• Fooloso4
    6.2k
    I started this thread in response to a comment by Jamal about Plato’s Republic:

    They all belong together and they're all important, although book 10 is weird and some would say adds nothing of much value to the whole work's argument.

    I want to look into it in order to see how much value it might add.

    In book 2 Socrates said:

    Do you not know that the beginning of any work is most important …
    ((377a)

    I begin book 10 at its beginning. The discussion begins:

    “Yes indeed,” said I, “I have all sorts of ideas in mind as to why our city has been founded in the best possible way. I say this particularly when I reflect upon poetry.”

    “What aspect?” he asked.

    “Our refusal to admit any poetry that employs imitation.
    (595a)

    What is at issue is the difference between an imitation and:

    … knowing things as they actually are. (595b)

    It is only when one knows things as they actually are, that is, knows the truth, that one can judge the image.

    Socrates makes a three-fold distinction:

    1) Beds and tables as they are by their nature, the singular forms.
    2) Beds and tables as they are made by the craftsman with an eye to the form
    3) Beds and tables as they are made by a maker of images, whose model is the beds and tables made by the craftsman.

    In order to see what the just soul is Socrates likens it to the just city and inquires into the sort of thing justice is in the city. (368e-369a) This raised several questions.

    Justice itself is what it is by nature, the form Justice. But justice itself is not found in the world. What Socrates presents is an image of the original form. At best justice once removed. Both ‘just soul’ and ‘just city’, however, are compounds or composites of forms not forms. They are, it would seem, images without an original form.

    Imitation, Socrates says, is surely at a far remove from the truth. (5598b) Even if there were such a thing as the form of a just soul or just city, any existing city or soul would be at a remove from it. Since Socrates’ city is made in speech, it is twice removed. An image (3) of an image (2). As such we do not know the truth of the just soul or just city by looking at the image Socrates makes.

    To what extent is justice in the soul like justice in the city? Initially we may have gone along with the image presented earlier, but it would seem that Plato is now leading us to reconsider how much the soul is like the city. To what extent should our idea of the one shape our idea of the other?


    Socrates poses the following question to Homer:

    ‘Dear Homer, if you are not actually at a third remove from the truth about excellence, a mere craftsman of an image, someone we defined as an imitator, but if you are indeed at a second remove, and would be able to recognise what sorts of activities make people better or worse personally and as citizens, then tell us, which cities have been better governed because of you, as Sparta was because of Lycourgos? (599d)

    We can pose the same question to Socrates. If he is a second remove rather than a third, then what is original that he has made an image of? In addition, if the city of Athens is the judge of such things then Socrates made the city worse not better.

    When he goes on to say:

    “Come on then, consider this carefully. The maker of the image, the imitator, according to us knows nothing of what is, but does know what appears. Isn’t this so? (601b-c)

    Shouldn’t the same consideration be given to Socrates’ own images?

    “By Zeus,” said I, “this business of imitation is concerned with something at a third remove from the truth. Isn’t it so?” (602c)


    This seems to be a good place to pause to consider all of this.
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    13.2k
    Socrates makes a three-fold distinction:

    1) Beds and tables as they are by their nature, the singular forms.
    2) Beds and tables as they are made by the craftsman with an eye to the form
    3) Beds and tables as they are made by a maker of images, whose model is the beds and tables made by the craftsman.
    Fooloso4

    I believe the best representation of this three-fold distinction is like this.

    The basic example consists of three beds, one made by God, one made by a carpenter, and the third being a painting of one made by the carpenter. You can see how the third is an imitation, and not even a real bed. So artists, poets, and playwriters who imitate (sometimes translated as narrate) like this are frowned upon, for producing something less than real. The point is that there are different perspectives, and the artist's imitation is from a perspective, therefore lacking in truth, and inherently deceptive.


    Now, to understand how this relates to good and bad, and Homer's representation of the divine, we are guided to take the analogy one step further. So, consider the following. The carpenter makes a physical bed. This physical bed is a copy of the carpenter's idea (form) of a bed. The carpenter's idea of a bed is itself a representation of the ideal bed, the divine Form of bed or best bed. The carpenter attempts to produce the ideal form of bed. Notice how the carpenter's material bed suffers the same problem of "imitation" that the painter's bed suffered. Rather than being based on the divine Form of bed itself, it is based on the carpenter's representation of what he believes is the divine Form. So it's an imitation produced from a perspective, and therefore lacking in truth.

    This is how we are instructed to look at Homer's representation of good, bad, and the divine, as opinion. There are three levels, the divine, the poet's ideas of the divine, and the poetry. We are inclined to believe that the poetry is a representation of the divine. But this leaves out the very important medium, which is the poet's own ideas of the divine. So the poetry really only represents the divine through the medium, which is the poet's ideas.
  • Amity
    5.3k
    I started this thread in response to a comment by Jamal about Plato’s Republic:

    They all belong together and they're all important, although book 10 is weird and some would say adds nothing of much value to the whole work's argument.

    I want to look into it in order to see how much value it might add.
    Fooloso4

    First of all thanks for starting the thread. I look forward to hearing more. It is, as you say, a response to Jamal's comment - a reply to my question here:
    https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/937134

    It surprised me - I had thought Book 10 would be the main conclusion. Perhaps echoing what Jamal said about Book 1:
    But the allusions or allegories in Book 1 of the Republic are woven in with the central themes of the work and contain everything that's to come in microcosm.Jamal

    So, perhaps a resolution of everything before?

    I wish I had asked about the 'weirdness' and who the 'some' were. I wondered if they leaned more to the hard philosophy or literary side. 'Nothing much of value' seems far too dismissive of Plato.

    It seems this has been a 'Problem' for readers since 1150 C.E., Averroes. From p12-13 of this fascinating dissertation: The Psychology of Plato's Republic: Taking Book 10 into Account
    Daniel Mailick
    The Graduate Center, City University of New York

    One hundred years ago, Shorey held the same opinion, saying that Book 10
    was "technically an appendix”.2

    Many of the best-known 20th century commentators feel much the same way. Reeve begins his chapter preface to Book 10 by saying “The main argument of the Republic is now complete”.3

    Annas speaks for many when she says: “Book 9 ends the main argument of the Republic, and ends it on a rhetorical and apparently decisive note. We are surprised to find another book added on”.4 She goes on to characterize Book 10 as “an excrescence”, “gratuitous”, “clumsy”, “full of oddities”, and overall, as a “coda” or “appendix...added to a work essentially complete already”.5

    On the other hand, many commentators of note have argued that the Republic, like many texts, was composed as a ring composition.6
    Academic works

    I am attracted to the latter interpretation. The dissertation conclusion convinces me of Book 10's value. (pdf 274- 283) It is an end come full circle. About how to live the best possible life.

    In book 2 Socrates said:

    Do you not know that the beginning of any work is most important …
    ((377a)
    Fooloso4

    As is the end.
  • I like sushi
    4.9k
    1) Beds and tables as they are by their nature, the singular forms.
    2) Beds and tables as they are made by the craftsman with an eye to the form
    3) Beds and tables as they are made by a maker of images, whose model is the beds and tables made by the craftsman.
    Fooloso4

    1) The purpose.
    2) The technique/skill ('techne'/'arete' perhaps?).
    3) The sensory impression ('imitation').

    To what extent is justice in the soul like justice in the city?Fooloso4

    1) Purpose = Nature
    2) Ability = Individual
    3) Imitation = Law

    The laws of a city is an imitation of natural laws. The human 'soul' is a 'natural law'. The individual is allowed to reconstitute itself in the face of nature and the contraposition of the 'imitative' force of nature embodied in 'law'.

    The main problem with the last part is Plato trying to equate the idea of 'imitation' of a 'visible image' with a 'narrative'.

    edit NOTE: I am not stating Plato's position here.
  • Jamal
    9.8k
    @Amity

    My statement that Book 10 is weird is based on my own experience with it, and so far this is a quite vague impression. My comment that some people have a low opinion of it is based on my secondary readings (including some of those referred to in your quotation from that dissertation). I am on my second and more thorough read through the Republic after having read it a few weeks ago, and I don't have a stable view either way. But certainly, Book 10 feels different from what has gone before.
  • Benkei
    7.8k
    It is different but it's not a footnote if my philosophy teacher was anybody to trust, who in turn really liked Eric Vögelin. He viewed it as a critical part of Plato's philosophical argument, particularly regarding the relationship between reality, imitation, and the nature of truth.

    Plato critiques poetry and the arts for being imitative, potentially misleading, and emotionally manipulative, distancing people from truth and rational understanding.The layers of imitation (the forms, the craftsman's creations, and the imitators' representations) reflect the complexity of human understanding and the challenge of grasping the transcendent order. It re-emphasizes the importance of striving for a direct encounter with the real rather than settling for mere representations or ideological constructs, much like the Simile of the Cave.

    It could be inferred that Plato’s critique of poetry reflects a broader philosophical concern about the ways in which individuals and societies can become detached from genuine understanding. The danger lies in accepting images or ideologies as sufficient substitutes for reality, leading to a distorted perception of justice and truth.

    I can understand how some people see it as a footnote though because it seems to re-examine points already made in the book.
  • Jamal
    9.8k


    Good stuff. I may say more when I've read it again.
  • Amity
    5.3k
    I am on my second and more thorough read through the Republic after having read it a few weeks ago, and I don't have a stable view either way. But certainly, Book 10 feels different from what has gone before.Jamal

    You are way ahead of me, and better placed to have a supported view after a second read.
    I've been hovering around the Republic, hardly daring to enter its complexities. That will have to be rectified.

    From the little I have gleaned, Book 10 is certainly different but that's not the same as being 'weird'.
    I wonder if this is due to the turn from the abstract to parable. The Myth of Er and the judgement of souls. Socrates is telling a story. Plato has decided to conclude his Dialogue on the Ideal City ( against poetry) with a poetic narrative. A spiritual nature.

    I think this shows that Book 10 does indeed have a symmetry with Book 1.
    I remember our discussion about the elderly Cephalus. His concerns and comments about any rewards or punishment after death. You suggested a negative picture of Cephalus - his contribution as frivolous.
    I took the opposite view:

    Who says that Cephalus is bad or contemptible?
    It is not the case that he leaves the debate the moment he gets a difficult question. He engages with Socrates up to the point where he agrees but then he must leave to attend to religious matters.
    He talks of old age in the wisest of terms and uses poets as support. Sophocles, 329c.

    From the Perseus site (excellent with notes):
    “You are right,” he replied. “Then this is not the definition of justice: to tell the truth and return what one has received.” “Nay, but it is, Socrates,” said Polemarchus breaking in, “if indeed we are to put any faith in Simonides.” “Very well,” said Cephalus, “indeed I make over the whole argument to you. For it is time for me to attend the sacrifices.” “Well,” said I, “is not Polemarchus the heir of everything that is yours?” “Certainly,” said he with a laugh, and at the same time went out to the sacred rites.[331e]

    He is thinking ahead to his death and how to please the Gods.
    He uses Pindar 331a to talk about the 'ledger of his life' - Cephalus is perhaps haunted by any wrong doings or injustice at his hands and wants to make amends.
    Poets and tyrants in the Republic, Book 1

    Again, your impression: 'Plato wants to portray Cephalus as ordinarily just, but complacent.'
    Annas was mentioned as viewing Cephalus as a contemptible figure.

    It will be interesting to hear your thoughts after a second read. :sparkle:
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    13.2k
    He viewed it as a critical part of Plato's philosophical argument, particularly regarding the relationship between reality, imitation, and the nature of truth.Benkei

    I agree with this. What Plato's describes here is the logical procedure toward the separation between human ideas, and the separate or divine Forms, which Aristotle and Aquinas followed up on, to a much more significant degree. This is the means by which traditional "Platonism" or Pythagorean idealism is dispelled. The principal issue is the deficiency of the human mind, in its attempts to grasp "the ideal", as the best, most perfect, divine ideas. The human mind naturally comes up short, and this creates a separation between human ideas, and the divine, perfect, ideal "Truth".

    The separation extends throughout all of humanity's mental enterprises, from the most vague ideas about beauty, good, and just, to the most precise ideas about numbers and logic. The cold hard reality is that the human mind cannot produce perfection in any of its conceptions, therefore there is always a separation between human ideas, and any supposed "independent Forms" such that Platonism, which holds human ideas to that high esteem, is necessarily incorrect. This separation, through its development by Aristotle and the cosmological argument, is fundamental to Thomism.
  • Amity
    5.3k
    Imitation, Socrates says, is surely at a far remove from the truth. (5598b) Even if there were such a thing as the form of a just soul or just city, any existing city or soul would be at a remove from it. Since Socrates’ city is made in speech, it is twice removed. An image (3) of an image (2). As such we do not know the truth of the just soul or just city by looking at the image Socrates makes.Fooloso4

    Humans can and do express their feelings and thoughts from a distance - however, that is not to deny them any 'truth' as experienced. It is true that there are daffodils and that they provide inspiration.

    William Wordsworth's poem 'I wandered lonely as a cloud'. Words painting a picture of a host of golden daffodils dancing in the breeze of the Lake District. Just as Plato paints pictures.

    Socrates makes an image of 'just souls or just cities' but I find it hard to see this as any 'truth', given that it is in his, or Plato's, imagination. I have not experienced similar, that I know of. I can, however, value it as a way of stretching my mind and thoughts.

    To what extent is justice in the soul like justice in the city? Initially we may have gone along with the image presented earlier, but it would seem that Plato is now leading us to reconsider how much the soul is like the city. To what extent should our idea of the one shape our idea of the other?Fooloso4

    I don't have any idea of the shape or structure of a 'soul'. However, I know what a city is like and its various structures e.g. socio-political. It is easy to compare what Plato suggests with our own.
    To judge the value of his way of thinking...
  • Amity
    5.3k
    You raise interesting questions.

    We can pose the same question to Socrates. If he is a second remove rather than a third, then what is original that he has made an image of? In addition, if the city of Athens is the judge of such things then Socrates made the city worse not better.

    When he goes on to say:

    “Come on then, consider this carefully. The maker of the image, the imitator, according to us knows nothing of what is, but does know what appears. Isn’t this so? (601b-c)

    Shouldn’t the same consideration be given to Socrates’ own images?
    Fooloso4

    We can also consider whether it is Socrates' or Plato's imagination based on What is and What could be? An Ideal state of affairs. But then, they must both know that this absolute perfection is questionable, no? And so it has proved to be...as thought-provoking as intended.

    How did Socrates make Athens 'worse not better'? Ah, you mean according to the Athenian judges. Returning us to the Apology...
  • Paine
    2.5k

    I find the specificity of Socrates' letter to Homer interesting. Here is the continuation after your quote:

    What state gives you the credit of having been a good lawgiver and having benefited it? Italy and Sicily would claim Charondas, we would claim Solon. Who would claim you?’ Will he be able to answer?”

    “I don’t think so,” said Glaucon. “Nothing is said on the matter even by the Homeridae themselves.”

    “There again, what war is on record as being well fought in Homer’s time under his leadership or on his advice?”

    “None.”

    “Or again, as would be expected of the deeds of a wise man, are there many ingenious inventions and clever contrivances in crafts or any other activities that are mentioned, as they are with the Milesian Thales and the Scythian Anacharsis?”

    “Nothing of that sort at all.”

    “And yet again, if not in public life, in private life is Homer himself said to have been a leading educator in his own lifetime for some who delighted in his company and passed on a kind of Homeric way of life to their successors, as Pythagoras himself was particularly loved for this, and even today his successors seem to be distinguished among the rest for a way of life they call Pythagorean?”
    — Republic, 599e, translated by Jones and Preddy

    This places Plato's effort in a continuum which is rarely expressed so directly in the Dialogues. It also points to a negative space where people can assemble. A way of life that does not talk about itself. That points back to the question of what Simonides meant to say in Book 1
  • Srap Tasmaner
    5k
    We are inclined to believe that the poetry is a representation of the divine. But this leaves out the very important medium, which is the poet's own ideas of the divine. So the poetry really only represents the divine through the medium, which is the poet's ideas.Metaphysician Undercover

    And if the poet is inspired?

    Are these two claims the same:

    (1) The poet expresses his ideas about the divine.
    (2) The divine expresses itself through the medium of the poet's ideas.

    The principal issue is the deficiency of the human mind, in its attempts to grasp "the ideal", as the best, most perfect, divine ideas.Metaphysician Undercover

    But what if it is not the poet reaching out toward the divine ("Ah, but a man's reach must exceed his grasp, or what's a heaven for?"), but the divine taking hold of the poet?

    The argument would have to be that a poet's ideas (or his words, really) make too poor a material for the divine to use to express itself. But what is that argument?
  • Fooloso4
    6.2k
    So, perhaps a resolution of everything before?Amity

    I don't think so. Many of the problems raises in the dialogues do not seem to have a resolution. Some might find the odd or unsatisfactory, but I think it is a reflection of life. There is much that we do not have answer for.
  • Fooloso4
    6.2k
    The laws of a city is an imitation of natural laws.I like sushi

    What are the natural laws? How are they known? If they are known then what is the purpose of imitation of the laws? Or is it that the law givers attempt to approximate something that is not known?

    The human 'soul' is a 'natural law'.I like sushi

    What do you mean?
  • Fooloso4
    6.2k
    Plato critiques poetry and the arts for being imitative, potentially misleading, and emotionally manipulative, distancing people from truth and rational understanding.Benkei

    There is another side to this that I will be addressing.
  • Fooloso4
    6.2k
    A way of life that does not talk about itself.Paine

    Can you say more about this?
  • Paine
    2.5k

    Book 10 concentrates on different ways a soul might get what is their due, in this life or afterwards. Plato placing tradition in continuum with previous challenges puts the immediate discussion in a broader context. The traditions Socrates is found questioning in many of the Dialogues involve a collision with a code of silence of sorts.

    For example, when Socrates challenges Antyus in Meno, the talk about learning virtue is seen by Antyus as an assault upon his honor. There is a vivid Homeric logic to what might happen next.

    Euthyphro provides another point of contrast but without the threat of violence pointed to in Meno and Republic Book 1.
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    13.2k
    And if the poet is inspired?Srap Tasmaner

    Being "inspired" does not equate with being able to represent the divine. The principal force of Plato's criticism of Homer is related to how Homer represents the divine. He uses the argument concerning "imitation" to attack Homer's credibility on the subject of the divine.

    Are these two claims the same:

    (1) The poet expresses his ideas about the divine.
    (2) The divine expresses itself through the medium of the poet's ideas.
    Srap Tasmaner

    No, clearly these two are very different. In (1) the poet is the active agent. In (2) the divine is the active agent. The improper assigning of "activity" is what Plato demonstrates to be the deficiency of the theory of participation. By the theory of participation, beautiful things partake in the Idea of Beauty. Notice, the beautiful things are active in partaking, and the Idea is passively partaken off.

    So Plato grasped a very difficult problem, which was the question of how forms, or ideas, could be causally active in the creative process. In modern days we have a simple representation of this problem, known as the interaction problem. Plato introduced the idea of "the good" as a causal principle, and Aristotle provided the term "final cause", defined as "that for the sake of which". This is provided as the means toward understanding how ideas are active in the creative arts.

    But what if it is not the poet reaching out toward the divine ("Ah, but a man's reach must exceed his grasp, or what's a heaven for?"), but the divine taking hold of the poet?Srap Tasmaner

    The whole point is that this, "the divine taking hold of the poet", is the false representation which Plato wants to rid us of. What Plato points out is that the human mind is a medium between the divine and the poetry produced by the human being. That's the point of the three layers. Further, the human mind provides only one perspective, and therefore truth is lacking. And instead of being guided by "the truth", the human perspective is guided by "the good". This renders the human being, with one's own free willing mind, as the agent in the creative act, the good is the object aimed for. So the claim that "God has taken a hold of me" and makes me do such and such (He came to me as a burning bush, and gave me this tablet of ten commandments, for example), is the deceptive claim. Would you accept "the devil made me do it" as an excuse for acting poorly? Why would you accept "God made me do it" as an explanation for the quality of one's poetry? The human being is a medium, an agent with free will, and is really speaking one's own opinions about the divine. The divine is not appearing to others, through the medium, no matter how the divine appears to the medium.
  • Srap Tasmaner
    5k
    The whole point is that this, "the divine taking hold of the poet", is the false representation which Plato wants to rid us of.Metaphysician Undercover

    The human being is a medium, an agent with free will, and is really speaking one's own opinions about the divine.Metaphysician Undercover

    But this is just denying that divine inspiration is a thing. It was already clear what your view on the matter is.

    And maybe it's Plato's too.

    So Plato grasped a very difficult problem, which was the question of how forms, or ideas, could be causally active in the creative process.Metaphysician Undercover

    But it's not the Forms that would matter here, but the Muses. And he doesn't seem to mention them. Maybe I overlooked it.

    But as near as I can tell no one is bothering to present an actual argument against the efficacy of the Muses in the production of Homer's poetry.

    Your incredulity is not an argument.
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    13.2k
    But this is just denying that divine inspiration is a thing. It was already clear what your view on the matter is.

    And maybe it's Plato's too.
    Srap Tasmaner

    Right, I was trying to clarify Plato's argument. If you don't agree with it, maybe you could provide an argument for the other side, attempt to refute Plato or something.

    But it's not the Forms that would matter here, but the Muses. And he doesn't seem to mention them. Maybe I overlooked it.

    But as near as I can tell no one is bothering to present an actual argument against the efficacy of the Muses in the production of Homer's poetry.

    Your incredulity is not an argument.
    Srap Tasmaner

    I've explained the argument. It's you who has not provided a counter argument. I suggest you go back and read what I wrote. But here's the gist of it:

    Now, to understand how this relates to good and bad, and Homer's representation of the divine, we are guided to take the analogy one step further. So, consider the following. The carpenter makes a physical bed. This physical bed is a copy of the carpenter's idea (form) of a bed. The carpenter's idea of a bed is itself a representation of the ideal bed, the divine Form of bed or best bed. The carpenter attempts to produce the ideal form of bed. Notice how the carpenter's material bed suffers the same problem of "imitation" that the painter's bed suffered. Rather than being based on the divine Form of bed itself, it is based on the carpenter's representation of what he believes is the divine Form. So it's an imitation produced from a perspective, and therefore lacking in truth.Metaphysician Undercover
  • I like sushi
    4.9k


    1) Beds and tables as they are by their nature, the singular forms.
    2) Beds and tables as they are made by the craftsman with an eye to the form
    3) Beds and tables as they are made by a maker of images, whose model is the beds and tables made by the craftsman.
    Fooloso4

    Their Nature is their Law (Natural).

    The Soul is its Nature.

    The Law (of polis) is an Imitation of Nature.

    The Nature of things is what their Truth is.
  • Srap Tasmaner
    5k


    Found the reference to Homer's muse, a little later, but alas it's the "pleasure-giving Muse" (607a-c), not the "true Muse -- that of discussion and philosophy" (548b).

    Not question-begging at all.

    Carry on.
  • Amity
    5.3k
    So, perhaps a resolution of everything before?
    — Amity

    I don't think so. Many of the problems raises in the dialogues do not seem to have a resolution. Some might find the odd or unsatisfactory, but I think it is a reflection of life. There is much that we do not have answer for.
    Fooloso4

    Yes. A reflection of life. And how best to live it. In not reaching any definite conclusions, Plato shows us that philosophy is never-ending. Inner and outer conversations continue, as long as we have a mind to.

    So, Book 10 - is both an ending and a beginning. It is an important part of the whole.
    It offers the opportunity to return and re-examine. From a different perspective with a new eye.
    Just as we are doing here...to carefully consider and increase our understanding. Hopefully.

    'There is much that we do not have the answer for'.
    Yes. But in general, our knowledge has increased in fields other than philosophy. Modern Neuroscience, for one. And at other levels, accessible to the ordinary, interested reader - e.g. a growing body of literature, easier to comprehend than the Republic. Now, we have Eco Literature and others, more inclusive. Like feminism and gender issues. The whole wide world unknown to Plato.
    Plato is a dinosaur of a dazzling writer.
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    13.2k
    Found the reference to Homer's muse, a little later, but alas it's the "pleasure-giving Muse" (607a-c), not the "true Muse -- that of discussion and philosophy" (548b).

    Not question-begging at all.

    Carry on.
    Srap Tasmaner

    I think that's an important point. Plato was not advocating an all out ban on the creative arts. Music actually plays a very important role in his proposed state. But the reason it plays a very important role is that it has a certain power over the soul. This type of power can do both, culture good character, or corrupt character. That is simply the nature of "power". As is explained earlier in the book, the person with the capacity to do the most good, has also the capacity to do the most harm. The "power" in and of itself is neither good nor evil, it is how it is used which is good or evil.

    Plato grasps the power of the creative arts, and understands that art can have a good influence or a bad influence over the culturing of human disposition. The problem is, that due to the nature of human intention, and free will, the specifics of this type of influence are very hard to get a handle on. So Plato approaches with a very general attitude, starting with the very broad principle, that all imitative type art, which is presented by the artist in a way that makes it appear like it is telling a true story, in the mode of narrative, ought to be banned, because it is actually not telling a true story. That's why Plato deemed it deceptive, it appears to be representing truth when it is not.

    However, Plato is very heavy handed in his use of irony. You'll notice that right after he gets finished explaining how this type of art needs to be banned outright, he proceeds into telling such a myth, to end the book. There's irony all through Plato's work, and much of it is quite humorous to the prepared sense of humour. But this particular example is probably better described as hypocrisy, the division between irony and hypocrisy being the seriousness of the intended message.

    At the end, 621c, Socrates says, "But if we are persuaded by me, we'll believe that the soul is immortal and able to endure every evil and every good, and we'll always hold to the upward path, practising justice with reason in every way." If the myth presented is meant in seriousness to be believed as "the truth", if Socrates is actually intending to persuade anyone with that story, then Plato is practising what he say's ought to be banned (that's hypocrisy). But if it is presented as obviously false, a humorous presentation of irony, Socrates knowing that he's not going to persuade anyone with that story, therefore it's not meant as an imitation or narrative of any real occurrence, then that story is simply presented as an ironic way of exemplifying what he is talking about. Which is it, irony or hypocrisy? Could it be both?
  • Fooloso4
    6.2k
    The discussion turns to the fate of the soul.

    Are you not aware,” said I, “that our soul is immortal and is never destroyed?”

    And he looked at me, in amazement, and said, “By Zeus, I am not, but are you able to say this?” (608d)

    We might be surprised at Glaucon's reaction. But for Homer, to lose one’s life is to lose one’s soul. It enters Homer’s “joyless kingdom of the dead”. (Odyssey 11.105) It is this image, above all others, that Socrates quarrels with. He does not do so by replacing images with reasoned argument but by presenting a different image.

    Socrates’ defense of justice depends on an afterlife, on what awaits the just and the unjust after death. (614a) This differs from his own defense in the Apology where he raises the possibility that:

    … the dead person is nothing and has no perception of anything …
    (40c)

    Here however he ignores that possibility and presents the myth of Er, the story of a man who comes back to life. (614b)

    The problem remains:

    … knowing things as they actually are.
    (595b)

    Unlike the poetry that Socrates criticizes, the purpose of the story of Er is not to bring pleasure to the listener. (607c) It may bring hope to some, but fear to others. It may not be the truth of what happens in death but it could be considered leading rather than misleading, for:

    What’s at stake is becoming good or bad, and so we should not neglect justice, and excellence in general (608b)
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    13.2k
    Unlike the poetry that Socrates criticizes, the purpose of the story of Er is not to bring pleasure to the listener. (607c) It may bring hope to some, but fear to others. It may not be the truth of what happens in death but it could be considered leading rather than misleading, for:

    What’s at stake is becoming good or bad, and so we should not neglect justice, and excellence in general (608b)
    Fooloso4

    Or, as mentioned above, it may be typical Platonic irony, taken to the extreme, the boundary of hypocrisy.
  • Fooloso4
    6.2k
    Or, as mentioned above, it may be typical Platonic irony, taken to the extreme, the boundary of hypocrisy.Metaphysician Undercover

    I think of Socratic/Platonic irony as a turning around, and this not simply as saying one thing and meaning another, but of things being more and other than they may seem to be, requiring us to look again, to look more closely, to make connections.
  • Amity
    5.3k
    The discussion turns to the fate of the soul.Fooloso4

    You jumped from 602c to 608d. Did you not think the missing sections to be important as to an understanding and assessment of Book 10's value?

    602C “By Zeus,” said I, “this business of imitation is concerned with something at a third remove from the truth. Isn’t it so?”
    “Yes.”
    “And what aspect of the person does it have the power to influence?”...
    Platonic Foundation - Book 10
    [emphasis added]

    You didn't want to follow this question?

    603C Let’s take a look, rather, at the very part of the mind with which poetic imitation consorts, and see whether it is lowly or superior.”As above

    Socrates then goes on to suggest that poetry leads us to remember past events and the accompanying sorrows. There is a desire for this which is 'irrational and idle and a friend of cowardice.'
    The troubled one is highly susceptible compared to the one who has an 'intelligent peaceful disposition.'
    (604E)

    He continues:
    “Then it is obvious that the imitative poet has no natural affinity with the good part of the soul, and his wisdom is not designed to please this if he is going to be well regarded among the general population. He has, rather, an affinity with the troubled and complex character because it is so easy to imitate.” (605A)

    What a load of... ass-umptions...he makes it worse...by design...

    ...You know that we are delighted, we surrender ourselves, we follow along and feel what they feel, and, in all seriousness, we praise whoever is best able to give us such an experience and call him a good poet.”

    “I know, of course.”

    “But when some personal misfortune befalls any of us, you realise, in this case, that we pride ourselves on the opposite response, on being able to remain at peace and to endure it, since this is the response of a man, while the other, the one we just praised is a woman’s response 605E
    [emphasis added]

    The question of poetry and its value has been revisited. It is seen to have been reasonable to have banished it from the city. The argument seems to have 'proved' this. But has it? Not here but perhaps later with the use of images and a myth? An intended irony or just plain sarcasm?

    To talk of justice at the same time as comparing men and women. The latter unfavourably and then to talk of poetry as a 'she'...bad and irrational. Even if there is irony involved, it sets up a certain kind of 'truth'. A smell that pervades Philosophy. The way male Philosophers are privileged and seen as good.
    Kings of Reason. Peaceful and Intelligent. They go to Heaven, don't they?

    And then, another truth but so condescending with it:

    But in case poetry accuses us of a certain harshness and lack of refinement, let’s explain to her that a dispute between philosophy and poetry is of ancient date. 607B
  • Amity
    5.3k
    Unlike the poetry that Socrates criticizes, the purpose of the story of Er is not to bring pleasure to the listener. (607c) It may bring hope to some, but fear to others. It may not be the truth of what happens in death but it could be considered leading rather than misleading, for:

    What’s at stake is becoming good or bad, and so we should not neglect justice, and excellence in general (608b)
    Fooloso4

    A fine thing to say. Easier said than done. We can only do our best...
  • Fooloso4
    6.2k
    Did you not think the missing sections to be important as to an understanding and assessment of Book 10's value?Amity

    It is. I will address some of it in relation to the myth of Er, but that does not mean the rest is not important.

    I wanted to address what @Benkei referred to as:

    misleading, and emotionally manipulativeBenkei

    but got sidetracked and left it undeveloped. I touched on the first part with the distinction between leading and misleading. And with regard to emotionally manipulative, the story is Er is emotionally manipulative in so far as it brings hope to some and fear to others, with the intend to lead to the listener being just.

    An intended irony or just plain sarcasm?Amity

    I think it is ironic because he does some of the same things he faults the poets for doing. The difference is his intent.

    To talk of justice at the same time as comparing men and women.Amity

    In the Republic women are regarded as equal to men when it comes to the capacity to be philosophers. But, of course, this should not obscure the differences attributed to men and women.

    In the myth of Er Necessity and her daughters play an important role. I will have more to say on that.
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