Kant's ethic is protestant

schopenhauer1

Only if we must always have a maxim in order to make a decision -- but given that Kant believes we usually follow our inclination, rather than a moral maxim, we could just admit that there's no maxim here to making a choice. — Moliere

I am not getting what you mean. Kant would say we follow our inclination but should follow a moral maxim.

Moliere

↪schopenhauer1

Sure. But if you're asking "How do we make a choice?" then it seems obvious -- we don't always make choices based on maxims, but upon inclination.

schopenhauer1

Sure. But if you're asking "How do we make a choice?" then it seems obvious -- we don't always make choices based on maxims, but upon inclination. — Moliere

Yeah sure, but I'm not sure that contradicts what I was saying about dignity. If you don't want to follow a maxim, don't follow a maxim.. According to Kant, that would not be moral though.

If I was to force someone into a game of unknown amounts of suffering, even if I gave them the tools that may or may not help mitigate it, and even if there were benefits from this force, it was still an unnecessary force. One would be using the other for some end, whether that is "living", "carelessness", "happiness-promotion", "legacy", or "something to do". All these other "reasons" would be indeed self-interest, or as you might say, "inclination".

Moliere

↪schopenhauer1

Go on.

schopenhauer1

Go on. — Moliere

That's the crux of it. There can be a lot more:
Don't cause harm, and justify it by mitigating harm if you didn't have to.
Don't assume for others what is good for them, and worth suffering for, especially without consent.

All this comes down to the second formulation of not using people.
Don't use people, disrespecting their dignity, by putting them in harmful conditions because you have positive-ethical project you would like to see carried out.

Moliere

That's the crux of it. There can be a lot more:
Don't cause harm, and justify it by mitigating harm if you didn't have to.
Don't assume for others what is good for them, and worth suffering for, especially without consent.

All this comes down to the second formulation of not using people.
Don't use people, disrespecting their dignity, by putting them in harmful conditions because you have positive-ethical project you would like to see carried out. — schopenhauer1

M'kay.

One thing that comes to mind is that I think of it as not merely using people. The pietism makes sense of this distinction: when, in your heart of hearts, you ask yourself if you're using people, even if you do not want to use people, you'll admit that you go to the shop keeper not because you're following a duty, but because you want to buy something for yourself. (EDIT: That is, you are using the shopkeeper, but you don't need to use him merely as a means to an end -- you can still respect his humanity)

This isn't a wrong mind -- it's just not right.

So going along with anti-natalism: if the reason you're creating a child is to use the child as a means to an end, and there is nothing more to it than that, then sure. But I think many parents feel a deeper attachment than that: they can recognize the biological inclination to continue on the species while at the same time treat their children as more than means to satisfying that biological inclination.

There are many maxims, after all.

schopenhauer1

One thing that comes to mind is that I think of it as not merely using people. — Moliere

Yes clearly I don't agree with this idea. Merely allows a LOT of leeway. But say we are granted "merely", I don't think causing (all future) harm to mitigating harm would fall under "merely", that is an agregious use.. But again, since decisions are ambiguous with Kant, my theme here seems to be popping up, that we are going to be stuck as to what counts.. I say this certainly counts as not simply "merely".. For example, I can say that I can FORCE you into a game because I think you would like it, without your consent, and you can say "Because I was thinking of YOUR interests, I can be justified". But that really does fly against autonomy, non-malfeasance, and the rest that you would think that goes with respecting someone's dignity, and not using that person. So I don't think "merely" should be used as a "do what you want" card because you can always justify anything by saying that you weren't "merely" using them...

when, in your heart of hearts, you ask yourself if you're using people, even if you do not want to use people, you'll admit that you go to the shop keeper not because you're following a duty, but because you want to buy something for yourself. (EDIT: That is, you are using the shopkeeper, but you don't need to use him merely as a means to an end -- you can still respect his humanity) — Moliere

Sure, but the shopkeeper, of his own volition is working there, and is choosing to interact. He wasn't forced. But in a way, he was.. He was forced to be in the situation whereby he needed to find a way to live in the first place, which was unasked, and forced... Not "merely" anything.

So going along with anti-natalism: if the reason you're creating a child is to use the child as a means to an end, and there is nothing more to it than that, then sure. But I think many parents feel a deeper attachment than that: they can recognize the biological inclination to continue on the species while at the same time treat their children as more than means to satisfying that biological inclination.

There are many maxims, after all. — Moliere

Indeed, but it's precisely this way of thinking that can justify doing anything in an aggressively paternalistic way towards another. I can force X upon you, because I deem it is good for you. That to me, is disrespecting an individual. There is the imposition, and then there is the negative outcome from the imposition.. In fact, TWO uses of imposition which make this a wrong.. Force-Imposition, Burden-Imposition. In this case it is the prevention of both a force-imposition AND a burden-imposition. Mitigating an already-existing set of impositions would be AFTER the initial preventative measure was bypassed and USING this notion to justify bypassing it.

Leontiskos

↪Moliere

- I think that is right. :up:

schopenhauer1

:razz:

↪Leontiskos

Well I provided my response

Leontiskos

↪schopenhauer1

- Sure, but we already have a thread on the topic of antinatalism, including a conversation (

↪Leontiskos

).

I think Kant is rightly interpreted as prohibiting using others as a mere means, and I think it is a social impossibility to try to remove that word, "mere." If we remove that word then we cannot buy goods from the shopkeeper at all.

schopenhauer1

I think Kant is rightly interpreted as prohibiting using others as a mere means, and I think it is a social impossibility to try to remove that word, "mere." If we remove that word then we cannot buy goods from the shopkeeper at all. — Leontiskos

I responded that “mere” should not be an excuse to cause harm, by use of it as justification to do so. This is why I made a distinction between preventing and mitigating that which was not prevented. And thus, negative ethics takes precedent, unless someone is already in need of mitigation (hence how child-rearing, for example, falls under mitigation).

Leontiskos

I responded that “mere” should not be an excuse to cause harm, by use of it as justification to do so. — schopenhauer1

I don't think Kant, Moliere, or Moliere's Kant hold that "mere" can be an excuse to cause harm. No one holds that position. Your arguments here seem too bent on justifying antinatalism, and for that reason they are deviating from the topic of Kant. If we must remove the "mere" then we cannot buy from the shopkeeper, and that's crazy. The claim that such a purchase is an "excuse to cause harm," is highly implausible, even though an antinatalist might make that argument. At the very least it is an undue imputation of motive. (And if you insist on the idea that the shopkeeper consents, then consider the tourist who asks a native for directions. It's not as though every time we "burden" someone consent is involved.)

The key problem with your reliance on consent is that it is moot for Kant. For Kant you cannot use someone as a mere means even if they consent to being used as a mere means. Consent is irrelevant to the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative.

Your argument here is something like, "If Kant's second formulation of the c.i. permits pronatalism, then it is false." The first problem is that this is invalid: even if antinatalism were true there could still be true moral principles that do not prohibit procreation. Not every moral principle will justify every moral conclusion. The second problem is that this is more a dispute over antinatalism than a dispute over Kant. Your argument has no force for anyone who doesn't already agree with you on antinatalism, and antinatalism is a highly controversial thesis. As I said, we already have a thread on antinatalism.

schopenhauer1

The claim that such a purchase is an "excuse to cause harm," is highly implausible — Leontiskos

I wasn't saying that example was an example of using "mere" for justification. But of course, there are others that are more egregiously so.

At the very least it is an undue imputation of motive. (And if you insist on the idea that the shopkeeper consents, then consider the tourist who asks a native for directions. It's not as though every time we "burden" someone consent is involved.) — Leontiskos

Well, it depends. I would contend that again, not all circumstances require preventative action. Am I disrespecting the dignity of the native by asking for directions? Well, there is one scenario where one simply says, "Excuse me sir, I need directions to X".. That would be not merely using someone. However, if I was to say, "Excuse me sir, I need directions to X, but I am giving you no choice but to help me, and don't worry, after you help me, you will thank me later for the privilege of having me force you to do so" then we are giving no "outs" for the native, and disrespecting is right to decline.

The key problem with your reliance on consent is that it is moot for Kant. For Kant you cannot use someone as a mere means even if they consent to being used as a mere means. Consent is irrelevant to the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative. — Leontiskos

Indeed, nor would I place all of a justification ONLY on consent. I usually say, violating someone's dignity...Consent is one component of that.

The first problem is that this is invalid: even if antinatalism were true there could still be true moral principles that do not prohibit procreation. Not every moral principle will justify every moral conclusion. — Leontiskos

Again, I am allowing "merely" but if it is not being an excuse to actually violate dignity... In other words, "I get to use you for X, because I have in my heart that it is good for you". That can become a slippery slope.

The second problem is that this is more a dispute over antinatalism than a dispute over Kant. Your argument has no force for anyone who doesn't already agree with you on antinatalism, and antinatalism is a highly controversial thesis. As I said, we already have a thread on antinatalism. — Leontiskos

I mean, Kant himself is highly controversial and I am trying to keep this at the level of Kant. Kant thought that lying is technically wrong no matter what, including about where your friend is when people are out to kill him, so if you think AN is controversial...

Leontiskos

Am I disrespecting the dignity of the native by asking for directions? — schopenhauer1

You are certainly using them as a means without their consent.

Again, I am allowing "merely" but if it is not being an excuse to actually violate dignity... — schopenhauer1

Again, the invalidity of your argument lies in confusing a prohibition with an allowance. Kant is saying, "You cannot use others as a mere means." This does not mean, "If you are not using others as a mere means, then whatever you are doing to them must necessarily be okay." It is logically impossible to use the second formulation as an excuse to act. The second formulation prohibits actions, it does not greenlight actions. I think you would see this more easily were not the planet of antinatalism exercising an undue gravitational pull on your thought.

I mean, Kant himself is highly controversial and I am trying to keep this at the level of Kant. Kant thought that lying is technically wrong no matter what, including about where your friend is when people are out to kill him, so if you think AN is controversial... — schopenhauer1

But Kant's position on lying follows even from the "merely." When you call into question the legitimacy of the "merely" you do not soften the prohibition on lying, you significantly strengthen it. So if you think Kant's position on lying is incorrect, then a position which calls "merely" into question would be all the more incorrect.

Moliere

So going along with anti-natalism: if the reason you're creating a child is to use the child as a means to an end, and there is nothing more to it than that, then sure. — Moliere

Something that came to mind here: Aldous Huxley's Brave New World.

The quote that came to mind is about a scientifically designed society which creates hierarchies before people are born: (pdf page 6 in the link)

Reveal

“I shall begin at the beginning,” said the D.H.C. and the more zealous students
recorded his intention in their notebooks: Begin at the beginning. “These,”
he waved his hand, “are the incubators.” And opening an insulated door he
showed them racks upon racks of numbered test-tubes. “The week’s supply
of ova. Kept,” he explained, “at blood heat; whereas the male gametes,” and
here he opened another door, “they have to be kept at thirty- five instead of
thirty-seven. Full blood heat sterilizes.” Rams wrapped in theremogene beget
no lambs.
Still leaning against the incubators he gave them, while the pencils scurried illegibly across the pages, a brief description of the modern fertilizing process;
spoke first, of course, of its surgical introduction- “the operation undergone voluntarily for the good of Society, not to mention the fact that it carries a bonus
amounting to six months’ salary”; continued with some account of the technique for preserving the excised ovary alive and actively developing; passed
on to a consideration of optimum temperature, salinity, viscosity; referred to
the liquor in which the detached and ripened eggs were kept; and, leading his
charges to the work tables, actually showed them how this liquor was drawn
off from the test-tubes; how it was let out drop by drop onto the specially warmed slides of the microscopes; how the eggs which it contained were inspected
for abnormalities, counted and transferred to a porous receptacle; how (and he
now took them to watch the operation) this receptacle was immersed in a warm
bouillon containing free-swimming spermatozoa-at a minimum concentration
of one hundred thousand per cubic centimetre, he insisted; and how, after ten
minutes, the container was lifted out of the liquor and its contents re-examined;
how, if any of the eggs remained unfertilized, it was again immersed, and, if
necessary, yet again; how the fertilized ova went back to the incubators; where
the Alphas and Betas remained until definitely bottled; while the Gammas, Deltas and Epsilons were brought out again, after only thirty-six hours, to undergo
Bokanovsky’s Process.

I'd say that this society violates the second formulation while maintaining the first: it's consistent, they continue on, and yet by relegating people before they are born to certain hierarchies -- even though everyone is happy -- it does not respect the humanity of people.

That, however, is a far cry from having children at all @schopenhauer1 -- I think utilitarianism, and psychological hedonism would be better friends to you than deontology, at least if you want to universalize anti-natalism (I did admit some conditions where I could, and even in my own life I can see, where having children isn't a good choice -- but the universal program is a bit much for me)

Leontiskos

I'd say that this society violates the second formulation while maintaining the first: it's consistent, they continue on, and yet by relegating people before they are born to certain hierarchies -- even though everyone is happy -- it does not respect the humanity of people. — Moliere

If you think it violates the second formulation, then who is being treated as a mere means? I don't quite see it, and I am thinking of the analogous situation of an arranged marriage. If parents arrange a marriage for their child, or if someone pre-selects an infant for a hierarchical role, does it follow that they are being treated as a mere means?

The difficulty is that the second formulation pertains to intention, and material acts only rarely have necessarily intentional implications of the kind that Kant is thinking of.

Moliere

If you think it violates the second formulation, then who is being treated as a mere means? I don't quite see it, and I am thinking of the analogous situation of an arranged marriage. If parents arrange a marriage for their child, or if someone pre-selects an infant for a hierarchical role, does it follow that they are being treated as a mere means? — Leontiskos

Well, I'd say so, yeah. I don't believe in arranged marriages or pre-destined roles for children, because I believe autonomy is more important than that.

For BNW, though, I'd say that it's at a different order than either because even with arranged marriages and roles the individual gets to choose within those confines(run away from home, get a divorce, use the role to their ends rather than to their parents as a king, whatever). What's happening in BNW is that the reproductive cells are being planned to produce people who will fit within different roles within a planned society -- so the Gammas that are needed for menial tasks are produced in a vat to push the elevator up or down and be happy with their position in life.

Building people to fit within a social structure seems to me to violate the general notions of autonomy that are valorized in Kant's ethic.

Leontiskos

Well, I'd say so, yeah. I don't believe in arranged marriages or pre-destined roles for children, because I believe autonomy is more important than that. — Moliere

But I think we are talking about the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, not autonomy. I grant that an arranged marriage infringes autonomy.

Added in an edit:

The difficulty is that the second formulation pertains to intention, and material acts only rarely have necessarily intentional implications of the kind that Kant is thinking of. — Leontiskos

Moliere

↪Leontiskos

heh, then we're getting into the nitty-gritty, cuz the question becomes more of when the 2nd formulation applies.

In one sense treating others to become better, for instance, is to treat them as means to an end: to the end of virtue. Even if they would, in fact, be better, we wouldn't be respecting them as end-makers if we manipulated them into being good, regardless.

Basically, autonomy, as I see it, is part of the second formulation. I don't think it would only apply when when someone is acting on a maxim? Though then perhaps I'm just being more expansive with the notion than you'd be.

Leontiskos

↪Moliere

- Well this is very similar to @schopenhauer1's ideas. I would say that if someone is being treated as a mere means then their autonomy is not being respected; but it does not follow that if someone's autonomy is not being respected then they are being treated as a mere means. Autonomy and consent do not exhaust the notion of "an end in themselves."

For example, the arranged marriage infringes autonomy but does not necessarily result in the case of a mere means. I assume that Kant's "means to an end" is a means to my (selfish) ends. So if I give someone an apple am I treating them as a means? Well, if they are a slave and the apple is merely meant to nourish them to better serve me, then yes. But if the apple is intended for their own intrinsic good, then no. I don't have to ask them if they desire nourishment before I can legitimately give the apple. As long as I think it will serve them in themselves apart from any motive on my part, it is not treating them as a mere means.

Even if they would, in fact, be better, we wouldn't be respecting them as end-makers... — Moliere

I have all along been uncomfortable with this language of "respecting them as ends-makers," because this is a reduction of the second formulation to autonomy. Obviously that is part of the second formulation, but I want to say that it is not the entirety of it. If it were entirely a matter of respecting them as ends-makers then I really would have to place their autonomy on a very high pedestal. This would be a rather significant, albeit interesting, deviation from Christianity. Is there textual warrant in Kant that the second formulation should be interpreted this way?

For Kant you cannot use someone as a mere means even if they consent to being used as a mere means. — Leontiskos

As far as I recall, Kant follows Christianity in claiming that one can fail to treat oneself as an end in oneself, and this would seem to undo the autonomy thesis. If it were just a matter of autonomy then treating oneself poorly would be impossible.

Moliere

I have all along been uncomfortable with this language of "respecting them as ends-makers," because this is a reduction of the second formulation to autonomy. Obviously that is part of the second formulation, but I want to say that it is not the entirety of it. If it were entirely a matter of respecting them as ends-makers then I really would have to place their autonomy on a very high pedestal. This would be a rather significant, albeit interesting, deviation from Christianity. Is there textual warrant in Kant that the second formulation should be interpreted this way? — Leontiskos

Nothing super direct comes to mind, other than "treating them as an end unto themselves" and noting how individual freedom is central -- as in a category of reason -- for moral thinking in Kant.

Since I can choose my ends, I have to recognize that others can do so as well.

Also, something Rawls points out, deontology is a literal lack of a goal: so to treat someone so that they fulfill a goal would be to violate them.

****

There are times, of course, that we do this -- for the betterment of the person, even, and especially with children.

Still -- I'd say arranged marriages are just a bit much (as a USian), and generally I think that childhood autonomy is undervalued in our society. For the most part, yeah, I'd say that the emphasis on autonomy is at least a partial deviation from Christianity -- though there are strains in Christianity which emphasize the importance of choice, too.

If you force someone to church that doesn't mean they really believe in Christ, for instance. What's important is that they actually assent, in their heart of hearts, not the goal of "Increase church membership"

schopenhauer1

Again, the invalidity of your argument lies in confusing a prohibition with an allowance. Kant is saying, "You cannot use others as a mere means." This does not mean, "If you are not using others as a mere means, then whatever you are doing to them must necessarily be okay." It is logically impossible to use the second formulation as an excuse to act. The second formulation prohibits actions, it does not greenlight actions. I think you would see this more easily were not the planet of antinatalism exercising an undue gravitational pull on your thought. — Leontiskos

But that's my point, dear Leontiskos, that negative ethics take priority! One doesn't violate the negative ethics to promote some welfare creating one.

But Kant's position on lying follows even from the "merely." When you call into question the legitimacy of the "merely" you do not soften the prohibition on lying, you significantly strengthen it. So if you think Kant's position on lying is incorrect, then a position which calls "merely" into question would be all the more incorrect. — Leontiskos

I am not necessarily denying the "merely", but simply saying that the application can be quite tricky. That is to say, if I create conditions for someone else's suffering, justifying it by some cause, in what way is that not using someone? And if you say, it is, but they are not merely using someone, how is that not a slippery slope? If I beat someone to make them stronger, and then at the end of it, they indeed are stronger, am I not violating their dignity? Well, you might say "No, because it is not MERELY using them" that is simply "USING THEM", as indeed, I can always say that I was looking out for them by way of initially harming them..

But you will protest, but then that is my point... that WHERE to draw the line of "MERELY" is tricky.

schopenhauer1

That, however, is a far cry from having children at all schopenhauer1 -- I think utilitarianism, and psychological hedonism would be better friends to you than deontology, at least if you want to universalize anti-natalism (I did admit some conditions where I could, and even in my own life I can see, where having children isn't a good choice -- but the universal program is a bit much for me) — Moliere

If suffering is given a priority and is tied into not using people as a mere means to an end, then it certainly can be deontological to not cause unnecessary suffering. Think about it.. All justified harm to someone is MITIGATING whilst unnecessary harm causes it for no reason necessary FOR THE PERSON (or potential person) IN QUESTION.

schopenhauer1

Well, if they are a slave and the apple is merely meant to nourish them to better serve me, then yes. But if the apple is intended for their own intrinsic good, then no. I don't have to ask them if they desire nourishment before I can legitimately give the apple. As long as I think it will serve them in themselves apart from any motive on my part, it is not treating them as a mere means. — Leontiskos

That is to say, to create someone who will suffer unnecessarily is to use them as a means for something other than the person. As the person wasn't even there to begin with.

schopenhauer1

In one sense treating others to become better, for instance, is to treat them as means to an end: to the end of virtue. Even if they would, in fact, be better, we wouldn't be respecting them as end-makers if we manipulated them into being good, regardless. — Moliere

You almost understand my AN ethic.. That is to say, to create someone who will suffer unnecessarily is to use them as a means for something other than the person. As the person wasn't even there to begin with.

schopenhauer1

Also, something Rawls points out, deontology is a literal lack of a goal: so to treat someone so that they fulfill a goal would be to violate them. — Moliere

Again, my point.

Moliere

↪schopenhauer1

Right -- but the "mere" part is what mitigates the choice.

And in any case, while AN isn't self-contradictory, if you're to respect the autonomy of other human beings you have to let them make their own choices under deontology, which would include having children. (it's not like that's self-contradictory... )

There are circumstances where I can imagine having a child violates the 2nd formulation -- say that you decide to have a child to save a marriage. That would be something where I can see how the child isn't being thought of at all, but is a solution to a problem: a marriage. That seems to violate the second formulation.

But I'm not seeing it for all birth. Sometimes people have children because they want their child to have a better life than they had, for instance -- they care about the child as an individual. In those circumstances I'm just not seeing how you could make the case.

Mww

Individuals will maxims…. — Moliere

I’m sorry, but I just don’t get that. A maxim is a subjective principle; how do we will a principle?

The will is the faculty of right action, or, volition. I can see acting on a principle, or in accordance with a principle, but I don’t see the willing of one.

In the lines just before your quote, is this…..

“…. As I have deprived the will of every impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law, there remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, i.e., I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law. Here, now, it is the simple conformity to law in general, without assuming any particular law applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its principle and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimerical notion….”

…..in which, to my understanding, just says the will is properly served iff one acts only in conformity to law in general universally, or, which is the same thing, without impulse from inclination or regard to consequence.

Notice as well, he says we will THAT our maxims, which just seems to indicate it is already presupposed.

It’s the little things, donchaknow. Our maxim is to act in a certain way, to will THAT our maxim is obtained, is to will a certain act, which makes much more sense within the theory as a whole.

Dunno…..maybe it’s just me. What say you?

Moliere

↪Mww

Could just be a turn of phrase, because I don't disagree with what you wrote. By "individuals" I was more thinking with respect to "everyone should"

So to rephrase more properly with this in mind:

The will is the faculty of right action, or, volition. I can see acting on a principle, or in accordance with a principle, but I don’t see the willing of one. — Mww

Individuals act on principles, or in accordance with a principle would be the same thing as I meant there. The contrast was -- can Everybody act in volition with a principle? Can I act in a manner that makes everyone act? It doesn't seem so to me. We'll want others, oftentimes, to follow our maxims, but the actual calculus isn't of the sort where if everyone is not following the maxim, for instance, I shouldn't -- it's the individual, rather than the group, that's more important in thinking through whether a maxim can be universalized, or an act is moral. (Or, really, it's the philosopher contemplating the individual)

schopenhauer1

And in any case, while AN isn't self-contradictory, if you're to respect the autonomy of other human beings you have to let them make their own choices under deontology, which would include having children. (it's not like that's self-contradictory... ) — Moliere

That would be a strawman to what I am saying as I never said that someone's choice should be limited here, so not sure why this part is necessary to include.

There are circumstances where I can imagine having a child violates the 2nd formulation -- say that you decide to have a child to save a marriage. That would be something where I can see how the child isn't being thought of at all, but is a solution to a problem: a marriage. That seems to violate the second formulation.

But I'm not seeing it for all birth. Sometimes people have children because they want their child to have a better life than they had, for instance -- they care about the child as an individual. In those circumstances I'm just not seeing how you could make the case. — Moliere

Because of the what I have been repetitively saying now- that causing known/unknown conditions for suffering, EVEN FOR THE GOAL of some positive ethic (happiness, etc.) is still causing those known/unknown conditions of harm that could have been prevented. And which is why I made the distinction with preventative to palliative. So my claim of how I am looking at violating the 2nd formulation is that if you overlook or BYPASS the preventative of suffering, to in fact cause the very conditions that someone will suffer, SO THAT you can follow through with a project, EVEN IF FOR THE CHILD, it is still using in such a way, even with the caveat of "merely" as a means, in fact, duly so because there is no way to cause the suffering that must then be mitigated, as it is known that suffering will occur. In other words, you cannot justify preventing suffering (or actively promoting it even), in the justification that later, you can MITIGATE it for someone.

You can swing back at me with general child-rearing or government actions, but I already addressed that with palliative versus preventative, and government I'd rather not discuss as much as its a category error to apply it to personal ethics, but even if so, go back again to palliative and preventative.

Kant's ethic is protestant

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