I wrote:

Not all correspondence(truth) is dependent upon meaning.

You replied(with a fair amount of skepticism):

Ok, then give me an example of an instance of correspondence which is not meaningful.

So, I answered as plainly as I could:

Every instance when meaning is first attributed.

Now you say this:

This is very problematic. When meaning is "first attributed" it is rarely if ever, most likely never, a case of correspondence (truth). You hear a sound for the first time, it is non-random, exhibiting some form of order, therefore meaningful, so you attribute meaning. You haven't the vaguest idea of what that sound corresponds to, yet you know it is meaningful.

Interesting. Indeed there are some problems beginning to show...

You see the word "therefore" above? It is being misused. It is supposed to be followed by a valid conclusion. It is not. It does not follow from there being an order to things, that there is meaning. As if order is prima facie evidence of meaning. Besides that, the word "so" indicates a dubious presupposition that the agent attributed meaning as a result of recognizing the aforementioned "order".

That is impossible.

When one is first attributing meaning, s/he doesn't have the intellectual capacity/framework to perform the comparitive analysis between order and randomness.

What's above is your worldview being projected onto an hypothetical "you". That amounts to conflating order with meaningfulness. Otherwise, it is a definition and/or a criterion of/for meaning, which would be fine if it didn't contradict what you've been saying all along...

If it is the case that meaning is dependent on interpretation, then there can be no meaning without thought/belief. Interpretation is existentially contingent upon thought/belief. Thus, there is no meaning without an agent. If there is no meaning without an agent, one could not be first attributing meaning to something already meaningful.

You've arrived at incoherence.

I'll answer the questions at the end the next time around...

If this is the case, then could you explain to me how you categorize both knowledge and truth, to maintain this separation which you are inclined to adhere to. — Metaphysician Undercover

I already explained this. Something can be true without anyone knowing it (e.g., my example of extraterrestrial life), so plainly true and knowledge are not the same thing.

Knowledge is the property of the thinking subject. — Metaphysician Undercover

No it isn't. Knowledge is a relation between a subject and the known fact. It's not merely a state or a property of a subject taken by itself. If you know that P, then P must be true.

Knowledge has this form: For some subject S and some proposition P, S knows that P.
Truth has this form: For some proposition P, P is true. — Srap Tasmaner

OK, let's go with this then. Can you explain what makes P true, other than S knows that P is true? In other words S knows that P is the condition for P being true. The argument I produced, if you followed it, demonstrates that P is true if S knows that P is true, and nothing further about being true. have you something to add? Further, I would say that not all knowledge consists of things which are true (as knowing-how is distinct for example), being true is a special type of knowledge.

It does not follow from there being an order to things, that there is meaning. As if order is prima facie evidence of meaning. — creativesoul

As I explained earlier, if one judges something as meaningful, there is meaning there. That there is not actually meaning there is an assertion that the first person is wrong, and needs to be justified. It cannot be justified because the second person does not perceive exactly what the first does. The second has a different perspective and cannot perceive all that the first does. Therefore not even order is required for meaning, it could be anything which one judges as meaningful. If it is judged as meaningful by any person, it necessarily is so. The introduction of "order" is irrelevant. In my opinion, if it exists, it is meaningful.

If it is the case that meaning is dependent on interpretation, then there can be no meaning without thought/belief. Interpretation is existentially contingent upon thought/belief. Thus, there is no meaning without an agent. If there is no meaning without an agent, one could not be first attributing meaning to something already meaningful. — creativesoul

My argument was that the judgement "that something is meaningful" is dependent on interpretation, because this is what you claimed was necessary for truth of a proposition, "that it is meaningful". That's why I said the representation of my argument as "meaning is dependent on interpretation" is a dreadful representation". If I wrote it that way, at one point, it was a mistake, and not what I meant, and I apologize for misleading you, but that's why I produced what I really meant, in that post, and what I stated in the first place, in that post.

So I do not assert that there is no meaning without an agent, what I assert is that there is no judgement as to whether or not something is meaningful, without an agent.

I already explained this. Something can be true without anyone knowing it (e.g., my example of extraterrestrial life), so plainly true and knowledge are not the same thing. — Fafner

Fafner, we've been through this already, it took us days to get agreement. Have you lost your memory? Are we back to square one? I addressed your example, "extraterrestrial life" requires interpretation, and this requires a subject. It cannot be true without anyone knowing it.

No it isn't. Knowledge is a relation between a subject and the known fact. It's not merely a state or a property of a subject taken by itself. If you know that P, then P must be true. — Fafner

And we've been through this. "Known fact" (objective knowledge), is what is justified, agreed upon by many subjects. Known fact is not necessarily true. When there is agreement (correspondence) between what the subject believes, and known fact (what is justified or agreed upon by the multitudes), this does not necessitate that what the subject knows is true. There are many examples of when "known fact" gets proven wrong.

Fafner, we've been through this already, it took us days to get agreement. Have you lost your memory? Are we back to square one? I addressed your example, "extraterrestrial life" requires interpretation, and this requires a subject. It cannot be true without anyone knowing it. — Metaphysician Undercover

We have only agreed that the truth of sentences depends (in some sense) on subjects and the world, but this doesn't entail anything about knowledge per-se. The sentence "extraterrestrial life exist" is true (if it is true) because a) in English the sentence means what it means (this is the part concerning subjects) and b) there is extraterrestrial life (this is how the world itself is). So it is perfectly possible that a sentence is true without anyone knowing it, because it is plain that many sentences that we don't know their truth still make sense, meaning that we already understand what would it take for them to be either true or false without knowing what is actually case.

And we've been through this. "Known fact" (objective knowledge), is what is justified, agreed upon by many subjects. Known fact is not necessarily true. When there is agreement (correspondence) between what the subject believes, and known fact (what is justified or agreed upon by the multitudes), this does not necessitate that what the subject knows is true. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course you are free to define knowledge your way (e.g. that you can know falsehoods), but this is not my definition of knowledge (where knowing that P logically entails the truth of P), and nothing that you say shows that there is no knowledge in my sense of the term.

There are many examples of when "known fact" gets proven wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

This only shows that the 'known fact' wasn't really a known fact, but was merely believed to be a known fact. These are two different things on my understanding of knowledge.

True. I can't explain how a single word has two senses without first explaining one sense and then explaining the other. So, for example, 'leg' can be used to include tails or it can be used correctly to exclude tails. "Correspondence" can be used to mean what correspondence usually means; or it can be used to mean anything you like in order to shore up a theory that thought and belief are all correspondence. That was the original complaint by another poster. It's worth thinking about even if you don't agree with it.

True. I can't explain how a single word has two senses without first explaining one sense and then explaining the other. So, for example, 'leg' can be used to include tails or it can be used correctly to exclude tails. "Correspondence" can be used to mean what correspondence usually means; or it can be used to mean anything you like in order to shore up a theory that thought and belief are all correspondence. That was the original complaint by another poster. It's worth thinking about even if you don't agree with it.

This doesn't counter or address what I said in any way. I do appreciate the attempt, though.

That doesn't mean that "correspondence" and correspondence are any different in semantics in their expressions themselves. They need further elaboration for that. But feel free to show how they're different without elaborating beyond the expressions themselves. You can't. — Thanatos Sand

Well, "correspondence" is a 14-letter word whereas correspondence is a close similarity, connection, or equivalence between two or more things (or communication by exchange of letters).

Just as "red" is a 3-letter word whereas red is a colour. And just as "Michael" is 7-letter name whereas Michael likes to talk about himself in the third-person.

That doesn't mean that "correspondence" and correspondence are any different in semantics in their expressions themselves. They need further elaboration for that. But feel free to show how they're different without elaborating beyond the expressions themselves. You can't.
— Thanatos Sand

Well, "correspondence" is a 14-letter word whereas correspondence is a close similarity, connection, or equivalence between two or more things (or communication by exchange of letters).

Just as "red" is a 3-letter word whereas red is a colour. And just as "Michael" is 7-letter name whereas Michael likes to talk about himself in the third-person.

Sorry, none of that disputes what I said about the semantics involved. Your definition of correspondence could well apply to "correspondence." So, you fail there.

And "red" and red are both colors and both are 3-letter words. Same applies to what you said about your "Michaels." So, you fail there, too.

You conflate use and mention.

Red is a colour, not a word, and "red" is a word, not a colour.

↪Thanatos Sand You conflate use and mention.

Red is a colour, not a word, and "red" is a word, not a colour.

No, I don't. And it's astonishing you think Red is not a word and "red" isn't a color. That makes no sense at all.

No, I don't. And it's astonishing you think Red is not a word and "red" isn't a color. That makes no sense at all. — Thanatos Sand

It makes sense if you understand the distinction between use and mention. So if it doesn't make sense to you then you don't understand the distinction. It's astonishing to think that you don't see it.

No, I don't. And it's astonishing you think Red is not a word and "red" isn't a color. That makes no sense at all.
— Thanatos Sand

It makes sense if you understand the distinction between use and mention. So if it doesn't make sense to you then you don't understand the distinction. There is one. It's astonishing to think that you don't see it.

No it doesn't because the distinction between use and mention you apply to these words is a false one you fail to support. So, it's not astonishing I don't see it. But keep on saying red isn't a word. That's adorable.

I am Michael. I am not a word. Therefore, Michael is not a word.

"Michael" is a 7-letter word. I am not a 7-letter word. Therefore, I am not "Michael".

The distinction between use and mention is pretty straightforward.

↪Thanatos Sand

I am Michael. I am not a word. Therefore, Michael is not a word.

You just said you're a word when you used the word Michael to write "I am Michael." Try to avoid contradicting yourself.

You just said you're a word when you used the word Michael to write "I am Michael." — Thanatos Sand

No I didn't.

Just as when I write "I am an English web developer who dabbles in philosophy" I'm not saying that I'm a sentence.

You're talking nonsense.

↪Thanatos Sand

I am Michael. I am not a word. Therefore, Michael is not a word.

Of course you did. You wrote that and those are all words, including the Michaels.

Of course you did. You wrote that and those are all words, including the Michaels. — Thanatos Sand

That I wrote the words "I am Michael" is not that I'm saying that I'm a word. It's absurd to think I am.

You continue to conflate use and mention.

Here's a simple overview for you:

The use–mention distinction is especially important in analytic philosophy. Failure to properly distinguish use from mention can produce false, misleading, or meaningless statements or category errors. For example, the following correctly distinguish between use and mention:

1. "Copper" contains six letters, and is not a metal.
2. Copper is a metal, and contains no letters.

The first sentence, a mention example, is a statement about the word "copper" and not the chemical element. Notably, the word is composed of six letters, but not any kind of metal or other tangible thing. The second sentence, a use example, is a statement about the chemical element copper and not the word itself. Notably, the element is composed of 29 electrons and protons and a number of neutrons, but not any letters.

Sorry, now you're trying to flip it around. You were trying to say Michael isnt' a word because you're Michael. And it's still a word. And it is absurd you said you were a word, so you should stop saying it.

It's absurd to think it's not.

You tried to do it right here, and that was wrong. Michael is still a word:

↪Thanatos Sand

I am Michael. I am not a word. Therefore, Michael is not a word.

You continue to conflate use and mention.

No, I don't, you just continue to set up a false separation of them in your misunderstanding of words. Michael is a word, and it's cute you think it isn't. And that blurb you quoted doesn't contradict it at all.

And that blurb you quoted doesn't contradict it at all. — Thanatos Sand

It does.

1. "Copper" contains six letters, and is not a metal.
2. Copper is a metal, and contains no letters.
3. "Michael" contains seven letters, and is not a person.
4. Michael is a person, and contains no letters.
5. "Red" contains three letters, and is not a colour.
6. Red is a colour, and contains no letters.

Thanks for proving my point. All those things you mentioned are still words. And the fact you think copper, Michael, and red contain no letters is very sad.

So, no, that blurb did not contradict it.

Further, I would say that not all knowledge consists of things which are true (as knowing-how is distinct for example), being true is a special type of knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover

Absolutely. I wouldn't conflate knowing-how and knowing-that, just assumed we were talking about propositional knowledge.

The argument I produced, if you followed it, demonstrates that P is true if S knows that P is true, and nothing further about being true. have you something to add? — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, sure, "know" is a factive verb. Everyone agrees that if someone knows that P, then P is true. (Someone knowing that P is a sufficient condition for P being true.)

In other words S knows that P is the condition for P being true. — Metaphysician Undercover

But now this is the converse: if P is true, then someone knows that P. (Someone knowing that P is a necessary condition for P being true.) Its contrapositive is that if no one knows that P, then P is false.

Suppose I have a machine like this: there is a button in Room 1, and a cup in Room 2, and when the button in Room 1 is pushed, the machine drops 1 ball or 2 balls into the cup and then shuts off. You can only see the cup if you are in Room 2.

Now suppose I am in Room 1 and I push the button. No one is in Room 2. Let n = the number of balls in the cup after I push the button. If the machine didn't work, n = 0, otherwise n = 1 or n = 2. I know that (n = 0 ∨ n = 1 ∨ n = 2), and it is true that (n = 0 ∨ n = 1 ∨ n = 2). No one knows that n = 0, therefore n ≠ 0; no one knows that n = 1, therefore n ≠ 1; no one knows that n = 2, therefore n ≠ 2. Therefore it is not true that (n = 0 ∨ n = 1 ∨ n = 2). And that is a contradiction.

Therefore it is false that if P is true, someone knows that P.

It's a convention. We can talk about a thing by using its name; if we want to talk about the thing's name instead of the thing itself, we put the name in quotation marks. (Talking about the thing by using its name we call "use"; talking about the thing's name by putting the name in quotation marks, we call "mention.")

Thus Michael's name is "Michael," but Michael is not Michael's name, for the obvious reason that things are not identical with their names.

Quotation marks just have multiple uses, and this is one of them.

If you don't like the convention, you're free to ignore it, but it makes it more difficult to distinguish when you're talking about Michael from when you're talking about his name.

We can also say this:
If no one knows n = 0, then n ≠ 0.
If n ≠ 0, then someone knows that n ≠ 0.
Who is this person who knows the cup is not empty?

↪Thanatos Sand
It's a convention. We can talk about a thing by using its name; if we want to talk about the thing's name instead of the thing itself, we put the name in quotation marks. (Talking about the thing by using its name we call "use"; talking about the thing's name by putting the name in quotation marks, we call "mention.")

What you and Michael don't get, and what Saussure demonstrated very well, is that the thing and the things's name can't be separated as long as you are using the same word, quotations or no.

Thus Michael's name is "Michael," but Michael is not Michael's name, for the obvious reason that things are not identical with their names.

I know that, but that's not what Michael said. He said "I am Michael, and I am not a word so Michael is not a word," which was wrong in many ways.

Quotation marks just have multiple uses, and this is one of them. — Srap Tasmaner

Quotation marks just have multiple uses, and this is one of them.

They do have many uses. That Is an incorrect use of them.

If you don't like the convention, you're free to ignore it, but it makes it more difficult to distinguish when you're talking about Michael from when you're talking about his name.

You were free to ignore our discussion, but chose to enter and make your erroneous statements. We were discussing the validity of that "convention" and I showed how it is incorrect. You are free to ignore his statement too if you don't like it.

These are entirely different dynamics and situations of which I have no interest. But thanks for sharing them. — Thanatos Sand

You might note that I wasn't addressing you here.

I got ya.

I found this bit of your discourse interesting...

Srap wrote:

The problem here is not just that whatever warrant you have for asserting that P is no guarantee that P is true.

Fafner replied:

Unless you are a disjunctivist.

This immediately reminded me of Gettier 'problems' with the JTB account. The sleight of hand regarding not taking account of the difference between the candidates' actual belief and Gettier's report upon that. One cannot believe both 'X' and not 'X'. Thus, disjunction does not warrant/justify belief in both.