No, the goodness and badness of an action are determined by the extent to which that action protects persons' ability to understand and make their own choices/violates persons' ability to understand and make their own choices. It isn't that only your those choices that belong to you can be good. In fact, they mostly can't since whatever choice one makes that concerns only those things that belong to them, it will presumably be permissible. It is the protection/violation of the ability to understand and make these choices that determines whether an action is good or bad.

You're still not making any sense. Let's assume that there is a whole lot of people, and each one has the capacity to make one's own choices, and so we value each such capacity as one. The capacity to make a choice which does not belong to the person is given a value of zero. Doesn't this imply that making a choice which does not belong to you, has no value? The capacity to make such a choice is not at all something to be protected, it has no value.

Now, you say that making a choice which does not belong to you can be good. How do you value this designation of "good"? It cannot be that it is valuable because it protects the capacity of others to make their own choices, because no matter how many things with the value of one that you add up, it still cannot remove the value of zero from the choice which does not belong to the person. So you base that value of good in some supposedly objective moral principles.

This is why Amadeus and I have both told you that you have two distinct value scales. And I believe that the two are incompatible. The primary scale of value, as stated by you, is the value of one's ability to make one's own choices. The secondary scale of value is the scale which we assign to choices that do not belong to the person. This is the scale of good and bad, and it's based on moral principles.

If the secondary scale, the one that applies to choices which do not belong to the person, is the one for good and bad, then what is the primary scale based in? What is the reason for protecting one's capacity to make one's own choices? "Good choices" are in the category of choices which do not belong to the person, so how is there any reason to protect choices which do belong to the person? Do you see what I mean? There appears to be no reason why the capacity to make one's own choices ought to be protected. This appears to be just an arbitrary designation by you. You could have chosen the capacity to eat, or the capacity to breathe, or to walk, or to sleep, or to grow, etc.. Why choose "the ability to understand and make their own choices" as the thing which needs to be protected. What value system do you apply, to give this type of activity the highest position?

There isn't two scales or value systems. The thing which makes any action good or bad is the extent to which is protects or violates the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices.

If you add one to zero, you don't get zero. You get one. Similarly, something not having intrinsic value doesn't negate the value it produces through its consequences somehow. The value of the action is in the consequences it produces (consequences which protect or violate the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. The choice being made doesn't need to be valuable for it's own sake in order to be good. It's good because it produces good consequences.

I'm happy to answer why this is the best measure of moral value (though I think it is covered in the primer), but I'd like to make sure we have pinned down the misunderstanding you seem to be having with the measure of value first.

There isn't two scales or value systems. The thing which makes any action good or bad is the extent to which is protects or violates the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices.

...

I'm happy to answer why this is the best measure of moral value (though I think it is covered in the primer), but I'd like to make sure we have pinned down the misunderstanding you seem to be having with the measure of value first. — Dan

Take this principle, "the extent to which it protects or violates the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". We have to justify it by saying why understanding and making there own choices is something which ought to be protected. This means that we need to place that principle "the ability to understand and make their own choices" in relation to other potential first principles, and scale it as the most valuable, in order to justify it as "the best measure of moral value".

Now the problem is that "the good acts", which are acts that protect another's or a multitude of others' ability to make their own choices, are not derived from a person's own choices. Since these good acts are ones which come from choices which are not one's own choices, it appears like this is contrary to the chosen principle, that protecting the ability to make their own choices is "the best measure of moral value".

So this is the way that it looks to me. You have two distinct types of choices, those which are one's own, and those which are not. The two produce a dichotomy. There is a scale for evaluating the one type, those which are not, as to bad or good. That scale is based in the assumption that the other type is valuable. The problem is that the two are dichotomous, "one's own", and "not one's own". And, since the primary category labeled "one's own" is the basis for scaling the acts of the other category as to bad or good, then no matter how good an act which is not one's own gets on the scale, it can never reach the level of one's own act. We will always have to say that one's own choice will trump any moral value of good or bad, assigned to an act which is not one's own.

The important thing to acknowledge is that there is a dichotomy produced by the principle "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". This principle turns making one's own choices into an ideal, in relation to the other category which is judged for good and bad. "One's own choices" is the highest goal, a sort of perfection, and it is set off from the other choices which are not one's own, in a special ideal category, as distinct, and incompatible with, the other choices, not one's own, which are judged for degrees of goodness.

It is my opinion, that you need to dissolve this dichotomy. The principle which sets the high (good) or low (bad) of the scale needs to relate to something within the scale, instead of something which the scale cannot provide for, because the dichotomy. For example, in a temperature scale, the boiling point of water, the freezing point of water, are "ideals" which the scale is modeled on, but they relate to points within the scale. So for instance, suppose we class all free choices together, including one's own and not one's own, in one class, as free choices, and scale them as to bad or good. Notice, we cannot say that as the choices get closer and closer to being totally one's own, they get better and better. This indicates that "the ability to make their own choices" is not an acceptable principle to scale good and bad. It is not a valid ideal. Therefore, I can conclude that you have arbitrarily placed that principle as an ideal, and the dichotomy which it creates between the acts which fulfill the criteria of that principle, and the acts which are judged for goodness, are incompatible. And, unless you dissolve this dichotomy you will always have inconsistency in your ethics.

One's own choices often aren't really good or bad. If I choose to key my own car, that isn't good or bad, it just is. These choices certainly aren't "the ideal". What is important is the ABILITY of persons to understand and make their own choices. Their freedom. That is what needs protecting. Since most choices of my own choices don't protect that freedom or violate it, they are generally fairly neutral actions.

Again, I'm very happy to discuss why I think the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is the best measure of value we have available, but I really want to make sure you have understood what that is first. I don't want to move on if we are just going to be back here in a few posts time with you suggesting that I can't call choices that don't belong to the person making them good or something similar. That is not an implication of anything I have said, and it is not my position. Those words don't belong in my mouth, and I'll thank you to stop trying to put them in there.

One's own choices often aren't really good or bad. If I choose to key my own car, that isn't good or bad, it just is. These choices certainly aren't "the ideal". What is important is the ABILITY of persons to understand and make their own choices. Their freedom. That is what needs protecting. Since most choices of my own choices don't protect that freedom or violate it, they are generally fairly neutral actions. — Dan

If such choices, "one's own" are generally not good choices, then why seek to protect that ability. I think it's incorrect to say that these choices are not the ideal, according to your principles. If protecting the ability to make such choices is the standard whereby other choices are judged as good or bad, than this type of choice is named as the ideal choice, the one which all others are measured against in relation to their capacity to enable that type. If this wasn't the case, then you could simply posit as your principle, "to protect the ability to make good choices". But you didn't propose "good choices" as your ideal, you proposed "choices which are one's own". So you talk about protecting the ability to make that type of choice, rather than the ability to make good choices

This is where the inconsistency lies hidden. You want to protect freedom, because you think that it has some value. However, freedom allows for both good and bad acts, and what you really want out of personal freedom is good acts. So valuing freedom is inherently inconsistent with valuing good acts because freedom allows bad acts As a sort of compromise to "freedom" you posit a "type of freedom", which is the freedom to make one's own choices. This is a type of choice which is generally neutral, removed from good and bad. But, like I already explained, this is not a type of freedom at all.

It's a highly compromised, restricted sense of "freedom", specifically formulated so as to make it appear like there is a type of freedom, which the protection of, would be consistent with the desire for good acts. In other words, if true freedom was what your principle sought to protect, this would not be consistent with cultivating good acts, because freedom allows for bad acts. So you posit a false freedom, the freedom to make one's own choices, which is not any type of freedom at all, because it consists of a very restricted, narrow and limited, range of choices. Then you state that one's own choices are neutral choices, to ensure that protecting one's own choices would not result in bad choices, in which case this ability ought not be protected. Therefore you end up with an extremely contrived sense of "freedom" which you are seeking to protect, the freedom to make choices which are neither bad nor good, i.e. choices which are morally irrelevant.

To support your enterprise, you need to produce some solid principles as to why the ability to make morally neutral choices ought to be protected at all. And, if this is supposed to be a form of freedom, what kind of freedom is it really. Is it the freedom from moral principles? If we all made only this type of choice, then we wouldn't have to concern ourselves with good or bad anymore. Is this the ideal?

Again, I'm very happy to discuss why I think the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is the best measure of value we have available, but I really want to make sure you have understood what that is first. — Dan

Go right ahead, I really want to know how you justify what I believe to be a false freedom. This is what it's all about. You have specifically designed what you call a "type of freedom", the freedom to make choices which belong to oneself, in an effort to make the value of "freedom" consistent with the value of morality. Now I would like to see you justify the value which you assign to this "type of freedom"

If protecting the ability to make such choices is the standard whereby other choices are judged as good or bad, than this type of choice is named as the ideal choice, the one which all others are measured against in relation to their capacity to enable that type

No it isn't. The whole idea of these choices being "the ideal type" is an invention of yours. It is not reflected in anything I have said. I suggest that you are interpreting all of this through the wrong lens.

This is where the inconsistency lies hidden. You want to protect freedom, because you think that it has some value. However, freedom allows for both good and bad acts, and what you really want out of personal freedom is good acts. So valuing freedom is inherently inconsistent with valuing good acts because freedom allows bad acts As a sort of compromise to "freedom" you posit a "type of freedom", which is the freedom to make one's own choices. This is a type of choice which is generally neutral, removed from good and bad. But, like I already explained, this is not a type of freedom at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are ascribing motives to me which I do not have.

It's a highly compromised, restricted sense of "freedom", specifically formulated so as to make it appear like there is a type of freedom, which the protection of, would be consistent with the desire for good acts. In other words, if true freedom was what your principle sought to protect, this would not be consistent with cultivating good acts, because freedom allows for bad acts. So you posit a false freedom, the freedom to make one's own choices, which is not any type of freedom at all, because it consists of a very restricted, narrow and limited, range of choices

It is a type of freedom consistent with all moral agents having the same freedom, which is surely the type that we should want in a consequentialist moral theory.

Then you state that one's own choices are neutral choices, to ensure that protecting one's own choices would not result in bad choices, in which case this ability ought not be protected. Therefore you end up with an extremely contrived sense of "freedom" which you are seeking to protect, the freedom to make choices which are neither bad nor good, i.e. choices which are morally irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

They are neither good nor bad because they are your choices to make, and the only good or bad choices are those that take that same freedom away from others or protect it.

And, if this is supposed to be a form of freedom, what kind of freedom is it really. Is it the freedom from moral principles? If we all made only this type of choice, then we wouldn't have to concern ourselves with good or bad anymore. Is this the ideal? — Metaphysician Undercover

It is the freedom to understand and make your own choices. Not the freedom from moral principles, the freedom from things that would prevent you being able to understand and make your own choices. Also you seem to be trying to find some buried ideal, but I think I have explained the moral philosophy fairly clearly. There isn't a hidden value under the hood.

You have specifically designed what you call a "type of freedom", the freedom to make choices which belong to oneself, in an effort to make the value of "freedom" consistent with the value of morality. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know what you mean with the value of morality. This is what I am suggesting has moral value.

Now I would like to see you justify the value which you assign to this "type of freedom" — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, I'm happy to, but I'm not moving off of this topic while you are still misunderstanding the measure of value under discussion. If you don't understand the measure of value, then I think any conversation about why it is our best candidate for a measure of value is likely to be doomed from the off.

The whole idea of these choices being "the ideal type" is an invention of yours. It is not reflected in anything I have said. — Dan

You said:

The thing which makes any action good or bad is the extent to which is protects or violates the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. — Dan

If you cannot understand that this means that this type of choice ("their own choices") is the ideal in relation to what makes any action bad or good, then I don't know what else to say.

Again, I'm happy to, but I'm not moving off of this topic while you are still misunderstanding the measure of value under discussion. If you don't understand the measure of value, then I think any conversation about why it is our best candidate for a measure of value is likely to be doomed from the off. — Dan

I'm afraid it's you who is having difficulty understanding "the measure of value under discussion". The principle by which value is scaled is "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". This implies that "ones own choices" is the ideal which the scale for valuation, is modeled on. You very clearly said that the extent to which the ability to make their own choices is protected or violated is the thing which makes an action bad or good. "The thing" here refers to an ideal, the ability to make their own choices. Therefore their own choices is an ideal.

Freedom is relative and an attribute of an entity with agency. So there is no solution to the problem, but rather a series of compromised solutions dependent on the nature of the entity/s concerned.

Good luck trying to get Dan to understand that. He seems to think that by representing "relative to the agent" as "types of freedom", he can get around that issue. So he ends up with types of restrictions, and then proceeds with a compromised "freedom". I' am now trying to show him that even with his compromised sense of freedom, the problem still cannot be resolved because the compromised freedom cannot be justified as something valuable.

The ability to make those choices is the measure of value that determines whether actions are right or wrong. That isn't the same as those being the "ideal choices". Is it possible I am misunderstanding how you are using the word "ideal"? I took you to mean that you thought that one's own choices were morally the best, though this is unlikely to be the cases as they don't, by themselves, often protect or violate one's ability to make one's own choices. If you meant that they were "an ideal" in the sense that they were a principle or a concept to be strived for, then I think that is probably also wrong, but perhaps less so.

Think of it this way. The ability to understand and make choices constitutes use of our rationality and our free will, which are the things that make us moral agents in the first place. It is the ability to put these things to use which I am suggesting is valuable, and I am restricting this to only over those choices that belong to us rather than those that do not on the principles that this allows for morality to be appropriately action-guiding, not result in constant conflict, and align with our intuitions somewhat. I am not having any difficultly understanding the measure of value under discussion.

Also, as to your post replying to Punshhh: Are you suggesting that the freedom to do absolutely anything is valuable? Your freedom to, for example, torture a child to death? Not just to make the choice to, but to actually do so without the police stopping you? I do not agree. Am I wrong in how I am reading this? Are you in saying that no kind of freedom can be valuable perhaps? Or just that freedom to make certain choices cannot be valuable but not making any further claims? What exactly are you suggesting here?

I'm not sure what you mean by relative in this context. Relative to what?

Also, I'm not sure I'd describe freedom as an attribute. It's not necessarily wrong, it's just... not terribly precise. I would say that "freedom," as I'm using it, refers to the ability to persons to understand and make their own decisions. So yes, certainly something that belongs to an entity with agency. But I'm not sure why you think that means there can't be a solution. Could you fill me in on the reasoning from one to the other?

By relative, I mean not universal, but something happening in entities. Each species of entity is different, so the result of the inquiry will be different.
Also without knowing the goal, or purpose of humanity as an example of an entity, the consequentialism can’t be established. (I accept that in an isolated case, or circumstance, one could establish something that could be described as freedom)

Do we know the “role”, or “goal”, or “purpose” of humanity in the wider universe?

Are you assuming that morality aims at humanity's goal, role, purpose, or telos generally? Or are you assuming that consequentialism requires the starting assumption that utilitarians make that we humanity aims at a goal and that goal has moral value? I would reject both of these assumptions. Further, I would say that morality is about how persons ought to be or act, not just humans, so it should encompass all possible persons/moral agents.


It would certainly be true that different entities would value choices differently and could plausibly own slightly different choices (a species with two bodies for example), but the ability to understand and make choices is really just the ability to use one's free will and rationality, which are both necessary conditions for moral agency. So this measure of value does only happen in some entities, but it happens (or can happen when it isn't being violated/restricted) in all and only all entities that are moral agents, so I'm not sure that is really a problem.

What I mean by "ideal", is a thing upon which a standard is based. For example in the temperature scale, the freezing point and boiling point of water, serve as ideals

The issue I am trying to point out to you, is that in scales like temperature, the ideals have a position within the scale, so that the scale is properly related to the ideal. In the case of your moral principle, the scale, good and bad is related to choices which are not one's own, but the ideal (the thing which serves as the standard of measurement) is choices which are one's own. So the ideal is outside of, and not properly related to the scale.

Now, you assign a value to the ideal, as that which ought to be protected, but this value is extrinsic to the values expressed by good and bad, and the value is not within the scale. So, unlike the scale of temperature, where the ideals are values within the scale, and other values are related, the value assigned to "the ability to make one's own choices" is not part of the scale of bad and good. Therefore you need to refer to another type of value, other than moral value (bad and good), to justify that this is something which ought to be protected, i.e., has value.

Also, as to your post replying to Punshhh: Are you suggesting that the freedom to do absolutely anything is valuable? Your freedom to, for example, torture a child to death? — Dan

The freedom to be evil, is equally the freedom to be good. That's the nature of free choice. So the freedom to torture a child to death, is the very same freedom as the freedom to save a child from being tortured. That's the point with free choice, it is the ability to choose freely from a vast variety of possibilities. Plato said that the man who is capable of doing the most evil is also capable of doing the most good. So when we look at knowledge as power, it can be used for bad or good. These are not distinct types of knowledge, the same knowledge might be put toward good actions, or it might be put toward bad actions. Likewise with "freedom". The same freedom allows a person to be good or to be bad.

In your temperature analogy, the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is not like the boiling point of water or the freezing point of water. It would be more like the average amount of kinetic motion per atom (not a perfect analogy here, but certainly closer). Which is to say, it's the thing we are using as the measure of value.

To your second point, that doesn't answer my question. Is you issue that your don't think freedom can be valuable because you don't think it is coherent to talk about being free to do something but not free to do something else?

I see now that I was misreading your OP. I was thinking about freedom, rather than morality. Morality is about social behaviour within a species. Whereas freedom is about autonomy within the restraints of the environment of a species/entity.

Presumably you are talking about freedoms within moral frameworks. So this is a discussion about morality, not freedom?

In your temperature analogy, the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is not like the boiling point of water or the freezing point of water. — Dan

Yes, that is the point I am making, the two are dissimilar, because in the case of your ethical example, the ideal is not something which relates to the scale.

It would be more like the average amount of kinetic motion per atom (not a perfect analogy here, but certainly closer). Which is to say, it's the thing we are using as the measure of value. — Dan

OK, so you are saying that the things to be judged (in this case choices), have a specific property, and we can measure the quantity of that property. The specified property is "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". So, it appears like what you are saying is that we must look at choices made by people, and evaluate these choices as to the quantity of this property which they display.

The problem which I've been trying to bring your attention to, is that the choices being judged, or evaluated, are explicitly not "their own choices". So you are asking to evaluate choices for a property which they have been stated as not having. We cannot get anywhere like this.

Therefore, you need to propose a different way that the ideal, "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices", is related to the things being judged. But as I pointed out already, the two are dichotomous. The things being judged are "choices which are not their own". So you'll find, that the two are only related as opposing ends of the scale, like hot and cold.

To your second point, that doesn't answer my question. Is you issue that your don't think freedom can be valuable because you don't think it is coherent to talk about being free to do something but not free to do something else? — Dan

I'm saying that it is not coherent to say that a person is free to choose X, but not free to not choose X. Further, I am saying that if freedom is supposed to be valuable, some reasons must be given which respect this fact, that freedom means both, the possibility that X will be chosen, and also that X will not be chosen. That is to say that if you want to assign moral value to freedom, you must respect the fact that freedom provides the possibility of bad acts, just as much as good acts. So if we say X represents something which is good, freedom allows for the possibility of bad. Because of this it is impossible to say that "freedom" is valuable, from the perspective of "value" assigned by a system of morality. That's why I suggested earlier, that "freedom" must transcend the moral system, as something taken for granted, which makes the moral system both possible and necessary (in the sense of needed).

I would say that morality is about how persons ought to be or act in a universal and objective sense, though I would concede that if you wanted to use "ethics" to refer to that and "morality" to refer to the norms and codes that exist, that would be fine too. This is very much a discussion about my attempts to discover the correct moral theory and solve the problem of how to weigh persons' freedom to make different decisions against one another.

No, I would say that we should judge the morality of choices by reference to their consequences and that the measure of goodness/badness of those consequences is how ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is protected/violated. I feel like I've said this many times, and you are still attempting to interpret what I'm saying to mean anything other than what I am saying.

It sounds like you are saying that it is not coherent to say that a person is free to choose X but not free to choose Y. Or free to do what you like with X (in this case, your own mind, body and property) but not with Y (other people's).

Maybe it would help me if you told me what you think it is I am claiming as simply as possible. Then maybe we can get to the bottom of where this misunderstanding is coming from.

No, I would say that we should judge the morality of choices by reference to their consequences and that the measure of goodness/badness of those consequences is how ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is protected/violated. I feel like I've said this many times, and you are still attempting to interpret what I'm saying to mean anything other than what I am saying. — Dan

Ok, so we're back to where we were a few posts ago. The goodness or badness of an intentional act is judged according to how the "ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is protected/violated" by that act. Now I will ask again, the question you refused to answer. Why do you believe that the moral value of all intentional acts can be based int this principle, "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices", when you have explicitly said that good acts come from choices which are not one's own choices? How do you justify the value of this type of choice, "one's own choice", when this is not even the type of choice which produces good acts?

It sounds like you are saying that it is not coherent to say that a person is free to choose X but not free to choose Y. Or free to do what you like with X (in this case, your own mind, body and property) but not with Y (other people's). — Dan

As I said, the issue is that freedom to choose X is also freedom to not choose X, or to choose not X. If a person is free to do something, then the person is also free not to do that. If X signifies a good act, and good implies moral value, then it is incoherent to say that there is moral value in freedom. Good and not good are equally the consequences of freedom.

Maybe it would help me if you told me what you think it is I am claiming as simply as possible. Then maybe we can get to the bottom of where this misunderstanding is coming from. — Dan

That's what I'm doing, trying to understand what you are claiming. I indicated a long time ago, that your entire system makes very little sense to me. To begin with, I could not at all understand how you used "freedom", and "types of freedom". When I got beyond that, I found the key to understanding the entire system was in your principle "one's own choices", or choices which belong to the person, Now that I am beginning to understand, I am beginning to see the reasons for your strange representation of "freedom". I've come a long way, but I still cannot tell you what I think you are claiming. I think I need to know why you place such high value on "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". To me, this is not valuing freedom at all, because freedom is equally the ability to make choices which are not one's own.

As I have said, I am happy to answer why I think that is the best candidate for moral value, but I would like to ensure we are on the same page first and that you understand what I am claiming before I explain why I am claiming it. As for "How do you justify the value of this type of choice, "one's own choice", when this is not even the type of choice which produces good acts?" That is simpler to answer - that is a complete non-sequitur. The fact that these choices are not the ones which are often not the ones which are morally praiseworthy has nothing to do with whether it is a good measure of value. Just like choices don't need to be enjoyable ones in order for the utilitarian to think they morally good, choices don't need to be our own in order for the freedom consequentialist to say the same.

I would agree that the freedom to choose X includes the freedom not to choose X, but that isn't an issue here because that is entirely consistent with the idea that only freedom over those things which belong to a person ought to be protected. The freedom to speak includes the freedom to stay silent, the freedom to live includes the freedom to die, etc.

Again, you seem to be getting worried about the word "freedom." Feel free to just say "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices" if you prefer, as that is what I mean by "freedom" here.

The fact that these choices are not the ones which are often not the ones which are morally praiseworthy has nothing to do with whether it is a good measure of value. — Dan

You need to justify this. We are talking about moral value here, moral praiseworthiness. If these choices are not necessarily morally praiseworthy, then what makes the ability to make them a "good" measure of value? See, "good" here must have a meaning other than morally good, and this other meaning causes ambiguity and invites equivocation. This is what I mean when I say that your principles imply two distinct scales of value. One value system judges acts for moral praiseworthiness, and the other scale of value places the ability to make one's own choices" as "a good measure of value", therefore implying that which 'ought' to be protected. The latter, as the measure of value for the former, serves as the ideal for that scale.

The problem I apprehend is the issue of establishing compatibility, commensurability, between the two systems of value, the one which assigns moral value, and the other which assigns value to the ability to make one's own choice. You appear to have created a dichotomy between making one's own choices, the ability to do which, serves as the measure of moral value, and making morally good choices, which are inherently not one's own choices. Such a dichotomy would leave the two scales of value as incompatible.

I would agree that the freedom to choose X includes the freedom not to choose X, but that isn't an issue here because that is entirely consistent with the idea that only freedom over those things which belong to a person ought to be protected. — Dan

Sure, but we literally have no place to go from here. Making only choices which belong to the person would lock one into one's own self=created solipsist world of private property. As soon as we enter the public sphere, even just to open our mouths to speak, we have an effect on the property, or minds, of others. Therefore the freedom to make one's own choices is not any type of freedom at all, it refers to a severe restriction. Because of this restrictive nature of "making one's own choices", I don't see how it could ever be something valuable.

When we take into account the fact that anytime an intentional act has an effect on others then it is not properly called "one's own choice", there is significant doubt as to whether this type of choice has any value at all. So to give "freedom" any value we need to release the restrictions beyond that of the self-imposed solipsism of "making one's own choices". However, when we move into the public sphere of making choices which affect others, we need to respect the fact that the freedom to make a good choice is also the freedom to make a bad choice. The freedom to say something good is also the freedom to say something bad. The freedom to take what is necessary for my subsistence may be the freedom to rob you of what is necessary for your subsistence. Consequently, the inability to assign value to "freedom" is extended accordingly.

A good candidate for a measure of value is one that is likely to be correct. In order to consider what is most likely to be correct, we make some assumptions, or theory selection criteria. For example, utilitarianism selects happiness based on the assumption that whatever humans pursue for themselves they should also pursue for others based on the additional assumptions that not doing so would be irrationally making an exception of yourself and doing that would be immoral, and that humans all pursue their own happiness. As I've pointed out before, this doesn't mean that right choices have to make the person making them happy, just as my theory claiming that the measure of value we should use is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices means that right actions need to be one's own choices. There is no conflict here.

Moral value and praiseworthiness are very different things. When a tornado changes course and doesn't destroy someone's house, that is morally good, but the tornado isn't morally praiseworthy. When it comes to judging actions, it would be more accurate to say my theory judges them as right, rather than praiseworthy, since whether we should praise something is another action that we would need to evaluate the consequences of. I did in fact explain how to judge whether actions are right or wrong, permissible, impermissible, obligatory, or supererogatory in the primer you read.

I mean, there is a sense in which we affect others by like breathing air that touches their stuff, but it is reasonable to assume consent to this by them taking their stuff outside with all the people who need to breathe. And, as we have previously discussed, quite a lot of the things you think of as restricting someone's freedom just don't. For example when you say "When we take into account the fact that anytime an intentional act has an effect on others then it is not properly called "one's own choice"" this is just wrong. There are lots of intentional acts one could make that affect others but are entirely that person's own choice. If I beat you in a contest, I have affected you with my choices, and in ways you would presumably prefer I didn't, but I haven't restricted your ability to understand and make your own decisions. It wasn't your choice whether you won the contest or not, so my denying you that opportunity doesn't affect you in a morally relevant way. These restrictions you are worried about are of your own invention.

I don't know Dan, we're not making progress. In fact, what you write now, is making less and less sense to me.

A good candidate for a measure of value is one that is likely to be correct. In order to consider what is most likely to be correct, we make some assumptions, or theory selection criteria. — Dan

For instance, this appears to be totally backward to me. When you say "correct", wouldn't it be better to say "true"? The thing about correctness, is that it is theory dependent, so that "correct" is relative to the theory, therefore determined by the criteria set out by the theory. This leaves no principles for comparing one theory to another. So, your specific theory places "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices", as the principle which sets the criteria, but we still need a way to judge that principle. That is what I am asking you for. Justify that principle, give me the reason why it is the one you have chosen, why you think it is the best measure, the ideal. "True" implies corresponding with reality, and since you claim to believe in objective morality, then we ought to be able to look for some form of truth to serve as judgement for that principle. Can you tell me why you think it is true that "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices" makes a good candidate for a measure of value.

For example, utilitarianism selects happiness based on the assumption that whatever humans pursue for themselves they should also pursue for others based on the additional assumptions that not doing so would be irrationally making an exception of yourself and doing that would be immoral, and that humans all pursue their own happiness. As I've pointed out before, — Dan

The key aspect of this utilitarian principle is "the additional assumptions that not doing so would be irrationally making an exception of yourself". Happiness is a personal thing, just like making choices is a personal thing. That it is irrational to place one's own happiness as more important than that of another, is a principle which needs to be justified, just like a claim that it is irrational to place one's own choices as more important than the choices of another, would need to be justified. It seems to me that the opposite is really the case. Only I can do the things most required to make me happy, eat, sleep, etc., so I think it would be irrational to think that I should place other persons' happiness as just as important as mine, when another cannot give a person what is most required for happiness. If everyone had that attitude, that the happiness of others is just as important as one's own happiness, we'd end up with no one being happy, because no one would properly look after themselves, us all sinking into misery not be able to give oneself more than we are capable of giving to others. In reality (truth), happiness is a deeply personal thing. brought about by a person's relationship with oneself. It is not provided by others. And it is irrational not to make an exception of oneself.

When a tornado changes course and doesn't destroy someone's house, that is morally good, but the tornado isn't morally praiseworthy. — Dan

This makes no sense. Morality is associated exclusively with the intentional behaviour of human beings. It makes no sense to say that the behaviour of a tornado is "morally good". That's a terrible category mistake.

...but it is reasonable to assume consent to this.. — Dan

We haven't discussed "consent" at all. But, by your definition of what constitutes a choice which belongs to a person, consent from another would not suffice to convert a choice which is not one's own into one which is one's own.

There are lots of intentional acts one could make that affect others but are entirely that person's own choice. If I beat you in a contest, I have affected you with my choices, and in ways you would presumably prefer I didn't, but I haven't restricted your ability to understand and make your own decisions. — Dan

This is contrary to your definition of "one's own choice". You defined this as a choice concerning only what belongs to the person, one's mind, body, and property. A contest is something public, so choices concerning a contest are not one's own choices. Whether or not your choice restricts my ability to understand and make my own choices, is not an accurate indication as to whether or not your choice is your own choice. There are many choices which are not one's own choice, and so they have an effect on others, but the effect is not to restrict another's ability to make one's own choices.

I would say the correct moral theory is the one that's true. I was using "correct" to mean true. Happy to sub in the word "true" there if you prefer.

I think you're probably wrong about no one being happy if we all cared about our everyone's happiness, but I also am not making that assumption. I was merely using it as an example of an assumption that underlies a different moral theory.

To say the tornado acted in a morally good way would be a category mistake. To say the outcome, that of not having your house destroyed, is morally good, in the sense of having high moral value, is entirely sensible. To say that it was a morally good thing that happened that the tornado didn't destroy your house is also sensible.

We haven't discussed "consent" at all. But, by your definition of what constitutes a choice which belongs to a person, consent from another would not suffice to convert a choice which is not one's own into one which is one's own. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nor would it need to? I'm not sure what you are taking issue with here.

This is contrary to your definition of "one's own choice". You defined this as a choice concerning only what belongs to the person, one's mind, body, and property. A contest is something public, so choices concerning a contest are not one's own choices. Whether or not your choice restricts my ability to understand and make my own choices, is not an accurate indication as to whether or not your choice is your own choice. There are many choices which are not one's own choice, and so they have an effect on others, but the effect is not to restrict another's ability to make one's own choices. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure what you are saying here. You said that protecting only those choices that belong to a person means that any choice that affects others must be restricted. I am pointing out that this isn't the case and giving an example where this is clearly not the case.

To say the outcome, that of not having your house destroyed, is morally good, in the sense of having high moral value, is entirely sensible. — Dan

I disagree. The moral value is in the act itself. Consequentialism measures the act by the outcome, but it does not place the moral value in the results of the act. The outcome is judged as an indication of the intent. The tornado has no intent, there is no moral value in the outcome of its activities. The "good" in not having the house destroyed is a different sense of good, like "good fortune". This sense of "good" is judged by a scale other than a moral scale.

I'm not sure what you are saying here. You said that protecting only those choices that belong to a person means that any choice that affects others must be restricted. I am pointing out that this isn't the case and giving an example where this is clearly not the case. — Dan

We were not talking about restricting choices, we were talking about the type of choice, the ability to make which, deserves protection; one's own choices. I asked you why the ability to make these choices merits protection. If the choices concern only what belongs to the person, then what good are they? The tornado example is clearly not relevant. Also, in your other example, choices concerning a contest are not one's own choices, by your definition. A contest concerns others, so this means that the choices are not one's own, and that example is no good either.

I was objecting to this statement you made:

There are lots of intentional acts one could make that affect others but are entirely that person's own choice. — Dan

A person's own choice concerns only what belongs to that person, by your definition. Therefore when the choice effects others, like your example of the contest, the choice cannot be said to be one's own choice. So I am still waiting for you to justify this standard of moral value, your ideal, "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices".

The problem being, that "good", "right", and "correct", when used in the moral sense, are applied to actions which are generally not the result of one's own choices. These are the result of choices which intentionally affect others. This leaves us with the problem I have presented to you. Why does the ability to make this type of choice deserve to be protected? That they may be good in an accidental way, like the tornado's acts are, does not merit protection, because the acts would be just as likely to be accidentally bad. Isn't it a far better principle to protect intentionally good moral acts, than to protect the possibility of an accidentally good act? But then we must completely rid ourselves of the misleading idea that this is some sort of freedom which is being protected. This is really moral restraint through the application of restrictions.

I disagree. The moral value is in the act itself. Consequentialism measures the act by the outcome, but it does not place the moral value in the results of the act. The outcome is judged as an indication of the intent. The tornado has no intent, there is no moral value in the outcome of its activities. The "good" in not having the house destroyed is a different sense of good, like "good fortune". This sense of "good" is judged by a scale other than a moral scale. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it is a good outcome in the sense of a morally good outcome. One we should aim to acheive. If we could have turned the tornado, we should have. Consequentialism tends to derive the right (the morally right action to perform) from the good (the thing which has value), so while it isn't right that the tornado didn't destroy your house because that implies moral agency, it is good.

We were not talking about restricting choices, we were talking about the type of choice, the ability to make which, deserves protection; one's own choices. I asked you why the ability to make these choices merits protection. If the choices concern only what belongs to the person, then what good are they? The tornado example is clearly not relevant. Also, in your other example, choices concerning a contest are not one's own choices, by your definition. A contest concerns others, so this means that the choices are not one's own, and that example is no good either. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, I understand what you are taking issue with now, but you're just wrong. My choosing to enter those contests that will have me is a choice that belongs to me. There are a bunch of choices like this, such as choosing to have sexual intercourse with someone. The whole thing isn't one person's choice, but each person chooses to consent to such an act and this choice belongs to them. Entering contests is not much different. You don't get to choose to enter a contest that won't have you, but you can choose to sign up, to do your best to win, etc.

Again, my point with the contest analogy was that choices that belong to me (or you, or anyone) can indeed affect others, and that's not a problem. If I own a piece of art that I have on display, but one day decide to destroy it instead, that affects others, but it is still my choice to make. Your claim that choices that belong to a person can't affect others is just wrong from the off.

I mean, I think we are likely to get tied in knots with this since you still seem unclear on what I am saying, but fine, I'll say something about why the ability to understand and make our own choices is the best candidate for moral value. I'm not going to go over everything, but I'll give what I think is the best reason:

If we assume that morality applies to all free, rational agents, then it seems that what we want is a measure of moral value that applies to all free, rational agents. The ability to understand and make choices fits this bill, as it essentially the ability to exercise one's free will, rationality, and, in a sense, agency. If we don't include measures which make up part of this one (such as just being able to understand choices), then it is essentially the only measure of value which applies to all moral agents, possible as well as actual.

As for why it should be constrained to their own choices, rather than any choices, this is more of a modus tollens. If we considered all possible choices, then this would lead to constant moral conflict and may render the moral theory unable to be action-guiding. Given that that is rather that moral theories are for, where the ability to understand and make choices should be protected is limited to choices over things that a person owns, specifically their mind, their body, and their property.

There, that is why I think this is the best candidate for moral value: it applies to all moral agents and allows for morality to be action-guiding.

No, it is a good outcome in the sense of a morally good outcome. One we should aim to acheive. If we could have turned the tornado, we should have. — Dan

You are still not making any sense. If people intentionally turned the tornado, then that act could be judged as morally good or bad, perhaps based on the outcome of the act, or perhaps based on the intention, or a combination of both, depending on one's ethical principles. In my understanding of morality, what the tornado itself does, or the consequences of what it does, is never judged as morally bad or good. It appears like we may have an unsurpassable difference as to what "morality" implies. You allow that morality can be assigned to the consequences of the activities of inanimate things, whereas I believe that when inanimate things are judged to have caused good or bad outcomes this is a completely different sense of good and bad.

Okay, I understand what you are taking issue with now, but you're just wrong. My choosing to enter those contests that will have me is a choice that belongs to me. There are a bunch of choices like this, such as choosing to have sexual intercourse with someone. — Dan

OK, but now you need to go back and redefine "one's own choice", and the outcome of weeks of discussion has been to change your mind about what "one's own choice" means. You now allow that making a choice which belongs to a person can be a choice concerning the mind, body, or property of others. So what is left for "one's own choice", other than a choice which a person understands and makes. Then why is my choice to steal your car not my own choice? How does consent from you, that I may borrow your car, change the nature of my choice to use your car? They are both freely willed choices which I understand. Why does one belong to me, and the other does not? How do you now define "one's own choice", and what distinguishes it from a morally good choice? Why not just say that one's own choice is one which is morally acceptable?

Your claim that choices that belong to a person can't affect others is just wrong from the off. — Dan

That was your definition. A choice which belongs to a person is one which concerns only that person's mind, body or property. If you now allow that a choice which belongs to a person may also concern the mind, body, or property of others, then this means the decision to do anything is one's own choice. If I decide to steal your car, it's a choice which involves my own body and my own tools which I will use, and also your property. How is this fundamentally different from deciding to play a game with you, other than that it is morally bad, and against the law? Why not just say that a choice which belongs to a person is one which is morally acceptable?

I mean, I think we are likely to get tied in knots with this since you still seem unclear on what I am saying, but fine, I'll say something about why the ability to understand and make our own choices is the best candidate for moral value. I'm not going to go over everything, but I'll give what I think is the best reason: — Dan

Going by the new sense of "the ability to understand and make our own choices" which you have now presented me with, I will simplify this with "the ability to make choices", as all decisions to act now appear to be one's own choices. And I will assume that this is what you are arguing is the best candidate for moral value, the ability to make choices.

If we assume that morality applies to all free, rational agents, then it seems that what we want is a measure of moral value that applies to all free, rational agents. The ability to understand and make choices fits this bill, as it essentially the ability to exercise one's free will, rationality, and, in a sense, agency. If we don't include measures which make up part of this one (such as just being able to understand choices), then it is essentially the only measure of value which applies to all moral agents, possible as well as actual. — Dan

But how do we get moral value out of this? As I've been telling you, the freedom to choose is just as likely to produce bad acts as it is to produce good acts. You can say that the freedom to choose ought to be protected, but why, if it's just as likely to produce bad acts as good acts? It's like you are saying that the tornado ought to be free to go wherever it goes, and no one ought to attempt to interfere. So it misses this house and destroys that house, and it's all "good" because the principle is that it is best to allow it to wonder freely without restrictions. And if you want to apply restrictions to human choices, then you are not protecting freedom. And if you qualify "choices" with "one's own choices", such that it means nothing other than choices which are morally acceptable, then all you are preaching is moral restraint.

As for why it should be constrained to their own choices, rather than any choices, this is more of a modus tollens. If we considered all possible choices, then this would lead to constant moral conflict and may render the moral theory unable to be action-guiding. Given that that is rather that moral theories are for, where the ability to understand and make choices should be protected is limited to choices over things that a person owns, specifically their mind, their body, and their property. — Dan

Now you finally admit it. What you are arguing for is moral restraint, and this is not a matter of protecting freedom at all. What you really mean by "their own choices" is choices which are morally acceptable according to principles like "consent", and what you are arguing for is not freedom of choice, but restriction of choice according to some moral principles. Why don't you just accept that this is what your principles are all about, instead of trying to create the illusion that you are trying to produce principles for protecting freedom?

When judging the consequences of an action, you can say they are good or bad in a moral sense there something morally valuable being increased/decreased/promoted/protected/restricted/violated. The tornado wasn't "right" to turn away, but the outcome was good.

I haven't changed my mind at all. All of these choices are choices about what to do with the mind, body, and property of the person making them, not that of others. What you seem to be missing is that choices about what to do with one's own mind, body, and property can affect the interests of others without in any way restricting their ability to understand and make choices regarding their own minds, bodies, and property. This isn't a different definition. I have been saying the same thing the whole time, and it is the same thing you will find in the primer you read or sources referenced in it that explain this in greater depth.

That was not my definition, that was how you incorrectly interpretted my definition. The choice to steal a car isn't yours because the car isn't yours. The choice of what to do with my car is mine because the car is mine. The choice to play a game with me isn't per se yours, but the choice to agree to play a game with me, to play games with those who will play them with you, is yours because it is a choice of what to do with your own mind and body (maybe property depending on the game). If I don't want to play, like in the case of you taking my car, you don't get to make that choice for me. But if we are both choosing to participate in the game, we are both making choices about what we do with our own minds and bodies, and that's no problem.

Again, it's always been the same definition. You just seem to be having trouble grasping it. I feel like I've been pretty clear, so I must wonder if it is in some way intentional.

I am not "admitting" anything, let alone "finally" given that all of this was in the thesis that I referenced in the initial primer. What I am arguing for is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. That is limited in the sense that it only concerns persons' own choices, not all choices, but that isn't even slightly the same as "moral restraint". It is very much freedom.

You keep talking about which choices are morally acceptable as if that is something we can know in advance, but the whole of a normative theory is to determine what choices/actions are morally acceptable (and unacceptable, obligatory, supererogatory, etc). It is fair to say that choices which are not morally acceptable shouldn't be protected, but what determines whether a choice is morally acceptable is down to its effect on the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices.