You wrote:

Fair enough. I'd go further. (I think) we're starting with the hypotheses that there is a reality; reality is real; and we're content for the moment to let a brick informally represent what "reality" means. And that "truth" is a word that we define, for the moment, as naming a quality that reality has. For example, in the same way (not sense) we say a lemon is yellow, we are, for the moment, saying that reality is truth (let's call it T1).


Still same page?

Something seems amiss...

"Truth" is a term that names a quality of reality. Truth is a quality of reality(that reality has).

I was ok to that point, but then you went on to say...

...We are, for the moment, saying that reality is truth (let's call it T1).

This doesn't seem right, tim. It doesn't work with the above..

Reality is a quality of reality?

I was ok to that point, but then you went on to say...

...We are, for the moment, saying that reality is truth (let's call it T1).

This doesn't seem right, tim. It doesn't work with the above..

Reality is a quality of reality? — creativesoul

Consider his example: "the lemon is yellow". He's not saying that the lemon is identical to yellow. And so when he says "reality is truth" he's not saying that reality is identical to truth.

Although I think his grammar is off. He should be saying "reality is true". Otherwise it's akin to saying "the lemon is yellowness".

Well, orange is named after the fruit, and not the other way around. Place, some more ah-hem... hunter gatherer communities still identify colours with the things. "like a tree", "like a tiger, "like a butterfly" etc. Some, maybe an orange is orangeness...

I understood.

If truth is a quality of reality, then reality cannot be truth. Otherwise it results in reality being a quality of itself.

I'm just trying to be as clear and committed to meaningful language use as we can be.

If truth is a quality of reality, then reality cannot be truth. Otherwise it results in reality being a quality of itself. — creativesoul

I think this is just grammatical confusion. He seems to mean it in the sense of saying that being yellow is a property of a lemon. Does it then follow that the lemon cannot be yellow, otherwise it results in the lemon being a quality of itself?

Yeah, I dunno...

Talk about properties and qualities and comparing the two...

Reeks of yet another false and/or utterly inadequate dichotomy.

I'll accept something sensible but calling "truth" a quality of reality in the way that yellow is a quality/property of lemons seems unsustainable.

Truth is intangible. Yellow is not.

Yellow is a color. Colors are kinds of qualities/properties.

What kind/group of qualities does truth belong to with regard to reality?

If truth is a quality of reality, then reality cannot be truth. Otherwise it results in reality being a quality of itself.

I'm just trying to be as clear and committed to meaningful language use as we can be. — creativesoul

What I wrote above was

And that "truth" is a word that we define, for the moment, as naming a quality that reality has. For example, in the same way (not sense) we say a lemon is yellow, we are, for the moment, saying that reality is truth (let's call it T1) — timw

Would you say that being a lemon is a quality of lemons, that lemons have? Do you see the problem? If yes, then lemons cannot be lemons. And no leads to an equal absurdity. I value clarity in language and usage. But I also try to keep out of the briar patch that questions of usage can lead to, and this could be a long and deep briar patch.

So I'll try a shortcut. If I said, "Bricks are truth," you might reasonably object that bricks are bricks. But I didn't say that. I defined truth as a quality that reality has. Do you find a problem with that definition?

I also wrote "reality is truth." The real criticism - question - here is if truth, in Aristotelian terms, is a substance or an accident. In calling it a quality, I'm calling it an accident, and accidents depend on substances and cannot exist on their own. On the other hand if truth is a substance, then it isn't an accident, cannot be a predicate.

Before going there, it's worth a sentence or two on where we've been and where we're going. The critique of truth given by MU (as I understand it) is that it is always subject to, "how do you know?" MU's answer is judgment; our judgment tells us so. The problem is that judgment is ever-fallible; that is, it's judgment all the way down and at every level subject to the same, "how do you know?"

Part of MU's argument is the dependence on definitions, and because there never was a complete definition, then you cannot have truth except via judgment, that is, dialectical truth. I agree, as far as it goes. But it is truth as essentially a product of language, and it a truth that never arrives. I think there's more to it.

Call it the truth that inheres in reality or experience. It does not speak, is not a product of language. It appears in language in such expressions as, "That is a brick," when referring to a brick. MU can't countenance this, for him it all goes through a verbal/linguistic process. But much of reality and experience is not of that process. How does a broken leg feel? How does a raspberry taste?

In brief, that's my argument: truth isn't equivocal, although in language it usual is. That is, it has a being outside of language, that language can access. In that sense, truth (that I call T1, above) informs, grounds, propositional truth.

Now I must repeat my question. I defined reality as truth, What, exactly, is the error?

I also wrote "reality is truth." The real criticism - question - here is if truth, in Aristotelian terms, is a substance or an accident. In calling it a quality, I'm calling it an accident, and accidents depend on substances and cannot exist on their own. On the other hand if truth is a substance, then it isn't an accident, cannot be a predicate.

Before going there, it's worth a sentence or two on where we've been and where we're going. The critique of truth given by MU (as I understand it) is that it is always subject to, "how do you know?" MU's answer is judgment; our judgment tells us so. The problem is that judgment is ever-fallible; that is, it's judgment all the way down and at every level subject to the same, "how do you know?" — tim wood

I think there's an historical factor that ought to be introduced here. I'm referring to the notion of the hierarchy of truth, which is implicit in Platonic epistemology. In The Republic, there is a very important section called the Analogy of the Divided Line - there's quite good summary on Wikipedia here.

A general point is that in the Platonic view, knowledge of sensory objects or of the 'domain of the senses', generally, can't be reliable because the senses are inherently treacherous. But knowledge of mathematical truths are relatively more stable, because they are not subject to the change and mutability that characterises worldly things. The highest knowledge, noesis, pertains to the knowledge of the forms themselves, the ideal archetypes of things, which exist on another level of reality altogether. Because they are the origin or source of the things we see 'here', then knowledge of them is knowledge of the actual origin of things.

Please forgive my pidgin Platonism, I'm no classics scholar and only have a very rudimentary grasp of these ideas. But the reason I mention it, is because in the classical Western tradition, 'certain knowledge' relied on there being an hierarchy of knowing or being, extending down from the One, through angels, then humans, animals, plants, mineral, etc, as depicted in this medieval woodcut:



Of course, in the transition to modernity, that whole schema has been undermined or effectively forgotten. Hence the sense of there not being any terminus of explanation, or foundation of certainty for knowledge, as that, among other things, is one of the things that has become 'lost in transition'.

This isn't for you to understand or see; it is a definition, or hypothesis - a starting point.

The point - my point - is to attempt to ground the meaning of the word "truth" in something secure and unequivocal. If truth just is reality, per definition, then, it seems to me, the only attack possible on truth is to attack reality. — tim wood

You can define a word however you please, but if it's not a good representation of how the word is used, then what good is that definition? In other words, if you want to talk about what truth is then we should refer to the way that the word is used, the thing which is referred to by "truth", not some made up thing. If you just make up a definition, then truth will be just that, whatever you've made up. But what kind of truth is that, one you can just make up?

And because I assert it, it needs no justification. — tim wood

See, what kind of truth is this? This is what truth is, and I don't need to justify this, because I assert it, this is truth.

Do you challenge that hypothesis? My hypothesis is that, "there is a reality; reality is real." Are you arguing that it is not the case that there is a reality, or that there is a reality, but that it is not real? It must be one of these, else why mention it? — tim wood

My challenge is this, if it is a hypothesis, "there is a reality", as you claim, then what justifies your claim that it is truth. In order that a hypothesis be recognized as truth, it must be justified. So yes, I challenge your hypothesis, "there is a reality". In order that reality is truth, your hypothesis must be justified or we risk the possibility that there is no such thing as truth. Are you prepared to proceed on an unjustified hypothesis, defining "truth" accordingly, but risking the possibility that there is no such thing as truth, due to the possible failure of your hypothesis?

But maybe we have to start with more primitive notions. Answer yes or no: Is there reality? Is there knowledge? — tim wood

I believe there is reality, and I believe that there is knowledge. But if I claim that reality is truth, as you do, then I must have certainty in my belief that there is reality. If I have certainty in my belief, then I ought to be able to justify this certainty, or else the certainty is just an illusion, false certainty. That's why I asked you for justification, because you have claimed that reality is truth, implying that reality is a certainty for you. So if it's a certainty for you, you ought to be able to justify it, and make it a certainty for me.

I also wrote "reality is truth." — tim wood

Another point, and to draw on another philosophical tradition, namely, Vedanta (Hinduism). There is a lovely word in that tradition, namely, Sat-Chit-Ananda ( सच्चितानन्द ) which denotes 'being-mind-bliss'.

sat (सत्): In Sanskrit sat means "being, existing", "living, lasting, enduring", "real, actual", "true, good, right", "beautiful, wise, venerable, honest", or "that which really is, existence, essence, true being, really existent, good, true".

cit (चित्): means "to perceive, fix mind on", "to understand, comprehend, know", "to form an idea in the mind, be conscious of, think, reflect upon". Often translated as "consciousness" or simply "mind".

ānanda (आनन्द):[means "happiness, joy, enjoyment, sensual pleasure", "pure happiness, one of three attributes of Atman or Brahman in the Vedanta philosophy". Frequently translated as "bliss".


The point is, in this tradition (and its cognates), 'reality', 'truth' and 'being' are in some fundamental way inseparable; to know something is to be at one with it. To know 'what is', is to be at one with it, but this is an existential state or condition, rather than propositional knowledge, as such.

Similarly, in Aristotle, the notion of an 'intelligible object' is that when one knows such an object:

in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible.

Lloyd Gerson, Platonism vs Naturalism.

Whilst Aristotelean and Hindu philosophies are worlds apart, this sense of the 'union of knower and known' can be found in both, primarily because it is an aspect of most pre-modern philosophies.

Whereas, the problem for modern philosophy is that 'thinking' is one thing, 'the object' another; 'the world' is one thing, 'the subject' another. There is nowhere any sense of ground or basis in the relentless march of science, which no longer deals in eternal laws, but only 'falsifiable hypotheses'.

I'm unsure if you've made an error at all tim. I want to say here that I have no problem with granting another's conceptual(linguistic) framework and seeing it through. I mean, there is no other way to understand an unfamiliar position. Yours is unfamiliar to me.

So...

I'm struggling to understand the parallel between "truth" being a quality of reality and yellow being a quality of lemons.

"Truth", if it is the name of a quality that reality has then it would be a sensible parallel to draw. I mean, "yellow" is the name of a quality that lemons have.

Is that rendering acceptable to you?

A general point is that in the Platonic view, knowledge of sensory objects or of the 'domain of the senses', generally, can't be reliable because the senses are inherently treacherous. But knowledge of mathematical truths is relatively more stable, because they are not subject to the change and mutability that characterizes worldly things. — Wayfarer

I want to stay with truth and not complicate it with ideas about knowledge, which is complicated enough by itself. Knowledge, different from truth, has its needs (stability one of them), that are not truth's. An example may settle the point: I have on a mountain ridge in fog and mists completely misunderstood what I was looking at. What I thought was the lodge, our goal, a kilometer distant turned out to be a rock about 150 meters away. I knew it was the lodge, until the wind blew some of the mist away. But it was never true.

You might argue that this is exactly the senses being treacherous (true, with respect to knowledge), but I would argue back that the senses gave true report; rather it was my understanding that failed in supposing what I saw provided enough data for me to draw a conclusion. That conclusion was false with respect to the facts - but true with respect to the information I had.

(And following on the ideas developed above, the truth of the reality of the situation, that I mis-perceived, was the ground by which I would have been correctly informed, had I perceived it correctly.)

You can define a word however you please, but if it's not a good representation of how the word is used, then what good is that definition? In other words, if you want to talk about what truth is then we should refer to the way that the word is used, the thing which is referred to by "truth", not some made up thing. If you just make up a definition, then truth will be just that, whatever you've made up. But what kind of truth is that, one you can just make up?

And because I assert it, it needs no justification.
— tim wood

See, what kind of truth is this? This is what truth is, and I don't need to justify this, because I assert it, this is truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, the problem is that the word "truth" in ordinary usage is simply not well-understood. My definition is a test, a hypothesis: can it stand; is it useful? Or does it fail, and why? As such it is not the conclusion of an argument, instead it is an early waypoint in a discussion. You object to it. Were it a conclusion there might be merit in the objection. But it's a premise, a for-the-sake-of-argument presupposition: objecting to that simply short-circuits the discussion.

My challenge is this, if it is a hypothesis, "there is a reality", as you claim, then what justifies your claim that it is truth. In order that a hypothesis be recognized as truth, it must be justified. So yes, I challenge your hypothesis, "there is a reality". — Metaphysician Undercover

My hypothesis is truth is reality, reality is truth. Reality is not a hypothesis. You want me to justify it. Let me note here that you acknowledged above that justification (and justification of justification) is an endless process, only got away from by the vehicle of a comfortable assumption. I'm continually pressed by the force of your arguments that you believe that's the best you can do. And in some limited and narrow senses, I agree with you! I think there's more, I don't think you share that thought with me.

My argument runs this way: given definitions of "truth" all have problems. Is it possible to find for it a substantive and non-trivial definition that is simple and problem free, even if the meaning is constrained as compared with the problematic definitions. I find one in regarding truth as reality (and reality as truth). The constraint is that in-so-far as reality does not speak, so truth does not speak. But like reality, it grounds, evidences, reveals, is; and in these, it is secure, simple, non-problematic. You don't like it because it's not the way you understand truth, but that's the whole point! Incumbent on you if you're engaging is to show where it fails on its own terms.

But maybe we have to start with more primitive notions. Answer yes or no: Is there reality? Is there knowledge?
— tim wood

I believe there is reality, and I believe that there is knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover

With this I won a bet with myself, that you could not or would not answer these. Because you did not answer "yes," it follows that for you there is neither reality nor knowledge. Maybe you can modify and correct this?

Reality is what each of us experience. It is a process, not a thing. Similarly, knowledge is an accumulation of experiences. It is a process, not a thing.

Hence, as processes, reality and knowledge are continuously evolving (changing) and are subject to interactions/processes of each individual. To embrace such a model is to believe in it. It is not a concrete thing. It is subject to evolving experiences.

Thank you! I admire and am envious of folks who can "walk" in more than one world.

The point is, in this tradition (and its cognates), 'reality', 'truth' and 'being' are in some fundamental way inseparable; to know something is to be at one with it. To know 'what is', is to be at one with it, but this is an existential state or condition, rather than propositional knowledge, as such. — Wayfarer

I read this - the sat-cit-ananda - as referring to understandings that are not passive receptors, but are sought out, decided, chosen, learned; active and not passive. I suspect it is a major cultural flaw (and personal), no doubt incubated in the expectations of science, to wait to be told what is, when at some point each of us needs to actively participate in that investigation. Not against science or in realms where science is best, but wherever there is care, and concern.

I'm struggling to understand the parallel between "truth" being a quality of reality and yellow being a quality of lemons.

"Truth", if it is the name of a quality that reality has then it would be a sensible parallel to draw. I mean, "yellow" is the name of a quality that lemons have. — creativesoul

Would it help to set aside reconciling truth and yellow until you've tackled reality and lemons? You're trying to reconcile generalizations with particulars, abstracts with concretes.

And as well, looking for and finding verbal parallelisms may get high scores on certain tests, but sometimes it's a fool's errand. Especially if you find one and it's both clever and useless.

My own approach has been to keep before me the question, "What is truth," while at the same time supposing that it is something and not nothing, and if something, then specifiable.

Knowledge, different from truth, has its needs (stability one of them), that are not truth's. An example may settle the point: I have on a mountain ridge in fog and mists completely misunderstood what I was looking at. What I thought was the lodge, our goal, a kilometer distant turned out to be a rock about 150 meters away. I knew it was the lodge, until the wind blew some of the mist away. But it was never true.

You might argue that this is exactly the senses being treacherous (true, with respect to knowledge), but I would argue back that the senses gave true report; rather it was my understanding that failed in supposing what I saw provided enough data for me to draw a conclusion. That conclusion was false with respect to the facts - but true with respect to the information I had. — tim wood

There is a stock example in Indian philosophy of 'mistaking a rope for a snake'. The analogy is used to illustrate that we misunderstand what we're looking at, in a similar way to your example. I'm sure proponents of that argument would contend that you did not, in fact, know that the rock was the lodge; that you thought it was, but were mistaken about it. It was, therefore, a mistaken belief, based on sense-impression combined with your expectation of what you were wanting to see.

I suspect it is a major cultural flaw (and personal), no doubt incubated in the expectations of science, to wait to be told what is, when at some point each of us needs to actively participate in that investigation. — tim wood

It's more that scientific method assumes the separation or detachment of observer from object; 'brackets out' the observer, so to speak. Which is all well and good, for a certain class of observations, but which is problematic in other respects, because we're not, actually, separate from, or outside of, life or reality as a whole. That sense of otherness or separateness is something that I think is characteristic of modernism as a mode of being.

You're simply conflating 'this is truly my belief' with 'this is a true belief'.

There is a stock example in Indian philosophy of 'mistaking a rope for a snake'. — Wayfarer

Clearly the rope is not a snake. Or is it, for a moment, while the error stands? Not as a matter of knowledge: but as truth is prior to knowledge, so as a matter of truth. This truth obviously cannot be the truth of the reality of a snake, because there's no snake. But will it pass as the truth of the experience of the rope as a snake? Is the experience a reality - is it real? I'm leaning toward thinking that it is real, and that under the understanding of truth that I'm offering, that truth is reality and reality truth, that for that moment, the truth is that it's a snake!

I hope no one will answer here until and unless they've taken a really close look at truth. Knowledge is out simply because we haven't got there yet; we're logically and temporally prior to knowledge.

Or is it, for a moment, while the error stands? Not as a matter of knowledge: but as truth is prior to knowledge, so as a matter of truth. — tim wood

Well, if you've said that, you've fallen into the pit of relativism, solipsism, and various other isms, none of them healthy. Surely any proposition concerning either truth or knowledge, has to be grounded in what really is the case.

Well, if you've said that, you've fallen into the pit of relativism, solipsism, and various other isms, none of them healthy. Surely any proposition concerning either truth or knowledge, has to be grounded in what really is the case. — Wayfarer

Several questions: can experience (by itself, in itself) be true? Is experience a kind of proposition? Is there any truth before figuring out what really is the case?

I'm asking, not arguing. It seems to me that while experience can be represented in a proposition, it is not itself a proposition. It also seems to me a kind of reality. Therefore the experience stands as a truth of reality that can (and usually does) inform. I have no objection to qualifying this truth somehow to distinguish from propositional truth, but truth it appears to be. If you don't think "truth" works here, what if anything would you call it. Not a mistake or an error, because that's not yet; the knowledge hasn't yet arrived.

You've already given a simple answer, but I think you raced ahead to propositional truth and knowledge. If, knowing that it's really a rope, I still claim it's a snake, then that's crazy. But before I know?

They're all good questions.

Is experience a kind of proposition? Well, I would have said not, a proposition is by definition a verbal statement. I suppose you could say, if someone comes at you brandishing a weapon, that they're proposing to attack you, but I would have thought that for it to be actually 'a proposition', it would be more along the lines of 'Let's say we go and attack person X' rather than the act itself.

But the nature of 'experience' is again one of those kinds of questions that sounds obvious, but really isn't. The scientific method constrains what constitutes 'experience', in the sense of requiring that empirical observations be replicable in the third person (notwithstanding the so-called 'replication crisis'). That rules out a lot of what we would like to call 'experience', in that unless it's an 'experience' that can be described in third-person terms, then it is deprecated.

But what constitutes 'knowledge', is, again, a subject that receives a lot of attention in Plato's dialogues. Interestingly, the Theaetetus, which is mainly concerned with those questions, is quite inconclusive; many of the dialogues end in aporia, questions without answers.

If, knowing that it's really a rope, I still claim it's a snake, then that's crazy. But before I know? — tim wood

before you know, you have a belief, which turns out to be false. If we both saw the same thing, and you said, 'it's a snake'., and I said a rope, then you would have been right. We can and do have mistaken beliefs about many things.

Customarily, it is said that 'knowledge is justified true belief' - which is true, although trite.

That's why I referred back to traditional philosophy - Greek and Indian. They both have a kind of sub-text or background, wherein 'knowledge' is inherently connected with virtue - Plato's 'knowledge of the Good', being an example.

The problem nowadays - and it's a profound issue - is that scientific knowledge is explicitly not concerned with any kind of value or moral normativity. The Universe is supposed to be value-free - most people here will say that value is subjective, something which humans project onto the supposedly blank canvas of the Universe.

most people here will say that value is subjective, something which humans project onto the supposedly blank canvas of the Universe. — Wayfarer

While my experience on this forum is not exhaustive, I have yet to witness anyone describe value in this way, since most probably consider themselves part of the Universe and not separate and apart from a blank canvas called the Universe.

As for me, value is an interaction between between me and that which I value, making it more of a feeling, the feeling varying in intensity.

Well, the problem is that the word "truth" in ordinary usage is simply not well-understood. — tim wood

I don't see a problem with "truth" according to ordinary usage. It's very clearly "that which is true", or "the state of being true. The issue with ordinary usage, where the problem is, and the thing which is not well understood is what it means to be "true". So the difficulty is not with "truth", which ordinarily refers directly to 'true", the difficulty is with "true".

It appears to me. like you think that you can bypass the difficulty of "true", by defining "truth" in some other way, which does not refer to "true".

My definition is a test, a hypothesis: can it stand; is it useful? Or does it fail, and why? As such it is not the conclusion of an argument, instead it is an early waypoint in a discussion. You object to it. Were it a conclusion there might be merit in the objection. But it's a premise, a for-the-sake-of-argument presupposition: objecting to that simply short-circuits the discussion. — tim wood

I disagree with this. A hypothesis, or proposition, which is a premise "for-the-sake-of-argument", is a proposal, and like any other proposition it needs to be properly supported before we proceed to the argument. This way the true meaning of the proposition, will be fully understood, and any conclusion derived will be fully understood. "Reality is truth" has no straight forward meaning, so it's meaning must be explained in a clear way.

My argument runs this way: given definitions of "truth" all have problems. Is it possible to find for it a substantive and non-trivial definition that is simple and problem free, even if the meaning is constrained as compared with the problematic definitions. I find one in regarding truth as reality (and reality as truth). The constraint is that in-so-far as reality does not speak, so truth does not speak. But like reality, it grounds, evidences, reveals, is; and in these, it is secure, simple, non-problematic. You don't like it because it's not the way you understand truth, but that's the whole point! Incumbent on you if you're engaging is to show where it fails on its own terms. — tim wood

I don't see any such problems with definitions of "truth". They are very straight forward, but they refer directly to "true". So that is where your argument clearly fails. You insist that there is a problem defining "truth", when no such problem exists. Then you use this as an excuse to produce your own definition of "truth". For what purpose, I do not yet know, but I'm sure there's a reason why you want to define "truth" in this way.

And as I said, the problem is in defining "true" not "truth". "True" is often used to mean "in accordance with reality". So the difficulty is in determining what is meant by in accordance with reality. If we proceed with your definition of "truth", in which truth is reality, then "true" simply means "in accordance with truth". You might claim to have solved the problem, but all this does is create a vicious circle, and avoids dealing with the difficult question of what is meant by "in accordance with reality".

You're simply conflating 'this is truly my belief' with 'this is a true belief'. — John

No I'm not conflating the two. The first says "I am certain that this is my belief". The second says "this is a belief which I am certain of". Do you see the difference?

Several questions: can experience (by itself, in itself) be true? Is experience a kind of proposition? — tim wood

Experience is a process not a thing. As far as I can tell, traditional logical syllogisms cannot deal with processes. I was never able to bring myself to read Alfred Whitehead, but brief description on Wikipedia which describes his process metaphysics, that is based upon the concept of extended experiences (I believe he was influenced by Bergson), is less dependent upon logic and more a result of creative intuition.

Alright tim. In the spirit of clarity. I've seen you arguing for an equivalency between truth and reality. That is why the bit about truth being a quality of reality didn't make sense to me. Then there was the comparison between reality and lemons and truth and yellow. I want to move on. In the meantime you've said to another what I took you to be saying from the beginning...

Truth is reality. Reality is truth.

That's a fine starting point. I'll accept that use of both terms. If they're not equivalent then it needs to be made clearer what the relationship is between them. If they are equivalent, then we can move on...

No rhe second just says that the belief is true. Whether I am certain about it is irrelevant. Saying a belief is true, no matter how certain of that I might be, does not make it so.

I don't see a problem with "truth" according to ordinary usage. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you kidding?

Maybe these, from this site:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/

"Truth has been a topic of discussion in its own right for thousands of years. Moreover, a huge variety of issues in philosophy relate to truth, either by relying on theses about truth, or implying theses about truth."

"It would be impossible to survey all there is to say about truth in any coherent way."

The problem of truth is in a way easy to state: what truths are, and what (if anything) makes them true. But this simple statement masks a great deal of controversy. Whether there is a metaphysical problem of truth at all, and if there is, what kind of theory might address it, are all standing issues in the theory of truth. We will see a number of distinct ways of answering these questions."

This Stanford article lists by my count 118 titles in the bibliography, many - most - with the word "truth" in the title, and none that I saw that had the word "true." And this makes sense, because the the subject is truth, not "true."

And from a site listed earlier: there are three main theories of truth (according to this site) correspondence, coherence, pragmatic: each having significant problems. It ends with this: "Perhaps the problem is with the idea of truth itself. Perhaps we should give up the pursuit of Truth (with a capital T) and begin thinking that truth is really a way we have of speaking of what we agree on and what we find persuasive. In this way we should focus on truths (with a small t)."

You insist that there is a problem defining "truth", when no such problem exists. — Metaphysician Undercover

And the Titanic never hit an iceberg! If I recall, your definition of "true" is that which, after a tiresome number of iterations of justifications, falls under a comfortable assumption we can have confidence in. Perhaps you may care to take just a brief look at the citations above.

Truth is reality. Reality is truth.

That's a fine starting point. I'll accept that use of both terms. — creativesoul

I mean it as a definition, and possibility. Way back when I was green I had a lot of trouble with an aspect of elementary mathematics. To solve some problems you have let something take a particular value. Given unknowns x and y, to solve for y you have to first let, for example, x =4. It was that let I couldn't get my head around. The point here is that as a tool, it solved the problem.

So maybe I should have said, let truth be reality (with appropriate qualifications) And if I should have, then I really should have and I apologize for not having thought of it earlier.

It leaves the questions, what kind of problem does it solve, and is it effective - is it a solution.

It offers a solution to the problem of what truth is - on the assumption that truth is something and not just an empty general label for true. If truth just is that generalization, then true, which appears to pertain to particular propositions, would seem to need a particular demonstration for each proposition. That's a lot of demonstrations.

An example occurs to me: You have a large pot of beans, thousands of them. I hold up a bean and ask, "What is this?" "A bean," you answer. "Prove it," sez I. And you do. Then I hold up another bean and ask, "What is this?" At a fundamental level this is a fair question and one that can be asked of every single bean. (No dinner tonight!) The way out is by resort to something that is neither a bean, nor the particular proof that this particular bean is a bean. Call it proof by appeal to the reality - the fact-ness - of beanness that every bean shares.

Or it could be the brick-ness of bricks, or the -ness of anything. The point is the "-ness." It bridges, it seems to me, the gap between the thing and the idea of the thing. How I'm not sure, maybe by putting them together. To have bricks and brickness, you need both. And this is unremarkable. We do it every day, all day, without a second thought, or any thought at all. This -ness is a fact, is real. It has an "always already" quality. Just as a hammer is always already a hammer, even before we have a use for it, or even know what a hammer is.

So: truth is the -ness of anything that makes that thing what it is. It is real, the reality of the thing. Condensing a bit, we end up with truth is reality and reality is truth.

And it seems effective. "Is that a brick?" "Yes, that really is a brick."

It seems to me an important point that this truth is not propositional ("proposition" broadly defined). It's pre-verbal, pre-propositional, and being real I think it's pre-language. It's always already there, needing merely be found and accessed, which access is usually propositional, in some broad sense (if even in the gesture of reaching for a tool that's supposed to be there, or pre-supposing a proof without actually thinking about it).

I remember years ago a discussion of proofs and the mention of the importance of the rule of non-contradiction. Someone asked, what proved the rule? How did anyone know it was right? The answer was brutal, but as the years have settled on it, it seems correct. The rule of non-contradiction was right, the professor said, "Because it had better be!" (Logicians have a gentler answer: in inconsistent systems anything can be proved.)

I doubt the world requires that truth be reality, after all, it's only a definition. But it may be that to give "truth" a substantive, clear, and simple meaning, and lacking any other way, that "it had better be."