Gödel's incompleteness theorems does [sic] not automatically apply to physics. — Lionino

The quartet of Incompleteness Theory includes: Bertrand Russell, Erwin Schrödinger, Werner Heisenberg, and Kurt Gödel. Russell and Gödel have something to say about the limits of axiomatic systems; Schrödinger and Heisenberg have something to say about the limits of quantized physical interactions.

There is no ample scope for "mysteries and miracles" here beyond someone's uneducated sophistry. — Lionino

"If we knew everything about the positions of every particle in the universe, we would have a complete physics database and could predict every physical event." -- Lee Smolin

Are you bear-hugging the hard determinism of the permutations (Three-Card Molly gone cosmic) of a complete physics database?

If we knew everything about the positions of every particle in the universe…. — ucarr

…we would still not know their velocities. I’m sure that’s a spurious quotation, Smolin would not endorse LaPlace’s determinism.

The above is my launch into the spine of my OP. — ucarr

And you start by making an obvious error. All questions are "what?" questions.

How does ice melt? = What are the processes/mechanisms that cause ice to melt?

With his paper, "The Hard Problem," David Chalmers shows in stark fashion what science, so far, cannot do: it cannot objectify the personal point of view of an enduring, individual self with personal history attached. It can technologize the self via computation, but the result isn't an authentic self. Instead, it's just a simulation of the self without an autonomous self-awareness. This technical self is just a machine awaiting additional source code from humans. — ucarr

There are many questions that science struggles to address. How consciousness works (what are the processes of consciousness) and what it is (what it does) are scientific questions.

Any question is potentially a scientific one - scientific method can be applied to SOME degree.

Expressing emotions and blind opinions are not scientific, but we can investigate the cognitive science behind why some people do this and explore how it can be useful (in a scientific manner NOT an emotional one instilled with blind opinions).

If there's a grain of truth in what I've written above, then Tarskian is correct in the characterization of the Incompleteness Theorem being the cause of a crisis in science and math. Jeffrey Kaplan compounds the reality of this crisis with his exegesis of Russell's Paradox. — ucarr

I think Husserl started to address this by pointing out that psychology does not deal with subjectivity - because it takes on a material objective measurement of non-material subjective content. The whole point of his phenomenology was to create a new 'science of consciousness' that explored primal concepts and better ground underlying principles for the physical sciences.

Science is defined by hard and fast rules/laws that are accurate enough to surpass mere blind opinion or singular subjective perspectives.

The Arts do not do this:

- History does not, whereas the science of Archeology does.
- Literature does not do this, whereas the science of Linguistics does.

I have a feeling you are confusing yourself by interchanging Why, How and What without appreciating that they are ALL What questions. This then lead to you holding to How for one line of questioning where it suits you whilst holding to Why for another (even though - to repeat - they are BOTH What questions).

Experiencing is experiencing. Consciousness is consciousness of ... not simply some floating item - Husserlian 'intentionality'.

Maybe you wish to ask 'What would we mean by saying Consciousnessing?' rather than relying on the term "thinking"?

As of yet, I am still unsure what you are saying and starting to think that you do not really have a clear idea of what you mean due to misapplication of terms and heuristic bias.

"If we knew everything about the positions of every particle in the universe, we would have a complete physics database and could predict every physical event." -- Lee Smolin — ucarr

That is another version of Laplace's demon:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laplace%27s_demon

We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past could be present before its eyes.

This demon cannot exist because of Cantor's generalized theorem (or "Cantor's diagonalization").

Cantor's generalized theorem says that there is no onto mapping possible between a set and its power set, even when such set has an infinite cardinality.

Cantor diagonalization. In 2008, David Wolpert used Cantor diagonalization to challenge the idea of Laplace's demon. He did this by assuming that the demon is a computational device and showed that no two such devices can completely predict each other.[10][11] Wolpert's paper was cited in 2014 in a paper of Josef Rukavicka, where a significantly simpler argument is presented that disproves Laplace's demon using Turing machines, under the assumption of free will.[12]

Noson S. Yanofsky pointed out in "A Universal Approach to Self-Referential
Paradoxes, Incompleteness and Fixed Points" that the following theorems are all a consequence of Cantor's generalized theorem:

https://arxiv.org/pdf/math/0305282

Instances of diagonal theorems

• Russell’s Paradox
• Grelling’s Paradox
• Richard’s Paradox
• Liar Paradox
• Turing’s Halting Problem
• Diagonalization Lemma
• Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem
• Gödel-Rosser’s Incompleteness Theorem
• Tarski’s Undefinability of the truth
• Parikh Sentences
• Löb’s Paradox
• The Recursion Theorem
• Rice’s Theorem
• Von Neumann’s Self-reproducing Machines

Yeah, those three (or closely related varieties of each) are the essential components of all successful structural designs. Also known as the Vitruvian Triad.

When the sciences divorced the humanities, many intellectuals (e.g. Schopenhauer) became reluctant to see architecture as an art. It just seemed too pragmatic, concerned with functions etc.

They failed to see the bigger picture, and so did many architects who arbitrarily began to reinterpret the meanings of the Vitruvian components to fit their special interests, e.g. by assuming that the beauty of what's practical is an invisible kind of beauty that can replace the Vitruvian component.

But invisible beauty doesn't interact with anything, so the architecture gets entirely determined by what's practical, or sustainable. The architecture became one-sided, brutal, or bland. But the counter-movements became equally one-sided when they prioritized beauty or sustainability at the expense of what's practical.

A building is not a machine to live in, nor a humanistic work of art, but the interplay of both. This is old ancient knowledge relevant today and forever.

The quartet of Incompleteness Theory includes: Bertrand Russell, Erwin Schrödinger, Werner Heisenberg, and Kurt Gödel. Russell and Gödel have something to say about the limits of axiomatic systems; Schrödinger and Heisenberg have something to say about the limits of quantized physical interactions. — ucarr

I don't know what this means. I take it you are referring to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. It is not about "limits of quantised physical interactions".

Are you bear-hugging the hard determinism of the permutations (Three-Card Molly gone cosmic) of a complete physics database? — ucarr

This has nothing to do with what you are replying to, and I don't know what "three-card molly gone cosmic" is supposed to mean.

I imagine that a professional physicist of non-classical fields would be bewildered by this thread.

And you start by making an obvious error. All questions are "what?" questions.

How does ice melt? = What are the processes/mechanisms that cause ice to melt? — I like sushi

what | (h)wət, (h)wät |
pronoun
1 [interrogative pronoun] asking for information specifying something: what is your name?

how1 | hou |
adverb [[i]usually interrogative adverb[/i]]
1 in what way or manner; by what means: how does it work?

-- The Apple Dictionary

We see the two words -- like science and art -- share common ground. Does that lead you to conclude they're synonyms, or do you stop short of that conclusion? This conversation isn't trying to establish the words -- nor the disciplines -- as polar opposites.

Do you believe science and art have trivial differences which can be dismissed?

If you believe their differences lie between trivial and polar, then words with differences likewise lying between trivial and polar should be available for use in naming them.

I think Husserl started to address this by pointing out that psychology does scientific philosophy and methodology do not deal with subjectivity - — I like sushi

Science is defined by hard and fast rules/laws that are accurate enough to surpass mere blind opinion or singular subjective perspectives. — I like sushi

$\Rightarrow$ reductive materialism

you are confusing yourself by interchanging...How and What without appreciating that they are...What questions. — I like sushi

I acknowledged this overlap long ago. Now, it's your turn to argue the point that overlap obliterates difference. After doing so, you can instruct the publishers of dictionaries in the details of the necessary revisions.

Maybe you wish to ask 'What would we mean by saying Consciousnessing?' rather than relying on the term "thinking"? — I like sushi

Why truck out your unwieldy "Consciousnessing" when we already have "perceiving"? Have you examined the differences between "perception" and "thought"? Be forewarned, there is some overlapping.

As of yet, I am still unsure what you are saying and starting to think that you do not really have a clear idea of what you mean due to misapplication of terms and heuristic bias. — I like sushi

According to my approach, conversations here don't wear cement shoes whilst treading the rows and columns of fresh ideas in flux to new understandings.

This demon cannot exist because of Cantor's generalized theorem (or "Cantor's diagonalization"). — Tarskian

So, uncountable sets prevent us from totting up the universe as a whole?

...the following theorems are all a consequence of Cantor's generalized theorem: — Tarskian

Instances of diagonal theorems:
Russell’s Paradox
Grelling’s Paradox
Richard’s Paradox
Liar Paradox
Turing’s Halting Problem
Diagonalization Lemma
Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem
Gödel-Rosser’s Incompleteness Theorem
Tarski’s Undefinability of the truth
Parikh Sentences
Löb’s Paradox
The Recursion Theorem
Rice’s Theorem
Von Neumann’s Self-reproducing Machines — Tarskian

If I've got a glimmer of understanding of what you're trying to tell me, this is treasure trove of information.

:up: Tarskian

invisible beauty doesn't interact with anything, so the architecture gets entirely determined by what's practical, or sustainable. — jkop

A building is not a machine to live in, nor a humanistic work of art, but the interplay of both. — jkop

We're on the same page regarding the interrelationship of: science, art, ecology. Now, in this conversation, I want to detail in some stuff that talks in a rational and general manner about what the differences are between the two titans: science/art, and how those modal differences are mediated by the unifying synchro-mesh of ecology.

Cantor's generalized theorem says that there is no onto mapping possible between a set and its power set, even when such set has an infinite cardinality. — Tarskian

I don't understand how one can disprove Laplace's Demon using Cantor's theorem. Do you mind elaborating?

I take it you are referring to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. It is not about "limits of quantised physical interactions". — Lionino

"We already talked about how position and position-over-time are related in quantum mechanics. So it turns out that when your position distribution is concentrated in a single area, when you (Fourier) transform it to get the momentum, that momentum distribution is more spread out (less determinable). Similarly, if the momentum distribution is concentrated, then the position distribution is more spread out (less determinable). The reason for this, mathematically, is that the momentum distribution and the position distribution of particles in Quantum Configuration Space are the Fourier Transforms of one-another.

Position and Momentum are related mathematically, unlike in big-stuff physics (Newtonian). Heisenberg's Principle comes from the fact that Position and Momentum distributions are Fourier Transforms of one-another, which leads to a fundamental inequality in the mathematics of Quantum Mechanics that is not attributable to any kind of Observation Effect."

--Tyler Kresch

Kresch is describing an elementary particle state within a five-dimensional math space. This math space is inferred to a conjectured ontic model of an animated elementary particle.

There is no ample scope for "mysteries and miracles" here beyond someone's uneducated sophistry. — Lionino

Are you bear-hugging the hard determinism of the permutations (Three-Card Molly gone cosmic) of a complete physics database? — ucarr

In your above quote you trash personal notions of mysteries and miracles. Well, that implies everything in existence can be known scientifically. In that case, every possible event is built into a thermodynamism of matter and energy never created nor destroyed. So changing events are just rearrangements of always pre-existing matter and energy forms. Isn't that a deterministic universe?

Three-Card Molly is a street-level gambling hustle using three cups and one pea under one of the cups. The dealer reveals the initial position of the pea. The gambler stakes a bet on being able to observe the shuffling of the cups closely enough to pick the cup covering the pea after the shuffle. Since this is a game based on the mathematically fixed number of possible positions of the shuffling cups per unit of time, the final position of the pea is an example of determinism governed by a measurable probability.

This is a miniature parallel of your thermodynamically conserved universe undergoing rearrangements.*

*See Tarskian's post for a refutation of my above claim.

In your above quote you trash personal notions of mysteries and miracles. — ucarr

No, I thrashed ideologically driven drivel.

that implies everything in existence can be known scientifically — ucarr

It doesn't. There are different kinds of knowledge other than scientific.

that implies everything in existence can be known scientifically — ucarr

It doesn't. There are different kinds of knowledge other than scientific. — Lionino

Yes. You're right. There are things opaque to scientific inquiry. I should've said: That implies every scientific exam, once underway and making new discoveries of truth, should realistically expect a definitive conclusion to its central questions. There should be no insoluble mysteries such as: what lies beyond a black hole's event horizon. This must follow if it's true that, as you say: There is no ample scope for "mysteries and miracles" here beyond someone's uneducated sophistry.

So, uncountable sets prevent us from totting up the universe as a whole? — ucarr

I don't understand how one can disprove Laplace's Demon using Cantor's theorem. Do you mind elaborating? — MoK

It was a reference to David Wolpert's and Josef Rukavicka's publications:

Cantor diagonalization. In 2008, David Wolpert used Cantor diagonalization to challenge the idea of Laplace's demon ... Wolpert's paper was cited in 2014 in a paper of Josef Rukavicka, where a significantly simpler argument is presented that disproves Laplace's demon using Turing machines, under the assumption of free will.[12]

They apparently used Cantor's theorem directly. It sounds like they could also have used Turing's Halting Problem instead.

Noson S. Yanofsky pointed out that Cantor's theorem is implicit in a whole host of diagonalization theorems including Turing's Halting Problem:

You cannot establish an onto mapping between a set and its power set.

(The power set of a set is the set of all its subsets)

Yanofsky demonstrates in his paper that Cantor's theorem is implicit also in theorems such as Godel's incompleteness theorem and Tarski's undefinability of the truth.

Cantor originally used this diagonalization argument between the natural numbers and the real numbers (which is its power set) to prove that there is a clear distinction between the countable infinity and uncountable infinity cardinalities.

(The cardinality of a set is just the number of elements in a set)

It basically means that a set and its power set never have the same size. The power set is always larger. This is the principle that ultimately seems to be at the core of the foundational crisis in mathematics.

It is your thread so you should provide clarity of what you are asking instead of throwing out random questions and having others guess what you are talking about.

If you are just riffing, fair enough. If you have something explicit to say I have not seen it yet.

They is no direct question in the OP (very nebulous). There are fundamental flaws with how you outlined science. Even in the discussions you are having with others hear I see virtually nothing relevant to the misconceptions expressed in the OP.

Perhaps if you show me how you would answer the previous questions you asked of me it would elucidate what you are actually getting at. Failing that I will just leave you to it. If so, have fun :)

The essentially difference between the sciences and the humanities is cross-culturalism. Science, as a method, is not culture bound (in the general sense). It's motivation is simplicity of theory, not outcomes.

Everything in the humanities is culture-bound (in the general sense) and outcomes are the policy-driving forces. These aren't problems, though. — AmadeusD

This is impressive thinking. :up:

I do not understand math but I keep trying. It is clear to me that the failure to understand math keeps my IQ low and I am qualified to discuss my opinion but not to participate in arguments based on empirical information and math. Without an intelligent thought of my own, I will quote from the book "Mind Tools" by Rucker.

"Number, space, logic- the most basic concepts of mathematics. Why are they so fundamental? Because they reflect essential features of our minds and the world around us. Mathematics has evolved from certain simple and universal properties of the world and the human brain. That our mathematics is effective for manipulating concepts is perhaps no more surprising than that our legs and good at walking."......

Rucker argues "It is evident that the thought forums of dyad, triad, and tetrad are objectively given archetypes. They correspond to the very basic numbers 2, 3, 4. The number 5 is also quite basic, and we might suppose there to be a thought form consisting of five related concepts. Let's call this form a pentad. One way of drawing a pentad is as the "quincunx" a legitimate dictionary word meaning "an arrangement of five things with one at each corner and one in the middle of a square.

This is, of course, a flattened picture. Just as the quaternity takes its truest form if we let it pop up into a three-dimensional tetrahedron, it turns out that a pentad takes its most natural shape if we let it spring out into a four-dimensional "pentahedron".

What do you think? for me that relates to so many other sources of math information that I have a hard time understanding.

We're on the same page regarding the interrelationship of: science, art, ecology. Now, in this conversation, I want to detail in some stuff that talks in a rational and general manner about what the differences are between the two titans: science/art, and how those modal differences are mediated by the unifying synchro-mesh of ecology.
a day ago — ucarr

Can you turn that into a four-dimensional pentahedron? That is a sincere question, not an attempt to inform anyone of anything. Here is the deal for me, I am uncomfortable with either/or arguments. either or arguments are mostly this and that. We live in a 4-dimensional reality so maybe we want to consider four dimensional patterns in statements of truth?

I heard, in India, it is assumed when we speak of one thing, we speak of its opposite. In the west we are very materialistic and seem to ignore movement and change. I Ching the Chinese Book of Change always includes the change. It takes into consideration the unfolding of seasons and climate. At times the climate will favor change and at other times the climate will prevent change.

you must explain how a science fact is not science. — ucarr

Science is a method for ascertaining facts about hte world. Facts about science are plainly different things? I'm not sure what's missed there so I'm sorry if this seems rude. Facts about science are ones which pertain to science, the method of inquiry. Scientific facts are ones which are gleaned from that process. Pure observations about states of affairs. "There is a book on shelf" is not a scientific fact, i'm sure you'd agree. Likewise "We ran test x. We ran it y times. We got a range of s-t values which allows us to conclude ABC". Running test X is a fact about the process of science being employed. ABC is a scientific fact as a result of hte scientific method having been carried out.

Perhaps this will illuminate what i'm saying:

the process of — ucarr

That's a science fact — ucarr

No. THe process of electrolysis is a fact about science. The measurements are 'science facts'. The method and the results are not the same kind of fact. I do not understand how you're confusing the two, and so perhaps my responses are inapt.

How is it not the case that your argument above is not pettifogging en route to word muddle? — ucarr

I'm not sure what this is meant to mean, but there is precisely zero muddle or problems witht eh words in my account. They are straight-forward, easy to understand and delineate, and adequately refer to the two distinct things I am referring to.

Here I think you insert an artificial partition; the Tony Awards would be meaningless without the dramatic performances that precede it. — ucarr

This is a non sequitur that does not relate to the discussion. No, Tony awards would not be possible without a performance, but they are plainly irrelevant to each other per se. Picking up the award is not acting a play out. Presenting your findings at a conference is not carrying out experiments under controlled conditions.

Here you distill the war between science and art: successful navigation of right and wrong facts and right and wrong logic leads to the science and technology that produces nuclear bombs. — ucarr

I don't recognize anything in the above in my account. I think you've jumped some massive guns here and landed somewhere entirely alien to both what I've said, and what I intended to convey.

Can we see, herein, that right and wrong is concerned with what things are, whereas good and bad is concerned with the moral meaning of how things are experienced? — ucarr

No, not at all. I don't actually see how what you've said is at all illustrative of this point, ignoring that I think the point is extremely weak and bordering on nonsensical. Neither of these accounts makes any sense prima facie which presents an issue for the conclusions being drawn. They need grounding principles to become apt for any context of discussion. I do, however, note that yes, "good and bad" are different from "right and wrong". Something "right" can be "bad" for someone (i don't know an ethical account that doesn't acknowledge this). I'm not quite sure the point, there, unless you're saying that "science facts" and "facts about science" can be put into the respective boxes there? If so, could you be a little clearer about those thoughts? I might be able to get on that train, depending how you're thinking of it...

Thank you Athena. I appreciate that :) Particularly as we've often bumped up against one another.

what the differences are between the two titans: science/art, and how those modal differences are mediated by the unifying synchro-mesh of ecology. — ucarr

Are they mediated? There are geometric forms that allow durability, utility, and beauty to coalesce, as in arches or catenary curves. Just being present or available satisfies a versatility that is adequate for many areas of human interest, e.g. architecture.

Health care and medicine are other areas where the wedge between the sciences and the humanities has had polarising effects on practices.

For example, the idea that consciousness is subjective, but science is objective, and therefore we can't have a science about consciousness, conflates two different senses of 'subjective'.

Consciousness is ontologically subjective as it exists only for the one who has it, but that doesn't mean epistemically subjective. We can be conscious of science, and we can have science about the conscious states of individual organisms.

I'm not sure what this is meant to mean, but there is precisely zero muddle or problems witht eh words in my account. They are straight-forward, easy to understand and delineate, and adequately refer to the two distinct things I am referring to. — AmadeusD

Pseudo-intellectualism is looking like the most probably explanation of this person's writing. I mean look at this needless word salad:

what the differences are between the two titans: science/art, and how those modal differences are mediated by the unifying synchro-mesh of ecology.

I am prone to florid sentences myself sometimes but this is just too much for me to stomach anymore.

Even my toddler can list off all the mediations provided by the synchro-mesh of ecology!

[/sarcasm]

I am prone to florid sentences myself sometimes but this is just too much for me to stomach anymore. — I like sushi

What would philosophy be without dubious sentences?

A more charitable interpretation of that sentence is that it is based on the dubious assumption that art and science are opposite modes of inquiry, and somehow ecology meshes them together. But the assumption is proven wrong by the fact that both in the sciences and in the arts we use pretty much the same modes of inquiry, e.g. abductive.

↪ucarr

It is your thread so you should provide clarity of what you are asking instead of throwing out random questions and having others guess what you are talking about. — I like sushi

If you are just riffing, fair enough. If you have something explicit to say I have not seen it yet. — I like sushi

You are not seeing what is here to be seen. (Notice how no one else is charging me with being vague and unfocused.)

The sciences are concerned with “what,” whereas the humanities are concerned with “how.”

Write an elaboration of what you think this means.

I’ll begin with my own elaboration:

What = existence; How = journey — ucarr

Summary: Science and the arts differ on the basis of "What" and "How." What = existence; How = Journey. Show me where, in the specific language of these statements, there's a lack of clarity about what I'm stating. As an example of what I'm asking for, show me how my two equations are unclear about what they're claiming.

I have a feeling you are confusing yourself by interchanging Why, How and What without appreciating that they are ALL What questions. — I like sushi

you are confusing yourself by interchanging...How and What without appreciating that they are...What questions. — I like sushi

In your two repetitive statements above, you use "interchanging" twice. If two things are interchangeable, which is to say they can be exchanged, that can mean they're of the same type or value. It doesn't necessarily mean they are equal. You equate them when you say,

...Why, How and What... are ALL What questions — I like sushi

So, the gist of your argument seems to be the claim they are equal. Do you agree this is the point of your argument? If you don't agree to this, then you're agreeing with an argument I've already made:

My claim, faulty though it be, characterizes the general difference as different modalities of method of discovery: the what modality for science; the how modality for art.

The what modality is a narration of things as things.

The how modality is a narration of things as experiences. — ucarr

If you deny you're equating "What" and "How," then your statement:

...Why, How and What... are ALL What questions — I like sushi

implies "How" and "What" belong to the general category of "What." This means, as you know, that "How" overlaps with "What" in important ways that land it within the general category of "What." They are exchangeable but not identical. As with Venn Diagrams, some of their terrain overlaps, some of it doesn't. They both belong to the same "type," but they nonetheless are distinct "tokens" not equal.

The terrain of my claim is the grayscale that lies between two polarities, say, black and white. "What" and "How" are non-identical exchangeables, just as, by your own argument, "science" and "art" are non-identical exchangeables. This means your argument -- because of the implied meaning of its own language ("What" and "How" are distinct "tokens" of the same "type") -- for my confusion becomes your confusion (about my confusion) due to an error in judgment (about who's confused) that makes your attack irrelevant.

They [sic] is no direct question in the OP (very nebulous). — I like sushi

Have you ever taken a test that asks you an essay question? Essay questions are not yes/no questions, nor are they multiple choice questions where you check the correct box. Essay questions ask the person to write an essay pertinent to the issue raised by the question. This is the hardest type of question because you're on your own judgment about what is the best answer. So, yes, there is no simple, bracketed answer indicated by the question, but that's because it wants you to be expansive in the expression of your pertinent thoughts.

I know you'll be unpersuaded by my arguments here. Thank-you for your time and energy because your involvement, something requiring my defense, has empowered me to better understand what I'm trying to communicate within this conversation.

The essentially difference between the sciences and the humanities is cross-culturalism. Science, as a method, is not culture bound (in the general sense). It's motivation is simplicity of theory, not outcomes.

Everything in the humanities is culture-bound (in the general sense) and outcomes are the policy-driving forces. These aren't problems, though. — AmadeusD

This is impressive thinking. :up: — Athena

Yes. Interesting observations.

Let's look at some details:

• I'm unsure of the meaning of "cross-culturalism" in this context.

• The method of science is simplicity of theory, not outcomes. It's not the case simplicity of theory is a strategy for achieving the best outcomes?

• I know science tries to keep blind to a particular outcome for a particular experiment. Does that imply indifference to outcomes in general? Why practice science if not for results? I don't think the outcomes of cancer research are matters of indifference to the researchers.

• Everything in the humanities is culture-bound (in the general sense) and outcomes are the policy-driving forces. Might this be a simplification? Are the plays of Shakespeare culture bound? If so, why are they produced all over the world? On the same note, why are popular books translated into many languages?
  
  These aren't problems, though. The culture-bound, policy-driving forces of Mein Kampf aren't a problem?

We're on the same page regarding the interrelationship of: science, art, ecology. Now, in this conversation, I want to detail in some stuff that talks in a rational and general manner about what the differences are between the two titans: science/art, and how those modal differences are mediated by the unifying synchro-mesh of ecology.
a day ago — ucarr

Can you turn that into a four-dimensional pentahedron? — Athena

As it turns out, I've got a more simple answer to your request:

The terrain of my claim is the grayscale that lies between two polarities, say, black and white. "What" and "How" are non-identical exchangeables, just as, by your own argument, "science" and "art" are non-identical exchangeables. — ucarr

Please click on the hyper-link of my name at the bottom of the above post. It'll take you to the post that contains the quote. There you'll get the context for the quote.

P.S. It's the third paragraph up from the bottom of the post.

I am prone to florid sentences myself sometimes but this is just too much for me to stomach anymore.
— I like sushi

What would philosophy be without dubious sentences? — jkop

Aye, doubt is the soul of philosophy.

A more charitable interpretation of that sentence is that it is based on the dubious assumption that art and science are opposite modes of inquiry, and somehow ecology meshes them together. — jkop

Here's an interesting example of a dubious premise leading to a useful conclusion:

But the assumption is proven wrong by the fact that both in the sciences and in the arts we use pretty much the same modes of inquiry, e.g. abductive. — jkop

It's not the dubious conclusion that's useful. Instead, it's the proffered example: abductive reasoning as the modal forms of both scientific and artistic discovery. (Who says the jeering section of the bleachers isn't essential to the triumphs of (the hallowed name of your favorite philosopher here))?

This is the type of answer I'm looking for. If the answer is a good one, then the goodness of the answer is at least partial validation of the florid sentence.

Let's say abductive reasoning is the mode of inquiry of both science and art. Well, that's a general and rational statement about the identities of science and art.

Now we come to what might be the fun part. What is the difference between science and art? If we replace art with humanities, then we might have a cogent answer from 180 Proof: science is a subset of humanities.

180 Proof

So, what about the difference? We've conjectured science and art are both of the humanities. We've conjectured they're both forms of abductive reasoning. Why do they have different labels? Why do few people confuse scientists with artists?

If the difference between science and art is trivial, then one label for both will suffice, right? Wrong. I don't expect anybody to start claiming one label is adequate for both. Do you? You don't.

While I await cogent arguments to the effect the difference IS trivial, I'll proceed with the work of this conversation: articulating, in a manner both general and rational, the difference between science and art.

What if the answer lies within an articulation of a hierarchy with three levels: a) humanities; b)... c) abductive reasoning. What's the b) level? I think it goes thus: b) nominative predication vs adverbial modification of nominative predication.

Discovery of "what" is rooted in the nominative predication of the fact of existing things.

This nominative predication of the fact of existing things establishes "what is."

Discovery of "how" is rooted in the adverbial modification of the nominative predication of the fact of existing things.

This adverbial modification of the nominative predication of the fact of existing things narrates "what it's like" to experience "what is."

This adverbial modification elaborates both the effect and the affect of the fact of existing things. To the main point, "how" drags consciousness into the frame of the lens of discovery.

David Chalmers has enlightened us with just how profound is the difference between "what" and "how" with his seminal paper, "The Hard Problem." It delineates what is perhaps the greatest limitation of abductive reasoning from "what." — ucarr

ucarr

Have you ever taken a test that asks you an essay question? Essay questions are not yes/no questions, nor are they multiple choice questions where you check the correct box. Essay questions ask the person to write an essay pertinent to the issue raised by the question. This is the hardest type of question because you're on your own judgment about what is the best answer. So, yes, there is no simple, bracketed answer indicated by the question, but that's because it wants you to be expansive in the expression of your pertinent thoughts. — ucarr

What question? There is no question in the OP.

You threw a question at me when I asked for clarity. How about you show me how to answer it. That might actually be useful for both us in gaining some degree of mutual understanding.

Is there a bridge linking "what" with "how" in the context I've elaborated here? — ucarr

I am not in an exam (plus my first post addressed the point in the OP and the issues with your "elaboration"). Tell me if there is or isn't AND explain it concisely.

Thank-you for your time and energy because your involvement, something requiring my defense, has empowered me to better understand what I'm trying to communicate within this conversation. — ucarr

We will see I guess.

Read my post directly above yours for the heart of what I have to say thus far. If it has any merit, we can all thank jkop for his smart and provoking input.

Also, there's plenty of detail that you, in fairness to me, should respond to in like detail.

As for the essay question, it's implied: given the prompt, what do you think?

There should be no insoluble mysteries such as: what lies beyond a black hole's event horizon. This must follow if it's true that, as you say: There is no ample scope for "mysteries and miracles" here beyond someone's uneducated sophistry. — ucarr

That physics may not explain everything in our universe does not leave ample scope for miracles. "Miracle" here is used casually and sophistically, but the above fact does not leave ample scope for miracles in a Humean sense either.

This is not to say that God is refuted or atheism is true, but there being unknown facts about the universe does not say anything to us about the supernatural. It would be comedic if it would, our knowledge of the natural is lacking and based on that we make claims about a domain beyond the natural?

I can't work with Quora quotations.