From your post I see a triad of three things: substance - a raw material with the potential to take on form (I note that a raw material has an innate inclination towards taking on a form that expresses its nature: this is Aritsotle’s recognition of chemistry: the innate form of gold differs from the innate form of lead); a form that expresses an organizing principle imparting a specificity of shape and function to a substance (an iron hammer); content - an implicit narrative about the natural world received by a comprehending mind (the Madonna with child statue conveys the role of women as nurturers and protectors of children).

Form and content are distinct from substance because they are closer in proximity to mind.

Fair, although note the ambiguity in the use of the term 'substance' in these conversations. In normal speech 'substance' is 'a material with uniform properties' (e.g. bronze, timber), whereas in philosophy 'substance' is 'a bearer of attributes', used to translate the Greek 'ouisia' which is nearer in meaning to the english 'being'.

Many thanks

Apologies, but I haven't read much of tthis thread.

How are the clay and the statue related? — frank

Simply, like footprints in sand on a beach, "the statue" (pattern) is a secondary quality and "the clay" (material) is a primary quality; thus, unlike the latter, the former is not physically conserved.

It seems that Bob paid for the statue rather than the clay, though. Did Bob pay for something that isn't physical?

Bob paid for the sculptor's work.

Ζ.13 therefore produces a fundamental tension in Aristotle’s metaphysics that has fragmented his interpreters. Some maintain that Aristotle’s theory is ultimately inconsistent, on the grounds that it is committed to all three of the following propositions:

(i) Substance is form.
(ii) Form is universal.
(iii) No universal is a substance. — SEP Aristotle's Metaphysics

I find that the way to resolve this apparent problem is to understand that in Aristotle there is two distinct senses of "form", just like there is "substance" in the primary sense and in the secondary sense. Notice, if substance is form, and there are two distinct senses of "substance" then there must be two distinct senses of form to correspond. This is what allows for two distinct types of actuality, and what makes Aristotle the dualist who resolved the interaction problem, following Plato's revelations concerning the deficiencies of "participation" theory.

So, is that to say my version of the story is an error?

No, I don't think your version is in error, more like incomplete. So I'll address specifically some aspects of your post with suggestions as to how I think it can be filled out better.

The authors of the article make some reasonable arguments to resolve the issue. I tend to look at it as an ongoing issue of how to understand the role of all the causes needed for particular creatures to come into being. Since the forms don't have their own real estate outside the convergence of causes, a new concept of the soul is needed. — Paine

The "new concept of the soul" is the one Aristotle proposes as a form which is the first actuality of a living body. The powers of a living being were understood as potencies, and this would lend itself to the idea of the soul as a power, or potency. But Aristotle showed that since the potencies of the living body are not always active, there is a need to assume an actuality which activates them when they become active. This is the soul, instead of a potency, it is an actuality.

Further study of his metaphysics reveals that this form, or actuality, "soul", must be prior to the body, as the cause of it being the particular body which it is, and not something else. By the law of identity, a thing must be what it is. However, it being what it is, is still contingent on a cause, and this is the prior form. In the case of a living body, it's the soul. Simply put, potencies are possibilities, and something must select (acting as cause) which possibilities will become actual (making the body, the body which it is rather than something else). This cannot be random chance, because the body is an organized body, so the cause is that form, (actuality), which is prior to the body.

There is a parallel consideration taking place in Plato's Sophist, where the sharp division between Being and Becoming is brought into question. It is interesting that Aristotle's Physics (nature) spends so much time and effort into pressing a thumb into the eye of the Eleatics. — Paine

The Greeks were principally scientists, focused on becoming, while the Eleatics were more like philosophers, considering the nature of being. The incompatibility between being and becoming is strongly discussed in Plato's Theatetus, I believe. In my interpretation of The Sophist, the Eleatics are treated as sophists by Plato. But Plato is very careful to explain that it is a fine line, even an undistinguishable line, between a sophist and a philosopher. That seems to be a main point in the dialogue, to determine how to distinguish a sophist from a philosopher or vise versa. So Socrates claims high respect for the Eleatics, but also demonstrates that their philosophy is sophistry.

I think It's pretty clear that Aristotle treats the Eleatics as sophists, especially Zeno. At one point he explains how sophists, by adhering rigidly to the law of excluded middle, in cases of becoming, can prove absurdities. This is why there is a need for the concept of "potential" which violates the law of excluded middle (as what may or may not be), to account for the reality of becoming.

That being and becoming are incompatible is demonstrated by Aristotle in the following way. Suppose there is a change form state-of-being A to state-of-being B, between these two is a case of becoming. If we posit a further state-of-being, C, as the intermediary between A and B, to account for A becoming B, then we have a succession of the following states-of-being, A, C, and B. But now there is a case of becoming between A and C, and also between C and B. Therefore we would need to posit further states of being here, and this becomes and infinite regress of states-of-being without ever accounting for the reality of change, or "becoming", which is supposed to happen between two distinct states-of-being.

It's very similar to the question of real numbers, and the number line. The real number is a point, and there is assumed to be a line between two points. There is always more points, (real numbers), to an infinite regress, and we never account for what the line is, which supposedly exists between points.

The reason why Aristotle is so dismissive of the Eleatics ought to be evident. Zeno for instance, describes motion and change with states-of-being (the arrow is at point A at t1, and point B at t2 for example), and then proceeds from those premises to demonstrate that motion, is impossible. That's Zeno's mode of argumentation, to proceed from assumed states-of-being to show that things like motion and becoming are impossible.

The problem is that there is something very intuitive about states-of-being, so we cannot simply dismiss the concept as unreal. That's why dualism becomes necessary, to account for the reality of both. Then, from dualist premises, becoming and change, being supported by empirical evidence, (sense observation), is subject to skepticism. So we go around, and the inquiry is never ending.

I disagree with your depiction of the Eleatics as sophists. Plato wrote the Sophist having a student of Parmenides overturning a critical tenet of his teacher. Aristotle (almost reluctantly) confirms Plato's descriptions of sophistry as a way to "say what is not." Pretty darn Parmenidean.

What strikes me about Aristotle's Physics is how his rejection of the Eleatics makes no reference to Plato's objections to them in the Sophist (or Plato's Parmenides). That makes it likely there is some portion of the work he likes well enough to make his own.

Your version of 'being' and 'becoming' gives a place for "potential" to hang out in between times of actuality. That does not fit well with Aristotle speaking of potential as something we can only apply by analogy. We need experience to use the idea. In a parallel fashion, I read the tension created in Metaphysics Zeta 13 to point to the complexity of causes beyond being able to recognize "kinds" (genos).

I disagree with your depiction of the Eleatics as sophists. Plato wrote the Sophist having a student of Parmenides overturning a critical tenet of his teacher. Aristotle (almost reluctantly) confirms Plato's descriptions of sophistry as a way to "say what is not." Pretty darn Parmenidean. — Paine

I don't understand what you are saying here. Parmenides is Eleatic. And then you say "Pretty darn Parmenidean", as if you are confirming that Parmenides was sophistic.

Anyway, I agree that we ought not classify the Eleatics altogether as sophists, nor do I think Plato or Socrates was doing such. That's why there was such a long discussion about how exactly to identify the sophist, so that we might separate the sophist from the philosopher, by reference to the individual, not to the type. Within the Eleatics, Zeno stands out as sophistic, using logic to prove things like motion is impossible.

Your version of 'being' and 'becoming' gives a place for "potential" to hang out in between times of actuality. That does not fit well with Aristotle speaking of potential as something we can only apply by analogy. We need experience to use the idea. In a parallel fashion, I read the tension created in Metaphysics Zeta 13 to point to the complexity of causes beyond being able to recognize "kinds" (genos). — Paine

There is much said about "potential", and "potency" in Aristotle's Metaphysics, especially Bk.9, and most is not said by analogy. So I do not know where you get that idea from. It is a concept which is developed by use, and he uses it in relation to actual. So "potential" is a word which derives its meaning in relation to the meaning of actual. Since "actual" has two distinct senses, just like "form" and "substance" each have two distinct senses, this allows potential to be the concept which relates these two. This is how "matter" provides the relation between "form" as universal, and "form" as particular, which is also the difference between "primary substance" as the individual, and "secondary substance" as the species. Matter partakes of one, but not the other.

I don't understand what you are saying here. Parmenides is Eleatic. And then you say "Pretty darn Parmenidean", as if you are confirming that Parmenides was sophistic. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was referring to Aristotle's comments in Sophistical Refutations. The formulation of Plato in that case references statements influenced by Parmenides' language. Aristotle charges the Eleatics of being 'eristic' more often than Plato does. It does not always mean something is 'sophistical.' I think it is safe to say that Aristotle does not hold Parmenides in the same high esteem expressed by Socrates in Theaetetus.

There is much said about "potential", and "potency" in Aristotle's Metaphysics, especially Bk.9, and most is not said by analogy. — Metaphysician Undercover

What we wish to say is clear from the particular cases by induction, |1048a35| and we must not look for a definition of everything, but be able to comprehend the analogy, namely, that as what is building is in relation to what is capable of building, and what is awake is in relation to what is asleep, |1048b1| and what is seeing is in relation to what has its eyes closed but has sight, and what has been shaped out of the matter is in relation to the matter, and what has been finished off is to the unfinished. Of the difference exemplified in this analogy let the activity be marked off by the first part, the potentiality by the second. |1048b5| But things are said to actively be, not all in the same way, but by analogy—as this is in this or to this, so that is in that or to that. For some are as movement in relation to a capacity [or a potential], and the others as substance to some sort of matter. — Aristotle, Metaphysic, Theta 6, 1048a34, translated by CDC Reeve

There is more in Book Lamda drawing the same distinction, but I remember that you have excluded that from your canon.

Maybe form and formlessness are dependent on one another for meaning. It's one concept.
4 days ago
Wayfarer
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↪frank Yes. That’s a rather Taoist way of looking at it. — frank

Also western.

Agreed, in principle. With the (entirely personal) caveat that any comprehensible notion of mind, as such, is necessarily conditioned by time, reflected in all the relations a mind constructs, including between matter and form in general, clay and statue as instances thereof. — Mww

:smile:

If the statue is clay, then there is another relationship between them... also related in minds. One of elemental constituency and perhaps also existential dependency.

:wink:

All experience presupposes space and time. On that we are in full agreement. I'm good with calling that intuition...

I think it is safe to say that Aristotle does not hold Parmenides in the same high esteem expressed by Socrates in Theaetetus. — Paine

I think we have to be very careful in what it means to say that Socrates held so and so in high esteem. Socrates was very respectful of all his interlocuters in Plato's dialogues. That was his mode of inquiry, show great respect for the individual philosopher, and great interest in his philosophy, so that the philosopher would explain and reveal as much as possible. Then after learning the information Socrates would address the weaknesses. So I think that if Socrates held Parmenides in high esteem in Theatetus, this doesn't really mean much relative to the question of whether Plato came to regard Parmenides as a sophist.

There is more in Book Lamda drawing the same distinction, but I remember that you have excluded that from your canon. — Paine

That looks exactly as I said, we learn what "potential" means through its relations to "actual":

" what is building is in relation to what is capable of building"
"what is awake is in relation to what is asleep"
" what is seeing is in relation to what has its eyes closed but has sight"
"what has been shaped out of the matter is in relation to the matter"
"what has been finished off is to the unfinished"
" some are as movement in relation to a capacity [or a potential]"

Your translation says "analogy", I would prefer "comparison", to describe how Aristotle explains these relations which give meaning to words like "potential", and "actual", because "analogy" has slightly different connotations in modern usage.

Notice also, that your quoted paragraph, is from BK 9 Ch. 6, where he is discussing the word "actuality", after he has already discussed "potential" in the prior chapter. The paragraph states that it is the meaning of "actual", that we learn by analogy, not the meaning of "potential".

It's easy to invert what Aristotle says, to suit one's purpose, because his writing is full of inversions. But in the big picture, to understand him clearly, it's better to adhere strictly to what he says, and not be swayed to create your own inversions. This will help to reveal inconsistencies like those in Book Lambda, which betray inauthenticity.

The paragraph states that it is the meaning of "actual", that we learn by analogy, not the meaning of "potential". — Metaphysician Undercover

It does not say that. It includes both terms in relation to each other. It goes out of its way to make that clear.

…..also related in minds. One of elemental constituency and perhaps also existential dependency. — creativesoul

……and I’m good with calling those correlations.

also related in minds. One of elemental constituency and perhaps also existential dependency.
— creativesoul

……and I’m good with calling those correlations. — Mww

A nice clear point of disagreement.

I suggest you read more carefully. Ch. 5 discusses potency, then chapter 6, starts out with the following sentence:

"Since we have treated of the kind of potency which is related to movement, let us discuss actuality ---what, and what kind of thing, actuality is."

The issue in this chapter, is that there are different senses of "actual", and he wants to distinguish a special sense of "actual". So he says that we understand the difference between these senses of "actual" by the way that they each relate to "potential". He wants to distinguish the special sense, which is what is meant when we say that something "actually exists", (or what is "actual"), from another sense which is "active", or "movement". This specific sense of "actual", as we say, "what is real", is what his analysis intends to bring out.

Your quoted paragraph refers to how we must relate "actual" to "potential", in order to determine what sense of "actual" is actually being used. At the end of that paragraph he makes the following statement:

Here is your quoted translation from Reeve:

"But things are said to actively be, not all in the same way, but by analogy—as this is in this or to this, so that is in that or to that. For some are as movement in relation to a capacity [or a potential], and the others as substance to some sort of matter."

Here is the translation of W. D. Ross:

"But all things are not said in the same sense to exist actually, but only by analogy---as A is in B or to B, C is in D or to D, for some are as movement to potency, and others as substance to some sort of matter.

So we have two principal senses of "actual" being discussed, movement which is related to potency (understood as active), and substance which is related to matter (seemingly passive as 'being', but still "actual"). The chapter ends with an interesting distinction between "actuality" in the present tense, as being active, moving, and "actuality" in the past, as what has been is "actual" in the sense of real, but it is not currently active.

"But it is the same thing that at the same time has seen and is seeing, or is thinking and has thought. The latter sort of process, then, I call, an actuality, the former, a movement."

Your reading overlooks the role of analogy as a response to what cannot be defined. The Greek of 1048a35 is:

καὶ οὐ δεῖ παντὸς ὅρον ζητεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνορᾶν — Theta 1048a35

The ἀλλὰ sharply separates the 'seeking the boundaries of all things' from 'being able to see through analogy'. The separation is reiterated at 1048b10:

But things are not all said to exist actually in the same sense, but only by analogy—as A is in B or to B, so is C in or to D; for the relation is either that of motion to potentiality, or that of substance to some particular matter. — Translated by Hugh Tredennick, Loeb Edition

Not being able to define actuality and potentiality more precisely echoes Aristotle wanting to move past Empedocles in Delta:

Of nothing that exists is there nature, but only mixture and separation of what has been mixed; nature is but a name given to these by men. — ibid. 1015a1

Hence as regards those things which exist or are produced by nature, although that from which they naturally are produced or exist is already present, we say that they have not their nature yet unless they have their form and shape. That which comprises both of these exists by nature; e.g. animals and their parts. And nature is both the primary matter (and this in two senses: either primary in relation to the thing, or primary in general; e.g., in bronze articles the primary matter in relation to those articles is bronze, but in general it is perhaps water—that is if all things which can be melted are water) and the form or essence, i.e. the end of the process of generation. Indeed from this sense of “nature,” by an extension of meaning, every essence in general is called “nature,” because the nature of anything is a kind of essence.

From what has been said, then, the primary and proper sense of “nature” is the essence of those things which contain in themselves as such a source of motion; for the matter is called “nature” because it is capable of receiving the nature, and the processes of generation and growth are called “nature” because they are motions derived from it. And nature in this sense is the source of motion in natural objects, which is somehow inherent in them, either potentially or actually. — ibid 1015a6, emphasis mine

Aristotle yokes together these two senses of natural being without reducing them further. Notice that it is the same pair of terms which get used analogically in Theta 6.

Your reading overlooks the role of analogy as a response to what cannot be defined. The Greek of 1048a35 is: — Paine

The point is, that in the chapter you quoted, Aristotle says we refer to analogy to understand the sense of "actual" which is implied in a particular instance of usage. We refer to analogy by determining what sense of "potential" is referred to in the usage. So sometimes "actual" is related to a potency, a power, and in this sense "actual" means active, or movement. But at other times "actual" is related to the potential of matter, and in this sense "actual" means what is substantial, what is real, or what exists.

Notice your quoted paragraph, from 1048b: "for the relation is either that of motion to potentiality, or that of substance to some particular matter" These are the two senses of "actual" which we distinguish by determining the related sense of potential (analogy).

Aristotle yokes together these two senses of natural being without reducing them further. Notice that it is the same pair of terms which get used analogically in Theta 6. — Paine

No it is not the same pair of terms. He is not talking about "natural being" in the section we are discussing, he is talking about "actual", and its two distinct senses which we distinguish through the type of "potential" which is related in the particular instance of usage. The issue is whether "actual" means movement, or active, as when it is related to potency, or whether "actual" means real, existent, or substance, as when it is related to the potential of matter. These are the two distinct senses of "actual" which he is describing, and he says that we distinguish one from the other through the use of analogy

We will have to agree to disagree. In any case, I will say no more here.

How are the clay and the statue related? — frank

There is no general agreement on how to shape a pile of clay for it to be a sculpture. Especially in a culture characterised by artistic individualism. Anyone can single-mindedly declare that a pile of clay is a sculpture, But that's uninteresting.

What's interesting is that when we work with clay, shapes begin to appear that we may find worth elaborating, and eventually our work has transformed the pile into a sculpture. In this sense, the clay is related to the sculpture by having properties that make it easy to shape. We can test shapes, revise them, and accumulate knowledge on how to proceed until we're satisfied with the result. The sculpture is related to the clay e.g. by having degrees of detail and textures that are possible to achieve with clay.

The ἀλλὰ sharply separates the 'seeking the boundaries of all things' from 'being able to see through analogy'. The separation is reiterated at 1048b10: — Paine

Your interpretation of "sharply separates", when Aristotle is talking about the difference between a definition, and understanding by analogy, is a fabrication by you. Please, stay true to a respectable translation, rather than making up your own translation, to suit your purpose.

Your post makes no sense Paine. You seem to be completely confused as to what Aristotle is explaining in Bk 9 Ch 6. You start out by saying that Aristotle is talking about sharply separating different ways of understanding meaning, then you end the post by saying that he "yokes together the two senses".

What he is saying about the two senses of "actuality" discussed in Ch 6, is that they are different meanings for "actuality", and these meanings are explicitly separable. But the difference in meaning is not one understood by referring to two different definitions, rather it is understood through analogy. The "analogy" spoken about involves reference to the related senses of "potential".

Please, try reading the entire chapter, beginning to end, then decide whether you still disagree with me. The chapter is not long, and although it is somewhat difficult, so it needs to be read slowly, it's not extremely difficult

Since you are compelled to undermine my reputation as a scholar, I will give the matter one last go:

The original translation I quoted from CDC Reeve agrees with HG Apostle, and Hugh Tredennick, who I quoted above from the Loeb Edition. Tredennick is also the translator of the English version at Perseus where I got the Greek text from.

In the text preceding Theta 6, different senses of how potentiality was present in a motion or a being was discussed. Theta 6 begins by addressing the difference between how actuality and potentiality can be said to be present:

“Actuality “means the presence of the thing, not in the sense which we mean by “potentially.” We say that a thing is present potentially as Hermes is present in the wood, or the half-line in the whole, from potentiality. because it can be separated from it: and as we call even a man who is not studying “a scholar” if he is capable of studying. That which is present in the opposite sense to this is present actually. What we mean can be plainly seen in the particular cases by induction; we need not seek a definition for every term, but must comprehend the analogy: that as that which is actually building is to that which is capable of building, so is that which is awake to that which is asleep; and that which is seeing to that which has the eyes shut, but has the power of sight; and that which is differentiated out of matter to the matter; and the finished article to the raw material. Let actuality be defined by one member of this antithesis, and the potential by the other. — ibid. 1048a30, emphasis mine

The antithesis is what will have to be applied analogically. The precise terms of actuality and potentiality are supplied in the text as ratios. That statement is not saying:

So he says that we understand the difference between these senses of "actual" by the way that they each relate to "potential". — Metaphysician Undercover

The passage does relate how specific senses of actuality relate to specific potential activities but it uses the clearly stated antithesis between actuality and potentiality to do so.

Edit to Add for Aquinas Fans:

1825. Now actuality (769).

Second, he establishes the truth about actuality. First, he shows what actuality is; and second (1828), how it is used in different senses in the case of different things (“However, things”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows what actuality is. He says that a thing is actual when it exists but not in the way in which it exists when it is potential. (a) For we say that the image of Mercury is in the wood potentially and not actually before the wood is carved; but once it has been carved the image of Mercury is then said to be in the wood actually. (b) And in the same way we say that any part of a continuous whole is in that whole, because any part (for example, the middle one) is present potentially inasmuch as it is possible for it to be separated from the whole by dividing the whole; but after the whole has been divided, that part will now be present actually. (c) The same thing is true of one who has a science and is not speculating, for he is capable of speculating even though he is not actually doing so; but to be speculating or contemplating is to be in a state of actuality.

1826. What we mean (770).

Here he answers an implied question; for someone could ask him to explain what actuality is by giving its definition. And he answers by saying that it is possible to show what we mean (i.e., by actuality) in the case of singular things by proceeding inductively from examples, “and we should not look for the boundaries of everything,” i.e., the definition. For simple notions cannot be defined, since an infinite regress in definitions is impossible. But actuality is one of those first simple notions. Hence it cannot be defined.

1827. And he says that we can see what actuality is by means of the proportion existing between two things. For example, we may take the proportion of one who is building to one capable of building; and of one who is awake to one asleep; and of one who sees to one whose eyes are closed although he has the power of sight; and “of that which is separated out of matter,” i.e., what is formed by means of the operation of art or of nature, and thus is separated out of unformed matter, to what is not separated out of unformed matter. And similarly we may take the proportion of what has been prepared to what has not been prepared, or of what has been worked on to what has not been worked on. But in each of these opposed pairs one member will be actual and the other potential.

And thus by proceeding from particular cases we can come to an understanding in a proportional way of what actuality and potency are. — Aquinas, Commentaries on Metaphysics, LESSON 5 Actuality and Its Various Meanings ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 6: 1048a 25-1048b 36

Now, that will be my last word. I leave your Church of the Only Aristotle. It is nice outside.

OK, if I still have your attention Paine, I will continue.

In the text preceding Theta 6, different senses of how potentiality was present in a motion or a being was discussed. — Paine

Right, this is the point I was making, the different senses of potentiality. That is what had been pointed to in Ch 5. One sense is related to movement, the other sense is related to being.

Theta 6 begins by addressing the difference between how actuality and potentiality can be said to be present: — Paine

Now, in Ch 6, he proceeds to discuss the two principal senses of "actuality" which are related to those two senses of potentiality.

The passage does relate how specific senses of actuality relate to specific potential activities but it uses the clearly stated antithesis between actuality and potentiality to do so. — Paine

Of course it uses the the antithesis between actuality and potentiality, you and I always agreed on that. But the significant point, the importance, of the chapter is the two distinct senses of "actuality" which correspond with the two distinct senses of potentiality, in the relation of antithesis. What I said already is that he states that we must use this relation between potential and actual as the means for determining which sense of "actual" is being referred to by the word.

You seemed to be ignoring, or simply denying, the substance of Ch 6 which is the distinction between two separate senses of "actual". He is saying that since there are two distinct senses of potential, if we maintain the antithesis, there must be two distinct senses of actuality. This is the analogy, wherever the analysis of "potential" has led us (to two distinct senses), so we must follow with "actual", to maintain the antithesis.

So, according to my Ross translation, Ch 6 progresses in this way.
"...let us discuss actuality..." 1048a,26
"...we not only ascribe potency to that whose nature it is to move something else...but also use the word in another sense..." 1048a, 27-29
"Actuality ,then, is the existence of a thing not in the way that we express by 'potentially'". 1048a, 30
"Let actuality be defined by one member of this antithesis and potential by the other. But all things are not said in the same sense to exist actually...for some are as movement to potency and others as substance to some sort of matter." 1048b, 4-8
"Since of the actions which have a limit none is an end but are relative to an end...but that movement which the end is present is an action. ... At the same time we are living well and have lived well, and are happy and have been happy. ... Of these processes, then, we must call the one set movements, and the other actualities." 1048b ,18-28
"The latter sort of process, then, I call an actuality, and the former a movement." 1048b, 34

The final statement above is how he closes out the chapter.

He has distinguished two principle senses of actual, corresponding by analogy to the two senses of potential distinguished earlier . One sense of "actual" describes what exists relative to the type of potential which is known as potency, and this is movement, activity, and it exists relative to an end. The other sense of "actual" describes what exists relative to the type of potential known as matter. This is substance, "actuality", and it has the end within itself.

Notice, that in his conclusion, he has not only distinguished these two principal types of actuality, but he has even gone so far as to have given one of them a different name "movement". This allows him to proceed with clarity as to what kind of thing "actuality" is, having been separated from activity and movement. "Actual" describes what exists as substance in relation to the potential which is known as matter. We know have "actual" in the sense of being, as distinguished from motion (what we call "activity") in the sense of becoming.

After having distinguished "actual" from "movement" in this way, he proceed to question which is prior, "the actual" (substance), or "the potential" (matter). He concludes by the so-called cosmological argument that the actual must be prior to the potential, and since he has separated "actual" from "movement" in this way, it is logically consistent to designate the actual as eternal, having been separated from the concepts of time and movement.

The effort you have put into placing me outside of the conversation does not address the distinctions that Aquinas also understood.

it is logically consistent to designate the actual as eternal, having been separated from the concepts of time and movement. — Metaphysician Undercover

The passage in question is not claiming that result.

The effort you have put into placing me outside of the conversation does not address the distinctions that Aquinas also understood. — Paine

I didn't see any need to comment on the Aquinas quote. He was explaining what you and I both agreed upon, that Aristotle said we understand the meaning of actuality in its relation to potentiality. The aspect of the passage from Aristotle which I was interested in, what I would call the content, or substance of that chapter, was the distinction between the two different senses of "actual". This is what I said is the key to resolving the problem you indicated earlier here:

Ζ.13 therefore produces a fundamental tension in Aristotle’s metaphysics that has fragmented his interpreters. Some maintain that Aristotle’s theory is ultimately inconsistent, on the grounds that it is committed to all three of the following propositions:

(i) Substance is form.
(ii) Form is universal.
(iii) No universal is a substance. — SEP Aristotle's Metaphysics

I replied, that the way to resolve this issue is to understand that Aristotle distinguishes two senses of "form". "Form" is understood as "actual", and in Ch 6, Bk 9, Aristotle is clearly distinguishing two distinct senses of "actual". Understanding this is the way toward resolving the problem which you quoted from SEP.

The passage in question is not claiming that result. — Paine

That's right, as I said, after finishing that chapter, with the clear conclusion and distinction made between "movement" and "actuality", as the two types, "movement" being related to the type of potential known as "potency", and "actuality" being related to the type of potential known as matter, he proceeds from that conclusion. So the result which you refer to follows later in Bk 9, when he demonstrates that actual is prior to potential in an absolute sense.