Purpose is a property of life and becomes a concept when intelligent minds recognize it. — Vera Mont

Right on! All living organisms have an innate driving purpose : to stay alive. But philosophical discussions of Purpose may be traced back to Theological notions that each moral agent of the world has a unique role to play in the epic of creation. In Genesis, the bit-part role of pre-enlightenment Adam & Eve was simply to be caretakers in the garden, as the animals with hands. No need for reasoning or insight, or concepts such as Good vs Evil.

Over time though, theology became more complex and sophisticated, and the search for an individual's purpose --- the one supposedly assigned by God --- became more important to one's post-life destiny. Each actor's ultimate payoff or punishment depends on discovering the role they were "meant" to play in God's dramaturgy. Some search the inscrutable scriptures for clues, while others look into their own empathetic hearts. But failure to find the divinely assigned role still seems to provoke anxiety in those who are not content with their evolutionary niche as animals, but aspire to play the role of angels on God's golden stage.

Modern science seems to be content with the most basic purposes of survival & propagation of genes. Yet, some philosophers still seem to feel that each of us needs some higher goal than just eat, drink, and f*ck. Do we have assigned roles in the drama of life --- by God or Nature --- or do we choose our own personas to suit personal talents & needs? Shakespeare pithily captured the secular version of the purpose quandary. Does our minor role on the world stage have any importance in the script of destiny? Is Purpose merely a property of natural instincts, or a higher Concept for the amusement of the gods? :smile:


*1. Anxious actors in the play of Life & Death & Destiny:

All the world’s a stage,
And all the men and women merely players;

Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player,
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/56966/speech-all-the-worlds-a-stage

You are confusing yourself with language. A relation is either an idea - or the expression of one - or a thing. I don't see how a screw can in any sense have an idea, nor how it can be one, and at the same time a screw. Nor do I see how an idea can be a thing. And the screw is a part of the engine not in virtue of any idea or relation, but on the simple fact that it is. — tim wood

I don't understand this. My OED defines "relation" as what a thing has to do with another. If you believe that a thing is not just an idea (don't you?), then why wouldn't you think that a relation is not just an idea? Do you believe that the earth and the sun are things, and not just ideas? How could you believe that these two things are not ideas, yet the relation between them is just an idea? That seems so inconsistent, so as to be incoherent.

And the screw is a part of the engine not in virtue of any idea or relation, but on the simple fact that it is. — tim wood

So here, you are saying that the relation which you call "a part of", is not an idea, but a fact. So you really do believe that relations are more than just ideas. Can I have some consistency please?

I agree on this section, but did you mean artifact instead of "artifice"? — tim wood

No, I meant artifice. An artifice is a clever device. Do you not think that an engine fits this description? Maybe you are thinking of a different meaning.

Great, what do they explain? — tim wood

I gave you the example. Why don't you address it? Here, have another look:

So, let's look at the above example. There's a thing called "the engine", and a thing called "the screw". Assume we know nothing about these things just their names. Now you say that the screw is a part of the engine. I say "the engine" is an artifice, a device intentionally built, and the screw has a purpose dictated by the creator's design. Do you honestly believe that my description provides no extra "explanatory value" over yours? — Metaphysician Undercover

Look, we can describe the engine as "a piece of metal" like you did, or we can describe the engine as a piece of metal designed and built with intention. Do you honestly believe that the latter explains no more about what an engine is, than the former?

I don't understand this. My OED defines "relation" as what a thing has to do with another. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah? How? Does the screw discuss with the engine? Or do they talk to you? What language does a screw speak? The screw and the engine - or any inanimate things - cannot partake of relationship - that can only be assigned by a being, and no guarantee the being gets it right.

So here, you are saying that the relation which you call "a part of", is not an idea, but a fact. So you really do believe that relations are more than just ideas. Can I have some consistency please? — Metaphysician Undercover

Saying x is a part of Y is an idea. Actually screwing the screw into the engine exhibits a facticity that corresponds to the idea.

I should like us to be able to reach an understanding as to the actuality of these things. Pieces of metal in themselves do not own or think or participate in anything at all. And such as is assigned to them is assigned by a being able to make the assignment. And your OED does not trouble, apparently, to make that distinction, and why should it, the OED mostly about common and informal understanding and usage - and etymologies. Exactly what we are not concerned with here.

Who knows, in the case of an agreement between people, you might argue that the agreement is actually between them, somewhere.

An artifice is a clever device. Do you not think that an engine fits this description? — Metaphysician Undercover

If you think it does, kindly make clear how it does - of course without reference to anything but he engine itself. And to be sure, there is nothing intrinsic to engines that is clever.

Look, we can describe the engine as "a piece of metal" like you did, or we can describe the engine as a piece of metal designed and built with intention. Do you honestly believe that the latter explains no more about what an engine is, than the former? — Metaphysician Undercover

Until you pay more attention to your own use of language, we're going to have a difficult time. "We can describe...". And indeed we can. But so what? When we describe, what we have is a description, our own description, which may be useful to us for our own purposes.

Yeah? How? Does the screw discuss with the engine? Or do they talk to you? What language does a screw speak? The screw and the engine - or any inanimate things - cannot partake of relationship - that can only be assigned by a being, and no guarantee the being gets it right. — tim wood

Do you think that "relation" requires communication? if one thing affects another, for example, there is a relation between them. Communication is not a requirement for a relation. The sun has an effect on the earth, the moon has an effect on the earth, and the screw has an effect on the engine. There are relations between these things.

Until you pay more attention to your own use of language, we're going to have a difficult time. — tim wood

Sorry, I have no inclination to restrict my language to suit your desires. You demonstrate severe obstinance, most likely the feature of a closed mind, which greatly limits your capacity to understand. Restricting my language in the way required for you to understand would disable me from being able to say what I want to say. This would simply leave me saying what you want me to say, so that your limited capacity for understanding could understand the things I say, within your own little world of 'how the world must be described' according to your dictates of 'the world is like this'. If you have no inclination to expand your little world to include the way that other people see the world, within your world, this type of discussion is pointless.

Sorry, I have no inclination to restrict my language to suit your desires. You demonstrate severe obstinance, most likely the feature of a closed mind, which greatly limits your capacity to understand. Restricting my language in the way required for you to understand would disable me from being able to say what I want to say. This would simply leave me saying what you want me to say, so that your limited capacity for understanding could understand the things I say, within your own little world of 'how the world must be described' according to your dictates of 'the world is like this'. If you have no inclination to expand your little world to include the way that other people see the world, within your world, this type of discussion is pointless. — Metaphysician Undercover

Language is first a tool of convenience that people use to get the world's work done. As such it is rife with implications that simply are not true of themselves, notwithstanding their utility. And to my knowledge no one complains too much about this facile, "artifice"-like aspect of language because it does get most of the world's work done. Most, but not all. There are times when the curtains have to be pulled aside, and the free use of language restricted.

In our case, it seems to me, you use descriptive language that in ordinary usage I take no exception to. And you then try derive specific meanings the language-as-convenient-tool cannot support. In a phrase, which might not be completely accurate but close enough for the moment, you try to reify description. We can talk all the day long about engines and screws and their purposes and intentions and relation to each other, but I and I suspect you too know perfectly well that these descriptive terms, while about the objects, are in no sense part of the objects themselves. And inasmuch - as you often say - this is a philosophy site, we ought to be able to make the distinction between casual descriptive language and more rigorous usage. Which of course means that language is subject to restriction - in fact language is always subject to some restriction for the sake of sense. The question being, how much sense do you want to make?
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Let's try "relation." What exactly do you say a relation is? I say it's the expression of an idea. Thus of a mind: no mind, no relation. But, you might say, there are lots of things in the universe not under the gaze of a mind: is there zero relation between these things? And I would answer that by asking if you were simply seeking some descriptive language, because if that's all, then why not? But if you want to attempt to approach the truth of the matter, you had then better be damned careful about what you say and what you mean.

Newton's gravity can stand here is an example: a mighty piece of description - which as a shortcoming apparently Newton himself understood better than most - but now replaced with the curvature of space-time, and some even newer, tentative theories. The-force-of-gravity is still a useful piece of description, but it would seem that there actually is no such thing.

Or race. people talk about race all the time - usually not a good thing. But apparently whatever they mean by race is a something that does not actually exist. Differences between individuals? Sure, just not race. And finally, as is the case especially with race, to talk about anything as existing that does not actually exist, absent good and useful purpose, is just plain at best not a good look, and at worst, much worse.

You want to insist on a carte blanche for your own language and meanings and significance? Yours for the taking, but it puts you outside the bounds of reason and reasonable discussion, certainly outside the bounds of TPF.

Why do you want to turn this into a discussion about the shortcomings of language, rather than sticking to the subject? Everyone knows that language has problems, ambiguity, redundancy, and simple lack of scope. We can either take a defeatist attitude, and assume that our goals will never be obtained due to these problems, or we can accept the problems of language and continue on, recognizing the shortcomings and working around them. You seem to be in the defeatist camp. I learned from Plato, and his artful demonstration of "dialectics" that these problems, which many take as impassable roadblocks, are really just minor obstacles, requiring slight detours.

We can talk all the day long about engines and screws and their purposes and intentions and relation to each other, but I and I suspect you too know perfectly well that these descriptive terms, while about the objects, are in no sense part of the objects themselves. — tim wood

Tim, why do you keep coming back to this point? I've explicitly said, numerous times, that purpose is not "in the object". It is in the object's relations to other objects. We've passed that little obstacle long ago. The disagreement we have is that you claim that relations only exist as ideas in human minds. I think that relations exist independently of human minds, just like the objects which are related to each other exist independently of human minds.

Here's a compromise proposal. You say relations exist as "ideas", or "expressions of ideas". I say relations exist outside of human minds. Can we agree that "ideas", or "expression of ideas" may exist outside of human minds? So, let's say that the screw has a relation to the engine, and this relation is an idea, or an expression of an idea, which is outside of all human minds.

Newton's gravity can stand here is an example: a mighty piece of description - which as a shortcoming apparently Newton himself understood better than most - but now replaced with the curvature of space-time, and some even newer, tentative theories. The-force-of-gravity is still a useful piece of description, but it would seem that there actually is no such thing. — tim wood

Let's look at gravity as an example then, then, under the principles of my proposal. Let's use the word "gravity" to refer directly to a specific type of relation between two objects. We can easily avoid the descriptive shortcomings you talk about, by saying that the way we describe the observed effects of "gravity" is completely irrelevant. For example, we say that there is a specific type of relation between the earth and the moon, which we know as "gravity", and whether we describe the effects of gravity in a Newtonian way, or an Einsteinian way, is completely irrelevant to us, because we are interested in the relation itself, not the description of the relation. This is commonly known as the difference between the map and the territory. We are not interested in the map, (whether the map is Einsteinian or Newtonian), we are interested in the territory, that specific type of relation between the earth and moon, known as "gravity".

Now, to adhere to my compromise proposal, we'd have to say that this relation is either an idea, or an expression of an idea. But how could that be the case? The earth and moon, each with one's own gravity having an effect on the other, through that relation we are calling "gravity", existed long before human beings and their ideas and expressions of ideas? Such an "idea" or "expression of idea" could not be human.

This problem is the result of the restrictions on language which you are trying to enforce. You are insisting that "a relation" must be either an idea or an expression of an idea. You are refusing to acknowledge that in order to develop an adequate understanding of reality, we must allow that relations have independent existence. Do you understand, and respect this conclusion? In order to have an accurate and adequate understanding of reality, and truth about the world, we need to allow that relations exist independently from the human ideas which attempt to understand them, just like we do with objects. Objects have independent existence, and so do their relations. Therefore we must allow that relations are not just human ideas, or expressions of human ideas, that is a linguistic restriction which would render the world as unintelligible.

Slight injustice here: I read, replied, read some more, rinsed and repeated. I should have just read first. And would have but for my inability to accommodate a lot at one time. Sorry for that.

It is in the object's relations to other objects. — Metaphysician Undercover

And this is where to my ear your answer equivocates. Where is the relation? What is it made of? Thing or idea? My view is that the screw just is, in some primordial sense that at the least represents the attempt to not attribute to the screw anything at all which it itself does not have - which ordinary, informal, everyday language does not even try to do, in part because it is not the business of such language to do that. Relation, then, the expression of an idea by a person who has the idea. Presumably referring to the thing we call a screw - although the idea expressed in itself as itself is no warrant as to its own correctness or accuracy.

There could even be the question whether the "screwness" of the thing we call a screw is attributable to it. And perhaps it isn't. What was it before it was a screw? Answer: a something we call a piece of metal. A piece of something its form changed to something else we call a screw. The point being that all of these distinctions and labels are not-so-much terms of art but rather terms-of-common, used in a convenient way to represent useful ideas of various kinds - and none whatsoever of it in or of the thing itself. And the discussion itself of no great importance, except as it can help to identify when people make wrong attributions.

I think that relations exist independently of human minds, just like the objects which are related to each other exist independently of human minds. — Metaphysician Undercover

Think or believe? On my usage of these two words, if you believe you get a pass from me. if you think, then show your thinking - make your case. "Exist independently": this existence either an invocation of magic or substantive in some sense that comports with existing. I know of two and only two classes of existing things: material things and ideas. I think the number two, for example, exists, but only as an idea. As it happens, for the screw, it seems to me that almost everything that in any ordinary way that might be said of it, is an idea. -- Hmm. That itself leads to the notion that everything expressed is just an idea - which I think is correct, no exceptions occurring to me at the moment.

I say relations exist outside of human minds. Can we agree that "ideas", or "expression of ideas" may exist outside of human minds? — Metaphysician Undercover

Um, no. I acknowledge you believe it. Are you looking for me to accept what you merely believe? Or if you have more, then make it more than just a belief. Make it real and then you needn't invite me, but instead compel (in a nice way of course).

For example, we say that there is a specific type of relation between the earth and the moon, which we know as "gravity" — Metaphysician Undercover

And just this an example of the kind of place where we have to be "damned careful" with what we say and mean. The proposition here is whether, not the map as you put it exists, but if the territory, the relation itself independent of mind, exists. I invite you here to think carefully about just what exactly it is that you believe - affirm - exists. My quick answer is the moon, the earth, and ideas about them. And people who have those ideas. The notion of accuracy of idea being here a test. If the idea is wrong, does it exist in your sense? That is, can existing things that cannot exist, exist? They can as ideas. If pressed I can affirm six impossible things before morning tea - as ideas.

This problem is the result of the restrictions on language which you are trying to enforce. — Metaphysician Undercover

Absolutely, in the context in which it matters. Absolutely not, in contexts where it does not matter.

You are refusing to acknowledge that in order to develop an adequate understanding of reality, we must allow that relations have independent existence. Do you understand, and respect this conclusion? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. because unnecessary and at best grounded in a kind of utilitarian apologetics.

And this "remembers" a discussion about whether anyone sees a tree. And of course they see the tree. Everyone sees the tree, always did, always will. Except that on analysis, no one ever saw the tree nor ever did nor ever will. And similarly we can talk about relations and purpose, intention, telos of course as independently existing or existing in things, of course of course of course. Except that on analysis they don't. Gravity a great example: of course it exists, except that it doesn't.

So, in this our context I divide between material and not-material, the latter being ideas. And these two being exhaustive. Believe what you like, but if you wish to establish a third category, be my guest. I request you keep in mind, though, that many approaches for you are disqualified in that you already have them, as convenient fictions.




.

The majority of your thread I apprehend as an irrelevant rant, so I'll skip it and get right to the point.

And just this an example of the kind of place where we have to be "damned careful" with what we say and mean. The proposition here is whether, not the map as you put it exists, but if the territory, the relation itself independent of mind, exists. I invite you here to think carefully about just what exactly it is that you believe - affirm - exists. My quick answer is the moon, the earth, and ideas about them. And people who have those ideas. The notion of accuracy of idea being here a test. If the idea is wrong, does it exist in your sense? That is, can existing things that cannot exist, exist? They can as ideas. If pressed I can affirm six impossible things before morning tea - as ideas. — tim wood

The moon exists, and the earth exists, so says you. Do you agree that the activities of these things also exist, and that these activities are not just ideas about the things, they are what the things are actually doing? So for instance, we describe an activity as "the moon orbits the earth", and another as "the earth has tides which are the effects of the orbiting moon". These sorts of activities and relations exist independently of our thought and ideas about them, and our representations of them. Can you agree?

Gravity a great example: of course it exists, except that it doesn't. — tim wood

What could this possibly mean?

And this is where to my ear your answer equivocates. Where is the relation? What is it made of? Thing or idea? — tim wood

Oh yes, I forgot to answer your question, I know you dislike that. Your act of limiting possible answers to two choices, "thing or idea", imposes a restriction which leaves the world unintelligible, as I explained here:

This problem is the result of the restrictions on language which you are trying to enforce. You are insisting that "a relation" must be either an idea or an expression of an idea. You are refusing to acknowledge that in order to develop an adequate understanding of reality, we must allow that relations have independent existence. Do you understand, and respect this conclusion? In order to have an accurate and adequate understanding of reality, and truth about the world, we need to allow that relations exist independently from the human ideas which attempt to understand them, just like we do with objects. Objects have independent existence, and so do their relations. Therefore we must allow that relations are not just human ideas, or expressions of human ideas, that is a linguistic restriction which would render the world as unintelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover

we describe an activity as "the moon orbits the earth", — Metaphysician Undercover

I say relations exist outside of human minds. — Metaphysician Undercover

Great, let these, then, be the examples of your insisting on the reality of a fiction and of reifying ideas in some kind of form which they don't have. The moon does not orbit the earth. But to you that's a fact and a relation that exists. How and where? Made of what? I keep inviting you to make your argument, to make your case, and you cannot or will not do it. And you can shift gears all you want, but until you engage your clutch, you're going nowhere, even if your engine is racing. You have your beliefs: some are imo nonsense. But they're your beliefs. If you want them to be more than merely your beliefs, you'll need more than just your insistence.

I would appreciate it if in your reply, if you reply, you acknowledge that the moon does not orbit the earth, and follow that with an explanation of how a false belief - the relation - can exist other than as an idea. If you get that far, please include how any belief can be other than an idea, and how any idea can be real and exist in whatever your sense of "exist" is. Ideas being the stuff of minds, it's hard to see how there can be such absent mind.

Gravity a great example: of course it exists, except that it doesn't.
— tim wood
What could this possibly mean? — Metaphysician Undercover

Best you do a little bit of research. I just did - you won't have a problem.

Great, let these, then, be the examples of your insisting on the reality of a fiction and of reifying ideas in some kind of form which they don't have. The moon does not orbit the earth. But to you that's a fact and a relation that exists. How and where? Made of what? I keep inviting you to make your argument, to make your case, and you cannot or will not do it. And you can shift gears all you want, but until you engage your clutch, you're going nowhere, even if your engine is racing. You have your beliefs: some are imo nonsense. But they're your beliefs. If you want them to be more than merely your beliefs, you'll need more than just your insistence.

I would appreciate it if in your reply, if you reply, you acknowledge that the moon does not orbit the earth, and follow that with an explanation of how a false belief - the relation - can exist other than as an idea. If you get that far, please include how any belief can be other than an idea, and how any idea can be real and exist in whatever your sense of "exist" is. Ideas being the stuff of minds, it's hard to see how there can be such absent mind. — tim wood

To be clear, I said there is activity which is described as "the moon orbits the earth", and that this activity exists.

Anyway, I think I'm starting to understand your perspective. Would you agree that the moon does not exist, and the earth does not exist? These words signify ideas, just like "the moon orbits the earth" signifies an idea. If you can agree with this, then we might have a starting point.

I approached this point when I made the statement about judging the truth or falsity of the description of the screw and the engine. The first step was to agree that there is a thing called "the screw", and a thing called "the engine". But if you want to insist that words refer to ideas, not the things or activities associated with those ideas, as you are doing, then we must start right from the bottom.

Anyway, I think I'm starting to understand your perspective. Would you agree that the moon does not exist, and the earth does not exist? These words signify ideas, just like "the moon orbits the earth" signifies an idea. If you can agree with this, then we might have a starting point. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't question the existence of things here. The moon, the earth, screws, engines, all exist. And absolutely the moon orbits the earth, in an ordinary and non-critical sense that is both intuitive and useful. What the moon and earth actually do in terms of these descriptions is that both revolve around a common moving center as they cork-screw their way along curved geodesics in space-time - or at least I think that's the most recent and accurate description.

And that leaves two questions: is that what they do as a matter of accurate description? Probably not. Maybe close, close enough for significant calculations, but as with map and territory, all we ever have about the territory is description. And the second question, is the description essentially accurate at all in any sense? And that a topic for another day; I don't think it's ours here.

I think the ground zero of the issue here is how ideas, the claims and descriptions themselves, exist. We appear to agree that material things exist. My criterion the material itself. I'm aware yours may be a bit more nuanced. But maybe here at least, no issue.

Ideas don't have material. They certainly exist. In as much as ideas are without material, I account for them as matters of mind, created by minds, in the exact sense that no mind means no ideas. Above you ask about the existence of the moon and earth. As descriptors, as ideas, we have to answer only as ideas. But at the same time I don't question the existence of the thing called the moon or the thing called earth - back to maps and territories.

I divide in two, then, things and ideas. Material and products of mind. You either divide into more than two, or one of your two is quite different from mine. and this the extra- or non-mind existence of ideas. Or, if I get it right, a) ideas have independent non-material existence, and b) you don't need a mind to have ideas.

One of your arguments seems based in utility. And no doubt; I don't question the utility of ideas - but that's not our question. So it's your account of this existence I wait for.

In passing: you note what appears to be the existence of non-material, non-idea things like relations, forces(?), intentions, purposes, and the like. I think if you look closely enough at them, you will see that they're all ideas, all usefulness granted, but, I think you will agree, utility not itself constitutive of separate and independent existence.

And our difference is categorical, thus not to be resolved through non-rigorous use of language, not through equivocation, ambiguity, amphiboly. Not to be resolved through any claim of mere belief. Ours to test whether something is or is not, and belief itself no standing nor merit in such a discussion.



,,,

What the moon and earth actually do in terms of these descriptions is that both revolve around a common moving center as they cork-screw their way along curved geodesics in space-time - or at least I think that's the most recent and accurate description. — tim wood

What are you saying now, that both things and their relations exist independently of the ideas which represent them? If you agree that both the moon and the earth exist independently of ideas, how can you deny that their intertwined activities also exist independently. And therefore their relationsare independent

I divide in two, then, things and ideas. Material and products of mind. You either divide into more than two, or one of your two is quite different from mine. and this the extra- or non-mind existence of ideas. Or, if I get it right, a) ideas have independent non-material existence, and b) you don't need a mind to have ideas. — tim wood

How can you continue to refuse to acknowledge the third category, the relations between things? This is what we observe as the interactions between things. So, we need three categories, things, the relations between things, and ideas. If we deny the validity of this category, "the relations between things", then how could there be any truth to what the moon and earth are doing with each other in their interactions? If this is only ideas, then one description is just as true as the other. The description of the sun going around the earth every day is just as true as the description of the earth spinning on its axis, because it's all just ideas, and there's no real relationship which we are trying to truthfully describe.

In passing: you note what appears to be the existence of non-material, non-idea things like relations, forces(?), intentions, purposes, and the like. I think if you look closely enough at them, you will see that they're all ideas, all usefulness granted, but, I think you will agree, utility not itself constitutive of separate and independent existence. — tim wood

No, as explained above, they cannot be "all ideas", or else there would be no truth or falsity about what the earth and moon are doing with each other, and what the earth and sun are doing with each other. Your perspective is known as Protagorean relativity. Your ideas about what these things are doing are no more true than mine, even though they are completely different, because there is no truth, it's just ideas, yours mine, or whoever.

How can you continue to refuse to acknowledge the third category, the relations between things? This is what we observe as the interactions between things. So, we need three categories, things, the relations between things, and ideas. If we deny the validity of this category, "the relations between things", then how could there be any truth to what the moon and earth are doing with each other in their interactions? — Metaphysician Undercover

"This is what we observe.., and if we deny the validity..., then how can there be any truth ...? So then it would appear that for you, what you "observe" and that comports what with what you think is the case, so that it agrees with your criteria for truth, must be right and true and exist.

Is that accurate?

"This is what we observe.., and if we deny the validity..., then how can there be any truth ...?So then it would appear that for you, what you "observe" and that comports what what you think is the case, so that it agrees with your criteria for truth, must be right and true and exist.

Is that accurate? — tim wood

Sorry, I don't understand what you're asking.

Sorry, I don't understand what you're asking. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you need help with English, get some.

The questions here are, then, what is purpose (in itself), where does it come from, what is its ground? Or, what exactly gives it all meaning, makes it all worthwhile? . . . .
My own answer, briefly, is that the lights come on when mind is. No mind no world. — tim wood

I'm a latecomer to this thread. But I just read an article in Scientific American magazine, that discusses "an infant's aha! moment" when they realize they can influence the world. The authors ran experiments with babies to see "when the lights come on", as you put it. The point (purpose) of the investigation was to learn "about the origins of agency". They concluded that "the birth of agency is a dynamic, self-organizing process". Humans are not born with fully developed minds. At first, we are at the mercy of The World, but eventually we can become causal Actors in the non-self world.

Which seems to imply that the desire for control of the outside world is an inborn motivation --- want or need for food, warmth, novelty, etc --- that later emerges as a sense of agency early in development of the body and brain. At first, the baby moves its limbs randomly, without any focused purpose. But eventually, the child discovers that some of those movements can cause changes in the environment. In the experiment, a string tied to the baby's toe and attached to a crib-toy, would, seemingly accidentally, cause the toy to move. At first, the baby does not make the "connection" between her own wiggling and the surprising interesting waving of the toy. But, after the aha! moment of insight --- I did that --- "spontaneous movements become purposeful action". "As our model proposes, the experience of agency emerges only when an organism . . . senses it is coupled to its environment". Yet, in order to become a causal agent, one must learn to differentiate Self from World.

My interpretation of this psychological experiment is that Purpose begins as a Feeling of Desire, that is enhanced by the feeling of Power over the environment (agency). Then, eventually that vague feeling becomes transformed into a verbal concept : if I do this, then the result will satisfy my desire for (fill-in the blank). So, Purpose is both the Desire and the Reason for Doing. But, is that desire directed by an internal agency (self-caused), or merely one link in a long chain of causes & effects? Most people, post infancy, take their own agency for granted. But ornery philosophers question everything, including the questioner.

The article notes that, "historically, the entire issue of purpose and agency in living things --- and, dare one say, 'free will' --- has been clouded in philosophical debate and controversy". Hence, the TPF thread on FreeWill and Determinism. So, we can either "take the bit in the teeth" --- as a determined agent of purpose, or just lay back and let physics take its course. Purposeful behavior is for Agents of Action, not for the wishy-washy flotsam of the world. Purpose is the feeling of being in control. And getting intended results gives meaning to the sense of Agency. :smile:

If you need help with English, get some. — tim wood

And this is the state of man.An artificial impasse. Granted, the individual this (metaphysician undercover) easily could have and perhaps should have mentioned the specific points of contention, lest it seemed every word and effort of your expression is little than that of a raving madman, something hurtful. But perhaps, instead of such a mindset, the answers to your questions are self-evident! And he is in fact challenging you to pursue such avenues of self-inquiry further.

So, let's embrace the mindset of an casual observer. He requests clarification. You seem such a request is beneath your effort as, certainly, any rational mind could make sense of what you purported? Is this correct? So, perhaps frame it differently. You seem to make a statement, that the person perceives as a question. That is to say, he derives several statements at least one begetting a question. This is a compliment. Not an insult. Should you not go from there?

All your points fair and orderly and in a reasonable world would prevail, but you clearly have not interacted with MU much. In this case, what he claims not to understand is his own words. Tell you what: here's the sequence; if like MU you find you cannot understand, then please let me know.

How can you continue to refuse to acknowledge the third category, the relations between things? This is what we observe as the interactions between things. So, we need three categories, things, the relations between things, and ideas. If we deny the validity of this category, "the relations between things", then how could there be any truth to what the moon and earth are doing with each other in their interactions?
— Metaphysician Undercover —

"This is what we observe.., and if we deny the validity..., then how can there be any truth ...?" So then it would appear that for you, what you "observe" and that comports what with what you think is the case, so that it agrees with your criteria for truth, must be right and true and exist.

Is that accurate?
— tim wood

Sorry, I don't understand what you're asking. — Metaphysician Undercover

I made an edit, a correction, from "what what," to "what with what."

No, as explained above, they cannot be "all ideas", or else there would be no truth or falsity about what the earth and moon are doing with each other, and what the earth and sun are doing with each other. Your perspective is known as Protagorean relativity. Your ideas about what these things are doing are no more true than mine, even though they are completely different, because there is no truth, it's just ideas, yours mine, or whoever.

This reminds me of the opening of G.K. Chesterton's Orthodoxy, where he talks about how "no one is more rational than the mad man." Everything is explained rationally for the person with paranoid delusions. Why did that person in the street fold his arms just then? To signal another conspirator. Why wasn't my newspaper delivered today? The conspiracy. Why am I being taken to an institution? Well that is just exactly what would happen if I truly was the rightful King of Britain and a group of people were trying to keep me from making my claim!

The solipsist who thinks they are God has a reason for everything. The paranoiac as well. The problem often isn't a lack of rationality but a surfeit, tightly packed into a very small world, an ever shrinking circle that contains, for that person, everything.

Edit: I should probably note that I didn't follow the whole interchange there, just that part.

So, Purpose is both the Desire and the Reason for Doing. But, is that desire directed by an internal agency (self-caused), or merely one link in a long chain of causes & effects? — Gnomon

Hard to see how any would not ultimately be "directed by an internal agency." And here implied a development, hierarchy, and a taxonomy of purpose, starting with the infant(ile), through to adult. But I wonder if there is a sub-taxonomy either within the adult or transcending or otherwise moving beyond adult, and what the names of those would be.

For example, for the adult there is self-interest, both with and opposed to others, and altruism extending into self-denial and sacrifice for others. The question then being whether the higher purpose is found in a balance of purposes, or in an extreme of purpose, and under what circumstances - or under any circumstances!?

Jesus Christ being an example - the example - of supreme sacrifice. But I wonder. Countless people act selflessly for others, giving their lives a little bit each day or all in a moment - and without benefit of knowing that they're also God.

I made an edit, a correction, from "what what," to "what with what." — tim wood

Good start tim. Maybe a few more acts of clarification, and I might be able to understand what you are asking.

Here's the problem. You take a couple snippets from my paragraph, present them out of context, and then draw a very strange conclusion containing three words "right" "true" and "exist". All I was talking about in that passage was "truth".

You should have simply asked, if it agrees with my criteria of truth, do I conclude that it is true, and I would have answered "yes". But "right" and "exist" are different words with different criteria, making your question appear absurd.

Which implies you understood well-enough to judge it inaccurate. But your arrow finds a target. Our contention is the existence of ideas. My view being that the universe contains material and ideas, ideas being immaterial matters/products/whatever, of minds. You holding that ideas exist absent/without mind(s) - I'm not sure what else you think is in the universe - and we both agree that ideas exist. And it appears that we each goggle at the other's absurdity.

I infer that for you truth is comportment with some set of criteria. I call that truth-according-to. And with that standard, you can, for example, represent the movement of the earth and moon on a very Euclidean piece of paper and say that the moon orbits, goes around, the earth. And that would be true-on-paper, but not really true. Thus "truth" itself a possible source of great confusion.

An axiom for me is that material things, in terms of their existence, truly exist. For you to hold - in my view - that an idea exists independently is to hold that in some sense the idea is true apart from any notion of "true-according-to." But ideas can obviously be wrong, even impossible. And that would suggest that as ideas, they cannot so exist. - Unless you separate idea from its content. Do you claim not that ideas exist, but instead idea as an "empty vessel" exists without content? A very odd thing to claim if you do.

As to relation(s), you apparently hold they exist. And we agree completely that they exist but differ completely as to how. I offer this quick distinction for convenience without claiming rigour: that you discover them and I invent them. You hold there is a relation between the earth and moon. I invite you to try even to think about what that relation might be without yourself putting into it exactly what you're trying to find in it.

That leaves your account of how and in what way ideas exist. How and in what way do they exist?

Which implies you understood well-enough to judge it inaccurate — tim wood

I apprehended it as needing clarification, not as inaccurate. Therefore I did not judge it as inaccurate, I judged it as requiring clarification. Your use of "right" and "exists" in that context didn't make sense to me. The typo, which you edited in the reproduction also contributed to the not making sense to me.

Our contention is the existence of ideas. — tim wood

No, our contention is not the existence of ideas. It is the existence of relations. Your assumption (which I take to be wrong) is that all relations are ideas. From this faulty premise, that all relations are ideas, you conclude that our contention is the existence of ideas. That is not our contention, our contention is whether there are relations which are not ideas.

I infer that for you truth is comportment with some set of criteria. I call that truth-according-to. And with that standard, you can, for example, represent the movement of the earth and moon on a very Euclidean piece of paper and say that the moon orbits, goes around, the earth. And that would be true-on-paper, but not really true. Thus "truth" itself a possible source of great confusion. — tim wood

Yes, "truth" is a source of great confusion, especially if you represent it like this, that something could be "true-on-paper, but not really true". This confuses me immensely, such that I cannot understand what you are trying to say at all, in this paragraph.

An axiom for me is that material things, in terms of their existence, truly exist. For you to hold - in my view - that an idea exists independently is to hold that in some sense the idea is true apart from any notion of "true-according-to." But ideas can obviously be wrong, even impossible. And that would suggest that as ideas, they cannot so exist. - Unless you separate idea from its content. Do you claim not that ideas exist, but instead idea as an "empty vessel" exists without content? A very odd thing to claim if you do. — tim wood

You are completely avoiding the issue with this straw man representation. You have an axiom which says 'material things truly exist'. I have an axiom which says 'the relations between material things truly exist just as much as the material things themselves truly exist. You apparently cannot understand how a relation can be anything other than an idea, so you misrepresent my axiom as 'ideas exist independently' just like material things do.

The issue is, that we cannot get to your misrepresentation (straw man) unless we accept your principle that all relations are ideas. I do not accept that principle. Therefore your claim that my belief is of independent ideas is false. My belief is of independent relations. And, I do not accept 'all relations are ideas', therefore I do not conclude, as you claim, that ideas exist independently.

I offer this quick distinction for convenience without claiming rigour: that you discover them and I invent them. — tim wood

Try this instead. I say we represent relations, with models and such. That's why I use the map/territory analogy. You say we invent relations. I say your position makes no sense, because if we actually were free to invent the relations, then these ideas (what I call models or representations, and you call inventions), could consist of absolutely anything, and one would not be more true (in the sense of corresponding with reality) than another.

I invite you to try even to think about what that relation might be without yourself putting into it exactly what you're trying to find in it. — tim wood

This is exactly the sort of question, or invitation which totally confuses me and therefore I ask for clarification. I cannot at all understand "without yourself putting into it exactly what you're trying to find in it". When we model a relation, i.e. try to describe it, we are neither trying to put something into the relation (that is an act of art, construction, manufacturing, or production). nor are we trying to find something in the relation. When we represent a relation, by describing it or modeling it, we are attempting to understand it. That is neither finding something in it, nor putting something in it.

Hard to see how any would not ultimately be "directed by an internal agency." And here implied a development, hierarchy, and a taxonomy of purpose, starting with the infant(ile), through to adult. But I wonder if there is a sub-taxonomy either within the adult or transcending or otherwise moving beyond adult, and what the names of those would be. — tim wood

Yes. Most humans seem to take their own personal agency for granted. Since they get their desired results from voluntary actions, they feel like they can control some aspects of the non-self world. But some philosophers see that what-we-call-agency might be just a continuation of physical causation that began in the Big Bang.

So, we are now dealing with a taxonomy of at least two classes of causes : Physical and Meta-physical (mental). Unless we define the Mind as a divinely endowed spiritual Soul, the emergence of metal "abilities", such as Agency, can be viewed as continuous with the universal chain of Causation. Consequently, a secular philosophical "taxonomy of purpose" could combine involuntary external physical Causation with voluntary internal meta-physical Intention, to conclude with some form of Compatibilism. In that case, what we call FreeWill might be a "sub-taxonomy" of Universal Causation, that is expressed in scientific terms as Thermodynamics (positive/negative energy). But in a philosophical sense, it might be classified as Moral Choice (good/evil consequences).

Daniel Dennett, in his book Freedom Evolves, says "Human freedom is not an illusion; it is an objective phenomenon, distinct from all other biological conditions and found in only one species - us". But other, more Libertarian thinkers, have scorned that his watered-down freedom is "not an ability worth having". However, Freewill-within-Determinism Compatibilism is compatible with my own BothAnd worldview. Does that compromise work for you? :smile:

...all relations are ideas. I do not accept that principle. — Metaphysician Undercover

So what are they? And also what are ideas?

Apparently for you ideas are independent of mind, existing without mind, and relations are not ideas. Great! Please make clear, then, what these are.

If for you axioms, or givens or hinge propositions or absolute presuppositions, please say so.

---------------------

I say your position makes no sense, because if we actually were free to invent the relations, then these ideas (what I call models or representations, and you call inventions), could consist of absolutely anything, and one would not be more true (in the sense of corresponding with reality) than another. — Metaphysician Undercover

Obviously they can and do- called theories - and on the basis of applied criteria - experiments - work or are disproved. The word for this is "science."

However, Freewill-within-Determinism Compatibilism is compatible with my own Both/And worldview. Does that compromise work for you? :smile: — Gnomon

Yes and I think it must. No doubt you had to decide whether one lump or two in your morning coffee. But I doubt you would claim that decision was made for you in, by, and during the Big Bang. Maybe better to say that the Big Bang, with a whole lot of other influences, set the stage for your opportunity to make such a decision.

So it seems to me - not being versed in the details of Determinism - that among the first things a determinist must make clear is what, exactly, it means.

I am inclined to believe that between any cause and any effect it is thought to be a cause of, is "noise" (here cleverly left undefined), the more of which reducing the connection of the cause and its effect. All this expressible more rigorously in a few several hundreds of more words, but I think you get it. Thus, Big Bang has nothing to do with your one or two lumps, but even if it did, the connection impossible to trace. Same page?

So what are they? And also what are ideas? — tim wood

The definition of "relation" I already told you, "what one thing has to do with another". The definition of "Idea" is more difficult, my OED says "a conception or plan formed by mental effort". Does that suffice for you?

I believe that if material objects exist independently of a conception formed by mental effort, then it is also the case that what one thing has to do with another (such as the interrelated activities of the earth and moon which we discussed already) also exist independently of conceptions formed by human minds.

Why is this perspective so hard for you to apprehend? Imagine the earth and moon existing independently of human conception. Would these two things not be doing anything at all? And if they are doing anything, wouldn't they be doing something with one another, as being related to one another?

So what is it that you believe? To me, it seems like you believe that the earth and moon exist independently of mental effort, but you do not believe that they are doing anything. You seem to believe that doing something requires mental effort.

Apparently for you ideas are independent of mind, existing without mind... — tim wood

Tim, are you having trouble reading? I just got though explicitly telling you the opposite of this, twice in one short post. I told you:

you misrepresent my axiom as 'ideas exist independently'

...

therefore I do not conclude, as you claim, that ideas exist independently. — Metaphysician Undercover

In between those two quotes is the explanation of why I do not believe that ideas exist independently. Please, stop the straw man representation. How many more times will I have to make this request?

Obviously they can and do- called theories - and on the basis of applied criteria - experiments - work or are disproved. The word for this is "science." — tim wood

You seem to be having difficulty understanding the difference between a relation, and the description of a relation (map and territory confusion). The theory is not the relation. The relation between the theory and the experiment is not an idea. The relation between the theory and the experiment is represented with ideas.

So it seems to me - not being versed in the details of Determinism - that among the first things a determinist must make clear is what, exactly, it means. — tim wood

I too, haven't been concerned enough to make a detailed study of the roots of philosophical Determinism, perhaps in ancient Greece. But, I assume its modern form could be traced back to the secular Enlightenment (materialism), which broke away from medieval religious Theology (spiritualism). And which usually viewed the rational human mind as evidence for a dualism of supernatural soul within a natural body. In reaction, Science -- the philosophy of the mundane world -- became a monism of Materialism.

However, if you don't view the Mind as supernatural, there's no need for a continuous chain of causation to ward-off any spiritual incursions. So, for me, the Mind is merely the natural Function*1 of the brain. In animals that function is mostly control over the body & physical world. But, in humans a new function emerged : to use imagination (metaphors ; words) to assist in control over the complex sapiens social environment. Over time, that ability to create mental models of the world, evolved into the mental function we call Reasoning (logic + math) : constructing imaginary & artificial scenarios to predict what effect our choices will have on the physical & social systems we are immersed in.

Therefore, one important function of Mind is to refine abstract ideas into purposeful, goal-oriented, intentional behavior. So Purpose is an imaginary hand, with which to reach out and control the outside world. And it "comes from" a long long chain of physical causation which has eventually undergone a phase transition into meta-physical (imaginary) power to cause changes in the world. All self-moving animals have some degree of mental intentional power, to find food & avoid danger. In some cases, the intentional behaviors affect other Minds (social animals), and in other situations (technological animals) the changes affect the physical world : as in apes cracking nuts, and the Panama Canal moving mountains story. :smile:


*1. Function : in math a function is the relation between inputs (X & Y) and outputs (Z). In mind, a function is the job or work of the coordinated neural network : what it does, what it produces : i.e. Ideas -- imaginary models of reality.
"To resolve this issue, Aristotle asks what the ergon (“function”, “task”, “work”) of a human being is, and argues that it consists in activity of the rational part of the soul in accordance with virtue "
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/

Tim, are you having trouble reading? I just got though explicitly telling you the opposite of this, twice in one short post. I told you: — Metaphysician Undercover

Here's a compromise proposal. You say relations exist as "ideas", or "expressions of ideas". I say relations exist outside of human minds. Can we agree that "ideas", or "expression of ideas" may exist outside of human minds? So, let's say that the screw has a relation to the engine, and this relation is an idea, or an expression of an idea, which is outside of all human minds. — Metaphysician Undercover

My bad, then, for being confused and not realizing it. Let's bury this, then: ideas exist, are immaterial but are mind-dependent, in that no mind, no idea. My corollary being that ideas and material things exhaust the contents of the universe. You appear to have a third category; the essence(?) of which you have yet to make clear.

Leaving relation, which all along I have taken to be an idea. But you say no, not an idea, but something immaterial existing independently of mind - not mind-dependent in the way an idea is. So far so good? A caveat, as I've said before I yield entirely on the usefulness of relations. But it's not their efficacy that is in question, but the nature and way of their existence. And as belief, axiom, or as supposition, I yield, but those also not the question. So its up to you to make clear how they exist, as non-material, non-mind-based what-evers.

And it's useful to look closely at our example, the earth and moon. They seem related to be sure. But the challenge is to make clear exactly how they are related, and then the convenient fiction yields to facts. To keep it simple, you say they're related, I say they are not, on two causes, 1) that relations are ideas and things don't have ideas, and 2) the "relationship" of earth and moon is a convenient fiction and artifact of ideas, and that the two have actually nothing to do with each other.