I don't understand that one.

Contribution: something given freely without recompense.

Are you poking fun at me?

:P

The smilie means you don't actually think I am, right? I never know what those things are supposed to mean.

I don't know. You could be self-deprecating like me, and poking fun at yourself. Or I could be completely missing the point of your reply. I do appreciate your contributions here. That said...

Even if you were poking fun at me, it would be fine if it were done in a respectful well intended way.

Your hypothetical actually reminds me of the current alt right's notion of alternative facts. It's almost as if you are analyzing them and how they choose which narrative to tell.

Not poking fun at you. (That is a strange idiom.)

Here's how this happened: to me, the schoolboy examples make it obvious that truth is not the same thing as knowledge or certainty; but the response I got was disheartening. So I wanted to do something with testing where you take away the "objective" part -- the answers -- and the only thing I could see to put in its place was consensus.

As it has happens, there are people around here who hold exactly this view: that truth is just what people individually or collectively say it is. So now I have a model where the truth is literally determined by vote. As I said before, I didn't foresee the cheating issue, but I agree with you it has some obvious real world analogies.

It is a strange colloquialism. Having lived in many different areas in the US and having many friends from around the globe, it's hard to tell where it was picked up. When in Rome...

The schoolboy example effectively set out my argument against Meta earlier regarding certainty.

The model, I think, is a fairly accurate portrayal of whose version of history(which historical account) is taken as the most accurate and therefore taught as history.

Seems to me that "truth" is whatever the consensus says it is. I mean, that is how the word's definition is established, by virtue of how it is used in speech. That skirts around the problem we find ourselves faced with when attempting to take an account of a)that which is not existentially contingent upon our awareness, b)that which is not existentially contingent upon language, and c)that which is not existentially contingent upon thought/belief.

Parsing those contingencies sheds new light on all sorts of things.

...the problem we find ourselves faced with when attempting to take an account of a)that which is not existentially contingent upon our awareness, b)that which is not existentially contingent upon language, and c)that which is not existentially contingent upon thought/belief...

Our awareness of our own mental ongoings is contingent upon our being able to identify and isolate them. That requires attributing meaning to some placemarker or other so that it can stand in as a proxy for our mental ongoings. There are many of these proxies in our terminology. Becoming aware of our own mental ongoings requires written language. It follows that mental ongoings are prior to our awareness of them. However, we know that not all mental ongoings can be prior to language, for some of our terms talk about things that are clearly existentially contingent upon language. So, we are faced with the need to be able to further discriminate between mental ongoings which are prior to language and those which are not.

The attribution of meaning is required for language. The attribution itself requires drawing correlations between symbol and symbolized. That is a mental act, and thus a mental ongoing. Thus, the attribution of meaning is prior to language. But yet again, we find ourselves needing to further discriminate between kinds of meaning, because we know that some meaning cannot possibly be prior to language.

Surely the aforementioned problem is beginning to make itself known?

So then, with regard to analyzing truth...

It's time to take a look at the different uses of the term "truth" in light of all this..

I find that it is clear that only one sense could be the case of us correctly becoming aware of that which is not existentially contingent upon language but is existentially contingent upon thought/belief.

Correspondence.

Another sense could be the case of us correctly becoming aware of that which is not existentially contingent upon either thought/belief or language. That would be when truth is equivalent to reality, the case at hand, the way things are, etc. The problem with this use is that - if and when it is strictly adhered to - it cannot take account of what makes true statements so, without resorting to the above sense...

Another sense could be the case of us correctly becoming aware of that which is not existentially contingent upon either thought/belief or language. That would be when truth is equivalent to reality, the case at hand, the way things are, etc. The problem with this use is that - if and when it is strictly adhered to - it cannot take account of what makes true statements so, without resorting to the above sense... — creativesoul

Well, on the assumption, which I make, that truth and true are different, I think truth is indifferent to true. If truth just is reality, etc., then that truth does not speak. It grounds; it warrants; it gives license for the expression of true propositions. But it provides nothing towards what makes true propositions true - how could it? That requires correct judgment.

There's an interesting implication: that truth cannot be known until and unless the relevant part of the world is known (and not, it seems to me, limited to merely the physical word). But I wonder if that is really so. And in this thread, at least, there is little agreement on just what reality is....

Hey tim!

Well, on the assumption, which I make, that truth and true are different, I think truth is indifferent to true. If truth just is reality, etc., then that truth does not speak. It grounds; it warrants; it gives license for the expression of true propositions. But it provides nothing towards what makes true propositions true...

We agree on that much. The following portion is a bit ambiguous, so I'm not sure what you're actually saying...

...it provides nothing towards what makes true propositions true - how could it? That requires correct judgment.

The term "that" in the last statement leaves me wondering what it is referring to. I'm unsure what it is exactly that you're claiming requires correct judgment.

Does providing something towards what makes true propositions true require correct judgment, or does what makes propositions true require correct judgment?

I've been looking for a way to build a sort of "economic" model of truth within a population and I think I've gotten something I can use from the test-taking scenario, namely how one's certainty can affect another.

I'm thinking of building on how Grice talks about meaning (simplifying a bit):
A tells B that p,
(1) intending B to believe that p,
(2) intending B to recognize that A intends B to believe that p,
(3) intending B to fulfill (1) on the basis of (2).
(The levels can be multiplied here without end ...)

We could do something like this with certainty: surely A is also expressing to B some degree of certainty that p, and intends B to recognize this, and intends B to embrace p in part on the basis of recognizing A's degree of certainty, and intends that B's degree of certainty that p be reflective of A's degree of certainty.

That's the ideal case, but in real life we often form a judgment about a speaker's entitlement to the degree of certainty he has expressed. So we would have to add that A intends B to recognize A's degree of certainty to be justified.

***
Before trying to flesh all that out, there's another candidate (i.e., another factor we might be able to analyze without talking about comparing statements to reality and such).

Truth is normative. I don't just mean in the sense that one should tell the truth. Generally speaking, one should believe what is true and one should not believe what is false.

So we could do this:
A asserts that p to B,
(1) implying B should believe that p,
(2) intending B to recognize that A believes B should believe that p,
(3) intending B to believe that p on the basis of (2).

(It's tempting to rewrite this using "expect," but unfortunately "expect" is ambiguous between merely predicting and demanding conformance to a norm. One reason for a parent to tell a child, "I expect you to behave," is, oddly, that they don't expect them to behave.)

There is a natural linkage between this normative sense of truth and the certainty calculus I've been playing with. You ask me where your keys are; if I tell you I think they're on the kitchen table but I'm not sure, I do not also think you should believe they're on the kitchen table. I might even think you should not believe this on the flimsy basis I've provided, but you shouldn't rule it out. But if I tell you I saw your keys next to the computer, I think you should believe that's where they are.

Anyway this looks promising.

Looks like justification... or warrant...

Interesting none-the-less...

We agree on that much. The following portion is a bit ambiguous, so I'm not sure what you're actually saying... — creativesoul

...it provides nothing towards what makes true propositions true - how could it? That requires correct judgment. — timw

The term "that" in the last statement leaves me wondering what it is referring to. I'm unsure what it is exactly that you're claiming requires correct judgment.

Does providing something towards what makes true propositions true require correct judgment, or does what makes propositions true require correct judgment? — creativesoul

We're supposing truth is just reality. We select a sample of reality, a brick. In doing so non-critically we sidestep a lot of questions - problems - about how we know it's a brick, and what a brick is anyway, and so forth. I think it is correct in this context to ignore/suspend/bracket for the moment all of those questions. There's no law against coming back to them, but if we cannot get to reality or a sample of it, then we really cannot get anywhere.

Anyway, we have a brick, and we say, "This here is a brick." A proposition (p) we can here define as true (T). We can abbreviate a generalization as Tp.

We ought to stop here and think a bit. We have a brick and a Tp. What do they have to do with each other. On the specification that the brick is just a piece of reality, I feel comfortable saying that it - the brick itself - does not and cannot have anything to do with the Tp (or anything else). And what is the Tp? To begin with, it is just a p, a proposition. It could be true or false. If we have constructed it carefully, it is contingently either, but certainly one of them. What it is that settles the contingency? What settles it is the "that" referred to above, that I call an act of correct judgment.

A corollary seems to be that truth and true exist only at a certain "scale" of understanding. If, say, the idea of a brick as a sample of reality (i.e., our given) is overturned, then both the trueness of the Tp, and the truth of the brick are overturned as well. (And also, the contingent nature of the p, that it is one or the other, goes as well). It follows, then, that if truth and true are useful ideas, then they're inoculated and immunized from arguments that would seem to explode their parts while leaving them intact.

An interesting question: keeping in mind our tentative designation of reality as truth, do we need truth to have true propositions? I can talk about bricks all day long, and not a brick in sight. I can do maths, and there never was there a number!

It appears from this that ideas must have a kind of as-yet-undefined reality of their own (again, with reference to our initial assumption). Or, that some p are true without any reference to any reality. Or we can extend the definition of "reality." Perhaps like this: truth is the ordinary reality of things, and it is the reality of the memory (for lack of a better word) of the ordinary reality of things, and it is the product of reason. It's but a step to ask if there is truth in art.

If these species of truth are different, then is there a unifying genus? And, if they are different, then they all need not stand or fall together. Whether there are Tp under art would be independent of whether there are Tp under ordinary reality.

The question of truth seems to lead from one to many and likely to aporia. True, on the other hand, appears to hold its ground, for so long as a truth can be associated with it, lacking which only then does true fail.

There's a short discussion of Kant and Theories of truth here:

http://people.tamu.edu/~sdaniel/Notes/epi-kant.html

What I'm wondering is this: if we analyze assertions to which we attach the additional normative claim -- "You should believe this" -- would that capture all the cases we usually describe as truth claims? Would it capture too much?

ADDED: Need to backtrack. This is all going to end up being about knowledge. What is claimed to be true is what you claim to know; it's the content.

We're supposing truth is just reality. We select a sample of reality, a brick. In doing so non-critically we sidestep a lot of questions - problems - about how we know it's a brick, and what a brick is anyway, and so forth. I think it is correct in this context to ignore/suspend/bracket for the moment all of those questions. There's no law against coming back to them, but if we cannot get to reality or a sample of it, then we really cannot get anywhere.

No worries. I'm a direct realist.

Anyway, we have a brick, and we say, "This here is a brick." A proposition (p) we can here define as true (T). We can abbreviate a generalization as Tp.

We ought to stop here and think a bit. We have a brick and a Tp. What do they have to do with each other. On the specification that the brick is just a piece of reality, I feel comfortable saying that it - the brick itself - does not and cannot have anything to do with the Tp (or anything else). And what is the Tp? To begin with, it is just a p, a proposition. It could be true or false. If we have constructed it carefully, it is contingently either, but certainly one of them. What it is that settles the contingency? What settles it is the "that" referred to above, that I call an act of correct judgment.

What would incorrect judgment look like if reality(the brick itself) does not and cannot have anything to do with the Tp?

I don't know Srap. I would be very hesitant in combining moral assertions with assertions of thought/belief(truth claims).

Sure, but I think rationality is normative in a non-moral sense. I don't think it's just a matter of expecting conformity, but there's "should" and "must" everywhere.

But maybe not. When Hume, he of the "is/ought gap" says "the wise man proportions his belief to the evidence," maybe we just take that as a fact, no implication that people ought to do this. But isn't rationality something we aspire to?

Well Srap...

I, for one, have very good reason to think/believe that morality is largely misunderstood(conventionally ill-conceived), again, as a direct result of misunderstanding thought/belief itself. That's a tangent that's probably not worth venturing very far into, but I'll say the following...

We adopt, at least initially, our worldview which includes moral belief(that which is considered acceptable/unacceptable thought/belief and/or behaviour).

To the bit about rationality...

I would say that being rational increases the likelihood of forming and/or holding true thought/belief about the world and/or ourselves, whereas being irrational has the opposite effect/affect. True thought/belief is imperative to successfully navigating the world.

What would incorrect judgment look like if reality(the brick itself) does not and cannot have anything to do with the Tp? — creativesoul

An incorrect judgment might be, "That is not a brick." Maybe I should say that the brick is not (cannot be) concerned with the judgment. The brick cannot, for example, wag its tail or purr or communicate in any way. Its brickness just is; and it is its isness, its being-as-a-brick, that allows judgment to create a proposition with respect to its brickness.

Its brickness just is; and it is its isness, its being-as-a-brick, that allows judgment to create a proposition with respect to its brickness. — tim wood

The difficulty with this perspective is that when you assume such a thing as "Its brickness ... its being-as-brick", it is implied within this assumption that there is a single correct, or objective definition of what it means to be a brick. If there is no such correct definition of "brick", then brickness is just a bunch of various different ideas, held by different people, and "that is not a brick", is true or false according to these various ideas.

We're supposing truth is just reality. We select a sample of reality, a brick. In doing so non-critically we sidestep a lot of questions - problems - about how we know it's a brick, and what a brick is anyway, and so forth. I think it is correct in this context to ignore/suspend/bracket for the moment all of those questions. There's no law against coming back to them, but if we cannot get to reality or a sample of it, then we really cannot get anywhere. — tim wood

See, it's not correct to ignore or sidestep theses questions, because these are fundamental issues, and there is no such thing as correct without first resolving the issue of definition. So you want to say:
"let's just assume that there is a brick, without first considering whether it is possible that there is a brick".
If it is impossible that there is a brick, and this might well be the case if there is no correct definition of what it means to be a brick, then the assumption that there is a brick is necessarily a false assumption.

In that case, you would be sidestepping these difficult questions, in order to proceed with a false premise, that there is a brick. In an enquiry such as this, what would be the point to sidestepping difficult questions, in order to proceed from a premise which mat be false?

Incidentally, that is why we cannot associate "true" with "correct" as Srap is trying to do. "Correct" is associated with "justified", meaning to be consistent with what others believe. "True" is associated with "certain". So if I say "that is a brick", and "it is true that that is a brick", what I mean is that I am certain that that is a brick. And if we proceed to ask, what makes me certain that that is a brick, often the answer is that I am certain because my belief is justified, but sometimes I can be certain even when my belief is not justified. And this is why we need to look beyond justification to determine what truth is.

When we look at the definition of "brick", this assumed "brickness ...being-as-a-brick", we can ask, is the definition accepted because it is justified, or is it true. Then we must confront the issue of what makes a definition a true definition, rather than a justified definition.

The difficulty with this perspective is that when you assume such a thing as "Its brickness ... its being-as-brick", it is implied within this assumption that there is a single correct, or objective definition of what it means to be a brick. If there is no such correct definition of "brick", then brickness is just a bunch of various different ideas, held by different people, and "that is not a brick", is true or false according to these various ideas. — Metaphysician Undercover

I wrote about "sidestepping" with you in mind, MU. Two problems I have with your way of looking at this are 1) it seems you will never have truth, or really any gold-standard proposition about pretty much anything. If we accept or offer a definition, that's always equivocal. If we just say the heck with it and define it ourselves, then how do we know it's right. I acknowledge the point, but it has narrow application, and beyond that quickly becomes absurd. After all, its atomic structure is always whizzing around, therefore from moment to moment it's never the same brick - we cannot even give it a name.

And 2), in our encounter with the brickness-of-(what we call)-the-brick we did not use any definitions at all. At the building supply store, for example, we might just as well have asked for a pallet of these.

"Brick" is of course not a univocal term. 'There are more bricks in heaven and earth, MU, then are dreamt of even in your philosophy.' But this merely makes "brick" an incompletely specification. The meaning can be refined, even to the point of wordlessly pointing: "this."

You yourself above concede the point.

If there is no such correct definition of "brick", then brickness is just a bunch of various different ideas, held by different people, and "that is not a brick", is true or false according to these various ideas. — mu

In the case where it is false (i.e., it is a brick), then it must be you have a complete specification, and consequently the proposition that affirms it, is true, grounded in the truth of, in this case, the brick itself.

And all of this is why I mentioned some time previously the ideas of right focus and right magnification - right understanding. It's getting pretty clear that the absolute quality of true is a product solely of the criteria in force; and of truth, its exemplification in something outside of itself. Admittedly this surrenders any notion of absolutes or ultimates apart from application, but for the price it secures both truth and true. Did I just win? (Did you have a moment to look at the brief article referenced above?)

I wrote about "sidestepping" with you in mind, MU. Two problems I have with your way of looking at this are 1) it seems you will never have truth, or really any gold-standard proposition about pretty much anything. If we accept or offer a definition, that's always equivocal. If we just say the heck with it and define it ourselves, then how do we know it's right. I acknowledge the point, but it has narrow application, and beyond that quickly becomes absurd. After all, its atomic structure is always whizzing around, therefore from moment to moment it's never the same brick - we cannot even give it a name. — tim wood

The point I am trying to make is that we must get past this issue of definition if we want to move on toward what "true" really means, or what truth really is. If we begin with the assumption, that there is "brickness", "being-as-a-brick", then we are basing or understanding of "true", and "truth", in this assumption. But this assumption is not necessarily true. Any definition may be justified, and accepted, but justification does not make it true. So when we base our analysis of true, and truth, in the assumption that there is a correct definition of things like "brick", then our truth is based in justification.

But this is not a true representation of truth, because "true" refers to things beyond justification, things which are not necessarily justified, and also things which are justified are not necessarily true. That is why we need to get beyond this assumption of "brickness", or "being-as-a-brick", because beginning with this assumption will necessarily restrict us to justification, and other things like justification (correct and right) which are to use creativesoul's terms "existentially contingent" on language. From this beginning, this assumption, we will never get to this form of truth which creativesoul insists goes deeper than language.

And 2), in our encounter with the brickness-of-(what we call)-the-brick we did not use any definitions at all. At the building supply store, for example, we might just as well have asked for a pallet of these. — tim wood

OK, so this is the point right here, why we are lead to certainty in our inquiry into "true" and 'truth" rather than assumptions of correctness. Do you recognize the difference between assuming that something is right or correct, and being certain that something is true? When someone says "that is a brick", or "it is true that that is a brick", what is meant is that the person is certain that that is a brick. This certainty is not based in an assumption that there is such a thing as "brickness", or "being-as-a-brick", it is based in something else, some sort of attitude of confidence.

Therefore what makes us say "true", is this attitude of confidence, not the assumption that there is a correct definition of "brick", and that satisfies the definition. The assumption that there is a correct definition of brick is the assumption that someone else has made a correct judgement, someone has correctly judged what it means to be a brick. The attitude of confidence is the assumption that I have made the true judgement. So this is where we find truth, in the assumption that I have made the true judgement, not the assumption that I am following the judgement of someone else, because it is correct.

And all of this is why I mentioned some time previously the ideas of right focus and right magnification - right understanding. It's getting pretty clear that the absolute quality of true is a product solely of the criteria in force; and of truth, its exemplification in something outside of itself. Admittedly this surrenders any notion of absolutes or ultimates apart from application, but for the price it secures both truth and true. Did I just win? (Did you have a moment to look at the brief article referenced above?) — tim wood

So I really beg to differ here. We do not find truth in the criteria in force, this is where we find justification. Truth is not necessarily aligned with right, what is aligned with right, is what is justified, but what is justified is sometimes false. We find truth as aligned with one's own personal conviction, the confidence and certitude in one's own power of judgement, to judge the truth, regardless of what others, or society taken as a whole, have designated as "right".

With regards to the referenced article, I think Kant is in a way correct. I base truth in personal certitude. So if anyone like Kant says, we cannot be certain of the truth, then this individual takes a position of skepticism, and lacking that certitude, there is no truth for that person. The non-skeptic, who is confident, has truth.

The criticism I'm leveling at equating "truth" with reality is all about the inherent incapability that that framework has in explaining what makes true statements/propositions so. You've agreed to that, adding that doing so requires judgment. Prior to further summarizing...

Is that account accurate enough on it's face?

Fair enough. I'd go further. (I think) we're starting with the hypotheses that there is a reality; reality is real; and we're content for the moment to let a brick informally represent what "reality" means. And that "truth" is a word that we define, for the moment, as naming a quality that reality has. For example, in the same way (not sense) we say a lemon is yellow, we are, for the moment, saying that reality is truth (let's call it T1).

Pretty clearly (at least to me) reality doesn't explain anything. Reality doesn't do; it just is. Truth, then, doesn't do; it just is.

This may seem a severe and austere understanding of "truth." But it appears to me to be the most that can be done with it, that is secure and unequivocal.

It happens that "truth" also has meaning and significance with respect to "true." My point here is that this is a simply a different sense, not to be confused with truth as reality, a distinction not always maintained in this thread. This second truth (T2) appears to derive its meaning from how it employs T1. T2 differs from T1 is that T2 is T1 in use propositionally.

"True" is just that word - adjective - applied to propositions. It's in use that truth, as T2, becomes equivocal and problematic.

Still same page?

For example, in the same way (not sense) we say a lemon is yellow, we are, for the moment, saying that reality is truth (let's call it T1). — tim wood

I don't understand this meaning of "truth". I don't see that "truth" is ever used in a sense which makes it equivalent to reality. "Truth" is related to "true", and "true" is related to "reality", but I don't see how you can relate "truth" directly to "reality" without going through the medium of "true". Is this what you're trying to do, relate "truth" directly to reality independent of "true"?

It happens that "truth" also has meaning and significance with respect to "true." My point here is that this is a simply a different sense, not to be confused with truth as reality, a distinction not always maintained in this thread. This second truth (T2) appears to derive its meaning from how it employs T1. T2 differs from T1 is that T2 is T1 in use propositionally. — tim wood

So I really think you have this reversed. T1 is "truth" in relation to "true". If you think that there is such a thing as "truth as reality" (T2), then you need to justify this claim, and this justification will determine exactly how this "truth as reality" relates to "true", and if it is truly independent from "true".

Fair enough. I'd go further. (I think) we're starting with the hypotheses that there is a reality; reality is real; and we're content for the moment to let a brick informally represent what "reality" means. And that "truth" is a word that we define, for the moment, as naming a quality that reality has. For example, in the same way (not sense) we say a lemon is yellow, we are, for the moment, saying that reality is truth (let's call it T1). — tim wood

See, you have only hypothesized that there is a reality. If we say that this hypothesized reality is truth, then it is independent from "true", because we have no means to judge the hypothesis as true. But what good is a "truth" which is independent from "true"? It's just a hypothesis which we have no means for judging whether or not it's true. Why even hypothesize such a "truth", it seems utterly useless?

The assumption that there is a correct definition of brick is the assumption that someone else has made a correct judgement, someone has correctly judged what it means to be a brick. The attitude of confidence is the assumption that I have made the true judgement. So this is where we find truth, in the assumption that I have made the true judgement, not the assumption that I am following the judgement of someone else, because it is correct. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Brick" is the English word for what Tim wants to buy.

I don't understand this meaning of "truth". I don't see that "truth" is ever used in a sense which makes it equivalent to reality. "Truth" is related to "true", and "true" is related to "reality", but I don't see how you can relate "truth" directly to "reality" without going through the medium of "true". Is this what you're trying to do, relate "truth" directly to reality independent of "true"? — Metaphysician Undercover

This isn't for you to understand or see; it is a definition, or hypothesis - a starting point.

The point - my point - is to attempt to ground the meaning of the word "truth" in something secure and unequivocal. If truth just is reality, per definition, then, it seems to me, the only attack possible on truth is to attack reality.

If you think that there is such a thing as "truth as reality" (T2), then you need to justify this claim, and this justification will determine exactly how this "truth as reality" relates to "true", and if it is truly independent from "true". — Metaphysician Undercover

I think your confusion is showing, although it may be no more than a typo. I define T1 "truth" as reality (not T2). And because I assert it, it needs no justification.

See, you have only hypothesized that there is a reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you challenge that hypothesis? My hypothesis is that, "there is a reality; reality is real." Are you arguing that it is not the case that there is a reality, or that there is a reality, but that it is not real? It must be one of these, else why mention it?

But maybe we have to start with more primitive notions. Answer yes or no: Is there reality? Is there knowledge?