So then never-mind all of the stuff(arguments from contingency) you've been saying heretofore?

That settles it now doesn't it?

I pointed out long ago that you were failing to properly quantify your arguments. If you believe all the stuff you've been writing about the existential contingency regarding meaningful statements, and this new revelation directly above, then I suggest you reconcile these claims by virtue of properly quantifying and categorizing the kinds of things that can be and/or are meaningful, and the kinds of meaning that apply to these things. — creativesoul

I really don't know what you mean. What is "quantify your arguments"? Are you suggesting mathematics? What is "existential contingency"? And how is my statement not consistent with what I said before? What do you mean by "quantifying and categorizing the kinds of things that can be and/or are meaningful"? Why is any of this relevant? You seem to be writing random nonsense.

I'm saying you've argued that meaning is dependent upon... and truth is dependent upon... and interpretation is dependent upon...

You should've been arguing that some meaning, and some truth, and some...

So how would you describe the famous fake barn facades case? You are standing in front of a real barn, and therefore you are directly aware of the barn, and so it seems that your are maximally warranted to believe that there's a barn in front of you; but you don't know that there's a barn in front of you (since it is the only real barn in that place, and you found it by mere chance). It seems to me that the disjunctivist would also have to admit that it's a case of a true justified believe that isn't knowledge.

And the reason that I think this case is particularly problematic for the disjunctivist because in this case your evidence consists in precisely the fact itself that you believe to be true, so we are not assuming here the 'highest common factor' view of evidence, or anything of this kind.

Given what you've been arguing, I can only laugh when you write things like...

You seem to be writing random nonsense.

As before, you're projecting...

I'm saying you've argued that meaning is dependent upon... and truth is dependent upon... and interpretation is dependent upon...

You should've been arguing that some meaning, and some truth, and some... — creativesoul

No, because that's not what I mean, what I mean is that all instances of being true are dependent on interpretation, not some. You keep insisting on "some", but fail to give me any examples of an instance of being true which does not involve interpretation. If you could, I'd have to switch to "some", and this would refute my argument, which is an argument of essences, what is essential to truth.

The sentence means what it means, without being interpreted? I give up. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, you can assume here anything you want about interpretation, but it doesn't matter because you have (b) as well that grounds its objective status.

The sentence only makes sense to a person interpreting it. Without a person interpreting it, it makes no sense, and therefore cannot be true. — Metaphysician Undercover

In my story I assume that the sentence is interpreted, because after all you understand what the sentence "extraterrestrial life exist" means. But the point is that interpreting the sentence is not sufficient either to guarantee its truth or to guarantee that it is known, because interpretation can only give you the meaning of the sentence.

We can't tell the difference between a known fact, and something believed to be a known fact, because they both appear to be known facts. So we call them both known facts. Since we can't distinguish between a known fact and what appears to be a known fact, or just believed to be a known fact, then it cannot be incorrect to call the thing which is believed to be known fact, by this name, "known fact", unless you want to ban the use of "known fact". Therefore your definition of "known fact" is untenable, rendering it always incorrect to use "known fact", because we would never know whether it is a known fact or not. However, if it is acceptable to refer to the thing which appears to be a known fact, as "known fact", then your definition is wrong. So your concept of "known fact" is actually useless. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you are begging the question. You just assume that knowledge (in my sense) is impossible without an argument. You wrote: "Since we can't distinguish between a known fact and what appears to be a known fact" - I don't accept this and I don't see any argument to support this claim.

Sorry, but I don't really see how disjunctivism helps here. How does a theory on perception address Gettier's original two formulations of justified true belief that can't reasonably be considered knowledge? — Michael

Disjunctivism isn't merely a theory about perception. Disjunctive theories of perception and epistemological disjunctivism are two separate topics, though they are very intimately related since they have the same general structure and are animated by the same motivation to root out some of the resilient Cartesian presuppositions that infect both theories of perception and traditional theories of knowledge.

And, of course, disjunctivists agree with Gettier that the JTB account of knowledge can't be correct. It goes further in pointing out how many attempts to buttress the JTB analysis with the addition of supplementary conditions are doomed to fail.

So how would you describe the famous fake barn facades case? You are standing in front of a real barn, and therefore you are directly aware of the barn, and so it seems that your are maximally warranted to believe that there's a barn in front of you; but you don't know that there's a barn in front of you (since it is the only real barn in that place, and you found it by mere chance). It seems to me that the disjunctivist will also have to admit as well that it's a case of a true justified believe that isn't knowledge. — Fafner

Thanks for bringing that up. This is a problem that I have thought long and hard about. I have imagined lots of puzzling scenarios where commandos are being unknowingly parachuted in Barn Facade County in the vicinity of a real barn, in an area within Barn Facade County where most barns are real, etc.

I think most of the problems that arise in such cases stem from presuppositions that are intimately connected with "highest common factor" theories. And those are presuppositions that epistemic powers of human beings aren't merely supervenient on their "internal" constitutions *and* actual favorable epistemic circumstances, but are independent of the range of counterfactual circumstances where those powers might be expected to be realized. What is peculiar about those ranges, properly defined, is that they always must be relativized to a specific practical context. This is in line with contextualist theories of knowledge according to which what counts as possession of knowledge by an agent whose epistemic powers are fallible is the practical considerations on which the possibility of failure are practically significant (and not merely probable in a statistical sense). Hence, for instance, you may count as knowing that your wife is home while you don't count as knowing that the lottery ticket that you bought is a losing one even though the probability of the former belief being mistaken is much higher than the probability of the latter being mistaken.

And the reason that I think this case is particularly problematic for the disjunctivist because in this case your evidence consists in precisely the fact itself that you believe to be true, so we are not assuming here anything like the 'highest common factor' view of evidence, or anything of this kind.

When the ineliminable contextualist constraints on ascriptions of epistemic powers to individuals are taken into account, then, it seems to me that disjunctivism deals correctly with barn facades. That's Because what is "taken in" as evidence isn't merely the actual object of cognition (a real barn, say) but also relies for its status as good warrant on one's epistemic powers not being suppressed by a contextually relevant range of possible (countrafactual) errors. Since those context can vary according to the perspectives of agents that are differently positioned, this means that the belief expressed by an agent as "there is a (real) barn in front of me" may count as a case of knowledge relativized to one practical context and not to another.

Here is an example. Suppose you are traveling with a friend to Barn Facade County (where most "barns" are actually mere decoy facades) and she knows this to be the case whereas you don't. Suppose then, that you stop by a real barn. The barn thus appear to both of you to be a real barn but only your friend knows that she doesn't know it to be a real barn (since she knows the probability for this to be quite low). According to the standard accounts of such situations, you don't know either that this is a barn since your "justified" true belief that this is a real barn isn't actually justified. And this is because you are mistaken about the objective probability of your experience being an experience of a real barn.

The problem faced by disjunctivim, it would seem, it that it wrongly would conclude in your having knowledge on the ground that circumstances are favorable, in this particular case, for your epistemic abilities being exercized. All that would be required (seemingly) is that this particular barn is real.

However, when suitably conjoined with a contextualist account of knowlege, disjunctivism would not render a unique verdict in this case, as it indeed shouldn't. The mistake that must be avoided is the idea that there is a unique objective probability of the perceptual experience being an experience of a real barn independent of the characterization of the epistemic power being exercized. How might this probability rather to be evaluated? What contextual range of counterfactual circumstances is it that might relevantly be taken into consideration for purpose of determining whether or not your belief that there is a barn counts as knowledge? I'll let you think about it a little before I propose my own suggestion.

The arguments I produced earlier demonstrate that it is necessary for someone to know P, in order for P to be true. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry, I can't figure out where you demonstrated this. Would you mind linking the post or posts?

First thank you for the very detailed and informative reply.

However, when suitably conjoined with a contextualist account of knowlege, disjunctivism would not render a unique verdict in this case, as it indeed shouldn't. The mistake that must be avoided is the idea that there is a unique objective probability of the perceptual experience being an experience of a real barn independent of the characterization of the epistemic power being exercized. How might this probability rather to be evaluated? What contextual range of counterfactual circumstances is it that might relevantly be taken into consideration for purpose of determining whether or not your belief that there is a barn count as knowledge? I'll let you think about it a little before I propose my own suggestion. — Pierre-Normand

And I agree that disjunctivist could possibly respond by giving some sort of contextualist account - but this was my point, it doesn't look that the disjunctivist has any inherent advantage over other accounts simply by virtue of being a disjunctivist. He still needs some pretty complicated story to tell in order to explain the difference between ordinary cases of knowledge and the Gettier cases, and that story would probably be as complicated as any of the proposed non-disjunctivist solutions to the problem (like those that appeal to 'sensitivity' or 'safety'), and hence no less contentious. I think the disjunctivict would've had a real advantage if he could handle the Gettier problem without the need of any "fine tuning" to specifically address the Gettier cases (that is, if the solution was built-in from the start).

And besides, I think that many non-disjunctivist epistemologists (at least those with a contextualist leaning - which I think nowadays is the majority view) would agree with most of what you say, and some I'm sure would even agree that we need, as you said, to reject "the idea that there is a unique objective probability of the perceptual experience being an experience of a real barn independent of the characterization of the epistemic power being exercized.". So my point is that it doesn't appear that there are any special resources which are available to the disjunctivist qua-disjunctivist to handle the Gettier problem, which are not also available to other epistemologists.

And I agree that disjunctivist could possibly respond by giving some sort of contextualist account - but this was my point, it doesn't look that the disjunctivist has any inherent advantage over other accounts simply by virtue of being a disjunctivist. — Fafner

Well, you had suggested rather more strongly that barn facades are "particularly problematic" for disjunctivist accounts of the fallibility of knowledge. And I agree that it might look, at first blush, that they are. On my view, disjunctivism recommends itself quite appart from the way it deals with Gettier cases since it is an account that jettisons the old empiricist conception of beliefs and justifications qua internal representational items the epistemic subject can be fully acquainted with irrespective of the "external" world doing her any favor. It just so happens that, on my view, disjunctivism *also* deals rather elegantly with barn facades through distinguishing much better than empiricism does between (1) the conditions where epistemic powers can be ascribed to subjects from (2) the conditions when those powers are successfully exercised.

I can grant you for the sake of argument that epistemic contextualism could also be made use of by an epistemologist who doesn't endorse disjunctivism in order to deal with Gettier examples. But I am unsure how successfully such an epistemologist would deal with the barn facade case. I haven't done a literature search for this and I have rather produced my own account from scratch in order to bring disjunctivism to bear on issues that were puzzling me. And I have found out that it throws light on the contextualism/invariantism debate regarding knowledge attributions. I also don't think this account produces explanations any more complicated than is warranted by the contrivance of the cases it is brought to bear on. But since this discussion about epistemological disjunctivism is veering off from the topic of this thread (my fault), I may start a new one regarding contextualism and barn facades.

Sure, you can assume here anything you want about interpretation, but it doesn't matter because you have (b) as well that grounds its objective status. — Fafner

We've been through this already, your (b) is covered by the other argument which you have not addressed. All we have to refer to, as "the way which the world is", is how the world appears to us. This is our interpretation of the supposed objective reality. And how the world appears to us, may or may not be a true representation of the way which the world is. Both sides, (a) and (b) are subjective.

When we apply the word "true", use the word to say that something is true, the (b) side of the correspondence is not "the way that the world is" but "how the world appears to us". So (b) does not ground the objective status of "true" when we commonly use the word, it refers to our interpretation of reality. If you insist that we can only use the word "true" when how the world appears to us is the way that the world is, then we can never use the word, because all we have is how the world appears to us. This leaves the word "true" useless.

However, we do clearly use the word, and when it is used, (b) does not ground the objective status of truth, because it refers to how the world appears to us, not how the world is, and this is interpretation. Your claim that (b) does objectify , relates to a definition of "truth" which renders the word "true" unusable.

You just assume that knowledge (in my sense) is impossible without an argument. You wrote: "Since we can't distinguish between a known fact and what appears to be a known fact" - I don't accept this and I don't see any argument to support this claim. — Fafner

See, you just dismissed the argument, as if it were irrelevant. We already agreed that known fact is based in how the world appears to us, and therefore it may or may not be as the world is. Now you've gone back to claiming that "known fact" is necessarily the way that the world is. Clearly this is not the case, because what is referred to as known fact is often proven wrong.

You've accepted that the reality of "known fact", as we use it, is grounded in the way that the world appears to us. However you assume that there is a different sort of "known fact" which is grounded in the way that the world is. But they are both the same name, with the same referent any time "known fact" is used, the way that the world appears to us. When looking at two things called known fact, how do you propose to distinguish whether it's your special sort of "known fact" which cannot ever be proven to have been wrong because it refers to the way that the world is, from the "known fact" of common usage which includes things that could be later proven wrong.

If you have no way to identify facts which are impossible to ever be proven wrong (known with absolute certainty), from those which may be proven wrong, then your claim is unfounded. Furthermore, if it is as you seem to believe, that "known fact" should only be used to refer to things which are known with absolute certainty, then "known fact" is rendered useless.

Sorry, I can't figure out where you demonstrated this. Would you mind linking the post or posts? — Srap Tasmaner

Are you ready to read? It's a series of arguments started at the beginning of the thread. It is complex arguments, because there are two sides of truth, as correspondence, represented lately by Fafner's (a) and (b). I am still repeating those same arguments now. They are not well understood by the other members, so repetition is necessary. I suggest starting from the beginning.

Here's a summary. There is a sentence, belief, or some such thing which is said to be true. Whether or not that sentence, or belief is true, is dependent on the meaning of it, and this is interpretation, which is "of the subject", subjective. On the other side, there is a supposed reality which the meaning corresponds with. But when we judge something as "true" we judge it according to how this reality appears to us, and this is also an interpretation, subjective. Therefore truth is entirely "of the subject", a property of knowledge. There cannot be truth outside of knowledge.

All we have to refer to, as "the way which the world is", is how the world appears to us. This is our interpretation of the supposed objective reality. And how the world appears to us, may or may not be a true representation of the way which the world is. Both sides, (a) and (b) are subjective. — Metaphysician Undercover

You don't see it, but what you said here actually proves my point. If the world appears to you in a certain way, then it is an objective fact that the world is either the way that it appears to you, or that it isn't. So having a mere appearance of reality already makes your appearance objectively true or false. So for example if you have an appearance of seeing a cat on the sofa, then it is either objectively true that there's a cat on the sofa, or objectively false. Nothing can be an appearance unless it already objectively represents reality to be in a certain way (and "objectively represent" is not the same as representing truly - a false representation is still objective in this sense, since it represents what is not the case, but could have been).

So ironically, interpretation is precisely what grounds objectivity.

Now you've gone back to claiming that "known fact" is necessarily the way that the world is. Clearly this is not the case, because what is referred to as known fact is often proven wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

All of this is just irrelevant to my definition (and the rest of what you say in the comment). It doesn't matter what we say or believe about the facts. My definition merely states the conditional that if someone knows that P, then P is a fact. If P is not the case, then by definition the subject cannot known that P (and it doesn't matter if he himself is aware of this). I'm not claiming that we actually know the facts, it is only a definition of what it means to know something.

It seems to me that you either don't understand what definitions are, or what conditionals mean (or both), because your objection simply makes no sense.

Here's a summary. There is a sentence, belief, or some such thing which is said to be true. Whether or not that sentence, or belief is true, is dependent on the meaning of it, and this is interpretation, which is "of the subject", subjective. On the other side, there is a supposed reality which the meaning corresponds with. But when we judge something as "true" we judge it according to how this reality appears to us, and this is also an interpretation, subjective. Therefore truth is entirely "of the subject", a property of knowledge. There cannot be truth outside of knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover

A very fair summary! I mean to test you on what seems to me a problem.

Whether or not that sentence, or belief is true, is dependent on the meaning of it, and this is interpretation, which is "of the subject", subjective.

I'm looking at "interpretation." I claim that the meaning of a text is got through a kind of focusing at a correct level of magnification. What I have in mind is analogous to looking at a newspaper photograph. If not focused, the image is just a blur. Too much magnification and all you get is dots, maybe to which no determinate meaning can be attached.

We have to look at - read - the text in the right way, else we have no chance of understanding it. ("It" refers to the text itself. I have no problem with folks who extract meanings got from radical kinds of readings, any more than I have problems with physicists who find traces of new forms of matter in atom smashers. But I do have a problem with those folks if they claim their reading just is the meaning of the text.)

This interpretation, then, is a kind of selection from among possible, and contingent, meanings. The hallmark of good interpretation is that it makes sense - your "judgment," if you will. Usually this happens at the speed of thought, and is most often called understanding. The catch is that the text has no meaning whatsoever beyond what it carries in the way of (understood to be) assigned significance/meaning. The claim that a text is understood means exactly that the author has been understood (although, to be sure, not always as the author expected!), and nothing else.

On the other side, there is a supposed reality which the meaning corresponds with. But when we judge something as "true" we judge it according to how this reality appears to us, and this is also an interpretation, subjective. Therefore truth is entirely "of the subject",

Now this second "interpretation" is a problem, maybe the problem. It simply is not the same as the first "interpretation." There's a better word: perception. But I think it's a mistake to play word games, here. You have to decide whether you "interpret" reality, or if you perceive it. That is, if reality is a text, you can - one supposes must - interpret it. But the consequence of its being a text is that in itself it has nothing on which to ground it as (a) reality - there is no "it," it's all interpretation!

In sum, if you interpret it, then for you there really is no "out there." Everything is subjective in a radical sense. And in consequence there is no objective truth - because there is nothing objective.

On the other hand, perception of reality implies there is a reality, and that it is as perceived! (Interpretation of perception is a whole other topic that I think is irrelevant here - a red herring.)

That allows truth some space in which to exist! Reality is truth. The truth of reality is the ground - the possibility - of propositional truth. And propositional truth is just the collection of propositions that have the quality of being true.

Where interpretation of perception might come in is that truth in some particular form might not be true, because misperceived, or the perception misinterpreted. And just here we're back to existential trust; i.e., that there is a world - a reality - and we can usually rely on our perception of it, and our understanding of our perception.

By the way, the inadequate, preconceived notion of knowledge, which led them astray, was the idea that knowledge had to exclude falsity — Metaphysician Undercover

Therefore if someone knows that P, this does not mean P is true. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you mean to say that under the same scheme of interpretation, some statement P could be false and someone know that P?

For example, "I am at work today," spoken by me, on this day, is false; it would be true spoken today by my buddy Mike; it would be true spoken by me on some other day.

(Note that under this scheme of interpretation, "I am not at work" is true, and there's no issue about knowing that I am not at work. That's still knowing something that's true.)

Is it possible for someone to know that I am at work today, interpreting "I am at work today" the same way I interpret it -- "I" referring to me, and so on -- an interpretation under which it is false?

Look.

You've been all over the place with what you've claimed in an attempt to refute my claim that correspondence is prior to language.

You have claimed that correspondence is dependent upon meaning.
You have claimed that if something exists it is meaningful.
You have claimed that meaning depends upon interpretation.
You have claimed that meaning depends upon judgment.

Clearly, it cannot be the case that all of these claims are true. However, one could foreseeably correct the incoherence by virtue of arguing that some meaning is...

Doing that would require re-categorizing meaning into different kinds. That's what I was getting at before. Regarding your suggestion to offer a case where correspondence existed prior to meaning, I gave you that already. Every time meaning is first attributed. So...

I have already presented you a case, based upon my framework, which you haven't actually considered in light of the framework itself. Rather than doing that, you continue to apply a different framework to the words I'm using. Namely, you've applied your own, which has been all over the place. As a matter of fact, it was within your reply to my example that you first claimed that if something exists it is meaningful. Nearly thirty pages into the thread. Arguing by definitional fiat. Moving the goalposts. Creating incoherence with what you've already claimed.

That's unacceptable for all kinds of reasons.

So, it seems that unless there is some much needed attention given to the fact that we're working from two contrary positions, there's not much to be gained by continuing...

Meta wrote:

Here's a summary. There is a sentence, belief, or some such thing which is said to be true. Whether or not that sentence, or belief is true, is dependent on the meaning of it, and this is interpretation, which is "of the subject", subjective. On the other side, there is a supposed reality which the meaning corresponds with. But when we judge something as "true" we judge it according to how this reality appears to us, and this is also an interpretation, subjective. Therefore truth is entirely "of the subject", a property of knowledge. There cannot be truth outside of knowledge.

The above conflates calling something "true" and truth. That is, it conflates belief(statements thereof) and truth.

You don't see it, but what you said here actually proves my point. If the world appears to you in a certain way, then it is an objective fact that the world is either the way that it appears to you, or that it isn't. So having a mere appearance of reality already makes your appearance objectively true or false. So for example if you have an appearance of seeing a cat on the sofa, then it is either objectively true that there's a cat on the sofa, or objectively false. — Fafner

No, it is not an objective fact that either the world is this way, or it is not this way. The concept of "the world" and the existence of the world, as understood by human beings, is supported by the concept of matter. Aristotle demonstrated that matter is necessarily exempt from the law of excluded middle, which you are employing to produce your so-called "objective fact". This refutes your argument.

My definition merely states the conditional that if someone knows that P, then P is a fact. If P is not the case, then by definition the subject cannot known that P (and it doesn't matter if he himself is aware of this). I'm not claiming that we actually know the facts, it is only a definition of what it means to know something. — Fafner

I addressed the problem with this phrase "knows that P" in my last post to Srap. Your use involves a category error.

Do you mean to say that under the same scheme of interpretation, some statement P could be false and someone know that P? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes that is correct. We have to account for the way that the word is used, when we define it. Things which we refer to as "knowledge", often turn out later to have been wrong. Many of the things which we know, are actually false, despite the fact that we claim to know them, and they are referred to as knowledge. The entire body of knowledge consists of things which may later be determined as false. So, we must look at that thing which we are calling by the name "knowledge", analyze that thing, and produce our definitions and descriptions accordingly. Doesn't it seem kind of ridiculous to say that what is essential to knowledge, is that knowledge excludes falsity, when this is not supported by the evidence, the evidence being the knowledge that exists? It's faulty inductive reasoning to say that everything which is known must be true, when clearly many things which are known are not true.

Is it possible for someone to know that I am at work today, interpreting "I am at work today" the same way I interpret it -- "I" referring to me, and so on -- an interpretation under which it is false? — Srap Tasmaner

The issue is what we are referring to with the word "know", what we are claiming when we claim to know. We do not claim absolute certainty with no possibility of being wrong. Often when I claim to know something, I end up being wrong. So we can not set up as a premise, for a logical argument, that to know something is to exclude the possibility of falsity. This would be a false premise, because it doesn't represent "know' in the way that it is normally used nor does it represent the thing referred to when we use "know". It is a premise based in faulty inductive reasoning, a false premise.

Clearly, it cannot be the case that all of these claims are true. — creativesoul

I don't see why not. Point to a place where you see inconsistency and I'll explain how you've misinterpreted what I said.

Doing that would require re-categorizing meaning into different kinds. — creativesoul

Until we have agreement, and understand each other on what meaning is, I see no point in trying to make categories. First we must clearly define what we are categorizing.

have already presented you a case, based upon my framework, which you haven't actually considered in light of the framework itself. Rather than doing that, you continue to apply a different framework to the words I'm using. — creativesoul

Right, we have little agreement or understanding of each others framework. "Meaning" seems to be the stumbling point. I suggest that we could continue in discussion, but we need to concentrate specifically on what is meaning.

The above conflates calling something "true" and truth. That is, it conflates belief(statements thereof) and truth. Granting all the rest, it would follow that calling something "true" is subjective. — creativesoul

OK, now we've gone outside of what I suggested, concentrating on meaning, but I'll make a reply to this, trying to concentrate on meaning. When we call something true, "true" has meaning, it refers to something. What it refers to is something subjective (of the subject). I think that "truth" is a concept we have, agreement between us, or some sort of informal convention, of what it means to be true, so that when different people call something "true", there is consistency between them as to what is meant by "true", because of this unofficial agreement to use the word in the same way. And this is what we call "truth", our agreement as to what constitutes being true. You say that this is "correspondence", and many agree with you, but not everyone. For those who agree with you, truth is correspondence, and they will use "true" accordingly.

Do you agree that, assuming sincerity in speech, that calling a statement "true" displays belief that the statement is true(corresponds to reality, if you like)?

The term "meaning" has meaning.

Kinda odd isn't it?

What makes it meaningful? What are the necessary preconditions for meaning?

Earlier you said existence.

I disagree.

Can one's definitions be wrong? If so, how so?

X-)

I wrote:

You have claimed that correspondence is dependent upon meaning.
You have claimed that if something exists it is meaningful.
You have claimed that meaning depends upon interpretation.
You have claimed that meaning depends upon judgment.

Clearly, it cannot be the case that all of these claims are true.

You replied:

I don't see why not. Point to a place where you see inconsistency and I'll explain how you've misinterpreted what I said.

If existence alone makes something meaningful, then it is not the case that meaning depends upon interpretation and judgment, for existence doesn't require either.

And...

Meaningless marks exist.

addressed the problem with this phrase "knows that P" in my last post to Srap. Your use involves a category error. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not a "category error." (Btw, the phrase you want, the one Ryle coined, is "category mistake.") It's also not a use/mention violation. "S knows that P" is just an informal schema. It is a stand-in for a proposition formed by concatenating the name of a subject, the phrase " knows that " and a proposition. The name substituted for S is to be used in the resulting sentence -- call it S1 -- and thus does not appear in quotes in S1; the proposition substituted for P is to be used in S1 and thus does not appear in quotes in S1.

The schema is informal in the sense that it is not part of any formal system and we are not committed to quantifying over subjects and propositions, although some informal quantifying seems harmless enough. No domain of discourse is being specified. No rules of inference. It's just a notation, a kind of shorthand. The argument is still being conducted in regular English.

"S knows that P" is also informal in the sense that it is designedly neutral on what sorts of things S and P are -- remember, there is no specified domain of discourse -- except that they would be considered appropriate on the LHS and the RHS of " knows that ". As such it is appropriate for broadly propositional accounts and inappropriate for anything else. It is not intended to be useful for discussion of abilities, skills, or any other sort of knowledge-how. Those things don't go on the RHS of " knows that ".

It's unnatural, but you could try to specify what you intend to substitute for S and for P, without actually doing so. (It's simplest just to do so, unless you start working with classes of S's and P's.) In that case, you might say, "S = 'George Washington', and P = 'life is suffering'." "S" and "P" are informally the names of variables; to specify their values, you write an identity between the name of the variable and the name of the value. In this identity, the names are used, not mentioned. Names for what we intend to substitute are formed by enclosing the expressions in quotes.

When we call something true, "true" has meaning, it refers to something. What it refers to is something subjective (of the subject).

When we say that something "is true", we're talking about thought/belief and/or statements thereof(assertions/propositions). We're saying that the statement/assertion/proposition is true. And yes, thought/belief and statements thereof come through a subject, however the ability to form thought/belief requires something other than the subject. Thus, talking in terms of subjective/objective is inherently incapable of taking proper account of that which consists in/of both, and is thus neither. Truth and meaning are two such things.

...this is what we call "truth", our agreement as to what constitutes being true.

Well, we can be wrong then, can't we?

We(mankind) have had plenty of historical agreements as to what constituted being true, and have been wrong. We've later found out that that which we once thought/believed and agreed was true, was not. Rather much of what we thought/believed was true was false. Truth cannot be false. Agreement about what is true can be. Therefore, agreement is insufficient for truth.

You say that this is "correspondence", and many agree with you, but not everyone. For those who agree with you, truth is correspondence, and they will use "true" accordingly.

I do not say that any of that is correspondence.

Can one's definitions be wrong? If so, how so? — creativesoul

A stipulative definition can't. A lexical definition is if it fails to describe how the word is actually used.

What about the cases in which we use some term or other to talk about something or other that existed prior to our becoming aware of it?

You complained that the statement ' "Correspondence" is not the same as correspondence' makes no sense. I explained that it does makes sense, what sense it makes, and how. So that addresses the complaint.

It's a reasonable point that "correspondence" is not (necessarily) the same as correspondence. A *so-called* thing is not necessarily the thing itself. Dismissing that point may be the *end* of a debate. I pointed out that it is not much for a *beginning*.

No, it is not an objective fact that either the world is this way, or it is not this way. The concept of "the world" and the existence of the world, as understood by human beings, is supported by the concept of matter. Aristotle demonstrated that matter is necessarily exempt from the law of excluded middle, which you are employing to produce your so-called "objective fact". This refutes your argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

Now you are simply appealing to authority. Some famous philosopher said it, therefore it must be true... It seems to me that you've ran out arguments, so I'm out.

This interpretation, then, is a kind of selection from among possible, and contingent, meanings. — tim wood

This is where we have to proceed with caution, and not jump to conclusions. You say this as if there are possible meanings, in existence, like possible worlds in existence, but if the interpreter chooses from possible meanings, these possible meanings are produced within the interpreter's mind, just like possible worlds are produced by the logician's propositions.

When an interpreter chooses a meaning, one does so on the assumption that there is a correct meaning. The assumption of a correct meaning is sometimes justified as what the author meant. However, sometime the author might speak intentionally ambiguously, as is often the case in poetry. Furthermore, there is often vagueness within the author's mind as to exactly what one's intentions are, as one's intention are often not completely clear to oneself.

The nature of intention is such that it is often something vague in the background, so if this is extended to "what was meant" by the author, there may not be such a thing as the correct meaning, what was meant. This may cast doubt on the assumption that there is a correct meaning. If this doubt seeps into the interpreter's act of choosing from possible meanings, then the assumption that there is a correct meaning is removed from the interpreter's guiding principles. The selection of possible meanings is produced by the interpreter's mind, and the meaning which is chosen (as the correct choice) is the one which is consistent with the intentions of the interpreter. We may argue that this is faulty interpretation.

The claim that a text is understood means exactly that the author has been understood (although, to be sure, not always as the author expected!), and nothing else. — tim wood

Yes, this is the result. One claims to have understood the author, but this is based on how one interprets the meaning. Has that individual striven to understand "the correct meaning", assuming that the author intends something, or has the interpreter chosen meaning based on what is appealing to oneself. As you say, much interpretation is done fast, and may be near a subconscious level. So in most interpretation there is degrees of each, considering the author's intentions, and the influence of the interpreter's intention, which enter in. We cannot avoid interpreting according to how we've learned to understand the particular words in use, but if we approach an author with an interpretation, the author might very well say, "that's not what I meant". So it is our due diligence to pay respect to the way that the author uses words, and if it appears to be a way which one is not familiar with, effort must be taken to understand that way.

Now this second "interpretation" is a problem, maybe the problem. It simply is not the same as the first "interpretation." There's a better word: perception. But I think it's a mistake to play word games, here. You have to decide whether you "interpret" reality, or if you perceive it. That is, if reality is a text, you can - one supposes must - interpret it. But the consequence of its being a text is that in itself it has nothing on which to ground it as (a) reality - there is no "it," it's all interpretation! — tim wood

Yes, this is definitely where the problem lies. When we interpret a text, we always maintain within our minds, or deeper at the subconscious level, that what we are getting out of it must be guided by the assumption that the author intended something, this is what is meant, the assumption of a meaning of the text . So we don't interpret in any willy-nilly way because we are assuming that there is a correct way. This we learn as a child, learning a language.

When we interpret reality, what grounds the assumption of a correct way? And of course we have perception to provide this for us. But what is perception other than a much more general form of interpretation? So take your example of looking at a photograph. When we learn to read, or to speak, by paying attention to what others are saying, we are learning to focus on a very particular aspect of our environment. Using language requires that we focus on this very small portion of what is going on around us. Perception in general involves this same type of focus. That other life forms perceive things in very different ways, indicates that they have evolved to focus on their environment in different ways from us. We can say that there are aspects of the environment which prove to be important to us, we evolve to focus on them. As a child we learn to focus on language use because it is important. And, living creatures have evolved ( therefore learned) to focus on particular aspects of their environment which are important, and this is perception.

Now the issue, where the problem lies, is what guides us towards the "correct" interpretation of reality. In the case of language use, we are guided by the assumption that there is something meant, a definite meaning, given by the author. In the case of interpreting reality, we are not guided by this assumption, so we produce the assumption that there is a way that reality "is", a type of logical basis, the law of identity. The problem is that this "the way that the world is" is inconsistent with the way that the world reveals itself to us through our senses. The world presents itself to us as continually changing through time, with no such thing as "the way that the world is".