urge to buy. So you clearly do not understand your choice. This is known as impulse buying, and in a more general sense, it is called "whimsical", and a similar concept is "overcome by passion". They are all concepts which refer to cases of not understanding one's own choices. And, you ought to see that acting by habit fits right in with these, as a case of not understanding one's own choice.

Clearly, the person does not understand what they are choosing nor what it means to make that choice. The person acts in a way which is contrary to a prior choice (changes one's mind on the spur of the moment) with no understandable reason for doing this. When a person chooses to change one's mind for no reason, that person does not understand what they are choosing (how could they, because there is no reason for it?), nor what it means to make that choice.

Yeeeeah, I don't think there is a principle to make a serious moral distinction between choosing to let something happen and choosing to make something happen. I agree that I didn't learn such a principle or recognize it, but I think that's because it doesn't exist. I think you may be suffering under a misapprehension. However, this doesn't prevent you from understanding your own choices, it just makes you wrong. — Dan

Do you recognize that a person can choose to do something, yet fail in doing it? If so, then you need to recognize the distinction between choosing and acting. If you continue to avoid this issue I will be forced to conclude intellectual dishonesty.

You seem to proceed from the assumption that I am wrong and also, seemingly, a moron. — Dan

I must admit, it is starting to look like you are a moron, and so I'm headed toward that conclusion. This was never an assumption of mine, I assumed you to be quite intelligent, that's why I engaged. Talking to morons gets boring so I try to avoid it. I'm not quite convinced yet though. I'll allow you to rethink the distinction between choosing and acting.

This choice, to take a risk on the unknown is the one which is misunderstood because it is contrary to the original. — Metaphysician Undercover

This looks like you are claiming something lunatic here. Could you please clarify what you mean.

We can see that it is a misunderstood choice, because there is no explanation, no reason given, as to why the change of mind was made. In other words, this choice was made without any reason, and without a reason for it, it cannot be understood. If the example stated a reason, 'it was so cheap it was irresistible', or, 'it looks so good I forfeit the 100% cotton rule, or the person decided that if they bought it and didn't like it they could give it to someone else, then the choice would be understood. But that's not what happened in the example. The person had a clear choice to only buy cotton, then suddenly dismissed that choice and for no reason at all, bought a shirt of unknown material. Since the person did this for no reason at all, it is very clear that the person did not understand one's own choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

Putting aside that I didn't give a reason because it isn't the point of the example, you are wanting way too much in order for someone to understand a choice. If people change their mind on a whim, that doesn't mean they don't understand the choice they are making. They might not understand their motives for making it (though this is also debatable) but that isn't the same as not understanding the choice they are making. In this case, they understand that they are making a choice with incomplete information to buy a specific shirt.

But the issue of the example is not a matter of making a choice with incomplete information. As you say, we make all choices this way. The issue of the example is that a choice is made without a reason for it. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that is the point of the example. I think the original version had a reason given since it had more of a complete story. I was just giving you a brief version and the reason behind the choice really isn't the point.

There is no reason why you went against your rule, you were suddenly overcome with the urge to buy. So you clearly do not understand your choice. This is known as impulse buying, and in a more general sense, it is called "whimsical", and a similar concept is "overcome by passion". They are all concepts which refer to cases of not understanding one's own choices. And, you ought to see that acting by habit fits right in with these, as a case of not understanding one's own choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah I would also say that in this case of buying lottery tickets on a whim, that the person seems to understand their choice perfectly well. They seem to understand what they are choosing and what it means to make that choice. Again, you want a lot more from "understanding one's choice" than I do. But, hopefully, that difference is now cleared up from these examples.

Do you recognize that a person can choose to do something, yet fail in doing it? If so, then you need to recognize the distinction between choosing and acting. If you continue to avoid this issue I will be forced to conclude intellectual dishonesty. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, it depends what you mean by "choose", but yes I suppose I would agree that someone can choose to do something but fail to acheive it. However, I've already offered to use "actioning choices" or some similar language if you would prefer. Also, I really don't know what this has to do with what you are responding to here. You seem to be saying that choosing and acting are different, but that is a whole different kettle of fish from acting and allowing being different.

More generally. While I have tried to keep up with all comments, helpful and otherwise, on this post despite it not being my preferred method to discuss solutions to this problem, I am going away for a while soon and will not be replying. I will get back to this eventually, and I do appreciate the suggestions I recieved to the email address provided.

This looks like you are claiming something lunatic here. Could you please clarify what you mean. — Dan

Look, the original decision was to buy a shirt only if it is 100% cotton. Then the person has a change of mind, and chooses to take a risk on a shirt of unknown composition. That change of mind results in a choice which is contrary to the original choice. The original choice: 'buy a shirt only if it is 100% cotton'. The second choice: 'buy the shirt of unknown composition'. Can you see how one is contrary to the other? Unless there is a reason for the change of mind, then a misunderstanding of one's own choices is indicated by the fact that the person has made contrary choices.

Putting aside that I didn't give a reason because it isn't the point of the example, you are wanting way too much in order for someone to understand a choice. If people change their mind on a whim, that doesn't mean they don't understand the choice they are making. They might not understand their motives for making it (though this is also debatable) but that isn't the same as not understanding the choice they are making. In this case, they understand that they are making a choice with incomplete information to buy a specific shirt. — Dan

As I said, you demonstrate a misunderstanding of "understanding". By my OED, it means "perceive the significance or explanation or cause of". Unless a person apprehends the reason why they discard an earlier choice that they have made to adopt a contrary choice, it is impossible that they could perceive the significance or explanation or cause of that change of mind.

No, that is the point of the example. I think the original version had a reason given since it had more of a complete story. I was just giving you a brief version and the reason behind the choice really isn't the point. — Dan

If the point of the example is merely to show an instance of making a choice on insufficient information, then it would not be relevant to what we are discussing. We are discussing "understanding" one's choice. Understanding is not simply a matter of having information it also involves applying the relevant information to the situation at hand. This is the point which you just don't seem to be getting. When a person has relevant information, they do not necessarily apply it. And that is why habit is so important as a source for misunderstanding one's own choices. It inclines one to act (often taking risks) without considering all the relevant information which is available. Failure to consider all the relevant information does not necessarily lead to misunderstanding, it often does not. But it can lead to misunderstanding.

So, in the case of buying the shirt, the person knows that they only want to buy a shirt if it is 100% cotton, that is information which they possess. However, in the act of shopping, they do not apply that very relevant information which they possess, and, by the force of habit or some other whimsical feeling, they choose to act in a contrary way. Acting in a contrary way to how one previously decided that they would act, without a reason for making this contrary choice, implies that the choice is not understood.

Again, you want a lot more from "understanding one's choice" than I do. — Dan

I really do not know what you could possibly mean by "understanding one's choice", if it's not to perceive the significance or explanation or cause of one's choice. How would you define "understand" in this context?

However, I've already offered to use "actioning choices" or some similar language if you would prefer. — Dan

No, this makes no sense. I am telling you that there is a distinction between acting and choosing, and you are now starting to agree with me. Yet you propose "actioning choices" as a way to deny the evidence which demonstrates your misunderstanding of "choice". Look at the shirt example. The choice to only buy if the shirt is 100% cotton, would be excluded as not an "actioning choice", because the person ended up acting on the contrary choice. Then we would be left unable to consider the very important condition of changing one's mind.

Why not recognize the real separation between choosing and acting, and then proceed to recognize that you were wrong to conclude that there is no serious distinction to be made between choosing to let something happen and choosing to make something happen? From here we can properly assess your reasons for believing in consequentialism.

Can you see how one is contrary to the other? Unless there is a reason for the change of mind, then a misunderstanding of one's own choices is indicated by the fact that the person has made contrary choices. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, so you mean that this indicates a misunderstand?

That is less crazy, but I think still wrong. I don't think it is a misunderstanding to change your mind. Or even to do so on a whim.

As I said, you demonstrate a misunderstanding of "understanding". By my OED, it means "perceive the significance or explanation or cause of". Unless a person apprehends the reason why they discard an earlier choice that they have made to adopt a contrary choice, it is impossible that they could perceive the significance or explanation or cause of that change of mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, there are a ton of definitions of words, and all of those are just based on common usage. Words are just ways of conveying meaning to one another. I think "understand" is a good choice to convey the meaning I am attempting to convey here, of being able to comprehend the nature of a choice and what it means to make that choice such that one can apply one's rationality to a choice and can respond to reasons for making it. Not knowing why you changed your mind does not preclude that one understood that choice in this way as one can clearly still know what the choice is and what it means to make that choice. In this case, that it is exchanging money for a shirt of an unknown material that feels like cotton.

If the point of the example is merely to show an instance of making a choice on insufficient information, then it would not be relevant to what we are discussing. We are discussing "understanding" one's choice. Understanding is not simply a matter of having information it also involves applying the relevant information to the situation at hand. This is the point which you just don't seem to be getting. When a person has relevant information, they do not necessarily apply it. And that is why habit is so important as a source for misunderstanding one's own choices. It inclines one to act (often taking risks) without considering all the relevant information which is available. Failure to consider all the relevant information does not necessarily lead to misunderstanding, it often does not. But it can lead to misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is definitely relevant. To understand the choice someone does not need to have all the information they might wish to have, never mind needing to apply it. My point is that the bar I am setting for understanding here is much lower than what you are talking about.

Acting in a contrary way to how one previously decided that they would act, without a reason for making this contrary choice, implies that the choice is not understood. — Metaphysician Undercover

It doesn't. They might well have changed their mind on a whim, which would not be considered misunderstanding the choice.

I really do not know what you could possibly mean by "understanding one's choice", if it's not to perceive the significance or explanation or cause of one's choice. How would you define "understand" in this context? — Metaphysician Undercover

To comprehend/recognize the nature of the choice and what it means to make that choice such that one can apply one's rationality to it.

No, this makes no sense. I am telling you that there is a distinction between acting and choosing, and you are now starting to agree with me. Yet you propose "actioning choices" as a way to deny the evidence which demonstrates your misunderstanding of "choice". Look at the shirt example. The choice to only buy if the shirt is 100% cotton, would be excluded as not an "actioning choice", because the person ended up acting on the contrary choice. Then we would be left unable to consider the very important condition of changing one's mind.. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, I would also quite happily describe the shirt example in terms of having a desire and then making a choice to buy a shirt that doesn't necessarily fufil that desire. I am not worried about whether the person wanting to get the shirt in the first place should be considered a choice or not. I just don't think it matters.

Why not recognize the real separation between choosing and acting, and then proceed to recognize that you were wrong to conclude that there is no serious distinction to be made between choosing to let something happen and choosing to make something happen? From here we can properly assess your reasons for believing in consequentialism. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have no idea how you have gotten from one to the other there. Let's say we agree that there is a difference between choosing and acting (mostly this seems linguistic to me at the moment). I'm not sure why I should think that choosing to act in a way that brings about some outcome, let's say the death of a person by my flipping a switch and sending a trolley to crush them, and me choosing to act in some other way which leads to the death of five people, in this case, not flipping the switch and watching while the trolley crushes them, are somehow different. Both of them could be considered a choice or an action, or both. The terminology isn't what's important. What's important is that there are two possible worlds (in this hypothetical) and I can pick one in which one person dies or one in which five do, and I can't see a principled reason why the fact that I have to flip a switch (or whatever) to get to the better world but only have to stand around twiddling my thumbs to get to the worse one should make a moral difference. This has nothing to do with whether or not there is a difference between acting and choosing.

Also, for what it's worth, I think choosing is definitely a type of action, even if it is a mental one. Though I don't think that has anything to do with whether there is a principled reason to draw a distinction between acting and allowing. The two things just don't seem to be related at all.

That is less crazy, but I think still wrong. I don't think it is a misunderstanding to change your mind. Or even to do so on a whim. — Dan

Changing your mind does not constitute misunderstanding one's choice, that's what I said. However, exchanging one choice for a contrary choice, without any reason, must indicate that the person does not understand one's own choices. A whimsical choice, if it is contrary to a prior choice, must be a misunderstood choice, because there is no real reason why the person negates the prior choice in favour of the new choice. The person can give no explanation for the choice. "Whim" means precisely that, without explanation.

Here's another way of looking at it. Lot's of people make New Years' resolutions, then many end up breaking them. Suppose a person resolves to quit smoking, then two days later is lighting up a cigarette. Notice that the two choices are contrary, first to not smoke, second to have a cigarette. One of the two choices must be misunderstood. Either the person doesn't misunderstand the force the addiction has on oneself, making the first choice misunderstood, or the second choice is misunderstood for the reason above. Usually we would not say that the first choice was misunderstood, we'd say that the person was not strong enough to overcome the addiction.

I think "understand" is a good choice to convey the meaning I am attempting to convey here, of being able to comprehend the nature of a choice and what it means to make that choice such that one can apply one's rationality to a choice and can respond to reasons for making it. — Dan

So, don't you agree, that changing one's mind to a contrary choice, without a good reason for doing such, constitutes not being able to comprehend the nature of the choice? Take the shirt example, there is no reason given for the change of mind, therefore the person cannot respond with reasons for making that choice. Imagine the person told someone else, a spouse or someone like that, that they were going to buy a shirt, but only if the shirt is 100% cotton. Then the person brings home a shirt of unknown composition, and the spouse asks, why did you buy that. I don't know. There is no reason given in the example. That's a common answer for children when asked why did you do that, I don't know. Adults give that answer sometimes too.

It is definitely relevant. To understand the choice someone does not need to have all the information they might wish to have, never mind needing to apply it. My point is that the bar I am setting for understanding here is much lower than what you are talking about. — Dan

As I said, making a decision without all the relevant information is not the issue. The issue is failure to apply the information which one has. When the person makes the choice only to buy a shirt if it's 100% cotton, there are reasons for this decision, and those reasons are available to the person within one's mind, the memory. Likewise, when the person decides to quit smoking there are reasons for this. When the person decides to buy on a whim, or decides to have a smoke because of an urge, that person does so without reconsidering all the information within the memory, which lead to the decision in the first place. That's why we say that it's a "whim", or the result of an "urge", the person is not applying the available information in making the choice. I'm not talking about not having the information, I am talking about having the information, but not properly applying it. That's why it's called "misunderstanding", it's a failure to apply the available information correctly.

I mean, I would also quite happily describe the shirt example in terms of having a desire and then making a choice to buy a shirt that doesn't necessarily fufil that desire. I am not worried about whether the person wanting to get the shirt in the first place should be considered a choice or not. I just don't think it matters. — Dan

I think you are missing the essence of the example. The decision to only buy the shirt if it's 100% cotton is clearly a choice. It's stated as that in the example. It's not a desire to have a cotton shirt, it's a choice to buy a used shirt, but only if it is 100% cotton.

You can rewrite the example, so as to call it a desire for a shirt, or a desire for a cotton shirt, but then you miss the essence of the example, which is the act of changing one's mind for a contrary choice. Please take note that this is just like your proposal to only consider "actioning choices". By doing this you exclude all the choices which do not end up in action, the choices of inaction, which is will power, and the choices which later get changed and do not end up in action. You can call all these choices "desires" if you want, but what's the point?

Why do you want to exclude all these choices from your consideration of choices? Obviously it's because this type of choice doesn't fit within you moral principles, your morality cannot deal with them. So instead of changing your moral principles to be consistent with the nature of choices in general, you choose to ignore all these choices, and hang on to defective moral principles.

I have no idea how you have gotten from one to the other there. Let's say we agree that there is a difference between choosing and acting (mostly this seems linguistic to me at the moment). I'm not sure why I should think that choosing to act in a way that brings about some outcome, let's say the death of a person by my flipping a switch and sending a trolley to crush them, and me choosing to act in some other way which leads to the death of five people, in this case, not flipping the switch and watching while the trolley crushes them, are somehow different. Both of them could be considered a choice or an action, or both. The terminology isn't what's important. What's important is that there are two possible worlds (in this hypothetical) and I can pick one in which one person dies or one in which five do, and I can't see a principled reason why the fact that I have to flip a switch (or whatever) to get to the better world but only have to stand around twiddling my thumbs to get to the worse one should make a moral difference. This has nothing to do with whether or not there is a difference between acting and choosing. — Dan

Sure, anyone can contrive an example where choosing inaction is just as morally reprehensible as choosing to act. I do not see how this is relevant to the issue of the distinction between choosing and acting.

Do you recognize that choices very often define conditions of inaction? Don't buy lottery tickets. Don't buy the shirt if it's not 100% cotton. Don't have a cigarette. Don't have a drink before driving. Thou shalt not... And so on. These are reasoned choices which serve as principles, rules which are designed for the purpose of preventing the urge to act, when the specified act is understood as unreasonable. Such choices do not produce observable acts, though they can change our attitudes. Since a judgement of one's moral character is a judgement of one's attitude, these choices which produce no actions turn out to be very important choices, morally.

Changing your mind does not constitute misunderstanding one's choice, that's what I said. However, exchanging one choice for a contrary choice, without any reason, must indicate that the person does not understand one's own choices. A whimsical choice, if it is contrary to a prior choice, must be a misunderstood choice, because there is no real reason why the person negates the prior choice in favour of the new choice. The person can give no explanation for the choice. "Whim" means precisely that, without explanation.

Here's another way of looking at it. Lot's of people make New Years' resolutions, then many end up breaking them. Suppose a person resolves to quit smoking, then two days later is lighting up a cigarette. Notice that the two choices are contrary, first to not smoke, second to have a cigarette. One of the two choices must be misunderstood. Either the person doesn't misunderstand the force the addiction has on oneself, making the first choice misunderstood, or the second choice is misunderstood for the reason above. Usually we would not say that the first choice was misunderstood, we'd say that the person was not strong enough to overcome the addiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think either was misunderstood. I don't think we need to say much about either one morally, but if I was to describe them, I would say that the person had competing desires and that they gave in to their urges rather than stick with the better course of action long-term. I don't think either one of these constitutes them not understanding their choices in the way I have described though.

So, don't you agree, that changing one's mind to a contrary choice, without a good reason for doing such, constitutes not being able to comprehend the nature of the choice? Take the shirt example, there is no reason given for the change of mind, therefore the person cannot respond with reasons for making that choice. Imagine the person told someone else, a spouse or someone like that, that they were going to buy a shirt, but only if the shirt is 100% cotton. Then the person brings home a shirt of unknown composition, and the spouse asks, why did you buy that. I don't know. There is no reason given in the example. That's a common answer for children when asked why did you do that, I don't know. Adults give that answer sometimes too. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I don't agree at all. The person still understands the choice such that they are able to apply their rationality to it. That's all that is required.

I think you are missing the essence of the example. The decision to only buy the shirt if it's 100% cotton is clearly a choice. It's stated as that in the example. It's not a desire to have a cotton shirt, it's a choice to buy a used shirt, but only if it is 100% cotton.

You can rewrite the example, so as to call it a desire for a shirt, or a desire for a cotton shirt, but then you miss the essence of the example, which is the act of changing one's mind for a contrary choice. Please take note that this is just like your proposal to only consider "actioning choices". By doing this you exclude all the choices which do not end up in action, the choices of inaction, which is will power, and the choices which later get changed and do not end up in action. You can call all these choices "desires" if you want, but what's the point?

Why do you want to exclude all these choices from your consideration of choices? Obviously it's because this type of choice doesn't fit within you moral principles, your morality cannot deal with them. So instead of changing your moral principles to be consistent with the nature of choices in general, you choose to ignore all these choices, and hang on to defective moral principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

None of these things are inconsistent with my moral principles. As I said, I don't think the language used here really matters.

Sure, anyone can contrive an example where choosing inaction is just as morally reprehensible as choosing to act. I do not see how this is relevant to the issue of the distinction between choosing and acting. — Metaphysician Undercover

That isn't remotely the distinction that is important for whether or not we should be consequentialists or not. Whether there is a distinction between acting and allowing is what matters. If you agree that it is incredibly easy to imagine a case where it is as blameworthy to act as it is to allow (and not even a case where the situation is somehow your fault in the first place), then how can there be an important distinction to be drawn between acting and allowing.

Do you recognize that choices very often define conditions of inaction? Don't buy lottery tickets. Don't buy the shirt if it's not 100% cotton. Don't have a cigarette. Don't have a drink before driving. Thou shalt not... And so on. These are reasoned choices which serve as principles, rules which are designed for the purpose of preventing the urge to act, when the specified act is understood as unreasonable. Such choices do not produce observable acts, though they can change our attitudes. Since a judgement of one's moral character is a judgement of one's attitude, these choices which produce no actions turn out to be very important choices, morally. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's say, for the sake of argument, that I agree that these are cases of inaction (which I'm not sure I do as it seems like they could also be framed as actions). I would say that I am the one who is treating inaction is morally relevant here. I am saying there is no important difference between acting or allowing, so "inaction" is as morally relevant as "action". Further, I would say that the reason these things are good, to the extent that they are, is their consequences. To borrow one of your examples, the reason it is good not to impair yourself with alcohol before driving is that doing so increases the risk of harming yourself and others, wouldn't you agree?

I really think I need to figure out how you are using the word "understand", because it's not making any sense to me.

I would say that the person had competing desires and that they gave in to their urges rather than stick with the better course of action long-term. — Dan

I think I see what you're saying here. What I call "choice" you call "desire", and what I call "act" you call "choice". So when the person decides to buy a used shirt only if it is 100% cotton, you call this a desire, and insist that it's not a choice, because it's not acted on, and the person's choice (act) is to buy the shirt of unknown fabric. I find this to be a very strange and confusing use of words which precludes the possibility of a person changing one's mind. What I call changing one's mind, you call "competing desires". I find this to be a very deficient description, but I'll try to follow you.

So here's the scenario you describe for me. A person has competing desires, then the person acts. The act is the choice. Where do you place thinking, decision making, in this process? We have to address this because you refer to "understanding" one's own choice, and "understanding" describes this thinking process. Is it fair to say that thinking, decision making, is a sort of medium between desires, what you call "competing desires", and the act which is the choice? (I intentionally say that the act is the choice rather than say that the act is representative of the choice, because you explicitly do not distinguish between these two.) And would you agree that "understanding" and its contrary "not understanding", are terms used to describe a judgement against this medium process, thinking, decision making? "Understanding is a judgement of correctness, and "not understanding" is a judgement of incorrectness in the associated thinking process.

I assume that in all cases of acting (choosing), there are competing desires, otherwise a desire would lead directly to an act, without any medium, and there would be no choosing. Do you agree? And would you agree that the medium, consisting of thinking, could be judged as either understanding or not understanding?

Now, the important point, who would make this judgement? The judgement of whether the thinking process was correct or incorrect, understanding or not understanding, must be made by someone. We cannot say that the person engaged in the thinking process, making that choice, also makes the judgement of correct or incorrect, or else all cases would be judged as correct, because the person would not make the choice unless they thought it was correct. Their judgement would have to correspond with the thinking process, because the choice actually is that judgement. Therefore the distinction of understanding/not understanding would be meaningless. In all cases of making a choice, the person would understand the choice, and there would be no question of the possibility of not understanding.

That would be the case if the person making the choice was the one who judged whether the choice was understood or not. All choices would be understood, and none not understood, and the use of "understand" in your principle, "the ability to understand and make one's own choices" would be redundant and meaningless. Your principle would be more clearly stated as "the ability to make one's own choices". Is this what you mean with that principle? Or do you want "understand" to hold some significance?

If the latter is the case, then we need to look to a third party, an observer to make the judgement of understood or not understood. Do you agree with the reasoning here? This means that we have to ask the acter, why did you do that, or something similar, and access the acter's thinking process in some way. From an analysis of the thinking process we can judge correct or incorrect, hence understanding or not understanding.

Do you agree with this Dan? If not, tell me please what you mean by "understand" in the context of the principle "the ability to understand and make one's own choices". I think that if we say a person understands one's own choice, this is a judgement we pass on the person, not a judgement that a person would pass on oneself, because that would be meaningless. If you agree, then could you name some criteria which would be used in that judgement? When we ask the person "why did you do that?" what sort of guidelines ought we to follow in our judgement of whether it is a case of the person understanding the act or not understanding the act?.

I am saying there is no important difference between acting or allowing, so "inaction" is as morally relevant as "action". — Dan

But the examples I mentioned are cases of disallowing, i.e. preventing one's one actions. This is distinctly different from "allowing". So the difference I am talking about is the difference between acting and disallowing one's own actions. It is not a matter of "allowing" the actions of others, those are irrelevant. What is relevant is the choices (actions) of oneself, and the difference I am talking about is the difference between allowing oneself to act, and disallowing oneself to act. In the shirt case for example, adhering to the principle "I'll only buy a shirt if it is 100% cotton", is a choice (I believe it is a choice anyway), which would have disallowed action in the circumstances of the example. However, in the example the person allowed oneself to act.