When judging the consequences of an action, you can say they are good or bad in a moral sense there something morally valuable being increased/decreased/promoted/protected/restricted/violated. The tornado wasn't "right" to turn away, but the outcome was good. — Dan

We have a deep difference as to what constitutes "morally valuable" In my understanding, what provides moral value to the consequences of an act is the intent of the conscious agent. If you remove the necessity of intent, then choice is only relevant in an accidental way. This would make it very difficult to justify your principle that choice is the best measure of value. If we can produce morally good results without making choices, why should we protect the ability to make choices?

All of these choices are choices about what to do with the mind, body, and property of the person making them, not that of others. — Dan

As I said, all decisions to act, or do anything at all, are choices about what to do with one's own mind, body, or property. That someone else's property might also be involved is accidental. This includes my decision to steal your car, as an example you said was not a choice which belongs to me. It now appears to be a choice which belongs to me because I am using my own body and tools. However, now you insist that stealing is not a choice which belongs to me because there is no consent. You really have provided absolutely no principles to distinguish between a choice which belongs to a person, and one which does not.

That was not my definition, that was how you incorrectly interpretted my definition. The choice to steal a car isn't yours because the car isn't yours. The choice of what to do with my car is mine because the car is mine. The choice to play a game with me isn't per se yours, but the choice to agree to play a game with me, to play games with those who will play them with you, is yours because it is a choice of what to do with your own mind and body (maybe property depending on the game). If I don't want to play, like in the case of you taking my car, you don't get to make that choice for me. But if we are both choosing to participate in the game, we are both making choices about what we do with our own minds and bodies, and that's no problem. — Dan

You simply introduce these terms, "consent", "agree", and you act as if whatever it is which is referred to by them magically converts a choice which appears to be one which does not belong to a person into one which does. We are talking about the ability of a person to understand and make one's own decisions. How does you giving me consent to borrow your car, affect that ability of mine, in relation to my choice to use your car without your consent? You are making no sense.

Again, it's always been the same definition. You just seem to be having trouble grasping it. I feel like I've been pretty clear, so I must wonder if it is in some way intentional. — Dan

You have not been clear at all. First, you insisted that "one's own choice" was a very special sort of choice, such that if I chose to steal your car this is not my own choice because it was a choice which involves your property. Now you insist that all choices I make which involve my own mind, body and property are my own, even if they involve your body or property as well. This implies that any choice I make, to do anything at all, including stealing your car, is my own choice, because it involves doing something with my own body and mind. But now you've arbitrarily added a constraint, "consent", or "agree", as if this makes a difference. How many other arbitrary constraints are you going to add, to mold and shape this concept "one's own choice", to suit your purposes? Will you make a new exception every time a situation comes up which your principles cannot deal with?

We have a deep difference as to what constitutes "morally valuable" In my understanding, what provides moral value to the consequences of an act is the intent of the conscious agent. If you remove the necessity of intent, then choice is only relevant in an accidental way. This would make it very difficult to justify your principle that choice is the best measure of value. If we can produce morally good results without making choices, why should we protect the ability to make choices? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the moral value in the consequences does not require intent. This is very much the point of consequentialism. Whether you meant to push the kid out of the way of the bus or whether you just thought it would be funny to push a child over, the consequences are just as good. I've already explained why I think we should use the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices as the measure of value, and that reason wasn't because intent is necessary to result in good consequences.

As I said, all decisions to act, or do anything at all, are choices about what to do with one's own mind, body, or property. That someone else's property might also be involved is accidental. This includes my decision to steal your car, as an example you said was not a choice which belongs to me. It now appears to be a choice which belongs to me because I am using my own body and tools. However, now you insist that stealing is not a choice which belongs to me because there is no consent. You really have provided absolutely no principles to distinguish between a choice which belongs to a person, and one which does not. — Metaphysician Undercover

It isn't a choice which belongs to you because it is the choice of what to do with my car. It doesn't "accidentally" involve my car as you put it. It is precisely about what happens to my car, specifically whether I keep it in front of my house or you take it and sell it for scrap metal. It's not that complicated.

You simply introduce these terms, "consent", "agree", and you act as if whatever it is which is referred to by them magically converts a choice which appears to be one which does not belong to a person into one which does. We are talking about the ability of a person to understand and make one's own decisions. How does you giving me consent to borrow your car, affect that ability of mine, in relation to my choice to use your car without your consent? You are making no sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

Consent doesn't "covert" the choice from belonging to one person to belonging to another. In the example given, the consent is the relevant choice to participate in a game or contest. What you have quoted there doesn't include anything about consent and cars. That being said, if you did obtain my consent to use my car, then that would make the use of my car morally permissible because I have made the choice that you can use it and it is my car, so you haven't taken my ability to understand and make those choices which belong to me away from me through your use of it (which you would have in the case where you stole it)

You have not been clear at all. First, you insisted that "one's own choice" was a very special sort of choice, such that if I chose to steal your car this is not my own choice because it was a choice which involves your property. Now you insist that all choices I make which involve my own mind, body and property are my own, even if they involve your body or property as well. This implies that any choice I make, to do anything at all, including stealing your car, is my own choice, because it involves doing something with my own body and mind. But now you've arbitrarily added a constraint, "consent", or "agree", as if this makes a difference. How many other arbitrary constraints are you going to add, to mold and shape this concept "one's own choice", to suit your purposes? Will you make a new exception every time a situation comes up which your principles cannot deal with? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't insist that. The choices which belong to you are the choices of what to do with your mind, body, and property. That doesn't mean that because you murdering something "involves" using your body, it is your choice to make. Whether or not your murder someone isn't choosing what you do with your own body, but with theirs (and their mind).

Sorry, are you really surprised that in a theory that focuses on the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices, that what those persons agree or consent to is relevant to what it is morally acceptable to do to them?

I haven't been making exceptions, I have been attempting to quash the strange ways you have interpreted my theory. But it is like playing whack-a-mole. I keep trying to clarify the same points and you keep intepreting that as me claiming something different and often bizarre. Without wanting to sound like too much of a jerk, I think if you look over our previous conversations with the assumption that I have been saying the same thing the whole time, they would make more sense to you.

No, the moral value in the consequences does not require intent. This is very much the point of consequentialism. Whether you meant to push the kid out of the way of the bus or whether you just thought it would be funny to push a child over, the consequences are just as good. I've already explained why I think we should use the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices as the measure of value, and that reason wasn't because intent is necessary to result in good consequences. — Dan

This example is not comparable. Pushing the kid is an intentional act, whether or not the intent is to kill the kid. Since it is an intentional act, the perpetrator is held accountable. If it was done as a joke, and the possibility of death was completely unforeseen, then the punishment would likely be less than if it was a planned murder. Regardless, the joke and the murder are both intentional acts. In you other example, the tornado does not act intentionally, so the consequences of its activities are not judged for moral value.

If this is what you really believe, that the consequences of inanimate activities can be judged for moral value, then it constitutes a significant difference of opinion between you and I.

That being said, if you did obtain my consent to use my car, then that would make the use of my car morally permissible because I have made the choice that you can use it and it is my car, so you haven't taken my ability to understand and make those choices which belong to me away from me through your use of it (which you would have in the case where you stole it) — Dan

See, your principle of "a choice which belongs to the person" is exactly as I say, based in moral judgement. When the choice is to do something "morally permissible" with another's body or property, then it qualifies as "my own choice". When the choice is to do something not "morally permissible with another's body or property, then it does not qualify as "my own choice". Therefore, just like I told you earlier, your goal to protect persons' ability to understand and make their own choices, is not a goal of protecting freedom at all, it is a goal of protecting moral restraint, i.e., to choose only what is "morally permissible".

The choices which belong to you are the choices of what to do with your mind, body, and property. — Dan

This is not true. You now admit to allowing that choices of what to do with another's body or property also qualify as choices which belong to you. This consists of things like a shared game, consensual sex, using borrowed property, etc.. It seems like so long as the choice is to do something morally permissible, it is one's own choice. So it is becoming more and more clear that your principle is not to protect the ability of people to understand and make their own choices (to protect some sort of freedom), but to protect the ability to understand and make choices which are morally acceptable (some sort of moral restraint).

Sorry, are you really surprised that in a theory that focuses on the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices, that what those persons agree or consent to is relevant to what it is morally acceptable to do to them? — Dan

No, I was a little surprised that a theory which claims to protect one's freedom of choice, is really a theory which only supports morally permissible choices. I'm not too surprised now, because I brought this to your attention, at the beginning of our engagement. I thought I'd give you a chance to explain yourself though, but we're not getting anywhere.

Without wanting to sound like too much of a jerk, I think if you look over our previous conversations with the assumption that I have been saying the same thing the whole time, they would make more sense to you. — Dan

You aren't saying the same thing though. Before, you said that choices which belong to a person are choices concerning one's own mind body and property. You continue to assert that, but your examples show clearly that choices concerning the mind, body, and property of others are also choices which belong to the person. This appears like inconsistency, but it's not necessarily. If we surmise that your principle is really "the ability to understand and make choices which are morally permissible", rather that "the ability to understand and make one's own choices", then the appearance of inconsistency is resolved.

This example is not comparable. Pushing the kid is an intentional act, whether or not the intent is to kill the kid. Since it is an intentional act, the perpetrator is held accountable. If it was done as a joke, and the possibility of death was completely unforeseen, then the punishment would likely be less than if it was a planned murder. Regardless, the joke and the murder are both intentional acts. In you other example, the tornado does not act intentionally, so the consequences of its activities are not judged for moral value.

If this is what you really believe, that the consequences of inanimate activities can be judged for moral value, then it constitutes a significant difference of opinion between you and I. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean yeah, those consequences can still be judged for moral value in the sense that they can be consequences that are morally good. It doesn't make sense to say the tornado "acted" rightly, but the consequences that occur, the situation which results, has higher moral value than what would have occurred in the situation where the tornado destroyed your house.

See, your principle of "a choice which belongs to the person" is exactly as I say, based in moral judgement. When the choice is to do something "morally permissible" with another's body or property, then it qualifies as "my own choice". When the choice is to do something not "morally permissible with another's body or property, then it does not qualify as "my own choice". Therefore, just like I told you earlier, your goal to protect persons' ability to understand and make their own choices, is not a goal of protecting freedom at all, it is a goal of protecting moral restraint, i.e., to choose only what is "morally permissible". — Metaphysician Undercover

That doesn't follow at all from what I said. My ability to understand and make my own decisions isn't restricted by me freely making a decision to allow you to use my car. Rather, it is exercised.

This is not true. You now admit to allowing that choices of what to do with another's body or property also qualify as choices which belong to you. This consists of things like a shared game, consensual sex, using borrowed property, etc.. It seems like so long as the choice is to do something morally permissible, it is one's own choice. So it is becoming more and more clear that your principle is not to protect the ability of people to understand and make their own choices (to protect some sort of freedom), but to protect the ability to understand and make choices which are morally acceptable (some sort of moral restraint). — Metaphysician Undercover

That is neither what I said nor what I meant. Consenting to sex is a choice that belongs to you, but having it is not (in the sense that if no one is keen to participate in that activity with you, your ability to understand and make your choices has not been restricted.

No, I was a little surprised that a theory which claims to protect one's freedom of choice, is really a theory which only supports morally permissible choices. I'm not too surprised now, because I brought this to your attention, at the beginning of our engagement. I thought I'd give you a chance to explain yourself though, but we're not getting anywhere. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is a theory of what choices are morally permissible, but that all flows from whether those choices protect or violate the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. Making their own choices is (usually) morally permissible, but not all morally permissible choices are choices which belong to the person making them.

You aren't saying the same thing though. Before, you said that choices which belong to a person are choices concerning one's own mind body and property. You continue to assert that, but your examples show clearly that choices concerning the mind, body, and property of others are also choices which belong to the person. This appears like inconsistency, but it's not necessarily. If we surmise that your principle is really "the ability to understand and make choices which are morally permissible", rather that "the ability to understand and make one's own choices", then the appearance of inconsistency is resolved. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you are reading things I'm not writing. You seem to be finding additional meaning between my words that I'm not putting there and, I submit, isn't there at all. For example, I haven't said that choices concerning the mind, body, and property of others belong to the person at all. I think if you'll look back over those examples, you will find I didn't make that claim and didn't use those words. I certainly talked about choices involving the minds, bodies, and properties, of others, such as when those choices might be morally permissible and when they might not be. I also talked about things like sex, in which I said that the choice that belongs to you was to consent to such an act, but that the choice to have it with someone (in the sense mentioned above in this post) was not yours. It is not yours specifically because it requires the body of another person. This inconsistency isn't between my views, it is between what I am writing and what you are reading it to mean.

I mean yeah, those consequences can still be judged for moral value in the sense that they can be consequences that are morally good. It doesn't make sense to say the tornado "acted" rightly, but the consequences that occur, the situation which results, has higher moral value than what would have occurred in the situation where the tornado destroyed your house. — Dan

I really do not understand what you could possibly mean by "higher moral value" here. Perhaps you could explain. Suppose I\m watching the approach of a tornado. I see that it misses all the houses in the neighbourhood, and rips through a forest instead. You say that there is moral value in this situation. Can you explain what you mean? Is it because the tornado could have killed people, but didn't? I could have got hit by a bus yesterday, but didn't. Does that mean there is moral value in the consequences of the bus not hitting me? Does any situation which can be judged as either negative or positive have moral value?

That doesn't follow at all from what I said. My ability to understand and make my own decisions isn't restricted by me freely making a decision to allow you to use my car. Rather, it is exercised. — Dan

But the example does not concern your ability to make your own decisions, it concerns the question of whether deciding to use your car in this situation is a choice which belongs to me or not.

Or, are you now distinguishing whether a choice belongs to me or not, by how it affects others' ability to make their own choices? That's what it appears like. If my choice doesn't restrict your ability to make your own choices, then the choice belongs to me. That would be very problematic.

That is neither what I said nor what I meant. Consenting to sex is a choice that belongs to you, but having it is not (in the sense that if no one is keen to participate in that activity with you, your ability to understand and make your choices has not been restricted. — Dan

Again, it appears like you are defining "one's own choice" in relation to whether the choice restricts the ability of others to make their own choices. This would lead to an infinite regress without ever determining what it means to make one's own choice.

It is a theory of what choices are morally permissible, but that all flows from whether those choices protect or violate the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. Making their own choices is (usually) morally permissible, but not all morally permissible choices are choices which belong to the person making them. — Dan

Sure, but in order for this principle to have any meaning, and to be able to be brought to bear on any real situations, we need to know what "their own choices" means. First you said that these are choices which concern one's own mind, body, and property. Then you allowed that in some situations, such as consent or agreement, choices concerning another's mind. body, or property also belong to the person. Now you seem to be saying that so long as the choice doesn't restrict another's capacity to make one's own choice, then the choice is one's own choice. This gets me no closer toward understanding what you mean by one's own choice.

For example, I haven't said that choices concerning the mind, body, and property of others belong to the person at all. — Dan

OK, so we've gone around a big circle. Let me get back to the issue as it was then. In general, choices which are judged as morally good, are not choices which belong to the person at all, if this means concerning one's own mind, body, or property. This is because morally good choices are about the mind, body, and property of others. So, how do you justify wanting to protect choices which belong to the person? And please, don't go off on a tangent again, speaking about how choices which belong to the person may affect the body or property of another in an accidental way, because the morally good acts, which we want to consider, are when we intentionally act in a good way. Why have a principle which promotes protecting the ability to make one's own choices, when a much better principle would be to protect the ability to make morally good choices. Neither of these principles is about protecting freedom of choice, so that idea is just a ruse anyway.

I really do not understand what you could possibly mean by "higher moral value" here. Perhaps you could explain. Suppose I\m watching the approach of a tornado. I see that it misses all the houses in the neighbourhood, and rips through a forest instead. You say that there is moral value in this situation. Can you explain what you mean? Is it because the tornado could have killed people, but didn't? I could have got hit by a bus yesterday, but didn't. Does that mean there is moral value in the consequences of the bus not hitting me? Does any situation which can be judged as either negative or positive have moral value? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, in the sense that it has higher moral value than some other set of consequences that could have occurred. Consequentialism is all about judging the consequences of actions by their moral value in order to determine if that action is right/wrong/permissible/etc. You can't judge the "actions" of the tornado, because it isn't a moral agent, but you can certainly say that the set of consequences which has occurred is morally better (more moral value is realized) than the set of consequences which would have occurred were it not for the tornado changing its direction.

But the example does not concern your ability to make your own decisions, it concerns the question of whether deciding to use your car in this situation is a choice which belongs to me or not.

Or, are you now distinguishing whether a choice belongs to me or not, by how it affects others' ability to make their own choices? That's what it appears like. If my choice doesn't restrict your ability to make your own choices, then the choice belongs to me. That would be very problematic. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. When I said that me giving consent to allow you to borrow the car makes it morally permissible to do so, that is not me saying that it makes it a decision which belongs to you. The use of my car is a decision that belongs to me, because it's my car. Which is what I said previously. I then made an offhand remark about the difference between borrowing and stealing a car, and how this is due to the difference in whether my ability to understand and make my own choices is restricted/violated or simply exercised. These are seperate points.

Again, it appears like you are defining "one's own choice" in relation to whether the choice restricts the ability of others to make their own choices. This would lead to an infinite regress without ever determining what it means to make one's own choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not accurate to say that is how I am defining one's own choices.

Sure, but in order for this principle to have any meaning, and to be able to be brought to bear on any real situations, we need to know what "their own choices" means. First you said that these are choices which concern one's own mind, body, and property. Then you allowed that in some situations, such as consent or agreement, choices concerning another's mind. body, or property also belong to the person. Now you seem to be saying that so long as the choice doesn't restrict another's capacity to make one's own choice, then the choice is one's own choice. This gets me no closer toward understanding what you mean by one's own choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

I did not say the second and am not saying the third. The choices which belong to a person are the ones concerning what to do with one's own mind, body, and property. I did not say, and do not think, that in cases such as consent or agreement, choices concerning another's mind, body, or property belong to anyone other than that person.

OK, so we've gone around a big circle. Let me get back to the issue as it was then. In general, choices which are judged as morally good, are not choices which belong to the person at all, if this means concerning one's own mind, body, or property. This is because morally good choices are about the mind, body, and property of others. So, how do you justify wanting to protect choices which belong to the person? And please, don't go off on a tangent again, speaking about how choices which belong to the person may affect the body or property of another in an accidental way, because the morally good acts, which we want to consider, are when we intentionally act in a good way. Why have a principle which promotes protecting the ability to make one's own choices, when a much better principle would be to protect the ability to make morally good choices. Neither of these principles is about protecting freedom of choice, so that idea is just a ruse anyway. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure what you mean by "morally good" choices here. I am presenting a theory of what morally good choices are, specifically the ones that protect the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. I have posited that this is the best candidate for a measure of moral value because it is applicable to all persons and bases moral value on the very features that make us moral agents in the first place.

Also, it is about freedom, specifically the freedom to make your own choices. That is not in any way a ruse.

Consequentialism is all about judging the consequences of actions by their moral value in order to determine if that action is right/wrong/permissible/etc. — Dan

Well, I do not agree with this, I think consequentialism is all about judging the moral value of actions through an assessment of the consequences. Moral value is attributed to the actions not the consequences.

Nevertheless, if we uphold this principle, that moral value is attributed to consequences, then your inconsistency becomes even more clear. The following is what you said about a person's own choice:

There are lots of intentional acts one could make that affect others but are entirely that person's own choice. If I beat you in a contest, I have affected you with my choices, and in ways you would presumably prefer I didn't, but I haven't restricted your ability to understand and make your own decisions. It wasn't your choice whether you won the contest or not, so my denying you that opportunity doesn't affect you in a morally relevant way. These restrictions you are worried about are of your own invention. — Dan

If moral value is attributed to the consequences of an action, then it is very clear that if a choice affects others, it affects them in a morally relevant way, whether the person intends to have an effect on others or not, and so this cannot be said to be one's own choice. If the person understands it as one's own choice, then that person misunderstands, not realizing the affects it will have on others.

So if you think that the choices which you make in that contest, are your own choices (concerning your own mind, body, or property) to make, then you misunderstand what your choice is really about. In reality the choice you make affects my mind as much as yours, so it is not really a choice which belongs to you. This is no different from if I decided to smash my car into yours, or even if I decided to drive over people. You would say that it was a choice that did not belong to me because I am destroying your car, or the ability of others to make their own choices, if I run people over. In reality, I just misunderstood, thinking that the choice did belong to me, because it is something I am doing with my car, and I am not considering the consequences which my actions have on others. This means I am inconsiderate. Likewise, when you beat me in a contest, and you think that that was the result of choices which belong to you, you simply misunderstand. Those choices do not belong to you. because it was me who you beat, and my mind, and the ability to make my own choices, which you are imposing suffering on, not your own, even though you are doing it with your own mind. Just like I am being inconsiderate when I impose suffering with my own car, you are being inconsiderate when you impose suffering through the contest.

The choice to have ones organs crushed (as in your example of being hit my a car) belongs to me, and by taking the ability to make that away from me, you have acted wrongly. The choice to not lose a contest does not belong to you, so I have not taken your ability to make choice away from you. A choice can indeed affect others while still being one's own choice. Because these are your own choices, mostly these won't affect someone in a morally relevant way, (though it is possible that they could and then there would be a genuine moral conflict). You being unhappy about losing a competition is not morally relevant because your happiness is not morally relevant. Only your ability to understand and make your own choices. Winning the competition was not your choice to make, and me beating you in it certainly would not constitute me taking away your ability to make your own choices.

The issue is how to determine which choices belong to a person and which do not. The ability to make "one's own choices" is what you desire to protect. Your criteria of concerning what to do with "one's own mind, body, and property" is very doubtful as to applicability, because most actual choices in practise, concern activities in the public sphere, and so choices concerning one's own mind, body, or property, have varying degrees of influence over the mind, body, and property of others.

You seem to have some sort of arbitrary guideline in your mind, as to the degree that a person's actions will affect others, which is supposed to act as a divisor between the categories of choices which belong to the person, and those which do not. If I understand correctly, the divisor itself, is the degree to which an act effects another person's ability to make one's own choice. So, if I choose to use my own body and my own property, and the effect is to crush your body, to the extent that your own capacity to make your own choices is restricted, then this is not a choice which belongs to me. However, if my choice simply makes you emotional, unhappy because I beat you in a competition, then this is a choice which belongs to me, because I have not robbed you of your ability to make your own choices.

Dear Dan, I think you ought to see this as extremely problematic. I could perform an act which injures you in a bodily way, cuts you, or breaks a bone, and this would not impair your ability to make your own decisions any more (perhaps even less) than causing you emotional distress would. Furthermore, since all choices concern doing something with one's own mind, body, or property, and there is almost always effects on others, then the determining factor, as to what qualifies as one's own choice, amounts to a decision based on the application of the arbitrary divisor you have in mind. The arbitrary divisor seems to be the degree to which other peoples' ability to make one's own choice is affected. But there is no clear definition of what constitutes "one's own choice", so there is an infinite regress of vagueness. To determine whether a choice is "one's own to make", we must refer to whether it affects the ability of another to make one's own choice, but we haven't yet determined how to know what "one's own choice" actually is.

Because of these problems with defining "one's own choice", I suggest that you drop this requirement, that the type of choice you want to protect the ability to make, is "one's own". Why not just start with the principle that you want to protect the ability to make choices? This would be a much better representation of "freedom", the capacity to make any choice whatsoever without restriction, and so you could start with this as your fundamental principle. Then you could apply your structure of necessary restrictions, due to moral relevance, to this freedom to make choices, in the most general sense.

I have explained why the choices to be protected should be restricted to one's own choices. I don't think it is vague to say you get to decide what to do with your own mind, body, and property. I think the limits of that (eg, your mind, body and property, not mine) are pretty clear.

You breaking my bone very much affects my ability to understand and make choices about my own body, such as whether I want my bones broken. You causing me emotional distress by, say, revealing a secret I would prefer stay hidden, does not. It is not my choice to make to keep the secret hidden. Pain is kind of a weird one, and one I discuss in my thesis somewhat but I'm not sure I ever perfectly nailed. It's a relatively minor issue though. Emotional distress, on the other hand, just isn't in itself morally relevant. If someone is made sad, or happy, it doesn't matter morally. What matters is whether they are able to understand and make their own choices.

I have explained why the choices to be protected should be restricted to one's own choices. I don't think it is vague to say you get to decide what to do with your own mind, body, and property. I think the limits of that (eg, your mind, body and property, not mine) are pretty clear. — Dan

That is overwhelmingly false. As we've discussed, every choice which an individual makes concerns what to do with one's own mind, body, or property. There is no limit intrinsic to that definition of "one's own choices". However, since our world is a communal world, what one does with one's own mind, body, and property, often has significant effect on the mind, body, and property of others.

As the examples we've discussed demonstrate, your goal is to impose a very arbitrary, and not at all well defined distinction between different types of "effects on others". Based on this ill-define distinction, you say that some types of choices belong to a person (are one's own), and other types of choices do not belong to the person (are not one's own). Your claim, that these "limits" are "pretty clear", is blatantly false. As evident from the examples, the proposed limit is arbitrary and weighted to your personal preferences. For example, when I damage your property (steal your car) this is weighted towards "not a choice which belongs to me", but when you damage my ego (beat me in a competition), this is weighted towards "a choice which belongs to you".

Please refer back to our earlier discussions about how education, and the establishing of habits of thinking, is a means by which people exercise considerable influence over the minds of others. The effects which education has are very significant, therefore choices made to educate others ought not be classed as one's own choice. Furthermore, any time that a person asks another for assistance, this would not be based in one's own choice.

The issue is, that since we live in a communal world, then once we start to apply your proposed principle of distinction in a consistent way, we end up with very few choices which are actually "one's own". This leaves the question of why do you want to protect the ability to make such choices. How are such choices at all valuable?

You breaking my bone very much affects my ability to understand and make choices about my own body, such as whether I want my bones broken. — Dan

You appear to be totally neglectful, and ignorant of the temporal nature of choices, which was discussed earlier. Choices relate to future possibilities, we must consider the past as determined. After you've had a bone broken, you cannot choose not to have it broken. You can wish that it did not happen, but such wishes must be separated out from, and dismissed as irrelevant to, the decision making process of a healthy mind. In Christian ethics, the separating of the past, from decisions toward the future, is very important, and this manifests in the confession/forgiveness process. "Jesus died for our sins" is a proposition which allows us to separate ourselves from the mistakes of the past, and move forward with a clear conscience.

Emotional distress, on the other hand, just isn't in itself morally relevant. If someone is made sad, or happy, it doesn't matter morally. — Dan

Like the beginning of your post, this at the end, is also blatantly false. Emotional distress is of immense moral importance. Anger for example is a contributing factor to a vast array of immoral acts. The angry person may act in a vengeful way, and this would mark a turning from making "one's own choices", toward choices which do not belong to the person ( even by your standards). Therefore it would be very foolish to dismiss emotional distress as not morally relevant. For example, if I injured you (broke a bone in the other example) this may send you into a condition of emotional distress (anger), and even though you maintain the ability to understand and make your own choices, you start to make choices which do not belong to you (revenge).

The issue being that choices are freely made, and a turning away from making one's own choices toward making choices which do not belong to oneself (by your proposed distinction), does not indicate that the ability to understand and make one's own choices is impaired. It simply means that the person has decided on other choices at that particular time.

As the examples we've discussed demonstrate, your goal is to impose a very arbitrary, and not at all well defined distinction between different types of "effects on others". Based on this ill-define distinction, you say that some types of choices belong to a person (are one's own), and other types of choices do not belong to the person (are not one's own). Your claim, that these "limits" are "pretty clear", is blatantly false. As evident from the examples, the proposed limit is arbitrary and weighted to your personal preferences. For example, when I damage your property (steal your car) this is weighted towards "not a choice which belongs to me", but when you damage my ego (beat me in a competition), this is weighted towards "a choice which belongs to you". — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you really want me to explain why stealing my car prevents me from being able to make choices about what to do with my stuff, but beating me in a competition does not, or are you just being facetious?

Please refer back to our earlier discussions about how education, and the establishing of habits of thinking, is a means by which people exercise considerable influence over the minds of others. The effects which education has are very significant, therefore choices made to educate others ought not be classed as one's own choice. Furthermore, any time that a person asks another for assistance, this would not be based in one's own choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

But just like when you said this the first time, you're just wrong that habits and education reduces someone's ability to understand and make their own choices (though miseducation of the kind that leads to people not understanding their own choices would obviously be morally relevant).

The issue is, that since we live in a communal world, then once we start to apply your proposed principle of distinction in a consistent way, we end up with very few choices which are actually "one's own". This leaves the question of why do you want to protect the ability to make such choices. How are such choices at all valuable? — Metaphysician Undercover

You aren't simply applying it in a consistent way, you are insisting on applying it either in such a way that our own choices can't affect others at all or in which any choice that you make with your own mind (which is presumably all of them) are your own choices. These are not the only options, and neither is one I would endorse.

You appear to be totally neglectful, and ignorant of the temporal nature of choices, which was discussed earlier. Choices relate to future possibilities, we must consider the past as determined. After you've had a bone broken, you cannot choose not to have it broken. You can wish that it did not happen, but such wishes must be separated out from, and dismissed as irrelevant to, the decision making process of a healthy mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's a few issues here. First, what choices one has access to and what choices one ought to have access to are not the same thing. Second, the choice is taken from me in the moment of arm breaking. It's no use saying that I don't have the choice once you've taken it from me, that is precisely the problem.

In Christian ethics, the separating of the past, from decisions toward the future, is very important, and this manifests in the confession/forgiveness process. "Jesus died for our sins" is a proposition which allows us to separate ourselves from the mistakes of the past, and move forward with a clear conscience. — Metaphysician Undercover

Christian ethics also relies on supernatural entities which almost certainly don't exist, human sacrifice, and eternal punishment, often for "crimes" which harm no one, so you'll excuse me if I don't take my cues from that.

Like the beginning of your post, this at the end, is also blatantly false. Emotional distress is of immense moral importance. Anger for example is a contributing factor to a vast array of immoral acts. The angry person may act in a vengeful way, and this would mark a turning from making "one's own choices", toward choices which do not belong to the person ( even by your standards). Therefore it would be very foolish to dismiss emotional distress as not morally relevant. For example, if I injured you (broke a bone in the other example) this may send you into a condition of emotional distress (anger), and even though you maintain the ability to understand and make your own choices, you start to make choices which do not belong to you (revenge). — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, we are getting into trouble because I am saying that the emotional distress is not morally relevant in the sense that it does not have moral value or disvalue that contributes to the consequences of an action being good or bad, are you are reading that as saying something else. Hopefully I have cleared up that misunderstanding.

Do you really want me to explain why stealing my car prevents me from being able to make choices about what to do with my stuff, but beating me in a competition does not, or are you just being facetious? — Dan

That is not the issue. "One's own choice" is defined as a choice concerning what to do with one's own mind, body, and property. It is not defined as a choice which does not prevent someone else from making one's own choice. The latter is not a definition, it is a fallacy of a "circular definition", a self-referential definition. And I've already explained to you why the choice to steal your car is just as much a choice concerning my own mind, body, and property, as are the choices which lead to beating another in a competition.

Anyway, I explained to you how hurting another emotionally may lead to anger, or other feelings which could result in an attack on the person, or some other vengeful activity. So I do not think you have any argument there.

But just like when you said this the first time, you're just wrong that habits and education reduces someone's ability to understand and make their own choices (though miseducation of the kind that leads to people not understanding their own choices would obviously be morally relevant). — Dan

Again, you misrepresent the issue. It is not a matter of whether teaching a person "reduces someone's ability to understand and make their own choices", it is a question of whether the decision to teach a person is a choice about one's own mind, body, and property. Clearly, the choice to teach a person is just as much a choice concerning someone else's mind, as the choice to steal a car is a choice concerning someone else's property.

You aren't simply applying it in a consistent way, you are insisting on applying it either in such a way that our own choices can't affect others at all or in which any choice that you make with your own mind (which is presumably all of them) are your own choices. These are not the only options, and neither is one I would endorse. — Dan

Sure, there are other options, like making an arbitrary distinction like you have, which as I explained, has principles weighted by your personal preferences. You think for example, that stealing a person's car has more moral significance than educating a person does. I think it is very clear that the opposite is true. Stealing a person's car has a one time, flash-in-the-pan effect on the person, which is very minimal in the scale of a person's lifetime, but educating a person has a lifelong effect on the person.

There's a few issues here. First, what choices one has access to and what choices one ought to have access to are not the same thing. Second, the choice is taken from me in the moment of arm breaking. It's no use saying that I don't have the choice once you've taken it from me, that is precisely the problem. — Dan

I spent a long time, at the beginning of this thread, trying to explain to you how any choice which a person makes limits that person's options, therefore restricting the person's freedom. Now you seem to be starting to understand, expressing how another person's choice may limit one's freedom. To fully understand this principle you need to recognize that a person's own choice limits one's freedom even more than the choice of another does.

Again, we are getting into trouble because I am saying that the emotional distress is not morally relevant in the sense that it does not have moral value or disvalue that contributes to the consequences of an action being good or bad, are you are reading that as saying something else. Hopefully I have cleared up that misunderstanding. — Dan

Oh sure, earlier you refused to distinguish between the choice, and the action which follows from the choice. Now, when it serves your purpose, you separate the act from the choice, to say that emotional distress does not contribute to the goodness or badness of the consequences of an "act". However, it is simply trickery, sophistry, to dismiss emotional distress in this way. Anger clearly contributes to the choices a person makes, producing consequences which are bad, bad actions. Therefore it has moral value in relation to choices. I am surprised that a person of your intelligence level would resort to such a sneaky trick, just to try and support a failing theory.

That is not the issue. "One's own choice" is defined as a choice concerning what to do with one's own mind, body, and property. It is not defined as a choice which does not prevent someone else from making one's own choice. The latter is not a definition, it is a fallacy of a "circular definition", a self-referential definition. And I've already explained to you why the choice to steal your car is just as much a choice concerning my own mind, body, and property, as are the choices which lead to beating another in a competition.

Anyway, I explained to you how hurting another emotionally may lead to anger, or other feelings which could result in an attack on the person, or some other vengeful activity. So I do not think you have any argument there — Metaphysician Undercover

First, it isn't circular to suggest that the limits of rights (or freedoms) should be where they abut upon those same rights (or freedoms) of another.

Second, anger doesn't "result" in attacks on other people, or other vengeful activity. People are morally responsible for their actions even when angry. Anger doesn't "make" people act violently, they choose to.

Again, you misrepresent the issue. It is not a matter of whether teaching a person "reduces someone's ability to understand and make their own choices", it is a question of whether the decision to teach a person is a choice about one's own mind, body, and property. Clearly, the choice to teach a person is just as much a choice concerning someone else's mind, as the choice to steal a car is a choice concerning someone else's property. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you choose to say something on the street corner, that thing might affect me, but it is a choice of what to do with yourself, not what to do with me. If you steal my car, it is a choice of what to do with my stuff. As I said before, whether someone is affected by your choice is not the appropriate measure of whether that choice is yours to make or not. Certainly, if they were affected in a morally relevant way (by which I meant their ability to understand and make their own choices were reduced/protected/etc) then that would affect whether it was morally justifiable to make that choice whether or not it was yours (though the choice whether to steal my car or not is pretty clearly not yours).

Sure, there are other options, like making an arbitrary distinction like you have, which as I explained, has principles weighted by your personal preferences. You think for example, that stealing a person's car has more moral significance than educating a person does. I think it is very clear that the opposite is true. Stealing a person's car has a one time, flash-in-the-pan effect on the person, which is very minimal in the scale of a person's lifetime, but educating a person has a lifelong effect on the person. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have not made an arbitrary distinction, but a principled one.

I spent a long time, at the beginning of this thread, trying to explain to you how any choice which a person makes limits that person's options, therefore restricting the person's freedom. Now you seem to be starting to understand, expressing how another person's choice may limit one's freedom. To fully understand this principle you need to recognize that a person's own choice limits one's freedom even more than the choice of another does. — Metaphysician Undercover

All of that is incorrect. A person's freedom (their ability to understand and make their own choices) is violated when those choices are made for them against their will (such as my choice to have my arm broken or not). It is not violated/restricted/reduced if I choose to break my own arm. In this second case, my freedom is exercised.

Oh sure, earlier you refused to distinguish between the choice, and the action which follows from the choice. Now, when it serves your purpose, you separate the act from the choice, to say that emotional distress does not contribute to the goodness or badness of the consequences of an "act". However, it is simply trickery, sophistry, to dismiss emotional distress in this way. Anger clearly contributes to the choices a person makes, producing consequences which are bad, bad actions. Therefore it has moral value in relation to choices. I am surprised that a person of your intelligence level would resort to such a sneaky trick, just to try and support a failing theory. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's no trick here. Again, I think you have misunderstood. Actions (or choices if you prefer), in any consequentialist framework, are judged by their consequences. What I am saying is that emotional distress is not a consequence which is relevant to determining the morality of an action (or choice). Does that make sense?

As for anger, it might contribute to someone making a bad choice. It might also contribute to someone making a good choice. Either way, the anger itself is not morally valuable. The consequences of that choice (or action, if you prefer) are what make it good or bad. Specifically, whether it protects or violates the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices.

First, it isn't circular to suggest that the limits of rights (or freedoms) should be where they abut upon those same rights (or freedoms) of another. — Dan

Yes it is circular. It's a self-referential definition, as I described. And that's a huge problem for the concept of "rights" in general. The definition of any specific right is always having to be reinterpreted because of that circularity. It's not a rigorous definition because every time that it reflects back on itself in an unwanted way, the definition has to be adjusted to the situation. This is why it's not a real definition, it is intentionally allowed to be adaptable because a rigid definition would run into problems.

Second, anger doesn't "result" in attacks on other people, or other vengeful activity. People are morally responsible for their actions even when angry. Anger doesn't "make" people act violently, they choose to. — Dan

Dan, you continue with the very same trickery, to turn things around. Anger is the consequence here, not the cause. The question is whether a choice which causes another person emotional distress is one's own choice. I believe that causing another person emotional distress, such as anger, is just as morally relevant as causing another person to lose one's property, through theft. In fact, I would go even further, to state that I believe that the reason why things like theft are morally relevant, is because they cause emotional distress. If theft did not cause emotional distress, no one would care about it, and it would not be designated as bad.

I am starting to think that you are being ridiculous. Instead of listening to the problems of your ill-fated theory, you have gone into denial about its problems, and are now resorting to trickery in an attempt to get around the problems.

If you choose to say something on the street corner, that thing might affect me, but it is a choice of what to do with yourself, not what to do with me. — Dan

This is blatantly incorrect. When I choose to say something to you, this is a choice of what to do with you. When I engage you in this way I am anticipating a response. The act of engagement is not about itself, it concerns the eliciting of a response. The intent of the act is to get a response from you, therefore it is "a choice of what to do with you". This is even more evident in my example of education, which you seem intent on ignoring. "To educate" is what you do to another.

I have not made an arbitrary distinction, but a principled one. — Dan

Your principles are arbitrary. You assign greater moral value to a person's property than you assign to a person's mental well-being. Stealing a person's property is "morally relevant", but causing a person emotional distress is not "morally relevant". Not only are your principles arbitrary, they are completely backward from accepted moral philosophy.

What I am saying is that emotional distress is not a consequence which is relevant to determining the morality of an action (or choice). Does that make sense? — Dan

No, this makes no sense at all, for the reasons explained above. One's emotional well-being, and mental stability is of the highest value. Therefore emotional distress is a consequence which is of the highest degree of relevance to determining the morality of an action. As I said above, the reason why stealing one's property is morally bad is not because it leaves you without a specific object, it is because it causes emotional distress.

Yes it is circular. It's a self-referential definition, as I described. And that's a huge problem for the concept of "rights" in general. The definition of any specific right is always having to be reinterpreted because of that circularity. It's not a rigorous definition because every time that it reflects back on itself in an unwanted way, the definition has to be adjusted to the situation. This is why it's not a real definition, it is intentionally allowed to be adaptable because a rigid definition would run into problems. — Metaphysician Undercover

Self reference does not, in-itself make for circularity. Eg, the moral relativist might coherently say that there are no objective normative truths and no objective metaethical truths except this one. That references itself but is clearly not circular. Likewise, it isn't circular to say that one's freedom of movement does not include blocking someone else in such that they cannot move. Especially given that other people's choices are not the extent of what defines what choices belong to a person.

Dan, you continue with the very same trickery, to turn things around. Anger is the consequence here, not the cause. The question is whether a choice which causes another person emotional distress is one's own choice. I believe that causing another person emotional distress, such as anger, is just as morally relevant as causing another person to lose one's property, through theft. In fact, I would go even further, to state that I believe that the reason why things like theft are morally relevant, is because they cause emotional distress. If theft did not cause emotional distress, no one would care about it, and it would not be designated as bad.

I am starting to think that you are being ridiculous. Instead of listening to the problems of your ill-fated theory, you have gone into denial about its problems, and are now resorting to trickery in an attempt to get around the problems. — Metaphysician Undercover

You haven't raised problems, you have raised misunderstandings. You might well be right that people migth not think theft was bad if it did not cause emotional distress, but they would be wrong. What is wrong would still be wrong even if all the world thought it right.

Also, you were the one who brought up anger causing immoral actions. I was simply pointing out that this isn't so. That isn't a dodge, that is addressing another thing you said.

This is blatantly incorrect. When I choose to say something to you, this is a choice of what to do with you. When I engage you in this way I am anticipating a response. The act of engagement is not about itself, it concerns the eliciting of a response. The intent of the act is to get a response from you, therefore it is "a choice of what to do with you". This is even more evident in my example of education, which you seem intent on ignoring. "To educate" is what you do to another. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, no it isn't. You don't do things "with me". You say some words and you might well hope for a response, but I might also walk on past. Unless you're chasing me down and tying me up, you haven't decided what to do with me.

Your principles are arbitrary. You assign greater moral value to a person's property than you assign to a person's mental well-being. Stealing a person's property is "morally relevant", but causing a person emotional distress is not "morally relevant". Not only are your principles arbitrary, they are completely backward from accepted moral philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

They are not aribitrary, they are based on the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. It is certainly true that I am going against accepted moral philosophy but accepted moral philosophy is wrong.

No, this makes no sense at all, for the reasons explained above. One's emotional well-being, and mental stability is of the highest value. Therefore emotional distress is a consequence which is of the highest degree of relevance to determining the morality of an action. As I said above, the reason why stealing one's property is morally bad is not because it leaves you without a specific object, it is because it causes emotional distress. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you actually mean it doesn't make sense in that you don't understand, or do you just not agree?

Self reference does not, in-itself make for circularity. Eg, the moral relativist might coherently say that there are no objective normative truths and no objective metaethical truths except this one. That references itself but is clearly not circular. Likewise, it isn't circular to say that one's freedom of movement does not include blocking someone else in such that they cannot move. Especially given that other people's choices are not the extent of what defines what choices belong to a person. — Dan

The problem I pointed out involved using self-reference in a definition. What happened was that you first defined "one's own choices" as a choice relating what to do with one's own mind, body and property. Then I pointed out that every choice which a person makes, relates to what to do with one's own mind, body, or property. And, what is really at issue is how one's choice to do something with one's own body, affects others. You moved to define "one's own choice" based on how a person's choice of what to do with one's body, affects others. So you came up with, if the choice doesn't limit another's ability to make one's own choice, then it is one's own choice.

Clearly, what you have proposed is a self-referential definition. I prefer to characterize it as infinite regress rather than circular. Q. How do we know if the choice is one's own? A. if it does not limit another's ability to make one's own choice. Q. How do we know if another's ability to make one's own choices has been limited if we do not know what it means to make one's own choice, other than that it is a choice which does not limit this ability of another? See, we cannot ever get anywhere because we do not know what it means to make one's own choices, other than that it doesn't affect another's ability to make one's own choice. But we cannot make that judgement as to whether it affects another in this way, because we don't know what it means to make one's own choice, other than that it doesn't affect another's ability to make one's own choice.

They are not aribitrary, they are based on the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. It is certainly true that I am going against accepted moral philosophy but accepted moral philosophy is wrong. — Dan

You have been unable to even adequately define your primary principle "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". Your attempts have been reduced to a meaningless self-referential definition.

Anyway, I don't think we are making any progress. I've come to see that what qualifies as "morally relevant" to you, is very different from what qualifies as "morally relevant" to me, and we seem to be completely incapable of bridging this gap. This is probably due to the attitude you disclose here, "accepted moral philosophy is wrong".

According to the op, you have spent the better part of ten years trying to resolve the issues of your moral theory. You have become so stymied that you now offer $10,000 to anyone who can resolve the problems with your theory. I suggest that it is high time for you to consider that the reason why you cannot solve the problems is that your theory is simply wrong, therefore there are issues which are impossible to resolve.

The problem I pointed out involved using self-reference in a definition. What happened was that you first defined "one's own choices" as a choice relating what to do with one's own mind, body and property. Then I pointed out that every choice which a person makes, relates to what to do with one's own mind, body, or property. And, what is really at issue is how one's choice to do something with one's own body, affects others. You moved to define "one's own choice" based on how a person's choice of what to do with one's body, affects others. So you came up with, if the choice doesn't limit another's ability to make one's own choice, then it is one's own choice.

Clearly, what you have proposed is a self-referential definition. I prefer to characterize it as infinite regress rather than circular. Q. How do we know if the choice is one's own? A. if it does not limit another's ability to make one's own choice. Q. How do we know if another's ability to make one's own choices has been limited if we do not know what it means to make one's own choice, other than that it is a choice which does not limit this ability of another? See, we cannot ever get anywhere because we do not know what it means to make one's own choices, other than that it doesn't affect another's ability to make one's own choice. But we cannot make that judgement as to whether it affects another in this way, because we don't know what it means to make one's own choice, other than that it doesn't affect another's ability to make one's own choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm fairly sure I didn't propose any of that. I think I pointed out that choosing to steal my car is a choice of what to do with my car, not your body. It's a choice that belongs to me, not you.

You have been unable to even adequately define your primary principle "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". Your attempts have been reduced to a meaningless self-referential definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think I've been pretty clear on what I mean and given a fairly clear and consistent definition. You seem intent to interpret what I'm saying in a strange way, then when I clarify that was never what I meant, you take me to be changing what I'm saying and interpret what I'm saying in a different (but no less strange) way.

According to the op, you have spent the better part of ten years trying to resolve the issues of your moral theory. You have become so stymied that you now offer $10,000 to anyone who can resolve the problems with your theory. I suggest that it is high time for you to consider that the reason why you cannot solve the problems is that your theory is simply wrong, therefore there are issues which are impossible to resolve. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have of course considered that I might be wrong, but I think we have good reason to think this is our current best bet. Certainly you misunderstanding me is not good reason for me to change my mind.

I'm fairly sure I didn't propose any of that. I think I pointed out that choosing to steal my car is a choice of what to do with my car, not your body. It's a choice that belongs to me, not you. — Dan

We're very far apart on this. What I pointed out to you, is that to steal your car is a choice of what I want to do with my own body. That it is your car being stolen, is completely accidental. I want to get myself from A to B, so I grab a car, or I want to make some quick cash, so I grab a car, and sell it. Whatever the case, what I want, and what I am doing with my own body, is the primary motivation here. Theft is fundamentally a selfish act. That it is your car which enters into my plans and not some other thing, or things, is purely accidental. There is no essential relation between my choice and your car, so my choice to steal your car is not at all "about your car", it is about my own selfish wants and desires, what I want, for myself. The choice shows complete disregard for you and your property, rather than your representation of it, as a choice about what to do with your property.

I have of course considered that I might be wrong, but I think we have good reason to think this is our current best bet. Certainly you misunderstanding me is not good reason for me to change my mind. — Dan

You are simply in denial, refusing to accept that I completely understand you, after weeks of quizzing you, but I also completely disagree with you. You have demonstrated very clearly that the concept of "one's own choice" which you propose, cannot be made to be coherent. That you insist it to be coherent, when I've demonstrated its incoherency, shows not a misunderstanding on my part, but denial on your part.

We're very far apart on this. What I pointed out to you, is that to steal your car is a choice of what I want to do with my own body. That it is your car being stolen, is completely accidental. I want to get myself from A to B, so I grab a car, or I want to make some quick cash, so I grab a car, and sell it. Whatever the case, what I want, and what I am doing with my own body, is the primary motivation here. Theft is fundamentally a selfish act. That it is your car which enters into my plans and not some other thing, or things, is purely accidental. There is no essential relation between my choice and your car, so my choice to steal your car is not at all "about your car", it is about my own selfish wants and desires, what I want, for myself. The choice shows complete disregard for you and your property, rather than your representation of it, as a choice about what to do with your property. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are confusing the motivation for the act with the act itself. Your stealing my car is very much about what happens to my car.

You are simply in denial, refusing to accept that I completely understand you, after weeks of quizzing you, but I also completely disagree with you. You have demonstrated very clearly that the concept of "one's own choice" which you propose, cannot be made to be coherent. That you insist it to be coherent, when I've demonstrated its incoherency, shows not a misunderstanding on my part, but denial on your part. — Metaphysician Undercover

I only don't believe that you understand me because in almost every post you have made, you have misrepresented me dramatically and/or accused me of making a claim I have not made.

You have not demonstrated anything of the sort. You may have claimed it, but you have not in the least demonstrated it. You have asserted that some definitions that aren't the same as what I have said don't work and you have insisted that stealing my car constitutes your own choice because you use your body to do the stealing. I am still not sure if you would like a clear explanation of why this isn't so or if you are being facetious in this case.

You are confusing the motivation for the act with the act itself. Your stealing my car is very much about what happens to my car. — Dan

Your principle, "one's own choice" states that the choice concerns one's own mind, body, and property. This implies that the motivation for the act, as that which concerns one's "mind" is just as much a determining factor as one's property. The car thief uses one's own mind, one's own body, and one's own tools, to achieve one's own ends. As I said, most all choices ought to be considered "one's own choices", by the dictates of your primary definition.

However, you do not accept your own definition. You realize that such a definition would require a multitude of exceptions to produce the result which you desire. The example above, of a thief using one's own tools, is one such exception. This is because 'what you desire', is to make how one's own choice affects other people, as the true defining feature of what constitute "one's own choice". So, when I make my own choice (according to your definition), to use my own mind, body, and property, to steal your car, you override your definition, to produce a new defining feature, how one's own choice affects the ability of another to make one's own choice. Accordingly, this overriding definition becomes the true definition which you utilize. The definition of "one's own choice" is no longer a choice which concerns ones' own mind, body, and property, it is now, "a choice which does not limit the ability of another to make one's own choice". However, this new definition suffers the problem of being self-referential.

Furthermore, you then place undue restrictions on your judgement as to which ways that one's choice affects others, are to be prioritized, to match the prejudice of your preference. You dismiss affects on one's mind as not morally relevant, and emphasize affects one one's property, as morally relevant. So your guiding principle of "one's own mind, body, and property" is thrown right out the window. It is now replace with how one's choice affects another's property, body sometimes, and never the affects on one's mind. Affects to one's mind being dismissed as not morally relevant.

Your principle, "one's own choice" states that the choice concerns one's own mind, body, and property. This implies that the motivation for the act, as that which concerns one's "mind" is just as much a determining factor as one's property. The car thief uses one's own mind, one's own body, and one's own tools, to achieve one's own ends. As I said, most all choices ought to be considered "one's own choices", by the dictates of your primary definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

I doesn't imply that at all. Motivation is not important in FC. I certainly didn't suggest that any choices one makes that in any way involve things that belong to you therefore belong to you. You are free to choose what happens to your body, but not to my car.

However, you do not accept your own definition — Metaphysician Undercover

It isn't my definition. It is your definition. Again I did not define it this way. I am not overriding anything, I was never suggesting that anything you do that in some way involves your mind, body, and property is your choice. I was suggesting that you get to choose what happens with your own mind, body, and property, and not what happens to the minds, bodies, and property of others.

Furthermore, you then place undue restrictions on your judgement as to which ways that one's choice affects others, are to be prioritized, to match the prejudice of your preference. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I dismiss feautres of actions that do not involve protecting or limiting the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. I do not dismiss effects on one's mind. There are quite a few effects on one's mind that one could have which would be morally relevant. But someone being upset is not one of them. You are, again, putting words in my mouth that do not belong there.

I doesn't imply that at all. Motivation is not important in FC. — Dan

Motivation is a large aspect of "one's mind". If it is not important to FC, then your principle, "one's own choice", defined by you as a choice concerning one's own mind, body, and property is not consistent with FC.

It isn't my definition. It is your definition. Again I did not define it this way. I am not overriding anything, I was never suggesting that anything you do that in some way involves your mind, body, and property is your choice. I was suggesting that you get to choose what happens with your own mind, body, and property, and not what happens to the minds, bodies, and property of others. — Dan

You are changing the goal post. You spoke about protecting a person's ability to make one's own choices. When I suggest that stealing your car is a choice I might make, you said it is not my own choice to make, because it concerns your property. Then you defined "one's own choice" as a choice about what to do with one's own mind, body, and property.

Now you have turned things completely around, saying "you get to choose what happens...and not what happens to...". You are now not talking about "one's own choice" in any stretch of the imagination. You are now telling everyone what they must and must not choose, so you are imposing your own choice onto the minds of others, "you get to choose...". How could this be a choice which belongs to you, to impose such restrictions on the choices of others?

There are quite a few effects on one's mind that one could have which would be morally relevant. But someone being upset is not one of them. — Dan

As discussed, I strongly disagree with this. And it is things like this, and your complete disrespect for conventional moral philosophy, (saying that it is wrong), which make me realize that you truly are way off track.

Motivation is a large aspect of "one's mind". If it is not important to FC, then your principle, "one's own choice", defined by you as a choice concerning one's own mind, body, and property is not consistent with FC. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure what you mean by this.

You are changing the goal post. You spoke about protecting a person's ability to make one's own choices. When I suggest that stealing your car is a choice I might make, you said it is not my own choice to make, because it concerns your property. Then you defined "one's own choice" as a choice about what to do with one's own mind, body, and property.

Now you have turned things completely around, saying "you get to choose what happens...and not what happens to...". You are now not talking about "one's own choice" in any stretch of the imagination. You are now telling everyone what they must and must not choose, so you are imposing your own choice onto the minds of others, "you get to choose...". How could this be a choice which belongs to you, to impose such restrictions on the choices of others? — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, the goalposts are where they always are. I'm not sure what you think I am turning around here. Is it "you get to choose" that you are taking issue with? What do you take that to mean that is different? I think you may be reading something different than what I am writing as I have been saying the same thing (though sometimes in different ways in order to clear up any confusion) from the off.

As discussed, I strongly disagree with this. And it is things like this, and your complete disrespect for conventional moral philosophy, (saying that it is wrong), which make me realize that you truly are way off track. — Metaphysician Undercover

This seems to be to be the fallacy of appeal to tradition. Also, on a related note I'm not sure I would consider saying something is wrong to be "complete disrespect"

Again, the goalposts are where they always are. I'm not sure what you think I am turning around here. Is it "you get to choose" that you are taking issue with? What do you take that to mean that is different? I think you may be reading something different than what I am writing as I have been saying the same thing (though sometimes in different ways in order to clear up any confusion) from the off. — Dan

Before, you were qualifying types of choices. The choice to steal your car was a choice which does not belong to me, and this judgement was made based on principles of "one's own mind, body, and property". Now you seem to be saying that there is something to prevent me from making such a choice; I do not get to make a choice which does not belong to me.

It's a "turn around" because at first you were just distinguishing between choices which belong to a person and those which do not, and claiming to protect the ability to make the one type. Now you imply that there is a mechanism in place which would restrict one's decision (therefore one's mind), to only make choices which one gets to make. So instead of looking forward to the future "I want to promote the ability to make one's own choices', you are now looking back at the past 'there is a mechanism which has been put in place which prevents one from making choices which are not one's own'.

This seems to be to be the fallacy of appeal to tradition. Also, on a related note I'm not sure I would consider saying something is wrong to be "complete disrespect" — Dan

Now it's my turn to say that you misunderstand me. Saying that a specific approach is "wrong", and dismissing it without demonstrating why it is wrong, is showing complete disrespect for it. However, you may actually understand it very well, and have very good reasons for saying it's wrong, and therefore actually have respect for it. But dismissing it as wrong, without showing these reasons, is to show complete disrespect.

The same principle goes the other way to claim tradition is correct, without showing why, is apprehended as an appeal to tradition. What I am claiming is not that tradition is necessarily correct, so I am not making an appeal to tradition. What I am claiming is that there is much information to be learned from the study of traditional principles, and your off-hand rejection of tradition as wrong, instead of demonstrating the faults in tradition, indicates that you have probably not taken the time to understand these principles. And this inclines me to think that you really do not have a good grasp of the principles which your theory attempts to deal with.

It's a "turn around" because at first you were just distinguishing between choices which belong to a person and those which do not, and claiming to protect the ability to make the one type. Now you imply that there is a mechanism in place which would restrict one's decision (therefore one's mind), to only make choices which one gets to make. So instead of looking forward to the future "I want to promote the ability to make one's own choices', you are now looking back at the past 'there is a mechanism which has been put in place which prevents one from making choices which are not one's own'. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. I am not claiming any such mechanism. I meant "you don't get to" in the sense that it is morally bad for you to make my choices for me.

But dismissing it as wrong, without showing these reasons, is to show complete disrespect. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is it? Again, I'm not sure that's true. Further, given the depth and breadth of traditional moral philosophy, explaining why it, as a whole, is wrong would be quite the undertaking, and we seem to have trouble even communicating what seem to be fairly simple ideas. If you would like me to explain why I think why much of moral philosophy is barking up the wrong tree, I can do it, but that might be getting rather off topic.

No. I am not claiming any such mechanism. I meant "you don't get to" in the sense that it is morally bad for you to make my choices for me. — Dan

But it isn't morally bad to make another's choice. That's what we already went through. It is generally good to save a person's life, for example. That's where your theory ran into problems, and you had to make all sorts of exceptions to allow that making another's choice is sometimes good. So, you do "get to" make choices which are not your own. Then this whole distinction (choices which do belong, and do not belong to the person) falls apart as meaningless, because what you are really trying to protect is choices which are morally good.

If you would like me to explain why I think why much of moral philosophy is barking up the wrong tree, I can do it, but that might be getting rather off topic. — Dan

Actually, I think that might be very helpful if we are to get anywhere in this discussion, because it might help me to understand why we are so far apart. On the other hand, you seem firmly attached to your beliefs, and I to mine, so it's unlikely we will get anywhere anyway.

But it isn't morally bad to make another's choice. That's what we already went through. It is generally good to save a person's life, for example. That's where your theory ran into problems, and you had to make all sorts of exceptions to allow that making another's choice is sometimes good. So, you do "get to" make choices which are not your own. Then this whole distinction (choices which do belong, and do not belong to the person) falls apart as meaningless, because what you are really trying to protect is choices which are morally good. — Metaphysician Undercover

You've made a category mistake. Making someone else's choice for them, taking it away from them, is bad. It might not always be wrong (for example, killing one to save five) but it is always bad. It always counts against the action. There are lots of choices that aren't yours that would be good and/or right to make, but not belonging to you is not the same as belonging to someone else.

Actually, I think that might be very helpful if we are to get anywhere in this discussion, because it might help me to understand why we are so far apart. On the other hand, you seem firmly attached to your beliefs, and I to mine, so it's unlikely we will get anywhere anyway. — Metaphysician Undercover

In briefest of brief, moral philosophy tends to rest on assumptions that I think are either incorrect or at least unfounded. Some of those include but are not limited to (and not all moral theories rely on the same assumptions of course, I'm just giving a few examples):

* That there is some end that all humanity is aimed at or some goal that all humanity pursues
* That if there were such an end or goal, it would be morally valuable (which in turn can often rest, though not always, on metaethical assumptions about what the point of morality is)
* That it is rational to do what is moral (and sometimes vice versa)
* That is is irrational to make an exception of yourself or treat your own ends as more valuable than those of others (this one can be a bit more complicated than this and the extent to which I have an issue with it depends a lot on how this is fleshed out)

You've made a category mistake. Making someone else's choice for them, taking it away from them, is bad. It might not always be wrong (for example, killing one to save five) but it is always bad. It always counts against the action. There are lots of choices that aren't yours that would be good and/or right to make, but not belonging to you is not the same as belonging to someone else. — Dan

You're really losing me Dan. How can there be a choice which does not belong to me , and yet does not belong to someone else? Who's choice is it? What type of existence does this choice have? I can see how it might be considered as a possibility, but how is it a choice?

In briefest of brief, moral philosophy tends to rest on assumptions that I think are either incorrect or at least unfounded. — Dan

Wow, you do have strange beliefs, don't you?

That there is some end that all humanity is aimed at or some goal that all humanity pursues — Dan

How could you justify cooperation without common goals?

* That it is rational to do what is moral (and sometimes vice versa) — Dan

Since human beings are rational animals, how could they be inclined to do what is moral, if it is not rational to do what is moral. Your claim makes not sense.

* That is is irrational to make an exception of yourself or treat your own ends as more valuable than those of others (this one can be a bit more complicated than this and the extent to which I have an issue with it depends a lot on how this is fleshed out) — Dan

This is the issue I took up with you already. I do not see how your position could be justified. When one decides that another's end is as valuable as one's own, this is just to make another's end one's own. It is logically impossible to make the ends of others as valuable as one's own, because all this means is to adopt another's as one's own. So only the ones judged as being valuable enough to be adopted as one's own are truly seen to be as valuable as one's own, and this is only by way of actually making them one's own. Therefore to keep moral principles aligned with truth, we must hold that one's own ends are always the most valuable to the person.

Cooperation is derived from common ends. But there is a big difference between taking another's end as one\s own, in cooperation, and allowing that there is no difference of importance in any goals of all others, like the principle you propose. The former (holding one's own as the most important) encourages rational judgement of any ends before passing judgement on importance on them. The latter (what you propose), provides no basis for judgement of the ends of others, because they already must be assumed to be just as important as one's own.

You're really losing me Dan. How can there be a choice which does not belong to me , and yet does not belong to someone else? Who's choice is it? What type of existence does this choice have? I can see how it might be considered as a possibility, but how is it a choice? — Metaphysician Undercover

The choice to say, write your name on the moon, does not belong to anyone. Nobody has a "right" to do so, so we not need to protect anyone's ability to make that choice.

Wow, you do have strange beliefs, don't you? — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, strange in the sense of uncommon, sure. But you did ask what my problem with traditional moral philosophy is and many disagreements come down to starting assumptions.

How could you justify cooperation without common goals? — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't say people don't have common goals. I said I take issue with the idea there is a goal or end that all of humanity is aimed at. Big difference.

Since human beings are rational animals, how could they be inclined to do what is moral, if it is not rational to do what is moral. Your claim makes not sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, in brief (and heavily simplified) I think Hume is broadly right that we should consider rationality more in terms of means-ends, rather than specificying rational goals.

This is the issue I took up with you already. I do not see how your position could be justified. When one decides that another's end is as valuable as one's own, this is just to make another's end one's own. It is logically impossible to make the ends of others as valuable as one's own, because all this means is to adopt another's as one's own. So only the ones judged as being valuable enough to be adopted as one's own are truly seen to be as valuable as one's own, and this is only by way of actually making them one's own. Therefore to keep moral principles aligned with truth, we must hold that one's own ends are always the most valuable to the person. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not entirely sure what you mean here. Are you taking issue with me disagreeing with this assumption, or are you claiming that I'm making this assumption?

The latter (what you propose), provides no basis for judgement of the ends of others, because they already must be assumed to be just as important as one's own. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think I have ever claimed or implied that individuals need to consider the ends of others as important as they consider their own ends.