The problem is that what's basic in one context is not in another. — Sam26

I don't see this as a problem so much as a part of the answer: it's not that some propositions are always hinges, but that in order to play a language game we must set aside doubt for some propositions.

Certainty is something we do. It is not something that is found.

I agree. Although I make a distinction between subjective certainty and objective certainty, the latter being akin to knowledge. I think Witt made this distinction too.

1) One can reasonably talk about the conditions for knowledge and experience and things prior to language, using language to describe them (Kant may represent this approach.. one done by many philosophers) — schopenhauer1

Well, this results in pages and pages about philosophical constructs such as the thing-in-itself... silence is much preferable. But it's not the silence of the Zen master, it's the silence of doing things.

2) Witt's notion: at some point language games cannot exist without certain "hinge" beliefs. Yet we can explore where hinge beliefs originate to some degree, even using empirical methods (developmental psychology and such). — schopenhauer1

Sure. The first step here is the one given above - that not doubting is something we do, not something we uncover.

Notice that this fits exactly with the core idea that we should look to use rather than meaning.

Cheers.

I do want to comment on what I was saying about hinges in relation to Godel's proofs. All I was trying to say is that instead of looking at certain axioms within a particular system as something that can't be proven within the system, we could look at them as endpoints not needing proof or justification, like Witt's hinges.

My thinking on OC is that Witt's biggest contribution is the idea that certain basic beliefs are the endpoints that form the bedrock of epistemological ideas. It solves the problem of the infinite regress of justifications, and it solves the problem of circularity. This is not insignificant.

The other important idea, and there are probably many more, is the way we think of doubt, viz., just as knowledge requires justification, so does doubting. People tend to think that their doubts are always warranted, but they're not. Think of knowledge and doubting as two sides of a coin. Both require a justification.

In some passages, Witt seems to compare Moore's statement about knowing this is a hand to someone's conviction of a particular belief. In other words, when Moore states what he knows, at least in these passages, it seems to be more a function of his convictions than a function of knowledge. For e.g., in OC 6 he says, "And through this misuse [misuse of the word know] a queer and extremely important mental state is revealed." I don't think it's a stretch to think that this mental state is the mental state of conviction. For instance, "Suppose I replace Moore's 'I know' by 'I am of the unshakeable conviction' (OC 86)." Or look at OC 91, "But has he got the right ground for his conviction? For if not, then after all he doesn't know (Russell)." Witt seems to be pointing out the subjective nature of what Moore is saying. Of course, as I've already pointed out, Witt uses certainty in two different senses, subjective certainty and objective certainty, the latter is akin to knowing, the former not, at least not in this context. Knowledge is not generated by some inner subjective point of view, at least not the knowledge that Moore's trying to convey to the skeptic.

Care might be needed to avoid a foundationalist reading of OC. I don't think there are some sentences that are unquestionable in an absolute sense. It's rather that if we are going to perform some given task, we must take some things for granted - if you would do maths, you need to grant that 1+1=2; if you would pick your nose, you must take this to be a hand; and so on.

Well, as you know I do read a kind of foundationalism into OC, but it's nothing like traditional foundationalism. Also, I don't view much of what I'm saying in an absolute sense, but in a general sense. I agree with all but your first statement, unless you're referring to traditional foundationalism, then I would agree.

In other words, the endpoints, i.e., where justification ends are a kind of foundational position, but a foundation without justification.

:wink: It's a faux, foundationalism, in that it is for a purpose, and not handed to us by god.

:grin: No, it's a concept that has various uses in different contexts. I don't see how anyone can read OC and not see a foundational component to what Witt is saying. I've read quite a few papers on this subject and it comes up time and time again, so it's not unique to me.

So, the analogy I use over and over again is to think of foundational in the same way that the rules of chess, the board, and the pieces are foundational. One doesn't need to justify these components they are just there as part of the background needed to play the game. The games rest on these components, i.e., they're foundational to the game. You can also think of language games in the same way, viz., resting on certain implicit and explicit rules within our forms of life.

Yep. This counts as a board, this counts as a bishop, and so on. Explicated neatly by Searle's status functions.

They are foundational in regard to what we do with them. Their meaning is their use in a language game.

They are foundational in regard to what we do with them. Their meaning is their use in a language agme. — Banno

Yes, but there is a sense where we are also forced into a foundational position if we want to play the game, whatever that game may be. However, this doesn't mean the foundation can't change, at least in some contexts.

"'Here I have arrived at a foundation of all my beliefs (OC 246)." This passage plays off of OC 245.

...but... — Sam26

I don;t see a point of disagreement here. The next bit: "This position I will hold!" – that is, it is something I do!

"Doesn't this mean: I shall proceed according to this belief unconditionally, and not let anything confuse me?

"But it isn't just that I believe in this way that I have two hands, but that every reasonable person does.

"At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded (OC 251, 252, and 253)."

Again, these endpoints seem to be foundational.

I agree with you that our actions are an important part of all this, they reflect something very important. We cannot forget about what we do! Our forms of life reflect this.

...but... — Sam26

The "but" wasn't meant to be a disagreement but an additional point.

It's interesting to note that different language games reflect different endpoints. However, it seems to me that some endpoints are not really hinges, and the way we can see this is by asking if it makes sense to doubt one's endpoint. For e.g., I've listened to some philosophers who want to place belief in God in the same category as Witt's hinges, so within their language game, it's a given, in the same way, this is a hand is a given. However, there is an important test to see if your hinge is proper, viz., does it make sense to doubt that proposition? Compare this is a hand and belief in God, it's much more natural to doubt the latter. There is an exception, let's say you had a veridical encounter with God, then in that case it could be considered a hinge. However, trying to prove your experience would be very difficult indeed.

One justifies that one knows how to ride a bike by getting on the bike and riding it. One justifies that one understands "here is a hand" by waving one's hand about. They agree that the "meanings" of words are seen in what we do with them, not in an explication. — Banno

These situations show that one is performing a practice in a particular way, and one’s understanding is this particular way of ‘knowing how’. These performances dont preclude the possibility that they might be performed in an entirely different way by some other culture, to produce entirely different meanings. If the game ‘chess’ is performed according to an entirely different set of rules in that other culture, then my playing chess according to my rules will not justify to that culture my claim that I know how to play chess. It will justify that I indeed know how to do something, but not what they understand as chess. What we do with words forms a system, and how that system of practices is organized as a language game determines its meaning.

If you and I inherit the same system of practices, then within that same system I may be able to justify that I know how to do something simply by doing it, which is what Wittgenstein means by certainty, that the performance simply IS the justification. Within this shared system of practices called riding a bike, I may make a mistake, and this possibility of error within the shared system is what Wittgenstein calls knowing. Justification, verification, being able to be wrong all are possible within a shared system, but are not applicable when we compare two different language games. If you and I are making use of different language games, then performances like riding a bike , playing chess or waving my hand which appear justified to me will not to you. They will appear unintelligible, even if you call my performance ‘incorrect’.

If you and I are making use of different language games, then performances like riding a bike , playing chess or waving my hand which appear justified to me will not to you. — Joshs

It seems to me that there is an important distinction between riding a bike and playing chess. I don't need to know anything about another person's language game to understand that a person confidently riding a bike has developed (at least) some intuitive understanding of the physics involved in riding a bike.

Can you show an example of bike riding that I will find unintelligible?

t seems to me that there is an important distinction between riding a bike and playing chess. I don't need to know anything about another person's language game to understand that a person confidently riding a bike has developed (at least) some intuitive understanding of the physics involved in riding a bike.

Can you show an example of bike riding that I will find unintelligible? — wonderer1

When I say the word ‘bike’ you already have a system of practices in mind, involving use of pedals, steering, balance, etc. Of course, your idea of bike doesn’t have to include all of those. Your bike may be electric and not have pedals, it may have three wheels and not require balance. But your practical understanding of bike will probably be general enough that you can participate with no problem in a language game in which criteria of successful bike-riding can be agreed on. But what if you live in a place where the language game ‘bike’ involved an entirely different system of relations, where bikes were flying, floating or digging devices? For you, someone justifying they know how to ride a bike by pedaling something with wheels on a street would be unintelligible as bike-riding.

Wittgenstein would have us use "know" only in situations where there is an explicit justification that can be given, in the form of a proposition, for the belief in question. — Banno

Let's look at a few examples:

3. If e.g. someone says "I don't know if there's a hand here" he might be told "Look closer". - This possibility of satisfying oneself is part of the language-game. Is one of its essential features.

What is the propositional justification? As I read it, he intends the opposite. Looking and seeing does not require propositional justification. But, of course, as he knows, "look closer" does not satisfy the skeptic who questions the existence of what is seen.

7. My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. - I tell a friend e.g. "Take that chair over there", "Shut the door", etc. etc.

Sit. Open the door. It is in such cases a matter of acting and doing not of saying. We know how to sit or open doors, but knowing that there is a chair or door in not a matter of knowing how. Justification does not even enter the picture.

90. "I know" has a primitive meaning similar to and related to "I see" ("wissen", "videre"). And "I
knew he was in the room, but he wasn't in the room" is like "I saw him in the room, but he wasn't
there". "I know" is supposed to express a relation, not between me and the sense of a proposition
(like "I believe") but between me and a fact.

This is related to 3: "look closer".

The passage continues:

So that the fact is taken into my consciousness. (Here is the reason why one wants to say that nothing that goes on in the outer world is really known, but only what happens in the domain of what are called sense-data.) This would give us a picture of knowing as the perception of an outer event through visual rays which project it as it is into the eye and the consciousness. Only then the question at once arises whether one can be certain of this projection. And this picture does indeed show how our imagination presents knowledge, but not what lies at the bottom of this presentation.

This is the source of modern skepticism. What Descartes calls the problem of judgment.

20. "Doubting the existence of the external world" does not mean for example doubting the
existence of a planet, which later observations proved to exist.

This is what Moore misses. If one doubts the existence of the external world then one would doubt the existence of something in that world - a planet or a hand. A theory of perception inserts itself" between me and a fact", leading to doubt and the demand for justification

"At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded (OC 251, 252, and 253)."

Again, these endpoints seem to be foundational. — Sam26

Anti-foundational foundations?

What is the propositional justification? As I read it, he intends the opposite. — Fooloso4

You are arguing that Wittgenstein does not think knowing requires propositional justification?

Well, you and I differ substantively on our readings. I don't see, then, how you can make sense of §10; nor of much that comes after, for a hundred or so pages. Wittgenstein argues that Moore is misusing "know" and should instead have said he certain that this is a hand. Hence the book's title.

I'll leave you to your variant.

Anti-foundational foundations? — Fooloso4

Yes, if what you mean by anti-foundationalism, is traditional foundationalism. His presentation of a foundation is nothing like traditional foundationalism. It's a different way of thinking about the foundation. It's outside epistemological constructs, i.e., it supports and gives life to epistemology.

I'm not too sure how to unpack your claims here.

So supose we have a culture in which "certain performances... might be performed in an entirely different way... to produce entirely different meanings".

On what grounds could you then claim that this culture was playing chess?

Supose the rules they follow are phrased in terms of - I don't know, it's your argument - river gods against mountain gods or some such. If what they do is equivalent to a game of chess, then their rules are functionally equivalent to the rules of chess - a translation.

And if they differ so substantively that the actions performed are not equivalent to a game of chess, then you have no grounds to claim they are playing chess...

Same with your answer to ; if their "bike" is used to dig holes, then the equivalence of the name "bike" is incidental; your claim that the digger is a bike is groundless.

So I've been unable to make much of your post.

You are arguing that Wittgenstein does not think knowing requires propositional justification? — Banno

Do the examples cited require propositional justification? If so, what is it?

His presentation of a foundation is nothing like traditional foundationalism. — Sam26

I agree, but when he says, as you quoted:

At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded .

It is analogues to the axis of our propositions at 152:

152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that
anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

and:

248: 'I have arrived at the rock-bottom of my convictions. And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house.

But, of course, as he knew quite well, a house does not support its foundation. The point is, there are no indubitable foundations.

305. Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory.

Just as there is no fixed point from which we can observe the motion of the universe, there is no fixed foundation for our knowing.

You are arguing that Wittgenstein does not think knowing requires propositional justification? — Banno

Just as there is no fixed point from which we can observe the motion of the universe, there is no fixed foundation for our knowing. — Fooloso4

There is no fixed point, but there are fixed points within given contexts. You seem to add things not part of what I'm contending.