Then again, is there any excluded middle in absence of any talk to apply it to? (Identity, instead, is presupposed by meaning; maybe identity is where ontology and logic meet.) — jorndoe

That observation can be made of any number of logical principles and even natural numbers themselves. My belief is that these are discovered not invented, and that this something about the nature of the rational intellect: that it is able to grasp such principles, but that they are not of its own making.

The argument from Aristotle is that a body is an organized existence, and an agent is required for any type of organization, as the organizer. Therefore the agent as organizer, is prior in time to the existence of the body. Of course abiogenesis is the basis for a denial of the secondary premise, but as the op points out, it's not a justified denial.

That's false, not all types of organization requires an organizer. Here's an example:

Evenly sized marbles inside a jar are organizedly stacked on top of each other, but there is/was no organizer that stacked up those marbles on top of each other.

I thought I understood. But I had a typo. I meant "immaterial." I just wanted to verify that you are saying only material things can be organized. — Patterner

That is what I meant. I don't see how we could assign any type of order to something which is completely immaterial. It's a difficult subject to discuss though

the point was that mind is temporal/process-like, come and go, occurs, is interruptible, has a more clear temporal demarcation than spatial, ... Where does intelligence fit in? — jorndoe

My point was that being-like, or static-like, is just as much temporal as process-like is. But both involve spatial and temporal aspects. So I do not agree that "process-like" has "a more clear temporal demarcation than spatial". Spatial elements are just as necessary to "process" as temporal elements are.

Evenly sized marbles inside a jar are organizedly stacked on top of each other, but there is/was no organizer that stacked up those marbles on top of each other. — night912

What do you mean? How did the marbles get into the jar? Isn't putting marbles into a jar an act of organizing them?

What do you mean? How did the marbles get into the jar? Isn't putting marbles into a jar an act of organizing them?

I'm not talking about the act of putting marbles into a jar. I'm talking about the marbles are stacked up in an organized way. There's no organizer that stacked up the marbles on top of each other so that they'll stacked up in an organized manner.

And to answer your question, the marbles could have just rolled into the jar from a table that suddenly became uneven.

But it isn't explained through physicalism alone.
— Patterner
It does explain that the processes such as the consciousness are made possible by the physical bodies that we possess.

Here is the folly of the civilized humans:
It is us that labeled the consciousness as non-physical before we have an argument for it. Let us admit this much. So how is it that we have arrived at this conclusion without first explaining its relation to the bodies. In fact what's happening here is that we already have a notion of what is non-physical before we have a reasoning for it. And the way we win this claim is by saying "no", "no", "no" to the theory of physicalism. And we feel smug about doing this because the theory of physicalism, according to us, did not even provide an adequate account of the non-physical.
Why would they? We invented the non-physical notion. And yet our senses do not deny that there are physical bodies that we perceive -- with the help of the light, the air, the atmosphere, darkness, and particle invisible to our eyes, the mass, the texture, we come to know what a tree is, a table, a chair, another human being, animals, starts and the sky. Everything we do involves matter — L'éléphant

Yes, matter is a requirement of consciousness. At least the only kind of consciousness we're aware of. But we don't have to declare consciousness non-physical. Let's just assume, for the sake of argument, that it's entirely physical. What is the physicalist explanation? Brian Greene is no slouch in the physical sciences, and he says there is nothing about the properties of matter that even hints at an explanation. Christof Koch paid off a 25 year old bet, admitting they don't know, after all that time he and Crick were trying.

Physicalism can even explain mental functions, like how we perceive different wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation, differentiate between different wavelengths, and move to avoid things that will harm the body.
— Patterner
I am guessing this is a typo. Last time I checked, you are opposed to this. — L'éléphant

No, I am not opposed to this. These things are mechanical. We've had machines that can do these things for years. The question is why this is accompanied by a subjective experience of it, rather than taking place "in the dark." The physical processes don't need consciousness, and they don't suggest it. What I've read about theories doesn't include anything that explains it. Is it the phi of Integrated Information Theory consciousness? How? How is integrated information consciousness? Why is it not just integrated information?

A nervous system allows for representations/images. Those help the body know what is good and what is harmful. We program robots work the same ability. See the depth of a drop, and stop before falling and being damaged. But that doesn't suggest subjective experience, awareness, or awareness of awareness.

How does a clump of particles knows it is a clump of particles? It's not explained by photons hitting retina, ion channels, and action potentials. Only the vision is. That's explainable, just as liquidity, fight, and life are.

I would love if someone could tell me of a book or site that explains it. I would very much appreciate a summary. Just a brief one, so I'll know what to keep in mind as I read it. This stuff is often far over my head. Like Tse. I feel like I was thrown into the middle of the ocean without a life preserver. Damasio is great. He's passionate, but goes slowly. But, still, how do these physical things accomplish the task?

I thought I understood. But I had a typo. I meant "immaterial." I just wanted to verify that you are saying only material things can be organized.
— Patterner

That is what I meant. I don't see how we could assign any type of order to something which is completely immaterial. It's a difficult subject to discuss though — Metaphysician Undercover

Why are immaterial things we deal with all the time that are organized not relevant? Logic and mathematics, for example.

Why are immaterial things we deal with all the time that are organized not relevant? Logic and mathematics, for example. — Patterner

My thoughts also. Platonism in a general philosophical sense (as distinct from specific discussion of Plato’s dialogues) upholds the reality of abstractions including numbers and universals. This was mainstream in Western philosophy until the medieval period, when it was eclipsed by nominalism and later by empiricism.

The Greek philosophers believed that such ‘intelligible objects’ belonged to a higher plane of reality than the material, which humans alone could grasp through the exercise of reason. These are real in a different sense to the objects of sense-perception, being graspable only by the intellect (nous).

Eric Perl’s book has the background to that.

I'm not talking about the act of putting marbles into a jar. I'm talking about the marbles are stacked up in an organized way. There's no organizer that stacked up the marbles on top of each other so that they'll stacked up in an organized manner. — night912

You are not making sense. If the marbles are in a jar, and you are talking about whether or not there is an organizer who cause them to be in this position, then obviously we must look at "the act of putting marbles into a jar". Or, are you assuming that they've been in that position forever?

Why are immaterial things we deal with all the time that are organized not relevant? Logic and mathematics, for example. — Patterner

This is why the subject is difficult. I believe that if we adhere to a strict definition of "immaterial", and do a thorough analysis of these examples, logic and mathematics, we will find that they are not actually immaterial things. All sorts of logic and mathematics rely on symbols, and symbols are not immaterial. What I think, is that in reality, the purely immaterial does not actually enter into what we call "our experience", or "our consciousness". The purely immaterial has a causal relation to what is consciously present to us, but it is not actually present within the content of our consciousness. What is present within our conscious experience is already a unified material/immaterial dualism, (Aristotelian matter/form), and this is due to the living being's dependence on a body.

So, this is why there is so much disagreement amongst different people, as to whether or not the immaterial is real, and even amongst those who believe it is real, as to how, or what type of existence it has. We only know about the reality of the immaterial through the dual nature (dualist representations) of what is present to us. This is not a pure "immaterial" existence because it is already contaminated by material aspects, so the dual nature of things serves only to demonstrate to us, the reality of the immaterial, but the purely "immaterial" remains unrevealed to us. This is what Aquinas says about God, we know God through His effects, but so long as the human being remains united to a body [and its intellect relies on that body] the human being can never truly know God, as purely immaterial.

Aristotle took up a related issue with the Pythagorean idealists, and certain "Platonists". There had been proposed a divine realm, of eternal circles of the heavenly bodies. The heavens were considered to be aethereal, divine, and eternal. Aristotle showed in "On The Heavens", that a circular motion necessarily involves something moving in that motion, and this thing moving in the circular motion must be material, bodily, and therefore not eternal. Then, in "On the Soul", he criticized these same idealists for saying that the soul, and intellect are immaterial and eternal, but they provide a representation of the soul (eternal circles) which include material aspects.

This is the problem we have with "the immaterial". We have very good evidence and logic to support the reality of the immaterial. However, whenever we produce representations of how the immaterial works within the material world, we assume material elements within our models of the immaterial. This is because that is how the immaterial appears to us, in the combined form of hylomorphism. And if we try to distance the immaterial from the material, we end up with the interaction problem. The subject is extremely difficult, and many are inclined to dismiss the reality of the immaterial altogether, and happily live in Plato's cave of denial. The fact is that we do not well enough understand the nature of time, to properly model the role of the immaterial within our world.

, you skirted the characterizations (older + above), but, no matter, by acknowledging that mind is temporal we're on the same page.

"eternal" in classical theism means "outside of time" — Metaphysician Undercover

Returning to intelligently intelligent intelligence intelligencing ...

Where does intelligence fit in? — Sep 22, 2024

What you say makes sense, and was what I was expecting you to say. But I'm thinking, we know a) it is possible for something that is immaterial to be organized, and b) the material that the immaterial caused is organized. Don't these two things present a good case for thinking the immaterial that caused the material was, itself, organized?

Yes, this is the way I see it. That comes at a fairly significant demand, however. I don't believe Newtonian/Cartesian/Comtean/Hobbesian matter or philosophy of nature has the adequate conception of the universe to explain how the non-living even has the potential to give rise to the living.

One of the only places I find myself agreeing with Descartes is that the idea of dead, dumb, inanimate matter somehow generating subjectivity, agency, meaning, poetry, art, philosophy and science is utterly absurd. On that score, Descartes is absolutely right.

I like the method Schelling developed which would eventually become what we know as neutral monism now; you take your concepts of matter, and intelligence/mentality and strip away their respective properties until you get to some sort of basal, common denominator, and build both back up again from there. I think what we get when we do that is neither matter or mind, but just a system with various biases and habits.

Or some basic habitual end-directedness. Material things and mentality are both kinds of system with various habitual ways of behaving, and the key is to figure out what it is about intelligent systems that makes them behave differently. This is the way to a naturalistic but not-reductive philosophy of nature that has intrinsic room for intelligence, subjectivity and agency etc.


I think what Schelling said is that nature is not brutely objective, external "stuff", but the expression of unconscious intelligence, albiet self-organizing. That expression of unconscious intelligence finds its expression as per se intelligence in us. Or, that matter is product and mentality productivity, but it's all the same sort of warp and woof.

You've lost me. Care to explain what you're asking?

What you say makes sense, and was what I was expecting you to say. But I'm thinking, we know a) it is possible for something that is immaterial to be organized, and b) the material that the immaterial caused is organized. Don't these two things present a good case for thinking the immaterial that caused the material was, itself, organized? — Patterner

No, I do not agree. "Organized" is the outcome, the effect. It does not make sense to use the same word to describe the cause, as is used to describe the effect. This tends toward annihilating the separation, or distinction between the two, making them one and the same thing.

That is the problem I referred to above, what happens when we describe the immaterial in words which are used to describe material things. "Immaterial" is distinctly not material. So describing the immaterial with the same words that we use to describe the material, cannot be correct. That is what has happened to quantum physics. If "the wave function" refers to something immaterial, and "the particle" refers to something material, then when they start describing "particles" as a feature of the wave function they come up with something incoherent.

So I can question the truth of "a) it is possible for something that is immaterial to be organized". Depending on how we relate "immaterial" to "material" it may not be possible for the immaterial to be organized. If we say that the two are absolutely opposite, then clearly it would not be possible for the two to have any shared properties. But that is rather extreme, and it is representative of the interaction problem. For example, temporal and eternal are absolutely opposite.

So the better way is to make them separate categories. As separate categories they might share some properties, and this allows for "a) it is possible for something that is immaterial to be organized". However, b) fails to make the case. That the effect is organized, does not provide the logical necessity required to conclude that it is likely that the cause is organized. We must not allow ourselves to get trapped in this type of word usage because it can be very misleading

Reading back to try to get a better handle on your position. my apologies for making you repeat yourself at any point. I'm just not understanding.

You say material had to have been preceded by immaterial, and organized had to have been preceded by un organized. If not, the current would not have been preceded; it would simply be a continuation of. Perhaps I have that right?

First of all, I don't know why that is the assumption. It could be the current is a continuation. if there was anything prior to the Big Bang, the Big Bang erased any empirical evidence of it. So we just don't know.

But let's just say you're right. Qualities of the current could not have existed in the prior. You say this:

Your phrasing ("how non-living matter became living") betrays an underlying misunderstanding of the problem. Classical ontology premises immaterial Forms which are prior to, and the cause of material existence. In this ontology, there is no issue of non-living matter becoming living matter, there is an immateri — Metaphysician Undercover

There was no material or organization prior, but there was life? What Is unorganized life? And why assume this particular quality of the current existed in the prior, when no others could have?

The question is why this is accompanied by a subjective experience of it, — Patterner

Define subjective experience.

You say material had to have been preceded by immaterial, and organized had to have been preceded by un organized. If not, the current would not have been preceded; it would simply be a continuation of. Perhaps I have that right? — Patterner

Generally speaking, yes that's about right. The "continuation" is commonly known as infinite regress.

First of all, I don't know why that is the assumption. It could be the current is a continuation. if there was anything prior to the Big Bang, the Big Bang erased any empirical evidence of it. So we just don't know. — Patterner

I do believe that understanding causes requires that we move beyond simple "empirical evidence" to the employment of logic.

There was no material or organization prior, but there was life? — Patterner

That. I believe, is where the logic leads.

What Is unorganized life? — Patterner

I don't know.

And why assume this particular quality of the current existed in the prior, when no others could have? — Patterner

Now that is a good question, and I believe the answer is approached in Aristotle's "On the Soul". For him it was called "the soul", we tend to just call it "life". What happens is that logic leads us toward the need to assume an agential cause of living organisms. Then we put a name to it, "the soul", or "life". Notice that the name does not refer to a "particular quality" at all, it's a name that philosophers have used, as referring to the cause of a body being alive.

The interesting thing is that it doesn't really have a place in our empirical understanding of the organized living body. That is, there is nothing we can point to as life", or "the soul", there is just the living body. There is no property we can attribute to the living body, as "life". So "life" really has no meaning to the physicalist and that is why they can talk about non-living matter becoming living matter, there is no real distinction between the two. And so "life" is not really a "quality of the current". It only really makes sense to talk about "life" as the cause of the body being alive. Even though we commonly talk of "life" as if it is a quality, it really makes no sense because it's not anything we can describe.

The question is why this is accompanied by a subjective experience of it,
— Patterner
Define subjective experience. — L'éléphant

We have devices that can detect the part of the electromagnetic spectrum that we call visible light. They can even distinguish different frequencies, 430 THz and 650 THz.

We can add to the machine, and give it the ability to detect vibrations in the air, and distinguish different frequencies. Maybe it can detect simultaneous frequencies of 262.63 Hz, 329.63 Hz, and 392 Hz.

But the machine does not see red and blue, and does not hear a C major chord. That is our subjective experience of seeing and hearing those frequencies.

We can hook sensors to our machine and to us, and see where the electricity is running, observing what is happening inside of us as we both detect these things. But we won't see anything in the scans of us that explains our subjective experience that is on top of the detecting that both the machine and we do. There aren't two activities taking place, one for objectively detecting, and one for subjectively experiencing. It would be interesting, and I'm sure we'd think of ways to block the subjective activity, so a person would only detect like a machine. But we don't detect a second activity.


All of the subjective experiences are why there is, as Nagel said, something it is like to be me.

But fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism – something it is like for the organism. — Nagel - What is it like to be a bat?

I can't know what it's like to be you, even though there is common ground between us. But I'm willing to believe there's something it's like to be you - for you. You have a point of view.

I really can't know what it's like to be a bat. There is still enough common ground for me to believe there is something it's like to be a bat - for the bat. It has a point of view.

There is nothing it's like to be a boulder - for the boulder. It does not have a point of view.

There is nothing it's like to be our machine - for the machine. It does not have a point of view.

It would be interesting, and I'm sure we'd think of ways to block the subjective activity, so a person would only detect like a machine. — Patterner

I don't think so, and that is the problem I've been describing to you in the inverse form, (separating the pure immaterial subjective agent, sometimes called soul, or mind, or intellect) from the material object is not possible. We learn from logic, that the two are separable in theory, but in practise they are not. This is because "practise" necessarily involves both.

So our theories about the pure immaterial active agent end up involving material representations (eternal circular motions for example), and our practises, (the experiments meant to represent "machine sensing" for example) incorporate the immaterial aspect of human intention, and the two are never properly separated.

This is the nature of "attention". It incorporates both of the two aspects. The "detection" aspect serves to assist in the synthesis of information 'after-the-fact'. The 'intention' aspect serves to direct the attention, in the role of anticipation, based on a 'prior-to' analysis. The two are separable in principle, as memory of the past, and anticipation of the future, but not in pracise, because separation would annihilate the conscious experience which the separation is a representation of. And so we have all sorts of theories about the prior and the posterior, to account for the reality of this distinction, which cannot be supported by empirical science which relies on the posterior.

I don't think so, and that is the problem I've been describing to you in the inverse form, (separating the pure immaterial subjective agent, sometimes called soul, or mind, or intellect) from the material object is not possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. I'm just brainstorming a possibility of a physicalist scenario. I don't know if any physicalist agrees. But if physicalism is the answer to everything, then it will reveal the brain operations that are, literally, consciousness. @wonderer1 just suggested it might take another couple hundred years. But at that point, we will, perhaps, be able to literally see consciousness in some brain activity that we're unable to detect now. And then we could try what I suggested

But no, I don't think any part of that paragraph is correct.

, with no minds "outside of time", can we speak of intelligence "outside of time"?

This is the word use issue I was discussing with Patterner. It doesn't make sense to talk about Intelligence outside of time, because "intelligence" as we know and use the word, refers to a property of material beings which are temporal. However this does not invalidate the logic which indicates that there is a cause of intelligence, which is outside of time. We just do not know how to describe this immaterial cause which is outside of time. But rather than use descriptive terms like "intelligence", it is far better just to name it, as we do with "soul", and "God".

, mindless intelligence-free doesn't go well with the common use of the word "God". :shrug:

I think we all know, the "God" commonly referred to, is dead.

, I suggest using different words since "God" is taken. Or the Platonia-type thing could be dropped.

Notice I used the naming of "God" and "soul" as examples. I would propose something like "the immaterial".

What do you mean about dropping the Platonia-type thing"? The whole point is that we need to account for the reality of the Platonia-type thing, and as I said it's better just to name it than to describe it, because our descriptions rely on empirical based terms. So when a name for the "Platonia-type thing" is employed, over time specific descriptions (you might call this the connotations) become associated with the name, as in the examples of "God" and "soul". Then the best thing to do is to choose a new name to avoid the implied description which has accumulated over the years.