91. If Moore says he knows the earth existed etc., most of us will grant him that it has existed all that time, and also believe him when he says he is convinced of it. But has he also got the right ground for this conviction? For if not, then after all he doesn't know (Russell).
Well, you and I differ substantively on our readings. — Banno
I know that a sick man is lying here? Nonsense!
Wittgenstein would have us use "know" only in situations where there is an explicit justification that can be given, in the form of a proposition, for the belief in question. — Banno
... one thinks that the words "I know that..." are always in place where there is no doubt, and hence even where the expression of doubt would unintelligible.
So supose we have a culture in which "certain performances... might be performed in an entirely different way... to produce entirely different meanings".
On what grounds could you then claim that this culture was playing chess? — Banno
Wittgenstein's view is that Moore can be certain, but not know, that he has a hand. — Banno
92…if Moore and this king were to meet and discuss, could Moore really prove his belief to be the right one? I do not say that Moore could not convert the king to his view, but it would be a conversion of a special kind; the king would be brought to look at the world in a different way.
94. I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.
Because your question, "What is the propositional justification?", is odd, since both Moore and Wittgenstein point out that there is no propositional justification... — Banno
Wittgenstein would have us use "know" only in situations where there is an explicit justification that can be given, in the form of a proposition, for the belief in question. — Banno
linkWittgenstein gave an interesting reason for his non-reading of Hume. He said that he could not sit down and read Hume, because he knew far too much about the subject of Hume’s writings to find this anything but a torture. In a recent commentary, Peter Hacker has taken this to show that ‘Wittgenstein seems to have despised Hume’. Hume, he adds, ‘made almost every epistemological and metaphysical mistake Wittgenstein could think of’.
I agree, except that "subjective" is counterproductive here. Moore would have "This is a hand" as an expression of something of which he is convinced - a self-justified true belief. Wittgenstein points out the ineffectiveness of self-justification, buts agrees that it is certain that "This is a hand". So he is loath to say say he knows "this is a hand", while agreeing that it is indubitable. His solution is along the lines of treating it as fundamental to the way we use word in our interactions, as a foundation to the word games. He does not come to a conclusion, although conclusions have been read in to the text by others.↪Banno My view is that Moore's assertion, "I know this is a hand," amounts to an expression of subjective certainty, i.e., akin to a conviction (which Witt points out) that he is certain without justification (although Moore thinks he's justified). The reason I add the subjective is that there is a use of certainty as a synonym for know, i.e., objective certainty. — Sam26
I know that a sick man is lying here? Nonsense!
This has nothing to do with proposition justification of a knowledge claim because Wittgenstein denies that it is a proper use of the term 'know'. — Fooloso4
Yes, that's right - there is no justifying proposition, and hence saying "I know..." is for Wittgenstein illegitimate.The belief in question is that there is a sick man lying there. What is the proposition that justifies that belief? Or, more to the point, where is the need for justification? — Fooloso4
If Moore knows, that would mean there's a sense of "know" that amounts to being unable to doubt. And per Hume, you can't prove what you can't doubt. So Moore would have some kind of unprovable knowledge, which doesn't sound right. — frank
But Wittgenstein denies that Moore does know — Fooloso4
Wittgenstein would have us use "know" only in situations where there is an explicit justification that can be given, in the form of a proposition, for the belief in question. — Banno
I'm sorry you are having so much trouble understanding this. — Banno
Wittgenstein would have us use "know" only in situations where there is an explicit justification that can be given, in the form of a proposition, for the belief in question. — Banno
You seem to think that it counts against what I have said, when it is entirely supporting what I said. — Banno
90. "I know" has a primitive meaning similar to and related to "I see" ("wissen", "videre").
SO allow me to address them directly:In your latest attempt once again you ignore 3 and 7. — Fooloso4
3. If e.g. someone says "I don't know if there's a hand here" he might be told "Look closer". - This possibility of satisfying oneself is part of the language-game. Is one of its essential features.
Neither of these count against what I have said. In the first it is pointed out that "know" involves being satisfied that something is the case - seeking justification. The second shows that certainty is lived, acted out. These are central to, not inconsistent with, the account I provided.7. My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. - I tell a friend e.g. "Take that chair over there", "Shut the door", etc. etc.
I'm all up in the web of ideas the work is a part of. — frank
I know it's your thing to put a philosopher's individual words under a microscope, — frank
Neither of these count against what I have said. — Banno
Wittgenstein would have us use "know" only in situations where there is an explicit justification that can be given, in the form of a proposition, for the belief in question. — Banno
The quip to look closer is not a propositional justification. — Fooloso4
This is not what Wittgenstein might say. He might point out that while you may be certain there is a chair, the lack of a suitable justification implies that it is improper to say you know there is a chair there.No propositional justification is needed for knowing that there is a chair or there is a door. — Fooloso4
And here the form "I thought I knew" is being overlooked. (21)
That would be for the best.I will respond one more time then drop it. — Fooloso4
No. It is a prompt towards seeking justification - "Can't you see it?. Look closer". — Banno
Wittgenstein takes it as read that knowing requires justification, and hence were there is no proposition to supply the justification, one cannot be properly said to know. — Banno
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