Determinism is an unprovable metaphysical belief, just as FreeWill is. So I freely choose to believe that when I drive my car I am in command, not the laws of nature or sparking neurons. — Gnomon

Many would say then that you believe in Free Will. But anyway, I agree on the unprovability of these metaphysical beliefs. The thing is that what we can rigorously prove is quite limited. However if and when we make models about reality, why not use them?

In my view both are very useful concepts. I will argue that you can have determinism and free will. Free will is a great concept to use as it easy describing various events and phenomena extremely well. Yet so is determinism too. What we have is logical limitations in understanding a deterministic reality, making predictions about it or calculating what will happen. Additionally people tend to overemphasize in the reductionist the basis, as if on a "lower" level (physics, quantum theory, quarks etc) are more important and profound than other subjects.

In my view both are very useful concepts. I will argue that you can have determinism and free will. Free will is a great concept to use as it easy describing various events and phenomena extremely well. Yet so is determinism too. — ssu

I agree with this. But there are some questions.
A popular way of having both is to argue that they are compatible. There's been a lot of discussion of that possibility, but I haven't seen anything that really resolves the differences between them. There's either freedom in the gaps or reduction of freedom to causality. Or have I missed something?
Another way of having both is simply to treat them say that they are different concepts (language-games), not in competition with each other. That would support the pragmatism that you seem to be suggesting, at the price of giving up on the question of truth.

I truly don't understand how you can say the things you are saying. It occurs to me that we're miscommunicating. Thinking we're talking about things the same way, when we're not. So let me try this. This is an equivalent of our conversation, as far as I can tell.

R: "We are circles, but we are squares."

P: "Something that is a circle cannot also be a square. They are mutually exclusive. How can that be possible?"

R: "It is possible. The circle can have four 90° corners, and four equal sides."

P: "You have given different wording for a square, but you have not explained how it is possible for a circle to be a square."

R: "But if it is true, then circles can be squares."

P: "But what reason do we have to think it is possible?"


And now substitute our topic.


R: "We are the product of physical interactions, which are determined entirety by the laws of physics, and none of our choices could ever have been, or ever will be, other than exactly what they were, or will be. But we have agency."

P: "Something that is entirely governed by physical determinism cannot have agency. They are mutually exclusive. How could that be possible?"

R: "It is possible. We are governed by physical determinism, but we are autonomous."

P: "You have given different wording for 'agency,' but you have not explained how it is possible for something ruled by physical determinism to have it."

R: "But if it is true, then we can be ruled by determinism, yet make independent choices."

P: "But what reason do we have to think it is possible?"


Am I not understanding something you are saying? Or are we defining our terms differently?

There's been a lot of discussion of that possibility, but I haven't seen anything that really resolves the differences between them. — Ludwig V

I think it would be productive for this thread if either you or anyone gives the most compelling case just why they cannot be both at the same time. Even if one doesn't personally agree with the argument.

There's either freedom in the gaps or reduction of freedom to causality. — Ludwig V

Can you be more specific what this means?

R: "We are the product of physical interactions, which are determined entirety by the laws of physics, and none of our choices could ever have been, or ever will be, other than exactly what they were, or will be. But we have agency."

P: "Something that is entirely governed by physical determinism cannot have agency. They are mutually exclusive. How could that be possible?"

R: "It is possible. We are governed by physical determinism, but we are autonomous."

P: "You have given different wording for 'agency,' but you have not explained how it is possible for something ruled by physical determinism to have it."

R: "But if it is true, then we can be ruled by determinism, yet make independent choices."

P: "But what reason do we have to think it is possible?" — Patterner

Fair summary. You believe agency and physicalism are mutually exclusive. I don't agree.

Here's a high level explanation of why I think it's possible:
1. compatibilism is consistent with agency.
2. Physicalism is consistent with compatibilism
3. Therefore physicalism is consistent with agency.

Thanks for the link to Bishop's review. Bishop's most salient point is that physicalism is inconstent with libertarian free will (LFW) because of Jaegwon Kim's causal closure argument.

FWIW, I earlier acknowledged that Tse was not successful at accounting for LFW, but that I think he IS successful at accounting for mental causation. Bishop picks a few nits with the language Tse uses, but he doesn't really undercut Tse's model of criterial causation (=mental causation). Mental causation is sufficient grounding for compatibilism.

In my view both are very useful concepts. I will argue that you can have determinism and free will. Free will is a great concept to use as it easy describing various events and phenomena extremely well. Yet so is determinism too. What we have is logical limitations in understanding a deterministic reality, making predictions about it or calculating what will happen. — ssu

I agree with your Both/And conclusion. My latest BothAnd Blog post is on the topic of Synchrony*1. The author of the 2003 book SYNCH, Steven Strogatz, says "These, then, are the defining features of chaos : erratic, seemingly random behavior in an otherwise deterministic system ; predictability in the short run, because of deterministic laws ; and unpredictability in the long run, because of the butterfly effect*2." The physical universe is an almost infinite system of malleable Matter and deterministic Thermodynamic laws that is also chaotic at the core, but with pockets of sublime order, such as our own blue planet. which defies the destiny of Entropy with emergent Life & Mind.
,
The "logical limitations" can be observed in physical Phase Transitions, where a stable organization of molecules can suddenly transform from one structural state (water) to another (ice), but scientists can't follow the steps in between. Another logical difficulty is with the non-linear mathematics of Creative Chaos*3 as opposed to the linear math of stable Organized systems. Strogatz says, "In a linear system, the whole is exactly equal to the sum of its parts". He doesn't use the taboo term, but what he's talking about is Holism.

Reductive Science looks for predictable linear systems, but has difficulty with non-linear effects, such as the emergence of a metaphysical willful Mind from a network of physical neurons. That may be why some posters on this forum have difficulty seeing the Mental forest for the Neural trees. The human mind is a holistic effect of neural cells that cooperate and inter-communicate to produce a state of mind that is sometimes unpredictable and willful. Holism doesn't break physical laws, but it does bend them into novel directions.

Long story short : our world is both linearly Deterministic and spontaneously Creative. :smile:


*1. Synchrony :
Emergence, as a natural phenomenon, is controversial, since it has implications for the evolution of Life from inanimate Matter, and of Consciousness from Gray Matter. For some thinkers, the discontinuous appearance of Life from Non-life, seems to defy the laws of gradual evolution.
http://bothandblog8.enformationism.info/page21.html

*2. Butterfly Effect :
In chaos theory, the butterfly effect is the sensitive dependence on initial conditions in which a small change in one state of a deterministic nonlinear system can result in large differences in a later state.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Butterfly_effect

*3. Creative Chaos Theory :
Scientists once believed that events or occurrences in nature were predictable or able to be mathematically calculated and predicted. Then along came chaos theory, proposing that many events are, in fact, chaotic—having no order or predictability, occurring in a completely random way. But more recently, even the most chaotic occurrences have been found to contain pattern and order,
https://www.secondwindonline.com/creative-chaos-theory?journal=239

↪Gnomon
Thanks for the link to Bishop's review. Bishop's most salient point is that physicalism is inconstent with libertarian free will (LFW) because of Jaegwon Kim's causal closure argument. — Relativist

Yes. Causal Closure (Determinism) was a simplifying assumption of 17th century physics. But 20th century physics has complicated the math with non-linear Chaos, and causal Uncertainty at the physical roots of reality. :smile:

I think it would be productive for this thread if either you or anyone gives the most compelling case just why they cannot be both at the same time. Even if one doesn't personally agree with the argument. — ssu

Thanks for the invitation. I can try. But as long as people think that the search for free will is the search for an uncaused cause or a search for indeterminacy, I doubt that anyone will be interested.

The basics, which I confess I though were universally known are that actions performed by people require for their explanation purposes, values and reasons. Values cannot be recognized in standard scientific determinism, because of the fact/value distinction. Purposes require orientation to a future state, which clearly cannot be the cause of action (in the standard sense of cause). Reasons are easily confused with causes, but they justify actions by linking the aim, purpose, ambition, goal or target of action to what is to be done (this is sometimes referred to as the practical syllogism) which is a form of explanation that has no role in causal determinism.

All of this is at least over-simplified and is possibly wrong. But unless this agenda is discussed, we cannot even articulate the difference between what people do and what happens in the inanimate world, never mind decide whether one is compatible with the other.

Forgive me if I've seem short-tempered, but I've been looking for a chance to put this on the table for a long time.

The "logical limitations" can be observed in physical Phase Transitions, where a stable organization of molecules can suddenly transform from one structural state (water) to another (ice), but scientists can't follow the steps in between. — Gnomon

The logical limitations start from what we can calculate and prove. What you are describing is more physical limitations that we notice in our empirical tests.

The logical part here is of course when a measurement effects what is being measured. This is something that isn't at all trivial. And then there's things that you simply cannot model in a laboratory.

The basics, which I confess I though were universally known are that actions performed by people require for their explanation purposes, values and reasons. Values cannot be recognized in standard scientific determinism, because of the fact/value distinction. — Ludwig V

I'm not so sure about this in a time when algorithms rule our lives and data mining and big data is extremely popular.

Reasons are easily confused with causes, but they justify actions by linking the aim, purpose, ambition, goal or target of action to what is to be done (this is sometimes referred to as the practical syllogism) which is a form of explanation that has no role in causal determinism. — Ludwig V

Well I can easily confuse reason with causes.

In fact, when doing a quick search on the definitions of reason and cause, I got:

reason: a cause, explanation, or justification for an action or event.

cause: a reason for an action or condition : motive, something that brings about an effect or a result, a person or thing that is the occasion of an action or state

When you say that practical syllogism has no role in causal determinism, I think you mean that self-cause is something that causal determinists avoid. But this is a bit of chicken and an egg: the causal determinist will simply say that a person, thanks to his thinking, reasoning and experience came to this conclusion because of the current situation that was can be traced to the past occurences, which can be then traced back to, well, the Big Bang. That there's a practical syllogism there doesn't in my view make the determined determinist change his or her dogma.

The "logical limitations" can be observed in physical Phase Transitions, where a stable organization of molecules can suddenly transform from one structural state (water) to another (ice), but scientists can't follow the steps in between. — Gnomon

The logical limitations start from what we can calculate and prove. What you are describing is more physical limitations that we notice in our empirical tests.

The logical part here is of course when a measurement effects what is being measured. This is something that isn't at all trivial. And then there's things that you simply cannot model in a laboratory. — ssu

The "Logical Limitation" I referred to is both a measurement problem and a modeling problem. And the Logic in both cases is Mathematical (1+2+X=?), not necessarily physical*1. The physics happens, presumably according to the rules of physics and logic. But the steps between phases are hidden in a fog of Chaos. :smile:


*1. Phase Transition in a Chaotic System :
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1140/epjs/s11734-021-00415-3

But this is a bit of chicken and an egg: the causal determinist will simply say that a person, thanks to his thinking, reasoning and experience came to this conclusion because of the current situation that was can be traced to the past occurences, which can be then traced back to, well, the Big Bang. — ssu

In fact, when doing a quick search on the definitions of reason and cause, I got:
reason: a cause, explanation, or justification for an action or event.
cause: a reason for an action or condition : motive, something that brings about an effect or a result, a person or thing that is the occasion of an action or state — ssu

Yes, that's a classic example of what dictionaries can do, otherwise known as a circular definition. I believe it is somewhat frowned upon in philosophical circles. Fortunately, we are free to disagree with a dictionary, even if we have to be a bit cautious about it. It doesn't make it easier to articulate what's going on here.

There is a truth here. It is perfectly possible to apply the concepts (language-game) of persons to inanimate objects, and we are very familiar with partial cases - animals (anthopomorphization) - and even applications to inanimate objects (polytheistic gods, personification). It is also perfectly possible - even helpful - to apply the concepts (language-fame) of inanimate objects - machines - to persons and partial persons. So the radical move of applying both language-games simultaneously to everything is just pushing those tendencies to the extreme - and much philosophy depends on tactics like that. (Hume called it "augmentation".)

But I really don't think that my "thinking, reasoning and experience " is particularly amenable to the scientific method (methods, approach). Certainly, much philosophy has derived from those difficulties. Sweeping them all away with a few key-strokes is not an appealing solution.

That's the best I can do for now.

Yes, that's a classic example of what dictionaries can do, otherwise known as a circular definition. I believe it is somewhat frowned upon in philosophical circles. Fortunately, we are free to disagree with a dictionary, even if we have to be a bit cautious about it. It doesn't make it easier to articulate what's going on here. — Ludwig V

Expecting more of a dictionary would be a mistake. A dictionary is limited to describing words with other words - there's inevitable circularity to it. There's something of a Munchausen Trilemma involved in writing a book full of words describing other words.

But I really don't think that my "thinking, reasoning and experience " is particularly amenable to the scientific method (methods, approach). — Ludwig V

Thinking and reasoning itself actually isn't so much about using the scientific method. The scientific method is really just a bigger method: it's about how you try to experiment or prove your thinking/hypothesis. Of course sometimes people can be in the happy situation that while studying something else or doing an experiment, they just stumble something they have no clue what it is and where it came from. That's then notice to try to figure what it is, or have you simply made an error.

Now if you go (not meaning @Ludwig V himself) too far with applying the scientific method, the you can hold a bit extreme views of scientism. Usually comes from that the person doesn't understand that other fields do use logic too.

Expecting more of a dictionary would be a mistake. A dictionary is limited to describing words with other words - there's inevitable circularity to it. There's something of a Munchausen Trilemma involved in writing a book full of words describing other words. — flannel jesus

You are quite right. But it's not often that I come across such egregious examples.
.

Now you go too far with applying the scientific method and hold a bit extreme views of scientism, but this usually comes from that the person doesn't understand that other fields do use logic too. — ssu

Dear, oh, dear. I thought it was the causal determinist who was guilty of scientism. I'm more than happy to insist that the methods (and concepts) of science do not apply when thinking about thinking. It's not really a strictly a question of logic, but of a more general conception of rationality. Or, put it another way, of a different kind of syllogism (though it was also invented by Aristotle) known as the practical syllogism.

Dear, oh, dear. I thought it was the causal determinist who was guilty of scientism. — Ludwig V

No no no! Sorry, I wrote badly. I didn't mean you, I meant in general "Now if you go" referring to people who go for scientism. And I'll change it to be more readable! :yikes:

No no no! Sorry, I wrote badly. I didn't mean you, I meant in general "Now if you go" referring to people who go for scientism. And I'll change it to be more readable! — ssu

There was no need to do that. It was my misinterpretation of you. But I appreciate the gesture.

There's been a lot of discussion of that possibility, but I haven't seen anything that really resolves the differences between them.
— Ludwig V
I think it would be productive for this thread if either you or anyone gives the most compelling case just why they cannot be both at the same time. Even if one doesn't personally agree with the argument. — ssu

I see it the other way around. If choices are made because of the physical interactions of all the constituent parts of the brain (whether considered at the level of particles, atoms, molecules, cells, neurons, brain areas, or whatever), due to the properties and laws of physics, and no choice could ever have been/be other than it was/will be, then what is the definition of Free Will that allows for choices to be made freely? Free from what? Other than our awareness of the whole thing, which a boulder lacks, in what way is a path taken for such causes by a person who comes to an intersection different from a path taken by a boulder rolling down a mountain?

I see it the other way around. If choices are made because of the physical interactions of all the constituent parts of the brain (whether considered at the level of particles, atoms, molecules, cells, neurons, brain areas, or whatever), due to the properties and laws of physics, and no choice could ever have been/be other than it was/will be, then what is the definition of Free Will that allows for choices to be made freely? Free from what? Other than our awareness of the whole thing, which a boulder lacks, in what way is a path taken for such causes by a person who comes to an intersection different from a path taken by a boulder rolling down a mountain? — Patterner

.
Umm... you answered the question yourself: our awareness of the whole thing. That's it.

Easiest way is simply compare yourself to a computer.

Ask a computer to do something else that isn't in it's program. As a computer just computes. calculates, follows orders and as such, it cannot do this. "Do something else" is a total impossibility, that you can only divert by programming to the computer what to do when asked that. However, the problem doesn't go away. Now before someone argues that we too can't know what our "meta-program" controlling our judgement is, let's think of it another way:

Ask yourself, if you have ever learned something.

If @Patterner of 2024 thinks even a bit differently than the @Patterner that was half of the age as now in 2024. So in the later half of your life, have you have learnt and do differently now, or anything that you think about differently? As the answer is extremely likely yes, then let's go forward.

Now because there was the younger you of the past, who thought or acted at least slightly differently than now, obviously your thinking has changed. You can describe this and tell it, you understand it, you totally can think about these kind of things that have changed subtly along the way. And this is the crucial part: If you are asked "Do something else", you can think what you have done earlier and then really do something else that you haven't done. You can even innovate, do really something that hasn't been there before in your mind. And here it's absolutely no coincidence that this subjective decision making and subjectivity itself poses such a problem, for instance why in neuro-science we have in the hard problem of consciousness. You just said awareness, but it could be described too by consciousness.

Does this refute determinism? Nope. But for entities that are conscious and sentient, free will is a really great model to use!

Free from what? Other than our awareness of the whole thing, which a boulder lacks, in what way is a path taken for such causes by a person who comes to an intersection different from a path taken by a boulder rolling down a mountain? — Patterner

Umm... you answered the question yourself: our awareness of the whole thing. That's it. — ssu

For the sake of argument, if one imagines a human mind as a "decision-making machine", then the freedom of the will is "free to act on the desires and decisions of that machine", in particular as opposed to "forced to act on the desires and decisions of other machines.

For the sake of argument, if one imagines a human mind as a "decision-making machine", then the freedom of the will is "free to act on the desires and decisions of that machine", in particular as opposed to "forced to act on the desires and decisions of other machines. — flannel jesus

Yes, but in order to be "free to act on the desires and decisions of that machine", which is yourself, you have to have the awareness that you are making a choice / decision. Awareness, consciousness, subjectivity are essential to understand free will.

I think it would be productive for this thread if either you or anyone gives the most compelling case just why they cannot be both at the same time. Even if one doesn't personally agree with the argument. — ssu

We started this discussion because you said:-

In my view both are very useful concepts. I will argue that you can have determinism and free will. — ssu

I think I may have interpreted this in a way different from you. It's complicated. You can't play both language-games at the same time, any more than you can play chess and draughts ("checkers" in the USA, I think) at the same time. The tricky bit is that, while there is no problem about playing both those games on the same board, there does seem to be a problem about playing both language games in the same world. Moreover, while I would like to say that it is just a question of how you consider or articulate the phenomena, I don't think it is as simple as that. So I think there is scope and need to see if some bridges might not be built. But we might need to revise the rules of both games.

It would be reasonable to think that one cannot have one's cake and eat it, but here are some possibilities:-
Here's one possibility. Follow this link to Rubin's vase. It is both a picture of two profiles and of a vase, depending on how you look at it. Because there is definitely just one "it" that you are looking at, there is also a third possibility, that "it" is neither, though it is arguably a picture, even if one cannot say, in the normal way, what it is a picture of. Wittgenstein features this issue, but it was a big topic in the early 20th century in psychology.
Here's another, simpler, possibility. The same events can be a meteorological event, a humanitarian disaster, an economic set-back at the same time.
This is about analogies. None of them is true, all of them are suggestive.

The first point to get one's head around is that it is sometimes very helpful to think of a person as a machine. That doesn't mean they are a (simply) machine. (Nor does it mean that the solar system is a machine). The second point to get one's head around is that although homo sapiens (a misnomer if ever there was one!) is the only animal that is a person (that we know of, so far), other animals have person-like traits, and that we can attribute person-like traits to machines - in fact, it is possible to attribute full-blown personhood to certain inanimate objects or phenomena - then we call them gods. What follows? "Machine" is not simply a classification of objects, but a way of thinking about objects. Similarly "person" is not a simply a classification of objects, but a way of thinking about them.

in what way is a path taken for such causes by a person who comes to an intersection different from a path taken by a boulder rolling down a mountain? — Patterner

The person who comes down the mountain is not in a free fall, as the boulder is - though they might be. Their descent is under control. It's not about which path they take.

You can even innovate, do really something that hasn't been there before in your mind. — ssu

I'm not at all sure this is relevant for our problem. In the first place, the billiard balls can travel along paths they have never travelled before. In the second place, if we are only free when we innovate, then we are in chains for most of our lives.

But for entities that are conscious and sentient, free will is a really great model to use! — ssu

I don't disagree, but I do wish we could stop talking about free will, with all its baggage, and concentrate on freedom.

You can even innovate, do really something that hasn't been there before in your mind. — ssu

I'm not at all sure this is relevant for our problem. In the first place, the billiard balls can travel along paths they have never travelled before. In the second place, if we are only free when we innovate, then we are in chains for most of our lives. — Ludwig V

Then I have to remind about the problem that LD had in predicting the future. I don't think LD has any problem in predicting billiard balls as they follow exceptionally well even Newtonian physics. Yet LD has a problem of making an equation when the future depends on his equation, especially the negation of it.

The negative self-reference that can be seen in Cantor's diagonalization has in my view profound consequences. Remember that this negative self-reference is in both Turing's Halting Problem and Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems. It's been long argued starting from J.R. Lucas (1961) and then continued with Penrose that human mind is different because we can understand Gödel's incompleteness theorems and computers cannot, but that argument is a confusing. (Anyway, I think it's nearly pointless to refer to this extremely important theorems because somewhere a logician will jump out and declare that's not what Gödel meant and go through the tedious two theorems until everybody has forgotten what the debate about.)

We do have the limitations that LD has too, yet obviously we can do something that we haven't done, which is hard for a computer computing equations. We can do a lot more than equations, like inequations and simply throw reasonable sounding wild guesses, even.

Are we in chains for most of our lives? Hopefully not literally. But naturally a lot is predictable in our behaviour, yet this shouldn't be a way to denigrate us. Other species are predictable too. What's the problem in being predictable? Large societies need predictability, for example when driving in traffic, I think everybody is happy if you predictably stay on your own lane.

Thanks for the invitation. I can try. But as long as people think that the search for free will is the search for an uncaused cause or a search for indeterminacy, I doubt that anyone will be interested. — Ludwig V

I think was arguing for compatibility of natural human FreeWill, not as an abnormal exception to Causation, but as a statistical option within causal Determinism. Not for supernatural freedom from Causation, as in the ex nihilo Big Bang Theory. Compatibility does not require total chaotic indeterminism, but only a few short-cuts on the road to destiny.

As a philosophical position, Compatibilism*1 assumes that the world system is a dynamic blend of linear Causation (1+1+1+1=4) and non-linear (1+1+1+X=?) Randomness*2. Including both dependent and independent variables ; both global regularity and small-world spontaneity. For example, the highly interconnected human brain is both a linear logic machine, and a non-linear insight producer*3. Our physical actions may not be free, but our meta-physical intentions are free as a bird, to defy gravity by flapping. "If god intended man to fly, he would have given him wings". Instead, he gave us imagination.

In footnote 2, please add Philosophers to the list of professionals who are "interested" in non-linear causation as a shortcut that allows some Freedom within Determinism*4. :smile:



*1. Compatibilism. Soft determinism (or compatibilism) is the position or view that causal determinism is true, but we still act as free, morally responsible agents when, in the absence of external constraints, our actions are caused by our desires. Compatibilism does not maintain that humans are free.
https://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialSciences/ppecorino/INTRO_TEXT/Chapter%207%20Freedom/Freedom_Compatibilism.htm
Note --- The man is not free --- he can be imprisoned --- but his mind is free : to roam the world of ideas.

*2. Non-linear Math :
In mathematics and science, a nonlinear system is a system in which the change of the output is not proportional to the change of the input. Nonlinear problems are of interest to engineers, biologists, physicists, mathematicians, and many other scientists since most systems are inherently nonlinear in nature. ___Wikipedia
Note --- In a Small World network, like the human brain, some interconnections are non-linear in that the output (novelty) is more than the input (data). Hence, spontaneous and not rigidly determined.

*3. Small World Network, brain insights :
https://jewishcamp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Schilling-2005_A-Small-World-Network-Model-of-Cognitive-Insight.pdf

*4. Freedom Within Determinism :
Compatibilism is the doctrine that determinism is logically compatible or consistent with what is said to be a single idea of freedom that really concerns us and with a related kind of moral responsibility -- the freedom in question being voluntariness.
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwTerminology.html



LINEAR CONNECTIONS BETWEEN NODES
NONLINEAR SHORTCUT BETWEEN CLUSTERS

Large societies need predictability, for example when driving in traffic, I think everybody is happy if you predictably stay on your own lane. — ssu

Quite so. Only, if at all possible, I would like to be regarded as only coerced by the law when I do so. Keeping the law means that one could break it.
That nicely reveals some of the complications about freedom.

When, exactly can someone who is capable of being free be said to be coerced? We say a blackmailer coerces their victim, but, from another perspective, the victim collaborates with the blackmailer. When I walk into my favourite bar (pub) and the person behind the bar pours my usual drink for me, I would normally be said to be choosing freely even though I am entirely predictable.

As the sun rises over the horizon, is it appropriate to say that the air is coerced to become hotter? If determinism excludes the possibility of freedom, as it seems to, then it also excludes the possibility of coercion. This is about what are called categories or language games. Certain concepts are said to be inapplicable (neither true not false, but rather meaningless) when applied outside their home language game. How much does the number 2 weigh? Does it weigh more or less that the number 3? Are both numbers weightless? The earth is neither free nor coerced as it orbits round the sun.

It's been long argued starting from J.R. Lucas (1961) and then continued with Penrose that human mind is different because we can understand Gödel's incompleteness theorems and computers cannot, but that argument is a confusing. — ssu

Well, that might be right. Though I would be a bit concerned if people who did not understand Godel were then to be classified as not free.

I don't think LD has any problem in predicting billiard balls as they follow exceptionally well even Newtonian physics. — ssu

But the billiard balls do not roll as they do because LD predicted how they would.

Yet LD has a problem of making an equation when the future depends on his equation, especially the negation of it. — ssu

Well, yes. I think feedback loops are an important part of enabling us to control our actions and hence act freely.

Compatibility does not require total chaotic indeterminism, but only a few short-cuts on the road to destiny. — Gnomon

I get the first half of the sentence. But the meaning of the second half is not at all clear to me. Your diagram in your "Small world model" doesn't help.

Our physical actions may not be free, but our meta-physical intentions are free as a bird, to defy gravity by flapping. "If god intended man to fly, he would have given him wings". Instead, he gave us imagination. — Gnomon

Are you suggesting that an imagined freedom is any substitute for the real thing? Seems like a very poor exchange to me.

Note --- The man is not free --- he can be imprisoned --- but his mind is free : to roam the world of ideas. — Gnomon

No, it is not the case that the man is not free just because he can be imprisoned. If he is not imprisoned, he is free. In case, the freedom to "roam the world of ideas" is no substitute for the freedom to go home to you partner and kids.

3) the causes of voluntary behaviour are certain states, events, or conditions within the agent: acts of will or volitions, choices, decisions, desires etc... — The Chapter you cited entitled Compatibilism

So an action is free if its causes are inside the agent. If the causes of those causes are outside the agent, can we conclude that his acts of will, etc are not free?
By the way, can you identify his acts of will etc independently of the actions they cause to provide the basic empirical information you need to carry out an induction?

Compatibilism is determinism with a slight modification for the sake of appearances and for our language use. It is a position taken because of the perceived need to have some idea of accountability or responsibility for human behavior. — The Chapter you cited entitled Compatibilism

So compatibilism is window dressing - a concession to the ignorant. Why would I be interested in this?

The person who comes down the mountain is not in a free fall, as the boulder is - though they might be. Their descent is under control. It's not about which path they take. — Ludwig V

It's about whether or not I can actually choose one path or another. As opposed to having multiple paths in front of me, but there being no possibility of choosing any but one. If I have no possibility of choosing any but one, despite others being just as available, then I do not have free will. And that's fine. I'm not arguing. It's a perfectly legitimate stance. (Although I disagree with it.) I'm just saying that you can't have no ability to choose any but one of multiple equally possible paths and have free will in the matter.

When, exactly can someone who is capable of being free be said to be coerced? — Ludwig V

Coercion usually means forcing someone to do something he or she doesn't want to do.

As the sun rises over the horizon, is it appropriate to say that the air is coerced to become hotter? If determinism excludes the possibility of freedom, as it seems to, then it also excludes the possibility of coercion. — Ludwig V

That kind of idea of determinism does away with lot of things. Anyway, if we want to hear some who thinks that with determinism there's no free will, then there's for example Susan Hossenfelder:



What is noteworthy is that she talks about emergent properties and decoupling of scales. At 6:40 she describes that the underlying laws still exist, and then at 7:20 even refers to some articles that refer to the Halting Problem, but as they talk about infinates, she disregards them. She also admits that the majority of philosophers believe in compatibilism. Finally on 12:20 she explains why she believes that determinism eliminates free will.

I would argue that this is one usual way people that hold physics to be this all encompassing all answering field, which obviously has all the correct theorems at hand, just look at the world. Great that they are enthusiastic of their field of study. Yet they disregard then the "more is different" argument, the emergent properties, and make simply a category error. The idea that everything is physics is reductionism at worst, when people assume that ontological questions can only be discussed in the realm of physics and through it's models. Because matter is made of quarks etc.

Good antidote would be to understand that the limitation on the predictive ability of LD is mathematics and logic.

But the billiard balls do not roll as they do because LD predicted how they would. — Ludwig V

Yes.
But even you or I could make good predictions about billiard balls at least on a billiard table. LD would easily.

What is crucial to remember in the LD example what Simon Laplace gets wrong is the every part: that LD can forecast everything. In many occasion giving a prediction doesn't affect what is predicted. That the Earth revolves around the Sun even a hundred years from now is a sound prediction. Giving that doesn't effect the future, the Earth or the Sun.

It's about whether or not I can actually choose one path or another. — Patterner

That little word actually is interesting. What does it mean? Either I have a choice, or I do not.

I'm just saying that you can't have no ability to choose any but one of multiple equally possible paths and have free will in the matter. — Patterner

In one way, you are right. But there are some kinds of coercion that are compatible with the capacity to choose. Determinism eliminates the capacity to choose, and so eliminates the possibility of coercion.

When the cop arrests me and asks me to hold out my hands for the cuffs, do I have a choice? When I drag myself in to work on a Monday morning, do I go because I have chosen to go? When my opponent forces me to take his rook (castle) in order to get my queen, what choices do I have? When I pay my taxes, what choice do I have? Assume in all these cases that I have a normal capacity to choose.

Coercion usually means forcing someone to do something he or she doesn't want to do. — ssu

Quite so. Does the sun want to rise in the morning?

Finally on 12:20 she explains why she believes that determinism eliminates free will. — ssu

Interesting. Is that because she thinks that determinism forces me to do things, or because choice is meaningless in a determinist framework?

In many occasion giving a prediction doesn't affect what is predicted. That the Earth revolves around the Sun even a hundred years from now is a sound prediction. Giving that doesn't effect the future, the Earth or the Sun. — ssu

Yes. That means that the prediction does not force me to do anything.

Yet they disregard then the "more is different" argument, the emergent properties, and make simply a category error. — ssu

Yes, it is a category error. I'm not sure about emergent properties. There doesn't seem to be much agreement about them and maybe those arguments are giving too much away. Yet we are physical beings, and physics doesn't have exceptions. Understanding that is the problem.