Thanks for the considered reply and interesting comments. I was connected the New Age movement and the Theosophical Society through the 1980's and into the 1990's, so I am moderately familiar with the thinking. Most of the folk I knew in those days were as anxious, status seeking, consumer obsessed and money oriented as any contemporary yuppie. But I guess the serious thinkers are always in the minority. I have never arrived at a reason to take this kind of metaphysics seriously. True or not, it makes no practical difference to how I conduct my life. I suspect a lot of this comes down to person's disposition. Some of us are unhappy in particular ways that seem to be ameliorated by philosophy and thoughts of higher consciousness. And perhaps some of us ruminate less and are more distractible. :wink:

You will not bait me..... — Manuel

I wouldn’t dare such a thing.

I wonder to what extent we should care about the second truth or the reality beyond our own. There may well be a Paramarthika Satya or ultimate realm beyond the empirical, but what of it? Can a good case be made that we should care about this and to what end — Tom Storm

Only if it brings joy. Those thoughts are pointless if they don't make you happy

Thoughts:

With regard to why believe in spirituality, it's important to know that the universe is not necessarily fair. It is just, but that' different. Err, i take that back because I have no idea if the universe also is merciful, and to what extent. It might be in an unfair way. I have a twin brother Matthew and I don't care what he does i would never damn him, and i have a pretty strong commitment to morals. He would be standing there, the murderer of himself, and if i could i would still take him to heaven becausr it is that consciousness that i love. It's not just or fair, but love is the meaning of spirituality

I mean, there is no alternative. There are extreme nonlocal correlations in quantum mechanics; you cannot get rid of the strangeness.

I re-read your very informative post and, well, I don't think that I am capable to make a counter-argument about the consistency of stochastic models. So, I'll accept that one can make a CFD stochastic model without violating relativity. After all, the non-locality that violats special relativity is a faster than light causal influence*, i.e. a specific kind of non-locality.
Just for curiosity, has been treated the 'Wigner friend' scenario in stochastic realistic models?

*As I said previously, there are also propoents of deterministic non-local realist models that say that their models are not in contrast with relativity. Other than some de Broglie-Bohm proponents, the thermal interpretation of Arnold Neumaier (I am not sure if it is accepted as among the 'viable' interpretations of QM, as it is new and it seems to have a single proponent. It has, however, produced a quite number of discussion among experts on Physics Forums for instance.).

I mean, there is no alternative. There are extreme nonlocal correlations in quantum mechanics; you cannot get rid of the strangeness. — Apustimelogist

Agreed, we have to accept some kind of strangeness. But my question was: do you think that 'physical realism' is undermined by the fact that the 'fundamental building blocks' of 'physical reality' are not spatially separable? I think that Einstein made an interesting point here about 'realism'. I do believe that we have to reject the idea of 'fundamental building blocks' altogether BTW.

↪boundless Thanks for the considered reply and interesting comments. I was connected the New Age movement and the Theosophical Society through the 1980's and into the 1990's, so I am moderately familiar with the thinking. Most of the folk I knew in those days were as anxious, status seeking, consumer obsessed and money oriented as any contemporary yuppie. But I guess the serious thinkers are always in the minority. I have never arrived at a reason to take this kind of metaphysics seriously. True or not, it makes no practical difference to how I conduct my life. I suspect a lot of this comes down to person's disposition. Some of us are unhappy in particular ways that seem to be ameliorated by philosophy and thoughts of higher consciousness. And perhaps some of us ruminate less and are more distractible. :wink: — Tom Storm

I see, thanks for the clarification. I am sorry for your bad experiences.
Anyway, I do believe that it is a case of 'abusus non tollit usum', i.e. even if the bad practicioners, teachers etc were the majority, this doesn't a priori negate the validity of a particular tradition.

BTW, in my previous posts I was however arguing for sonething else: if one rejects naive realism (and here I mean the unsophisticated kind which is IMO the true naive realism, not more 'refined' ones that are actually not naive realism), then one accepts automatically some kind of notion of 'two truths'. Naive realism errs in interpreting pragmatic 'truths' as ontological ones. But this insight is shared by practically everyone that is not a naive realist (even by skeptics). We can interpret what the naive realist take as 'ultimate truths' as 'pragmatic truths', eventualmente if we do not have a position about what the 'ultimate truth' might be.

I am sorry for your bad experiences. — boundless

The people were 'bad' but I regret nothing.

even if the bad practicioners, teachers etc were the majority, this doesn't a priori negate the validity of a particular tradition. — boundless

Of course - and if I argued that I'd be making a fallacy. I make no claim about higher consciousness as an idea, I was referring to who the subject seems to attract and the innate difficulty (perhaps impossibility) of persuing it a useful way. But I'll leave this to others who are more interested.

(and here I mean the unsophisticated kind which is IMO the true naive realism, not more 'refined' ones that are actually not naive realism), then one accepts automatically some kind of notion of 'two truths'. Naive realism errs in interpreting pragmatic 'truths' as ontological ones. — boundless

I think phenomenology may do away with the need to pars the world into realism or indirect realism or idealism models, but I am not sufficiently versed in the thinking to articulate an argument.

Naive realism errs in interpreting pragmatic 'truths' as ontological ones. — boundless

That's fair. I'm skeptical that we can access ontological truths, or that we should we be overly concerned to identify them. I'm content with tentative models of the world, which is all science can provide. But even an idealist becomes a naive realist when he leaves the house to go to work. That's paraphrasing Simon Blackburn. Which comes back to my take on all this. None of it much matters since the world we inhabit can't be denied in practice and for the most part it makes no difference to how we live if we believe that all is an illusion.

The people were 'bad' but I regret nothing. — Tom Storm

Ok!

Of course - and if I argued that I'd be making a fallacy. I make no claim about higher consciousness as an idea, I was referring to who the subject seems to attract and the innate difficulty (perhaps impossibility) of persuing it a useful way. But I'll leave this to others who are more interested. — Tom Storm

Fair enough. Sorry for the misunderstanding.

I think phenomenology may do away with the need to pars the world into realism or indirect realism or idealism models, but I am not sufficiently versed in the thinking to articulate an argument. — Tom Storm

Well, neither do I. I tried to study phenomenology and I enjoyed some ideas I found. But, unfortunately, I found the language and the exposition too taxing and unclear, so to speak.
BTW, Husserl's 'epoche' I think is quite close to what I was getting at, i.e. 'suspension of judgment' (at least for a transitory phase).

That's fair. I'm skeptical that we can access ontological truths, or that we should we be overly concerned to identify them. I'm content with tentative models of the world, which is all science can provide. But even an idealist becomes a naive realist when he leaves the house to go to work. That's paraphrasing Simon Blackburn. Which comes back to my take on all this. None of it much matters since the world we inhabit can't be denied in practice and for the most part it makes no difference to how we live if we believe that all is an illusion. — Tom Storm

Ok! Well, I agree up to a point. The fact that the 'model' of the 'two truths' is so prevalent (either explicitly or implicitly) suggests to me that there is something very important about it. But at the same time, one cannot ignore the extreme diversity of how that distinction is conceptualized and this can be taken as a suggestion that we can't have a 'true knowledge'.
Personally, I think that even if we are unable to 'discover for ourselves', the distinction between the 'provisional' and the 'ultimate' is important, it's hard to deny how widespread this 'theme' is (as I said with Epicurus and Pyrrho, in ancient times even materialists and skeptics endorsed some version of it), so you can't agree with what Simon Blackburn* says if it is taken as a conclusive criticism. For my part, I try to be as open-minded as possible and go on with the 'search'.

*But on the other hand, it somewhat makes my point. Yes, we tend to be naive realists when 'we leave the house to go to work' and when we are in a dangerous sistuation (and this is useful for our survival and the survival of our species as Hoffman might say) but at the same time we tend to be naive realists even with respect to the apparent movement of the Sun in most our daily life even if such a take is erroneous. But naive realism being 'useful' doesn't imply it being 'truthful'. And we instictively also seek truth.

But even an idealist becomes a naive realist when he leaves the house to go to work. That's paraphrasing Simon Blackburn. Which comes back to my take on all this. None of it much matters since the world we inhabit can't be denied in practice and for the most part it makes no difference to how we live if we believe that all is an illusion. — Tom Storm

As my favorite psychologist, George Kelly, said:

To put it simply, it is not what the past has done to a man that counts so much as it is what the man does with his past. The psychotherapist can scarcely fail to be amazed at how differently two of his clients may make use of what has happened to them. If he is alert he will be aware of wide differences in the way they make use of him too. Men are not so much shaped by events as they are shaped by the meaning they ascribe to such noises. This is not to say that one is perfectly free to ignore what is going on. He is not. But man is always free to re-construe that which he may not deny.

We take the stand that there are always some alternative constructions available to choose among in dealing with the world. No one needs to paint himself into a corner; no one needs to be completely hemmed in by circumstances; no one needs to be the victim of his biography.

*But on the other hand, it somewhat makes my point. Yes, we tend to be naive realists when 'we leave the house to go to work' and when we are in a dangerous sistuation (and this is useful for our survival and the survival of our species as Hoffman might say) but at the same time we tend to be naive realists even with respect to the apparent movement of the Sun in most our daily life even if such a take is erroneous. But naive realism being 'useful' doesn't imply it being 'truthful'. And we instictively also seek truth. — boundless

To put in another way, in order to function, we are usually 'forced' to live assuming naive realism is true. However, on reflexion, we recognize that we live as if naive realism was true but we generally recognize that it is false.
How much importance we give to this awareness is another matter.

Just for curiosity, has been treated the 'Wigner friend' scenario in stochastic realistic models?

It hasn't but I talk about it in this post:
— boundless

Wigner — Apustimelogist

Essentially, there are always definite, objective outcomes but the statistics of the world are oberserver-dependent. This contextuality isn't specifically about observation but the statistical constraints when stochastic systems are coupled (e.g. a measurement device and system bring measured or any other kind of system-environment interaction perhaps).

do you think that 'physical realism' is undermined by the fact that the 'fundamental building blocks' of 'physical reality' are not spatially separable? — boundless

No, if there is a reasonable explanation. Obviously explanations may seem reasonable or unreasonable to different people.

I do believe that we have to reject the idea of 'fundamental building blocks' altogether BTW. — boundless

In what sense? I may agree in some sense and have thought about that, motivated by the hsrd problem of consciousness. But may not have been in the same sense you mean.

Out of fear of forgetting to do what I wanted to, let's just go straight into it. I don't know if it is appropriate to this thread or no.

So, Kant speaks about "things in themselves" and these are the ground of appearances. We do not know how this grounding relation works, only that it must be so, otherwise objects would relations all the way down, and that's incoherent for us.

On the other hand, Kant speaks of noumena. He is quite clear on noumena in the positive meaning of the term, these are the things traditional metaphysics was discussing and never managed to advance.

Positive noumena could including things like Leibnizian monads or Cartesian souls - maybe even Platonic Ideas. We have no idea if this knowledge is possible and how it could possibly be like.

Since this is so, we best leave noumena in the positive sense behind, it's like arguing over words.

The issue, as I see it, is Kant's description of noumena in the negative sense. He says it may exist, but we can't be sure, it's a kind of limit to speculation.

But yet: 1) He shows no such hesitation when speaking about "things in themselves" and 2) in the practical domain, he has recourse to speaking about noumena to account for freedom!

Why not do this to things-in-themselves? Or rather, why would he even bother saying there are things in themselves, but there may or may not be noumena in a negative sense?

In short, I don't see why Kant couldn't have merely said there are things in themselves and noumena in a positive sense and put aside noumena in a negative sense. It seems excessive to me.

These are my impressions, and I probably misread many things.

BTW, why do you think that the geocentrists in ancient times and middle ages were wrong? What was their mistake? — boundless

Geocentrism can be viewed as a matter of perspective, and as such it is neither right nor wrong - it is apt in some contexts and not others. But if you are referring to ancient cosmologies viewed (somewhat ahistorically) as scientific theories, they posited things that proved to be untenable when more and better observations (appearances) became available, and our analytical tools improved as well.

The stars and the Sun do orbit the Earth in the earthbound frame — SophistiCat

They do not. — AmadeusD

I see that you need a refresher in relative motion. Start with linear motion - boats and trains and all that. Rotating frames are a little trickier, but riding a carousel can give you an intuitive feel for them (or a motion sickness).

Essentially, there are always definite, objective outcomes but the statistics of the world are oberserver-dependent. This contextuality isn't specifically about observation but the statistical constraints when stochastic systems are coupled (e.g. a measurement device and system bring measured or any other kind of system-environment interaction perhaps). — Apustimelogist

Interesting, thanks.

No, if there is a reasonable explanation. Obviously explanations may seem reasonable or unreasonable to different people. — Apustimelogist

Agreed!

In what sense? I may agree in some sense and have thought about that, motivated by the hsrd problem of consciousness. But may not have been in the same sense you mean. — Apustimelogist

Well, I wasn't thinking about consciousness, actually, but simply about what physical theories tell us.

Consider the case of a system of two interacting particles in newtonian mechanics. In this case, the interaction causes a temporal variation of the momentum in both particles. The temporal variation of the momentum of each particle, however, is exactly the opposite of the temporal variation of the second one, which means that the temporal variation of the total momentum is zero, i.e. the total momentum of the isolated two-particle system is zero. Of course, this can be proved by using the three newtonian laws. But the third law seems ad 'hoc', doesn't seem to have any kind of justification whatsoever if the particles themselves are considered the 'fundamental entity' here.
On the other hand, consider the reverse perspective. The conservation law of the total momentum says that the total momentum of any isolated system is constant, i.e. the temporal variation of the total momentum of the system is zero. But if this is true and if the interaction between the two particles changes their momentum, then these two assumptions imply that the variation of their momentum must be opposite. This perspective is clearly 'holistic': a property of the 'whole system' (the conservation law of the total momentum) 'dictates' how the properties of the subsystems (the particles) behave.
Of course, newtonian mechanics doesn't tell us which 'perspective' is right. But the second has the advantage of being more intelligible. It also implies that a 'physical object' can be quite extended, composite and yet 'holistic' not reducible. And, of course, the same can be said for more advanced theories. In fact, possibly the single truly isolated system is the whole universe. It seems that ontological primacy is given to the whole universe rather than to its 'components' (or in any case, this is true for the 'isolated system').
In 'realistic' interpretations of QM, ultimately it seems the 'universe' is seen as a single quantum object (at least, this is true in de Broglie-Bohm, MWI and the thermal interpretation).

Not only that: in the case of entangled quantum systems, there is a clear indication that what is 'more fundamental' is, in fact, the whole system of entangled objects, and this is not reducible to the subsystems.

This suggests to me that, if I were to choose an ontological interpretation of 'what physics seems to tell me', I would pick a fundamentally holistic perspective. The 'whole universe' is the fundamental object and its 'components' are secondary. Also, in some cases, some composite objects cannot be reduced.

BTW, at the same time, as I said before, I lean towards an epistemic interpretation of QM, because I think epistemic theories, i.e. theories that do not make ontological commitments, better represent 'what I know'. But, if I allow myself to speculate, I think that physics is fundamentally 'ontologically holistic' (of course, in many cases an analytical, reductionistic approach is the right one)

Geocentrism can be viewed as a matter of perspective, and as such it is neither right nor wrong - it is apt in some contexts and not others. But if you are referring to ancient cosmologies viewed (somewhat ahistorically) as scientific theories, they posited things that proved to be untenable when more and better observations (appearances) became available, and our analytical tools improved as well. — SophistiCat

Well, I agree with that. 'Neither right or wrong' is a good way to put it.
What is common to all geocentric models was the view that the Earth was at the center of the universe and it didn't move. The apparent motion of the Sun in the sky that we see in our perspective (the one we see with our own eyes at least) can be 'explained' by this kind of models. But at a certain point, with different observations showed that in some cases these kinds of models gave wrong predictions. So, the geocentric models were discarded.
But strictly speaking what was 'discarded' was the ontological interpretation of them.

Anyway, while I would phrase differently, I think we are in agreement.

Kant speaks about "things in themselves" and these are the ground of appearances. We do not know how this grounding relation works….. — Manuel

.

The things-in-themselves are not the ground of appearances; if they were they would not be “in-themselves”. Things are the ground of appearances, hence the grounding relation of appearances is known to us. Cause and effect: for every sensation as effect there is necessarily a thing which appears, sufficient as a cause of it.

…..only that it must be so, otherwise objects would relations all the way down, and that's incoherent for us. — Manuel

Objects are relations all the way down, insofar as they remain intelligible for us. Given from the principle of cause and effect, it is only incoherent for us when we look for one of those without the other connected to it. So…don’t look there.
————

On the other hand, Kant speaks of noumena. — Manuel

Yes, he speaks of it, but only from pure understanding’s perspective….

“….the understanding (…) takes for granted that an object considered as a thing in itself must be capable of being thought (…) and is thereby led to hold the perfectly undetermined conception of an intelligible existence (…) for a determinate conception of an existence, which we can cognize in some way or other by means of the understanding….”

….this isn’t to say understanding is in the act of thinking an object, but is comparable to what we would simple call something “just popped into my mind”. This cannot be the ding an sich from which are given the things that appear to sensibility, it is a thing in itself because it comes to understanding as a singular whole thought. Obviously, if something (in or as itself) pops into your mind, it must be capable of being in your mind (in or as itself), which is the same as it must be capable of being a thought (in or as itself). So whatever happens to pop into your mind is at that exact point, being nothing more a perfectly undetermined conception which exists nowhere but in your own intelligence, but it is there, which kinda suckers understanding into thinking it can do something constructive with it. But….as we all know….understanding can’t cognize a damn thing on its own. So it is that understanding takes for granted it can think objects, which it can, and can do something with them, which it cannot. Those things are the intelligible existences, the undetermined conceptions, called ……waaaiiiitt for itttttttt…..noumena.

Positive or negative noumena don’t matter; each is noumena as far as understanding is concerned, and since understanding is the problem-child here, the exposition of its flawed or illegitimate functionality is paramount. Besides, positive or negative noumena have to do with intuition anyway, in which either there is a kind of it we don’t have, re: that kind which can develop its representations given merely intelligible existences, or, there is that kind we do have, re: that kind which develops its representations only because there are real existences.

These are my impressions and I might have misread many things myself.

Objects are relations all the way down, insofar as they remain intelligible for us. Given from the principle of cause and effect, it is only incoherent for us when we look for one of those without the other connected to it. So…don’t look there. — Mww

Well, I may have been either tainted or mislead, but for better or worse I have taken in Lucy Allais interpretation of Kant so if I removed this aspect for my interpretation then my understanding of Kant would almost entirely collapse. Which is quite plausible.

In any case, this is the section which I find interesting:

"Accordingly the understanding limits sensibility, but without therefore expanding its own realm. And inasmuch as the understanding warns sensibility not to claim to deal with things in themselves but solely with appearances, it does think of an object in itself. But the understanding thinks it only as transcendental object. This object is the cause of appearance (hence is not itself appearance) and can be thought neither as magnitude nor as reality nor as substance… Hence concerning this object we are completely ignorant as to whether it is to be found in us-or, for that matter, outside us… If we want to call this object noumenon, because the presentation of it is not sensible we are free to do so… [it only serves] to mark the bound of our sensible cognition…”

(A 288-A 289, B 344- B 345)

When he says this object is the cause of appearance (transcendental object) I take it that he does so because he thinks that, if an object as appearance consisted of relations all the way down, things make no sense. In a previous page he says:

"It is startling, to be sure, to hear that a thing is supposed to consist altogether of relations. Such a thing, however, also is mere appearance and cannot be thought at all through pure categories..." (A 286. B 341-342)

I mean, then we also can't understand an object consisting entirely of relations either. Ugh.

It is more intelligible (to me) to say a thing (as appearance) consists of relations. But the ultimate ground of these relations we do not know. They must play some kind of grounding role, which we cannot know.

As you can see, I don't know how to cite him properly.

Positive or negative noumena don’t matter; each is noumena as far as understanding is concerned, and since understanding is the problem-child here, the exposition of its flawed or illegitimate functionality is paramount. Besides, positive or negative noumena have to do with intuition anyway, in which either there is a kind of it we don’t have, re: that kind which can develop its representations given merely intelligible existences, or, there is that kind we do have, re: that kind which develops its representations only because there are real existences. — Mww

Hmmm.

But he says

"If, on the other hand, by merely intelligible objects we mean merely objects of nonsensible intuition - objects for which, to be sure, our categories do not hold and of which therefore we can never have any cognition at all (neither intuition nor concept) - then noumenon in the negative signification must indeed be admitted..."

(B 343)

Then he goes on to say this is the "problematic" concept of the noumena. And now I have trouble finding his comments on "positive noumena". But he quite likely has in mind Leibniz and his monads.

This is quite more laborious that I thought, though I should have known...

In any case, let me try to zone it in.

hence the grounding relation of appearances is known to us. Cause and effect: for every sensation as effect there is necessarily a thing which appears, sufficient as a cause of it. — Mww

I see a green tree. The cause of it is photons hitting my eye, then my brain does something we-don't-know-what then I see a tree.

But, what causes the photons? And then we keep going down and down.

So, what we are doing is describing relational structures at a certain level of complexity. Mind you, even describing photons and eyes, we still are entirely ignorant as how could photons lead to any phenomenon.

Anyway, have at it. I suppose the best we can hope for is some kind of agreement on like two topics. Wild.

I thought context might help. Or not.

You may know Kant considers the “I” that thinks to be the ground of consciousness, just meant to provide that “….all my representations belong to me alone….”, such that there’s no chance for “…a varied and many-sided self as there are representations….”.

I bring this up because a distinction is required between the understanding that thinks, which is the same as taking for granted it can consider objects as things in themselves, and the “I” that thinks. Conceptions belong to understanding, they arise through spontaneity with respect to phenomena, and they also arise spontaneously even without the synthesis with phenomena, hence the intelligible object, and this is what it means for the understanding to think, the spontaneity of conceptions.

The “I”, on the other hand, that thinks, indicates only the synthesis of representations in consciousness, which means the conceptions represented are already given, which means understanding has already thought. This makes sense when we say, “I understand”, which makes explicit “I” as the transcendental ego representing the self, is not the same as the faculty of understanding, which is merely a logical functionary.

Here, too, when he says, “I can think whatever I please provided only that I do not contradict myself…”, it happens that when understanding considers the objects it thinks as intelligible existences, understanding is contradicting itself, by trying to apply a category, existence, to that which isn’t even available for it to be applied to, insofar as such availability requires sensibility, not mere thought.

Another way to think about it…..time. When we say, it just popped into my head, we’re talking about a sheer instant, that time when there was no considered object, and the next when there was. At that point of “there was”, there is no other cognitive constituency at work, there just hasn’t been any time for it.

Ok, so now let it be given the human cognitive system doesn’t stop working, there are no blank spots while conscious and otherwise naturally functional. So we got this time of a considered object, and if the system keeps on rolling along as it should, it will do what it supposed to do, which is to form a cognition of the thing it just took for granted as a considered object. So now let it also be given that the means for cognizing anything at all has certain requirements, and one of these requirements is synthesis of representations…..and we find there just aren’t any representations present in the system to be synthesized, at the time understanding merely considers an object in itself.

Yes, good. If I understand correctly or roughly, sure we can think what we please and face no contradictions (save logical ones) and we could go on thinking we are grasping something which is not, noumena for instance. Of course, for us, and our mode of thinking, if we leave this out of the picture, then something seems to be missing intellectually.

This of course does not guarantee we are (or are not) getting at something and then there is the point you raise in your last sentence that we can't find a representation which consists of an object in itself.

I think your interpretation of Kant would be called a "deflationary" one? Maybe.

Edit: this is for my indulgence. The explicit Kant discussions stops here.

Alright. Maybe we are leaving Kant maybe not or maybe we are talking about S. now, it doesn't matter much, the topic is what's interesting to me:

We have representations. All our knowledge is representational. This necessarily implies that what we experience is an interaction between a subject and an object. Knowledge is relational. No relations, no representations, no knowledge. But we don't want to say (at least I don't) "no things" remain.

Objects exist and have a way of existing. We only know how objects exist as representations. Objects must have a way of existing that is not reducible to us alone. They must have a way of being, independent of us, in virtue of which they exist independently of us.

If this is false, then we have to deny astronomy, paleontology, geology, etc.

My final twist here is that, astronomy, geology, still do not tell us about noumena. Nothing can, outside this intellectual feeling we have that something like that ought to exist in some manner.

What is wrong here?

A question I have is, what is 'truth' as distinct from 'perceived reality'? — Wayfarer

I'm sort of thinking that regardless of what you perceive, you can't experience my self-awareness, for example.
You'll find it a wee bit easier to perceive the ground you walk on (I assume).
Nonetheless, I hope you think I'm just another self/aware homo sapiens and forum denizen, though. :)
The statement "jorndoe is self/aware" is true, so truth and perceived reality aren't the same at least.
Epistemic endeavors have truth in mind, if you will, whatever it all may be.

Yes, when I was thinking about fundamentalness in a different way in terms of how physics doesn't seem to paint a picture where there is a constant, fundamental set of objects at the bottom of the universe which just change arrangement over time. And then thinking about whether this helps some aspects of the hard problem.

This perspective is clearly 'holistic': a property of the 'whole system' (the conservation law of the total momentum) 'dictates' how the properties of the subsystems (the particles) behave. — boundless

Not sure I agree. Its a property of the interaction so I wouldn't say it is necessarily holistic, though I would say the two different descriptions were equivalent.

Not only that: in the case of entangled quantum systems, there is a clear indication that what is 'more fundamental' is, in fact, the whole system of entangled objects, and this is not reducible to the subsystems. — boundless

I think this is interpretation-dependent imo but I know many people do believe something like this.

Objects (…) must have a way of being, independent of us, in virtue of which they exist independently of us. — Manuel

I see a green tree. — Manuel

What is wrong here? — Manuel

The entire raison d’etre of the first Critique, is to prove those two statements are contradictory.

I think your interpretation of Kant would be called a "deflationary" one? — Manuel

I’m ok with that, if “deflationary” means getting to the bottom of why those two statements are contradictory.

In Melbourne? I had a short foray in the area (intellectual area) and Melbourne was a hot bed at the time (circa 2010-2015). I still quite like the Thesophical Society Bookstore

Hegel on Kant's philosophy:

"The other side, in contrast, is the independence of the thinking that grasps itself, the principle of freedom, which this philosophy has in common with the metaphysics of older tradition; but it empties all the content out of it, and is unable to put anything back into it. Being robbed of all determinations, this thinking, now called 'reason', is set free from all authority. The main effect of Kant's philosophy has been has been that it has revived the consciousness of this absolute inwardness. In that, because of its abstraction, this inwardness cannot develop into anything, and cannot produce by its own mean any determinations, either cognitions or moral laws, it refuses all together to allow something that has the character of outwardness to have full play in it, and to be valid for it. From now on the principle of the independence of reason, of its absolute inward autonomy, has to be regarded as the universal principle of philosophy, and as one of the assumptions of our times." The Lesser Logic

For Hegel, Kant made the world into a lie, something that deceives, and did not allow reason access to the intellect in order that it could circumvent the traps of the understanding. Kant merely gives an inventory of the understanding instead of uniting freedom with thought. Why the understanding is how it is is never explained by Kant. It is truly the outside world provides the "shock" which the unconscious needs into order to become conscious. The non-Ego is as important to Ego as Ego is to itself. Our bodies are, in a sense, non-Ego. We are a part of this world and so Kant thought we could not solve the mystery of existence because we were part of the mystery. Whether he suceeded or not, Hegel's philosophy was an attempt to deduce the essence of existence itself

In Melbourne? I had a short foray in the area (intellectual area) and Melbourne was a hot bed at the time (circa 2010-2015). I still quite like the Thesophical Society Bookstore — AmadeusD

Yep, Melbourne. They used to be in a really coool 1920's building which was sadly demolished a couple of years ago. Now they're around the corner in Flinders Lane. In the 1980's I used to almost live in that bookshop.

Yes, when I was thinking about fundamentalness in a different way in terms of how physics doesn't seem to paint a picture where there is a constant, fundamental set of objects at the bottom of the universe which just change arrangement over time. And then thinking about whether this helps some aspects of the hard problem. — Apustimelogist

Yeah, I agree. Regarding the 'hard problem', I am not sure. The problem is that it seems that there are no properties present in the insentient matter (that we are aware of) that might be able to explain in an intelligible way the arising of consciousness.

Not sure I agree. Its a property of the interaction so I wouldn't say it is necessarily holistic, though I would say the two different descriptions were equivalent. — Apustimelogist

I actually agree with this. The 'holistic' interpretation is not forced, but I think it is the most reasonable.

Yes, you can say that 'conservation laws' might arise from the properties of interactions. But 'why'? It seems that if we take this position, then it seems an 'ad hoc' assumption. Why these interactions behave in the precise way that ensures the conservation laws is left unexplained.

On the other hand, if we take the view that conservation laws are properties (or related to properties) of the whole isolated system, then we understand why the interactions behave the way they behave: they are determined by the properties of the 'whole systems'. Also, Noether theorem, as I understand it, supports the 'holistic' view: conservations laws are related to symmetries. Of course, one might ask "but why there are such 'holistic' properties, then?". Well, an holistic framework doens't explain that, probably, but at least it explains something.

I think this is interpretation-dependent imo but I know many people do believe something like this. — Apustimelogist

Agreed. However note that non-locality in entangled systems is due to the fact that we cannot analyse them in separated 'parts', they are at least formally irreducible. Does this 'formal irreducibility' imply an 'ontological irriducibility'? Well, this is an interpretation-dependent question.

Anyway, as I said before, I generally prefer 'epistemic interpertations' as interpretations that inform me about what I know.
On the other hand, the study of 'ontic interpretations' might help us to have a 'glimpse' to what might be 'beyond' empirical knowledge, so to speak. I believe that quantum nonlocality and conservations laws are best understood in a holistic framework. But I would not claim that this amounts to a scientific knowledge.

My final twist here is that, astronomy, geology, still do not tell us about noumena. — Manuel

I don't think this can be a deductive conclusion.

Running with the phenomena-noumena thing, you can know how something interacts with you at least, yes?

Say, you may interact with an apple-an-sich, which might at least tell you something about the apple, namely about your interaction therewith. Or, you may interact with a neighbor-an-sich, which might tell you something about the neighbor, namely how the neighbor interacts at least.

(As far as I can tell, the "might" part would have to be disproven for the quote to be deductive, but maybe I'm wrong; actually I might have misunderstood entirely. :smile:)

If we expect apple-omniscience/certainty, then we're over-demanding.
In terms of (phenomena-noumena) epistemics, what would be required (perhaps expected) to know a ding-an-sich (without interaction)? Becoming das-ding...?

apple-an-sich — jorndoe

I think that's an oxymoron, no?

The problem is that it seems that there are no properties present in the insentient matter (that we are aware of) that might be able to explain in an intelligible way the arising of consciousness — boundless

Yes, I don't think so either. My desire to just get rid of an inherent conflict between our direct aquaintance of experience and our descriptions of ontologies in physics. I think there is much less conflict by getting rid of this notion of a bottom to the universe with a fixed set of objects just arranged in different ways. Already, the conflict is weakened somewhat imo if it is emphasized the way that physics can be seen as models or tools that describe or trace functional aspects of the universe rather than intrinsic things.

Ultimately, I do not think it is actually possible to give an informative, coherent characterization of fundamental ontology or intrinsic nature of reality. I would even go as far as saying that ontology and 'being' are empty concepts in regards to characterizing fundamental ontologies.

Why these interactions behave in the precise way that ensures the conservation laws is left unexplained. — boundless

It's unexplained either way imo. I just am not compelled to commit to the idea that its brute nature requires appeal to anything beyond local dynamics. I don't need to appeal to the whole universe (the only isolated system that exists) to observe examples of conserved quantities from interactions, as implied by conservation laws, in local systems. And I imagine you could say the same thing if the local system was further decomposable so one could focus on what is happening at a single component of it.

Well, this is an interpretation-dependent question. — boundless

Yes, it especialliy depends if you interpret the wave-function as a physical object I think.