For me, ‘reality’ is the ‘totality of what exists’; and ‘existence’ is the primitive concept of ‘being’. ...given the modern perspective, we understand that reality in-itself lacks any forms. Perhaps you can give some insight into this. — Bob Ross
To me, to take a ‘realist’ account, in the medieval sense, is to necessarily posit that the a priori ways by which we experience is a 1:1 mirror of the forms of the universe itself; and I have absolutely no clue why I should believe that. — Bob Ross
Because of the definition in play for the conception of reality, which is a category, having all the real as schemata subsumed under it, re: “….Reality, in the pure conception of the understanding, is that which corresponds to a sensation in general; that, consequently, the conception of which indicates a being (in time).…”
The parenthetical is wrong: a thing can exist and not be given to the senses. Without the parenthetical the statement is a contradiction, re: there could be a thing in reality but is not.
YEA!!!
(Does the happy dance, feet just a’flyin’, enough to make Snoopy jealous, I tell ya)
But, and again from a high level, what I'm calling attention to the sense in which the mind constructs reality on an active basis moment by moment.
If you agree with me that the forms of reality are really attributed by our cognition; then they are not ‘real’ (in the realist’s sense) but rather transcendentally ideal; and this would be a position which is neither nominalist nor realist (in the sense of those terms as you defined them). — Bob Ross
For Peirce, universals are real because they represent tendencies or patterns in nature that guide how things behave. His realism is grounded in his belief that the regularities of the world, such as the laws of logic or nature, are not arbitrary constructs of the human mind but are real features of the universe.
while something real may be said to exist, reality encompasses a broader domain of truths, including abstract concepts like laws of nature or mathematical objects, which don’t exist in a material sense but are still real because they hold independently of personal opinion.
The relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation exist?' the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'. There is no place or time where we can find the relation 'north of'. It does not exist in Edinburgh any more than in London, for it relates the two and is neutral as between them. Nor can we say that it exists at any particular time. Now everything that can be apprehended by the senses or by introspection exists at some particular time. Hence the relation 'north of' is radically different from such things. It is neither in space nor in time, neither material nor mental; yet it is something. — Russell, the World of Universals
We shall find it convenient only to speak of things existing when they are in time, that is to say, when we can point to some time at which they exist (not excluding the possibility of their existing at all times). Thus thoughts and feelings, minds and physical objects exist. But universals do not exist in this sense; we shall say that they subsist or have being, where 'being' is opposed to 'existence' as being timeless.
I think this vision of 'what is', is at the heart of both philosophy and mysticism, and that we generally don't see 'what is' (tathata in Buddhist philosophy) because of that sense of otherness.If you see "what is" then you see the universe, and denying "what is" is the origin of conflict. The beauty of the universe is in the "what is"; and to live with "what is" without effort is virtue. — J. Krishnamurti
My understanding is limited, and deploys a limited concept of ‘real’ in order to construct my conscious experience. — Bob Ross
Through reason, pure reason, which is purely self-reflective, I can know that reality must be far more than what the understanding determines it to be. — Bob Ross
you are using the concept of ‘reality’ which is a transcendental category of the understanding; and deny, for some reason, the concept as understood by self-reflective reason—by meta-cognition. — Bob Ross
My other point, now, would be that our self-reflective reason has the ability to understand, just like it can about other transcendental things, that the true concept of reality cannot be identical to that category of the understanding which you refer; because something can be which is not sensed. — Bob Ross
If you deny this, then the very concept of ‘reality’, as a category of the understanding, is not real; nor anything which is not currently being sensed; nor anything else transcendentally determined. — Bob Ross
….how can something which isn’t real cognize something which is? — Bob Ross
Firstly, “a priori” refers, within the context of transcendental investigations, as “that which is independent of any possible experience—viz., independent of empirical data”. — Bob Ross
“Knowledge” is just a justified, true belief (with truth being a version of correspondence theory) or, more generically, ~”having information which is accurate”. — Bob Ross
The proposition “all bodies are extended” is universally true for human experience and a priori because the way we experience is in space (necessarily); and so this is a priori known. — Bob Ross
This immediately incites the question: “if A is knowledge and B is knowledge, then aren’t they inheriting the same type of knowledge and, if so, thereby the question of ‘what is knowledge?’
Of course, you probably have an answer to this that I don’t remember….it has been a while (; — Bob Ross
Briefly, I will also say, that your schema doesn’t negate the possibility of a priori “knowledge” (in your sense of knowledge): it would be applicable knowledge, as the whole metaphysical endeavor of transcendental investigation would be applicable knowledge. — Bob Ross
The question becomes: “why don’t you think that we can apply a priori knowledge without contradiction and reasonably to the forms of experience (viz., the necessary preconditions for the possibility of experience) given that we both agree that our experience is representational?”. — Bob Ross
The fact that we can do math in different bases does not negate that the same mathematical operations are occurring, and that they are synthetical, a priori propositions. — Bob Ross
It is purely an abstract thing that cannot be applicably known.
Ehhhh, then you cannot claim to know that there must be a thing-in-itself at all; or otherwise concede that you can know applicably, through experience, that if our experience is representational then there must be a thing-in-itself. — Bob Ross
"The thing in itself" is a space alien
Then a thing-in-itself is not a concept which is purely logical—that was my only point on this note. It is referencing something concrete. — Bob Ross
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