Again, these aren't facts about anything, other than that time proceeds unidirectionally and we cannot change an act that already occurred. — AmadeusD
This is incoherent to me. Making a choice doesn't restrict one's freedom to choose in any sense other than that time moves in one direction. Freedom isn't in play. You already chose. There's no 'restriction'. It's plainly not open to you to make that same decision again. Restricting is both inadequate and inapt. The general fact that time moves in one direction restricts your choices to one's that operate in the same direction. But this isn't at all what you've tried to say.
I'm truly not understanding what lifting you think these ideas are doing? — AmadeusD
The choice is no longer extant to be made. It is in the past. There is no consideration of Freedom. You would not say that my not having gills restricts my freedom to breathe underwater. I am simply unable to do so. Freedom isn't relevant. The present case is the same, as far as I see it. — AmadeusD
I don't think that's a problem. I don't think we need to protect your freedom to go and stab people in the throat. In fact, I think we should restrict your ability to do that. That is very much a feature not a bug. — Dan
If you are with me so far, then we might take a step further to look at freedom itself, as something outside of, transcending, moral principles. That freedom truly transcends moral principles is evident from the fact that we can freely make choices with complete disrespect for any codes of ethics. However, because you are inclined to understand freedom as something which needs to be curtailed by moral restraint, I don't think you really want to consider freedom itself as something which ought to be protected. Notice, if we properly allow that freedom transcends moral principles, we cannot truthfully say that it ought or ought not be protected. Would you agree? — Metaphysician Undercover
Each of these disagreements has an affect on how we individually understand freedom and its restrictions. — Metaphysician Undercover
and I've explained how it is logically impossible to choose another option if the other option is not present to the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover
You deny the necessity of the cause/effect relationship within a habit, which I assert. — Metaphysician Undercover
you dismiss — Metaphysician Undercover
the self-evident is of the utmost importance, because it is used to form the base — Metaphysician Undercover
It is therefore the most interesting to "us". — Metaphysician Undercover
earlier part of the act, and a later part. — Metaphysician Undercover
and subject to "possibility"? — Metaphysician Undercover
but the future part exists as possibilities — Metaphysician Undercover
They claim a necessity here — Metaphysician Undercover
appear to have — Metaphysician Undercover
We call this causation, and this necessity allows us to make accurate predictions. — Metaphysician Undercover
is a restriction of some sort — Metaphysician Undercover
I see it as being the most important. — Metaphysician Undercover
restriction but not a restriction on one's freedom? — Metaphysician Undercover
in the middle of an act occurring — Metaphysician Undercover
Further, the past part, since it cannot be changed, serves as a restriction on what is possible in the future part. — Metaphysician Undercover
If something is impossible for a person to do, then the person's "freedom" is restricted accordingly. — Metaphysician Undercover
To choose is to do something — Metaphysician Undercover
Of course I would say that. — Metaphysician Undercover
So, I believe there is significant disagreement between you and I on what is meant by "freedom of choice". — Metaphysician Undercover
You seem to think that even though the past is fixed and cannot be changed, and it poses significant restrictions on us, these restrictions are simply impossibilities, and these impossibilities have no relevance to our freedom of choice. — Metaphysician Undercover
In other words, all the arguments which determinists make about the past having causal influence over us, you dismiss as irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not really clear on what you are trying to solve. You haven't shown at all that protecting the kind of freedom that I am discussing is incompatible with consequentialism and the kind of freedom you think is incompatible with consequentialism isn't the kind I'm trying to protect. I don't think there is a problem there. — Dan
Your conception of freedom is, in my view, plainly wrong. Impossibility has nothing to do with freedom. Freedom only obtains when choices are available ("could have done otherwise"). The passing of time negates this, as it is a metaphysical barrier to choice at all. Time does not restrict freedom. It prevents choice. If you do not have gills, the 'choice' to breathe underwater is not open to you. Freedom doesn't enter the discussion on my view. — AmadeusD
While I understand what you're saying here entirely, I don't think is a good point. If it's self-evident, stop labouring it. We're already in agreement. There's is no reason to invoke something we already agree with to support further assertions as they plainly cannot do so. This is my point. The passage of time is not an interesting factor in the assessment of Freedom. It is something in light of which we must consider Freedom. We have no choice. There is no discussion. It's not to do with with any denial - it is inapt. — AmadeusD
I can't really get on board with this. Technically I acknowledge it - there is a moment of time at the 'initiation' of an act, and then it;s 'completion' let's say. Noted. But, this does not, imo, make present anything knew. An act occurs in totality. You can't be half-way through an act and leave an act half-done. The entire act is carried out, regardless of the content and consequence. An act is whatever is done in a single action. And I would be extremely clear (at the very least for discussion purposes) that mental acts and physical acts need to be treated separately. — AmadeusD
No idea what this could refer to. An act is a total action. You can't be in the middle of it other than retrospection (because you can denote the exact time the act took to carry out - in the act, there is no such distinction of time - but this supports my view) is my view. — AmadeusD
No. The Freedom doesn't obtain. There is no Freedom to be restricted. Freedom requires that one could (in the case of restriction) otherwise have done so/done otherwise. When the option is empirically, metaphysically not open to you, invoking freedom is empty and meaningless.
I do not have my choice to breathe through gills restricted. I simply do not have freedom in that pursuit. It is not open to me. I could not possibly choose that option. Freedom (to do so) does not obtain, and cannot be restricted. — AmadeusD
No it plainly is not. To Choose is to adopt a mental disposition. — AmadeusD
I think it is pretty clear your version of Freedom is inapt, and unable to describe how humans actually choose and act in the real world. — AmadeusD
We "start" with a lot of different understandings of what people are free or should be free to do or be, and what they should be free from, and we make sense of that so we can have a sensible conversation. — Dan
Second, constraints and restrictions are not properly understood as only the properties of an agent's environment. — Dan
Third, there is absolutely not any requirement for constraints to be a part of the agent in order for them to have a type of freedom. — Dan
However, it may be a literature you could benefit from examining, because I think you are mistaken about the issues you are raising regarding types of freedom. — Dan
I'm not really sure what an "objective definition" would even be. The definitions of words are either explicitly stated within specific contexts (such as within a particular discipline, or even within a particular conversation) or they are determined by usage. — Dan
You keep getting caught on the idea that "freedom" must mean freedom from all restrictions to do anything. It certainly can mean that, but it's a word, it can mean lots of things. For example, when I talk about a free, rational agent, I don't mean an agent who has complete freedom, or even an agent who has much freedom at all. In that case "free" refers to the agent having free will, which is different from freedom (one doesn't lose any free will if they are chained up and kept in a box, but they certainly lose a lot of freedom). — Dan
Is the fact that the past can't be changed self-evident? Even if it were, what does that have to do with anything? — Dan
To "have" something doesn't just mean to have it as a property. I have a red car, but a red car isn't a property of me. Also, even if I have a property, then the conditions that allow me to have that property do not have to be inherent in me. For example, I might have the property of iridescence, but only under specific lighting. The lighting conditions would be a restriction on my having that property, but they aren't a part of me. — Dan
You keep getting caught on the idea that "freedom" must mean freedom from all restrictions to do anything. It certainly can mean that, but it's a word, it can mean lots of things. For example, when I talk about a free, rational agent, I don't mean an agent who has complete freedom, or even an agent who has much freedom at all. In that case "free" refers to the agent having free will, which is different from freedom (one doesn't lose any free will if they are chained up and kept in a box, but they certainly lose a lot of freedom). — Dan
This supposed contradiction seems to be predicated on you not allowing people to use words differently from how you want them to be used. — Dan
So long as people are being clear about what they mean, equivocation doesn't seem to come into it. I agree that freedom certainly has something to do with being unconstrained, but there are lots of types of freedom, lots of ways of being unconstrained from various things, that we might want to discuss. It seems that we could simply specify what we mean (which I have, numerous times) and then discuss whether that type of freedom is important or not, rather than getting hung up on linguistics. — Dan
No, in my examples, "free" can be used to two ways. To say that some agent is free to act in some way is using "free" to refer to the person having freedom to act in that way. To say that someone is a free, rational agent, is using "free" to mean that the agent has free will. By "freedom" I mean the ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices. I offered to use a different word, but you offered "moral constraint" which is so far divorced from how either of those words are used as to be completely inappropriate. — Dan
I have clearly defined how I am using the word "freedom" and why I am using that word rather than another. — Dan
You and I have a fundamental disagreement as to what "freedom" is — Metaphysician Undercover
freedom means unrestricted — Metaphysician Undercover
You are defining "freedom" as already restricted, and that is incoherent in relation to how we actually understand "freedom". — Metaphysician Undercover
Because of this fundamental disagreement about "freedom", I think the point is highly relevant to freedom, and you think it is not at all relevant. — Metaphysician Undercover
The problem here... — Metaphysician Undercover
Have you never found yourself in the middle of doing something? — Metaphysician Undercover
But this is contrary to experience, which demonstrates to us that acts take place at the present. — Metaphysician Undercover
Haha, you reject 'empirical fact' when I bring it up, with reference to Hume, now you employ it — Metaphysician Undercover
Freedom does not mean 'one could have done otherwise', it means 'one can do whatever one wants'. — Metaphysician Undercover
You say "I simply do not have freedom in that pursuit", and you pretend that this does not mean that your freedom is restrict in that respect. — Metaphysician Undercover
then what does it mean? — Metaphysician Undercover
Wouldn't you think that simply not having freedom in all those other pursuits constitutes a restriction to your freedom? The way you are using "freedom", like Dan, is simply incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover
I find that a joke, considering that the way you use "freedom" is simply incoherent. And, the fact that you refuse to recognize that acts are occurring at the present, instead of insisting that all acts are in the past. . — Metaphysician Undercover
Again, you seem to be defining "free" in a very strange way. It seems entirely reasonable for the police for example to say of someone "you are free to leave". It is clear what this means: there are not restrictions being placed on you leaving. It doesn't require that it also be true that the person is free to go to the moon. — Dan
What conflicts in the public sphere are you concerned about? — Dan
Having free will definitely doesn't mean being free of will. I had assumed that you were familar with the term "free will", but I will clarify it for you if you like. There are a lot of ways one might define free will, and I suspect there are those who think my definition is claiming too much, but I would say that to have free will is to be able to act in ways that are caused wholly be the agent, not determined by preceding events or scripted responses, and not in-principle predictable ahead of time. — Dan
The ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices is exactly how I use "freedom". I agree that I do only want to protect certain choices, specifically persons' own choices. The choices that belong to them. I am not being inconsistent at all. — Dan
So be it. Take care my friend :) I shall not engage this one further, I don't think. — AmadeusD
It was this that I was taking issue with. Hence pointing out that being free to act in some specific way is a perfectly sensible thing to say, and doesn't require freedom to act in all possible contrary ways or that freedom be completely unrestrained by anything. — Dan
I agree that there are... some cases where we might need to constrain what someone is saying. Generally threats, fraud, and incitement to violence. Quite a lot of other things, like just deception generally or hate speech, needs no constraint as it doesn't restrict others freedom. — Dan
Without getting back into why habits aren't restrictions on the will, I'm not really sure what kind of restrictions you are concerned about. A person's free will is not diminished by being locked in a cell, so being unable to change the past just doesn't seem like a concern. — Dan
An alternative way of thinking about the kind of freedom that freedom consequentialism seeks to protect is that it is plausibly the same thing protected by some rights theories. Would conceptualizing it as a consequentialism of rights help you? — Dan
No, I don't think deception is a restriction on free thinking... most of the time. As I've said, there are some cases where it is, such as fraud. But most of the time, no. And, for the same reason, education is not a restriction on freedom in the way you describe. Hate speech can indeed incite violence, and it is possible that in some circumstances there is an argument for restricting it, but it does not itself violate anyone's freedom, so restricting it is (if and when it is ever appropriate) a case of doing something bad to prevent something worse from happening. — Dan
I'm not totally sure what you are talking about regarding childhood, but I will attempt to answer what appears to be the core question. Specifically, I would quite happily say that there are all sorts of things that restrict a person's choices, their "freedom" if you like, but don't restrict the kind of freedom I have identified as morally relevant. For example, my lack of a private plane "restricts" my choice to take my private plane when traveling. But this isn't a choice that belongs to me, so the fact it is "restricted" in this way isn't morally relevant. — Dan
No, a right is not very different from freedom. I think, properly understood, rights are ultimately about the kind of freedom I have been discussing. To have a right to something is to have a choice of whether to do that thing, or what to do with that thing. For example, a right to life entails a right to die, a right to speak entails a right to stay silent. I'm very happy have any future discussions without the language of rights. — Dan
I should say now that doing so wouldn't quite be accurate, as I would say my theory aims to protect the thing at the core of rights theories, rather than rights themselves, and there is some baggage associated with rights that isn't applicable, such as rights being trumps and each right being kind of seperate from each other one, rather than a single underlying value as I would suggest. But, bearing that in mind, we can talk about freedom consequentialism as a consequentialism of rights from now on. — Dan
Being able to "understand' one's choices is a fairly low bar to clear, but it can be affected by deception in some cases. — Dan
I mean, I am not sure how to be more clear about this. I contend that a specific type of freedom should be protected, specfically that of persons over those choices that belong to them. — Dan
What you do or don't have in your possession isn't at issue, what matters is what belongs to you, what choices you (for lack of a better phrase) have a right to make. — Dan
(assuming that people have such a right) — Dan
I am not sure what you think I have reversed. — Dan
It is the freedom to make certain choices that I am advocating for, I don't think I have ever been less than clear about that. — Dan
If you wish to call the thing I am promoting schmeedom, then that's fine. — Dan
Also, to be clear, I'm not saying that people aren't allowed to make any choices that don't belong to them, simply that their ability to do so does not require protection. — Dan
Yeah, I agree that it is very easy to resolve conflicts between choices that don't belong to someone and those that do, but this isn't the problem I outlined in the initial primer. I was concerned with how to weigh different amounts of freedom (over those choices that beong to people) against each other. For example, how many people's eyesight is worth one person's life if we are in a position to only save group or the other. — Dan
Further, I'm not sure how you tell which choices people have a "more absolute right" to. — Dan
We might think that people have "more of a right" to live than to see, but that doesn't tell us how many of one is worth how many of the other. — Dan
I really think this discussion would go smoother if you read more of the primer I wrote to begin with. — Dan
The issue is with deciding how to balance different people's freedom to do different things against each other. — Dan
I'm not sure what you mean by finding either strength or weakness in belonging or how we would find that. Also, I'm not sure why how often people's freedom is restricted would determine the extent to which that choice belongs to them. — Dan
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