Which brings to mind the Pinter analysis - that form is precisely what is brought to bear by cognition so as to navigate the environment — Wayfarer

It’s not just humans who bring form to bear on an environment. This is precisely what all living systems do. And we don’t have to stop there. The non-living world subsists in itself as configurative phenomena. Matter ‘comes to matter’ within intra-actively changing agential configurations.

Matter ‘comes to matter’ within intra-actively changing agential configurations. — Joshs

What now?

I think both form and content are missing from the blob Bob received. Can we take a closer look at the relationship between these things? — frank

Ironically, I had just read a book review in Philosophy Now magazine, before I noticed this post. The book author discusses the "neoliberal consumerist worldview", and the reviewer noted : "in postmodern culture the value of art is financial rather than aesthetic". The illustration showed a stainless steel sculpture by Jeff Koons, which sold for $91 million dollars in 2019. What did the buyer get for his financial fortune : a> a tchotchke to put on a shelf for the aesthetic amusement of his friends, or b> a steel object emulating a child's plastic balloon? Is "The Rabbit" merely a material thing (Hyle), or an aesthetic idea (Morph) in the form of a visual joke : steel art emulating plastic plaything?

Aristotle's Hylomorphism*2 has been interpreted in various ways. The Hyle (wood) component is obviously a material object, but the Morph (Form) component is defined philosophically as "immaterial". Yet Materialists may not distinguish between the tangible (stuff) of the Thing and the Idea (meaning) of the Thing. Is the aesthetic value of the Rabbit in the stainless steel, or in the irony of a child's toy on a museum pedestal? Did the buyer pay for the physical Matter or the metaphysical Form? Which is the "content", the steel or the joke? :joke:


*1. A financial investment, or a sight gag (wink, wink)?


2. Hylomorphism is a philosophical doctrine developed by the Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, which conceives every physical entity or being as a compound of matter and immaterial form, with the generic form as immanently real within the individual. ___Wikipedia

*3. Steel Manufacturer Pays More Than $100 Million to Reduce Emissions from its Dearborn, Michigan Facility
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/steel-manufacturer-pays-more-100-million-reduce-emissions-its-dearborn-michigan


PS___
a> Does the stainless steel Rabbit have more or less Content (material or financial or aesthetic value) than the plastic inflatable Rabbit?
b> The language on such topics gets confusing. Is the steel mill (*3) paying for negative Material (hyle ; pollution) and positive Content (form ; ethics ; purity ; public image ; legal status )?

I love most of Koons' stuff. But yea, investment is like accounting: it's a bizarre other world. S&P500 futures make about as much sense as a giant balloon dog.

If this was an exercise in all of the possible definitions of "house", then yes. But in exploring the agreements between the homeowner and the contrators, no.

Ok, but my point is not that 'house' can have many definitions, but that the form of a house is insignificant for its definition.

A homeowner and a contractor can agree to build a house in the form of a pile of building materials as long as it can be used according to the building regulations (e.g. provide shelter, possibilities for cooking, toilet, shower etc).

There is no form shared by all houses. Instead, there are some functions shared by all houses.

We're able to impose form on it by way of analysis of the chemical composition, spectroscopic analysis, etc. But in another sense, there are vast clouds of interstellar matter that are formless.

Which brings to mind the Pinter analysis - that form is precisely what is brought to bear by cognition so as to navigate the environment.

If the mind is imposing a form on "clouds of interstellar matter," that lack it, why does it impose one form over any other? Why would this imposed form be helpful if it doesn't have to do with something that exists in the "cloud of matter?" And then what causes this imposition of form?

For my part, it seems like the causes must be traced, at least in part, to the things, in which case things can be said to poses form.

But we imagine that if we had eyes small enough, we would see particles down there. It's not really formless, is it?

I suppose it depends on how we use the term "form." In Artistotle, and the classical metaphysical tradition more generally, the form is responsible for all of a thing's "whatness," quiddity. Without eidos, form, there is nothing to say about a thing. And there is a strong phenomenological thread ancient and medieval thought, so this would also amount to saying that formless matter cannot be experienced as anything (cannot be a noema in Husserl's terminology, a target of intentionally.) Prime matter, matter without form is only known as speculative abstraction.

St. Gregory of Nyssa takes this up in "On the Making of Man." Apparently, a common argument at the time was to say that matter must be coeternal with God (a view based on the Timaeus) because God, as pure act, would lack the properties of matter (which must come from somewhere). But as St. Gregory points out, having removed all form, all whatness, from matter, one is left with nothing, no attributes at all—so there is nothing to "lack" in a "lack of potency." (This is also how Aristotle's Prime Mover(s) or Plotinus' One cannot be said to suffer from any privation through being pure act).

So all observed matter would have some form, but not all things would be beings (i.e., having a telos, an internally organizing principle). Clay, rocks, etc. are just bundles of external causes. Statues, being artifacts, have their forms determined by the minds of men.

Now, if form is rather something created by/imposed by the mind, it almost seems to counterintuitively dislodge the phenomenological side of the understanding of eidos, since now the whatness of things is no longer essential to what they are but is rather something produced in one corner of the world, for some perceiving subject.

The non-living world subsists in itself as configurative phenomena.

What does this mean? Are there non-configurative phenomena as a constant?

Matter ‘comes to matter’ within intra-actively changing agential configurations.

"Agent" as the term is used in chemistry, e.g anything affecting change, or "agent" as the term is often used in the social sciences, as an entity that makes intentional decisions/choices?

If the mind is imposing a form on "clouds of interstellar matter," that lack it, why does it impose one form over any other? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Because 'cloud' is a familar cognitive trope. But do clouds possess form at all? I think in the strict sense that it is questionable. They fall under this description:

Clay, rocks, etc. are just bundles of external causes. — Count Timothy von Icarus

(That question is anticipated in the Parmenides, when Socrates asks if there are forms for hair, dirt and mud.)

In any case, the fact that forms are artefacts of the cognitive system, does not undermine their objective (or would that be transjective) reality. It doesn't say that they're solely the product of the mind, but that they arise in the relationship between observer and observed. Biological phenomenology such as enactivism sees such cognitive artifacts as co-arising as a consequence of the interaction between organism and environment. For the pre-moderns, obviously forms could have 'eternal reality in the mind of God' but that is generally not an option for modern philosophy, but we could plausibly say that the idea of forms arose from an intuitive grasp of this co-dependency.

(That question is anticipated in the Parmenides, when Socrates asks if there are forms for hair, dirt and mud.) — Wayfarer

This is an issue where Aristotle's argument about the inseparability of form and matter comes into play. The call for a comprehensive causality means not being able to choose who shows up for the party.

Ah, ok. Makes sense!

St. Gregory of Nyssa takes this up in "On the Making of Man." Apparently, a common argument at the time was to say that matter must be coeternal with God (a view based on the Timaeus) because God, as pure act, would lack the properties of matter (which must come from somewhere). But as St. Gregory points out, having removed all form, all whatness, from matter, one is left with nothing, no attributes at all—so there is nothing to "lack" in a "lack of potency." (This is also how Aristotle's Prime Mover(s) or Plotinus' One cannot be said to suffer from any privation through being pure act). — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's interesting. One of the books I read about Plotinus suggested that he was an eliminative idealist (like a reflection of an eliminative materialist). Though we talk about the privation of the good (or mind), it's not really an independent thing. It's also part of the One, though apparently the part where Plotinus explains this is squirrelly.

Now, if form is rather something created by/imposed by the mind, it almost seems to counterintuitively dislodge the phenomenological side of the understanding of eidos, since now the whatness of things is no longer essential to what they are but is rather something produced in one corner of the world, for some perceiving subject. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I suppose that goes well with panpsychism. I've leaned pretty far into the skepticism about metaphysics these days. Don't have much to say about it, but I could go on and on forever about the dramas that Form and Formlessness play out in the psyche. Cool stuff.

It's also part of the One, though apparently the part where Plotinus explains this is squirrelly. — frank

Does this source quote from a specific text from Plotinus?

↪Joshs

The non-living world subsists in itself as configurative phenomena.

What does this mean? Are there non-configurative phenomena as a constant?

Matter ‘comes to matter’ within intra-actively changing agential configurations.

"Agent" as the term is used in chemistry, e.g anything affecting change, or "agent" as the term is often used in the social sciences, as an entity that makes intentional decisions/choices? — Count Timothy von Icarus

There are no non-configurative phenomena. All events take place within some larger pattern of relations. Agency here does not refer to an entity, but to the organizational capacities of reciprocally affecting relational processes.

If the mind is imposing a form on "clouds of interstellar matter," that lack it, why does it impose one form over any other?
— Count Timothy von Icarus

Because 'cloud' is a familar cognitive trope. But do clouds possess form at all? I think in the strict sense that it is questionable. They fall under this description:

Clay, rocks, etc. are just bundles of external causes.
— Count Timothy von Icarus — Wayfarer

And the concept of external cause is not itself a form (Wittgenstein would say form of life)? What is it we are doing when we split an observer off from an observed, and then go on to declare the observed as lacking any form in itself?

In any case, the fact that forms are artefacts of the cognitive system, does not undermine their objective (or would that be transjective) reality. It doesn't say that they're solely the product of the mind, but that they arise in the relationship between observer and observed — Wayfarer

If forms arise in the relationship between observer and observed, isn’t this also true of what supposedly lies outside of the experience of the observer? This gets to the issue of the basis of the reality-appearance distinction questioned by writers like Wittgenstein (seeing something as something) and Nietzsche.

What is it we are doing when we split an observer off from an observed, and then go on to declare the observed as lacking any form in itself? — Joshs

I don't think I suggested that. I am suggesting that the notion of 'formless matter' is meaningful. From the perspective of classical philosophy, 'formless matter' refers to matter that lacks a specific form or structure, awaiting the imposition of form to become a particular. In this sense, formless matter is a potentiality that can take on various forms through natural processes or external causes. From that perspective, clouds of interstellar gas could be considered formless matter in a metaphysical sense, as they are raw material that, under the right conditions (e.g., gravitational forces, fusion processes), can form stars, planets, or other celestial bodies. For that perspective, 'form' (morphe) refers not just to shape but to the organizing principle that gives a substance its identity.

As @frank points out, from a scientific perspective, interstellar gas and dust are not really formless, as they are subject to physical laws and composed of atoms which have regular structures. They are subject to processes of condensation, fusion, and gravitational collapse, enabling the formation of structures like stars or planets. In this sense, the term "formless" would not strictly apply, since even gas clouds have properties (mass, temperature, charge) and follow patterns like the formation of stars in nebulae. However, they could be seen as chaotic or unstructured compared to highly organized systems such as life-bearing planets and human artefacts.

If forms arise in the relationship between observer and observed, isn’t this also true of what supposedly lies outside of the experience of the observer? — Joshs

What do we suppose does lie outside all experience? Can that even be meaningfully discussed?

What I'm wrestling with are two senses of 'form'. There's the Aristotelian sense of morphe which informs matter. That is the classical view, which to all intents became absorbed into Christian theism. As such it's a kind of no-go for a lot of people, if it suggests anything like intelligent design or the 'divine intellect'.

Then there's the enactivist approach, which considers form as both an emergent principle, on the one hand, and also a cognitive function, where forms serve as gestalts, the unitary wholes which enable the mind to recognise particulars as part of a species.

As far as forms being emergent principles, there is still some resonance of the Aristotelian morphe in that, as it is preserved in the current lexicon as morphology and its derivatives. Both Terrence Deacon and Alice Juarrero acknowledge a revised Aristotelian element in their books.

As far as the 'observer and observed' are concerned, that's a whole other topic. I've started trying to draft an essay on it but it is wide and deep.

Maybe form and formlessness are dependent on one another for meaning. It's one concept.

Yes. That’s a rather Taoist way of looking at it.

(This is also how Aristotle's Prime Mover(s) or Plotinus' One cannot be said to suffer from any privation through being pure act). — Count Timothy von Icarus

But Plotinus' "One" is pure potency rather than pure act. This is the principal metaphysical difference between Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism.

This is an issue where Aristotle's argument about the inseparability of form and matter comes into play. — Paine

This claimed "inseparability" needs to be qualified as unidirectional. Matter cannot be separated from form, to produce "prime matter", but form is separable from matter. In principle this is how sensing, and abstraction is explained. The human mind receives the form of the object without the matter.

This understanding of abstraction created a problem for the ancients (exposed by Plato and Aristotle), because the form in the mind (the abstraction) is not precisely the same as the form in the material object. Aristotle explained this difference with the concept of "accidents", the form which the material object has is complete with accidents, while the abstracted form consists only of the essence of the object. The problem, well demonstrated by Plato in The Timaeus, is that if the form which comes to be in the human mind is an abstraction, an essence, it is categorized as a universal, yet the individual material object has a "form" which is particular to itself, complete with the accidentals which makes it a unique thing. Now, the question was, how does an object come to have a unique form, when "forms" as they are known to the human mind, are universals. So Plato grappled with the question of how universals produce particulars.

The solution presented by Aristotle, with reference to a further premise, the law of identity, is that the form of a material object must preexist the object's material existence. So in BK 7 of Metaphysics Aristotle discusses how an artist gives matter the particular form which it has, in the case of a work of art, by putting the form into the matter. He then proceeds to explain why natural objects must be generated in a similar way, the form preexists the material object, and is put into the matter.

This principle validates the separation of form from matter, in the sense that pure form is prior in time to matter. That is the principle which Aquinas and other Christian theologians exploit, claiming God to be pure Form, pure act, and Creator of matter. This representation is derived from Aristotle's so-called cosmological argument, which shows that since it is necessary that the form of an object preexists its material presence, there must be a form which preexists all material presence. Then we must conclude that matter comes into existence from this primordial Act, and must always have form, making matter inseparable from form.

Because 'cloud' is a familar cognitive trope. But do clouds possess form at all?

In the older sense of eidos, yes. Clouds are intelligible and sensible. If they lacked form they couldn't be experienced as clouds.

(That question is anticipated in the Parmenides, when Socrates asks if there are forms for hair, dirt and mud.)

Yes, it's a problem crying out for clarification. Aristotle has the distinction between "things that exist by, [i.e. according to their], nature"—beings which possess a telos—and things that exist "from causes." But I don't think Aristotle's distinction gets at the full scope of the problem here. Plato's forms, at least if taken in terms of some "two worlds Platonism," where forms exist subsitently and not in relation with one another, is also problematic because things are not wholly intelligible in isolation, e.g. "redness" as set off from "color" and all the other colors. For example, you can't really explain what a "tree" is without reference to the air, the sun, the soil, water, etc. Forms are not intelligible in isolation.

Aristotle doesn't do much with this second problem but it is addressed in later thinkers, St. Maximus the Confessor being a prime example of an advanced synthesis that is able to distinguish between the unity that contains all ideas/forms (the Logos) and their dynamic instantiation in the created world. Hence, even "number," "hardness," etc. are dynamic in precisely that they only exist instantiated in created things, but exist according to their "logoi," which is ideas "at work" in the world. The idea of species as all being differentiated expressions of a unifying genus progressing towards the unity/whole and goal of the genus would then be a further working out of this idea.

For the pre-moderns, obviously forms could have 'eternal reality in the mind of God' but that is generally not an option for modern philosophy, but we could plausibly say that the idea of forms arose from an intuitive grasp of this co-dependency.

It's not an option for good reasons or out of bias? "Thou shalt not explain ideas in terms of the transcedent or absolute," yet one can apparently offer up explanations of anything, and indeed everything, that bottom out in brute facts, "it just is," and "for no reason at all." And things even seem to be allowed to bottom out as brute facts isolated in the sui generis powers of finite minds, such that the mind "just is," the source of all sorts of things in the world, including Goodness, Truth, and Beauty.

IDK, this strikes me not so much as contemporary philosophy being opposed to positing God as part of an explanation as contemporary philosophy wanting to make man take the place of God. (But of course, a voluntarist God, whose freedom is defined in terms of power and potency.)

In any case, the fact that forms are artefacts of the cognitive system, does not undermine their objective (or would that be transjective) reality. It doesn't say that they're solely the product of the mind, but that they arise in the relationship between observer and observed. Biological phenomenology such as enactivism sees such cognitive artifacts as co-arising as a consequence of the interaction between organism and environment.

I don't see how enactivism would require that forms are "artefacts of the cognitive system." This sounds like something leaning more towards representationalism, forms as "constructed intelligible likenesses," that must be created "in the mind" to be experienced. But of course, if things are already likenesses of themselves and if we're talking about an enactivist perspective, there is no need for having there be secondary likenesses "constructed for the mind." E.g., the idea of the cognitive/sensory system as a lens we "look through," as opposed to producing images we "look at."

Perception arises in the relationship between observer and observed. It seems another step to say that form would arise from this interaction, since it would imply that the world is unintelligible and without causes before the human mind steps to the plate and declares "let there be light! Or form, or anything at all." And of course, we can never get behind this act of the mind to explain it in terms of causes, for all causes and intelligibility start with the mind.

Like I said, this strikes me as not that different from approaches that invoke the divine, except man is fills the role of God.

But Plotinus' "One" is pure potency rather than pure act. This is the principal metaphysical difference between Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism.

Correct, stoic-inspired omnipotence. But the One wouldn't have a strictly Aristotlean potency, since this would entail mutability, change, and parts. I probably should have phrased that better; point being lack of mutability is not a privation.

Or maybe we would say "beyond act and potency," (as all discursive reason) but we can apophaticaly negate "mutable" of the One. Luckily, in English we have "power" and "potency" to (sort of) distinguish what Eriugena terms "nothing through excellence," (pure, immutable power beyond any defining actuality) and the nothing of prime matter (a "nothing on account of privation"). Or at least, translators seem to use "power" more for Plotinus, which I think works better.

I am suggesting that the notion of 'formless matter' is meaningful…

clouds of interstellar gas could be considered formless matter in a metaphysical sense, as they are raw material that, under the right conditions (e.g., gravitational forces, fusion processes), can form stars, planets, or other celestial bodies. For that perspective, 'form' (morphe) refers not just to shape but to the organizing principle that gives a substance its identity…

…from a scientific perspective, interstellar gas and dust are not really formless, as they are subject to physical laws and composed of atoms which have regular structures. They are subject to processes of condensation, fusion, and gravitational collapse, enabling the formation of structures like stars or planets. In this sense, the term "formless" would not strictly apply, since even gas clouds have properties (mass, temperature, charge) and follow patterns like the formation of stars in nebulae. However, they could be seen as chaotic or unstructured compared to highly organized systems such as life-bearing planets and human artefacts. — Wayfarer

It is possible to make distinctions between different kinds of formative agencies without needing to derive formative agency from formless matter, or separating the two into different conceptual realms (mind vs world , or mind-body vs world). Instead of placing the inorganic under the category of efficient cause and the organic under the category of complex dynamical systems, and then trying to make the latter’s forming agency ‘ emerge’ from the former, formative agency can be accorded to the inorganic as well as the organic. We simply have to move way from the concept of ‘unstructured’, ‘chaotic’ efficient cause with regard to the physical.

I should add that what you’re identifying as formative
capability in humans is not a passive picture of the world created by an observer, but a performative activity, a set of practices involving mind, body and environment in a dance of interaffection. Form is not our stance toward the world but a pattern of material interactions with it, in the midst of it.

How are the clay and the statue related? — frank

By minds.

Luckily, in English we have "power" and "potency" to (sort of) distinguish what Eriugena terms "nothing through excellence," (pure, immutable power beyond any defining actuality) and the nothing of prime matter (a "nothing on account of privation"). Or at least, translators seem to use "power" more for Plotinus, which I think works better. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The idea of pure immutable power, is what Aristotle took issue with. Such a power would not have the capacity to actualize anything. If absolutely anything is possible, then there is nothing actual to cause anything, and the situation will always remain the same, as absolutely anything is possible. That is why Aristotle assumed an actuality which is prior to all potential, and the logical need to assume this actuality negates the possibility of pure immutable power. The prior actuality is the cause which accounts for the reality of this particular existence, which consists of limited possibility, rather than an endless existence of infinite possibility, or power.

Plotinus sort of grasped this problem and tried to deal with it by portraying the pure power, the One, as something other than a cause. So the reality which we know emanates from the One, rather than being caused by the One. But this description fails in the capacity to explain how any particular thing could come into being from a pure potency, or power. We need something to account for this existence rather than some other existence, a choice, and this is an actuality such as a will.

IDK, this strikes me not so much as contemporary philosophy being opposed to positing God as part of an explanation as contemporary philosophy wanting to make man take the place of God. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And I’d concur. ‘Anything but God’. That was part of the firewall built by the Enlightenment. It’s more than just a bias, although it’s also that.

I don't see how enactivism would require that forms are "artefacts of the cognitive system." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Caution required here. I’m not tying to provide a psychological explanation. It's more aligned with Charles Pinter's book Mind and the Cosmic Order:

Everything you see, hear and think comes to you in structured wholes: When you read, you’re seeing a whole page even when you focus on one word or sentence. When someone speaks, you hear whole words and phrases, not individual bursts of sound. When you listen to music, you hear an ongoing melody, not just the note that is currently being played. Ongoing events enter your awareness as Gestalts, for the Gestalt is the natural unit of mental life. If you try to concentrate on a dot on this page, you will notice that you cannot help but see the context at the same time. Vision would be meaningless, and have no biological function, if people and animals saw anything less than integral scenes.

Note, people and animals. As Joshs says, forms that are co-emergent in the relationship with the environment.

Instead of placing the inorganic under the category of efficient cause and the organic under the category of complex dynamical systems, and then trying to make the latter’s forming agency ‘ emerge’ from the former, formative agency can be accorded to the inorganic as well as the organic. — Joshs

It only begins to meaningfully show up in the form of living beings. Otherwise, whether it was 'there' or not, there'd be nobody to debate it!

I should add that what you’re identifying as formative capability in humans is not a passive picture of the world created by an observer, but a performative activity, a set of practices involving mind, body and environment in a dance of interaffection. Form is not our stance toward the world but a pattern of material interactions with it, in the midst of it. — Joshs

Quite. From another discussion:

The 'transjective' refers to the dynamic, participatory relationship between the subject and the world, in which meaning arises through interaction rather than being either imposed by the subject ('in the mind') or existing outside ('in the world'). Vervaeke argues that the objective/subjective distinction presents a false dilemma because it overlooks how humans are always embedded in a web of relationships and processes within which meaning arises. The 'transjective' thus highlights the co-emergence of perception and reality, suggesting that meaning is neither purely personal nor purely external but is co-constituted through engagement with the world. And that applies to meaning in all the different senses of that word, from the utilitarian to the aesthetic, which arise along a continuum, from a spider spinning a web to a poet spinning a sonnet. — Wayfarer

However I would question that these can be seen only in terms of 'material interactions', unless you want to advocate panpsychism.

By whose minds? The clay is strictly related to the statue if it is necessary to be made by the potter. But this is not necessary. Bob can go to another artist, and ask for a marble statue instead. I thought along this thread that the clay is only in the potter's mind.

Agreed, in principle. With the (entirely personal) caveat that any comprehensible notion of mind, as such, is necessarily conditioned by time, reflected in all the relations a mind constructs, including between matter and form in general, clay and statue as instances thereof.

Maybe form and formlessness are dependent on one another for meaning. It's one concept. — frank

Yes. In Mind and the Cosmic Order, Charles Pinter seems to be making the point that is suggesting : that common sense equates the Material Object with its Meaning. "This is quite an amazing insight, and it demonstrates how far our native intuition can diverge from reality. We are convinced beyond a shadow of doubt that every material object has substance and form. That is, an object's form inheres in the object itself, and is an aspect of the matter of which the object is made. Once again, we are misled by common sense. Actually, an object's form is an aspect of the object as an undivided whole, viewed from outside the object." Pinter also summarizes : "Form does not inhere in brute matter but emerges in Gestalt observation".

A Gestalt (holistic) observation sees not just the superficial object, but its internal structure and its interdependent context (the big picture). But Common sense --- e.g. Flat Earth and Materialism --- sees the obvious, but is blind to the implicit meaning or significance or value. On the other hand, a holistic perspective (philosophical sense?) sees the logical structure within the superficial substance, and its conceptual context. If so, then as Wayfarer implies, the isolated object, apart from its interrelationships, is Formless. However, a Gestalt view will observe both formless shape and enformed meaning. :smile:

Note : The modern definitions of Substance and Form are influenced by post-enlightenment reductive Materialism. Their ancient philosophical meanings were more holistic.

makes sense :up:

What I'm wrestling with are two senses of 'form'. There's the Aristotelian sense of morphe which informs matter. That is the classical view, which to all intents became absorbed into Christian theism. As such it's a kind of no-go for a lot of people, if it suggests anything like intelligent design or the 'divine intellect'. — Wayfarer

For Aristotle, moving away from the idea of 'participating' in forms involves the particular individual coming into being as an event of ousia that the universal or genos cannot provide a sufficient explanation for. The issue is at the center of the disruptive quality of Metaphysics Zeta 13. Here is an SEP article that puts it in a nutshell:

Ζ.13 therefore produces a fundamental tension in Aristotle’s metaphysics that has fragmented his interpreters. Some maintain that Aristotle’s theory is ultimately inconsistent, on the grounds that it is committed to all three of the following propositions:

(i) Substance is form.
(ii) Form is universal.
(iii) No universal is a substance. — SEP Aristotle's Metaphysics

The authors of the article make some reasonable arguments to resolve the issue. I tend to look at it as an ongoing issue of how to understand the role of all the causes needed for particular creatures to come into being. Since the forms don't have their own real estate outside the convergence of causes, a new concept of the soul is needed.

There is a parallel consideration taking place in Plato's Sophist, where the sharp division between Being and Becoming is brought into question. It is interesting that Aristotle's Physics (nature) spends so much time and effort into pressing a thumb into the eye of the Eleatics.

The different role of matter in Plato and Aristotle is difficult to fully draw out but the expression "morphe which informs matter" is a product of later Platonism where matter is the empty husk that Soul attempts but fails to completely fill. Aristotle rejects that view in De Anima when he dispenses with the Pythagoreans' concept of soul.