Why thank you :pray:

You're welcome.

(I've had a look around your recent essay - respect for putting the effort into an extended argument such as that, and taking the time to get the prose right. Good work. My cynical quips about speculative physics would be misplaced.)

I have to say, this is entirely intelligible to me and (linguistically) solves a problem I've had for some time - there are clearly non-physical objects of experience. — AmadeusD

"Objects of experience" or 'aspects of understanding or judgement'? Perhaps an example or two would be helpful.

Thank you Banno, means a lot. I don't claim that it conveys anything particularly earth-shattering but I was pleased with the writing style and with what I think is the novel idea in the title.

…..“that which is real its existence is given; a real thing cannot not exist (necessity)”
-Mww

Is this “real thing” the object which was given to the senses? — "Bob

Yes.

Why would it be necessary that a cup exists because we experience a cup? — Bob Ross

It is necessary that some thing exists, which becomes the experience of, in this case, cup.

I don’t see the necessity you are talking about here. — Bob Ross

The thing is necessary for human intelligence to have something to work with. If not the thing, then at least something not contained in any part of human intelligence, which is the same as being outside all parts of it, so why not just call it an appearance, in which case the thing is just shorthand for that which appears.
—————-

The way we sense is prestructured (….) in a certain way to react to stimuli — Bob Ross

That just says what we sense with, is prestructured, which is true. Ears hear this way, eyes see this way, and so on. Science has a lot to say nowadays about the way we see, that wasn’t available in the times of traditional metaphysical theory. But even so, I suspect empirical science hasn’t much consideration for a priori ventures into the sublime.

Ehhhhh….until 1925 anyway, when scientists became philosophers once again, or at least were forced to think like one.
——————

Technically, though, the a priori structure of sensibility itself (…) resides in reason, insofar as the matter of sensation is transcendental.

I don’t see how it would be. Our neurons send the sensations to the brain; not vice-versa. — Bob Ross

Errrr….wha??? We don’t care what neurons do when talking about speculative transcendental architecture. You’re explicitly demanding neurons send the feeling of a mosquito bite, when the science legislating neural activity will only permit neurons to send quantitative electrochemical signals.
—————-

I think we have good reasons to believe, e.g., that electrons exist. — Bob Ross

That was never a contention; believing in a thing is very far from knowledge of it.

Why not, though, just use ‘real’ and ‘existent’ interchangeably and note, instead, that not all the models and concepts we deploy to explain experience necessarily exist in reality (i.e., are not real)? — Bob Ross

The real and the existent are pretty much already interchangeable, and none of the concepts we deploy to explain experience exist in reality to begin with, so….what’s the point?
——————

If we can't sense it, can’t indicating an impossibility, how would we know it exists?

Through empirical tests with the help of self-reflective reason. — Bob Ross

Then it’s no longer impossible. Sensing an affirmative second-hand representation proves a possibility. Sensing changes in spectral lines proves that which changes state is possible, without sensing the electrons themselves.
——————-

That’s an equivocation. (1) I wasn’t asking just about empirical knowledge…… — Bob Ross

Yes you were, you just didn’t know it. Because you’re talking sensing, the only knowledge you’re going to get from it, if you get any at all, is empirical.

your using the term ‘empirical’ to only strictly refer to what is sensed—that’s not what it usually means. — Bob Ross

That’s all it’s ever meant to me. I use empirical to describe a kind of knowledge, rather than a posteriori, which prescribes its ground or source.

What else does it refer to for you?
———————-

I know that my car is in my garage even though no one is sensing it. For you, this is invalid knowledge. — Bob Ross

For me it’s unjustified to call it knowledge.

What do you really know, with respect to the car itself, when somebody tells you he put your car in the garage?
———————-

……representing objects in space is a priori knowledge; which I thought you were denying because it is intuition. — Bob Ross

Representing objects in space is a priori; it is intuition, which isn’t knowledge.
———————-

We are getting there — Bob Ross

Helps to keep foremost in mind here….we’re not talking about things you know, we’re talking about how you know things.

I think we have good reasons to believe, e.g., that electrons exist. — Bob Ross

They only have a tendency to exist. We know they don't have any determinate existence until they're measured. That is an implication of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. We also know that sub-atomic phenomena can behave as both waves and particles, and so are not really either one or the other, as those two forms of existence are incommensurable.

I am not following how we only know through contradictions (between our experiences and reality). I can imagine perfectly fine a person who infers correctly, without contradiction, that their conscious experience is representational; and then proceeds to correctly identify that there must be a thing-in-itself which excites the senses which, in turn, begins the process to construct the conscious experience which they are having. — Bob Ross

Lets break this down. First, remember at this point that there is a difference between having the idea of what a 'thing in itself' is, and whether its something that exists and is knowable. We also need to break down what we mean by 'knowable'.

This is why in my knowledge theory I broke down what knowledge is into two camps. Distinctive, and applicable. Distinctive is 'knowing the experience I have'. So if I have an experience of a 'goat'. That's the experience I know I had. Then there's applicable knowledge. "Was that actually a goat, or was it a sheep I misidentified?" "Distinctively I know the definition of a goat and a sheep. But was my belief that what I experienced was a goat, correct in reality? So I have the distinctive knowledge of 'experience' of identifying a goat, but not the applicable knowledge that the identification of a goat was of an actual goat.

Ok, now back to 'things in themselves'. As an identity, I can distinctively know what 'a thing in itself' is. "A thing in itself is a logical conclusion that there is something that I am observing, but can only observe it through the senses and brain interpretations. But because I can only know it through observations, I can never know it apart from the interpretation of those observations". How do I applicably know this? According to its definition, I cannot.

So what is applicably knowing? If I take a definition of a goat, and apply its properties to a creature without contradiction, and without it overlapping a separate identity I've created in my mind (like a sheep), then I applicably know that creature as a goat.

Of course, unknown to me, its a space alien. Its so good at disguise, that there is no way with my current capabilities that I can detect its a space alien. "The thing in itself" is a space alien, but I applicably know it as a goat. Now this first part is simply a primer to the next step, "I applicably know that this thing is a goat, but I can never applicably know if that's 'the thing in itself'.

If I can only know applicably through testing, observation, and a lack of contradiction, how do I applicably know of something apart from all sensation and interpretation? I would have to 'be' what I am trying to applicably know. Its like consciousness. I can observe that my friend is conscious by their actions. But do I know what its like to 'be' that friend? To know them as they are 'in themselves'?

Applicable knowledge is obtained from our interactions and interpretations of the world. We know a 'goat' by the fact that its not contradicted. If our 'goat' started flying and shooting laser beams from its eyes, our applicable knowledge would then be contradicted. But even if it did not, if it was really a space alien, we would only be able to applicably know it as a goat. "The thing in itself" is the conception of something which CANNOT be applicably known. Therefore it is entirely a logical conception that results from our understanding that 'we cannot be what we observe, so we can only known it from our outside observations of it'.

Can you cite something we could say is knowledge that did not require any experience to gain it?

The most basic example that comes to mind is mathematical knowledge. Your brain necessarily has to already know how to perform math to construct your conscious experience; and this is why mathematical propositions, in geometry, are applicable and accurate for experience: the axioms of geometry reside a priori in our brains — Bob Ross

This is incorrect. What we have is the ability to discretely experience, and over time, learn to conduct comparisons and quantities between them. A newborn does not come with the knowledge of 'addition', '1', or anything else. This is all learned over time through experience. What they have is the capacity to understand these relations, but by no means does this entail that there is some innate born knowledge.

For example, we applicably know math through 'base 10'. But math can be in any base. Base 2, or binary, is the math we use for logic circuits. Hexadecimal, or base 16, is used to calculate computer memory. Are we born with the innate knowledge of hexadecimal? Did you know when you were born that the number for base ten '11' is 'A' in Hexadecimal? Of course not. Just like you had to carefully be taught base ten, and basic math as a kid, you would need to have the experience of learning hexadecimal.

As for geometry, this also has to be learned. As a baby, you don't quite understand depth perception yet. It takes time. You grow and learn how the world works as a physical set of interactions. You have to be taught, or can learn through logic and observation, that "A squared + B squared = C squared" on a triangle. But all of these things have been rigorously proved over centuries through careful testing, observation, and application. None of this is known innately.

Mathematical propositions are valid in virtue of being grounded in how our brains cognize; and they are only valid for human experience. They are true, justified, beliefs about experience—not reality. — Bob Ross

They are valid in the fact they can be applicably known in reality. It is 'the logic of discrete experience'. But this must be experienced, tested, and learned to be applicably known. We can of course create what ever experience of math that we want distinctively. I can distinctively create a math in base Steve. Steve + Visit = Snacks for example. But this can only be applicably known if ever time Steve + Visit happens there always results in Snacks.

Perhaps that’s where the confusion was: the a priori knowledge we have is not knowledge about reality, but about how we cognize it. — Bob Ross

The ability to think is not generally prescribed as 'knowledge'. Just like the ability to 'move my limbs' doesn't mean I know 'how to move them to walk'. This is why I noted earlier we were very close on the definition of apriori. I agree that we have instincts, innate capacities, and 'our innate existence'. But none of that is 'knowledge'. Knowledge can only be obtained after some kind of experience. Even distinctive knowledge is the creation of an identity that we then remember. But we must first have an experience to identify because we can claim knowledge of it.

So what is a flower apart from any observation

I would say that we merely say that there is some thing which is exciting our senses, and of which we represent as what we normally perceive as a flower. — Bob Ross

Correct. But notice you've described how you know a flower purely through your representations and senses. What is a flower apart from that? What if the thing in itself that we're 'dividing' into a flower is really a few other things around the flower? What if the air two millimeters away from the flower is also part of the flower in 'the thing in itself' but we just don't interpret it that way? What if its a space alien? (I really like that example don't I?) What is it like to BE the flower? These are all things that are outside of our capacity to applicably know. This limit is a logical reminder that there are some things outside of our applicable knowledge. At that point, we induce if you recall. So a thing in itself is not a probability or a possibility. It is a cogent inapplicable plausibility. It is a concept that we can never applicably test, but one that pure reason cannot seem to do without.

And that's all the 'thing in itself' is. Its an unknowable outside of the mind existence.

Agreed; but that’s not a purely abstract thing, then. It is a concrete—unknown. — Bob Ross

It is purely an abstract thing that cannot be applicably known. Its plausible that it is a concrete thing. We know that we cannot applicably know it. And that's as far as we can go.

"Objects of experience" or 'aspects of understanding or judgement'? Perhaps an example or two would be helpful. — Janus

I suppose that just depends on what way you're comfortable presenting hte notion. I mean to say that there are things that exist outside of minds, and things that exist only within minds. Something like an 'intention' or numbers, or the complex network of inter-related memories and partial memories that create a specific state of mind... Things that can't be pointed to, in any way, basically. I think it's completely coherent to say that these things are real, in the way Banno uses the word a few posts ago, and that they do not 'exist' in the way something would want to exist while not being experienced by consciousness.

Please elaborate, as I am not following. Give me an example of where something is real but does not exist (if applicable); and where something exists but is not real (if applicable).

…..“that which is real its existence is given; a real thing cannot not exist (necessity)”
-Mww

Is this “real thing” the object which was given to the senses? — "Bob

Yes.

So a ‘real thing’ is real because its existence is given, and a ‘fake [viz., non-real] thing’ is an existence which is not given? How, then, do you distinguish from a fake thing which is does not exist, and one which does (but of which both are not given to the senses)?

It is necessary that some thing exists, which becomes the experience of, in this case, cup.

Agreed; but you are also saying that this necessary thing that is given not only exists but is real; which implies that a thing which exists but is not given is not real.

You’re explicitly demanding neurons send the feeling of a mosquito bite, when the science legislating neural activity will only permit neurons to send quantitative electrochemical signals.

Those are the sensations, no? What, then, is a sensation?

Errrr….wha??? We don’t care what neurons do when talking about speculative transcendental architecture.

True, but the sensibility must have some pre-structured way of sensing before anything is intuited or cognized—i.e., without reason. Talking about neurons is just a nice analogy.

I think we have good reasons to believe, e.g., that electrons exist. — Bob Ross

That was never a contention; believing in a thing is very far from knowledge of it.

I think we have good reasons to know, e.g., that electrons exist.

The real and the existent are pretty much already interchangeable

Not at all under your view! The real is only a subset of existent things which are given or (perhaps) possibly given to the senses. I have no clue why we would assume that most, if not everything, can be sensed by our sensibility—viz., given to the senses.

Because you’re talking sensing, the only knowledge you’re going to get from it, if you get any at all, is empirical.
…
That’s all it’s ever meant to me. I use empirical to describe a kind of knowledge, rather than a posteriori, which prescribes its ground or source.

What else does it refer to for you?

But, then, you would have to deny any a priori knowledge; since we only know that empirically. That which is a posteriori is not the same as that which is empirical---don’t you think? E.g., I must use experience to extrapolate the a priori structure by which I experience, which is technically empirical, and yet it is not itself derived from what is given to the senses.

All knowledge starts with experience, but that does not mean all knowledge comes from experience—as Kant would say.

Even if you think the empirical is the same as what is a posteriori, then I think you still see my point: we can reason about our experience to know things which are not directly perceived.

For me it’s unjustified to call it knowledge.

What do you really know, with respect to the car itself, when somebody tells you he put your car in the garage?

I know it, because I have a true, justified belief. E.g., I just drove it into the garage, went inside, and now am being asked “is the car in the garage?” 5 seconds afterwards—yeah, I think I have a justified belief which is true (i.e., corresponds to reality).

If I take your position, then we have virtually no knowledge of anything. You don’t know you exist, that you brushed your teeth this morning (even though you remember doing it), etc. All knowledge ultimately is probabilistic and uncertain, except for maybe a small set of things (like logical axioms).

Representing objects in space is a priori; it is intuition, which isn’t knowledge.

What makes something a priori and knowledge, then? I know that “all bodies are extended” because of the way my brain represents objects a priori in space; and I know that “the shortest line between two points is the line drawn between them” because my brain <…>.

I think I may get what you are saying a bit, though. Are you noting that the act of synthesis in space that our brain does when intuiting is not itself knowledge, because there is not agent acquiring information but rather there is just a pre-structure for doing so, and that propositions that we (qua agents) know a priori because of that pre-structure (e.g., “all bodies are extended”)? I can get on board with that.

I am not familiar enough with quantum physics to comment back: I don't understand how to reconcile qp with practical life---it seems incoherent.

Lets break this down.

I appreciate the elaboration!

Firstly, “a priori” refers, within the context of transcendental investigations, as “that which is independent of any possible experience—viz., independent of empirical data”. “Knowledge” is just a justified, true belief (with truth being a version of correspondence theory) or, more generically, ~”having information which is accurate”. Knowledge a priori, then, is when one has a true, justified belief about something which was not derived from empirical data (but, rather, the means by which our representative faculties intuit and cognize that data). The proposition “all bodies are extended” is universally true for human experience and a priori because the way we experience is in space (necessarily); and so this is a priori known. Now, to your point, of which I concede, in order to acquire this a priori knowledge one must have the self-reflective cognitive abilities to reason about their experience transcendentally; and so a baby, I agree with you, necessarily does not have a priori knowledge even though they necessarily have an a priori means of experiencing and the a priori propositions are true of their experience as well (e.g., “all bodies are extended”). I was conflating, I think, that which is a priori with that which is a priori knowledge. E.g., intuition (necessarily) in space is a priori but is not knowledge, but some propositions are true a priori and are grounded in it (such as “the line drawn between two points is the shortest path” in geometry).

Secondly, I recognize that you reject the JTB theory of knowledge; so let me try to address yours as it relates hereto.

This is why in my knowledge theory I broke down what knowledge is into two camps.

When we ask “what is knowledge?”, we are expecting an monistic answer—e.g., “it is <…>”—and not a plurastic answer—e.g., “it is <…> and <…>”. You are saying that knowledge doesn’t have one fundamental identity but, instead, is two separate irreducible ones—namely “applicable” and “distinctive”.

This immediately incites the question: “if A is knowledge and B is knowledge, then aren’t they inheriting the same type of knowledge and, if so, thereby the question of ‘what is knowledge?’ is still unanswered?”. That’s like me saying knowledge is a priori and a posteriori. Ok. But we are asking “what is knowledge?”; so how did that answer the question?

Of course, you probably have an answer to this that I don’t remember….it has been a while (;

Briefly, I will also say, that your schema doesn’t negate the possibility of a priori “knowledge” (in your sense of knowledge): it would be applicable knowledge, as the whole metaphysical endeavor of transcendental investigation would be applicable knowledge. The question becomes: “why don’t you think that we can apply a priori knowledge without contradiction and reasonably to the forms of experience (viz., the necessary preconditions for the possibility of experience) given that we both agree that our experience is representational?”.

For example, we applicably know math through 'base 10'. But math can be in any base. Base 2, or binary, is the math we use for logic circuits.

The fact that we can do math in different bases does not negate that the same mathematical operations are occurring, and that they are synthetical, a priori propositions.

The ability to think is not generally prescribed as 'knowledge'. Just like the ability to 'move my limbs' doesn't mean I know 'how to move them to walk'.

Correct. I was using the phrase too loosely.

It is purely an abstract thing that cannot be applicably known.

Ehhhh, then you cannot claim to know that there must be a thing-in-itself at all; or otherwise concede that you can know applicably, through experience, that if our experience is representational then there must be a thing-in-itself.

"The thing in itself" is a space alien

Then a thing-in-itself is not a concept which is purely logical—that was my only point on this note. It is referencing something concrete. @Mww is denying this, and I thought so were you.

Give me an example of where something is real but does not exist (if applicable); and where something exists but is not real (if applicable). — Bob Ross

What exists is what you can meaningfully encounter. But there are many things we take for granted as real which we can’t encounter and which don’t exist in that concrete sense. They are constituted as agreements, conventions, rules, and the like. Where do interest rates or exchange rates exist? Not in banks, or financial institutions. They are real even though we cannot encounter them in the sense we encounter existents. A contract is not just the piece of paper, but the meaning it conveys, likewise a national constitution or a penal code (adapted from here). Humans are embedded in a web of such meanings, which are every bit as real as the material objects we encounter but which are not existent in the sense that sensable objects are. We don't notice that, because that web of meanings lies beneath the threshold of conscious attention, unless we make the effort to bring it to awareness.

So these are factors in our cognitive life that are real but not phenomenally existent. As to things that exist but aren't real - well, fictional characters would fit the bill. We will both know who Bugs Bunny and Sherlock Holmes are, so we have a common reference point, but they're not real. Nowadays we're constantly bombarded by unreal imagery.

In actuality, conscious experience always comprises the synthesis of phenomenal existents - sensable objects - and the cognitive faculties which incorporate them into a web of meaning. That is what Kant was on to. But because of the natural extroversion of today's culture we tend to exagerrate the former and fail to notice the latter - we tend to think that only what is 'out there' is real, and fail to notice how much of what is 'out there' is really put there by our own minds.

Where do interest rates or exchange rates exist? Not in banks, or financial institutions. — Wayfarer

They consist in what the banks or financial institutions do. They consist in concrete actions. Failing their actualization they exist merely as ideas in peoples minds.

How, then, do you distinguish from a fake thing which is does not exist, and one which does (but of which both are not given to the senses)? — Bob Ross

In experience, I can do nothing with, thus have no more than passing interest in, that which does not appear to my senses. For that of which I merely think, which would be that thing which for me cannot be real because I have no intuition of it, there’s no difference in my internal treatment of a real and a non-real thing, insofar as the only representation for either of them is a conception or a series of conceptions, in accordance with a rule.

….a ‘fake [viz., non-real] thing’…. — Bob Ross

This is a logical contradiction when viewed from proper understanding, to which a fake thing is nonsense and a non-real thing is impossible, re: optical illusion, and a transcendental antinomy when viewed from reason, to which a synthesis of ideas and experience occurs but from principles without the power to unite them, re: deities, infinite time of the world, etc..
————-

It is necessary that some thing exists, which becomes the experience of, in this case, cup.
-Mww

Agreed; but you are also saying that this necessary thing that is given not only exists but is real; which implies that a thing which exists but is not given is not real. — Bob Ross

Yes, for any experience, a real existent is necessary for it. For that of which existence is possible, but for which there is no appearance to my senses of it, I can affirm nothing of its reality, for there is nothing to affirm.
———-

the sensibility must have some pre-structured way of sensing before anything is intuited or cognized—i.e., without reason. — Bob Ross

Yes, sensibility must be capable of accomplishing what reason theorizes in its prescriptions for it. If we are not conscious of the machinations of sensibility as an empirical faculty in a physical system, and there is a feasible method for its machinations as a metaphysical faculty in speculative system, why would those of us not in the field of cognitive neuroscience and related disciplines, care how it does it?
————-

I have no clue why we would assume that most, if not everything, can be sensed by our sensibility—viz., given to the senses. — Bob Ross

It is safe to assume every thing can be given to the senses, iff it meets the criteria of pure intuitions and pure conceptions proposed as belonging to human intelligence. Every thing is not, nor can ever be, the same as everything, and a silly language game ensues for lack of separating the respective notions from each other, according to rules.

The real and the existent are pretty much already interchangeable….
-Mww

Not at all under your view! The real is only a subset of existent things which are given or (perhaps) possibly given to the senses. I — Bob Ross

Not quite. Dialectical consistency mandates that, for us, the real and the existent are necessarily codependent, it follows that the merely possible existent holds as only possibly real. In other words, it is not certain that possible existences are real.

The real, then, is the set….not a subset…..of existent things given to the senses, which says nothing at all about things not given to the senses, and for which, therefore, the real has no ground for consideration.
—————-

I think you still see my point: we can reason about our experience to know things which are not directly perceived. — Bob Ross

All experience is from that which is directly perceived. That which is not directly perceived cannot be experience. Hence to reason about experience, and to know things not directly perceived from that reasoning alone, is a posteriori reasoning. Knowledge of that which is not directly perceived is possible, but does not descend from, or relate to, experience, hence is called a priori reasoning. These are principles, pure conceptions, and so on, which ground experience but are not experiences themselves or reasoned from them but rather, make reasoning about them possible.

This is the difference between “…. though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience….”.
—————-

What do you really know, with respect to the car itself, when somebody tells you he put your car in the garage?

I know it, because I have a true, justified belief. E.g., I just drove it into the garage, went inside, and now am being asked “is the car in the garage?” — Bob Ross

Your answer doesn’t respect the question. Trust me, it’s pertinent, at least to the theme we’re immersed in up to our eyeballs in right now.
—————-

What makes something a priori and knowledge, then? — Bob Ross

Pure reason. What a human does, and the conclusions he infers, when he thinks in general.
—————-

there is just a pre-structure for doing so, and that propositions that we (qua agents) know a priori because of that pre-structure (e.g., “all bodies are extended”)? I can get on board with that. — Bob Ross

Cool. This pre-structure is very far from the pre-structure you assigned to sensibility, however. The pre-structure here, re” “all bodies are extended”, is an empirical principle, in that it applies to things alone, and is only susceptible to natural proofs, but our knowledge of this arises through separate pure principles of universality and necessity, in that without these pure principles, the empirical principles cannot have natural proofs at all, from which follows the possibility some bodies are not extended, and we are presented with a contradiction and our knowledge of empirical things becomes forever undeterminable.
(Sidebar: technically called Hume’s dilemma, for which ol’ Dave had no answer.)

They [electrons] only have a tendency to exist. We know they don't have any determinate existence until they're measured. That is an implication of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. We also know that sub-atomic phenomena can behave as both waves and particles, and so are not really either one or the other, as those two forms of existence are incommensurable. — Wayfarer

I am not familiar enough with quantum physics to comment back: I don't understand how to reconcile qp with practical life---it seems incoherent. — Bob Ross

Exactly. What does that even mean to not have determinate existence until they are measured? It sounds like confusing the map with the territory. They are confusing the measurement with the electron. To say that something doesn't have a determinate existence is to say that it hasn't been measured yet. If what we are measuring does not have a determinate existence, then what is being measured and what property of the electron is the measurement pointing to? If it isn't pointing to anything then how can we say we actually measured an electron?

Something exists if it is in the domain of discourse. Frodo walked into Mordor, therefore there is something that walked into Mordor.

Something is real in contrast to things that are not real - is it real money, or counterfeit? Is that really water, or a mirage? Is that a real argument, or just a vague rant?

Other uses are parasitic. — Banno

All you are describing here is a category error, where some information is a product of our brain (Frodo and Mordor), and assumed to point to something outside of our brain as opposed to a product of some other process (how money is made). Counterfeit money is real money when you buy things with it. It is only when someone is able to make the distinction (measured) and no longer accepts it does it become counterfeit (if we are to apply the same line of thinking Wayfarer described about electrons).

They both have causal power. The idea of Frodo and Mordor can cause you to talk about them and draw pictures of them and movies being made about them. Counterfeit money can cause other things to happen in the world. They are both real and exist in that sense. To be real, or to exist, simply means that thing has causal power. It is both an effect of prior causes and a cause of subsequent effects.

Frodo and Mordor are real ideas. They exist as ideas. The category error comes about by asserting that Frodo and Mordor are not just ideas.

Then a thing-in-itself is not a concept which is purely logical—that was my only point on this note. It is referencing something concrete. Mww is denying this, and I thought so were you. — Bob Ross

The thing-in-itself is a purely logical concept, distinguishing the concept of the empirical thing as sensibility would have it, from the concept of the empirical thing as reason itself would have it without input from sensibility. Thus, a purely logical concept can still have reference to something concrete, even if cognition of something concrete belonging to that conception, is not determinable from such mere reference alone.

Space, a purely logical concept if there ever was one, would be useless if it didn’t refer to concrete things, so……there ya go. The categories, even while being deduced a priori from reason, reference concrete things, in that no judgement regarding cognitions of concrete things is possible without the relevant schema of categories.

So, no, I do not deny the thing-in-itself references something concrete, while maintaining the thing-in-itself is a purely logical conception.

Hopefully there’s no need to clarify the sense of logic being used here. But just in case, it is entirely syllogistic and propositional in its expositions in the form of a particular philosophy, that is, first in its theoretical construction and then its subsequent analysis, as governed by Aristotle’s laws of proper rational thought, with the additional methodological limitation from Kant, that understanding and reason are the two cognitive faculties the metaphysical functions of which are legislated by those laws, which is not as much its philosophical exposition as its speculative use by a system predicated on that philosophy.

Counterfeit money is real money when you buy things with it. It is only when someone is able to make the distinction (measured) and no longer accepts it does it become counterfeit — Harry Hindu

I disagree. Counterfeit money is counterfeit from the get go, having not been manufactured in a way that grants it legitimacy.

(if we are to apply the same line of thinking Wayfarer described about electrons) — Harry Hindu

There's your problem, right there.

There are some posts I know better than to respond to ;-)

Would that I were so wise as you. I could have avoided various unpleasantries today.

Something is real in contrast to things that are not real - is it real money, or counterfeit? Is that really water, or a mirage? Is that a real argument, or just a vague rant? — Banno

None of this explains what it means to be real. What property of counterfeit money, mirages and arguments are we are comparing exactly if not the causes or circumstances that are necessary for them to exist?

I disagree. Counterfeit money is counterfeit from the get go, having not been manufactured in a way that grants it legitimacy. — Banno

Exactly. Counterfeit has a determinate existence prior to being measured and it is in measuring (comparing the appearance of real money to counterfeit money) that one knows it is really counterfeit money.

Counterfeit money is real/exists in that there are prior causes that are necessary for it's existence and causes different things to happen when someone knows it is counterfeit. There is real counterfeit money and real money. You can hold up a counterfeit bill and say, "This is a real counterfeit bill".

Counterfeit bills and money are made of electrons.

Frodo and Mordor have a determinate existence as ideas. So there is no problem in saying that "Frodo is real" because Frodo is real, as an idea. The issue isn't when someone says "Frodo is real". It is when someone says "Frodo is a person", just as if someone to hold up a counterfeit bill and say, "This is money". It seems to me we can dispense with term "real" altogether and just use "exist".

What exists is what you can meaningfully encounter.

I appreciate the elaboration!

The only issue I have is with your semantics: I think you are using ‘existence’ as if it is reserved for only things which exist materially (or perhaps physically). E.g., the monetary value of a diamond exists because there is a monetary value to a diamond; my feeling of pain exists even though it is not located anywhere in material (or perhaps physical) reality; the agreement which a contract represents exists because there really is an agreement being made between both parties; etc. Nothing about this suggests that these things exists as a different type of existence nor that they are real but don’t exist. Something exists if it is—that’s the only and nicely circular way of defining being.

As to things that exist but aren't real - well, fictional characters would fit the bill. We will both know who Bugs Bunny and Sherlock Holmes are, so we have a common reference point, but they're not real. Nowadays we're constantly bombarded by unreal imagery.

Technically, fictional characters exist and are real fictional characters. What you are doing is conflating this with colloquial language where one would mean by “is this fictional character real?” “is this fictional character referencing a person or thing which existed beyond a mere work of fiction?”. I think your “real” vs. “existent” distinction collapses once the ambiguity in colloquial speech is resolved.

For that of which I merely think, which would be that thing which for me cannot be real because I have no intuition of it, there’s no difference in my internal treatment of a real and a non-real thing, insofar as the only representation for either of them is a conception or a series of conceptions, in accordance with a rule.

Why isn’t it real for you if you have no intuition of it??? Your car in the garage isn’t real right now, even though you have every reason to believe it is there, because you can’t currently sense it?

The real, then, is the set….not a subset…..of existent things given to the senses, which says nothing at all about things not given to the senses, and for which, therefore, the real has no ground for consideration.

This is incoherent though: you are saying that there could be a thing which is in reality but is not (i.e., does not exist because it cannot be given to the senses). Do you see what I mean? You are playing around with ‘being’ in ways that are not fundamental enough (:

Hence to reason about experience, and to know things not directly perceived from that reasoning alone, is a posteriori reasoning.

Then, you are claiming that all a posteriori knowledge is about non-existent things; since only directly perceived things exist, and knowledge of not-directly-perceived things constitutes a posteriori knowledge.

Your answer doesn’t respect the question. Trust me, it’s pertinent, at least to the theme we’re immersed in up to our eyeballs in right now.

How so? Isn’t it epistemically justification enough to claim that the car is in the garage (even though I don’t see it right now) because I had just drove it in there 5 seconds ago?

The pre-structure here, re” “all bodies are extended”, is an empirical principle, in that it applies to things alone, and is only susceptible to natural proofs, but our knowledge of this arises through separate pure principles of universality and necessity, in that without these pure principles, the empirical principles cannot have natural proofs at all, from which follows the possibility some bodies are not extended, and we are presented with a contradiction and our knowledge of empirical things becomes forever undeterminable.

Correct; and I believe this is exactly to say that “all bodies are extended” is true for human experience; but not for reality as it is in-itself.

Thus, a purely logical concept can still have reference to something concrete, even if cognition of something concrete belonging to that conception, is not determinable from such mere reference alone.

I think we are saying the same thing, then. I am saying that the concept refers to something concrete.

Space, a purely logical concept if there ever was one, would be useless if it didn’t refer to concrete things, so……there ya go.

Nooooo. The concept of space refers to extension—I think you are thinking it refers to something concrete because it is used to represent objects.

So, no, I do not deny the thing-in-itself references something concrete, while maintaining the thing-in-itself is a purely logical conception.

If by “pure logical conception” you just mean that it is a concept which is derived from pure reason; then I agree.

The only issue I have is with your semantics: I think you are using ‘existence’ as if it is reserved for only things which exist materially (or perhaps physically). — Bob Ross

Things that exist as phenomena. And recall, 'phenomena' means 'what appears'. Whereas what I'm calling attention to are what were understood to be 'intelligible objects' in classical philosophy, using number as an example. Notice the difference between 'the diamond exists' and 'the value of the diamond'. Its existence is phenomenal, but the value it has is derived from perceptions of worth.

I will often concede that it is perfectly intelligible to say in normal speech, that the number 7 exists, but the square root does not. But that, strictly speaking, the number which you indicate is actually a symbol. What is real is what is denoted by the symbol, and that is not something that exists in the sense of being real independently of any mind (as only a mind can grasp number.)

What you are doing is conflating this with colloquial language where one would mean by “is this fictional character real?” — Bob Ross

What I'm doing, is calling attention to a real distinction which has been lost sight of, for deep historical reasons. You will know that the description 'realist philosophy' has a completely different meaning now, than it did in medieval culture. Now, it means 'belief in the mind-independent reality of objects'. Then, it meant 'belief in the reality of universals.' I say that in the transition from the medieval to the modern, something of importance was lost, which we now can't even see as nominalism (the view opposed to scholastic realism) won out.

C S Peirce upheld this same distinction.

C.S. Peirce’s distinction between reality and existence is rooted in his pragmatic philosophy and his interest in semiotics. For Peirce, reality refers to that which is independent of individual thought, meaning it would still be true regardless of what anyone believes. In contrast, existence pertains to something that actively interacts with other things in time and space, having a physical presence. Thus, while something real may exist, reality encompasses a broader domain of truths, including abstract concepts like laws of nature or mathematical objects, which don’t exist in a material sense but are still real because they hold independently of personal opinion.

Peirce's scholastic realism was grounded in the form of medieval scholasticism which argued that universals (such as concepts like 'redness' or 'beauty') are real, though they don’t exist as independent objects. Peirce adopted this view, opposing nominalism, which claims that universals are merely names we use to group things together. For Peirce, universals are real because they represent tendencies or patterns in nature that guide how things behave. His realism is grounded in his belief that the regularities of the world, such as the laws of logic or nature, are not arbitrary constructs of the human mind but are real features of the universe. Thus, scholastic realism for Peirce upholds the idea that general principles and categories have a real basis in the fabric of reality, not just in human thought.

//

Peirce understood nominalism in the broad anti-realist sense, usually attributed to William of Ockham, as the view that reality consists exclusively of concrete particulars and that universality and generality have to do only with names and their significations. This view relegates properties, abstract entities, kinds, relations, laws of nature, and so on, to a conceptual existence at most. Peirce believed nominalism (including what he referred to as "the daughters of nominalism": sensationalism, phenomenalism, individualism, and materialism) to be seriously flawed and a great threat to the advancement of science and civilization 1.

//

Characterized by forms, reality had an intrinsic intelligibility, not just in each of its parts but as a whole. With forms as causes, there are interconnections between different parts of an intelligible world, indeed there are overlapping matrices of intelligibility in the world, making possible an ascent from the more particular, posterior, and mundane to the more universal, primary, and noble.

In short, the appeal to forms or natures does not just help account for the possibility of trustworthy access to facts, it makes possible a notion of wisdom, traditionally conceived as an ordering grasp of reality. Preoccupied with overcoming Cartesian skepticism, it often seems as if philosophy’s highest aspiration is merely to secure some veridical cognitive events. Rarely sought is a more robust goal: an authoritative and life-altering wisdom. — Joshua Hochschild, What's Wrong With Ockham?

I understand you will probably reject this, because of the overwhemingly nominalist cast of modern culture and philosophy. But that's OK, and thanks for reading.

Why isn’t it real for you if you have no intuition of it? — Bob Ross

Because of the definition in play for the conception of reality, which is a category, having all the real as schemata subsumed under it, re: “….Reality, in the pure conception of the understanding, is that which corresponds to a sensation in general; that, consequently, the conception of which indicates a being (in time).…”

I spoke of things I merely think, and for those things, there is nothing that appears to me by my perception of it, hence no sensation, no intuition, no phenomenon, so do not meet the criterion of the definition of the real in play.

Your car in the garage isn’t real right now, even though you have every reason to believe it is there, because you can’t currently sense it? — Bob Ross

Correct, it isn’t a real thing as far as my sensibility is concerned, unless, of course, I can perceive it by being in the garage along with it. But to say I have every reason to think it is where I put it when I’m not there, is wrong, insofar as I only have one reason, re: I have the certainty of knowing I put it there. The best I can say otherwise, is that I have no reason to think it isn’t still there, but that does not authorize me to say I know it is still there.
—————-

This is incoherent though: you are saying that there could be a thing which is in reality but is not (i.e., does not exist because it cannot be given to the senses). — Bob Ross

The parenthetical is wrong: a thing can exist and not be given to the senses. Without the parenthetical the statement is a contradiction, re: there could be a thing in reality but is not.

I would agree to the statement that there could be a real thing that is not given to the senses, or, there could be an existence I’ll never experience.
——————

You are playing around with ‘being’ in ways that are not fundamental enough — Bob Ross

Except I’ve never used the word, preferring exists or existence instead. The word and concept represented by it is contained in the quote above, but that’s not my usage. And I use existence because to me that’s as fundamental as it gets, with respect to real things.
—————-

….to know things (…) from that reasoning alone, is a posteriori reasoning.
-Mww

Then, you are claiming that all a posteriori knowledge….. — Bob Ross

Why are you talking about knowledge, when I’m talking about reasoning?

…..since only directly perceived things exist. — Bob Ross

No. Only perceived things are real; things may exist that are not perceived. But if a thing is perceived its existence is given. All of which is irrelevant, insofar as to reason about an experience presupposes it, and the existent thing perceived in order to make the experience possible. From the faculty of reason, the thing reasoned about is an indirect perception, or, if you like, a historic perception.

Technically, the content of the experience being reasoned about, resides in consciousness, so isn’t perception, direct or otherwise. I should have written that differently. But still, reasoning about experience is a posteriori reasoning because its contents are all empirical.
—————-

Your answer doesn’t respect the question.
-Mww

How so? Isn’t it epistemically justification enough to claim that the car is in the garage (even though I don’t see it right now) because I had just drove it in there 5 seconds ago? — Bob Ross

If you read the damn question, you’d know you weren’t the one driving!!! THAT’S how so.
—————-

“Space, a purely logical concept if there ever was one, would be useless if it didn’t refer to concrete things….”
-Mww

Noooo. The concept of space refers to extension….. — Bob Ross

Hmmm. Ya know, that could be reasonable, in that space refers to concrete things, which always must be extended, so maybe space refers to extension.

However, I personally take the idea of extension in relation to things, from A21/B35, which says….

“…..Thus, if I take away from our representation of a body all that the understanding thinks as belonging to it, as substance, force, divisibility, etc., and also whatever belongs to sensation, as impenetrability, hardness, colour, etc.; yet there is still something left us from this empirical intuition, namely, extension and shape….”

….key part being “what the understanding thinks”. It follows that understanding cannot think away extension, which leaves in to remain in empirical intuition. Empirical intuition, now, as defined at A20/B34, is that intuition which relates to an object through sensation. Sensation, as defined just beforehand, is the effect of objects on the faculty of representation insofar as we are affected by it.

“Still something left for us”, then, seems most likely to be that which can never be dismissed from the things that appear to the senses. This makes more sense when we consider that in thinking away all that belongs to things, we cannot think away the space in was in. The space of the thing is represented a priori in us by the extension of it represented a posteriori by its appearance to us, therefore extension must belong to the thing.

Another way to look at it: we can easily think the non-existence of things, but can never think the non-existence of space. The non-existence of a thing reduces to the mere absence of extension, while the space remains for a thing to be extended into, making explicit they are not the same kind of representations.
—————

So it is that space, as a pure intuition all its own, doesn’t refer to extension, but refers to the relation of things to us, and thereby is a condition belonging to the subjects themselves. Extension, as well as shape, on the other hand, represents that condition of things the negation of which is impossible, for otherwise there is nothing to appear, hence belongs to objects alone.

Something else: in normal cognitive operations, understanding thinks that which belongs to objects in order to cognize something about them. Understanding has no need to think extension as a necessary conception in its syntheses with a phenomenon in order to form a cognition of it, which makes explicit extension is already given. Support herein arises from the predicates of a particular speculative metaphysics in which the categories are necessary for the cognition of things, and in which extension is not a category.

To me, because understanding cannot think away what it hasn’t first connected, and it cannot think away extension hence doesn’t need to think of things in accordance with that conception, extension itself doesn’t belong to any part of the internal system by which things are thought. Which leaves extension belonging only to things as they are given. Furthermore, if it is the matter of things which is given to sensibility, as the text mandates, it follows that extension is necessarily presupposed.
—————-

then I agree. — Bob Ross

YEA!!!
(Does the happy dance, feet just a’flyin’, enough to make Snoopy jealous, I tell ya)

I appreciate your response.

I understand you will probably reject this, because of the overwhemingly nominalist cast of modern culture and philosophy. But that's OK, and thanks for reading.

I think we are currently in different headspaces: you view this as a dispute between nominalism and realism, whereas I see it as a semantic note. For me, ‘reality’ is the ‘totality of what exists’; and ‘existence’ is the primitive concept of ‘being’. What I understand you to be doing, is trying to convey an interesting point with (in my opinion) bad semantics by making a distinction between existing qua the universe (or what is phenomenal) vs. qua the form of that universe. The problem with this is the same as @Mww: you are positing that something can not exist but is, when, in truth, what you are really trying to convey is that something can exist which is not a part of the physical universe. It is impossible, still yet, for me to coherently parse your semantics since you confirm the existence of things which do not exist (according to your schema)—e.g., the square root.

I was not, and am not, suggesting that nominalism is necessarily true: I wasn’t intending to comment on that whatsoever, and still don’t feel the need to given my complaint above. However, if I must, then I would say that the rationality which we perceive as the form of the universe, to me, is the transcendental ideality of human a priori cognition. To me, I struggle with providing any proofs about reality as it is in-itself. To me, to take a ‘realist’ account, in the medieval sense, is to necessarily posit that the a priori ways by which we experience is a 1:1 mirror of the forms of the universe itself; and I have absolutely no clue why I should believe that. Likewise, to posit a nominalist account, I don’t see any reason to believe that, given the modern perspective, we understand that reality in-itself lacks any forms. Perhaps you can give some insight into this.

Things that exist as phenomena. And recall, 'phenomena' means 'what appears'.

Perhaps I am too stuck in the Kantian mindset; but the Peirceian perspective you quoted was, by my lights, about reality in-itself—not phenomena.

To me, to take a ‘realist’ account, in the medieval sense, is to necessarily posit that the a priori ways by which we experience is a 1:1 mirror of the forms of the universe itself; — Bob Ross

By way of footnote, there is a sense in which that is true for Aristotelian and Thomist philosophy. It is because the forms or essences of particulars are what is most real about them, and nous is able to directly apprehend them, whereas the senses only know indirectly. Anyway thanks for your patience Bob. It's a thesis I'm pursuing in history of ideas but very I'm very much a voice in wilderness.

What is real is what is denoted by the symbol, and that is not something that exists in the sense of being real independently of any mind (as only a mind can grasp number.) — Wayfarer

So what? There are many attributes and properties of things that do not exist independently of the thing itself. We don't say that the ripeness of this apple isn't real because it can't exist independently of this apple. You seem to be making an unwarranted special case for minds.

Symbols are real. Symbols exist. They are the effects of prior causes and causes of subsequent events. In this sense they are real and exist.

I don't want a footnote Wayfarer: I want a response (: