Yep. Any point can be taken as fixed, providing the origin of a coordinate system. And if any other point is chosen by someone else, then it is a simple mater to translate from one coordinate system to another. Further, the Principle of Relativity ensures physical laws are consistent, regardless of which system of coordinates is chosen.

Again, choosing the foundation is an act, a way of using words.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/930609

There is no fixed point, but there are fixed points within given contexts. — Sam26

So, cultural relativism?

This is unproductive.

Are you arguing that Wittgenstein does not think knowing requires propositional justification?

Because your question, "What is the propositional justification?", is odd, since both Moore and Wittgenstein point out that there is no propositional justification...

So, going over it again, Moore claims to know that this is a hand, despite not having a propositional justification. Wittgenstein objects, amongst other things, that this is a misuse of know, that Moore can be certain, but in the absence of a propositional justification, he cannot properly be said to know that this is a hand.

Now, you seem to think this is not quite correct, but it remains unclear to me what alternative you might be proposing.

There's always going to be a certain amount of cultural relativism.

91. If Moore says he knows the earth existed etc., most of us will grant him that it has existed all that time, and also believe him when he says he is convinced of it. But has he also got the right ground for this conviction? For if not, then after all he doesn't know (Russell).

Wittgenstein's view is that Moore can be certain, but not know, that he has a hand.

My view is that Moore's assertion, "I know this is a hand," amounts to an expression of subjective certainty, i.e., akin to a conviction (which Witt points out) that he is certain without justification (although Moore thinks he's justified). The reason I add the subjective is that there is a use of certainty as a synonym for know, i.e., objective certainty.

Well, you and I differ substantively on our readings. — Banno

That can happen when you ignore parts of the text that have direct bearing on the issue. Rather than identify the propositional justification at 3 and 7 you ask about 10, as if what is true in one case must be true in all

But let's look at 10:

I know that a sick man is lying here? Nonsense!

This has nothing to do with proposition justification of a knowledge claim because Wittgenstein denies that it is a proper use of the term 'know'. What is at issue is the occasion on which this proposition "I know" is used, not a proposition that justifies it.

Your claim again was:

Wittgenstein would have us use "know" only in situations where there is an explicit justification that can be given, in the form of a proposition, for the belief in question. — Banno

The belief in question is that there is a sick man lying there. What is the proposition that justifies that belief? Or, more to the point, where is the need for justification?

... one thinks that the words "I know that..." are always in place where there is no doubt, and hence even where the expression of doubt would unintelligible.

So supose we have a culture in which "certain performances... might be performed in an entirely different way... to produce entirely different meanings".

On what grounds could you then claim that this culture was playing chess? — Banno

You’re making Wittgenstein’s point for him. He sees Moore’s raising of his hand as a performance which is grounded in a picture of the world which cannot be proved more correct than any other. To doubt the truth of this picture is to substitute a different picture, a different language game, just as doubting the picture of the world implied by the rules of chess is to no longer be playing chess. Moore’s demonstration convinces doubters of its certainty by bringing them to look at the world in a different way, not by satisfying them of its correctness.

Wittgenstein's view is that Moore can be certain, but not know, that he has a hand. — Banno

I agree with @Sam26. For Wittgenstein the distinction between certainty and knowledge is that between a conviction or picture of the world, and a justifiable proposition. My picture of the world may have telling grounds, but not grounds on the basis of which I can prove that picture to be more correct than any other.

92…if Moore and this king were to meet and discuss, could Moore really prove his belief to be the right one? I do not say that Moore could not convert the king to his view, but it would be a conversion of a special kind; the king would be brought to look at the world in a different way.

94. I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.

There's always going to be a certain amount of cultural relativism. — Sam26

Yes, but how much? A house does not support its foundation (248). The axis (152) is not a foundation and is not in need of a foundation.

Because your question, "What is the propositional justification?", is odd, since both Moore and Wittgenstein point out that there is no propositional justification... — Banno

And yet you say:

Wittgenstein would have us use "know" only in situations where there is an explicit justification that can be given, in the form of a proposition, for the belief in question. — Banno

If Moore knows, that would mean there's a sense of "know" that amounts to being unable to doubt. And per Hume, you can't prove what you can't doubt. So Moore would have some kind of unprovable knowledge, which doesn't sound right.

But Wittgenstein denies that Moore does know

But Wittgenstein denies that Moore does know — Fooloso4

Read aaaaaalllllll the way to the end of my huge post.

Reading aaaaaalllllll the way to the end of your huge post it would seem that you are in agreement that Wittgenstein denies that Moore knows, while citing an argument that Wittgenstein did not appeal to.

So?

This not to contest what you said. My preference when interpreting a text is not to bring other texts into it. It adds another layer of questions. I don't know how Moore might have responded, or what Wittgenstein thought of Hume's contention if he was aware of it. It just makes it cleaner.

From a chapter on Hume and Wittgenstein in "Impressions of Empiricism" Oswald Hanfling says:

Wittgenstein gave an interesting reason for his non-reading of Hume. He said that he could not sit down and read Hume, because he knew far too much about the subject of Hume’s writings to find this anything but a torture. In a recent commentary, Peter Hacker has taken this to show that ‘Wittgenstein seems to have despised Hume’. Hume, he adds, ‘made almost every epistemological and metaphysical mistake Wittgenstein could think of’.

link

I don't worry as much about "interpreting texts" as you do. I'm all up in the web of ideas the work is a part of. Every philosopher pings off others in the vast forum of discussion we call philosophy.

I know it's your thing to put a philosopher's individual words under a microscope, but I wouldn't get anything out of that. And anyway, all I did was recall that Hume said you can't prove what you can't doubt. I think that actually does bear, if obliquely, on this particular work. I'm not overly concerned if you don't see that. :up:

I'm sorry you are having so much trouble understanding this. Not much I can do for you.

You’re making Wittgenstein’s point for him. — Joshs

Good, since I think he is right.

. For Wittgenstein the distinction between certainty and knowledge is that between a conviction or picture of the world, and a justifiable proposition. — Joshs

I agree. What an odd pair you and Fool are.

↪Banno My view is that Moore's assertion, "I know this is a hand," amounts to an expression of subjective certainty, i.e., akin to a conviction (which Witt points out) that he is certain without justification (although Moore thinks he's justified). The reason I add the subjective is that there is a use of certainty as a synonym for know, i.e., objective certainty. — Sam26

I agree, except that "subjective" is counterproductive here. Moore would have "This is a hand" as an expression of something of which he is convinced - a self-justified true belief. Wittgenstein points out the ineffectiveness of self-justification, buts agrees that it is certain that "This is a hand". So he is loath to say say he knows "this is a hand", while agreeing that it is indubitable. His solution is along the lines of treating it as fundamental to the way we use word in our interactions, as a foundation to the word games. He does not come to a conclusion, although conclusions have been read in to the text by others.

For my part, something like Searle's account of language must be correct, were there are certain things that must be taken as granted in order for a language game to take place – there must be some agreement amongst the "players" as to what is occurring. On that account we might read "This is a hand" as something like "This counts as a hand for the purposes of our everyday encounters", where the ..."counts as..." sets up the institution of calling this waving, nose-picking, pen pushing thing a hand.

Problems will occur when hinges are said to be non-propositional, or not true, as Moyal-Sharrok wishes to. This needs a fair amount of tidying up, but it is clear that if some belief is going to function as part of an explanation for a behaviour, it needsmust be truth-functional.

Perhaps the difference I have with her is that I do take beliefs to be evaluative attitudes. Being so is how they relate to actions, and without acts, beliefs are nothing.

Perhaps I will try again.

I know that a sick man is lying here? Nonsense!

This has nothing to do with proposition justification of a knowledge claim because Wittgenstein denies that it is a proper use of the term 'know'. — Fooloso4

This is an example that fits my case exactly. Wittgenstein is pointing out that there is no justifying proposition that supports "I know that a sick man is lying here", that it is instead something seen in what is before us. Hence, he says that it is nonsense to say "I know...".

You seem to think that it counts against what I have said, when it is entirely supporting what I said. So:

The belief in question is that there is a sick man lying there. What is the proposition that justifies that belief? Or, more to the point, where is the need for justification? — Fooloso4

Yes, that's right - there is no justifying proposition, and hence saying "I know..." is for Wittgenstein illegitimate.

You seem to want to disprove my case by presenting things which support it.

If Moore knows, that would mean there's a sense of "know" that amounts to being unable to doubt. And per Hume, you can't prove what you can't doubt. So Moore would have some kind of unprovable knowledge, which doesn't sound right. — frank

But Wittgenstein denies that Moore does know — Fooloso4

@Frank, you seem to behaving the same problem, with Fool, as I. That Wittgenstein dislikes Hume is bedsides the point. Wittgenstein takes it as read that knowing requires justification, and hence were there is no proposition to supply the justification, one cannot be properly said to know.

Wittgenstein would have us use "know" only in situations where there is an explicit justification that can be given, in the form of a proposition, for the belief in question. — Banno

I'm sorry you are having so much trouble understanding this. — Banno

How else might your claim that:

Wittgenstein would have us use "know" only in situations where there is an explicit justification that can be given, in the form of a proposition, for the belief in question. — Banno

be understood? I admit that I might have misunderstood you but you have not given any indication of how this is to be understood if not in a straight forward way.

In your latest attempt once again you ignore 3 and 7.

You seem to think that it counts against what I have said, when it is entirely supporting what I said. — Banno

I don't think it counts against what you said. I think that it avoids the issue raised by 3 and 7. Unlike 10, they are examples where the term 'know' is used but no explicit propositional justification is present or needed.

Also:

90. "I know" has a primitive meaning similar to and related to "I see" ("wissen", "videre").

In your latest attempt once again you ignore 3 and 7. — Fooloso4

SO allow me to address them directly:

3. If e.g. someone says "I don't know if there's a hand here" he might be told "Look closer". - This possibility of satisfying oneself is part of the language-game. Is one of its essential features.

7. My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. - I tell a friend e.g. "Take that chair over there", "Shut the door", etc. etc.

Neither of these count against what I have said. In the first it is pointed out that "know" involves being satisfied that something is the case - seeking justification. The second shows that certainty is lived, acted out. These are central to, not inconsistent with, the account I provided.

I'm all up in the web of ideas the work is a part of. — frank

I agree with this, but as part of the web the work should not get lost. If there is something unique about it that should not become part of a homogeneous whole.

I know it's your thing to put a philosopher's individual words under a microscope, — frank

Well, its not individual words, its a matter of interpreting the text as a whole This is not the only approach. Is not yours. I have no problem with that and have read some interesting books and articles that take this approach.

its a matter of interpreting the text as a whole — Fooloso4

Trouble is, this text is not a whole. It is an incomplete process, a work in progress. @Sam26 and I have pointed this out repeatedly.

Neither of these count against what I have said. — Banno

I will respond one more time then drop it.

What you said is:

Wittgenstein would have us use "know" only in situations where there is an explicit justification that can be given, in the form of a proposition, for the belief in question. — Banno

How does using "know' only in situations where there is a explicit justification that can be given in the form of a proposition fit these cases?

The quip to look closer is not a propositional justification. Taking a chair or shutting the door points to the fact that in doing these things we show that we do not doubt their existence. No propositional justification is needed for knowing that there is a chair or there is a door.

The quip to look closer is not a propositional justification. — Fooloso4

You are quite right – it's not. It is a prompt towards seeking justification - "Can't you see it?. Look closer".

But it seems you can't.

No propositional justification is needed for knowing that there is a chair or there is a door. — Fooloso4

This is not what Wittgenstein might say. He might point out that while you may be certain there is a chair, the lack of a suitable justification implies that it is improper to say you know there is a chair there.

And here the form "I thought I knew" is being overlooked. (21)

He is setting up the discussion by considering various uses of the terms involved. (7) is not a conclusion, it is setting the grounds by showing how we use "know" to express certainty – see the other examples in the surrounding text. He goes on to unknot the ramifications of this casual use, in an attempt to make consistent sense of it.

I will respond one more time then drop it. — Fooloso4

That would be for the best.

No. It is a prompt towards seeking justification - "Can't you see it?. Look closer". — Banno

But as I understand it looking closer could never provide Wittgenstein with justification for knowledge, and thus it is odd to say that "looking closer" will somehow yield justification.

Wittgenstein takes it as read that knowing requires justification, and hence were there is no proposition to supply the justification, one cannot be properly said to know. — Banno

The oddity is that the ultimate justification for empirical knowledge is usually thought to be sense data, and so for Wittgenstein to say that sense data does not count as a justification seems to commit him to the view that knowledge of this kind does not exist at all. If nothing is self-justifying then how can anything be justified?

The question of foundationalism is here the elephant in the room, is it not? With Sam, I don't see how it can be avoided. Does Wittgenstein believe that knowledge exists at all? And if so, what would be an example of knowledge and its attendant justification?