I don't see this as a problem so much as a part of the answer: it's not that some propositions are always hinges, but that in order to play a language game we must set aside doubt for some propositions.The problem is that what's basic in one context is not in another. — Sam26
Well, this results in pages and pages about philosophical constructs such as the thing-in-itself... silence is much preferable. But it's not the silence of the Zen master, it's the silence of doing things.1) One can reasonably talk about the conditions for knowledge and experience and things prior to language, using language to describe them (Kant may represent this approach.. one done by many philosophers) — schopenhauer1
Sure. The first step here is the one given above - that not doubting is something we do, not something we uncover.2) Witt's notion: at some point language games cannot exist without certain "hinge" beliefs. Yet we can explore where hinge beliefs originate to some degree, even using empirical methods (developmental psychology and such). — schopenhauer1
They are foundational in regard to what we do with them. Their meaning is their use in a language agme. — Banno
One justifies that one knows how to ride a bike by getting on the bike and riding it. One justifies that one understands "here is a hand" by waving one's hand about. They agree that the "meanings" of words are seen in what we do with them, not in an explication. — Banno
If you and I are making use of different language games, then performances like riding a bike , playing chess or waving my hand which appear justified to me will not to you. — Joshs
t seems to me that there is an important distinction between riding a bike and playing chess. I don't need to know anything about another person's language game to understand that a person confidently riding a bike has developed (at least) some intuitive understanding of the physics involved in riding a bike.
Can you show an example of bike riding that I will find unintelligible? — wonderer1
Wittgenstein would have us use "know" only in situations where there is an explicit justification that can be given, in the form of a proposition, for the belief in question. — Banno
3. If e.g. someone says "I don't know if there's a hand here" he might be told "Look closer". - This possibility of satisfying oneself is part of the language-game. Is one of its essential features.
7. My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. - I tell a friend e.g. "Take that chair over there", "Shut the door", etc. etc.
90. "I know" has a primitive meaning similar to and related to "I see" ("wissen", "videre"). And "I
knew he was in the room, but he wasn't in the room" is like "I saw him in the room, but he wasn't
there". "I know" is supposed to express a relation, not between me and the sense of a proposition
(like "I believe") but between me and a fact.
So that the fact is taken into my consciousness. (Here is the reason why one wants to say that nothing that goes on in the outer world is really known, but only what happens in the domain of what are called sense-data.) This would give us a picture of knowing as the perception of an outer event through visual rays which project it as it is into the eye and the consciousness. Only then the question at once arises whether one can be certain of this projection. And this picture does indeed show how our imagination presents knowledge, but not what lies at the bottom of this presentation.
20. "Doubting the existence of the external world" does not mean for example doubting the
existence of a planet, which later observations proved to exist.
You are arguing that Wittgenstein does not think knowing requires propositional justification?What is the propositional justification? As I read it, he intends the opposite. — Fooloso4
Anti-foundational foundations? — Fooloso4
You are arguing that Wittgenstein does not think knowing requires propositional justification? — Banno
His presentation of a foundation is nothing like traditional foundationalism. — Sam26
At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded .
152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that
anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.
248: 'I have arrived at the rock-bottom of my convictions. And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house.
305. Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory.
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