[quote↪Thanatos Sand You complained that the statement ' "Correspondence" is not the same as correspondence' makes no sense. I explained that it does makes sense, what sense it makes, and how. So that addresses the complaint.

It's a reasonable point that "correspondence" is not (necessarily) the same as correspondence. A *so-called* thing is not necessarily the thing itself. Dismissing that point may be the *end* of a debate. I pointed out that it is not much for a *beginning*. ][/quote]

You clearly weren't reading the discussion before you entered it with your irrelevant, erroneous point, and you clearly haven't been reading my posts well. So, I am done with our conversation. Continue your erroneous, irrelevant points if you will; I won't be reading your posts on this thread.

Now don't be sore. It's only food for thought.

Funny thing is that Cuthbert's last point was spot on. The name for a thing is not necessarily the same as the thing. We talk about things we invent/create. We talk about things we discover.

While the use/mention distinction is relevant in discourse about truth, I placed quotes around the term correspondence as a means to talk about the term itself as compared to talking about what the term denotes.

Now you are simply appealing to authority. Some famous philosopher said it, therefore it must be true... It seems to me that you've ran out arguments, so I'm out. — Fafner

Ha, ha, that's funny. Either I believe a famous philosopher whose work has stood the test of time, whose arguments are well explained and make sense, and he remains an authority today, or I believe Fafner with the contrary opinion. There's something to be said for authority, don't you think?

Funny thing is that Cuthbert's last point was spot on. The name for a thing is not necessarily the same as the thing. We talk about things we invent/create. We talk about things we discover.

No, the funny thing is he wasn't spot on at all, as I never said the name for a thing is necessarily the same as the thing. Your and Cuthbert's problem is you think when you use the word for the thing you are actually successfully representing the thing itself instead of more words referring to that thing.

And Cuthbert wasn't even saying what you said he was saying. He was trying to explain the difference between a word in scare quotes and one without them, which wasn't the issue I had been discussing.

This interpretation, then, is a kind of selection from among possible, and contingent, meanings.
— tim wood

This is where we have to proceed with caution, and not jump to conclusions. You say this as if there are possible meanings, in existence, like possible worlds in existence, but if the interpreter chooses from possible meanings, these possible meanings are produced within the interpreter's mind, just like possible worlds are produced by the logician's propositions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Less complicated. "Third door on the right," requires consideration and rejection of other doors, acceptance of the right door, and the question (which does not cease to be a question, even when answered, and certainly not when answered provisionally), "Is this the right door?" Any question of material existence is out-of-court. If you mean exists as ideas, that's iffy, because my idea of a possible world is no possible world, it is merely my idea of a possible world. In this case, "my idea of a possible world" is a noun substantive and cannot be broken into pieces without destroying the original meaning.

When an interpreter chooses a meaning, one does so on the assumption that there is a correct meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

For a guess. For present purpose it's enough note there's an act of interpretation. In the sense you argue, all interpretation is faulty; which is to say, exactly, that all interpretation is interpretation. In short, I do not think we're here much concerned with quality of interpretation.

But what is perception other than a much more general form of interpretation? — Metaphysician Undercover

But what is being punched in the nose but a more general form of thinking about being punched in the nose? I'm thinking they're plain different.

I can see an argument in favor, but at the expense of being able to talk about reality, because it's all interpretation. We're back to my question: Is this the substance of your argument, that everything is interpretation? Or not?

In the case of interpreting reality, we are not guided by this assumption, so we produce the assumption that there is a way that reality "is", a type of logical basis, the law of identity. The problem is that this "the way that the world is" is inconsistent with the way that the world reveals itself to us through our senses. The world presents itself to us as continually changing through time, with no such thing as "the way that the world is". — Metaphysician Undercover

Too many unexamined presuppositions. Let's try this. You encounter a tree - no mystery or confusion, it's a tree. For me, it's a tree. For you its an act of interpretation. Question, why don't you "interpret" it as a car?

And why would you say that there is no such thing as the way the world is, because it's continually changing? If your idea is that the world does not change, then I can see where you have a problem, but why have that idea? What compels you to it?

We're caught on words, "interpretation," perception," "understanding," and no doubt others. We should not redefine them; we should clarify what we mean by them.

I would invite you to consider the Toy Story example I presented earlier. Buzz and Woody actually mean exactly the same thing by the word "flying" and falling, with or without style, is excluded from that meaning. Buzz applies the word to events Woody doesn't only because Buzz has a mistaken belief that these are cases of what he and Woody agree is flying.

So it is with your treatment of the word "knowledge."

The world presents itself to us as continually changing through time, with no such thing as "the way that the world is". — Metaphysician Undercover

A leaf twists, turns, and flutters in the wind, showing us now this side, now that, its color shifting as its angle to the sun changes, but the whole time, it's a leaf.

Language is not designed to describe every detail of every moment, and its failure to do so is actually its success at doing something else: language picks our the relatively invariant. Even the process of the leaf's constant movement has some invariance to it that can be picked out, as I did in the first sentence of this post.

(Besides which, it's largely only a practical not a theoretical limitation: a digitally encoded film is in essence the entire contents of a person's visual field turned into language.)

The invariance we pick out with words is actually there. We have words like "leaf" in our language because leaves are relatively persistent. Even in death, they are still leaves for quite a while before they finally decay enough for us to stop calling them leaves. That boundary is vague and nevertheless useful and effective. What leaves never do is spontaneously turn into mushrooms or fruits or rocks.

No, the funny thing is he wasn't spot on at all, as I never said the name for a thing is necessarily the same as the thing.

He was spot on by virtue of describing something agreeable to my words, not yours. You were arguing against mine earlier, by virtue of misunderstanding. He chimed in earlier in order to share that bit of knowledge with you, seeing that I was quite unsuccessful at it.

Your and Cuthbert's problem is you think when you use the word for the thing you are actually successfully representing the thing itself instead of more words referring to that thing.

Why would you mistakenly conclude that I conflate conceptual meaning with the unknown realm?

And Cuthbert wasn't even saying what you said he was saying. He was trying to explain the difference between a word in scare quotes and one without them, which wasn't the issue I had been discussing...

Cuthbert was pointing out differences between a plurality of different uses/meaning for using quotes. In other words, he set out the the use of quotes two different ways. The bit about the word not being the thing is akin to the map/territory distinction.

Are you familiar with it?

"S knows that P" is just an informal schema. It is a stand-in for a proposition formed by concatenating the name of a subject, the phrase " knows that " and a proposition. — Srap Tasmaner

You call this "informal", but it is not informal, because P stands for "proposition" and "proposition" signifies something formal. If we remove the formal reference, we say "S knows that A", where "A" signifies "what" S knows. See the difference? In the one case "A" signifies what is known by the subject, and in the other case P signifies a proposition. So A refers directly to what S knows whereas P refers to a bunch of words which themselves signify what is known. To confuse these two is category error.

Let's say that S stands for a particular subject, and P stands for a particular proposition. S is Bob, and P is "the sky is blue". Now "Bob" refers to a particular individual, and "the sky is blue" refers to a particular state of affairs. What purpose does "that" serve? Bob knows the sky is blue, or, Bob knows that the sky is blue?

When we say "Bob knows the sky is blue", what is meant is "Bob knows that the sky is blue", not "Bob knows this proposition "the sky is blue'". If we add "that", to say "Bob knows that the sky is blue", what we are saying is Bob knows the proposition "the sky is blue", as true. What is added then, by adding "that", is that "the sky is blue" now signifies a proposition which is designated as true, instead of a state of affairs. So by adding "that" to "knows", such that we say "knows that", we change what follows (the sky is blue), from signifying a state of affairs to signifying a proposition.

S knows that P" is also informal in the sense that it is designedly neutral on what sorts of things S and P are -- remember, there is no specified domain of discourse -- except that they would be considered appropriate on the LHS and the RHS of " knows that ". — Srap Tasmaner

Ok, if "S knows that P" is informal, and says nothing about what S and P are, can we use S and P in the normal way? Let's say S stands for subject and P stands for predicate. When you say S knows that P, what you are really saying is that this proposition P, is attributed to this subject S. Now that we have the category error worked out, we can remove "that" as redundant, and just say S knows P, so that P represents a proposition predicated of S, as knowledge which S has, like any object has properties. S knows P is predication. Using the ancient Parmenidean equation, "Being is Knowing", therefore S is P.

Do you agree that, assuming sincerity in speech, that calling a statement "true" displays belief that the statement is true(corresponds to reality, if you like)? — creativesoul

Yes, there is a relationship between sincerity and truth, so when we say "that one speaks the truth", or "what has been said is true", sincerity is necessarily implied. "Sincerity" being the broader term, does not necessarily imply truth, because we use "sincere" in some other ways.. So "sincerity" in this case signifies that the person saying "true" means true according to that person's understanding of the word. If that person understands "true" as "corresponds to reality", then this is what the person means.

Can one's definitions be wrong? If so, how so? — creativesoul

I went through this earlier in the thread with tim woods. It had occurred to me that the essence of truth was to be found in definition. A definition is not itself false, because it must be judged as such, by comparing it to reality, and reality is inductive principles drawn from common usage. So if it is not an acceptable definition according to inductive conclusions, one might try to argue that it is "false". But since usage varies and changes, these inductive principles cannot rule out any possible uses or definitions as impossible, so none can accurately be said to be false. If definitions are the type of thing which cannot be false, and truth is the type of thing which cannot be false, then we have correspondence between truth and definition. That is, if one is assuming that truth is the type of thing which cannot be false, then we find truth as corresponding to definition.

If existence alone makes something meaningful, then it is not the case that meaning depends upon interpretation and judgment, for existence doesn't require either. — creativesoul

Existence, meaning, and things like this, are attributes, properties which are predicated of a subject. But the act of predication requires a subject. Without the subject, there is no existence, or meaning, because these words refer to how subjects describe their environment. There is nothing illogical about saying that all existing things are meaningful, this just makes "meaning" the more general category from "existing", so that all existing things are meaningful, and it is still possible that non-existing things may be meaningful as well.

And...

Meaningless marks exist. — creativesoul

That is a claim you make, but I don't see how you could ever justify this claim. Just by referring to these marks here, you have made them meaningful. So any such claim, that something meaningless exists, is self-refuting. You have referred to the meaningless thing, making it meaningful. "Existing" is an assumption made by a subject, and one cannot make the assumption without giving meaning to that thing referred to as existing. In reality, what you are attempting to do here is refer to non-existent things, and this just demonstrates that meaning is the more general term than existing, because we can refer to non-existing things, such that they have meaning as well as existing things.

And yes, thought/belief and statements thereof come through a subject, however the ability to form thought/belief requires something other than the subject. — creativesoul

I would say that this is a dubious premise, to say that the ability to form thought/belief requires something other than the subject. We should leave this one as something which can never be demonstrated, and therefore not a sound premise.

We(mankind) have had plenty of historical agreements as to what constituted being true, and have been wrong. We've later found out that that which we once thought/believed and agreed was true, was not. Rather much of what we thought/believed was true was false. Truth cannot be false. Agreement about what is true can be. Therefore, agreement is insufficient for truth. — creativesoul

I agree with the first part of this, that we are sometimes mistaken in what we believe. I don't agree with the second part. When I claim X is true, and I believe it, I am referring to the object, what I believe, as having the property of being true. And other people use "true" in this way as well. It may be the case, that later in time it is demonstrated that this object does not have the property of being true, and I respect this fact, but that does not prevent me, or others from using "true" in this way, and this being an acceptable way of using "true". Therefore, what "true" refers to, in actual usage (and what we should adhere to for our definition, if we wish to maintain accuracy), is not the property described as "impossible to be false". So your statement "truth cannot be false" is inconsistent with reality, because when we use the word "true" we still allow the possibility of falsity. You want to define "truth" in a way which is inconsistent with reality.

Thanatos Sand

No, the funny thing is he wasn't spot on at all, as I never said the name for a thing is necessarily the same as the thing.

He was spot on by virtue of describing something agreeable to my words, not yours. You were arguing against mine earlier, by virtue of misunderstanding. He chimed in earlier in order to share that bit of knowledge with you, seeing that I was quite unsuccessful at it.

Describing something agreeable to your words isnt' being "spot on;" its being replicative. And he didn't even do that.

"Your and Cuthbert's problem is you think when you use the word for the thing you are actually successfully representing the thing itself instead of more words referring to that thing".

Why would you mistakenly conclude that I conflate conceptual meaning with the unknown realm?"

Why would you mistakenly conclude I said anything about an "unknown realm.". Try and read my posts better.

And Cuthbert wasn't even saying what you said he was saying. He was trying to explain the difference between a word in scare quotes and one without them, which wasn't the issue I had been discussing...
Cuthbert was pointing out differences between a plurality of different uses/meaning for using quotes. In other words, he set out the the use of quotes two different ways. The bit about the word not being the thing is akin to the map/territory distinction.

Are you familiar with it?

He was doing nothing of the kind. Again, you need to read posts better before addressing them. I'm sure you can.

It had occurred to me that the essence of truth was to be found in definition. A definition is not itself false, because it must be judged as such, by comparing it to reality, and reality is inductive principles drawn from common usage. So if it is not an acceptable definition according to inductive conclusions, one might try to argue that it is "false". But since usage varies and changes, these inductive principles cannot rule out any possible uses or definitions as impossible, so none can accurately be said to be false. If definitions are the type of thing which cannot be false, and truth is the type of thing which cannot be false, then we have correspondence between truth and definition. That is, if one is assuming that truth is the type of thing which cannot be false, then we find truth as corresponding to definition — Metaphysician Undercover

The essence of truth is found in definition.
Ok, a hypothesis. Something to be proved.

A definition is not itself false,
Hypothesis or itself definition?

because it must be judged as such
Claim? Support?

by comparing it to reality, and reality is inductive principles drawn from common usage.
Is that what reality is, or is this just another definition?

...inductive principles cannot rule out any possible uses or definitions as impossible, so none can accurately be said to be false.
What!!?

If definitions are the type of thing which cannot be false, and truth is the type of thing which cannot be false, then we have correspondence between truth and definition. That is, if one is assuming that truth is the type of thing which cannot be false, then we find truth as corresponding to definitionIs this your conclusion?

Hi MU. If your post, that I've spread out here, is an argument, would you please append to this a clear statement of your conclusion, if it isn't included above. I suspect your argument is a piece of extended irony, intended to give some folks a rash.

So, Meta...

You claim that truth can be false.

I've nothing further.

The bit about the word not being the thing is akin to the map/territory distinction.

Are you familiar with it?

Why do you ask?

Because being familiar with it will help one to understand my earlier use of quotes.

Well, if it does, then show how. I'm not going to make your point for you. If you can't do so, we can just move on.

Apply it and re-read what was written earlier.

So, you can't show how it applies to or supports your earlier use of quotes. Good to know.

Have a good day. You and I are done here; I won't read anymore of your posts.

Sigh...

It would be shown to you in the only way it can be if you a)understand the map/territory distinction and b)re-read my earlier post while applying it.

So, I'm outside this morning doing my normal thing. The adolescent hens, of which there are three, are hanging out nearby. Part of my normal thing is feeding the chickens. They're quite amusing at times. For example, when they see my car pull in the driveway, they come running. When they see me from afar they do the same. I can only surmise that this behaviour is, in part, the result of my feeding them regularly. In addition, these chicks were hand reared from very early on, as a result of losing their mother.

Here's something to consider...

Sometimes the chickens get fed old cereal(cheerios). The cereal is in a plastic bag which is near perfectly clear. I mean, the cereal is quite easily able to be seen through the bag, and yet it seems that the chicks do not take note of that. I say that as a result of the bag never being bothered by the chicks despite it's being left outside and unattended for days on end. And yet, when I pick up the bag and call to the chickens with bag in hand they will come running. At this point, I can lay the bag on the ground and reach into it, grab some food, and spread it around at the chickens' feet and they will eat what's been spread. I can then close the bag with the clip and leave it lay without the chickens ever paying attention to it...

That's a bit odd, but it seems that some things can be surmised from it.

Any takers?

The term "chickens" is not chickens.

X-)

Chickens are not terms.

When we say "Bob knows the sky is blue", what is meant is "Bob knows that the sky is blue", — Metaphysician Undercover

Hmmmmm.

not "Bob knows this proposition "the sky is blue'". If we add "that", to say "Bob knows that the sky is blue", what we are saying is Bob knows the proposition "the sky is blue", as true. What is added then, by adding "that", is that "the sky is blue" now signifies a proposition which is designated as true, instead of a state of affairs. So by adding "that" to "knows", such that we say "knows that", we change what follows (the sky is blue), from signifying a state of affairs to signifying a proposition. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, "that" doesn't do any of that. That's you. (English doesn't care if it's there or not.)

Believe it or not, "S knows that P" is just an ordinary piece of Anglo-American philosophical shop talk. It is not, for instance, itself a theory of knowledge. You seem to be under the impression that it is. You seem to think it amounts to a claim that knowledge is knowledge of propositions being true, or assenting to them, or holding them true, or whatever. This little shorthand is no such theory; if any claim is made in using this schema, it is only that it is reasonable for us to describe some examples of people knowing things in this way. (And that it can be distinguished from things like knowing how to ride a bike, knowing John Kennedy, knowing the way to San José.)

For instance, I could give you a purely causal theory of knowledge, something like "S knows that P if and only if there is a causal chain (of some special sort) connecting the state of affairs said in P to obtain and S." Nowhere in there is it suggested that S would even recognize P if he sat on it, much less that he holds it true or anything else. Doesn't matter. We can describe S as knowing that P, so far as we're concerned who know all about knowledge.

Now if one believed no one can ever properly be described as knowing something in this broadly propositional sense, then certainly one would want to avoid "S knows that P" like the plague.

Less complicated. "Third door on the right," requires consideration and rejection of other doors, acceptance of the right door, and the question (which does not cease to be a question, even when answered, and certainly not when answered provisionally), "Is this the right door?" Any question of material existence is out-of-court. If you mean exists as ideas, that's iffy, because my idea of a possible world is no possible world, it is merely my idea of a possible world. In this case, "my idea of a possible world" is a noun substantive and cannot be broken into pieces without destroying the original meaning. — tim wood

Interpretation of "third door on the right" begins with the assumption that there is a correct door signified.
That produces as you say, the question, "is this the right door?". Possibilities enter the interpretation. The hallway with doors might have two ends to enter from, for example. My point about the "existence" of these "possibilities" is that they are produced, created by, the interpreting mind. But if the interpreting mind assumes a correct interpretation, these possibilities are related to that assumption as a possibility that it is the correct one.

To resolve the issue of possibilities, the interpreter must consult further information. Keeping in mind that there must be a correct interpretation, the interpreter consults the context. The assumption of a correct interpretation inclines one to consult context. Without context, "third door on the right" could refer to any door, so we assume that "correct" is determined by the perspective of the speaker. By "context", and "perspective of the speaker", I mean what is going on within the mind of the speaker, not the speaker's environment. So if you are at one end of the hall, and I am at the other, and you say to me "third door on the right", I will assume that you are giving me information to be interpreted from my perspective, though you would more likely say "third door on your right" to make things more clear.

For a guess. For present purpose it's enough note there's an act of interpretation. In the sense you argue, all interpretation is faulty; which is to say, exactly, that all interpretation is interpretation. In short, I do not think we're here much concerned with quality of interpretation. — tim wood

But what is key, is the assumption that there is a correct interpretation. To say that all interpretation is somewhat faulty, is just a reflection on how we approach certainty. We never achieve absolute certainty, and we know that, but this does not prevent us from saying "I am certain". So, we have confidence in our interpretation, despite the fact that we know "all interpretation is faulty", as you say. This confidence produces certitude and certainty. The "quality of interpretation" is of the utmost importance, because this is what produces certainty, confidence that the "correct interpretation" has been obtained.

As I indicated, we can abandon the assumption of "correct interpretation" but this brings us to a completely different level of uncertainty.

I can see an argument in favor, but at the expense of being able to talk about reality, because it's all interpretation. We're back to my question: Is this the substance of your argument, that everything is interpretation? Or not? — tim wood

The issue is the assumption of "correct interpretation". In our approach to reality, there is no question in my mind, that we are interpreting reality, that's what sensing, perceiving, and apprehending is. The question is whether reality consists of a kind of substance or something like that, which can ground our assumptions of a correct interpretation. If not, then nothing grounds our possibilities. There is no such thing as having a high probability of having the correct interpretation, if there is no such thing as the correct interpretation.

In the case of interpreting the sentence, we turn to the context, which is what the author meant, to ground the assumption of a correct interpretation. In the case of interpreting reality, what is the "context" which we should consult? In reality, the context we use is the spatial temporal context. So when I look down the hallway for the "third door on the right", I assume certain fixed spatial relations between the doors, and the assumption of these fixed relations validates my assumption that there is a correct interpretation of what is in front of me. When we add time into the context there doesn't seem to be "fixed" relations, and context becomes extremely complex, such that we might give up on the notion of fixed relations. If we do, then we may give up on the notion of "correct interpretation" of reality as well.

Too many unexamined presuppositions. Let's try this. You encounter a tree - no mystery or confusion, it's a tree. For me, it's a tree. For you its an act of interpretation. Question, why don't you "interpret" it as a car? — tim wood

I don't interpret the tree as a car, because I learned when I was young, and consequently my habit, is to call it a tree. I don't see the point you're trying to make, someone might call it a bush or a shrub, in different languages they would call it by things other than "tree".

And why would you say that there is no such thing as the way the world is, because it's continually changing? If your idea is that the world does not change, then I can see where you have a problem, but why have that idea? What compels you to it? — tim wood

As I said, the assumption of a "correct interpretation" is supported by the assumption that there is a "context". We assume that we can produce a correct interpretation by putting the thing being interpreted into the appropriate context. In the case of interpreting reality, the context is time and space. The spatial context alone is very simple, "third door on the right", is direct and straight forward. But if in time, I move to the other end of the hall, "third door on the right" means something completely different.

So if your context is supposed to be "the way that the world is", wouldn't this require determining a particular point in time? But what good would this do for grounding your interpretation of reality, when there is a countless number of points in time which could be chosen?

Hi MU. If your post, that I've spread out here, is an argument, would you please append to this a clear statement of your conclusion, if it isn't included above. I suspect your argument is a piece of extended irony, intended to give some folks a rash. — tim wood

That was a little summary of what we had been discussing earlier in the thread. Essentially, I was arguing that "correct interpretation" is dependent on accurate definitions. The point I was trying to make, in the last post, is that if we go this route, which opposes truth to falsity by definition, then we can go no further in our enquiry into truth, because "true" is defined as being necessarily opposed to "false", and this would form the complete essence of "true" and therefore truth. The necessity created by that definition would disallow that truth is anything other than this.

What I am trying to impress upon some members of this discussion who are inclined to insist that true is opposed with false, is that we will not ever get to the true essence of truth without looking at how "true" is actually used. And, when we do this, we are forced to give up on this necessity. When we say that something is true, in accepted usage, we do not imply that it is absolutely impossible that it is false, because we never achieve absolute certainty. So to oppose "true" with "false" with that form of necessity, is a type of ideal, which exists in theory, but it isn't practical. Therefore it fails to provide us with a practical understanding of truth.

I would invite you to consider the Toy Story example I presented earlier. Buzz and Woody actually mean exactly the same thing by the word "flying" and falling, with or without style, is excluded from that meaning. Buzz applies the word to events Woody doesn't only because Buzz has a mistaken belief that these are cases of what he and Woody agree is flying. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't quite understand this example. It is clear to me that Buzz and Woody don't mean the same thing with the word "flying". On what basis do you assume that they do?

So it is with your treatment of the word "knowledge." — Srap Tasmaner

And this is what we find with the word "knowledge", we actually mean different things when we use it. In theory, one says "knowledge excludes falsity". This becomes a premise for deductive logic, and all kinds of epistemological conclusions may follow. In practise though, "knowledge" does not exclude falsity. When we use "knowledge" we believe that falsity has been excluded, but this belief does not necessitate that falsity has actually been excluded. So the meaning of the word "knowledge" is different for the epistemologist who claims that falsity is necessarily excluded from knowledge, and for the average user of the word who recognizes that knowledge is an ever changing, evolving thing, and some knowledge might later be proven to be false.

The invariance we pick out with words is actually there. We have words like "leaf" in our language because leaves are relatively persistent. Even in death, they are still leaves for quite a while before they finally decay enough for us to stop calling them leaves. That boundary is vague and nevertheless useful and effective. What leaves never do is spontaneously turn into mushrooms or fruits or rocks. — Srap Tasmaner

All right, I'm on board with this idea, let's go with it and see where it leads. Let's say that there is real invariance, and this is what our words refer to. Can we call this invariance "spatial relations which are maintained for a period of time"? Our senses might have evolved to pick out some of these invariances, allowing us to identify things. However, our senses are vary sharp, and what they seem to really pick out is changes. So hearing for example, is picking out changes in the air. Smelling and tasting is detecting certain changes as well. Even with sight, what attracts our attention, is changes. But with sight, we can see that this invariance which you refer to forms a background, upon which we detect changes.

So invariance is a type of background, perhaps it's the context, within which, changes are occurring. So as I was saying to tim wood, when we interpret reality (sense, perceive, and apprehend it), the assumption of a "correct interpretation" is validated by reference to a broader context. This is the background invariance. The background invariance provided the assumption of something "fixed". The invariance must be grounded as real though, or else our interpretation will not be, and this involves how we relate to space and time.

Believe it or not, "S knows that P" is just an ordinary piece of Anglo-American philosophical shop talk. It is not, for instance, itself a theory of knowledge. You seem to be under the impression that it is. You seem to think it amounts to a claim that knowledge is knowledge of propositions being true, or assenting to them, or holding them true, or whatever. This little shorthand is no such theory; if any claim is made in using this schema, it is only that it is reasonable for us to describe some examples of people knowing things in this way. (And that it can be distinguished from things like knowing how to ride a bike, knowing John Kennedy, knowing the way to San José.) — Srap Tasmaner

I have only responded to how "S knows that P" has been used in this thread. It is quite clear that P stands for a proposition. If your claim is that "S knows that P" may be used in many different ways from this, that fact is irrelevant, because you are just taking "S knows that P" out of the context from which it was used here, then basing your defence in this unrelated usage.

I have only responded to how "S knows that P" has been used in this thread. It is quite clear that P stands for a proposition. If your claim is that "S knows that P" may be used in many different ways from this, that fact is irrelevant, because you are just taking "S knows that P" out of the context from which it was used here, then basing your defence in this unrelated usage. — Metaphysician Undercover

Read again what I said. We may, as theorists, describe something using propositions, without claiming that what we so describe has propositional form. It's practically the point of indicative speech.

For instance, when early Wittgenstein made the additional claim that reality has something like proposition form, most demured, but went on describing reality using propositions. Simply saying "S knows that P" doesn't commit you to thinking S herself entertains the proposition P.

I don't quite understand this example. It is clear to me that Buzz and Woody don't mean the same thing with the word "flying". On what basis do you assume that they do? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know how you could think that if you've seen the movie.

What I am trying to impress upon some members of this discussion who are inclined to insist that true is opposed with false, is that we will not ever get to the true essence of truth without looking at how "true" is actually used. And, when we do this, we are forced to give up on this necessity.

The above concluded that since thought/belief can be false, so too can truth.

That would be the case if, and only if, thought/belief were equivalent to truth. It's not.

When we say that something is true, in accepted usage, we do not imply that it is absolutely impossible that it is false, because we never achieve absolute certainty. So to oppose "true" with "false" with that form of necessity, is a type of ideal, which exists in theory, but it isn't practical. Therefore it fails to provide us with a practical understanding of truth.

Here you're invoking certainty. Not a bad aspect when talking about thought/belief, but it has nothing at all to do with whether or not statements are true/false. One can have unshakable conviction that 'X' is true, and yet 'X' can be either true or false. One can also be quite uncertain whether or not 'X' is true, and 'X' can be either.

I don't interpret the tree as a car, because I learned when I was young, and consequently my habit, is to call it a tree. I don't see the point you're trying to make, someone might call it a bush or a shrub, in different languages they would call it by things other than "tree". — Metaphysician Undercover

I wasn't asking about what you call it, but what you interpret it as being. That is, there has to be something by which you know it's a tree and not a car. And for so long as it is just interpretation and nothing more, then you can't know, and my question stands.

The issue is the assumption of "correct interpretation". In our approach to reality, there is no question in my mind, that we are interpreting reality, that's what sensing, perceiving, and apprehending is. The question is whether reality consists of a kind of substance or something like that, which can ground our assumptions of a correct interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

And just here you want it both ways. Above, it appears to mean "sensing, perceiving, and apprehending." Be good enough to explain how any, or any combination, of these interprets anything. Of course, my understanding of interpretation is assigning or providing meaning. It's here in this slippage of "interpretation" that my question has purchase. If by interpretation you mean that you just know it's a tree, because of your perception/interpretation, then we may ask how you interpret a text. And then there is the problem of "correct interpretation." In short, something has to be out there, or you got nothing.

If this is you, then it seems yours is a consistent position, except for your claims about reality and correctness, as they are usually understood.

As I said, the assumption of a "correct interpretation" is supported by the assumption that there is a "context". We assume that we can produce a correct interpretation by putting the thing being interpreted into the appropriate context. In the case of interpreting reality, the context is time and space. The spatial context alone is very simple, "third door on the right", is direct and straight forward. But if in time, I move to the other end of the hall, "third door on the right" means something completely different. — Metaphysician Undercover

What you say doesn't make it so. Context and interpretation of texts is problematic, the difficulties of which are not our topic. I agree that texts have to be interpreted. There is no context for reality: reality just is. I believe your understanding of reality as being contextualized in space and time is one of the places where you have difficulty. We don't perceive the scientist's space and time: we perceive, we experience, the world and things as being in the world. The idea of the world or the things in it being constituted through contextualization is incoherent on its face.

...if [truth is opposed] to falsity by definition, then... this would form the complete essence of "true" and therefore truth. The necessity created by that definition would disallow that truth is anything other than this.
...we will not ever get to the true essence of truth without looking at how "true" is actually used. And, when we do this, we are forced to give up on this necessity. When we say that something is true, in accepted usage, we do not imply that it is absolutely impossible that it is false, because we never achieve absolute certainty. — Metaphysician Undercover

Indeed! I argue that truth is always true. Proof: For propositions or states of affairs that are always so, the proposition that affirms them is always true. Propositions that are not always true are contingent. But contingent propositions are always propositions that lack complete specification. Given complete specification, then the true proposition is always true. These are the distinctions between rhetoric and logic, between the empirical and universal, between analytic a priori and synthetic a posteriori.

Of course the contingent remains with us, because often enough complete specification is not available.

Read again what I said. We may, as theorists, describe something using propositions, without claiming that what we so describe has propositional form. It's practically the point of indicative speech.

For instance, when early Wittgenstein made the additional claim that reality has something like proposition form, most demured, but went on describing reality using propositions. Simply saying "S knows that P" doesn't commit you to thinking S herself entertains the proposition P. — Srap Tasmaner

OK, so if we are using "S knows that P" in the informal sense, then "S knows that P" is insufficient for "P is true", because many things which we know turn out to be false. "S knows that P" would only be sufficient for "P is true", if knowledge consisted of absolute certainty, which it does not.

I don't know how you could think that if you've seen the movie. — Srap Tasmaner

I'm just going by your post. I suppose I missed the point?

The above concluded that since thought/belief can be false, so too can truth.

That would be the case if, and only if, thought/belief were equivalent to truth. It's not. — creativesoul

I am going by the evidence. It is quite evident that when we say "X is true" we do not have absolute certainty, and some times the belief which was said to be true turns out to be false. We know that it could be false, and we have respect for that fact, but we still say "X is true". Therefore if we define "truth" according to how "true" is normally used, truth does not exclude falsity. If you define truth in such a way that it excludes falsity, then you are not remaining true to the way that we use "true", and this definition may constitute a false premise.

One can have unshakable conviction that 'X' is true, and yet 'X' can be either true or false. — creativesoul

Yes, this is exactly the point. Either we define truth according to how it is used, the unshakable conviction which inclines one to say "X is true", or we define truth according to the logical principle principle "either X can be true or X can be false". If the latter, then we need to look no further to understand the nature of truth, because there is nothing more to it other than this definition. But I believe that this is an incorrect definition of truth, to oppose it with false, because this is not reflective of the way that we commonly use the word "true", it only reflects how epistemologists would like us to use "true". How we really use "true", is more like the former definition, having a firm conviction. But even when we have such a conviction, we recognize that what we hold as true may end up being false. So truth does not exclude falsity. We might say that it is improbable that something which is true is false, or something like that.

I wasn't asking about what you call it, but what you interpret it as being. That is, there has to be something by which you know it's a tree and not a car. And for so long as it is just interpretation and nothing more, then you can't know, and my question stands. — tim wood

I still don't get your point. How I sense things and how I call things by name are tied together, intertwined. How can you ask me "what I interpret it as being", as if this is something different from what I call it. These are one and the same. What I interpret it as being, is what I call it. If I come across something I am unfamiliar with, I can't interpret it as being anything in particular because I don't know what it's called. I can give it a name, and describe it, but I don't think that this is what you mean by "what you interpret it as being". Do you mean "how I would describe it"?

Of course, my understanding of interpretation is assigning or providing meaning. — tim wood

Right, this is consistent with how I use "interpretation". So for example, when I sense my surroundings, and conclude that I see a tree, this act of assigning "tree" to what I am sensing is an act of assigning meaning. I interpret what I sense as a tree.

In short, something has to be out there, or you got nothing. — tim wood

Of course something has to be out there, which I assign meaning to, just like there is a text out there which I assign meaning to. Where's the difference? My eyes produce an image and I assign "tree" to it, or I sense the word "tree", and I provide an image to correspond. Aren't these both very similar, only one is the inversion of the other? They are both a matter of assigning meaning.

Context and interpretation of texts is problematic, the difficulties of which are not our topic. — tim wood

I beg to differ. The truth of the statement or belief depends on the interpretation, and correct interpretation requires reference to the context. We can surrender the notion of correct interpretation, but that is what I think is extremely problematic to truth. How could there be truth if there is no correct interpretation? I do not think it is possible. Therefore in order to maintain a concept of truth, it is necessary to reference context, and allow context as an essential aspect of truth.

There is no context for reality: reality just is. — tim wood

This is what doesn't make sense, not my insistence on a spatial-temporal context. What could you possibly mean by "reality just is"? "Is" references the present time. But "the present time" gives us no meaning, it is meaningless, without the context of the past and future. So your claim "reality just is", is meaningless without this context.

We don't perceive the scientist's space and time: we perceive, we experience, the world and things as being in the world. The idea of the world or the things in it being constituted through contextualization is incoherent on its face. — tim wood

But we do not perceive or experience the world. "The world" is a concept which we create through our understandings of space and time, in order to give context and meaning to the things which we do perceive and experience. This context, which you call "the world", aids us in assigning meaning, and our quest for correct interpretation. So I am not claiming that the world is constituted through contextualization, "the world" itself is a contextual concept. The point being that we need to differentiate between contextual concepts (universals), and particular instances of sensing and perceiving. We understand the individual things which we are sensing, through contextualizing them in relation to universal concepts. The process of understanding involves placing the more specific, particular instances of perception, into the larger context, the more general concepts of the world, to the most
general, space and time.

Given complete specification, then the true proposition is always true. — tim wood

Here, context is included under the title of "complete specification". And this is the problem with "the true proposition is always true", specification is never complete. In assessing context, one must distinguish relevant from irrelevant factors. "Complete specification" is an impossibility, an ideal, and so the true proposition which is always true, is likewise an ideal, which does not exist in practise. Therefore we have to accept the reality that in practise the true proposition is not always true, it is sometimes false. But the fact that the true proposition is sometimes false, does not prevent us from saying that the proposition is true, nor does it indicate that we are using the word "true" incorrectly when we call it true. It is just this rule, the principle, that true and false are mutually exclusive, which makes this an incorrect use of "true". The problem is that no one really follows this rule in practise, so it's not really a rule of language usage at all, it's just a principle which epistemologists have made up, a faulty one. And so we have to proceed in a different direction to understand what "true" really means.

You wrote:

I am going by the evidence. It is quite evident that when we say "X is true" we do not have absolute certainty, and some times the belief which was said to be true turns out to be false. We know that it could be false, and we have respect for that fact, but we still say "X is true".

We don't continue to say "X is true" after becoming aware that it is not.

I wrote:

One can have unshakable conviction that 'X' is true, and yet 'X' can be either true or false.

You replied:

Yes, this is exactly the point. Either we define truth according to how it is used, the unshakable conviction which inclines one to say "X is true", or we define truth according to the logical principle principle "either X can be true or X can be false". If the latter, then we need to look no further to understand the nature of truth, because there is nothing more to it other than this definition. But I believe that this is an incorrect definition of truth, to oppose it with false, because this is not reflective of the way that we commonly use the word "true", it only reflects how epistemologists would like us to use "true". How we really use "true", is more like the former definition, having a firm conviction. But even when we have such a conviction, we recognize that what we hold as true may end up being false. So truth does not exclude falsity. We might say that it is improbable that something which is true is false, or something like that.

What's the difference between believing that "X is true" and "X" being true?