But keeping it simple, supposing one has a general duty of care to one's fellow beings, one who is bent on harming his fellows thereby forfeits his own right to be cared for. — unenlightened

l think in a very practical sense of, 'this is the way things go among humans', I would have to agree with something like that. More idealistically I'd hope for caring for everyone, even knowing it's an ideal I can't come close to living up to.

It certainly is relevant to my having taken a chunk of brass rod to what I was afraid could turn into a gun fight. The guy with the gun was a coworker at my first job out of college, and it's really a story about a fucked up year in four people's lives.

I guess I was hoping mentioning having such an experience myself might motivate someone else to give an account of a relevant experience of their own, and spare me from feeling I should go into more detail. It's a story I would have to get out between bouts of tears and I'm awfully ambivalent about trying to condense it to reasonable post length.

I thought the claim to have acted in self defence was the way one justified an act of harm. — unenlightened

In that case the OP is a probing of the justification: How does the justification work? Does the justification stand? A justification needs to be more than a simple claim or assertion. In a similar way, the OP could be construed as a devil's advocate argument for pacifism.

...if the principle of self defence cannot stand alone... — unenlightened

What do you take the "principle of self-defense" to be? It's not so clear what such a thing is supposed to be.

A justification needs to be more than a simple claim or assertion — Leontiskos

Can you justify this claim? Where do justifications bottom out? I'm probing the probing here.

Edit: Also, what more can be provided?

Can you justify this claim? Where do justifications bottom out? I'm probing the probing here. — unenlightened

The OP actually sets out two competing justifications for self-defense: double effect and forfeiture. In <this post> you gestured towards a forfeiture doctrine:

I might talk about a 'necessary mutuality' of moral behaviour, such that the thief forfeits his right to possess his own property — unenlightened

This makes it sound like we strip thieves of all property, which is not the case, and yet it seems to me that forfeiture justifications have a difficult time drawing that line. Nevertheless, this claim introduces two difficulties: punishment vs. defense and public vs. private. Classically these things are distinguished from one another. Defense is not necessarily punishment and punishment is not necessarily defense; and not everything that is available to a public authority is available to a private citizen.

Here is SEP's perspective:

On a standard view, the moral wrongness of killing and injuring is grounded in persons’ having stringent moral rights against such treatment. If defensive harming is at least sometimes morally permissible, it needs to be explained how the use of force can be consistent with these rights. Two broad types of justification are common in the literature.

The first holds that a person’s right against harm, though weighty, is not absolute and may be permissibly infringed if necessary to achieve a sufficiently important good. This is known as a lesser-evil justification.

...

[Second justification...] Instead, the permission to kill Attacker is explained by his lack of a right not to be killed in the circumstances. This is known as a liability justification for harming. — Self-Defense | SEP

Good discussion!

@Lionino, I think our conversation went astray because I (or perhaps we) was (or perhaps were) focusing on the pain involved in the vaccination and not the harm. In a complete sense, the harming of the person is necessarily prior to the release of the dead cells (or what not) that will help them build immunity; and so I completely understand and agree with you (now) that this is analogous to the self-defense example I gave: part of the means is harming the person, as opposed to being a side effect of the means.

Your solution to the OP, however, is wrong; because it liberates the discussion into weighing the consequences of actions instead of their natures; and this leads (necessarily) to the bizarre permitting of immoralities for the sake of the greater good.

The solution, I think, is to reject 3: I realized that my theory is eudaimonic and not hedonic, and so I am not committed to the idea that harming someone, in-itself, is bad for them. Likewise, I find nothing wrong, now that I have liberated myself from 3, with deploying a principle of forfeiture whereby one can harm someone for the sake of preventing them from doing something wrong; and this is not a case of an action which is bad in-itself because the action of harming is not in-itself bad and the intention bound-up with the action (of harming), in this case, is good.

I don't know what the phrase "flow of intention" is supposed to mean

I mean what is intended in-itself (at least within the context) and what is intended directly for that per se intention. An archer aims to hit their target, and pulling back the string on the bow (with an arrow in place) is intended for the sake of the intention of hitting the target. The whole motion of placing the arrow in place, pulling the string back, etc. is a part of the intentional flow towards the end; but, e.g., what is not a part of that directional flow is effect of alarming a deer standing nearby.

@Leontiskos

It's not so clear to me that self-defense involves an intent to harm.

It doesn't per se, but a lot of cases do. For example, if I am about to get shot by an aggressor and the only way to stop it is to pull out my gun and shoot them, then, in that case, I must directly intentionally harm them to save myself; for the causal means of saving myself is shooting my gun and the effect necessary to prevent my death or injury is the bullet penetrating the aggressor and harm them sufficiently to stop them from pulling their own trigger. I don't see how, in that case, you could argue that (1) there is not intent to harm nor (2) that the intent is direct.

When we consider self-defense in the context of double effect, and scrutinize the criterion that the bad effect may not be a means to the good effect, it becomes crucial to determine what we mean by a means. Is it a causal or temporal means?

I was meaning a causal means, like pulling a lever. Technically the gun, or my fist (in case of punching), is the means and the effect is the bullet harming the aggressor.

When I look through Aquinas it would seem that he does not view harm as a proper act

This is a really good point that I overlooked; and helped me realize that I am not committed in the slightest to accepting that harm in-itself is bad. An action is a volition of will; and as such cannot be analyzes independently of the per se intention behind it.

An action 'simpliciter' is simply what your being is at any moment in time.

I find this inadequate, although I appreciate the elaboration. According to your definition here, a person who is brain dead in a coma is ‘acting’ by not moving their arms; because it is a part of ‘what their being is [at this moment]’. Actions are tied to agency, not being.

A decision to make an action

I see the problem now: as a matter of definition, you must reject the idea of choosing to do nothing.

This is absurd to me, because, again, it is so painfully obvious that you can choose to not do something without choosing to do something else. You can decide, right now, to never respond to this message without choosing to go do something else instead: if that is true, then you made a choice to not make an action—which violates your definition of ‘choice’.

You know me: I hate semantics as much as the next person; but if you define ‘choice’ in this way, then I would note that you must still agree that one can ‘reach a conclusion through the process of thinking’ which results in that ‘conclusion’ being that one should not act; and this then would not, by definition, be a ‘choice’ in your schema—but that’s what I am getting at.

Assuming agency, if you choose to do A, but at the last second, pick B, you changed your choice to B.

What you are noting here, is that ‘if one acts, then they chose those actions’; and if I were to grant your point here, it would not suffice to negate the possibility of being able to choose to not act. All this notes, is that ones actions are necessarily chosen; but not that ones choices are all about actions.

Like I stated before, I do reject that all acts are chosen; because it is impossible to reach a decision other than through rational deliberation; which leads me to my next point:

A decision to make an action

Choosing is the act of deciding: you circularly defined a ‘choice’ here with ‘decision’. I would submit to you that ‘making a decision’, ‘making a choice’, etc. are all the results of the process of thinking; and ‘thinking’ is an act of rational deliberation (even if it is irrational in the sense that one doesn’t have sound argumentation or hasn’t thought it through very robustly). If this is true, then you must accept that one can act without choosing; because one can act without thinking—and surely you agree, semantics aside, with that.

I've already pointed this out once, but I am talking about mutually exclusive scenarios.

Got it: that wasn’t clear to me. You said it was a matter of a logical formula, which was confusing me.

They chose to not pull the lever, and acted on it, because they thought it more moral to do something else

How did they act on it? What you are missing, is that the choosing to not pull the lever is a choice to refrain from acting; and if that is the case then they didn’t act on it.

Omissibility in itself neither necessarily exempts or makes the person responsible

I apologize, I used the terms wrong: moral omissibility is a category of moral thought that revolves around when someone fails to do something good. The point I was making is that an omission is sometimes permissible.

if we had a 50/50 situation, in which you only had two choices and both were equally bad, no one could judge you for your choice.

These examples we are using are not situations where all choices are equally bad. Again, allowing something bad to happen is not as bad as doing something bad. Likewise, to use your negligence example, the worker would be held morally responsible if they should have reasonably known to push that certain button; but if they couldn’t have reasonably known, then they shouldn’t be. The main point would be, though, that this concedes that not even all inactions are equal. E.g., it would not be right to say that the worker in both instances is doing something equally bad.

No, I'm not saying that at all.

We have deeper issues now. If you define a ‘choice’ as ‘a decision to make an action’, then one cannot choose to let something happen—as a matter of definition.

And in the situation of moral choice, 'not acting' is the action you take.

That’s manifestly incoherent: you either have to accept that all moral choices are not instances of ‘not acting’, or you have to concede that your definition doesn’t work.

Lionino, I think our conversation went astray — Bob Ross

Yep, this seems right to me.

I don't see how, in that case, you could argue that (1) there is not intent to harm nor (2) that the intent is direct. — Bob Ross

Sure, I think that's a fair point.

I was meaning a causal means, like pulling a lever. Technically the gun, or my fist (in case of punching), is the means and the effect is the bullet harming the aggressor. — Bob Ross

Sure, but it is helpful to remember that causality does not track intention. To take a clearer example than the baseball bat, suppose someone applies a rear naked choke in self defense, and suppose that this does harm the aggressor but the defender is not aware of the harm involved. Have they used harm as a means?

An action is a volition of will; and as such cannot be analyzes independently of the per se intention behind it. — Bob Ross

Yes, I think that's exactly right.

The solution, I think, is to reject 3: I realized that my theory is eudaimonic and not hedonic, and so I am not committed to the idea that harming someone, in-itself, is bad for them. — Bob Ross

The OP raises subtle questions that probably cannot be solved in a single day or in a single thread. For a consequentialist the topic is fairly straightforward, but for a non-consequentialist it is more complicated. This is because most non-consequentialists recognize that consequences cannot simply be ignored. Harm in itself tends to be a consequence, and it is not obvious when the level of harm becomes morally relevant and when it does not. For Thomists it is the tricky question of when and how a circumstance can enter into the object of a moral act, and corrupt it.

Likewise, I find nothing wrong, now that I have liberated myself from 3, with deploying a principle of forfeiture whereby one can harm someone for the sake of preventing them from doing something wrong — Bob Ross

To press the complications, this would seem to be a case of deterrence, which is not the same as self-defense. This can be approached by noting that preventing precedes a bad act, whereas forfeiture follows after a bad act. At best we would say that a right is forfeited on account of some evil and manifest intent, and that use of force prevents the carrying out of that intent. Still, this more accurately describes the police officer than the private citizen who is merely concerned with self-defense. Self-preservation and prevention of wrongdoing are not the same thing, even though in some cases they interleave. Aquinas' article on blows is somewhat on point.

For me the heart of this thread is the question of the moral status of harm simpliciter. Supposing we have a duty to not harm or minimize harm, in what does this precisely consist? — Leontiskos

A preliminary takeaway is that harm does not necessarily invalidate an act, and yet it can invalidate an act. Specifically, if there is not a proper relation between the volitional act and the harm that ensues, then the harm will presumably invalidate the act. Still, to assess acts primarily in terms of harm is a preoccupation of democratic liberalism and consequentialism, and this way of assessing acts seems to be mistaken.

I don’t know what “action of agency” is vs. “action” simpliciter. — Bob Ross

Autonomous breathing is an action simpliciter. An action of agency is done with conscious intent.

A decision to make an action

I see the problem now: as a matter of definition, you must reject the idea of choosing to do nothing. — Bob Ross

My point is that you cannot 'not make an action'. To not act is to be dead. The whole point of this conversation is to demonstrate that you cannot avoid a moral situation by 'not acting'. You are deciding not to act on a set of moral choices, but your action is to walk away from the situation, think of sharks, or anything else. Its not that you are 'not acting' period. Your action is simply not aligned with 'pulling the lever' in this case.

You can decide, right now, to never respond to this message without choosing to go do something else instead: if that is true, then you made a choice to not make an action—which violates your definition of ‘choice’. — Bob Ross

I can choose to not respond to the post, but I choose to make some other type of action in my life. Again, I would have to be dead. My not posting does not absolve me for choosing to do something else.

You know me: I hate semantics as much as the next person; but if you define ‘choice’ in this way, then I would note that you must still agree that one can ‘reach a conclusion through the process of thinking’ which results in that ‘conclusion’ being that one should not act; and this then would not, by definition, be a ‘choice’ in your schema—but that’s what I am getting at. — Bob Ross

A choice is simply an assertion that you are going to commit an action based on your perceived options. So if I have a mutually exclusive choice between A and B, if I choose to do A, I am also choosing to not do B. My action will include A, and exclude B. Now if I didn't know that B was an option, I would not be able to choose B, or not choose B. My action would exclude B, but I would think I could only choose A.

All this notes, is that ones actions are necessarily chosen; but not that ones choices are all about actions — Bob Ross

Agreed. A realized choice is a choice that you act on. An unrealized choice is one that you are unable to. For example, if I choose to move my hand, try to, and find my hand is stuck on some glue, my choice was not fully realized.

Choosing is the act of deciding: you circularly defined a ‘choice’ here with ‘decision’. I would submit to you that ‘making a decision’, ‘making a choice’, etc. are all the results of the process of thinking; and ‘thinking’ is an act of rational deliberation (even if it is irrational in the sense that one doesn’t have sound argumentation or hasn’t thought it through very robustly). If this is true, then you must accept that one can act without choosing; because one can act without thinking—and surely you agree, semantics aside, with that. — Bob Ross

I would say agency more than thinking, as one can act emotionally, then rationally think about it later. The only way you can act without choosing is if its an autonomous action like a reflex, heart beating, etc.

I've already pointed this out once, but I am talking about mutually exclusive scenarios.

Got it: that wasn’t clear to me. You said it was a matter of a logical formula, which was confusing me. — Bob Ross

Not a worry, I should have been more explicit.

They chose to not pull the lever, and acted on it, because they thought it more moral to do something else

How did they act on it? What you are missing, is that the choosing to not pull the lever is a choice to refrain from acting; and if that is the case then they didn’t act on it. — Bob Ross

That's a poor sentence from me. My intent was to say, "The action they took did not involve pulling the lever, because they thought it more moral to do that action then pull the lever." Choosing to 'walk away' is the same as 'choosing not to pull the lever' as it was an option they had deliberated on.

The point I was making is that an omission is sometimes permissible. — Bob Ross

Agreed 100%

Again, allowing something bad to happen is not as bad as doing something bad. — Bob Ross

This sentence is circumstantially true or false. It is only true if you allowed something bad to happen because any other action or prevention would have only made it worse. For example, if I see a dog caught in a flood current in a river, I can choose not to save the dog because I'm a poor swimmer and the current would almost certainly kill me too. I wouldn't call this 'allowing' something bad to happen, just noting that there is nothing you can do to mitigate it. But that's semantics and probably not important. :)

On the other hand, lets say I'm a crane operator on a crane by the river and I realize I can easily scoop the dog out of the water without issue. If I choose to sip on some water and stare at the sky instead, I have done something bad. Staring up into the sky and sipping water are not innately bad, but they are considering everything the crane operator knows they can do given their options. By choosing to take the action of staring at the sky, I have chosen not to help the dog, and I have done wrong.

I think I understand what you are going for, which is that ‘one must perform an action to avoid another action’. (1) This isn’t true; and (2) even if it was it would not negate my point.

With respect to #1, the problem is that you keep using examples where one coincidentally chooses a different act instead of doing the act in question (e.g., walking away instead of pulling the lever); but this is not always the case. For example, imagine you decide to just stand there and keep watching instead of pulling the lever: continuing to watch is not itself an action—instead, you would be deciding to not do anything and since you are already watching you continue to watch. What you are doing is failing to analyze the inaction in-itself—e.g., choosing to not get up is itself (A) a conclusion reached through thinking and (B) not a choice to do something.

With respect to #2, even if I grant your point it does not follow that one cannot choose to do nothing: even in the case that it is true that “one must perform action X to avoid action Y”, it also true that the choice to not do Y precedes the choice to do X—all you are noting is that not doing Y requires a subsequent action which is not Y for Y to not be done. If this is true, then even under your view it must be conceded that choices can be about inactions—which violates your definition of ‘choice’.

In your view, we end up with a peculiar conclusion that it is false that ‘one can choose to not do Y’; and you get this problem because you are falsely inferring that “one cannot choose to do nothing” because “one cannot lack action”. You are forgetting that deliberation is an act, but that it can be about inaction; and this means that one is technically acting when they are concluding to not do something (in virtue of performing the act of thinking), but that they are performing the act of choosing to not do anything.

I can choose to not respond to the post, but I choose to make some other type of action in my life.

That is not a part of the original choice made—or at least it isn’t per se. You could choose to not respond to the post without, in that act of deliberation, choosing to not do so for the sake of some other action. Whether or not you must choose, after that, to act is a separate and irrelevant question.

You still have failed to give a coherent definition of a ‘choice’, and I think this is what is hindering you from seeing the issues I have exposed (even above).

I would say agency more than thinking, as one can act emotionally, then rationally think about it later.

An emotion is not a result of a choice: you don’t choose what you feel. Choices are cognitive, not conative. Again, you defined ‘choice’ as a ‘making a decision to act’: decisions are cognitive—it makes no sense to include emotions in that other than what emotions are filtered through reason.

"The action they took did not involve pulling the lever, because they thought it more moral to do that action then pull the lever."

This is wrong, because you have conflated a reason one may possibly have for not doing X with it being necessary that they have such a reason for not doing X: do you find it impossible for a person to choose to not pull the lever “because they simply wanted to watch them die”? If not, then your point cannot stand: they are not choosing to not pull the lever for the sake of another action they want to perform.

With respect to #1, the problem is that you keep using examples where one coincidentally chooses a different act instead of doing the act in question (e.g., walking away instead of pulling the lever); but this is not always the case. For example, imagine you decide to just stand there and keep watching instead of pulling the lever: continuing to watch is not itself an action—instead, you would be deciding to not do anything and since you are already watching you continue to watch. — Bob Ross

Right, continuing to watch is the action that you decide to do. Actions are from moment to moment. You pull the lever, or you continue to watch. Either way, you're taking an action.

What you are doing is failing to analyze the inaction in-itself—e.g., choosing to not get up is itself (A) a conclusion reached through thinking and (B) not a choice to do something. — Bob Ross

I don't think I'm trying to avoid what inaction is, I'm just noting that we have to be careful what we mean by inaction. If I have a group of 3 choices, A, B, and C, I can refuse to take action on A, B, and C. Colloquially we might say, "They did not take any actions.", but that' in reference to THOSE actions. Its not a statement "They chose to drop dead instead". In the logical sense, you still took an action, just not A, B, or C.

With respect to #2, even if I grant your point it does not follow that one cannot choose to do nothing: even in the case that it is true that “one must perform action X to avoid action Y”, it also true that the choice to not do Y precedes the choice to do X—all you are noting is that not doing Y requires a subsequent action which is not Y for Y to not be done. If this is true, then even under your view it must be conceded that choices can be about inactions—which violates your definition of ‘choice’. — Bob Ross

I've tried to explain that a choice is what you are going to do, and by consequence, what you actively chose not to do. To have 'no choice' is to have no options. I am simply noting that choice is given its main meaning in the affirmative. What one did is the choice that lead to action, and what one did not do is by consequence. While one can say, "I chose not to go swimming yesterday," this still begs the question, "What did you choose then?" "Whereas if I say, "I chose to go walking yesterday", it would be strange if I asked, "Well what did you not choose then?" Its not that you can't ask this, its that the past tense of 'choice' entails an action. Inaction is in relation to this, and the context of the different actionable options you could have picked instead. What you cannot say is, "I chose to do literally nothing' yesterday and have that literally mean 'I made no actions of any kind'. That's just a phrase like "tow the line", not a literal meaning of the words.

If one is talking about the context of "A, B, and C" and they chose not to do any of them, they could answer "Nothing" referring to that context and we know what they mean. But because they can say "Nothing" within that context, that does not mean they didn't choose something outside of that context. They had to have. They chose whatever action they did instead. You can say I chose ~A, but its incomplete information until you give what you actually chose to do instead.

In your view, we end up with a peculiar conclusion that it is false that ‘one can choose to not do Y’ — Bob Ross

One cannot choose to not do Y, then say they did not do anything 'at all' in the literal sense. One cannot stop actions unless one is dead if one is acting with agency. That is all I'm claiming.

You are forgetting that deliberation is an act, but that it can be about inaction; and this means that one is technically acting when they are concluding to not do something (in virtue of performing the act of thinking), but that they are performing the act of choosing to not do anything. — Bob Ross

Deliberation is an act. Meaning what they chose to do is, "Deliberate some more". And in the context of other actions, A, B, and C, they chose not to do those, but "D" for deliberate instead. They are not 'doing nothing' in the logical sense. They are actively deliberating.

An emotion is not a result of a choice: you don’t choose what you feel. Choices are cognitive, not conative. — Bob Ross

Correct, you choose how you act. And sometimes people act on their feelings and nothing more. "I feel hungry, I eat". I would call that an act of agency, and not autonomous. We may not be disagreeing here but just have a different way of looking at "emotional decision".

"The action they took did not involve pulling the lever, because they thought it more moral to do that action then pull the lever."

This is wrong, because you have conflated a reason one may possibly have for not doing X with it being necessary that they have such a reason for not doing X: do you find it impossible for a person to choose to not pull the lever “because they simply wanted to watch them die”? — Bob Ross

Let me break this down.

There is a reason for not doing X.
It is necessary that they have a reason for not doing X.

I don't believe I ever implied the latter without the context of choice. I even mentioned earlier that if one had not considered B an option, its not that one 'didn't choose B', its that B wasn't even a choice. So if someone asked, "Why didn't you choose B," the reply would be, "I didn't even know B was an option."

In the case of having choices, and not picking them, yes you must have a 'reason' but it does not need to be a high bar of reason. If I have A, B, or C, and I choose D, choosing D is what the primary locus of choice is about. I could ask, "Why did you not pick A?" and the answer could be as simple as, "I forgot A was a choice", or "I liked D the most" and D is "I wanted to watch him die". If someone deliberates on an option, however briefly, then there is a reason they did not pick that option over the action they finally chose when the time came. But it doesn't have to be 'reasonable' or ethical, and it could be as simple as, "I liked D more, so by consequence, I didn't pick A".

What did you think of my example with the dog in the currents? I feel that gave the best practical example of what I've been trying to communicate. I also don't mean to go around and around on this, I feel I may have distracted from the original point of your OP.

1. It is morally impermissible to perform an action that is in-itself bad;
2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something bad—even for the sake of something good;
3. Harming someone is, in-itself, bad. — Bob Ross

So in the case of the person in the crane, sipping water and staring at the sky is not in itself bad, but in itself normally good. You need water and moments of relaxation to be healthy. However, it is bad if that is the action they chose to do instead of easily saving the dog. The action in itself is not innately good or bad, it is good or bad based on the context of what one could choose.

The same goes for the reverse. It is innately bad according to company policy, to dip the crane in the river. In fact, the brief dip in the crane will require the crane to be inspected and re-oiled, costing the business profit that day. It would generally be considered negligence on the part of the operator. But in the instance of "A few dollars spent to save a dogs life," using the crane is the right choice. Again, it is not innately good or bad, it is good or bad based on the context of the choice.

Now back to your example. Lets work backwards. Harming someone is generally, in itself, bad. A person is going to blow themselves up, killing them and everyone around them in ten seconds. You have the skill and capability to stop them, but you'll have to harm them. There is not a soul in the world who would say it is impermissible for you to save those lives by harming that individual. Because it is not innately good or bad to harm a person, but based on the context of the choice.

Now lets twist the scenario. You have the skill and capability to stop them, but you decide instead to donate ten dollars to a charity box next to you. Donating to charity is not in itself bad, and many might say its in itself good. Yet in the context of the moment, it was very bad to donate to charity instead of stopping the suicide bomber. Once again, the context of the choice.

As we spoke earlier, bad is relative to the situation, as logically good is. If the person 'just stood there' that's not innately bad or good, but bad or good dependent to the situation on hand. Since the person had the capability to stop the suicide bomber but 'stood there' (Did something else/nothing to stop the bomber) they chose the wrong action. It is not literally 'doing nothing', it is choosing to stand there. And in the context of the moral dillema, the wrong action, "Or finalized choice by action".

Unfortunately, we aren’t making any progress in our discussion so far. The main issue is that your use of the concepts of ‘to choose’ and ‘to act’ are littered with incoherencies; and that is primarily what I would like you to see.

For example:

I've tried to explain that a choice is what you are going to do, and by consequence, what you actively chose not to do.

I understand that you use “choice” in a looser sense, but what exactly is it under your view? — Bob Ross


A decision to make an action. — Philosophim

Do you see how these two statements are incoherent? If to choose is to decide to make an action (notwithstanding the circularity in the definition), then you cannot claim that one “actively chose not to do” something. There is not such thing as “choosing not to do X” in your view by definition.

EDIT:: Given your terms (and notwithstanding the circularity), when you say "I chose not to do X" that is equivalent to "I decided to perform the action of not doing X".

You need to overcome this problem before we can continue to all your examples.

I think the best way forward is to pause here, and ask you to try and define 'to choose’ again; because anything I point out in your response is going to hinge on your vague and incoherent use of the terms.

Again, to be clear on my side, an ‘action’ is a ‘volition of will’; and to choose is to ‘arrive at a conclusion from rational deliberation’.

The main issue is that your use of the concepts of ‘to choose’ and ‘to act’ are littered with incoherencies — Bob Ross

No worry! This has been fun to sort through and try to give exact definitions. Its made me realize we use 'choice' very loosely in common language, and the word itself needs some addendums if we wish to narrow it to specific situations.

If to choose is to decide to make an action (notwithstanding the circularity in the definition), then you cannot claim that one “actively chose not to do” something. There is not such thing as “choosing not to do X” in your view by definition. — Bob Ross

I think the problem is that 'choice' can have two meanings. "Choice" as in 'intent to act' and "choice" as in 'how I acted'. My hunch is this is where the confusion is coming from. So let me break out the difference in choice by separating the two into 'unactualized choice' and 'actualized choice'.

This also requires us to dive into the definition of 'action' a bit. An action can be measured by time. Every second of existence, you are making an action. You might be thinking, sitting, walking, laughing, etc. We can have different types of actions, such as autonomous like reflexes, and actions of agency which can be described as you noted, "a volition of will', or 'embodiment of being by intention'.

An unactualized choice is that which has not been met with an action yet. Lets say that I have five seconds to pull the lever to alter the outcome, and anytime after that pulling the lever will be too late. If I choose to pull the lever, yet I have not yet pulled it, that's an unactualized choice. Once I pull the lever, its an actualized choice. If my choice was to pull the lever in 5 seconds, but I pull it in six, my choice to pull it within 5 seconds was unactualized as well.

An actualized choice is one in which the action of the choice has been fulfilled. So if I pull the lever within five seconds, my choice was actualized. If I decide to not pull the lever in five seconds, and 6 seconds pass, my choice is also actualized.

The point is, that choices are all about intent of action, or actual action. If I chose not to pull the lever, my actual action at 6 seconds was something else. What my actualized choice is, is always in reference to my actualized action. Your actualized choice of "Choosing not to do X" in no way means, "You made no action at all". Your actionable choice was the action you took. "Not doing the action X" is only part of the story. What did you do instead?

Given your terms (and notwithstanding the circularity), when you say "I chose not to do X" that is equivalent to "I decided to perform the action of not doing X". — Bob Ross

No, it is equivalent to, "I decided to perform an action that was not X". It in no way means, "I took no action at all".

I hope that clarifies it Bob. Let me know!

I appreciate the elaboration, and we are getting closer!

I think the problem is that 'choice' can have two meanings

Ok, so here’s the first problem: nowhere in your exposition of ‘choice’ and ‘to choose’ did you define it (in your response)! Again, what is a ‘choice’ and what is ‘the act of choosing’ in your view?

"Choice" as in 'intent to act' and "choice" as in 'how I acted'.

This is the closest you got to a definition, but instead of giving one noted two mutually exclusive definitions of the word; and I am not sure which one you mean to use for this discussion. Are you taking a pluralistic account of the concept?

This confusion is partly my fault: since we are having to get this technical about it, it is important to note that ‘a choice’ and ‘the act of choosing’ are separate things; and thusly deserve separate definitions. For me, ‘a choice’ is ‘the result of the act of rational deliberation [i.e., thinking]’ and ‘the act of choosing’ is ‘the act of rationally deliberating [i.e., thinking]’. What do those mean under your view?

So let me break out the difference in choice by separating the two into 'unactualized choice' and 'actualized choice'.

I am assuming you don’t mean to say that ‘the act of choosing’ nor ‘a choice’ each have two equally cogent and incompatible definitions; so this actualized vs. unactualized distinction is just noting that when we choose to do something sometimes it doesn’t actually happen. I don’t have any problems with this; however, I must note that this in no way entails that all choices made are about actions.

This also requires us to dive into the definition of 'action' a bit.
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[actions] can be described as you noted, "a volition of will', or 'embodiment of being by intention'.

Are you agreeing that an ‘action’ is a ‘volition of will’? It seems like you are accepting my definition now, because this is the closest you got to defining an ‘action’ in your response.

The point is, that choices are all about intent of action, or actual action.

Why? That just begs the question. For now, I want to know how you define ‘a choice’, ‘the act of choosing’, and ‘to act’. You elaborated on them, without defining them clearly.

Given your terms (and notwithstanding the circularity), when you say "I chose not to do X" that is equivalent to "I decided to perform the action of not doing X". — Bob Ross

No, it is equivalent to, "I decided to perform an action that was not X". It in no way means, "I took no action at all".

This is so patently false though! E.g., I can legitimately decide not to pick up my phone, and that is not itself the decision to respond to your response instead. Viz., one can decide to not perform an action, and this does not imply a decision to do something else—even if one has to perform actions for the rest of their life continuously.

Likewise, I can act without choosing, which you seem to agree with me on that, and this implies that I can choose to not act and then proceed to act without choosing—which refutes your position here.

"Choice" as in 'intent to act' and "choice" as in 'how I acted'.

This is the closest you got to a definition, but instead of giving one noted two mutually exclusive definitions of the word; and I am not sure which one you mean to use for this discussion. Are you taking a pluralistic account of the concept? — Bob Ross

There is a past, present, and future tense to choice. I'm making a choice, I've made my choice, I've completed my choice. A choice can only be made when there are options of action in a moral set of options. So when discussing choice, we have to think about whether we are using the past, present, or future tense. In all cases, a choice is only realized through action when faced with a series of actionable options, at least in the moral sense.

I have been wondering if there are choices that do not require actions. and perhaps there are in the non-moral sense. For example, "What's your favorite color?" But when discussing moral choices, we are discussing actions as a moral choice is about what you will do in a particular set of possible outcomes.

For me, ‘a choice’ is ‘the result of the act of rational deliberation [i.e., thinking]’ and ‘the act of choosing’ is ‘the act of rationally deliberating [i.e., thinking]’. — Bob Ross

This is my thinking as well. What you are describing is the present and future. "Choosing" is the present, and "choice" is either future or past. Future if you have yet to act on it, and past if you have.

I am assuming you don’t mean to say that ‘the act of choosing’ nor ‘a choice’ each have two equally cogent and incompatible definitions; so this actualized vs. unactualized distinction is just noting that when we choose to do something sometimes it doesn’t actually happen. I don’t have any problems with this; however, I must note that this in no way entails that all choices made are about actions. — Bob Ross

This last part of the sentence did get me thinking if there were choices that didn't require actions. And perhaps there are, but I did not see this in a moral sense. Trying to go along your line of thinking, there is the idea of the armchair philosopher who creates a scenario in their head and says, "This is what I would choose if the scenario presented itself." But again, this requires an action. Sometimes when the reality of the situation is present, what a person thinks they will choose is not the same as what they actually choose. And what they actually choose is how they act in the situation.

In a moral situation, it seems to always come down to actions as we talk about the results. And results are dependent on how the person acted in the situation. I can say, I chose not to pull the lever, but I did anyway," as a form of speech. But if you had free agency, you may have wanted to choose to not pull the lever, but when the time came, you did choose to pull the lever. Can you think of any moral examples of choice that don't inevitably come down to action?

Are you agreeing that an ‘action’ is a ‘volition of will’? It seems like you are accepting my definition now, because this is the closest you got to defining an ‘action’ in your response. — Bob Ross

Sure, I never rejected your definition of action, I did add a little to it though. An action of will would be an action of agency. An autonomous action would not involve one's will, like a reflex or natural breathing.

The point is, that choices are all about intent of action, or actual action.

Why? That just begs the question. — Bob Ross

Because a choice that isn't acted on in a moral sense isn't really what you chose. If I say, "I'm going to walk to the park today," then walk to the store, what did I really choose? Choosing doesn't require an action yet. A choice that has not had an action expect that choice to be actualized eventually. And a choice that has been actualized is one that has been acted on.

No, it is equivalent to, "I decided to perform an action that was not X". It in no way means, "I took no action at all".

This is so patently false though! E.g., I can legitimately decide not to pick up my phone, and that is not itself the decision to respond to your response instead. — Bob Ross

I didn't quite get this example.

I have a choice, I can either pick up the phone, or not pick up the phone. But if I don't pick up the phone, what am I doing instead? Whatever I am doing is what I chose to do instead of pick up the phone. This is if the choice is in the past tense, or actualized by action.

Viz., one can decide to not perform an action, and this does not imply a decision to do something else—even if one has to perform actions for the rest of their life continuously. — Bob Ross

How? If you're not doing X, and you're doing something else instead, aren't you doing an action? And isn't a fully realized choice how you act?

Alright Bob! I hope that made things more clear. What might help me to see what your seeing as well, is if you can come up with examples of choices that don't require actions, and then see if we can apply them in moral situations. As I noted, I tried to think of something, but the most I could come up with was an opinion, or maybe a statement of intent that a person ended up not going through with at the moment of action. The problem with the latter is of course, the real choice is what a person did, despite what they thought they would do. Anyway, let me know what you think as usual.

Since you continue to fail to give an internally coherent definition of the vital concepts at play (e.g., ‘to act’, ‘to choose’, ‘a choice’, etc.), and with all due respect, I am forced to assume you don’t have any; and so I am going to proceed with my definitions for my response here. Please let me know, at any time, what your definitions are if you can think of them; and if it is the case that you don’t have any because, perhaps, you haven’t had to dive this deep into those concepts then no worries! I’ve been there too!

The good news is that you now seem to recognize that not all choices are about actions; but the bad news is you think all morally relevant choices are about actions. Before we get into that, I need to point out a couple slightly irrelevant issues with your response:

Sure, I never rejected your definition of action, I did add a little to it though. An action of will would be an action of agency. An autonomous action would not involve one's will, like a reflex or natural breathing.

You cannot accept that an action is a volition of will and then say not all actions involve willing—that’s patently incoherent; so, no, you technically are not accepting my definition. This is why I wanted to you to define an ‘action’, because you are importing a definition which as of now remains utterly concealed and notional. For now, I am assuming that an ‘action’ is a ‘volition of will’ and, thusly, that an ‘autonomous action’, by virtue of being an action, does involve willing.

This is my thinking as well. What you are describing is the present and future. "Choosing" is the present, and "choice" is either future or past. Future if you have yet to act on it, and past if you have.

If a ‘choice’ is ‘the result of the act of rational deliberation [i.e., thinking]’ and you agree with me (by saying ‘this is my thinking as well’), then you would have to agree that:

1. Not all actions involve choices.
2. Not all voluntary actions involve choices.

I think we can agree on this now that you agree with my definitions.

Ok, on to the substance of the conversation: why would one think that not all morally relevant choices are about actions?

First, we have to understand what a morally relevant choice is. Now, to avoid begging the question, I would like to point out that what makes the choice morally relevant is that it is about what is permissible, impermissible, omissible, or obligatory as those concepts relate to goodness and badness—irregardless if you would leave out inaction from consideration with respect to choices.

Now, if we give an example of any of those moral modes of thought, then we can evidently see that it can pertain to inaction. E.g., it is permissible, sometimes, to not do something. This entails that morally relevant choices can be about inaction—e.g., to say ‘it is permissible to not do X’ is to the say that ‘one can choose to not do X [if they so choose]’.

This immediately invalidates your position.

If you're not doing X, and you're doing something else instead, aren't you doing an action?

You are failing to analyze the given choice per se: we are currently asking if a given choice can be about, and only about, not doing something. What you are noting is, at best, after making that choice another choice may be committed to do something instead of what was chosen not to be done. E.g., if I choose to not eat ice cream and go for a walk instead, I have chosen (1) to not eat ice cream and chosen (2) to go for a walk. The reasons for each decision may be interrelated, but they are separate decisions.

This is why I think you are wanting an example of a morally relevant choice that results in inaction and are failing to find one, because in all my examples you are conflating the analysis of the given choice qua itself with qua all choices related to it.

The most obvious example I have is choosing to not get up from one’s chair and continue doing whatever they were already doing. What you are going note is that whatever I am continuing to do is itself an action; and you would be right. However, (1) my choice to not get up is a choice solely about inaction, (2) my choice to keep doing what I am doing is a separate choice (albeit related), and (3) the choice to continue doing something is about continuing to act and does not introduce a new action into the mix.

If you can try to segregate the choices being made instead of evaluating them on the final, chronological action being taken; then I think you will be able to see what I am saying.

Since you continue to fail to give an internally coherent definition of the vital concepts at play (e.g., ‘to act’, ‘to choose’, ‘a choice’, etc.) — Bob Ross

It would be helpful if you pointed out how its incoherent as I'm not seeing it. But its ok to move on.

You cannot accept that an action is a volition of will and then say not all actions involve willing—that’s patently incoherent; so, no, you technically are not accepting my definition. This is why I wanted to you to define an ‘action’, because you are importing a definition which as of now remains utterly concealed and notional. For now, I am assuming that an ‘action’ is a ‘volition of will’ and, thusly, that an ‘autonomous action’, by virtue of being an action, does involve willing. — Bob Ross

I honestly have no issue in separating the two concepts if you have a term that properly covers 'autonomous' actions. "When I entered the cave, I sneezed," describes to me what people would call an action. Its one they couldn't help, a reflex that was outside of their autonomy, or choice. What are you calling an involuntary sneeze then?

If a ‘choice’ is ‘the result of the act of rational deliberation [i.e., thinking]’ and you agree with me (by saying ‘this is my thinking as well’), then you would have to agree that:

1. Not all actions involve choices.
2. Not all voluntary actions involve choices. — Bob Ross

If an action is a volition of will, then how can it not be a choice? What you will to happen is what you choose to happen no?

I don't see how its possible to make an action and say, "I didn't choose to do it", if you voluntarily did it. If we don't voluntarily do something we say, "We had no choice". If we voluntarily commit to something we say, "This is what I chose to do." How do you reconcile this with the way the words are most commonly used in language?

Now, to avoid begging the question, I would like to point out that what makes the choice morally relevant is that it is about what is permissible, impermissible, omissible, or obligatory as those concepts relate to goodness and badness—irregardless if you would leave out inaction from consideration with respect to choices. — Bob Ross

Except what do the terms of permissibility mean? "They mean what you should, and should not act on". If something is obligatory, it means I should act in accordance to that obligation. If its "You are obliged to save that man," and you do nothing but say, "I choose to say the man", you did not fulfill your obligation. As the old saying goes, "Talk is cheap." :)

Now, if we give an example of any of those moral modes of thought, then we can evidently see that it can pertain to inaction. E.g., it is permissible, sometimes, to not do something. — Bob Ross

That would literally mean its permissible to cease to exist, and nothing more. Again, you're taking a figure of speech, "I did nothing", and thinking that means you actually did nothing. No, you did something. Give me an example in which you did absolutely no actions.

You are failing to analyze the given choice per se: we are currently asking if a given choice can be about, and only about, not doing something. — Bob Ross

I feel I've analyzed it pretty in depth at this point. You say its incoherent, but you haven't really pointed out why based on what I've stated so far. It would help if you went back through and showed why its incoherent instead of just claiming it is. I feel the point is straight forward. If you choose not to do one thing, you are choosing to do something else. How is that wrong? Show me an instance in which a person chooses not to do X, and at the moment in which they don't do X, they are not doing anything else.

E.g., if I choose to not eat ice cream and go for a walk instead, I have chosen (1) to not eat ice cream and chosen (2) to go for a walk. The reasons for each decision may be interrelated, but they are separate decisions. — Bob Ross

Of course they are separate decisions. But at the end of the day the choice is only realized by action. There is always a relation between what you acted on, and what you did not. Thus your actionable choice has something that you acted on, and something that you didn't. It is impossible to have what you didn't do, without what you did instead. I can claim I'm going to go eat ice cream, but if I go for a walk, I did not commit to my former choice, but instead chose to go for a walk.

This is why I think you are wanting an example of a morally relevant choice that results in inaction and are failing to find one, because in all my examples you are conflating the analysis of the given choice qua itself with qua all choices related to it. — Bob Ross

I don't understand what this means, can you elaborate more?

The most obvious example I have is choosing to not get up from one’s chair and continue doing whatever they were already doing. What you are going note is that whatever I am continuing to do is itself an action; and you would be right. — Bob Ross

That's all I'm saying. If you understand this, you understand my position.

However, (1) my choice to not get up is a choice solely about inaction, (2) my choice to keep doing what I am doing is a separate choice (albeit related), and (3) the choice to continue doing something is about continuing to act and does not introduce a new action into the mix. — Bob Ross

1. It is solely about inaction on that one particular option. It does not entail that you did not act on another option.

2. No argument. But my point if you say, "I did not get up", when I ask what you chose to do instead you say, "Lay in the chair".

3. Whether the action is new or not doesn't seem to have relevance. We're just taking your choices: Stand up, lay in the chair. You choose to lay in the chair. It doesn't matter what your choice was one second ago, an hour ago, or a year ago. We're just talking about you having a choice to make within a time frame, then acting on that choice. If you say you were going to do something, then act on it, that's the choice you made upon the actions completion. If you say were going to do something, then did something else at the moment of action, if voluntary, that action is what you ultimately chose to do.
And again, your reason for laying down could have been, "Because I didn't want to get up." That's fine. Your action was still to lay in the chair.

It would be helpful if you pointed out how its incoherent as I'm not seeing it. But its ok to move on.

Like I said before, you haven’t defined them clearly; and your attempts I outlined before:

”Sure, I never rejected your definition of action, I did add a little to it though. An action of will would be an action of agency. An autonomous action would not involve one's will, like a reflex or natural breathing. “ – Philosophim


You cannot accept that an action is a volition of will and then say not all actions involve willing—that’s patently incoherent; — Bob Ross

”"Choice" as in 'intent to act' and "choice" as in 'how I acted'. “ – Philosopim


This is the closest you got to a definition, but instead of giving one noted two mutually exclusive definitions of the word; and I am not sure which one you mean to use for this discussion. Are you taking a pluralistic account of the concept? — Bob Ross

"When I entered the cave, I sneezed," describes to me what people would call an action. Its one they couldn't help, a reflex that was outside of their autonomy, or choice. What are you calling an involuntary sneeze then?

Under my definitions, sneezing upon entering a cave might constitute a voluntary act (although it would perhaps be a stretch); because it is a volition of will insofar as my body will’s to sneeze as a reaction. In my view, the knee-jerk reaction to the doctor hitting your knee (to test its reflexes) is a voluntary act; but not an act of choice.

Remember, voluntariness is about what is in accordance with one’s will; and choosing is about what is in accordance with the conclusions of rational deliberation.

Whether or not sneezing upon entering a cave is voluntary or not is going to hinge, for me, on if one can connect it to the will of the organism which sneezed. Irregardless, an involuntary act would be like sneezing because one’s brain has a huge tumor in it that is causing the sneeze.

I honestly have no issue in separating the two concepts if you have a term that properly covers 'autonomous' actions.

What you are calling an ‘autonomous action’ is for me an action which is not a choice. There’s not second concept at play here for me: that’s the issue with your concepts. You agreed with my definition and then turned around and implicitly denied it.

If an action is a volition of will, then how can it not be a choice? What you will to happen is what you choose to happen no?

Willing is not always a product of thought; and thusly is not always a product of rational deliberation. So not all acts are choices, but all acts are willed. E.g., punching someone out of pure rage can happen very well without any thinking involved, and this is an action but not a choice—and likewise the action is (most likely) voluntary because it was willed in accordance with one’s will. It is important to note that not everything which is willed is in correspondence with one’s will—e.g., eating ice cream because someone is threatening to kill you otherwise.

I don't see how its possible to make an action and say, "I didn't choose to do it", if you voluntarily did it.

That is because you still haven’t defined the concepts! What is ‘voluntariness’ under your view? What is an ‘action’?

For me, I have been very clear; and it follows from my definitions that an action can be voluntary without being a choice (since an action can be in correspondence with one’s will without being a product of rational deliberation [i.e., thinking]).

How do you reconcile this with the way the words are most commonly used in language?

Common language is full of vague, notional, incoherent, and irreconcilable uses of terms: I am not particularly interested in trying to fit my schema to match 1:1 the common usages; however, I am interested in giving a refined schema which can provide clarity with respect to their common usages. E.g., people say “I think <…>” interchangeable with “I feel <…>” when these are clearly different concepts, and I am not interested in reconciling them.

Except what do the terms of permissibility mean? "They mean what you should, and should not act on".

Permissibility is the mode of moral thought whereof one can do an act but doesn’t have to. What you just described is impermissibility or obligatoriness.

I feel I've analyzed it pretty in depth at this point.

Send me the links to where you defined the following clearly: ‘an action’, ‘to act’, ‘a choice’, ‘to choose’, and ‘voluntariness’. You haven’t.

That would literally mean its permissible to cease to exist, and nothing more. Again, you're taking a figure of speech, "I did nothing", and thinking that means you actually did nothing. No, you did something. Give me an example in which you did absolutely no actions.
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This is why I think you are wanting an example of a morally relevant choice that results in inaction and are failing to find one, because in all my examples you are conflating the analysis of the given choice qua itself with qua all choices related to it. — Bob Ross

I don't understand what this means, can you elaborate more?

The problem is that you are not understanding that a choice can be made about something without it also itself being made about something else. I have pointed out that one can choose to do nothing, and you keep pointing out that after making that choice they then separately choose to do something else. Plainly and simply put: one can reach a conclusion with rational thought which has absolutely no reference to performing an action and complete reference to not performing an action.

Here’s exactly that issue:

1. It is solely about inaction on that one particular option. It does not entail that you did not act on another option.
…
Of course they are separate decisions.

If you agree that they are separate decisions, then you agree that they are separate choices being made! If you agree that they are separate choices being made, then the choice to not do it is itself a choice and solely about inaction: that’s the only point I have been making. Your view only works if you deny that they are separate choices; because you have defined a decision in such a manner as to exclude the possibility of a choice being made which refers solely to an inaction.

The most obvious example I have is choosing to not get up from one’s chair and continue doing whatever they were already doing. What you are going note is that whatever I am continuing to do is itself an action; and you would be right. — Bob Ross

That's all I'm saying. If you understand this, you understand my position.

Which doesn’t demonstrate your original point, which was that choosing cannot be about inactions. If you agree with me on this now, then you can now understand why inactions can be evaluated independently of any subsequent actions one takes—viz., it is possible for me to say that an inaction is evaluated differently than an action.

Remember, my original point was that, all else being equal, one should let themselves continue to starve because the only action they can take is to steal. You cannot appreciate this if you keep denying that one can let something bad happen (which implies it was a result of inaction that is to blame for the bad thing happening).

Remember, my original point was that, all else being equal, one should let themselves continue to starve because the only action they can take is to steal — Bob Ross

Letting yourself starve is a crime against yourself. You wouldn't let a dog starve, how could it be right to let yourself starve?

Under my definitions, sneezing upon entering a cave might constitute a voluntary act (although it would perhaps be a stretch); because it is a volition of will insofar as my body will’s to sneeze as a reaction. — Bob Ross

So is your heart beating an act of will then? Surely you see the clear difference that I'm noting between acts of will and autonomous acts correct? My definition of autonomous acts doesn't contrast with your idea of acts of volition, I'm just noticing that some actions can be outside of our volition through reflex or automatic responses that we don't really choose.

In my view, the knee-jerk reaction to the doctor hitting your knee (to test its reflexes) is a voluntary act; but not an act of choice. — Bob Ross

If it was voluntary, it wouldn't be an unconscious reflex. Its very strange that you think an unconscious reflex is an action of will. Most would say will is a conscious effort. And I agree, an involuntary reflex is not a choice.

Remember, voluntariness is about what is in accordance with one’s will; and choosing is about what is in accordance with the conclusions of rational deliberation. — Bob Ross

Right, I don't think my definitions contradict your points. I'm only adding extra points to them to handle exceptions like involuntary reflexes. If you're saying they're an act of will...I don't know what to tell you. The medical community notes that reflex reactions are things that are unconscious actions.

https://byjus.com/biology/nervous-system-coordination/#:~:text=Reflex%20action%20or%20reflex%20is,when%20exposed%20to%20bright%20light.
"Reflex action or reflex is an involuntary action in response to a stimulus. This is a spontaneous action without thinking. For example, we adjust our eyes when exposed to bright light."

Irregardless, an involuntary act would be like sneezing because one’s brain has a huge tumor in it that is causing the sneeze. — Bob Ross

Its just a nervous system response built up over centuries of evolution. No tumor. :)

What you are calling an ‘autonomous action’ is for me an action which is not a choice. There’s not second concept at play here for me: that’s the issue with your concepts. You agreed with my definition and then turned around and implicitly denied it. — Bob Ross

No, I don't think you understood my points at all if you think that. I've clearly stated a few times now I'm just adding onto what you've put forward. I agree that an autonomous action is not a choice. Its outside of one's will. A choice which is acted on is a volition of will. I've never contradicted that.

That is because you still haven’t defined the concepts! What is ‘voluntariness’ under your view? What is an ‘action’? — Bob Ross

An act of volition. An involuntary action like a reflex is not an act of volition.

For me, I have been very clear; and it follows from my definitions that an action can be voluntary without being a choice (since an action can be in correspondence with one’s will without being a product of rational deliberation [i.e., thinking]). — Bob Ross

How? A reflex? Science has already noted reflexes are involuntary. Give me another example.

Common language is full of vague, notional, incoherent, and irreconcilable uses of terms: I am not particularly interested in trying to fit my schema to match 1:1 the common usages; however, I am interested in giving a refined schema which can provide clarity with respect to their common usages. — Bob Ross

Right, but this didn't answer my question. How does your refined schema provide clarity with respect to their common usages when what your saying contrasts common usages?

I feel I've analyzed it pretty in depth at this point.

Send me the links to where you defined the following clearly: ‘an action’, ‘to act’, ‘a choice’, ‘to choose’, and ‘voluntariness’. You haven’t. — Bob Ross

If I have not been clear, I'll put them in definition format:

Action - Noun. A bodily state at any tick of time. This can be an act of volition, or an autonomous act.
Act of volition - Noun. An act based on will/consciousness/intention/agency.
Autonomous act - Noun. An unconscious act. One's will is not behind this. An autonomous reflex is an example.

To act - Verb. The act of undertaking an action at any tick of time.
A choice - Noun. A decision that when given a set of options to act on, one or more are chosen. Choices have a reason. They can be emotional, rational, but are made with agency. Reasons can be as simple as, "I didn't like the other choices", to complex as a highly refined argument. "Choice" can be defined in terms of the past, present, and future.

Past choice: A moment in time prior to now in which a decision was made to take an action at x time. X time may, or may not have passed. If X time has passed, and the action was completed at X, then the choice was fulfilled. If X time has passed, and the action was not completed at X, then that past choice was unfulfilled. A past choice is a promise of intent, but it is a promise that does not have to be kept.

Present choice: The option one has decided to act at the moment. An autonomous action is not a choice.

Future choice: A declaration of intention of how one will act at X seconds. A promise does not need to be fulfilled, and a choice can change up until the point of X seconds.

Voluntary - The choice and/or action are made with agency.

Except what do the terms of permissibility mean? "They mean what you should, and should not act on".

Permissibility is the mode of moral thought whereof one can do an act but doesn’t have to. What you just described is impermissibility or obligatoriness. — Bob Ross

By 'terms of permissibility' that was meant to include all variations such as impermissibility. What is deemed as permissible can be due to logic, limitations, or societal allowances. You are either logically, by limitation, or socially obligated to not do what is impermissible, and only do what is permissible. You should only act in ways that are permissible, you should not act in ways that are not permissible.

The problem is that you are not understanding that a choice can be made about something without it also itself being made about something else. I have pointed out that one can choose to do nothing, and you keep pointing out that after making that choice they then separately choose to do something else. Plainly and simply put: one can reach a conclusion with rational thought which has absolutely no reference to performing an action and complete reference to not performing an action. — Bob Ross

I did say earlier that one could possibly make a choice in reference to an opinion. "I choose that my favorite color is blue." for example. But we're not talking about opinions in the case of moral decisions. Because moral decisions are about actions. You even note in your example, "Choose to do nothing". "Doing" is the an act. As I've noted many times, this is not clear language, but slang. What are you doing today. "Just hanging". You're not actually hanging from something like a tree. Slang is always an indirect implication, and the words should not be taken literally.

You cannot 'choose to do nothing' in an exact sense, as whatever action you are doing at time X, is if you did no action of any kind. You would be dead. Just like I wasn't literally hanging at time X, I'm not literally 'doing nothing' at time X. As I've noted before, the slang is shorthand for, "Out of a selection of choices, A, B, and C, I chose to an option that did not fit any of those options at X time. This can be as simple as standing there, looking to the left, or pondering what you'll have for dinner when the given options were, Did you choose to "Walk, jog, or run?" "I chose to do nothing." Does that mean you ceased to exist at time X? No, it just means you didn't act from that selection of choices, but you did act in some other way.

1. It is solely about inaction on that one particular option. It does not entail that you did not act on another option.
…
Of course they are separate decisions.

The full context of the above to be clear:

E.g., if I choose to not eat ice cream and go for a walk instead, I have chosen (1) to not eat ice cream and chosen (2) to go for a walk. The reasons for each decision may be interrelated, but they are separate decisions.
— Bob Ross

Of course they are separate decisions. But at the end of the day the choice is only realized by action. There is always a relation between what you acted on, and what you did not. Thus your actionable choice has something that you acted on, and something that you didn't. It is impossible to have what you didn't do, without what you did instead. I can claim I'm going to go eat ice cream, but if I go for a walk, I did not commit to my former choice, but instead chose to go for a walk. — Philosophim

Please address the full context. As I've mentioned several times, you may logically list what you didn't act on as part of a choice at X time, but that doesn't mean you didn't act at X time.

The most obvious example I have is choosing to not get up from one’s chair and continue doing whatever they were already doing. What you are going note is that whatever I am continuing to do is itself an action; and you would be right. — Bob Ross

That's all I'm saying. If you understand this, you understand my position.

Which doesn’t demonstrate your original point, which was that choosing cannot be about inactions. — Bob Ross

At what point in that decision was no action made? Laying down in the chair at X seconds is what you chose to do. Is lying there not an action? Is that not a choice?

Remember, my original point was that, all else being equal, one should let themselves continue to starve because the only action they can take is to steal. You cannot appreciate this if you keep denying that one can let something bad happen (which implies it was a result of inaction that is to blame for the bad thing happening). — Bob Ross

I have never stated that you cannot choose to let something bad happen. I have only been stating, "You always take an action, you cannot avoid it." Meaning you choose to starve or steal. What you seem to be implying is like if I said, "I'm currently stealing, but my only choice is to starve. So I don't make a choice and continue stealing." So again, as you noted there are relative evils. Which is more evil, to starve or to steal?

The circumstances can inform us of how to act, but they never dictate whether an action is right, wrong, or neutral. If stealing is wrong, then one should not steal: period.

If we want to get very technical, 'stealing' isn't a very clear act; as the government takes people's earned wealth all the time without their consent and it is not considered stealing (e.g., taxation). A worthy question to ask is: "what is stealing, exactly?". Stealing, to me, is actually, technically, a neutral act; because taking someone's private property isn't wrong in-itself--as is clear with taxation. I think a lot of laws are built around pragmatically and generally instilling justice; and so a lot of those laws are themselves circumstantial.

In the case that an act is neutral, then whether or not someone should be doing it is determined by the effect which they intend to bring about, and any side effects which will also reasonably be brought about.

It is also worth exploring whether it is permissible for a person who has the means and wealth to feed a starving person to choose not to; but this would be besides the point I made.

However, I mentioned none of this to Philosophim because I am trying to get them to analyze actions in-themselves, and assuming stealing is wrong per se is an easy example for demonstrative purposes.

I thought we made progress, but now that I have gotten you to try to define the concepts it is clear to me that you are still not agreeing on even the parts that you have agreed to before; so I am going to focus on addressing your definitions for now (so that we don’t talk in circles here).

That is because you still haven’t defined the concepts! What is ‘voluntariness’ under your view? What is an ‘action’? — Bob Ross

An act of volition. An involuntary action like a reflex is not an act of volition.

This is a circular definition: you defined an action as an act of volition.

Action - Noun. A bodily state at any tick of time.

Like I stated before, this would include what is clearly not an action—e.g., lying perfectly still in a coma. As bodily states are not always volitions of will.

Act of volition - Noun. An act based on will/consciousness/intention/agency.

You are lumping a lot of distinct concepts together there: when people use the term “conscious”, they are usually referring to the ‘ego’ or, in other words, self-consciousness. That’s why most people still associate the ‘id’ with ‘subconsciousness’.

Willing is not tied to conscious acts in the sense of actions which the ‘ego’ takes responsibility for. Willing is a faculty of imposition of a disposition determined by an agent; and there are degrees to willing—e.g., to take your example, the heart beating is still, as far as I remember, an act willed by the brain and, so, it is voluntary but that does not mean that it was willed equivocally to when your brain decides to eat ice cream.

Autonomous act - Noun. An unconscious act

I see what you are going for; but, again, unconscious acts are obviously willed. E.g., sleep walking. You are going to have a hard time explaining why sleep walking isn’t an action willed by the brain but yet is an unconscious act.

To act - Verb. The act of undertaking an action at any tick of time.

This is circular: ‘to act’ cannot be defined in terms of ‘the act of <…>’. This definition needs to be thrown out.

A choice - Noun. A decision that when given a set of options to act on, one or more are chosen. Choices have a reason. They can be emotional, rational, but are made with agency. Reasons can be as simple as, "I didn't like the other choices", to complex as a highly refined argument. "Choice" can be defined in terms of the past, present, and future.

Past choice: A moment in time prior to now in which a decision was made to take an action at x time. X time may, or may not have passed. If X time has passed, and the action was completed at X, then the choice was fulfilled. If X time has passed, and the action was not completed at X, then that past choice was unfulfilled. A past choice is a promise of intent, but it is a promise that does not have to be kept.

Present choice: The option one has decided to act at the moment. An autonomous action is not a choice.

Future choice: A declaration of intention of how one will act at X seconds. A promise does not need to be fulfilled, and a choice can change up until the point of X seconds.

Why are you separating their definitions based off of time? A choice is a choice. Once you define what a choice is, then you can easily determine its past, present, and future tense. You don’t start out without a definition and start defining the tenses separately.
Let me try, nevertheless, to dissect them anyways:

A choice - Noun. A decision that when given a set of options to act on, one or more are chosen
…
Past choice: A moment in time prior to now in which a decision was made to take an action at x time
…
Present choice: The option one has decided to act at the moment.

All of these are circular! A decision is a choice! I am throwing out these definitions: please provide a new one that isn’t circular. You did not get any closer to exposing what you mean by making a choice here nor what a choice is: you just substituted the word for a synonym.

The only one that isn’t circular is this one:

Future choice: A declaration of intention of how one will act at X seconds

Ok, so a declaration of intention to act (in the future) is a future choice. So this would mean that a choice is an intention to act—no? Are you defining a choice as an intention to act?

Again, we have agreed now that it would be patently false to define a choice as about actions; so this definition of future choices and the extrapolated definition of a choice are both patently false. You’ve already agreed with me that choices can be about things which aren’t actions nor inactions (e.g., picking a favorite color).

Do you see how all over the place your definitions are? How they inchohere with all the progress we’ve made at getting you to see that choices aren’t just about actions?

Voluntary - The choice and/or action are made with agency.

What’s agency? We need to try to stick to the same terms so we can find common ground. This definition seems oddly close to mine (of an action in correspondence with one’s will) but there’s slight differences that I don’t know how to parse—e.g., splitting up a choice and an action in this definition implies that some choices are not actions (which you denied above in your definition of a choice) and that some of those can be made without agency (which makes no sense: how does one make a choice without thinking about it?--or do you just mean thinking about it but with external coercion involved?).

The circumstances can inform us of how to act, but they never dictate whether an action is right, wrong, or neutral. If stealing is wrong, then one should not steal: period. — Bob Ross

Likewise it is wrong to injure yourself.

This is a circular definition: you defined an action as an act of volition.

Action - Noun. A bodily state at any tick of time. — Bob Ross

Oh, I need to amend that. It would be better as "A bodily state of a living being..." I described an action as above, then defined what an act was. An act is the verbal enactment of an action. An act can be of two types, one of volition, and an involuntary act. If you intend your bodily state to be A at time X, that's an act of volition. If you don't, like an autonomous reflex, then its not an act of volition. So if I act on the lever to pull it, I'm using my hands to exert force on the lever with the intent to move it.

Like I stated before, this would include what is clearly not an action—e.g., lying perfectly still in a coma. As bodily states are not always volitions of will. — Bob Ross

Hopefully my adendum of "a living being' helps clarify this. Being in a coma is an autonomous action, not an act of will. You are still alive. I (don't think) I'm denying your note that we have acts of volition, I'm just noting that some of our acts are against what we will. I'm not understanding why this is controversial, as it is a common understanding in science that the body will act in ways apart from our conscious will.

What I don't understand how is how purposefully lying down is not an action of volition under both yours and my definition. If lying down is not an act of volition, then are you saying you were forced to lie down? That you had no decision or choice to lie down at X seconds? That your will was not involved?

I am trying to understand your viewpoint, so let me ask a few questions to help me. Do you believe that an action is only made if you alter the state you are in from a previous moment of time? You keep implying that lying down is not an action, because you already chose to lie down previously, but prior to the new considerations in front of you. So five seconds later, if I have a choice to get up instead of lying down, by default lying down isn't an action because I've already been doing it?

The problem is we can reverse this. So I could be pulling the lever and it isn't budging. Two seconds later I get a choice that I can release the lever. But if we are to extend logically your implications on an action, because I've been pulling the lever, continuing to pull the lever isn't an action, while releasing it would be. So in your case if I continued to pull the lever, it wouldn't be an act of volition because I had been, and when faced with the new choice I would continue to 'do nothing instead'.

The division between conscious and unconscious actions is a fairly common understanding in science, and if you are going to deny that it exists that demands high justification. So far I have not seen any justification we cannot have actions that do not involve our volition besides an insistence we cannot.

Is it because we have a different understanding of volition?

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/volition

1. the power of choosing or determining : will
2 an act of making a choice or decision
also : a choice or decision made

What do you mean by volition when you use it?

(Me) Act of volition - Noun. An act based on will/consciousness/intention/agency.

You are lumping a lot of distinct concepts together there: when people use the term “conscious”, they are usually referring to the ‘ego’ or, in other words, self-consciousness. That’s why most people still associate the ‘id’ with ‘subconsciousness’. — Bob Ross

In the context of what I've written you would need to be conscious to have volition right? To be clear, I'm only referring to 'conscious' in reference to unconscious. We do not need to go into Freud. :) We're talking about choice as a rational process right? You need to be conscious, aware, and will to go through with them. In other words, a sleep walking person who pulled the lever would in no way be choosing to pull the lever. That action is outside of their conscious control.

Autonomous act - Noun. An unconscious act

I see what you are going for; but, again, unconscious acts are obviously willed. E.g., sleep walking. You are going to have a hard time explaining why sleep walking isn’t an action willed by the brain but yet is an unconscious act. — Bob Ross

I have never heard the phrase, "I willed to sleepwalk". Bob, can you clarify your definition of will please? This is a contradiction to the general notion of will. Surely there is another word that captures what you want here without outright destroying the general notion of will as people understand it? I mean, there is no court of law that would say that an unconscious action was an act of will or consent. If I went up to a sleep walker and asked them, "Would you sign this form that gives all of your property and wealth away to me," and they did, this would not represent the will of the person.

To act - Verb. The act of undertaking an action at any tick of time.

This is circular: ‘to act’ cannot be defined in terms of ‘the act of <…>’. This definition needs to be thrown out. — Bob Ross

Ah, I should have proof read more carefully! :) Change it to "Undertaking an action at any tick of time". Its just the verb form of 'action'.

Why are you separating their definitions based off of time? A choice is a choice. Once you define what a choice is, then you can easily determine its past, present, and future tense. — Bob Ross

Ah, I neglected to note that these are in reference to choice as a verb. We can use choice as a noun and choice as a verb. A choice, in a moral decision, is a promise of action. Undertaking a choice, or 'choosing' is the verbal description. Therefore with choice as a verb, we can consider it as prior to an action, a choice being fulfilled as an action, and a choice that was fulfilled as an action. After all, I can choose 10 seconds prior to when pulling the lever would make a difference that, I won't pull it. Then choose two seconds before that I will. Then at the moment of time to pull the lever, choose again not to.

All of these are circular! A decision is a choice! — Bob Ross

Ok, if you view a decision as synonymous with a choice, then lets use another word. First, I'm just showing I'm not crazy Choice - "an act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities" Oxford Language But lets change it.

Intent - resolved or determined to do

A choice - Noun. An intent of action that when given a set of options to act on, one or more are chosen

Past choice: Verb. A moment in time prior to now in which an intent was made to take an action at x time

Present choice: Verb. The attempt to to fulfill one's intention by action.

Future choice: Verb. A declaration of intention of how one will act at X seconds. A promise does not need to be fulfilled, and a choice can change up until the point of X seconds.

Again, we have agreed now that it would be patently false to define a choice as about actions; so this definition of future choices and the extrapolated definition of a choice are both patently false. — Bob Ross

No we have not agreed to this at all. I have noted that there is the possibility of making a choice without regards to actions, proposing an opinion, but you have not followed up with me on that. One example I can see as a choice without an action is, "Out of the moral choices, which one do you like the most?" Again, an opinion, and not a declaration of action. But the focus of our discussion are about moral choices as actions. You are "Pulling, or not pulling the lever". Its not, "What do you think is better, "Pulling or not pulling the lever?" The prior is about the intent to act, the second is a conveyance of opinion.

So really what we're talking about are actionable choices, and unactionable choices in regards to moral decisions. You are claiming that 'Not pulling the lever' is an unactionable choice, but I have seen no good argument given for why this is. If you had said, "I think its better not to pull the lever", then yes, that's an unactionable choice. But if the moral decision is about how we will act at time X. It is an actionable choice, and we cannot 'not act' in the literal sense.

Do you see how all over the place your definitions are? How they inchohere with all the progress we’ve made at getting you to see that choices aren’t just about actions? — Bob Ross

I don't see how they're all over the place. Amendments on some word use sure, but the intent of what I'm trying to convey I believe has been fairly consistent.

What’s agency? We need to try to stick to the same terms so we can find common ground. This definition seems oddly close to mine (of an action in correspondence with one’s will) but there’s slight differences that I don’t know how to parse—e.g., splitting up a choice and an action in this definition implies that some choices are not actions (which you denied above in your definition of a choice) and that some of those can be made without agency (which makes no sense: how does one make a choice without thinking about it?--or do you just mean thinking about it but with external coercion involved?). — Bob Ross

Yes, that's fair. You can replace 'act of agency' with 'act of volition'. We just need to make sure we're on the same page of what you mean by 'volition'. Do my definitions above work, or did you have something else in mind? My intent is to hew as close to as possible to 'act of volition', but also noting that there can be acts that do not have volition, or autonomous actions.

Good discussion Bob! I look forward to your thoughts.

The main issue is that we will not be able to find common ground until we both provide clear schemas of the concepts; and, dare I say, your definitions are still patently (internally) incoherent with your view (as a whole).

For example:

A choice - Noun. An intent of action that when given a set of options to act on, one or more are chosen
…
I have noted that there is the possibility of making a choice without regards to actions

Your usage of the concept of a choice and the act of choosing are incoherent with the definition you have provided; as you defined a choice as necessarily about an intent to act, while also claiming that it is not necessarily about an intent to act. Again, you must either (1) throw out your definition of a choice, or (2) deny that choices exist about non-actions (such as choices about favorite colors). You need to address this before we get into most of what you want to discuss, because the confusion lies in the fact that you aren’t using the concepts coherently.

Being in a coma is an autonomous action, not an act of will
…
”Sure, I never rejected your definition of action, I did add a little to it though. An action of will would be an action of agency. An autonomous action would not involve one's will, like a reflex or natural breathing. “ – Philosophim

You’ve agreed with me that an action is a volition of will; but then incoherently claim that not all actions are volitions of will. This is why I think you need to deny my definition of an action to make your position work; otherwise, it is internally incoherent. You can’t say that an autonomous action is a type of action which is not a volition of will and then say that actions are volitions of will.

It seems like, from your response, that we are not referring to the same thing by ‘willing’: for you, it seems to be linked to conscious activity (in the modern sense of that term) and this you seem to interchangeably use with ‘intentionality’. For me, willing is ‘the exercised power of determining according to one’s will’; ‘a will’ is ‘the dispositions of an agent taken as a whole’; ‘an intention’ is ‘an end an agent has for something’; ‘intending’ is ‘acting’: ‘a volition of will [with an intention—which is implied given my definitions]’; and by ‘volition’ I mean ‘willing’ (viz., ‘a volition of will’ is the same as saying ‘an instance of willing’).

I completely agree that, in colloquial speech and legal speech, we would not say “I willed to sleep walk”; but this is because the terms are not robust, nor do they need to be, for their application. The average person has absolutely no robust account of what they mean by “I” nor what it means ‘to will’.

An agent is the whole of their physical constitution responsible for the processes of judging and production of dispositions which that being has; and this ‘whole’ is taken to have a will, which is just the conglomerate of dispositions which that judging being has. In this sense, it is very clear that “I willed to sleep walk”—in the event that one did sleep walk—is (1) true (because the agent as a whole, comprised of the judging faculties of the brain, did will it), (2) an action (because it is an instance of willing), and (3) is not an instance of willing with the full capacities of that agent (taken as whole). #3 is what you noted and why legal speech doesn’t think of ‘willing’ this way: all the courts are interested in is what I call ‘rationally deliberate action’ (i.e., what one chose to do).

Again, this distinction between voluntariness and choosing does not exist in colloquial speech: people say “I chose to do X” and “I did X voluntarily” interchangeably (because they have no robust analysis of these concepts).

For me, morality is concerned with right and wrong behavior that is chosen; and not merely actions which were voluntary.

The problem is that we cannot make headway on this if you cannot provide a clear and robust alternative schema to what I have put forth here; and so far I have demonstrated (above) that your definitions are still internally incoherent.

In the context of what I've written you would need to be conscious to have volition right?

NO. That’s what I am trying to get you to see: if you are using a ‘consciousness’ vs. ‘unconsciousness’ schema (and omitting ‘subconsciousness’), then sleep walking is a conscious act. Normally sleep walking is a subconscious act—if it were an unconscious act, then there would be no walking whatsoever (as someone would is unconscious, in the modern sense you are implying, has completely lost their ability to act whatsoever [e.g., a person knocked out cold from a punch]).

I think, at a minimum, you have to abandon your ‘consciousness’ vs. ‘unconsciousness’ distinction for one that includes ‘subconsciousness’. However, then you have the issue of explaining how subconscious acts aren’t actions...like sleep walking.

You might, then, sublate your view with something like: “well, ok, I need the concept of ‘subconsciousness’ to work; and sleep walking is a subconscious act; and so it is an act; but it is not an act that is willed because it wasn’t done consciously”. If that is so, then you are (1) denying my definition of an action (i.e., that an action is a volition of will) and (2) you need to provide a definition which coheres within your schema that enables you to make such a claim. You probably can do it, but then we will just to talking over each other: since all I need you to understand is that, given my definition of an action, subconscious activities are actions—under your definition, they are called something else.

But, here again, you are being incoherent:

The division between conscious and unconscious actions is a fairly common understanding in science

Again, you agreed with me that an action is a volition of will; said that unconscious actions exist (which are called autonomous actions); and said these sort of actions are not willed: this isn’t coherent. You have to throw out one of these claims.

Do you believe that an action is only made if you alter the state you are in from a previous moment of time?

No. I would say that actions are about changing reality. It may be the case that I am forcing my body to stay how it is, contrary to what it would be doing otherwise, through willing. However, willing something to be the same is the act of stopping something from doing what it was going to do otherwise; and so this is a form of change insofar as it is a form of preventing change.

What I was noting with the lying down example, is that (1) lying down is an action, but (2) continuing to lie down (all else being equal) is not. It is a lack of willing that keeps me in that position on the floor. Now, you added into the mix that I have a disability where my body naturally jerks around without me choosing it, then I am acting by forcing those jerks to stop through hyper-focus. See what I mean?

So I could be pulling the lever and it isn't budging. Two seconds later I get a choice that I can release the lever. But if we are to extend logically your implications on an action, because I've been pulling the lever, continuing to pull the lever isn't an action, while releasing it would be.

Continuing to pull the lever is a part of the action which you are still performing; and one can make decisions while still acting; so, yes, me choosing to continue to perform action X does not create a new action Y.

Again, the reason you are failing to understand this is because you have no robust nor internally coherent account of what an action vs. a choice is; nor how acting simpliciter relates to acting qua choosing.

I genuinely think that once you come up with a robust schema, a lot of these issues will expose themselves to you; and you will be able to work out the crinkles without any problems.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Your usage of the concept of a choice and the act of choosing are incoherent with the definition you have provided; as you defined a choice as necessarily about an intent to act, while also claiming that it is not necessarily about an intent to act. — Bob Ross

Sure, I've been mentioning in the discussion that yes, choice cannot involve action in particular circumstances like an opinion. But in your case of moral discussion, we are talking about actions, not opinions. You're not saying, "I choose that its better not to pull the lever." I would have no debate over you making a choice such as that. But when you say, "I choose not to pull the lever" you are bringing this into the context of action, or what you 'do' vs 'not do'. And as I've mentioned several times, if the choice is an actionable one, some type of action happens at X time. It is unavoidable.

Basically, actionable choices vs inactionable choices. I can say, "My favorite color is blue", but in an actionable choice choose a shirt that is purple instead of blue. The action doesn't change my opinion. For my view, what you need to do is demonstrate how when faced with actionable choices, you can take no action at all.

You’ve agreed with me that an action is a volition of will; but then incoherently claim that not all actions are volitions of will. — Bob Ross

I will spell out clearly so there's no confusion. I agreed with you that one type of action is an act of volition. I already defined action, then the verb of 'to act', and noted there were two types of actions. An action of volition, and an autonomous action. I even linked a science article noting there are involuntary actions. When I say "autonomous", I mean involuntary if there was any confusion.

Surely Bob if there are voluntary actions, there are involuntary actions right? Otherwise the term 'voluntary' loses its meaning entirely.

For me, willing is ‘the exercised power of determining according to one’s will’; ‘a will’ is ‘the dispositions of an agent taken as a whole’; ‘an intention’ is ‘an end an agent has for something’; ‘intending’ is ‘acting’: ‘a volition of will [with an intention—which is implied given my definitions]’; and by ‘volition’ I mean ‘willing’ (viz., ‘a volition of will’ is the same as saying ‘an instance of willing’). — Bob Ross

Ok, so "will" is a noun. And the noun is, the disposition of a person. By disposition do you mean:

a: prevailing tendency, mood, or inclination
b: temperamental makeup
c: the tendency of something to act in a certain manner under given circumstances

If so, you're just using the term disposition instead of will. And if that is the case, you and I agree. Both actions of agency and autonomy are part of a person's disposition. But a person's disposition is not will. They are not synonyms.

1: the desire, inclination, or choice of a person or group
2: the faculty of wishing, choosing, desiring, or intending

As you can see a will is a type of disposition. Just like being pliant, sad, unconscious, conscious, etc. I see no justification for changing the term 'will' to include all dispositions, when the term disposition will suffice.

For me, willing is ‘the exercised power of determining according to one’s will’ — Bob Ross

What does the "exercised power of determining" mean? Isn't that an action? Isn't the verb basically "Acting on one's will?" Considering that volition is "the faculty or power of using one's will" "Willing" would be 'an act of volition'' right?

‘an intention’ is ‘an end an agent has for something’; ‘intending’ is ‘acting’: — Bob Ross

I agree with the first part, but intending can also mean something like, "I intend to mow the lawn today". Its usually a less forceful promise of future action, opposed to, "I will mow the lawn today". The former has the possibility that something might get in the way, while the second indicates that you forsee nothing getting in the way.

and by ‘volition’ I mean ‘willing’ (viz., ‘a volition of will’ is the same as saying ‘an instance of willing’). — Bob Ross

Ok, we just need to clarify 'exercised power of determining' then. What does this mean to you?

I completely agree that, in colloquial speech and legal speech, we would not say “I willed to sleep walk”; but this is because the terms are not robust, nor do they need to be, for their application. The average person has absolutely no robust account of what they mean by “I” nor what it means ‘to will’. — Bob Ross

This is not an argument. We are not separate from people who do not study philosophy. Our language is not our own. Our job is to take the language that is commonly used, process it to be more accurate, clear up issues, etc. and put it back into the language of everyone else. What good are we otherwise if we construct our own language in an ivory tower? Anybody can do that and be 'right'. We have the challenge of working within a system to refine. Not that we can't create a new system or subsystem, but we need a good reason to.

Specifically, what is the problem with will as commonly defined? Is there some implicit use of will that its current definition ignores or is unaware of? You know I have no problem with amending words, but there must be a good reason to do so beyond the convenience of our own arguments. Pointing out where you feel the general use of will is lacking, and what your redefinition solves will help the discussion greatly.

In this sense, it is very clear that “I willed to sleep walk”—in the event that one did sleep walk—is (1) true (because the agent as a whole, comprised of the judging faculties of the brain, did will it), (2) an action (because it is an instance of willing), and (3) is not an instance of willing with the full capacities of that agent (taken as whole). — Bob Ross

If the person is unconscious and sleeping, how is that at their full capacities? What example can you give of a person not at their full capacities, and why? If they aren't at their full capacities, but interacting with the world somehow, is that will or not will? Again, the word 'disposition' agrees with what you are noting, but will is a very particular type of disposition that entails awareness, consciousness, and agency.

Again, this distinction between voluntariness and choosing does not exist in colloquial speech: people say “I chose to do X” and “I did X voluntarily” interchangeably (because they have no robust analysis of these concepts). — Bob Ross

This is an excellent example of where we can come in as philosophers. Why do people use it interchangeably? In what sense is it logical to do so, and in what sense is it logically not to? Notice how I defined 'choice' in this case as "a choice of action". In which case we can see where the interchange makes sense. When people refer to choice as 'an action I took', they're referring to an actionable choice that took place in the past tense. The idea in philosophy is to define words that clarify reasons of use in a logical manner, not to outright contradict or redefine the word against the use that people use.

The problem is that we cannot make headway on this if you cannot provide a clear and robust alternative schema to what I have put forth here; and so far I have demonstrated (above) that your definitions are still internally incoherent. — Bob Ross

I would like to think we're having a discussion here and trying to refine both of our terms. I agree, the point is to get to a set of terms that make sense and are logically consistent and useful. But Bob, you have to do that with your own terms as well. Your set has problems with ignoring involuntary actions, just as I was ignoring choices that do not require actions. You have a problem in using definitions that seem very at odds with common use, and have not given a good logical reason why. It doesn't mean you're wrong, but these things should be addressed better before they can be accepted as right.

NO. That’s what I am trying to get you to see: if you are using a ‘consciousness’ vs. ‘unconsciousness’ schema (and omitting ‘subconsciousness’), then sleep walking is a conscious act. Normally sleep walking is a subconscious act—if it were an unconscious act, then there would be no walking whatsoever (as someone would is unconscious — Bob Ross

This seems irrelevant to the point about voluntary vs involuntary actions. I don't care what you want to label sleep walking as, except for the fact that no one would say a person sleep walking has the mental faculties to make choices of agency, rationality, or will. You need to give a good reason why we should change this outlook, and not simply because it fits your argument.

It may be the case that I am forcing my body to stay how it is, contrary to what it would be doing otherwise, through willing. — Bob Ross

If your body does something against your will then, isn't that an involuntary action? But according to your earlier definition of will as being synonymous with disposition, wouldn't this be a disposition and an act of will? What do you call your body doing an action without your will?

Continuing to pull the lever is a part of the action which you are still performing; and one can make decisions while still acting; so, yes, me choosing to continue to perform action X does not create a new action Y. — Bob Ross

You just noted exactly what I pointed out. "Choosing to continue to perform action x", or "Continuing to act" is a choice. Actions are performed over time. How I act at time X vs how I act at time Y. As you noted, "You can continue to make decisions while acting," Meaning as time ticks on, you can continue to do action X, or do another action. I'm not seeing in your point how I'm 'not acting' at all.

Again, the reason you are failing to understand this is because you have no robust nor internally coherent account of what an action vs. a choice is; nor how acting simpliciter relates to acting qua choosing. — Bob Ross

Or perhaps your own set of definitions isn't internally consistent or robust? If it was Bob, why would I feel the need to introduce a counter? :) I'm not being contrary, just pointing out I see some problems and trying to point out what I see with possible fixes. That's why we chat right? Your criticisms have helped refine my words, but look to your own as well.

Finally, what is 'acting simpliciter'? Is that acting without thinking? Is that acting with will, or without will? Alright, this one has gone on far enough, let me know what you think Bob.

I am unsure how to progress the conversation: I keep trying to get you to define what a choice and an action simpliciter are; and you seemed to just accept that you don’t have any—or don’t need to provide them.

The difference between the problems with volunariness (which you brought up about my schema) and your definitions is that yours are internally incoherent whereas mine, even if I grant you your critiques, are. I’ve cited many times how yours are incoherent, and you keep ignoring them.

To avoid repeating myself, I am only going to address the parts of your response that I think haven’t been touched on adequately yet.

But a person's disposition is not will

I didn’t define ‘a will’ as a person’s disposition—I defined it as ‘the dispositions of an agent taken as a whole’. My point is that a person’s will is typically considered whatever they desire, are passionate about, believe, etc. taken as a whole. ‘A will’ is not an instance of willing—to will is not the same thing as a will. A will is about a person’s character and personality as a whole, and to will is willing.

The reason I am avoiding saying willing is ‘the act of volition’ is because that is suspiciously close to circular reasoning—but technically isn’t. Acting and willing are identical to me, so saying ‘the act of willing’ is like saying ‘the willing of willing’.

What does the "exercised power of determining" mean?

Willing is a power that one can exercise and it is the power of imposing one’s will on reality.

Our job is to take the language that is commonly used, process it to be more accurate, clear up issues, etc. and put it back into the language of everyone else.

That’s exactly what I have done. It is impossible to refine colloquial usages of words in such a way as to completely preserve them—that was my point.

The problem you are having is you keep using notions in your arguments and I am trying to get you to elevate them to concepts. Using colloquial understandings of terms, with no modifications, which are pluralistic most of the time, is not going to cut it in a formative analysis of a subject-matter. It never has, and it never will.

Specifically, what is the problem with will as commonly defined?

It is notional, vague, vacuous, pluralistic, … need I go on? Look up the definition of any word, and you will find three or four irreconcilably different definitions for it—all from reliable sources. Webster isn’t about providing robust and refined definitions: they are trying to just give a super-basic exposition of the words that people use. None of the well-known dictionaries nor search engines provide good formative nor formal definitions of words.

If the person is unconscious and sleeping, how is that at their full capacities? What example can you give of a person not at their full capacities, and why?

Because their brain has shutdown most of their higher-level cognitive functions—wouldn’t you agree? A person who is sound asleep cannot converse with you, they cannot think, they are not aware of their surroundings, etc.

In sleep, a person only gets a phantom of these processes through dreaming.

Why do people use it interchangeably?

Because they don’t have a clear understanding of what they mean. People use terms to vaguely delineate meaning all the time—that’s basically the essence of colloquial speech.

In what sense is it logical to do so, and in what sense is it logically not to?

There’s nothing illogical about it, and that’s not saying much.

I defined 'choice' in this case as "a choice of action".

So you are taking a pluralist account of concepts, then? I want one definition of what you think a choice simpliciter is—I don’t care how other people use the term, nor if they use it in mutually exclusive and incoherent ways.

Your set has problems with ignoring involuntary actions

The critiques you made have nothing to do with an inconsistency nor internal incoherence with my schema—you are noting what is, for you, an external incoherence. For your schema, it is blatantly internally incoherent.

At best, if I grant your critique, my definitions allow for some actions which would intuitively be found to be involuntary as voluntary; whereas under your view, at best, a choice is and is not solely about actions.

If your body does something against your will then, isn't that an involuntary action?

Yes. Like I stated before, there are gray areas where I am not entirely sure how the biology underlying it works to comment—but I clearly outlined that there is such a thing as involuntary acts, and that they are “actions which one commits which do not correspond with one’s will”. What you just asked stipulates exactly what I need in order to claim it is involuntary.

But according to your earlier definition of will as being synonymous with disposition, wouldn't this be a disposition and an act of will? What do you call your body doing an action without your will?

I call it an involuntary act; and it wouldn’t make it to the brain to be processed through the lens of one’s dispositions taken as a whole nor as a part—e.g., a reflex to avoid pain. Certain aspects of the brain, in conjunction, are responsible for the fact that we are agents and subsequently have wills; and there are certainly lower-level actions which are performed which can’t be meaningfully tied to those aspects [of the brain]. Where is the line drawn? I would say wherever the threshold is for the brain judging things. A reflex as primitive as removing one’s hand upon touching a hot surface is probably not an act of judgment by the brain; and if it is, then it is not processed very thoroughly (such as going and eating ice cream because it taste good).

To be honest, this aspect does call for more investigation and is interesting; but it utterly irrelevant to the analysis of morality. So I see no need continue on this point.

Continuing to pull the lever is a part of the action which you are still performing; and one can make decisions while still acting; so, yes, me choosing to continue to perform action X does not create a new action Y. — Bob Ross

You just noted exactly what I pointed out. "Choosing to continue to perform action x", or "Continuing to act" is a choice. Actions are performed over time.

Nope. Not at all. I’ve tried explaining to you that you keep conflating choices and choosing with acts and acting; but you refuse to engage.

Finally, what is 'acting simpliciter'?

I mean simply acting—not acting in a morally relevant manner or what not…just what it means to act in general.

Bob

I am unsure how to progress the conversation: I keep trying to get you to define what a choice and an action simpliciter are; and you seemed to just accept that you don’t have any—or don’t need to provide them. — Bob Ross

I had to think for a while whether I would continue this conversation or not. I think its been clear that I've been engaging with you fairly and trying to define and redefine on every post so far. I don't mind if you don't want to use my definitions, but I think at this point if you still believe I'm not engaging with you in good faith, its best to stop. I think this has morphed from a fun conversation, and that's all this was meant to be. I have a lot of respect for you Bob, so I'll leave you to it. Good luck with the other discussions here, I'll see around in another thread.

Absolutely no worries, Philosophim! If you don't want to continue the conversation, then I respect that; and, as always, I look forward to our next one!

I don't believe that you are operating in bad faith, but you still have not defined what an action nor a choice simpliciter are; and it is impossible for us to progress the conversation if you cannot. Like I noted before, most of the issues that you want to discuss hinge on false and incoherent understandings of the concepts [of choice and action]; and this is why you are failing to understand how a choice can be about an inaction; and how that choice can be made without any action being committed because of that choice [about inaction].

At this point, without diving into your schema (which would require you to provide definitions), I cannot provide anything else useful to the conversation without it being a mere reiteration.

@Bob Ross I am curious what your response is to what I said regarding 'self-defense'? If one uses 'force' to merely incapacitate temporarily without causing actual bodily harm (eg. pinning to ground or such) does this straddle the definitions in your premises or not?

Another example would be if someone is holding a gun and you knock it out of their hand is this a form of 'force'? Is this not permitted in your premises?

Maybe you can think of another grey area where an unarmed person disarms someone without using 'force' on them directly. This would be 'self-defense' but just without 'force' used on the target directly.

I think the solution to this is to note that harming [something] is not a proper act, because it is an action includes the intentionality behind it; so act of self-defense is a specific action which can produce harm, but is permissible (and even sometimes obligatory) because it is good in-itself (being that the intention is to stop the attacker and NOT to kill or harm them).

To answer you question: yes, you could argue that self-defense which does not use harm is fine; but, then you have the problem that harming is being implicitly utilized as a proper action, and so you end up with the problems you noted (e.g., is hitting a gun out of their hand technically harm?).