Seems a bit goofy to me. You could get around all this notion of suffering simply by noting, or adhereing to, a duty to preserve life, suffering or no.

I think a hedonic ethic or a utilitarian ethic or a consequentialist ethic will serve AN better. Not that you couldn't put AN into deontology -- here you are doing it -- but others will have different maxims from you, and part of deontology is respecting others' choices.

You want an ethic that lets you tell when others are wrong, but deontology is more about the self choosing actions, I think. It's only in the eyes of God that we could tell if someone is right or wrong, but we only have the eyes of a human.

Seems a bit goofy to me. — Moliere

I mean again, Kant thought not lying to a killer was appropriate if one was to be truly moral, assuming with a straight face, so I guess any philosophy can be deemed so...

You could get around all this notion of suffering simply by noting, or adhereing to, a duty to preserve life, suffering or no. — Moliere

But ironically, it is the duty to prevent life that would do this (presumably not doing so would fail to prevent the suffering that could have been easily prevented. Not like losing limb for country, or um, not lying to a killer).

I think a hedonic ethic or a utilitarian ethic or a consequentialist ethic will serve AN better. Not that you couldn't put AN into deontology -- here you are doing it -- but others will have different maxims from you, and part of deontology is respecting others' choices. — Moliere

And I agree it works on multiple grounds.. It works on negative rule utilitarian grounds. It does not work on totalizing/classic utilitarian grounds, or rather, if it does, it leads to contradictions. I also just don't believe those types of ethics are actually "moral", as I think it conflicts with basic deontological considerations which I am laying out here.

You want an ethic that lets you tell when others are wrong, but deontology is more about the self choosing actions, I think. It's only in the eyes of God that we could tell if someone is right or wrong, but we only have the eyes of a human. — Moliere

Granted, which is why I think the freedom to choose is part of deontological considerations.

Could just be a turn of phrase…. — Moliere

Oh absolutely. It’s those cursed turns of phrases in the Kantian corpus that instigates his successors to find contradictions. The most infamous being that gawd-awful noumena/phenomena thing. (Sigh)

Anyway, ever onward.
————

….it's the individual, rather than the group, that's more important in thinking through whether a maxim can be universalized, or an act is moral. — Moliere

Agreed. Given the possession of practical reason by humanity in general, then, all else being equal, each member would be individually conditioned by it with respect to his moral disposition, as long as it is the case practical reason is sufficient for the job, which, of course, the Esteemed Professor sought long and hard to prove.

The c.i. merely stipulates the necessary criterion for the worthiness of being happy, from which follows that disregard for it, is to be immoral, which is nothing more than even if some action willfully determined from your own version of pure practical reason makes you happy, you damned sure didn’t deserve to be. You’ve disrespected something along the line, perhaps without even knowing what it was. Or, which is more commonly witnessed, given human nature itself, one does know, but acts in disregard anyway. Either way, we all recognize this feeling we get from one or the other, hence the two primaries….pleasure or pain.

Excellent dialectical theme you’ve created here; I appreciate the thought-provoking aspect, even without total mutual accord.

Nothing super direct comes to mind, other than "treating them as an end unto themselves" and noting how individual freedom is central -- as in a category of reason -- for moral thinking in Kant.

Since I can choose my ends, I have to recognize that others can do so as well.

Also, something Rawls points out, deontology is a literal lack of a goal: so to treat someone so that they fulfill a goal would be to violate them. — Moliere

Okay, then I am more comfortable in my claim that you are misinterpreting Kant. From my edit:

For Kant you cannot use someone as a mere means even if they consent to being used as a mere means. — Leontiskos

As far as I recall, Kant follows Christianity in claiming that one can fail to treat oneself as an end in oneself, and this would seem to undo the autonomy thesis. If it were just a matter of autonomy then treating oneself poorly would be impossible.

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The key here is that it is not legitimate to reduce "treat them as an end in themselves" to "treat them as an ends-maker." Those are not the same thing for Kant. The latter does not exhaust the former. Just because we are treating someone as an ends-maker does not mean that we are treating them as an end in themselves. The specific emphasis on autonomy and ends-making comes later, and I would argue that if taken too far is a strong deviation from Kant.

(Hence, in the arranged marriage, the parents are failing to treat the betrothed as ends-makers, but they are not necessarily failing to treat them as ends in themselves.)

And if you say, it is, but they are not merely using someone, how is that not a slippery slope? — schopenhauer1

Because it does not justify acts. Kant is not greenlighting, he is prohibiting. You've missed this point two times now.

That is to say, to create someone who will suffer unnecessarily is to use them as a means for something other than the person. As the person wasn't even there to begin with. — schopenhauer1

But this is the metabasis, which you appeal to when it suits your argument and ignore when it cuts against it. The fact that "the person wasn't even there to begin with" is what makes the whole antinatalist project so logically out of kilter.

---

That, however, is a far cry from having children at all schopenhauer1 -- I think utilitarianism, and psychological hedonism would be better friends to you than deontology, at least if you want to universalize anti-natalism (I did admit some conditions where I could, and even in my own life I can see, where having children isn't a good choice -- but the universal program is a bit much for me) — Moliere

I agree.

Seems a bit goofy to me. — Moliere

It is goofy, and @schopenhauer1 is ignoring arguments in the antinatalism thread whilst arguing antinatalism in a thread on Kant. For example, his reasoning results in absurd consequences:

The problem occurs if this is a valid argument:

1. Suppose every living human being is guaranteed a pinprick of pain followed by 80 years of pure happiness.
2. [Insert Benatar's antinatalist argument here]
3. Therefore, we should never procreate

Are you starting to see the reductio? The reductio has force because we know that any (2) that can get you from (1) to (3) is faulty argumentation. — Leontiskos

It is goofy, and schopenhauer1 is ignoring arguments in the antinatalism thread whilst arguing antinatalism in a thread on Kant. — Leontiskos

Im not ignoring anything. But I’ll look at the rest

The fact that "the person wasn't even there to begin with" is what makes the whole antinatalist project so logically out of kilter. — Leontiskos

Makes it unique, but not out of kilter.

Are you starting to see the reductio? The reductio has force because we know that any (2) that can get you from (1) to (3) is faulty argumentation. — Leontiskos

I answered your hypothetical

Okay, then I am more comfortable in my claim that you are misinterpreting Kant. From my edit: — Leontiskos

Oh it wouldn't be the first time ;). And it wouldn't surprise me that my memories are off -- I through this in the lounge for that reason. I didn't feel like doing the deep work :D -- but I wanted to think through the ethics a bit.

As far as I recall, Kant follows Christianity in claiming that one can fail to treat oneself as an end in oneself, and this would seem to undo the autonomy thesis. If it were just a matter of autonomy then treating oneself poorly would be impossible. — Leontiskos

My memory on that claim is that it was with respect to masturbation, which always made me kind of shrug at that claim -- though, yes, that definitely fits with his Christian heritage. It may be here that this is what previously was raising feathers : I can acknowledge the Christian heritage, but at what point are we talking about Kant, the man, and Kant's philosophy, as intended, and Kant's philosophy, as written.

That was one of his examples I always sort of put to the side as worthless, though I could see the case being made for, say, substance abuse -- I don't think that's respecting yourself as an end (not sure if it would be a universalizable maxim, that one)

Though respecting someone as an ends-maker wouldn't entail, I don't think, that autonomy makes right or something -- rather, it is right to respect autonomy. It's a pretty important feature of the ethic, I think, though I agree that there would be times where just because someone says they choose something that then they are morally good or something like that. (EDIT:...is not a claim to morality)

You'd have to go through the process of reflection.

And that's where it gets hard to really apply the ethic to others. How can you reflect for someone else whether they are following a maxim?

The key here is that it is not legitimate to reduce "treat them as an end in themselves" to "treat them as an ends-maker." Those are not the same thing for Kant. The latter does not exhaust the former. Just because we are treating someone as an ends-maker does not mean that we are treating them as an end in themselves. The specific emphasis on autonomy and ends-making comes later, and I would argue that if taken too far is a strong deviation from Kant.

(Hence, in the arranged marriage, the parents are failing to treat the betrothed as ends-makers, but they are not necessarily failing to treat them as ends in themselves.)

One thing I don't think the ethic handles well is disparity in power. Kant doesn't really talk about children at all -- are they born with the categories? Do the categories become more apparent as they develop? When are they rational beings?

But I agree there's more to it than just because someone chooses something, or something along those lines, as I said above.

Granted, which is why I think the freedom to choose is part of deontological considerations. — schopenhauer1

That's interesting. I had never put together that freedom could act as a kind of limit to practical reason, just as metaphysics is a limit for theoretical reason. Though I'm not sure it's strictly Kant as this point, it's still an interesting parallel!

That's interesting. I had never put together that freedom could act as a kind of limit to practical reason, just as metaphysics is a limit for theoretical reason. Though I'm not sure it's strictly Kant as this point, it's still an interesting parallel! — Moliere

Two things here...
Isn't Kant's philosophy predicated on a "free will"? So that being said, having the maximum playing field to enact one's will freely, would seem to be entailed for this to be played out, no?

For example, a highly totalitarian society might not allow enough freedom of choice for one to even make a free will decision in regards to various personal decisions...

Also, my deontology isn't strictly Kantian-based, though I think most modern deontology is inspired by his framework... Intent/autonomy/rights/dignity/not being used, etc..

Excellent dialectical theme you’ve created here; I appreciate the thought-provoking aspect, even without total mutual accord.

Thanks :).

No need for total mutual accord, at least I don't demand it. It's pretty hard with the greats. And don't be shy -- say wherever and however you wish to disagree. I don't bite, though if questioned I'll give a quote or admit I don't know :D

Isn't Kant's philosophy predicated on a "free will"? So that being said, having the maximum playing field to enact one's will freely, would seem to be entailed for this to be played out, no? — schopenhauer1

Freedom is central to his ethics, but I don't think there's a maximization function -- that sounds a bit more like utilitarianism, and I'd be hesitant to reduce it all to free will: there's things like duty, respect, humanity, rationality that are all in play. Plus the religious background, at least so I've been saying (though where to draw the line...)

Also, my deontology isn't strictly Kantian-based, though I think most modern deontology is inspired by his framework... Intent/autonomy/rights/dignity/not being used, etc.. — schopenhauer1

Sure. I'm not really presenting my direct ethical view, though it's not like I don't feel empathy for Kant's view at times -- but I don't think it's as universal as he'd like it to be. I think it's more of a time-and-place thing, like I do of all the normative theories.

Oh it wouldn't be the first time ;). And it wouldn't surprise me that my memories are off -- I through this in the lounge for that reason. I didn't feel like doing the deep work :D -- but I wanted to think through the ethics a bit. — Moliere

Okay. :up:

My memory on that claim is that it was with respect to masturbation, which always made me kind of shrug at that claim -- though, yes, that definitely fits with his Christian heritage. It may be here that this is what previously was raising feathers : I can acknowledge the Christian heritage, but at what point are we talking about Kant, the man, and Kant's philosophy, as intended, and Kant's philosophy, as written.

That was one of his examples I always sort of put to the side as worthless, though I could see the case being made for, say, substance abuse -- I don't think that's respecting yourself as an end (not sure if it would be a universalizable maxim, that one) — Moliere

Er, I think it's much more than a one-off. Examples include masturbation, suicide, treatment of animals, and self-mutilation, but the deeper point is that an ends-maker is not necessarily an end in themselves. This is actually a big problem in our culture as far as I'm concerned: autonomy is maximized and dignity (of oneself or others) is minimized. There is no reason why I must treat an ends-maker as an end in themselves, as these are two distinct concepts. I think our motivation to do so has more to do with modern political philosophy than morality or Kant.

Though respecting someone as an ends-maker wouldn't entail, I don't think, that autonomy makes right or something -- rather, it is right to respect autonomy. — Moliere

Why is it right to respect autonomy?

Again, if I treat someone as a mere means then I am not respecting their autonomy, but if I fail to respect their autonomy it does not follow that I am treating them as a mere means (or that I am failing to treat them as an end in themselves). Perhaps more crucially, by respecting someone's autonomy it does not follow that I am treating them as an end in themselves. It only follows that I am not using them as a mere means. Libertarian indifference to others is a good example of this sort of thing.

And that's where it gets hard to really apply the ethic to others. How can you reflect for someone else whether they are following a maxim? — Moliere

By considering the consistency of their actions.

One thing I don't think the ethic handles well is disparity in power. Kant doesn't really talk about children at all -- are they born with the categories? Do the categories become more apparent as they develop? When are they rational beings? — Moliere

True.

Makes it unique, but not out of kilter. — schopenhauer1

Here is a logical presentation of the greenlight/prohibition distinction, which I tried to add in an edit but apparently did not get added:

You are committing the fallacy of denying the antecedent: <If you do X, then you are acting immorally; he did not do X, therefore he is acting morally>, where X = treating another as a mere means. It does not follow that my action is moral or permissible just because it does not treat another as a mere means.

It does not follow that my action is moral or permissible just because it does not treat another as a mere means. — Leontiskos

You'd have to qualify this again in context. Perhaps I wasn't really addressing your objection.

But I'd say we can move this to the other thread as I addressed you there, and actually have more to add so going to do that...