I think the solution to this is to note that harming [something] is not a proper act, because it is an action includes the intentionality behind it; so act of self-defense is a specific action which can produce harm, but is permissible (and even sometimes obligatory) because it is good in-itself (being that the intention is to stop the attacker and NOT to kill or harm them). — Bob Ross

Bob, your OP has given me an opportunity to at least somewhat process some PTSD. Thanks for that, I guess.

I spent a year protecting a new born baby and his mother from my (at least psychopath adjacent) coworker. This is a guy who thought it would be cool to be in the military and have it be legal for him to kill people. He talked at times about considering killing himself, and that if he did so he planned to take his wife and child with him. I think the guy really did consider me his best friend, while I saw myself more like ethically trapped into being his baby sitter. On that fateful day, when his wife was finally ready to take their son and go to a battered women's shelter I was prepared to punch him to a bloody pulp if need be, to protect his family from him,

As things turned out, I didn't feel the need to do what I was prepared to do, which was punch him as hard as I could, and inflict as much damage on him as I could repeatedly, for as long as I saw a need to.

Anyway, I realize that what I was in the middle of was not a purely self defense situation, but still I feel like saying, "Oh My Fucking God Bob, you have no idea what things getting real is like."

But I've got that off my chest now, so carry on. :yikes:

I completely understand wonderer1: this OP is meant to explore, intellectually, the underlying justification for self-defense. Of course, the intellectual pursuit of a coherent ethical theory is going to be much different from the reasoning one may find through experience.

I am essentially endeavoring on determining a fully coherent and plausible account of what is right and wrong; and so, although it may seem in practicality obvious that self-defense is permissible, I must be able to back that up intellectually in a way that coheres with my ethical theory.

I am essentially endeavoring on determining a fully coherent and plausible account of what is right and wrong; and so, although it may seem in practicality obvious that self-defense is permissible, I must be able to back that up intellectually in a way that coheres with my ethical theory. — Bob Ross

Why? So you can feel particularly righteous?

Why? So you can feel particularly righteous? — wonderer1

The blinding hypocrisy in your last two posts here is a bit much.

[Edited]

Yeah, I was figuring you would be raging. I'm not really seeing much point in responding to that kind of stuff right now.

Why? So you can feel particularly righteous? — wonderer1

No, because Bob is constructing something important to them, an ethical theory. They are trying to get to the underlying logic of ethics, which is in my opinion, one of the last areas where true philosophy is still desperately needed. We do things all the time in our life that we cannot explain intellectually, as Bob noted. I've spoken with Bob many times, and he is not a self-righteous individual. They are passionate, curious, polite, and in my opinion, a true philosopher that is open to critique and changing their mind.

This is what philosophers endeavor to do. It is to construct a set of definitions and principles and come to a logical set of rules that help humanity understand and explain things beyond a surface level. When you encounter a person like Bob, who is a rare jewel on these forums, understand that this is their motivation. Bob can of course defend themself, but I can vouch for their reputation and intent on this forum.

Why? So you can feel particularly righteous?

I definitely do not pursue philosophy to feel righteous or a part of some sort of ‘elite’: I do it to uncover the truth, and to give myself (as well as hopefully others) a coherent and consistent account of reality.

The reason I find ethics so important, is because it is the basis of all action (and inaction)—it is the crux for why we should be doing anything at all, and why we shouldn’t being doing certain things. Without ethics, agency is like a boat that has set sail with no destination—what wind is favorable, then? None, and nihilism or radical individualism ensues.

I think it is a shame that ethics has been shoved under the rug in modern times; and I see a real threat of society (and the individual) collapsing if we do not correct this. I think the postmodern sense of “ethics” has the potential to do real damage to the individual; and I see it starting to happen already (e.g., active shooters, suicides, mental illness epidemics, the loss of respect for life, etc.). I, consequently, devote my free time to endeavoring to find a coherent, holistic ethical account of living; and I hope, one day, I can find the answers which will give us the key to reinstating ethics and living a actually (not hypothetically) good life as central to human culture, and I hope to (at least) give myself a full account of the living the good life.

I understand that life is a sticky place, and it can excite past emotions to try and think about topics, especially ethics, through the lens of the dull, rigid eye of reason; but it has to be done, if one is to have good reasons for what they permit themselves to do (and what not). Otherwise, we just have irrationality governing our actions—and this cannot be what ethics surmounts to.

The moral principles and facts being stipulated are that:

1. It is morally impermissible to perform an action that is in-itself bad;
2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something bad—even for the sake of something good;
3. Harming someone is, in-itself, bad. — Bob Ross

Seems to me that 2. is a contradiction. If your act is for the sake of the good how can it be something bad?

If not, then intending something bad for the sake of the good cancels each other out and the act is neither bad nor good.

It seems to me, under these stipulations, that one could never justify self-defense—e.g., harming someone that is about to kill you—because it will always be the case in such examples that one directly intends to harm that person for the sake of saving themselves. — Bob Ross

I don't know about that. If someone is trying to kill you, then does that not qualify as them doing something bad? In defending yourself are you not trying to prevent something bad from happening, or something worse as they may continue killing if they are not stopped?

What use is discussing what is good or bad and what is permissible if you're not willing to do something about it, ie stopping bad acts? Saying some act is bad doesn't stop people from engaging in bad acts.

:up: :kiss:

@Bob Ross @Philosophim

Just a reminder...

But I've got that off my chest now, so carry on. — wonderer1

Just a reminder... — wonderer1

But I've got that off my chest now, so carry on. — wonderer1

You did say that, but you obviously didn't follow through on your word. Remind yourself that not two hours later you showed yourself untrue by continuing your petty attack on philosophy:

Why? So you can feel particularly righteous? — wonderer1

Why? — wonderer1

I think it is an important question, but do not think it is for the purpose you suggest.

I will address this generally, whether or not it applies in this case:

I think the reason is the desire to arrive at clear answers where none are available. It is, however, in my opinion, misdirected. Ethics is not a matter of discovering or inventing equations or formulas or exceptionless rules that can be applied to whatever situation that arises. It is, as Plato and Aristotle knew, a matter of phronesis, of good judgment. It is pragmatic, involves compromises, and may not yield agreed upon or totally satisfactory results. The desire for wisdom becomes foolishness when we attempt to abstract from the confusion and messiness of life.

It is, as Plato and Aristotle knew, a matter of phronesis, of good judgment. — Fooloso4

You leave out the other thing that Plato and Aristotle knew: thinking through ethical questions aids us in arriving at good judgment. No one has ever arrived at good judgment by avoiding all thought of ethics.

It should be obvious to anyone who understands what phronesis is that it involves thinking through ethical questions. Thinking through ethical questions, however, does not mean the attempt to find abstract, universalizable, one size fits all answers that can be appealed to in lieu of moral deliberation.

The moral principles and facts being stipulated are that:

1. It is morally impermissible to perform an action that is in-itself bad;
2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something bad—even for the sake of something good;
3. Harming someone is, in-itself, bad. — Bob Ross

I do not agree with your stipulations. Particularly #3. It is not an absolute that harming someone is bad. For example, it is not bad to harm someone in self-defense.

It should be obvious to anyone who understands what phronesis is that it involves thinking through ethical questions. Thinking through ethical questions, however, does not mean the attempt to find abstract, universalizable, one size fits all answers that can be appealed to in lieu of moral deliberation. — Fooloso4

Moral principles are part of moral deliberation, and thinking to them and through them is part of ethics. Else, you fall into caricatures and strawmen if you think that inquiring into the rationale for justified self-defense is seeking "one-size-fits-all answers."

Moral principles are part of moral deliberation, and thinking to them and through them is part of ethics. — Leontiskos

There is a difference between deliberating and rule following. There is a difference between an appeal to a moral principle and an ethics that has as its goal a system of principles. There are good reasons why many philosophers have abandoned rule based principles and returned to some form of virtue ethics.

The attempt to set up a comprehensive set of rule based principles must deal with exceptions and the need for further rules regarding exceptions. The set becomes more and more unwieldy as exceptions accrue and are compounded.

By analogy, there may be some useful principles to keep in mind when playing chess, but no set of rules that can tell you what to do in every situation. There are cases where following a genera rule will not lead to favorable results. Cases where the rule should not take precedence over other considerations, and no rule that covers when that is the case.

... if you think that inquiring into the rationale for justified self-defense is seeking "one-size-fits-all answers." — Leontiskos

It is not a matter of inquiring into the rationale for justified self-defense but, as the OP makes clear, of self-defense under the constriction of certain stipulated moral principles.

There is a difference between deliberating and rule following. — Fooloso4

The one who is engaged in the attempt to formulate and justify rules is not engaged in mere rule-following. This false charge is common.

It is not a matter of inquiring into the rationale for justified self-defense but, as the OP makes clear, of self-defense under the constriction of certain stipulated moral principles. — Fooloso4

No, it is an inquiry into whether a justification for self-defense is consistent with certain axioms.

The one who is engaged in the attempt to formulate and justify rules is not engaged in mere rule-following. — Leontiskos

Right! The attempt to formulate and justify rules is not based on rules. Or, in other words, moral deliberation must rest on something other than principles.

No, it is an inquiry into whether a justification for self-defense is consistent with certain axioms. — Leontiskos

These axioms are the moral principles stipulated in the OP. It is, then, not an inquiry into the justification of self-defense, but of self-defense under certain principles or axioms. Moral inquiry, however, is not limited by certain so called axioms. It includes the question of whether certain assumptions should be regarded as true. The three principles specified are not, as the OP calls them, "facts". They are assumptions that can and should be called into question.

When Bob Ross says:

Given the following stipulations, I am wondering if there is a way to salvage the principle of self-defense ... — Bob Ross

He gets it exactly backwards. The question is whether the stipulated claims can be salvaged in light of the need for self-defense. Calling "the principle of self-defense" into question too, is an indication of why moral deliberation based on principles that turn out to be questionable, as the three specified principles are, should be called into question.

It includes the question of whether certain assumptions should be regarded as true. — Fooloso4

And the one who actually reads the OP notices sentences like this one:

It seems to me that the only way to justify self-defense is to either (1) abandon stipulation #1 or (2) reject #3. — Bob Ross

The one with a predetermined interpretation has to ignore sentences like that one.

You completely miss what is at issue in my criticism. Moral deliberation is not about accepting or abandoning or rejecting stipulated principles. It not not about moral principles.

You claimed that:

it is an inquiry into whether a justification for self-defense is consistent with certain axioms. — Leontiskos

It any of those so called axioms is abandoned or rejected then they are not axiomatic. This supports the claim that moral deliberation is not axiomatic.

Why?
— wonderer1

I think it is an important question, but do not think it is for the purpose you suggest. — Fooloso4

I wasn't suggesting, but I was asking Bob, because I was curious as to his purpose. Granted, it might have been better for me to stop at, "Why?"

I will address this generally, whether or not it applies in this case:

I think the reason is the desire to arrive at clear answers where none are available. It is, however, in my opinion, misdirected. Ethics is not a matter of discovering or inventing equations or formulas or exceptionless rules that can be applied to whatever situation that arises. It is, as Plato and Aristotle knew, a matter of phronesis, of good judgment. It is pragmatic, involves compromises, and may not yield agreed upon or totally satisfactory results. The desire for wisdom becomes foolishness when we attempt to abstract from the confusion and messiness of life. — Fooloso4

:100: :up:

this OP is meant to explore, intellectually, the underlying justification for self-defense. Of course, the intellectual pursuit of a coherent ethical theory is going to be much different from the reasoning one may find through experience.

I am essentially endeavoring on determining a fully coherent and plausible account of what is right and wrong; and so, although it may seem in practicality obvious that self-defense is permissible, I must be able to back that up intellectually in a way that coheres with my ethical theory.

In your OP, the second stipulated premise is completely dependent upon the perspective of the observer (specifically the labels of "bad" and "good"). Thus any "good" action I may choose to perform can produce a "bad" effect upon someone somewhere, perhaps in a tengential and/or marginally important or even measurable way or amount. In that case (practically all cases if one searches hard enough), then the action may be good from my perspective and perhaps to the direct recipient of my action, yet be bad to a third party, perhaps remote from the primary and secondary actors. Is the action therefore "good" if the third party suffered a "bad" outcome from it?

To my mind there are two practical options to address this situation. First, one could also stipulate that only the primary actor's perspective is used. In that case self defence would be "good" since from his perspective he is saving a life. The other option would be to acknowledge that all actions have good and bad qualities so the entire scheme needs to be adjusted to mean: "majority good" and "majority bad" (instead of good and bad). In that case self defense would be permissible because while partially "bad", it is majority "good".

Personally I think it is morally obligatory to defend yourself in a way that doesn’t hurt the attacker, but it could also be permissible to defend yourself in a way that hurts the attacker. As long as the previous is obligatory, you don’t get problems where someone who has been attacked (assuming they follow this) attacks the original perpetrator for vengeance.

The reason the latter isn’t impermissible (and is allowed legally) in my mind is because of 3 reasons, most of which have to do with the likely hook of being able to actually apply these principles.

• It is unreasonable to expect people to not fight back in the interest of others, especially since we have an instinct for self-preservation.
• There will always be people that violate the moral code, and allowing self defense in it discourages the perpetrator from attacking, for fear of action on the victim’s part or simply the ineffectiveness of the attack itself. The moral code described in the OP hasn’t been widely adopted because it only really works best in a society where everyone follows the code, in which case you don’t need it.
• Self defense with the conditions stated above is almost always an overall benefit for humanity as a whole, usually benefitting the victim more than it hurts the perpetrator, and discouraging attacks from occurring, as stated above.

Personally I think it is morally obligatory to defend yourself in a way that doesn’t hurt the attacker, but it could also be permissible to defend yourself in a way that hurts the attacker. As long as the previous is obligatory, you don’t get problems where someone who has been attacked (assuming they follow this) attacks the original perpetrator for vengeance.

The reason the latter isn’t impermissible (and is allowed legally) in my mind is because of 3 reasons, most of which have to do with the likely hook of being able to actually apply these principles.

• It is unreasonable to expect people to not fight back in the interest of others, especially since we have an instinct for self-preservation.
• There will always be people that violate the moral code, and allowing self defense in it discourages the perpetrator from attacking, for fear of action on the victim’s part or simply the ineffectiveness of the attack itself. The moral code described in the OP hasn’t been widely adopted because it only really works best in a society where everyone follows the code, in which case you don’t need it.
• Self defense with the conditions stated above is almost always an overall benefit for humanity as a whole, usually benefitting the victim more than it hurts the perpetrator, and discouraging attacks from occurring, as stated above.

Generally, a utilitarianism (negative or otherwise) would agree that self defense is necessary in these situations.

TL;DR: I agree with all but the second stipulation. Not that it is always good, but that if it actually has a good effect that outweighs the bad, then it is permissible. Obviously the question of weights complicates things a little, but it feels like the right way to go.

Given the following stipulations, I am wondering if there is a way to salvage the principle of self-defense; and would like to here all of your responses.

The moral principles and facts being stipulated are that:

1. It is morally impermissible to perform an action that is in-itself bad;
2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something bad—even for the sake of something good;
3. Harming someone is, in-itself, bad.

It seems to me, under these stipulations, that one could never justify self-defense—e.g., harming someone that is about to kill you—because it will always be the case in such examples that one directly intends to harm that person for the sake of saving themselves. — Bob Ross

Has anyone yet mentioned that self-defense is nearly by definition a preventing of harm to one’s own self?

A murderer wants to murder you. On what grounds is allowing the murderer (whose intentions are most always deemed unethical to begin with) his desire of harming your own being to be deemed anything but bad?

So, harm in some ultimate sense is a bad thing. OK. If so, then in the case of conflicts such as the one specified, harm to someone is inevitable: either to you, to your assailant, or to both. Given the murderer’s intention of murdering you, what then makes the harm to the murderer’s self of greater wrong than the harm to your own self? And, again, the murderer is unethical while you (I can only presume) are not unethical (at least no where near the same extent).

And is it not a good to choose the lesser of two wrongs whenever no other alternative is in any way available to you?

--------

The OP’s question runs far deeper, though: what grants a given self more value, or worth, than some other self whenever any conflict between selves occurs?

More concretely exemplified via just a few examples: what make one’s loved one more important than the stranger down the street as a self; what makes a human self more important than a dog’s selfhood; what makes a virtuous person’s self (say a Mother Teresa or a Gandhi) of more worth than the self of a person filled with actively occurring vice (say a Hitler or a Stalin); and so on and so forth.

This isn’t an easy question to answer as far as I know, but it does determine what harm to what self is prioritized over the lack of harm to the other self - this in our judgements of right and wrong - whenever conflicts between selves occur. And I sincerely believe that only in this issue’s answer can be found an understanding of what justifies self-defense. Tricky issue, though.

BTW, leaning on issues of self-preservation doesn't to me seem to offer much help: the murderer is attempting to preserve their total selfhood (with mind and its desires included) in attempting to murder you on par to you attempting to preserve your own total selfhood (likewise with mind and one's own desires included) in attempting to not be murdered. To in any way prevent a self-identified murderer from being a murderer is then, technically at least, to harm the murderer's selfhood - such that it is no longer preserved via means antithetical to the self's desires. But, then, this gets into issues of what a selfhood is defined by: knowing oneself to be "the most financially wealthy person in the world", for example, requires the self-preservation of this identity/selfhood ... this in parallel to how a person who knows themselves to be domineering (with a murderer as one possible extreme example) requires the self-preservation of one's rank as a top dog that can thereby do anything they please, so to speak. All this is to say that a self is more than just a physical body, and that self-preservation thereby addresses more than a physical body's continuation of being. So the question of what a self is plays a major role in the issue of what self-defense is, of when it is virtuous, and of when it might not be (say, Hitler's actions in self-defense of his total being as a fascistic dictator.)

My OP presupposes moral realism; so whether not an action is good, bad, or neutral is stance-independently true. It does not matter semantic differences in what you or I may call 'good' or 'bad'.

The OP is not arguing that self-defense is impermissible: it is just exploring how a non-consequentalist who accepts the OP's stipulations would be able to justify it. I completely agree that self-defense is permissible; and I will update the OP with the solution.

Has anyone yet mentioned that self-defense is nearly by definition a preventing of harm to one’s own self?

Self-defense is usually defined in a way to include the defense of other innocents as well.

On what grounds is allowing the murderer (whose intentions are most always deemed unethical to begin with) his desire of harming your own being to be deemed anything but bad?

Did you read the OP? The OP is exploring what justification exists for self-defense's permissibility given certain stipulations.

Thanks for the clarification.