OK, so you support what I said then. Your use of "arguably" indicates exactly my point, we really have no consensus on what warrants "knowing". — Metaphysician Undercover

If a slime mold can do something self-initiated then it knows how to do that thing. I'm not claiming that it experiences itself, or understands itself, as knowing.

Anyway, know-how has not been the focus of my part in the discussion, but rather 'knowing that' or what is called 'propositional knowledge'. We can warrant that we know things via empirical observation and logic. We cannot warrant that we know anything propositional in any other way I can think of. If you can think of an example that involves and demonstrates another way of knowing-that then why not present it for scrutiny?

Abiogenesis is simply a theory of how life came from non-life, what’s woo-woo about that ? It’s just a word for a type of process(es) that occurred 3.5 billions of years ago during the inception of life. How can it be supported by science when we’re not privy to the conditions and events that transformed non living matter to living one 3.5 billions of years ago.

In the absence of alternative theories abiogenesis is just a label of how life came from non-life. You may dismiss it as woo-woo but it still remains a valid theory although it doesn’t have the answers of exactly how life came about, you have the right to remain sceptical about it. — kindred

"Hypothesis" would be a more scientifically appropriate word to use than "theory" in the context of discussing abiogenesis.

Thanks wonderer that makes more sense, although abiogenesis is unsatisfactory at this time in terms of providing answers or conclusive explanation of how non-life to life happened it at least gives us something to work on.

No my claim is that something exists before it manifests as an actual thing in the world, in this case intelligence. — kindred

You realize - yes? - that you're talking nonsense here. E.g., if a thing exists that is not an actual thing, and then it "manifests as an actual thing," then it is either the same thing or a different thing, and in-as-much as it goes from being a not-actual thing to an actual thing, then it's hard for me to see how it is the same thing. And as to the claim of the existence of not-existing things, it's incumbent on you to make clear just how that can be.

Inanimate matter could have continued to remain inanimate yet it didn’t because we have life (intelligence) so something happened to it which we can’t explain, we call this process abiogenesis. — kindred

Perhaps you will read the Wikipedia article on abiogenesis. You will see that what life is, is not-so-easy to say, and that intelligence is a very long way down the evolutionary road. That is, that life and intelligence are not the same thing and should not be confused. Life seems to be a kind of ordinary process, which I think is inevitable given the right conditions. Maybe also intelligence, but maybe too with that some luck required.

My view is pantheistic more than anything and probably Spinozist. — kindred

Afaik, Spinoza is an acosmist² and not a "pantheist"¹ like (e.g.) Hegel.

(2023)
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/825698 [1]

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acosmism [2]

You realize - yes? - that you're talking nonsense here. E.g., if a thing exists that is not an actual thing, and then it "manifests as an actual thing," then it is either the same thing or a different thing, and in-as-much as it goes from being a not-actual thing to an actual thing, then it's hard for me to see how it is the same thing. — tim wood

I’ve used the term pre-existing to describe a phenomenon that has always existed prior to its manifestation in nature in this case intelligence. As we have evidence of intelligence existing in the world it’s not unreasonable to ask whether it’s always been or only emerged at some point in time like matter did with the Big Bang.

We know with certainty that intelligence (human or non-human) emerged at some point in the distant past and that it emerged from inanimate matter, this must mean that it’s been there all along or it wouldn’t exist at all. Why would it exist if it didn’t exist ?

When I say it’s been there all along I’m faced with a problem because the same logic can be applied to matter as we know that it hasn’t been there all along, it only existed after the Big Bang. Yet we don’t fully understand the Big Bang either or how something can come from nothing which is not logically possible unless it’s always been there in some form or other eternally. This same logic can be applied when we talk about intelligence.

And as to the claim of the existence of not-existing things, it's incumbent on you to make clear just how that can be. — tim wood

I’m not claiming the existence of non-existing things, I’m claiming that something (matter, intelligence) has always existed.

Abiogenesis is simply a theory of how life came from non-life, what’s woo-woo about that ? It’s just a word for a type of process(es) that occurred 3.5 billions of years ago during the inception of life. How can it be supported by science when we’re not privy to the conditions and events that transformed non living matter to living one 3.5 billions of years ago. — kindred

In my understanding "woo-woo" means unscientific. A theory, such as abiogenesis, which is completely unsupported by any science, is, by that definition, woo-woo.

You may dismiss it as woo-woo but it still remains a valid theory... — kindred

Right, it's valid as "a theory", just not valid as a "scientific theory". Therefore we may, and ought to, dismiss it as woo-woo.

Anyway, know-how has not been the focus of my part in the discussion, but rather 'knowing that' or what is called 'propositional knowledge'. We can warrant that we know things via empirical observation and logic. We cannot warrant that we know anything propositional in any other way I can think of. If you can think of an example that involves and demonstrates another way of knowing-that then why not present it for scrutiny? — Janus

See, this is a very clear example of exactly the epistemological problem I pointed to. You narrow down the definition of "knowledge", to make the word refer only to one specific type of what is commonly called "knowledge", to produce an argument which supports your prejudice. That is what Wittgenstein, in the Philosophical Investigations, called creating boundaries in the use of a word, for a purpose. As I said, it's "super unproductive" in a philosophical argument, because it's nothing other than the fallacy of begging the question.

Thanks wonderer that makes more sense, although abiogenesis is unsatisfactory at this time in terms of providing answers or conclusive explanation of how non-life to life happened it at least gives us something to work on. — kindred

The point though, is that as an hypothesis, it has been around for quite some time, and as your quoted paragraph indicates, scientists have been unsuccessful in their attempts to provide the science required to support it. Failure to prove an hypothesis, after many attempts, is evidence that the hypothesis is incorrect. Compare abiogenesis with the concept of "spontaneous generation". This was once a very popular hypothesis, which scientists failed to prove. It is through recognition that the pervading hypothesis is incorrect, and through examining the evidence of those failures, that we move along to better hypothesis.

It is through recognition that the pervading hypothesis is incorrect, and through examining the evidence of those failures, that we move along to better hypothesis. — Metaphysician Undercover

What hypothesis of the origin of life is better than abiogenesis? Genuinely asking,

You narrow down the definition of "knowledge", to make the word refer only to one specific type of what is commonly called "knowledge", to produce an argument which supports your prejudice. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I apply the word 'knowledge' only to those cases where we can clearly explain how it is that we know. It is obvious that we know things propositionally via observation and via logic. If you can point to another mode of knowing (other than know-how and the knowing of acquaintance or recognition, because those are not the subjects at issue) then do so.

What hypothesis of the origin of life is better than abiogenesis? Genuinely asking, — Patterner

As far as I'm concerned, any hypothesis about the origin of life on earth is better than abiogenesis, because abiogenesis is really nothing other than the lack of an hypothesis. It basically says that since we have no idea where life came from, or how life came about, let's just assume that it sprang from nothing (spontaneous generation). See, it's really a lack of hypothesis, more than anything else. The flying spaghetti monster is a better hypothesis, because at least it hypothesizes something

No, I apply the word 'knowledge' only to those cases where we can clearly explain how it is that we know. It is obvious that we know things propositionally via observation and via logic. If you can point to another mode of knowing (other than know-how and the knowing of acquaintance or recognition, because those are not the subjects at issue) then do so. — Janus

Propositional knowledge is a form of know-how. So your dismissal of "know-how" is unjustified. And, as I said, you want to reduce "knowledge" in general, (which would include all forms of know-how) to one specific type, knowing how to explain things through the use of propositions, to serve your purpose. That's not productive, we need to go the other way, to see what all the different types of knowledge have in common, if we want to understand "knowledge".

As far as I'm concerned, any hypothesis about the origin of life on earth is better than abiogenesis, because abiogenesis is really nothing other than the lack of an hypothesis. It basically says that since we have no idea where life came from, or how life came about, let's just assume that it sprang from nothing (spontaneous generation). See, it's really a lack of hypothesis, more than anything else. The flying spaghetti monster is a better hypothesis, because at least it hypothesizes something — Metaphysician Undercover

You’re misconstruing what abiogenesis is, it is the emergence of life from non-life via natural processes not spontaneous generation. Therefore it remains a valid hypothesis though it may not have all the answers we are looking for.

You’re misconstruing what abiogenesis is, it is the emergence of life from non-life via natural processes not spontaneous generation. Therefore it remains a valid hypothesis though it may not have all the answers we are looking for. — kindred

If it was an actual hypothesis, then those "natural processes" which account for the emergence of life from non-life would be named, and the hypothesis could be tested. But there is no named natural processes which are hypothesized to lead to from non-life to life, and no real hypothesis. Instead it is assumed that life just sprang into existence, through some sort of spontaneous generation.

[
I'm not jumping on board for any hypothesis or theory of how non-living matter became living, because, even though we can stack the deck any way we want, we haven't managed it. We don't have to try to set up the conditions of primordial earth, and see if any life arises. We can create any conditions we want, making everything as favorable as possible. But we haven't managed to make non-living matter live.

But if that's not how life began, what other possibilities are there? Sure, some think meteorites brought what was needed. But that's not the same as bringing life. Whatever they brought would still have to have become living, presumably after joining with other non-living matter already here.

And even if meteorites brought actual life, then the question is just put off to wherever it originated.

So if life did not come from non-living material, what other options are there?

I gotcha. I misinterpreted your post that I initially responded to. — Patterner

No problem. :up:

Ah, materialist philosophy of mind. I’ll try out some objections. First, you’re up against ‘the hard problem’ - there’s never been a plausible account of how the first-person nature of lived experience arises from the processes described by objective science. Experience has a qualitative dimension which never appears in the equations of physics by design, due to the ‘Cartesian division’ at the origin of modern science, the separation of primary (measurable) and secondary (subjective) attributes. — Wayfarer

I could interpret what you say here in two ways: One. In other words, you are supporting physicalism. If there's never been an account of how the first-person nature of lived experience arises from the objective source, then wouldn't that tell you that maybe it's because it can be sufficiently explained through physicalism alone?
Two. We just accept that there are two categories of existence -- the physical and the non-physical without further argumentation.

Practical illustration. You arrive home to discover your house and everything in it has burned down. If there was an instrument that could capture your precise neuronal and physiological state at that instant, it might capture data from which a suitably-trained user might be able to infer a state of acute emotional distress, and which would be an objectively accurate account. But on the basis of that data no matter how detailed, there would no way to determine how it feels and what it means to you. Saying that this is ‘neuronal’ or ‘physical’ might be objectively accurate but it would also be meaningless in the absence of the first-person perspective - namely, yours - which you bring to it. — Wayfarer

I see where I need to make what I said clearer (or at least, my idea of physicalism).

It is not a matter of objectively perceiving what one feels -- in your example, turmoil and distress. Physicalism is not in the business of determining the objectivity (or the lack thereof) of experience. I think we make a mistake when we take physicalism as an epistemic theory, rather than an ontological theory. If it could demonstrate (and I think it does pretty well) that all things supervenes on the physical structure, then it has done its job.

What I think is difficult for us to reconcile with accepting the truth of physicalism is that we, by default, feel defeated by the notion of the "mechanical". But if you follow Aristotle's 4 causes, it theorizes that we're not just machines in motion, but could be affected by changes in our environment, the efficient cause. So, we are necessarily in the trajectory of change. However, there's the final cause, which is described as the point of our existence (the end or purpose). Here you could argue that the final cause is a subjective notion -- but if you actually incorporate all the 4 causes into the formation of an entity, you'd find that the trajectory of our existence necessarily leads to us being the way we are. (We need to drop this expression "in motion", like particles are in motion. Rather, we have to think in terms of imprinting, or molding, or even influencing).

Propositional knowledge is a form of know-how. So your dismissal of "know-how" is unjustified. And, as I said, you want to reduce "knowledge" in general, (which would include all forms of know-how) to one specific type, knowing how to explain things through the use of propositions, to serve your purpose. That's not productive, we need to go the other way, to see what all the different types of knowledge have in common, if we want to understand "knowledge". — Metaphysician Undercover

You are still misunderstanding the point. I realize that propositional knowledge can be understood as a kind of know-how, but that is not relevant to what I've been saying. As I already said we can easily explain how we know that something is the case if we've witnessed it and we can easily see that we know things deductively in logic and mathematics and when it comes to know-how we can easily see that we know how to do something when we are able to do it.

Now I've challenged you to come up with some other kind of purported knowledge, and to explain how it is that you know that it is knowledge.

If there's never been an account of how the first-person nature of lived experience arises from the objective source, then wouldn't that tell you that maybe it's because it can be sufficiently explained through physicalism alone? — L'éléphant

No, because the fact of one's own being is neither a physical fact, nor can it be denied (cogito ergo sum).

I think we make a mistake when we take physicalism as an epistemic theory, rather than an ontological theory. If it could demonstrate (and I think it does pretty well) that all things supervenes on the physical structure, then it has done its job. — L'éléphant

And here, 'supervenes' is able to be defined in just such a way as to paper over any current or even newly-discovered inadequacies in physicalism.

What I think is difficult for us to reconcile with accepting the truth of physicalism is that we, by default, feel defeated by the notion of the "mechanical". But if you follow Aristotle's 4 causes, it theorizes that we're not just machines in motion, but could be affected by changes in our environment, the efficient cause. — L'éléphant

Well, speaking of Aristotle, he distinguishes artifacts (i.e. machines) from organisms on the basis that the latter are self-organising and their parts all work together to maintain the whole. Whereas machines are manufactured, their principle is external to them, and each part performs only the role designated by manufacturer.

No, I'm opposed to physicalism because I think it's an illusion, something like a very influential popular myth. Because we're bedazzled by science and technology (and hey I'm no different in that respect) we see the world in those terms, but matter has no ultimate, mind-independent reality. Tangential to the original post, but there it is.

If there's never been an account of how the first-person nature of lived experience arises from the objective source, then wouldn't that tell you that maybe it's because it can be sufficiently explained through physicalism alone? — L'éléphant

But it isn't explained through physicalism alone. Physicalism explains physical things. If atoms are mainly empty space, how are solids solid? Why is water the universal solvent? How do things that are heavier than air fly? How does a plant get energy from the sun? we know how things like mass, charge, electron shells, and gravity explain these things.

Physicalism can even explain mental functions, like how we perceive different wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation, differentiate between different wavelengths, and move to avoid things that will harm the body.

But physicalism doesn't explain how the first-person nature of lived experience arises. As Chalmers puts it:

This further question is the key question in the problem of consciousness. Why doesn't all this information-processing go on "in the dark", free of any inner feel? Why is it that when electromagnetic waveforms impinge on a retina and are discriminated and categorized by a visual system, this discrimination and categorization is experienced as a sensation of vivid red? We know that conscious experience does arise when these functions are performed, but the very fact that it arises is the central mystery. There is an explanatory gap (a term due to Levine 1983) between the functions and experience, and we need an explanatory bridge to cross it. A mere account of the functions stays on one side of the gap, so the materials for the bridge must be found elsewhere. — David Chalmers

And no wonder. I've quoted Brian Greene in Until the End of Time before. Here it is again;

And within that mathematical description, affirmed by decades of data from particle colliders and powerful telescopes, there is nothing that even hints at the inner experiences those particles somehow generate. How can a collection of mindless, thoughtless, emotionless particles come together and yield inner sensations of color or sound, of elation or wonder, of confusion or surprise? Particles can have mass, electric charge, and a handful of other similar features (nuclear charges, which are more exotic versions of electric charge), but all these qualities seem completely disconnected from anything remotely like subjective experience. How then does a whirl of particles inside a head—which is all that a brain is—create impressions, sensations, and feelings? — Brian Greene

I haven't seen where any scientist contradicts him, explaining how those features and the mathematical description does the job. I've tried reading Tse and Damasio, on the recommendation of @wonderer1. I've looked at other sources. But I have not seen any theory or hypothesis that addresses why it doesn't all take place "in the dark.". There just seems to be an unspoken acceptance that, when you put enough mental functions, like the ones I just mentioned, together, it just happens.

I'm not jumping on board for any hypothesis or theory of how non-living matter became living, because, even though we can stack the deck any way we want, we haven't managed it. — Patterner

Your phrasing ("how non-living matter became living") betrays an underlying misunderstanding of the problem. Classical ontology premises immaterial Forms which are prior to, and the cause of material existence. In this ontology, there is no issue of non-living matter becoming living matter, there is an immaterial form of life, which became a material form of life.

So your phrasing, instead of questioning whether immaterial forms became material forms, or, non-living matter became living matter, already excludes the former, and assumes the latter as a starting point. However, there is no science which supports this exclusion.

Now I've challenged you to come up with some other kind of purported knowledge, and to explain how it is that you know that it is knowledge. — Janus

I've been trying to tell you that this is an extremely unproductive restriction to place on "knowledge". The criteria you suggest, that one must know how one knows what one knows, in order for the person to "know" what one knows, is completely unrealistic. People know all sorts of things without any idea as to how they know them. That is what Socrates demonstrated. He went to all sorts of people with different types of knowledge, and requested of them, that they demonstrate how they know what they know. He stumped them all, in every field he approached. That is a fundamental and also very important aspect of "knowledge", which one must understand, in order to understand the nature of knowledge.

Knowing is clearly prior to knowing how we know, as the temporal priority demonstrates that it is impossible to know how we know prior to knowing. Therefore to dismiss knowledge, just because the person does not know how they know what they know, or to insist that they must know how they know, in order for that knowledge to be relevant, is an illogical thing for you to do.

The fact is, that no one truly knows how they know what they know. Your claims that we can easily explain how we know some types of things, is completely false, stemming from a confidence induced illusion. For example, claiming "I witnessed X" in no way explains how you know X. This is because "witnessed" does not equate with "know". And, in the case of logic and mathematics, epistemologists really cannot say how logic works. How do you know that 2+2=4? Is it because your teacher said so? Proofs serve no purpose here because they do not demonstrate that one knows how the proof proves.

Your phrasing ("how non-living matter became living") betrays an underlying misunderstanding of the problem. Classical ontology premises immaterial Forms which are prior to, and the cause of material existence. In this ontology, there is no issue of non-living matter becoming living matter, there is an immaterial form of life, which became a material form of life.

So your phrasing, instead of questioning whether immaterial forms became material forms, or, non-living matter became living matter, already excludes the former, and assumes the latter as a starting point. However, there is no science which supports this exclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

What is the science which supports the premise of immaterial Forms which are prior to, and the cause of material existence? Is there some -ology?

It's called "logic", from basic premises which are very well supported by empirical evidence.. Here, look at my first post on this thread, for a start. We can use that as the basis for discussion if you are interested.

The argument from Aristotle is that a body is an organized existence, and an agent is required for any type of organization, as the organizer. Therefore the agent as organizer, is prior in time to the existence of the body. Of course abiogenesis is the basis for a denial of the secondary premise, but as the op points out, it's not a justified denial. — Metaphysician Undercover

The problem with the question as posed in the thread title, is that ‘pre-existing’ is a temporal description, referring to something that existed before everything else existed in time. Whereas classical theism, as a model, has the ‘ground of being’ as omnipresent and eternal, meaning, outside of time altogether. It’s ‘before’ the existing world not in the sense of temporal order, but in terms of ontological priority as first principle or ground of being.

What is the science which supports the premise of immaterial Forms which are prior to, and the cause of material existence? Is there some -ology? — Patterner

That is the basic premise of metaphysics in the classical tradition. Of course it is a truism that nowadays metaphysics has fallen into disrepute, viewed as dusty tomes of scholastic philosophy. But there’s been a recent revival, and there’s a great book, which a kindly soul has made available online, Thinking Being: Introduction to Metaphysics in the Classical Tradition, of which there’s an unauthorised .pdf copy online (which is just as well, as it’s both out of print, and extremely expensive in hardcopy.) The first several chapters lays out the origin of Plato’s ‘forms’ with pristine clarity.

The argument from Aristotle is that a body is an organized existence, and an agent is required for any type of organization, as the organizer. Therefore the agent as organizer, is prior in time to the existence of the body. Of course abiogenesis is the basis for a denial of the secondary premise, but as the op points out, it's not a justified denial. — Metaphysician Undercover

I haven't read Aristotle, or much of anything else. So I don't know what I don't know. This may be universally understood in a specific way, but I'm not aware of it. Is the agent not organized, therefore needing it's own agent/organizer? Are you talking about the uncaused cause?

Is the agent not organized, therefore needing it's own agent/organizer? — Patterner

"Organized" refers to material existents. The term therefore is not applicable to the cause of material existence which, being prior to material existence, is necessarily immaterial. And the terminology of "uncaused cause" is not very useful unless well defined, due to the multitude of distinct ways that "cause" is used.

The problem with the question as posed in the thread title, is that ‘pre-existing’ is a temporal description, referring to something that existed before everything else existed in time. Whereas classical theism, as a model, has the ‘ground of being’ as omnipresent and eternal, meaning, outside of time altogether. It’s ‘before’ the existing world not in the sense of temporal order, but in terms of ontological priority as first principle or ground of being. — Wayfarer

There is a relatively simple way around this problem. First, the recognition that "eternal" in classical theism means "outside of time", as you state. Second, we recognize that "time" in the conventional conception is derived from change. "Time" is a concept abstracted from observations of material, or physical, change. As such, the concept "time" is dependent on physical change. This places the eternal, as outside of this conception of time, which is an abstraction produced from, and dependent on, change. That conception of time is the one which Aristotle described in his Physics as the principal meaning for "time", a number which is the measure of change.

However, Aristotle also described a secondary meaning for "time", as something which is measured. This is what we know, and experience as the passing of time. It is what we measure by keeping track of the sun and moon, or the oscillations of a cesium atom.

So in the primary sense of "time", the clock gives us seconds and minutes, and we apply this to perform measurements of change. In the secondary sense of "time", there is a real aspect of nature, which we measure as the passing of time, with the use of observations, or a tool, the clock.

In the secondary sense, the logical priority of the relation between change and time, is reversed from the primary sense. In the primary sense, "time" as the abstraction is logically dependent on the existence of change. In the secondary sense, change, as the activities of physical things, is dependent on the existence of time. The passing of time is logically necessary for physical change to occur.

Now when we understand "time" in the secondary sense, we allow for the possibility of time passing with no physical change occurring, because time is necessary for change, but change is not necessary for time, due to the logical priority of time. This allows for the reality of activity (activity logically requires the passing of time, secondary sense), which is outside of "time" in the primary sense. That is the actuality of the immaterial. Simply put, it is the restriction of the meaning of "time" to the conventional conception of "time", as tied to, or dependent on, physical change, which drives the need to assume an actuality which is "outside of time. When the conception of "time" is rectified to allow for an actuality which is truly immaterial, transcending material change, then we no longer need to think of this actuality as "eternal". It is now within the reality of "time" in the secondary sense, but transcending material change.

, to give an account of time you have to account for when (simultaneity) and how long (duration) alike: Nov 11, 2022 (way old comment)

• Say, my supper is spatial/object-like, locatable, movable, breakable, my experiences thereof occur, are interruptible ⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾, temporal/process-like. Say, stomachs are spatial/object-like, left to right, front to back, and digestion (say, starting with chewing and salivating) occurs, comes and goes, temporal/process-like.

• Rocks and bodies are spatial/object-like: left to right, top to bottom, front to back, movable, locatable, breakable (under conservation ⁽³⁾), ... Eddies/currents and minds/experiences are temporal/process-like: come and go, occur, interruptible ⁽⁴⁾⁽⁵⁾ (interaction/event-causation), ...

Mind isn't in atemporal's vocabulary. If you're talking atemporal, then you're not talking sentience; if you're talking sentience, then you're not talking atemporal. Isn't intelligence something that mind can do (or possess, be capable of)?

How about the law of the excluded middle. Is that temporal?

"Organized" refers to material existents. The term therefore is not applicable to the cause of material existence which, being prior to material existence, is necessarily immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

Material things cannot be organized?

And the terminology of "uncaused cause" is not very useful unless well defined, due to the multitude of distinct ways that "cause" is used. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, not very useful until well defined. Still, I don't see how you could not be talking about an uncaused cause. Immaterial and uncaused. No?



Thank you. I've started it.

I do not think that the "spatial/object-like", " temporal/process-like" distinction is very useful in this context. The issue is that "object" itself implies a temporal duration, a temporal continuity of sameness. To be an "object" is to have a temporal duration. This means that within the proposed concept "spatial/object-like", there is already an implied temporal dependence. The distinction then is reduced to sameness over duration, and change over duration.

Both of these have a temporal aspect, "duration", and a spatial aspect, "same" in one case, "difference" in the other case. "Simultaneity" is a more complex temporal conception, because it is a comparison. This means that there is a necessity of more than one "duration" involved in "simultaneity". And, since temporal duration is already qualified in two distinct ways, sameness over time, and difference over time, "simultaneity" becomes very difficult to grasp. To simplify "simultaneity", and make it a useful concept, we assume "a point in time", and designate the "state-of-being" at that point. All things within that "state-of-being" are simultaneous, as being "at the same time".

Mind isn't in atemporal's vocabulary. If you're talking atemporal, then you're not talking sentience; if you're talking sentience, then you're not talking atemporal. Isn't intelligence something that mind can do (or possess, be capable of)? — jorndoe

The "point in time", is the basis of the concept of "atemporality". "Time" in its natural existence, as what is passing, (secondary sense, in the prior post), is continuous. The imposition of "a point" is artificial, and since time is not passing at the point, the point is atemporal. This make "simultaneity", and all of the other conceptions which rely on a "point in time" fundamentally atemporal.

So, I don't know what you mean here with "Mind isn't in atemporal's vocabulary". The inverse is what is the case, "atemporal is in mind's vocabulary". It doesn't even make sense to attribute vocabulary to atemporal, rather than to mind, so this paragraph appears extremely confused.

Material things cannot be organized? — Patterner

I suggest you reread that. I said "organized" refers to material things. The cause of existence of material things is cannot be material (is immaterial) and therefore cannot be called "organized". "Organized" refers to a spatial ordering, a concept which cannot be applied to the immaterial.

Sure, not very useful until well defined. Still, I don't see how you could not be talking about an uncaused cause. Immaterial and uncaused. No? — Patterner

This is a complex issue due to the difference in types of causation. "Efficient cause" refers to physical activities and how they produce effects. If we assume a chain of efficient causes, in time, and look backward in time some will conclude that there is a need for a "first cause". The "first cause" would necessarily be an "uncaused cause" if we maintain consistency in the meaning of "cause", as efficient cause. However, since there are other senses of "cause", such as "final cause", we can say that the "first [efficient] cause" was caused by a different type of cause, i.e. final cause.

This is the way that we understand free will causation. A free will choice sets up a chain of efficient causes designed to produce the desired end. There is a beginning (or end, looking backward in time) to that chain of efficient causes, which we know as the "final cause". The final cause is the intention of the intentional being, the end which is aimed at.

Material things cannot be organized?
— Patterner

I suggest you reread that. I said "organized" refers to material things. The cause of existence of material things is cannot be material (is immaterial) and therefore cannot be called "organized". "Organized" refers to a spatial ordering, a concept which cannot be applied to the immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

I thought I understood. But I had a typo. I meant "immaterial." I just wanted to verify that you are saying only material things can be organized.

, I'm thinking no — as the common abstract or grammar rule, though not in intuitionism. Then again, is there any excluded middle in absence of any talk to apply it to? (Identity, instead, is presupposed by meaning; maybe identity is where ontology and logic meet.)

, the point was that mind is temporal/process-like, come and go, occurs, is interruptible, has a more clear temporal demarcation than spatial, ... Where does intelligence fit in?

But it isn't explained through physicalism alone. — Patterner

It does explain that the processes such as the consciousness are made possible by the physical bodies that we possess.

Here is the folly of the civilized humans:
It is us that labeled the consciousness as non-physical before we have an argument for it. Let us admit this much. So how is it that we have arrived at this conclusion without first explaining its relation to the bodies. In fact what's happening here is that we already have a notion of what is non-physical before we have a reasoning for it. And the way we win this claim is by saying "no", "no", "no" to the theory of physicalism. And we feel smug about doing this because the theory of physicalism, according to us, did not even provide an adequate account of the non-physical.
Why would they? We invented the non-physical notion. And yet our senses do not deny that there are physical bodies that we perceive -- with the help of the light, the air, the atmosphere, darkness, and particle invisible to our eyes, the mass, the texture, we come to know what a tree is, a table, a chair, another human being, animals, starts and the sky. Everything we do involves matter.

Physicalism can even explain mental functions, like how we perceive different wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation, differentiate between different wavelengths, and move to avoid things that will harm the body. — Patterner

I am guessing this is a typo. Last time I checked, you are opposed to this.

No, because the fact of one's own being is neither a physical fact, nor can it be denied (cogito ergo sum). — Wayfarer

A claim without support.

And here, 'supervenes' is able to be defined in just such a way as to paper over any current or even newly-discovered inadequacies in physicalism. — Wayfarer

Another claim without support.

Well, speaking of Aristotle, he distinguishes artifacts (i.e. machines) from organisms on the basis that the latter are self-organising and their parts all work together to maintain the whole. Whereas machines are manufactured, their principle is external to them, and each part performs only the role designated by manufacturer. — Wayfarer

I don't know what to make of this. Did you read his 4 causes?

Just to be clear, I am not saying that Aristotle came up with physicalism. All I am saying is, if you read his 4 causes, the material cause is there. If you are searching for a sympathetic philosopher to the notion of physicalsim, it is Aristotle.

No, I'm opposed to physicalism because I think it's an illusion, something like a very influential popular myth. Because we're bedazzled by science and technology (and hey I'm no different in that respect) we see the world in those terms, but matter has no ultimate, mind-independent reality. Tangential to the original post, but there it is. — Wayfarer

All I see here is a "no". But you didn't provide a convincing argument for why you are opposed to it.