Morphic Resonance — Rich

Yeah. No need to pay any more attention to Rich.

If you were a micro-organism-sized intelligence that lived in the water in the cup, it might be 'the ocean', — Wayfarer

That is really a 'thought-experiment' type of point, intended to show that what we apprehend to be an unambiguously real object - 'the cup' - is also dependent on our cognitive faculties. It's a Kantian point that you also find in Buddhist philosophy, which denies that 'cups' have objectively real essence, while at the same time agreeing that they can be used to drink tea from.

The fact that you call it 'a cup' and that it performs that function is dependent on human designation, perception and convention. If you were a micro-organism-sized intelligence that lived in the water in the cup, it might be 'the ocean', as far as you're concerned. You imagine the cup 'being there', in the cupboard, when nobody's around looking at it, but that's still an image, an imaginary act, constituted by your human mind, which classifies objects according to their shape, function and so on and situates them in the imaginary 'empty space'. There is no intrinsic cup apart from that. — Wayfarer

I hate to butt in on a comment not directed at me, especially a comment not directly related to the reincarnation subject, but this one hit me. I, pretty much a realist-monist of sorts, agree with this assessment. Sans language that seems to render common definition that this semi-persistent state of not-really-particles makes up what we both agree is a cup, the designation has no existence.
It is idealism to a point, but one that cannot lead to solipsism.

This seems not a QM thing where consciousness is collapsing the complex wave function into cup. But a few million years ago, there was no Jupiter, there was not even particles. That Jupiter only exists now.
Somebody posted in my one thread that to exist is to be named. I brushed that off at first, but it has been working its way in all this time.

which denies that 'cups' have objectively real essence, while at the same time agreeing that they can be used to drink tea from. — Wayfarer

And again in Wittgenstein's rejection of both idealism and realism.

No problem. I'm recording all of these concepts for inquisitive philosophies who are curious about new and exciting ideas that nourish their curiosity. Sheldrake is absolutely brilliant.

http://www.sheldrake.org/reactions/tedx-whitechapel-the-banned-talk

Somebody posted in my one thread that to exist is to be named. — noAxioms

Partially in agreement. Something is out there. It is real. But it is the mind that experiences it as a form. What I am experiencing may be different than what someone else is experiencing, but via the learning and sharing process we agree on certain attributes, and agree to call it Jupiter.

With no one experiencing it, there is still something real out there, but it unknown what it is.

And again in Wittgenstein's rejection of both idealism and realism. — Banno

Precisely the reason analytical philosophy became a wasteland.

With no one experiencing it, there is still something real out there, but it unknown what it is. — Rich

I went on a different direction, not basing existence on epistemology. The existing thing corresponding to "Jupiter" seems to be the naive realist thing that is the object of language, whether I know what it really is or not. But the thing-in-itself that we suppose corresponds to that name seems in fact not to have the sort of observer-independent existence we imagine. There is not still something real out there.
This is a strange turn in views that I have been recently exploring. I by no means assert any of this, and it probably runs into conflicts at some point, meaning it needs work.

This seems not a QM thing where consciousness is collapsing the complex wave function into cup. But a few million years ago, there was no Jupiter, there was not even particles. That Jupiter only exists now.
Somebody posted in my one thread that to exist is to be named. I brushed that off at first, but it has been working its way in all this time. — noAxioms

It's a very subtle and complicated argument. My take on it is: there is an irreducibly subjective pole, aspect or element to reality. That is, there is no 'ultimate object' which exists 'independently' of all perception - which is pretty well what has been shown by quantum mechanics, it is the deep philosophical issue at the bottom of the whole 'observer problem'. People will go to amazing lengths to avoid this conclusion, including the 'Everett speculation'.

I really have no more time today, off for the weekend to stay in hotel with wife, she will not take kindly to me talking to my 'invisible friends', so, back much later.

(Y) Interesting comment.

People will go to amazing lengths to avoid this conclusion, including the 'Everett speculation'. — Wayfarer

Well I'm one of those, since the interpretation does away with so many problematic things only at the cost of a thing-in-itself corresponding to 'me', which isn't much of a price to a non-religious sort that I am. That which I perceive as 'me', the thing for whose benefit I draw breath, seems to be just a carrot on a stick leading me on fit paths. Yea, I still follow the carrot, but at least I'm not suckered into buying an insurance policy for it.

You have asserted this once or twice before, and each time I point out that rather, it has become ubiquitous. So widespread that perhaps you do not recognise it.

Mind you, very few in these amateur fora have a grasp of the critical tools involved.

That is, there is no 'ultimate object' which exists 'independently' of all perception - which is pretty well what has been shown by quantum mechanics, — Wayfarer

But that's just not the case. It is a metaphysical presumption made by one small group of physicists and not generally accepted.

That there is entanglement and no separation is experimentally observed as large as molecules. Entanglement had recently been verified over very long distances. Independence of observer and observed does not exist in quantum experiments. In fact, it has been demonstrated that observation affects the path of quanta in laboratory experiments.

Physicists and philosophers have been modifying their interpretations based upon the constant steam of new experimental results. Only a very tiny, tiny, tiny minority are still clinging to the 16th century materialistic view of the universe.

Here's the thing. I do not disagree that there is such a thing as entanglement, nor that making an observation can affect the path of an electron.

What I am denying is the elicit conclusion that this quantum mechanical stuff shows that "there is no 'ultimate object' which exists 'independently' of all perception".

But, to confuse you a bit more, I'll add that I agree that there is no "ultimate" object, and deny that this means that there are no objects.

What I am denying is the elicit conclusion that this quantum mechanical stuff shows that "there is no 'ultimate object' which exists 'independently' of all perception".

But, to confuse you a bit more, I'll add that I agree that there is no "ultimate" object, and deny that this means that there are no objects. — Banno

Quantum physics itself is silent on what is being observed. Bohm's re-working of the classical Schrodinger equation, providing equivalent results (albeit more difficult to use) suggests that quanta is real and causal and probabilistic.

Using the realism of Bohm's equations we can avoid the many-many-many (onto infinity) worlds interpretation but are forced to accept non-locality (which Bohm named the quantum potential). Non-locality was a big show-stopper 50 years ago, but post-Bell it had been experimentally observed in one experiment after another in starts as large as molecules and and far away as satellite distances (the recent Chinese experiment).

So where does that leave us. Utilizing Bohm's and Bell's extraordinary accomplishments we can suggest a metaphysics that claims everything out there is real, entangled, and without boundaries. Each of us experience it via our very real mind/consciousness. However, how we experience it is internal and can only be known to the individual.

Via sharing experiences we learn to call similar things with the same name. This is done by consensus. However, calling something by the same name does not mean that internally we are experiencing the same thing. There is no way to share actual memory (though some twins claim they can).

Hence, that mind is integral in formation of the experience does not mean that there is nothing real out there. It is just that the actual form (e.g. the rotating teacup) must necessarily involve the mind, because that is the only way to access it, and in the process modifying it. Everything is entangled. This is the huge change introduced by quantum theory. Entanglement and non-locality. This had to be fully digested by any metaphysical model.

Thanks, Rich. I was worried we would not be able to proceed.

Utilizing Bohm's and Bell's extraordinary accomplishments we can suggest a metaphysics that claims everything out there is real, entangled, and without boundaries. Each of us experience it via our very real mind/consciousness. — Rich

So we agree to ignore the many-worlds interpretation. We will for now set aside the other interpretations. Our difference is that between the Copenhagen and the von Neumann. That is, is it the consciousness of the experimenter that collapses the wave function?

It comes down to wether the wave collapses when it makes a difference, or when consciousness intervenes.

Now I am happy to admit that at this stage we do not know which interpretation is correct. But it is important to note that the von Neumann interpretation is far form the most widely accepted.

What I object to is the use of the von Neumann interpretation as a justification for dualism. There is a circularity in using the von Neumann account to justify a belief in dualism, when the preference for the von Neumann account is based not on empirical evidence, but on a preference for dualism. One ought admit that one is accepting the von Neumann interpretation because one has a preference for dualism, not because it has better empirical support.

The speculations of physicist are just that: speculations.

However, how we experience it is internal and can only be known to the individual. — Rich

This leads us to the notion of a private language, which has been thoroughly, and I think successfully criticised. Nor does this follow form what was said before.

THe thread on social construction might be the best place to continue this part of the discussion.

Our difference is that between the Copenhagen and the von Neumann. That is, is it the consciousness of the experimenter that collapses the wave function? — Banno

I am actually using the De Broglie/Bohm equations where there is no collapse. Everything is real. The election might be considered a perturbation if the quantum potential wave, thus avoiding all issues associated with the Copenhagen collapse.

Hence, we have a real world out there that is being sensed by a real observer. The new element, a necessary and crucial aspect of quantum theory, is that there is absolutely no way to separate the observer from what is being observed, and that the observation itself changes something. The internal experience necessarily is different than what is out there and different for each observer.

Everything is real but different. Communication of experiences creates consensus.

De Broglie/Bohm equations where there is no collapse — Rich

So you want to use pilot-wave theory?

It was initially referred to as pilot-wave. Subsequently descriptions changed. De Broglie referred to the "particle" as a wave perturbation. Bohm, because of his new equations, introduced the controversial (now experimentally observed due to Bell's work), quantum potential which acted instantaneously at a distance (explaining the Wheeler delayed double slit experiment).

Bohm-Hiley went in to develop a metaphysics that they called the Implicate Order that can be considered holographic in nature with consciousness embedded in the Implicate Order.

The beauty of Bohm's approach is that everything is real and it also predicted noon-locality which was subsequently experimently observed. Quite a feat.

Then surely you are a monist?

Since this label can mean so many different things, suffice to say that I fundamentally subscribe to Bergson's point of view within its necessary limits. His philosophy very much conforms to quantum theory (as described in an essay by De Broglie) and holography though his works predated the discovery of both by several decades.

If at core a holographic explanation accounts for both conciseness and "real" objects, and all there really is, is holograms of some sort... that's holographic monism.

If everything reduces to one thing, then it doesn't matter what we call it. Physical, holographic, green cheese or whatever. It all reduces to the same thing, and it would be meaningless to call it some distinct particular thing from experience, unless we're simply using that one thing as the only true thing, and using it to discredit everything but it. It's to give this one particular aspect, or object of experience a sacred place among the others, like it's the window into the real, whereas everything else muddies the water by being less like it.

I think that that's a less than useful way to look at the world.

But that (that there is no 'ultimate object') just not the case. It is a metaphysical presumption made by one small group of physicists and not generally accepted. — Banno

Not at all! The idea of there being an ultimate point-particle, the indivisible atom, was indubitably undermined by the discoveries of quantum mechanics. 'Atom' as you know literally means 'uncuttable' or 'indivisible'; metaphysically, 'the atom' was the 'uncreated' in the sense of being the unchangeable substratum of changeable phenomena. That was always the basis of philosophical materialism. And it was that that got torpedoed by uncertainty and non-locality.

So the man in the street might colloquially accept that 'everything is made of atoms' and in some sense, that is true - but not in any ultimate sense. We now know that most of what we're made out of was churned out of exploding stars ('we are stardust' ~ Joni Mitchell). So what is the 'uncaused cause' now that the 'indivisible particle' is no more? Not claiming to have an answer to that, just to acknowledge that it's still a question.

The fact that you call it 'a cup' and that it performs that function is dependent on human designation, perception and convention. If you were a micro-organism-sized intelligence that lived in the water in the cup, it might be 'the ocean', as far as you're concerned. You imagine the cup 'being there', in the cupboard, when nobody's around looking at it, but that's still an image, an imaginary act, constituted by your human mind, which classifies objects according to their shape, function and so on and situates them in the imaginary 'empty space'. There is no intrinsic cup apart from that.
— Wayfarer

Sure.

What are the microbes swimming in? The cup. They see an ocean, we see a cup, but we are talking about the very same thing.

So we can conclude that there is a something that is an ocean to the microbes and a cup to us.

What is not justified is the conclusion that there is neither an ocean nor a cup. — Banno

That's not what is at issue. The assertion that 'nothing is real' is nihilism pure and simple. You general attitude seems to be realism. There are alternatives to both. But in your case, it always seems to end up with 'the cup really is in the cupboard.'

I honestly can't see any sense in which the cup is not in the cupboard. And I am completely familiar with all the idealist and anti-realist arguments; appeals to QM and so on. I even used to subscribe to them; but now I believe that they are really, at worst, incoherent, and at best, beside the point.

I don't get it. Why postulate that such idealism is popular/prevalent/undeniable among academics, when that's just not the case?

Source: https://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl
^{(Here skepticism should perhaps be read as parsimonious skepticism, albeit not radical.)}

In an ontological sense, such idealism will have it that the Moon is not actually the Moon, but rather is Moon-experiences. There may be all kinds of chatter about the Moon as if it's real, but, on idealism, I'm led to understand that experiencing the Moon cannot be separated from the experiencer (even in principle), such chatting is like a kind of pretense (maybe even hypostatization), or just linguistic practice perhaps. So there's no mind-independent Moon as such, it's dissipated according to this inquiry, rather it's relata among the experience (e.g. qualia, phenomenological) and the experiencer (the self). All I (the self) can ever know is the experience, and so that's where the road ends, more or less literally. The Moon = those Moon-experiences.

It's been discussed plenty, and remains sort of strangely artificial. OK, maybe "artificial" isn't the right word, but you catch my drift. Sure is self-elevating. I'm not omniscient, since otherwise I'd know that I were. I don't have to experience someone else's self-awareness to take it's independent existence for granted; I don't have to become the Moon to take it's independent existence for granted; I learn of both much the same way, by interaction, observation, whatever.

I'm aware of Hameroff's Orch-OR. Wave-function collapse does not take consciousness. But of course mind is also part of the world per se, whatever exactly it all may be. As mentioned, hijacking quantumatics for idealism is not philosophy, neither scientific.


Is “information is physical” contentful? (Scott Aaronson, Jul 2017)
Seven wonders of the quantum world (Michael Brooks, New Scientist)

No one is hijacking quantum physics. The only hijacking that was done was when science hijacked the human mind and memory and stuffed in in something called Natural. There is nothing natural in quantum. It has vanished. There is something that is referred to as the observer and there is no getting rid of it. It is totally entangled in the experiment.