So you are saying that the world is deterministic, even though our models will never demonstrate that? — Ludwig V

World being deterministic or not is a metaphysical question. If reality is actually a multiverse where the worlds are constantly changing, how would we know that from the determinist Block universe? And any way, how we model reality is the essential question.

You can assume that the World is deterministic, but that doesn't limit your free choice. You have that because it's simply impossible to model everything even if the World is deterministic. There are simply limitations on just what you can model from the deterministic World. And that's my point.

We cannot logical deduce or find out answers to metaphysical questions. If we could, they wouldn't be metaphysical.

Yes. Physics doesn't have the conceptual apparatus to describe or even acknowledge choices. Ordinary life requires a whole different way of thinking. — Ludwig V

Mmmh...how is it then with quantum physics and the use of probabilities.

But generally this is so: we use totally different models in economics or other social sciences. Even biology isn't so simple as Newtonian physics.

Why is that? — Patterner

Because you cannot do something you won't do or cannot do.

Whether I chose to write a comment or not, it is a decision. — Patterner

Yes. And obviously there exist then other decisions that you didn't make when you made a certain decision. A lot of others, actually.

If, in principle, something with the perceptions and intellect to understand how all those physical events interacting translates to decisions and actions, and can forecast what response I would type, why would it not be able to forecast that I would choose to not respond? — Patterner

Because there's the interaction! (If there would be NO interaction, if that something not part of this world, it could do it. At least the determinist would think so.)

Just think about it: if this something with the perceptions and intellect to understand everything would now write here what you @Patterner will say, how could it get it right? Because before you write you next comment you would read it, think about and comment on it. You usually do comment on what others write, you know. You have the ability to use the forecast itself and it isn't surely in control of you.

If you give any forecast m, which should correctly model what is going to happen, you cannot give the correct forecast when the correct model would be ¬m. That's the reason negative self-reference limits modelling the future.

I'm basically asking the same thing again. Does ordinary life require a whole different way of thinking in the same sense that we need to think of large numbers of air molecules as thermodynamics, because we simply can't perceive such a gargantuan number, much less calculate all the interactions that will take place between all of them within the space they occupy? — Patterner

In my view, definitely.

For classic physics you have objectivity and clarity, assuming you have enough accurate data. In other realms you have subjectivity and things like learning, which makes everything far more different. Also reductionism goes only so far. If I remember correctly, Zygmunt Bauman said that the difference between the social sciences and natural sciences is that the social sciences themselves are a subjective. (Meaning that what social sciences think the human society operates has an effect on how humans view the human society.)

This means that extreme reductionism usually falls flat. So you can make a diagram like below, but don't think you can skip some levels and explain everything from physics.

So one could argue that free will (or interaction) is a limit to making models, extrapolation or forecasting, but it doesn't refute determinism. — ssu

No, I think that our limits to modelling, extrapolation and forecasting do not show anything about free or constrained choices, because actions are a different category or language-game from events. For a start, they are explained by references to purposes and values, which have no place in theories of physics, etc. BTW, I think that the concept of free will is hopelessly loaded with metaphysical assumptions, and it would be much better to talk about freedom, free choices or free actions.

Determinism is not absolute. So, why assume human choices are forbidden by the gapless Chain of Cause & Effect? — Gnomon

Any events that are not determined by cause and effect are indeterminate. Freedom (or at least the philosophical version of it) is a language-game distinct from physics, etc.

Personally, I don't think human Life, or Culture, is incompatible with scientific explanation. — Gnomon

Nor do I. On the contrary, I think that scientific explanation is a part of human life of culture.

Does ordinary life require a whole different way of thinking in the same sense that we need to think of large numbers of air molecules as thermodynamics, because we simply can't perceive such a gargantuan number, much less calculate all the interactions that will take place between all of them within the space they occupy? — Patterner

I don't know about "in the same sense", because the cases are very different. But along the same lines, yes.

Is everything in this reality deterministic, — Patterner

I don't think that the idea that everything in this reality is deterministic is an empirical hypothesis. It is a completely different kind of proposition. Think of it as a research programme that defines what questions can be asked about phenomena and when they have been answered. Does that help?

But the necessity for Observer choices --- in experimental set-up, and interpretation of evidence --- resulted in "a whole different way of thinking". — Gnomon

H'm. I probably don't know enough to evaluate that. But I would have thought that observer choices in setting up experiments and interpreting evidence have always played an essential role in science. Though it is true that scientists have mostly assumed that it is possible to observe phenomena without affecting them, and that only becomes inescapably false at the sub-atomic level.

We cannot logical deduce or find out answers to metaphysical questions. If we could, they wouldn't be metaphysical. — ssu

I like that. Can we stop talking about it now?

Determinism is not absolute. So, why assume human choices are forbidden by the gapless Chain of Cause & Effect? — Gnomon
Any events that are not determined by cause and effect are indeterminate. Freedom (or at least the philosophical version of it) is a language-game distinct from physics, etc. — Ludwig V

Yes. I was using physical indeterminacy as a parallel analogy to the philosophical question of Freedom vs Determinism. Do you consider philosophy to be an ideal "language game" of no importance in the "real" world?

Classical Physical Determinism (cause & effect) implied that only one course of events is possible*1. But Quantum Physics is uncertain and indeterminate at the fundamental level, allowing more than one path from Cause to Effect. Some scientists inferred that the mind of the scientist could play the role of a Cause in the experiment.

Do you see any philosophical implications of that well-known fact? Indeterminacy is a mathematical concept ; whereas Freedom is a human feeling, derived from lack of obstacles to Willpower*2. Do you see any relationship between physical freedom (mathematical value) and mental freedom*3 (metaphysical value)? :smile:


*1. Quantum indeterminacy is the assertion that the state of a system does not determine a unique collection of values for all its measurable properties.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_indeterminacy

*2. Indeterminacy, in philosophy, can refer both to common scientific and mathematical concepts of uncertainty and their implications and to another kind of indeterminacy deriving from the nature of definition or meaning. It is related to deconstructionism and to Nietzsche's criticism of the Kantian noumenon. ___Wikipedia

*3. Quantum Consciousness :
New research indicates that consciousness may rely on quantum mechanics. Perhaps the brain does not operate in a "classical" way.
https://bigthink.com/hard-science/brain-consciousness-quantum-entanglement/

But the necessity for Observer choices --- in experimental set-up, and interpretation of evidence --- resulted in "a whole different way of thinking". — Gnomon
H'm. I probably don't know enough to evaluate that. But I would have thought that observer choices in setting up experiments and interpreting evidence have always played an essential role in science. Though it is true that scientists have mostly assumed that it is possible to observe phenomena without affecting them, and that only becomes inescapably false at the sub-atomic level. — Ludwig V

Yes. But, at the macro level, the minuscule "observer effect"*1 could be ignored. Only after scientists began probing into the microscopic level of physics did the Observer play a significant role in the outcome of an experiment.

Although the Double-Slit Effect is well-attested, its philosophical & metaphysical implications are still debatable. Some think the Cause of the effect is physical nudging, while others infer that Conscious probing can affect entanglement. No need for us to untangle that conundrum here. We can still draw analogies from physics to metaphysics. :smile:


*1. The observer effect is the fact that observing a situation or phenomenon necessarily changes it. Observer effects are especially prominent in physics where observation and uncertainty are fundamental aspects of modern quantum mechanics.
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8423983

Do you consider philosophy to be an ideal "language game" of no importance in the "real" world? — Gnomon

That's a difficult question to answer. Language-games are not well-defined entities. They are mostly useful as heuristics the "battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our language." Some of those bewitchments are very important. How effective philosophy is in neutralizing them is hard to discern. I don't justify philosophy any more than I justify science or art. All of them are worthwhile for their own sake, though one always hopes to be fighting on the side of the angels.

I was using physical indeterminacy as a parallel analogy to the philosophical question of Freedom vs Determinism. — Gnomon

Do you see any relationship between physical freedom (mathematical value) and mental freedom*3 (metaphysical value)? :smile: — Gnomon

Not really. I think that freedom is contextually defined, except where it is inapplicable. In each context, one needs to understand what counts as a constraint or compulsion, and that can be different.
If determinism is true, freedom and constraint or compulsion are inapplicable, at least in physics and similar sciences. On the other hand, there are ordinary language uses of "free" that do give a sense to saying that insensate objects are free or constrained, but philosophy seems unwilling to recognize them.
I try not to mention metaphysics, since I don't know what it means. :smile:

Some scientists inferred that the mind of the scientist could play the role of a Cause in the experiment. — Gnomon

Well, if you are really desperate, it's worth considering. I'm surprised the parapsychologists haven't got in there years ago. It's really a wild west out there.

Indeterminacy is a mathematical concept ; whereas Freedom is a human feeling, derived from lack of obstacles to Willpower*2. — Gnomon

If indeterminacy is a mathematical concept, then so is determinism. At last, we'll get an answer. Oh, wait, mathematicians don't agree about anything, either.
Being able to do what you want to do is not a bad definition of freedom. But then, are those choices necessarily free? It seems that sometimes they are not, so it's not enough. There's something about needing to be in good physical and mental health, living in a healthy society if one is to be free.
Willpower is very problematic concept for me; it is metaphysically loaded and poorly defined, even though there are ordinary language uses that are unobjectionable. It is awkward that if someone is trying very hard to achieve something, we say that they are determined to do it.

Perhaps the brain does not operate in a "classical" way. — Gnomon

Now there's something to agree with, so long as it isn't taken to have metaphysical implications.

I think there is a real problem about understanding how physics relates to human action, and the blanket free or determined is very unhelpful. At this stage and for our purposes, it is the detailed analysis of cases that will help us most.

BTW, I think that the concept of free will is hopelessly loaded with metaphysical assumptions, and it would be much better to talk about freedom, free choices or free actions. — Ludwig V

This is a good point. Free will is quite a loaded term, especially when you juxtapose free will with determinism. I think that's one of the problems here.

And when you just talk about limitations to modelling and forecasting, the debate can avoid drifting to metaphysical questions.

And when you just talk about limitations to modelling and forecasting, the debate can avoid drifting to metaphysical questions. — ssu

Well, I prefer it because it is so much easier to understand what is being said. But people seem to believe in it, and I can't work out why. The encyclopedias are not much help.

This is a good point. Free will is quite a loaded term, especially when you juxtapose free will with determinism. I think that's one of the problems here. — ssu

Quite so. But nobody seems to be interested in teasing out the complexities. It's all Freedom (capital F) and never free (attention to context and cases.) What are the differences between addiction and preference? Can people who do something in a temper plead provocation? Can a sincerely held, but completely unjustified, belief excuse a crime? (I thought the person I killed was an alien invader). And so on. Endless real questions.

Just think about it: if this something with the perceptions and intellect to understand everything would now write here what you Patterner will say, how could it get it right? Because before you write you next comment you would read it, think about and comment on it. — ssu

I think I am finally understanding you. :grin: I don't know if you changed your wording in such a way that I finally caught on, or if I was just too dense to figure it out until now. The latter is certainly a good possibility, and I don't want to embarrass myself by going back and looking at what you were saying before.

Without ever trying it, you and I are smart enough to see the problem that will arise if the thing with the perceptions and intellect to understand everything [Maybe we can just call it Laplace's Demon (LD)?] declares what my next post will be. I don't see any reason to think LD would not also see the problem. It would, in fact, have perfect knowledge of what my response would be. And it would be unable to state that ahead of time without changing what I would have said. On and on and on.

That doesn't invalidate the idea of determinism. Requiring LD to announce the forecast, and an endless chain of revised forecasts, is just setting up an impossible condition. LD wouldn't announce the forecast ahead of time. But it would know, if everything I think and do is the result of determinism. Maybe it could write it down, only to reveal it after I made my post.

There is a science fiction book called ]I]Thrice Upon a Time[/i], by James Hogan. A scientist puts his friend in front of a computer. A small piece of paper prints out. The scientist looks at it, but does not show his friend. Then the scientist tells his friend to type six characters on the computer and hit enter. After the friend does that, the scientist shows him the print out from a minute earlier. It matches what the friend just typed. The scientist found a way to send that amount of information back in time one minute. So what was printed out a minute before it was typed. At that point, of course, the friend tried to outsmart the machine. After the scientist gets a print out, the friends typed nothing. And the scientist revealed a blank printout from 60 seconds earlier. And then the friend tries to double-fake the machine, and on and on.

Is everything in this reality deterministic,
— Patterner
I don't think that the idea that everything in this reality is deterministic is an empirical hypothesis. It is a completely different kind of proposition. — Ludwig V

Is it not the proposition of this thread? Some think it is, some think it isn't. Not to say we can prove it one way or thre other. If we could, there wouldn't still be new threads about it.

I think I am finally understanding you. :grin: I don't know if you changed your wording in such a way that I finally caught on, or if I was just too dense to figure it out until now. — Patterner

That's great! :blush: Yet in actuality, this is quite hard, especially to understand the link to the undecidability results in mathematics. The link to a more general consequences what this means (what I know) has been made first by just one mathematician David Wolpert at the start of this Century (actually). At least in Wikipedia in the text about Laplace's Demon in arguments against it in "Cantor Diagonalization" it's cited. But it's not yet something in the logic textbooks and hence people don't know about it.

Without ever trying it, you and I are smart enough to see the problem that will arise if the thing with the perceptions and intellect to understand everything [Maybe we can just call it Laplace's Demon (LD)?] declares what my next post will be. I don't see any reason to think LD would not also see the problem. — Patterner

Well, assuming LD would have quite an awesome knowledge base, it could give a year-long lecture about everything we have thought wrong about science. And likely many people would simply not get what it would try to explain to us. And just how many would be devastated when LD told us all the limitations of science and would refute any hopes of further advances! Poor LD with that perfect knowledge of science, a real party stopper.

It would, in fact, have perfect knowledge of what my response would be. And it would be unable to state that ahead of time without changing what I would have said. On and on and on. — Patterner

Exactly. You got it perfectly. It's a logical limitation on modelling or forecasting.

That doesn't invalidate the idea of determinism. Requiring LD to announce the forecast, and an endless chain of revised forecasts, is just setting up an impossible condition. LD wouldn't announce the forecast ahead of time. But it would know, if everything I think and do is the result of determinism. Maybe it could write it down, only to reveal it after I made my post. — Patterner

Yet notice that it's not anymore interacting. LD is then more of a historians ultimate event checker. But the issue of course is settled when LD doesn't interact with the World it's forecasting. But this naturally wasn't at all what Laplace had in mind. We are part of the universe ...and so are our models too.

There is a science fiction book called ]I]Thrice Upon a Time[/i], by James Hogan. A scientist puts his friend in front of a computer. A small piece of paper prints out. The scientist looks at it, but does not show his friend. Then the scientist tells his friend to type six characters on the computer and hit enter. After the friend does that, the scientist shows him the print out from a minute earlier. It matches what the friend just typed. The scientist found a way to send that amount of information back in time one minute. — Patterner

Sending information back in time, well, that's one way to say it ...but it's basically the LD argument. And the situation you earlier wrote (with the LD writing it down, but not showing to you).

And here you see the obvious difference: there is no negative self reference loop. The friend doesn't know the information. As I've not read the book, I think the friend doesn't then say to the scientist "Why don't you do it yourself? Are you going obey and write what the paper says you to, or can you write something else?". How the writer would continue on, would be interesting...

Quite so. But nobody seems to be interested in teasing out the complexities. — Ludwig V

Hopefully this discussion thread (and PF in general) makes the exception. :smirk:

Yet notice that it's not anymore interacting. LD is then more of a historians ultimate event checker. But the issue of course is settled when LD doesn't interact with the World it's forecasting. But this naturally wasn't at all what Laplace had in mind. We are part of the universe ...and so are our models too. — ssu

But a thing with the perceptions and intellect to understand everything, whether or not it interacted with anything, is not a necessary part of an entirely deterministic reality. The fact that there isn't such a thing (someone recently told me why there could not be such a thing on another thread, although I never suspected there was) does not have any bearing on whether or not everything, including everything about us, is deterministic.

And here you see the obvious difference: there is no negative self reference loop. The friend doesn't know the information. As I've not read the book, I think the friend doesn't then say to the scientist "Why don't you do it yourself? Are you going obey and write what the paper says you to, or can you write something else?". How the writer would continue on, would be interesting... — ssu

Well, naturally, the scientist tested it himself at first. I don't remember all the specifics of the conversation (it's been decades. But I have the paperback, so I'll check.), but I can't imagine he did not try to trick it.

But a thing with the perceptions and intellect to understand everything, whether or not it interacted with anything, is not a necessary part of an entirely deterministic reality. — Patterner

If assumed that LD has God-like abilities, that's a different issue. The basic idea didn't start from the entity have other abilities except perfect knowledge of the laws of nature and perfect knowledge of the data about everything. Nowhere is it hinted that LD is in control of everything, the idea is really that the LD can perfectly extrapolate from current data and knowledge what the future will be.

Well, naturally, the scientist tested it himself at first. I don't remember all the specifics of the conversation (it's been decades. But I have the paperback, so I'll check.), but I can't imagine he did not try to trick it. — Patterner

How does that go? The computer prints the paper first, then the person writes what should be in the paper, that was printed earlier. At least that's how you described it. Fine if it's the friend who doesn't know what is on the paper. But here if the scientist himself reads the paper, then writes, you do have the illogical causality where LD got it's name. Because if the printed paper then defines what the scientist does, he's not anymore in command of himself and lacks that free will: he has to write or do what the paper tells him. That's why basically LD is said to be a D (unlike Laplace himself). Yet seeing some piece of paper usually doesn't somehow control scientists, hence it cannot be. Just as nobody cannot write here what you are going to write (or @Ludwig V will write in his future posts) before you have written it.

You might check it, if you find the book.

Here's what in 2014 Josef Rukavicka wrote in The American Mathematical Monthly Volume 121, 2014 Issue 6, which goes total the same lines as we have discussed:

Rejection of Laplace’s Demon

In the 19th century, Laplace claimed that it might be possible to predict the future under the condition that the positions and speeds of all items in the universe at a certain moment were known [3]. The entity that is able to make such a prediction is often called Laplace’s demon. This topic has been extensively discussed and investigated (see, for example, Hawking’s lecture [1]).

Recently, Wolpert [4] defined ”inference devices” and proved several theorems associated with them. One of the consequences of the theorems is that he disproved any possible existence of Laplace’s demon. The proof he used is based on Cantor’s diagonal argument. In this note, we present a much simpler proof using the Halting problem of a Turing machine [2]. Recall that the Halting problem can be stated as follows, ”Given the description of a Turing machine with some input string, in general, we cannot determine (predict) whether that Turing machine will halt. ”

We claim that if it is impossible to predict whether a Turing machine will halt, then it is impossible to predict the future. In other words, if we claim that we can predict the future, then we must be able to predict whether a Turing machine will halt. This result can be easily presented without any reference to Turing machines, or even to mathematics at all. Suppose that there is a device that can predict the future. Ask that device what you will do in the evening. Without loss of generality, consider that there are only two options: (1) watch TV or (2) listen to the radio. After the device gives a response, for example, (1) watch TV, you instead listen to the radio on purpose. The device would, therefore, be wrong. No matter what the devicesays, we are free to choose the other option. This implies that Laplace’s demon cannot exist.

It's the same thing we have been talking about here, and here's the catch:

I think it's too easy, too obvious when you stated as above (once people get it), and people don't understand how important the whole issue is. People will go just: "Huh? Well, Laplace's ancient history, anyway". The fact that this really is important in math doesn't come up. Or hasn't yet as do note that the timeline here: Wolpert made his papers 2000-2008 and Ruckavicka stated the simplified version in 2014.

Why I'm so obsessed about this (one could argue)?

The limitation is essential part of logic, yet it's not understood as to be so. And I think it actually defines a part of mathematics that hasn't been accurately describe: the non-computable. How does mathematics even have a field that is non-computable and the link of the non-computable to objectivity and subjectivity isn't made clear either.

If assumed that LD has God-like abilities, that's a different issue. The basic idea didn't start from the entity have other abilities except perfect knowledge of the laws of nature and perfect knowledge of the data about everything. Nowhere is it hinted that LD is in control of everything, the idea is really that the LD can perfectly extrapolate from current data and knowledge what the future will be. — ssu

Yes, that is my understanding of LD.

Here's what in 2014 Josef Ruckavicka wrote in The American Mathematical Monthly Volume 121, 2014 Issue 6, which goes total the same lines as we have discussed: — ssu

Unfortunately, I would have to pay $61 to read that. And that is nothing close to a guarantee I would understand it.

No matter what the device says, we are free to choose the other option. — Ruckavicka above

Yes. That's why we could only ever conclude from the LD that prediction is not control and though the D may be said to determine, at least sometimes, in the sense of "discover", it cannot be said to determine in the sense of "control".

The effects of feedback of predictions on future action is very well known in economics, isn't it? Though perhaps it is the self-fulfilling prophecy that is more to be feared. That said, I do think that feedback loops in general are very important in understand how the body works, so they will contribute substantially to our understanding how we are able to do what we want - without being incompatible with determinism. That's the only way to go, in my opinion.

The limitation is essential part of logic, yet it's not understood as to be so. — ssu

I'm not quite sure what you mean. But I think that the important logical part of this is that the future is unlike the past in the sense that a prediction is not really true or false, but fulfilled or not. Compare G. Ryle "Dilemmas" Lecture II 'It Was To Be'. But I'm not aware that it has been discussed in the context of the symmetry of past and future in science.

I copied the abstract above (so hopefully the magazine won't sue me :yikes:). So, it's basically what we were talking about. If you look at how Turing made the argument in his Turings Machine, you would notice that it's also similar to this. And of course, Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem's are even more difficult.

The effects of feedback of predictions on future action is very well known in economics, isn't it? — Ludwig V

Actually as I've studied economics in the university in the 1990's, at least it wasn't so back then. Economics just tries to use dynamical models which don't blow up. Yes, speculative bubbles, self enforcing expectations, Keynesian Beauty Contests are known, but their use is the problem! The math isn't there to use. Economics tries to use mathematical models. And, well, I think you can guess the problem lies (as we have been talking about a limitation on mathematic modelling).

(Sorry, I misspelled the name, it was Rukavicka.)

I'm not quite sure what you mean. — Ludwig V

The limitation on the modelling isn't generally known, although some discussion about it has been said.

Take for example economics: in the 1930's two later-to-become Nobel economists had a debate in an American economic journal where the other pointed out this basic problem in forecasting (if forecast itself effects the future). The other one simply attempted to refute this by stating there simply has to be a correct model, because there is an outcome. He just stated that perhaps in the future we will know how to do this model. Well, this didn't actually answer the question, but economics simply attends those kind of events where forecasting can work (mathematically).

And secondly, the result here isn't generally accepted or public knowledge. Just look at the references, videos or writings about LD. The usual idea is that since we have quantum physics, LD isn't happening because the physics isn't all Newtonian. But that's it.

I try not to mention metaphysics, since I don't know what it means. . . . .
Now there's something to agree with, so long as it isn't taken to have metaphysical implications. — Ludwig V

I've enjoyed discussing the old Freedom vs Determinism question with you. But if you are going to place Metaphysics*1 off-limits in a philosophical forum, my arguments will be nullified, because the whole point is to explore the "metaphysical implications" of physical observations.

From my personal perspective, Philosophy is not Physics, but Meta-physics*2 --- in the scientific Aristotelian sense, not the religious Scholastic sense. Philosophy is about Ideas, not real things. And Freedom is an Idea, that can't be placed under a microscope, but under the penetrating eye of Reason. If you don't like the medieval connotations of the term "metaphysics", let's just call it "Philosophy". :smile:

*1. Aristotle. …metaphysics: he calls it “first philosophy” and defines it as the discipline that studies “being as being.”
https://www.britannica.com/topic/first-philosophy

*2. Meta-physics :
The branch of philosophy that examines the nature of reality, including the relationship between mind and matter, substance and attribute, fact and value.
1. Often dismissed by materialists as idle speculation on topics not amenable to empirical proof.
2. Aristotle divided his treatise on science into two parts. The world as-known-via-the-senses was labeled “physics” - what we call "Science" today. And the world as-known-by-the-mind, by reason, was labeled “metaphysics” - what we now call "Philosophy" .
3. Plato called the unseen world that hides behind the physical façade: “Ideal” as opposed to Real. For him, Ideal “forms” (concepts) were prior-to the Real “substance” (matter).
4. Physics refers to the things we perceive with the eye of the body. Meta-physics refers to the things we conceive with the eye of the mind. Meta-physics includes the properties, and qualities, and functions that make a thing what it is. Matter is just the clay from which a thing is made. Meta-physics is the design (form, purpose); physics is the product (shape, action). The act of creation brings an ideal design into actual existence. The design concept is the “formal” cause of the thing designed.
5. I use a hyphen in the spelling to indicate that I am not talking about Ghosts and Magic, but about Ontology (science of being).
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page14.html

And, well, I think you can guess the problem lies (as we have been talking about a limitation on mathematic modelling). — ssu

And secondly, the result here isn't generally accepted or public knowledge. Just look at the references, videos or writings about LD. The usual idea is that since we have quantum physics, LD isn't happening because the physics isn't all Newtonian. But that's it. — ssu

Well, perhaps I'm ahead of the curve, for a change.

let's just call it "Philosophy". — Gnomon

I'll buy that. I'm sure we can get along and maybe occasionally agree to disagree. Most topics in philosophy seem to have only contested definitions, so there's nothing new here.

I'll buy that. I'm sure we can get along and maybe occasionally agree to disagree. Most topics in philosophy seem to have only contested definitions, so there's nothing new here. — Ludwig V

This is a philosophy forum, not a Communist Re-education Camp. So of course we are free to disagree. But, I suspect that we are not that far apart on the topic of this thread. So, once more into the breach . . .

The traditional arguments against human Freewill were typically based on the assumption that the whole world, from Big Bang onward, is a linear deterministic physical system. But 20th & 21st century physics has cast doubt on that 17th century Classical assumption. LaPlace's Demon may have been a prescient insight about that presumption ; he described inevitable gapless Demonic Determinism as supernatural instead of natural. Modern physics has found a limited role for non-linear Chaos*1 --- butterfly effect --- within natural systems, that might conceivably have allowed freethinking humans to evolve from dumb robotic apes.

Even skeptical Daniel Dennett claims to be a compatibilist*2, in his book Freedom Evolves. So, that's all my linear-Determinism-vs-non-linear-Freedom analogy is proposing. The rest is up to the individual, to decide if her willpower is capable of imagining and implementing un-predetermined novelties within the physical (phenomenal) and metaphysical (noumenal) realms of reality. For example, is it possible that a long-standing human metaphysical desire/will for a short-cut from Atlantic to Pacific oceans could have a physical causal effect on the geology of Panama --- not moving mountains by faith, as suggested by Jesus, but moving mountains by dynamite, as implemented by French & American engineers.

Anyway, all I'm suggesting is that FreeWill is not incompatible with the mathematics of natural processes, as sometimes argued. Instead, physics has instances of both boring linear and surprising non-linear changes over time. With that in mind, what is your positive or negative "definition" of Freedom within Determinism? Yea or Nay? :smile:



*1. Does Chaos Theory Allow For FreeWill?
“The two things are not directly connected. We certainly have free will (the ability to make decisions that are ours), and chaos theory certainly works for complex physical systems, so the two must be compatible.
The brain/mind, however, is the kind of complex system that chaos theory describes, so how we perceive ourselves is predicated on the kind of systemic consistency and specific unpredictability which chaos theory helps describe.”
https://www.quora.com/Does-chaos-theory-allow-for-free-will


*2. Determinism-Freedom Compatibilism :
“Dennett's stance on free will is compatibilism with an evolutionary twist – the view that, although in the strict physical sense our actions might be determined, we can still be free in all the ways that matter, because of the abilities we evolved. “
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_Evolves

The traditional arguments against human Freewill were typically based on the assumption that the whole world, from Big Bang onward, is a linear deterministic physical system. — Gnomon

That's true only because of quantum indeterminacy. So, instead of strict determinism from big bang to present, there's numerous instance of probabilistic determinism along the way. It remains to be seen if quantum indeterminacy plays a role in mental processes (some think it does), but if so- it would only seem to add a random element to the otherwise fully deterministic processes, which doesn't make it more free (in a libertarian free will sense).

That's true only because of quantum indeterminacy. So, instead of strict determinism from big bang to present, there's numerous instance of probabilistic determinism along the way. It remains to be seen if quantum indeterminacy plays a role in mental processes (some think it does), but if so- it would only seem to add a random element to the otherwise fully deterministic processes, which doesn't make it more free (in a libertarian free will sense). — Relativist

Yes. That's why I'm only advocating FreeWill in a Compatibilist sense. Humans obviously don't have god-like magical freedom to do anything they want. But they are also not constrained from exercising a few degrees of freedom from absolute locked-in Determinism. If I choose to reach-out and pick-up a cup of coffee, I don't have to stop and think whether this choice was allowed by the all-powerful Big Bang roll-of-the-dice 14 billion earth-years ago. I just do it. My freedom is not an illusion, if the cup actually rises to meet my mouth.

Physical actions are indeed constrained by the limiting laws of physics. But meta-physical (mental) choices are not subject to physical laws --- perhaps only the laws of Logic. So, our few degrees of freedom lie in the gray transition zone between Physics (matter) and Meta-physics (mind). You could say that Quantum Physics forced us to acknowledge that nothing in the world is absolute. It's governed, not by certainty, but by probability. Instead, the statistical nature of Nature, randomness, adds an element of uncertainty to any action.

Unfortunately, Las Vegas gamblers imagine that the odds favor the clever or lucky, instead of the house, holding all the cards. That's what a compatibilist would call "pushing your luck". :joke:


The statistical nature of Nature :
A deterministic model is a mathematical model in which the output is determined only by the specified values of the input data and the initial conditions. This means that a given set of input data will always generate the same output.
A statistical model is a mathematical model in which some or all of the input data have some randomness, for example as expressed by a probability distribution, so that for a given set of input data the output is not reproducible but is described by a probability distribution. . . . Statistical models can be run by using Monte Carlo simulation.
https://www.sv-europe.com/blog/what-is-the-difference-between-the-various-types-of-statistical-models/

Physical actions are indeed constrained by the limiting laws of physics. But meta-physical (mental) choices are not subject to physical laws --- perhaps only the laws of Logic. — Gnomon

Are you assuming reductive materialism is false? Otherwise, I don't see how you get any freedom from physical laws. There is only an illusion of freedom.

Physical actions are indeed constrained by the limiting laws of physics. But meta-physical (mental) choices are not subject to physical laws --- perhaps only the laws of Logic. — Gnomon

One has to be careful about language here. What we can do is obviously constrained by our physical limitations. But what we can do is also enabled by our physical capabilities. The physical both constrains and enables what we do.
When I choose my sushi from what's on offer or a book from the shelf, is that a physical action, a mental action or a metaphysical action? (What's a metaphysical action?)
When you say that my mental choices are not subject to physical laws, you are using language that is at home and perfectly clear when we are talking about the law of the land. What it means when we are talking about physical laws is not at all clear. What would it be like to be not subject to physical laws? I don't think that any of the many non-conformist phenomema that have been identified, both in classical physics and in quantum physics, take us any nearer to understanding human action. Freedom of the gaps is no more helpful than God of the gaps was.

In a way, I would agree with you; human actions and choices are a distinct category from events taking place among inanimate objects, and perhaps that's what you mean when you say they are metaphysical. I think it is clearer to say that they and physical events are embedded in a distinct language games. The law of the land operates as part of the language-game of human actions; it doesn't operate at all in the language-game of physical events and their causes. If we speak of law it is a distinct kind of law, almost a metaphor, derived from the idea that God makes (and presumably enforces) the laws of nature. I don't think we need that idea any more; certainly, part of the point of the 17th century was to abandon that resource in natural science; making room for the new theories absolutely required that.

That's why I'm only advocating FreeWill in a Compatibilist sense. — Gnomon

I think we cannot get away with just saying that human freedom and laws of nature apply to different categories/language games. They obviously interact, and it is that interaction that we have to understand.

There is only an illusion of freedom. — Relativist

That's an interesting half-way house. But can deterministic theories explain how there can be an illusion of freedom?

Here's a good interview where David Wolpert goes through his reasoning why Laplace's Demon cannot make his forecasts (starting at 4:16)... among other things closely related and others not so. The name given to the talk below is misleading and can lead to misunderstandings as this isn't at all a religious discussion.

When I choose my sushi from what's on offer or a book from the shelf, is that a physical action, a mental action or a metaphysical action? (What's a metaphysical action?) — Ludwig V

Here's my opinion.

Decision-making is a mental process, but mental processing is fundamentally a physical process of the central nervous system.

Under a physicalist metaphysics: metaphysical = physical; although when we account for mental activity, we don't do so at the microscopic level of particle behavior. It's somewhat analogous to a hurricane: we track them as functional entities, not as the activities of water and air molecules.

Mental states are functional entities, like hurricanes. They cause other mental states. We analyze them at the functional level.

Here's my opinion.

Decision-making is a mental process, but mental processing is fundamentally a physical process of the central nervous system. — Relativist

Well, everything is basically a physical process in the physical universe. At least in one metaphysical World view.

In fact then when @Gnomon's idea is viewed as an ontological idea, that "Physical actions are indeed constrained by the limiting laws of physics. But meta-physical (mental) choices are not subject to physical laws --- perhaps only the laws of Logic", it can be argued that he is making the argument that there's something else than the physical. But has there to be a separation?

Above all, do we have to fall into the pit of metaphysical discussions that we have no way of solving (and hence no way to climb out from)? There's no ladder there to reason your way out from the pit.

It's false to draw conclusions from a materialist World view that then free will or making decisions doesn't happen / is meaningless. @Ludwig V has to choose the sushi he wants to eat and he really has to make that decision. Metaphysical questions of what reality really is, don't give an answer to this and deterministic world models are quite useless models to use in this place. That in 200 years we are all dead and @Ludwig V behaved exactly the way as he did when next to sushi table is useless information when our friend has to choose what sushi he eats. And similarly the question just where the decision process happened, or was the @Ludwig V at the sushi table -event predetermined right from the Bing Bang is useless. And neither will it be useful if we go with @Gnomon's idea that there's a mental choice for Ludwig to do, which is different from the physical reality.

We use models about reality to get answers to certain questions. Many times, those models aren't declarations of our views on ontological questions. Yet often the models are interpreted as how we think what reality actually is. The difference between reality and a certain model of reality (that answers certain questions about it) is blurred.

We use models about reality to get answers to certain questions. Many times, those models aren't declarations of our views on ontological questions. Yet often the models are interpreted as how we think what reality actually is. The difference between reality and a certain model of reality (that answers certain questions about it) is blurred. — ssu

I don't quite understand this. I could understand if you were talking about hypotheses. The journey from hypothesis (possibility) to theory (proven) is a long and tortuous one - blurred, if you like. But a model doesn't have a similar journey - unless there is a way in which a hypothesis can be a model or vice versa. Is that your point?

Above all, do we have to fall into the pit of metaphysical discussions that we have no way of solving (and hence no way to climb out from)? There's no ladder there to reason your way out from the pit. — ssu

That's how I feel about it. But people keep using the word.

It's false to draw conclusions from a materialist World view that then free will or making decisions doesn't happen / is meaningless. — ssu

Are you saying that any theory that is incompatible with freedom (free will) is false on that ground alone? That's a good start. But many people speak as if determinism was true and we have to bear the consequences, yet seem to believe that determinism is an empirical claim. Even when there's empirical evidence against it, they don't give up on it. I think it has to be classified along with hinge and grammatical propositions, perhaps as a research programme.

Metaphysical questions of what reality really is, don't give an answer to this and deterministic world models are quite useless models to use in this place. — ssu

There are ways of determining what is real and what is not. Those ways differ depending on the kind of thing you are talking about, but they exist. Asking what's Real, as if there could be a single-non-context-dependent answer, is the metaphysical way and goes nowhere.

There is only an illusion of freedom. — Relativist

What material evidence do you have to support your belief that personal choice is illusory?