Kant's ethic is protestant

Moliere

I don’t think we have the authority to suggest for Kant anything he didn’t admit for himself.

I’m not saying he never mentioned the influence his religious upbringing may have had on the formulation of his moral philosophy, only that I’ve yet to find out about it. And from that it follows necessarily at least I have no warrant for understanding such philosophy as if it were conditioned by it. — Mww

That's fair. Take a peek at the SEP article I linked and let me know what you think.

Moliere

). But I found this which seems to be about this subject. Moliere maybe this will help:
https://problemi.si/issues/p2018-2/03problemi_international_2018_2_kobe.pdf — schopenhauer1

Thanks for this. Still pittering along through the article, but yup -- this is a more detailed treatment of what I'm thinking through

schopenhauer1

↪Moliere

:up:

Leontiskos

I'd push back here a bit. Self-interest is definitely a Hobbessian point, and to some extent Locke, but Rousseau -- by my understanding -- is more a romantic. "Man is born free, and yet everywhere is in chains" — Moliere

That's fair. I concede your point. I was thinking more about Hobbes' social contract than Rosseau's. My mistake.

With that said, I do think Kant in his pessimism is closer to Hobbes than Rosseau. In Religion within the bounds of Reason Alone Kant speaks about man as evil or corrupt by nature, and I am told that in his Perpetual Peace a very Hobbesian political approach emerges.

Also since he believes that self-interest is something which makes an action not-moral -- an act can follow the moral law and so be legal, but it's the motivation towards the moral law which qualifies a particular as as moral or not moral -- I'd say that Kant inherits some of this Romanticism with respect to human beings: We are valuable ends unto ourselves. — Moliere

I think Simpson argues convincingly that at the heart of Kant is the universalization of a kind of communal self-interest, but his argument is doing to draw on the universalization formulation of the Categorical Imperative, along with Kant's conceptions of inclination and respect. If we consider the formulation of the Categorical Imperative which has to do with means and ends—which you may here allude to—then an argument against universalized communal self-interest is certainly available.

In a way what becomes sacred is less the metaphysics of morals and more the individual making choices — Moliere

I think the moral principles are sacred in that they are largely opaque to reason, and for Kant any explanation or justification for them will necessarily be limited and incomplete. I think Kant sees it as mistaken to ask for clear rational reasons why we ought to heed his moral principles. In a very weird but true way, for Kant if there are sufficient rational reasons for some act then that act is not necessarily a moral act, and therefore moral philosophy and complete rational explanations are like oil and water.

Moliere

I think Simpson argues convincingly that at the heart of Kant is the universalization of a kind of communal self-interest, but his argument is doing to draw on the universalization formulation of the Categorical Imperative, along with Kant's conceptions of inclination and respect. If we consider the formulation of the Categorical Imperative which has to do with means and ends—which you may here allude to—then an argument against universalized communal self-interest is certainly available. — Leontiskos

Yeh, I'm of the opinion that the three formulations are not "really the same" as Kant claims. The first one provides an abstract foundation that any morality which is aiming to universalize principles must adhere to -- the second one adds more to that, but Kant claiming that it is the same provides a hint as to what is morally appealing to reason, I think. The third is a kind of consistency condition not just on the maxim but based on the first two. In valuing other people as ends-makers we recognize that just as we are moral agents making choices of principle so others' must be seen as well, and the fourth is where I think the influence from Rousseau is strongest.

But I don't think the collective will is one of self-interest, exactly. It's more like, in the long run of humanity, the final product that comes about when moral agents are acting within a moral community.

But does the first formulation really entail that we care about other ends-makers? Couldn't we universalize a maxim that the great dominate, and accept our fate in the war of all against all? What makes these four formulations the only formulations, given that each one -- while they paint a consistent picture of an ethic -- doesn't necessitate the others?

That's where I think this sort of elucidation of Kant's religion and moral commitments make his ethic more understandable. It's in the particular examples, and in making sense of all four formulations, that I think we get a sense of his ethic.

The unity of it comes down to human freedom to judge while recognizing the rights of other judgers. (the part that makes it particularly Christian, at least, is in how principles have to be universalized in a seemingly fair way between people -- a way which respects everyone's freedom and say. at least I'd say this is the fair reading)

I think the moral principles are sacred in that they are largely opaque to reason, and for Kant any explanation or justification for them will necessarily be limited and incomplete. I think Kant sees it as mistaken to ask for clear rational reasons why we ought to heed his moral principles. In a very weird but true way, for Kant if there are sufficient rational reasons for some act then that act is not necessarily a moral act, and therefore moral philosophy and complete rational explanations are like oil and water. — Leontiskos

I'd put it that it's just a different kind of rationality. For him it's the necessary conditions for any particular moral principles one holds to that the philosopher spells out -- but the philosopher does not need to spell these things out because common, good people already know what is good. There is no deep technical knowledge: One does not lie because it is against the moral law. It's the simple, straightforward precepts of the common religion which follow the categorical imperative, or at least that his moral philosophy is aiming at.

I think he's of the belief that people already pretty much know what is good, hence the emphasis on conscience.

With that said, I do think Kant in his pessimism is closer to Hobbes than Rosseau. In Religion within the bounds of Reason Alone Kant speaks about man as evil or corrupt by nature, and I am told that in his Perpetual Peace a very Hobbesian political approach emerges. — Leontiskos

There's a way of reading Rousseau which puts the popular will as a kind of agent. But I'd emphasize the "bottom up" reading more. The popular will is the result of individual agents willing. It's the call for freedom, and progress, which I'd emphasize from Rousseau to Kant. While it's true that Kant expresses a "warped wood" theory of human nature, it seems that he also believes in human progress else he wouldn't talk about the need for an afterlife to fulfill perfection. Also it makes sense of his insistence that we should develop our talents, and other such stuff.

He, like many philosophers, expresses the dismay of human nature in their time, but I think he's still a progressive liberal for all that.

Mww

…..let me know what you think. — Moliere

Regarding the SEP article, an informative compendium of opinions, as are most encyclopedic entries of this particular subject matter.

Regarding the SEP article’s effect on my opinions relative to the subject matter, it informed in a supplemental manner, but not sufficiently enough to alter my understanding of fundamental Kantian moral philosophy.

Kant is adamant that his thesis is not for popular consumption, therefore it fascinates me that folks reference a popular source for their definitive information.

Kant is adamant that his thesis is not for the common understanding, but my understanding is very specific, insofar as it is mine alone, thus it is hardly common. Why do you think he was so derisive of the “…. the arrogant pretensions of the schools…”?

Kant wanted his thesis to be understood; I doubt he figured it important, for that understanding, to also incorporate a familiarity with the affectations of his developmental environment. He wants to be known his reasons grounding what he says, as befits a proper theory, regardless of the conditions by which what he says, came about, except with respect to arguments relative to his peers or predecessors.

I don’t care one whit for his religious background, or even if there was or was not one to care about. I want to know if his epistemological and moral philosophies reflect my personality, or are that by which I may judge otherwise.

That is, when push comes to shove, precisely what a theoretical metaphysical philosophy is supposed to do, re: be subject, or object, in a logical cognitive system predicated on relations.

That’s what I think. Nothing all that special about it, in the Grand Scheme of Things, I admit.

Leontiskos

Yeh, I'm of the opinion that the three formulations are not "really the same" as Kant claims... — Moliere

I agree. Good points.

But I don't think the collective will is one of self-interest, exactly. It's more like, in the long run of humanity, the final product that comes about when moral agents are acting within a moral community. — Moliere

I think this is right if we look at the fourth formulation instead of the first.

But does the first formulation really entail that we care about other ends-makers? Couldn't we universalize a maxim that the great dominate, and accept our fate in the war of all against all? What makes these four formulations the only formulations, given that each one -- while they paint a consistent picture of an ethic -- doesn't necessitate the others?

That's where I think this sort of elucidation of Kant's religion and moral commitments make his ethic more understandable. It's in the particular examples, and in making sense of all four formulations, that I think we get a sense of his ethic. — Moliere

Okay, interesting.

The unity of it comes down to human freedom to judge while recognizing the rights of other judgers. — Moliere

I think that's a plausible interpretation, although I also think others are equally plausible. This sort of project would require a close reading of all of Kant's ethical works along with an (at least implicit) hierarchical ordering of the different "formulations" of the Categorical Imperative. This task is beyond me, but I think you are right that bringing in the religious background could be helpful in completing such a project. The idea here is that the religious element is necessary in order to bring clarity to Kant's underdetermined moral system.

I'd put it that it's just a different kind of rationality. For him it's the necessary conditions for any particular moral principles one holds to that the philosopher spells out -- but the philosopher does not need to spell these things out because common, good people already know what is good. There is no deep technical knowledge: One does not lie because it is against the moral law. It's the simple, straightforward precepts of the common religion which follow the categorical imperative, or at least that his moral philosophy is aiming at.

I think he's of the belief that people already pretty much know what is good, hence the emphasis on conscience. — Moliere

I think this explains in part why the opacity did not bother Kant, but I think Kant was under the spell of many false assumptions in this sort of thinking, and I think Nietzsche in particular is going to pick it apart.

There's a way of reading Rousseau which puts the popular will as a kind of agent. But I'd emphasize the "bottom up" reading more. The popular will is the result of individual agents willing. It's the call for freedom, and progress, which I'd emphasize from Rousseau to Kant. While it's true that Kant expresses a "warped wood" theory of human nature, it seems that he also believes in human progress else he wouldn't talk about the need for an afterlife to fulfill perfection. Also it makes sense of his insistence that we should develop our talents, and other such stuff.

He, like many philosophers, expresses the dismay of human nature in their time, but I think he's still a progressive liberal for all that. — Moliere

Okay, fair points. Good post. :up:

frank

"Protestant" maybe isn't any thesis at all, but a historical category? — Moliere

It's was an element of a large scale shift in power in Europe. The old Catholic view was that if you were born poor, this was God's will for you. To promote social mobility was blasphemy because it meant you were defying God's plan. The Catholic clergy were generally sons of the aristocracy, so Catholicism and the aristocracy were joined at the hip. Protestantism was backed by the rising merchant class so they could break from that kind of thinking. To them, it was obvious that God intended everyone to fully express their potential, whatever that may be. So Protestantism was the ideological grounding for social destratification. It was about freedom. The Catholic Church reacted to the rise of Protestants by becoming violently ultra-conservative. Where it had once been a rich forum for diverging ideas, it became just a reflection of the Protestants. That's what Catholicism has been ever since.

By the way, Erik Erikson wrote a really interesting book about Luther. It's part biography and part psychoanalysis. When Luther went off to become a monk, his father showed up at the monastery and stood outside screaming about the fact that Luther had abandoned the family's plan, which was about social mobility. Luther's father wanted him to study law and become a burgermeister, which would have been another step upward out of the mines and into a position of power.

Does any of that fit with Kant?

Mww

I'm of the opinion that the three formulations are not "really the same" as Kant claims. — Moliere

An opinion to which you are certainly entitled, but I would offer that Kant, being the non-stop dualist he admits to being, wants it understood the c.i. also has a dualistic nature, re: its form and its content. As such the form is always the same, insofar as commands of reason cannot be self-contradictory, whatever be the act determinable by the formula of its content, which only expresses the relation between an imperfect subject and the objectively necessity…..lawful…..object of his will.
————-

….aiming to universalize principles…. — Moliere

Granted that a maxim is a subjective principle, is it the principle, or the law of nature which necessarily follows from it, to which universalizing is aimed? I don’t think that which is predicated entirely on subjective constitution has the power of universality as stipulated by the conception of law, especially regarding nature, which in Kant is the totality of all possible things, which in turn manifests as any act by any other moral agent.

If a principle could be universalized, why go through all the trouble of objectively acting as if the mere subjective will, in which the principle resides in the form of pure practical reason, is sufficient causality for all rational beings to follow suit? It is, after all, respect for the law which grounds the interest of the will relative to itself, hence it is respect for the law as universally willed by one, that subsequently becomes the duty of another’s to endorse. In a perfectly moral world, of course, as determined by pure a priori metaphysics.
—————

quote="Moliere;909588"]….an act can follow the moral law and so be legal….[/quote]

Be…..legal? An act that follows the moral law, is good, a tacit description representing the worthiness of being happy, whether or not such act is in accordance with jurisprudence.

I’m pretty sure you didn’t mean to implicate contingent administrative codes, but…..legal?? I just had to bring that one up, donchaknow. I’d beg forgiveness for quibbling, but I ain’t like that. (Grin)

Moliere

Be…..legal? An act that follows the moral law, is good, a tacit description representing the worthiness of being happy, whether or not such act is in accordance with jurisprudence.

I’m pretty sure you didn’t mean to implicate contingent administrative codes, but…..legal?? I just had to bring that one up, donchaknow. I’d beg forgiveness for quibbling, but I ain’t like that. (Grin) — Mww

From his Critique of Practical Reason:

What is essential in the moral worth of actions is that the moral law should directly determine the will. If the determination of the will takes place in conformity indeed to the moral law, but only by means of a feeling, no matter of what kind, which has to be presupposed in order that the law may be sufficient to determine the will, and therefore not for the sake of the law, then the action will possess legality, but not morality.

That's the bit I mean, though I think he means to use legal terms in philosophical ways (similar to the way he uses "deducation" in CPR)

An opinion to which you are certainly entitled, but I would offer that Kant, being the non-stop dualist he admits to being, wants it understood the c.i. also has a dualistic nature, re: its form and its content. As such the form is always the same, insofar as commands of reason cannot be self-contradictory, whatever be the act determinable by the formula of its content, which only expresses the relation between an imperfect subject and the objectively necessity…..lawful…..object of his will. — Mww

I think it's the scope of the commands of reason which Kant narrows with his further iterations. Basically I'd be more dismissive towards the ethic unless I took his other formulations seriously because I think the first formulation makes sense from an ethic that wants to be universalizable, but I'd say this open him up to some pretty damning criticism.

After all: What is self-contradictory about willing a contest of all between all? Isn't that basically one of Nietzsche's motifs (As @Leontiskos alluded to earlier, and which I agree with)? And surely, given the spirit of Kant's various texts, I don't think that's what his moral philosophy entails, exactly.

Taking each articulation "fills out" the ethic, in my estimation, to be something worth thinking through more thoroughly than a reduction to the first articulation of the CI opens up the work to. Read in context it makes a good deal of sense, but if it's the only rule we have to follow in formulating maxims then it seems we're able to will many things which are consistent, but insofar that we are willing to accept that we are also going to be treated as mere means to an end, for instance, we could consistently break the second formulation (even though that goes against the spirit of the text -- but again, there's a notion that's not exactly pure reason...)

Granted that a maxim is a subjective principle, is it the principle, or the law of nature which necessarily follows from it, to which universalizing is aimed? I don’t think that which is predicated entirely on subjective constitution has the power of universality as stipulated by the conception of law, especially regarding nature, which in Kant is the totality of all possible things, which in turn manifests as any act by any other moral agent.

If a principle could be universalized, why go through all the trouble of objectively acting as if the mere subjective will, in which the principle resides in the form of pure practical reason, is sufficient causality for all rational beings to follow suit? It is, after all, respect for the law which grounds the interest of the will relative to itself, hence it is respect for the law as universally willed by one, that subsequently becomes the duty of another’s to endorse. In a perfectly moral world, of course, as determined by pure a priori metaphysics. — Mww

Granted that a maxim is a subjective principle, is it the principle, or the law of nature which necessarily follows from it, to which universalizing is aimed? I don’t think that which is predicated entirely on subjective constitution has the power of universality as stipulated by the conception of law, especially regarding nature, which in Kant is the totality of all possible things, which in turn manifests as any act by any other moral agent. — Mww

There's something funny in Kant here because he posits freedom as its own kind of causality. And so here we are in the world with our bodies as we know them being subject to the laws of nature, and yet we are these noumenal selves with free will able to act. Flipping through the Critique of Practical Reason to find some relevant quotes to think through I came across this (long) quote shortly after the last one in the same chapter:

Reveal

If now we consider also the contents of the knowledge that we can have of a pure practical reason, and by means of it, as shown by the Analytic, we find, along with a remarkable analogy between it and the theoretical, no less remarkable differences. As regards the theoretical, the faculty of a pure rational cognition a priori could be easily and evidently proved by examples from sciences (in which, as they put their principles to the test in so many ways by methodical use, there is not so much reason as in common knowledge to fear a secret mixture of empirical principles of cognition). But, that pure reason without the admixture of any empirical principle is practical of itself, this could only be shown from the commonest practical use of reason, by verifying the fact, that every man's natural reason acknowledges the supreme practical principle as the supreme law of his will- a law completely a priori and not depending on any sensible data. It was necessary first to establish and verify the purity of its origin, even in the judgement of this common reason, before science could take it in hand to make use of it, as a fact, that is, prior to all disputation about its possibility, and all the consequences that may be drawn from it. But this circumstance may be readily explained from what has just been said; because practical pure reason must necessarily begin with principles, which therefore must be the first data, the foundation of all science, and cannot be derived from it. It was possible to effect this verification of moral principles as principles of a pure reason quite well, and with sufficient certainty, by a single appeal to the judgement of common sense, for this reason, that anything empirical which might slip into our maxims as a determining principle of the will can be detected at once by the feeling of pleasure or pain which necessarily attaches to it as exciting desire; whereas pure practical reason positively refuses to admit this feeling into its principle as a condition. The heterogeneity of the determining principles (the empirical and rational) is clearly detected by this resistance of a practically legislating reason against every admixture of inclination, and by a peculiar kind of sentiment, which, however, does not precede the legislation of the practical reason, but, on the contrary, is produced by this as a constraint, namely, by the feeling of a respect such as no man has for inclinations of whatever kind but for the law only; and it is detected in so marked and prominent a manner that even the most uninstructed cannot fail to see at once in an example presented to him, that empirical principles of volition may indeed urge him to follow their attractions, but that he can never be expected to obey anything but the pure practical law of reason alone.

The distinction between the doctrine of happiness and the doctrine of morality, in the former of which empirical principles constitute the entire foundation, while in the second they do not form the smallest part of it, is the first and most important office of the Analytic of pure practical reason; and it must proceed in it with as much exactness and, so to speak, scrupulousness, as any geometer in his work. The philosopher, however, has greater difficulties to contend with here (as always in rational cognition by means of concepts merely without construction), because he cannot take any intuition as a foundation (for a pure noumenon). He has, however, this advantage that, like the chemist, he can at any time make an experiment with every man's practical reason for the purpose of distinguishing the moral (pure) principle of determination from the empirical; namely, by adding the moral law (as a determining principle) to the empirically affected will (e.g., that of the man who would be ready to lie because he can gain something thereby). It is as if the analyst added alkali to a solution of lime in hydrochloric acid, the acid at once forsakes the lime, combines with the alkali, and the lime is precipitated. Just in the same way, if to a man who is otherwise honest (or who for this occasion places himself only in thought in the position of an honest man), we present the moral law by which he recognises the worthlessness of the liar, his practical reason (in forming a judgement of what ought to be done) at once forsakes the advantage, combines with that which maintains in him respect for his own person (truthfulness), and the advantage after it has been separated and washed from every particle of reason (which is altogether on the side of duty) is easily weighed by everyone, so that it can enter into combination with reason in other cases, only not where it could be opposed to the moral law, which reason never forsakes, but most closely unites itself with.

But it does not follow that this distinction between the principle of happiness and that of morality is an opposition between them, and pure practical reason does not require that we should renounce all claim to happiness, but only that the moment duty is in question we should take no account of happiness. It may even in certain respects be a duty to provide for happiness; partly, because (including skill, wealth, riches) it contains means for the fulfilment of our duty; partly, because the absence of it (e.g., poverty) implies temptations to transgress our duty. But it can never be an immediate duty to promote our happiness, still less can it be the principle of all duty. Now, as all determining principles of the will, except the law of pure practical reason alone (the moral law), are all empirical and, therefore, as such, belong to the principle of happiness, they must all be kept apart from the supreme principle of morality and never be incorporated with it as a condition; since this would be to destroy all moral worth just as much as any empirical admixture with geometrical principles would destroy the certainty of mathematical evidence, which in Plato's opinion is the most excellent thing in mathematics, even surpassing their utility.

Instead, however, of the deduction of the supreme principle of pure practical reason, that is, the explanation of the possibility of such a knowledge a priori, the utmost we were able to do was to show that if we saw the possibility of the freedom of an efficient cause, we should also see not merely the possibility, but even the necessity, of the moral law as the supreme practical law of rational beings, to whom we attribute freedom of causality of their will; because both concepts are so inseparably united that we might define practical freedom as independence of the will on anything but the moral law. But we cannot perceive the possibility of the freedom of an efficient cause, especially in the world of sense; we are fortunate if only we can be sufficiently assured that there is no proof of its impossibility, and are now, by the moral law which postulates it, compelled and therefore authorized to assume it. However, there are still many who think that they can explain this freedom on empirical principles, like any other physical faculty, and treat it as a psychological property, the explanation of which only requires a more exact study of the nature of the soul and of the motives of the will, and not as a transcendental predicate of the causality of a being that belongs to the world of sense (which is really the point). They thus deprive us of the grand revelation which we obtain through practical reason by means of the moral law, the revelation, namely, of a supersensible world by the realization of the otherwise transcendent concept of freedom, and by this deprive us also of the moral law itself, which admits no empirical principle of determination. Therefore it will be necessary to add something here as a protection against this delusion and to exhibit empiricism in its naked superficiality.

But my tl;dr understanding here is that it's the principle is aimed at universalization. So we have Kant who believes that lying is always bad, no matter the circumstances, and he holds it as a principle everyone ought follow. While we are all free agents, and so can choose our own ends, when we hold a principle to universalize it we obviously would like it if others followed suit -- that is, if they recognized that we are also end-makers as they are, and so if we respect one another as moral beings of choice we'll come to some rules just by the necessity of having to get along in a moral community.

So in the long run, supposing everyone adopts the same maxim, then the moral law becomes as if it were a natural law -- it's empirical, and everyone follows it, and so it is indistinguishable from natural law.

However, what makes this possible (again, in my head-cannon) is that there are two kinds of causality, one of which is a category for theoretical reason, and the other which is a category for practical reason, and since these are just two different powers of reason at the center of the thinking subject we are free to employ them as we see fit -- and Kant makes it clear in the quote above that theoretical reason is believed because of the success of science, and practical reason due to an appeal to common sense.

Moliere

Does any of that fit with Kant? — frank

I don't think so. I mean I can squint a bit, but not really.

Mww

↪Moliere

It’s all good. It’s better to have taken the time to digest this philosophy, then to argue over differences in interpretations of it, perhaps from differences in primary sources. You seem to favor CpR, the philosophy concerning the empirical part of ethics, while I draw from Groundwork, which concerns the non-empirical parts, re: morality proper. Actually, you might find a mix of the two, but I kinda don’t.

schopenhauer1

↪Moliere

↪Mww

On a tangent based on last notions of CI.. IF CI cannot be practically reasoned as to "what" counts as universalizable, what practical use is it?

For example, if All X, did Y, then there would be no need for X.. I know he presents "perfect" and "imperfect" as a way around this, but how is this really solving the problem and not being accused of ad hoc rationalizations of this "pristine" ethic that arises from the non-empirical?

Rather, I think the second formulation is simply a good basis to deem an ethics proper from, because it provides a locus of ethics (the individual), and the content of the universal principle (dignity, people as ends). Any other universalizability principle from the first formulation is bound to come up with application problems as to how one can and cannot universalize.

Moliere

↪Mww

Oh, for sure. I mostly just wanted to show that he says some stuff about that somewhere -- and that's the first place I thought of to look.

My inclination is to try and read them all as a whole, even though there are tensions all throughout the philosophy, and I certainly haven't worked out the whole coherent picture -- but it's still fun to think about and look at.

Re: The original question, I've been convinced that it's better to say Lutheran, at least, if I'm going to make this association, because that seems less loaded (yet more familiar than "Pietist", which is what I was thinking with "Protestant": a familiar distinction)-- something I didn't consider was how heavily the Protestant/Catholic divide could figure into the statement, when I was more just thinking about how my own origins in a protestant religion get along with a lot of Kant's sentiments, and I think this was probably was initially attracted me to the philosophy: It was like an ethics I "felt", that could be articulated, but without all the metaphysical stories and strange arguments.

On a tangent based on last notions of CI.. IF CI cannot be practically reasoned as to "what" counts as universalizable, what practical use is it? — schopenhauer1

By the way I've been expressing Kant he's not providing it as a practical tool, but as a philosopher's interpretation of the everyday good person's morality.

Though I don't think it's that hard, given Kant's examples and reading in context, what he has in mind. If not then I'd be on flimsy footing with respect to my assertion that we can differentiate the four formulations in the way I've attempted to make them more mutually supportive.

schopenhauer1

Though I don't think it's that hard, given Kant's examples and reading in context, what he has in mind. If not then I'd be on flimsy footing with respect to my assertion that we can differentiate the four formulations in the way I've attempted to make them more mutually supportive. — Moliere

It does seem rather hard because how are we to determine if something like, “Everybody shouldn’t be an asshole because if everybody were assholes, we might live in a world without congeniality,” is universalizable? That he would say wouldn’t lead to a logical contradiction. Therefore, it’s an imperfect duty.

However, stealing would lead to a logical contradiction because property itself would be undermined if everyone followed this. I am sure that there are many maxim that if universalized would lead to contradictions or absurdities. It’s hard to figure out what rules would be necessary to universalize and what ones are not important enough for this universalization.

Moliere

It does seem rather hard because how are we to determine if something like, “Everybody shouldn’t be an asshole because if everybody were assholes, we might live in a world without congeniality,” is universalizable? That he would say wouldn’t lead to a logical contradiction. Therefore, it’s an imperfect duty.

However, stealing would lead to a logical contradiction because property itself would be undermined if everyone followed this. I am sure that there are many maxim that if universalized would lead to contradictions or absurdities. It’s hard to figure out what rules would be necessary to universalize and what ones are not important enough for this universalization. — schopenhauer1

Kant had no problem with choosing "Lying" as an example.

In a plain-language sense, it seems to me that as long as someone's principle they're enacting could be enacted by everyone without undermining the principle then this maxim is a maxim which passes the first formulation of the C.I.

If everyone follows the maxim "Do not lie" or "Always tell the truth", that would not lead to some contradiction in actions between the group of people who have adopted the maxim.

I'm not sure a person can adopt the maxim that "Everybody should not. . . " -- that's not of the form of a maxim, is it? Individuals will maxims, so quoting from the Groundwork of metaphysics of morals:

/ ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim
should become a universal law. Here mere conformity to law as such, without having as its basis some law determined for certain actions, is what
serves the will as its principle, and must so serve it, if duty is not to be
everywhere an empty delusion and a chimerical concept.

The clarification thereafter being that if the maxim was not universalizable then it would undermine the very basis of law.

Since the ethic is based in freedom which one's we pick to universalize is kind of up to us -- but a meta-ethical description from the philosophy would say that if you picked a maxim which might only look universalizable but carries special exceptions to it then it would fail the first formulation and could not even be a candidate for the moral law (since it, somehow, undermines the notion of law itself)

Given the large use of jurisprudence in Kant, and especially taking after his deduction, I take it that if we wanted others to adopt our maxims we'd have to present them in some sense as we would to any tribunal of reason: So we tell which ones we can universalize through rational judgment.

Leontiskos

Be…..legal? An act that follows the moral law, is good, a tacit description representing the worthiness of being happy... — Mww

"The distinction between the doctrine of happiness and the doctrine of morality, in the former of which empirical principles constitute the entire foundation, while in the second they do not form the smallest part of it..." — Moliere

You seem to favor CpR, the philosophy concerning the empirical part of ethics, while I draw from Groundwork, which concerns the non-empirical parts, re: morality proper. — Mww

The Groundwork is just as clear that an act premised on happiness would not be moral.

It’s hard to figure out what rules would be necessary to universalize and what ones are not important enough for this universalization. — schopenhauer1

And regarding that earlier concept of communal self-interest the question arises of whether a failure to universalize results in a contradiction or whether it results in societal disintegration. For example:

If everyone follows the maxim "Do not lie" or "Always tell the truth", that would not lead to some contradiction in actions between the group of people who have adopted the maxim. — Moliere

...Moliere talks about a "contradiction in actions between the group of people," which is apparently social conflict.

Moliere

...Moliere talks about a "contradiction in actions between the group of people," which is apparently social conflict. — Leontiskos

Well.. sort of -- but no, because social conflict is usually about competing groups -- two different actions or maxims or something.

Here still in the imagination: If the maxim could not be followed by a group of people, such as the lying example where if everyone told lies then no one could tell lies and so the maxim couldn't be followed insofar that everyone that's "in group" followed it -- that's what I think it means. Also, just looking at the quote, something about undermining law itself (or duty itself -- perhaps that you could come up with a metaphysic of morals that evaluates maxims, such as a utilitarian one which has some method of computing good or bad, but then this would not be an ethic of duty anymore, which is what Kant is getting at)

Moliere

In a more general sense: I think everyone has a line somewhere where you simply don't cross because it's the wrong thing to do. (or some follow rules because they just think it's the right thing):

As long as the maxim that serves as motive for the rule can be followed by everyone then it's a candidate.

Batman's "Code Against Killing" works here. Batman doesn't kill the bad guys because killing is bad, full stop. As long as everyone followed the maxim "Don't kill", everyone could still follow the maxim "Don't kill" -- so it's permitted as a maxim. Batman does this not because it benefits him -- there are many criminals, such as the Joker, that if he'd kill Gotham would be safer. He does it out of a sense of duty (or trauma, whatever -- it's a superhero story so we can say it's duty ;) )

So to figure out if a maxim is universalizable first you'd have to have some maxim you're considering and go through this thought experiment before the tribunal of reason.

Leontiskos

↪Moliere

- That's fair, but I would still say that in each case social disintegration threatens on the heels of the "contradiction."

Moliere

↪Leontiskos

True.

I poke fun at Kant's lying example, but @unenlightened has made the point many times over, and it is also true, that if we all adopt the maxim that everyone is lying -- that it's all propaganda -- then the lying and propaganda ceases to work because we all know that we're all making propaganda and lying to one another and so there's no point in listening. There is something deeply pro-social to the ethic, I think, even though it's framed in these individual terms (which is one of the reasons I bring up Rousseau)

Leontiskos

↪Moliere

- No, it's a good point, and I think Kant got lying right. Trust is incredibly important to the existence of society. It's no wonder ours is collapsing. :grimace:

schopenhauer1

I'm not sure a person can adopt the maxim that "Everybody should not. . . " -- that's not of the form of a maxim, is it? Individuals will maxims, so quoting from the Groundwork of metaphysics of morals: — Moliere

I mean reformulate it how you like to fit the definition of a maxim.

Since the ethic is based in freedom which one's we pick to universalize is kind of up to us -- but a meta-ethical description from the philosophy would say that if you picked a maxim which might only look universalizable but carries special exceptions to it then it would fail the first formulation and could not even be a candidate for the moral law (since it, somehow, undermines the notion of law itself) — Moliere

But that's the point, is that it's hard to figure out in every situation.. and since..

Given the large use of jurisprudence in Kant, and especially taking after his deduction, I take it that if we wanted others to adopt our maxims we'd have to present them in some sense as we would to any tribunal of reason: So we tell which ones we can universalize through rational judgment. — Moliere

...there's no objective tribunal, it's hard to tell what matters and what doesn't, and thus, it's hard to determine who is applying it correctly.

You may think being an asshole isn't universalizable, but I might think it is. And even the subject of this thread.. the Pietism for which he may have been influenced comes in mostly it seems, in the parts of his philosophy whereby he thinks we are being moral when we will ourselves out of respect of the law, which is a state that is impossible to ascertain.

And regarding that earlier concept of communal self-interest the question arises of whether a failure to universalize results in a contradiction or whether it results in societal disintegration. For example:

If everyone follows the maxim "Do not lie" or "Always tell the truth", that would not lead to some contradiction in actions between the group of people who have adopted the maxim.
— Moliere

...Moliere talks about a "contradiction in actions between the group of people," which is apparently social conflict. — Leontiskos

Could this distinction be between perfect and imperfect duties? I see imperfect duties as close to Rawls' Veil of Ignorance. What do you think?

I found this website helpful in a very brief sketch of the problems:
https://myweb.ecu.edu/mccartyr/GW/perfectandimperfectduties.asp

Moliere

You may think being an asshole isn't universalizable, but I might think it is. — schopenhauer1

What would stop it from being universalizable? Surely if everyone follows the maxim "Be an asshole" that doesn't lead to self-contradiction as much as a world of assholes. This is why I think you need the 2nd, and other, formulations to start making sense of Kant's ethic as a recognizable, even common-sense, ethical theory (that is stated philosophically) -- I don't think that the other formulations logically follow from the first formulation (though they are consistent and seem to work well together, I think)

Although I'd be hesitant to put forward a maxim which references being or character or something along those lines because then it'd be difficult to distinguish it from virtue-theoretic ethics, which I think it ought be distinguished from.

I think actions are the sorts of things under consideration: So the 10 commandments come to mind, along with the imperfect duties like improving yourself which a person is given leeway to execute. They're of the form of an imperative:
"(You) Do not lie!"
"(You) Improve your talents!"

So if a person held to some maxim, which is that doing such and such is a good thing or not doing such and such is a bad thing, and it's done out of respect for the moral law rather than inclination then it is moral.

At least, this is what I would say. I'd think that for a maxim to fall to the first formulation it'd have to somehow mimic those examples where the maxim followed by an individual in a society can be followed, but if somehow everyone magically started to follow that maxim no one could follow the maxim anymore. He's going for something like a contradiction, but instead with respect to practical reason I think. So it's a logic, but now a logic of ethics.

In terms of a dispute between two decisions, well -- that'd be a split in the soul, in the case of an individual trying to make a choice. And of course choices are hard -- but that's what the power of judgment is about! :D

schopenhauer1

So if a person held to some maxim, which is that doing such and such is a good thing or not doing such and such is a bad thing — Moliere

But my point was that maybe one cannot discern this is "a good thing". For example, if I tell myself, "Don't make the cashier go back to the register from the window to get the quarter he owes me. Let him keep the quarter because I can afford not taking the quarter and rarely use change..." Can that be universalizable? Perhaps, but then someone else can say, "No sir! That quarter, if you don't let the cashier give you the quarter when it is owed you, then it justifies not being provided one's fair share!" Or another person might say, "No sir, if everyone was to not take money they are owed, then the principle of saving and thrift would be violated, even if one can afford it!".

Now, this EXTREMELY minor, but that's the point.. Everyday living is unclear and full of contradictions and hard to discern values that often compete. Just following one version of an imperfect duty might override another version of an imperfect duty.

Now, it looks like you are prepared to say that Kant thinks that as long as we are following this imperfect duty out of respect for universal law, then it is all good. But then, how is the universalizable principle useful to tell us what to actually do? It becomes impotent. You seem to indicate that here:

So if a person held to some maxim, which is that doing such and such is a good thing or not doing such and such is a bad thing, and it's done out of respect for the moral law rather than inclination then it is moral. — Moliere

At least, this is what I would say. I'd think that for a maxim to fall to the first formulation it'd have to somehow mimic those examples where the maxim followed by an individual in a society can be followed, but if somehow everyone magically started to follow that maxim no one could follow the maxim anymore. — Moliere

That is the first formulation in regards to perfect duty, not imperfect duties. A lot fewer things fall under a performative contradiction. It is arguable that even the perfect duties could be interpreted rather indecently by someone who doesn't mind living in a "man eat man world", Mad-Max style, so they never thought of it as "theft" to begin with, just "might makes right". And we are at square one, because their ethic universalized would be just what they are doing.. "Come get it, bitch, or I will take what's mine!". Not decent at all!

In terms of a dispute between two decisions, well -- that'd be a split in the soul, in the case of an individual trying to make a choice. And of course choices are hard -- but that's what the power of judgment is about! :D — Moliere

In fact, his notion that people should do things to maintain a society because then we wouldn't be alive to enact our free will in the first place, assumes a certain goal that doesn't seem to itself have justification. "Well don't you want to live in a society so you can carry out your ends?" can be answered, "No, not if it means that suffering exists!" And hence, antinatalism.. Ironically though, it is based on Kant's second formulation (that people have dignity), that I think the real value of a basis for ethics is defined more clearly, and is part of a basis for antinatalism. "Not causing suffering" is no longer a contradiction in regards to procreation, if we consider that the decision will affect someone.

Indeed, but then ethics is telling us very little how to act if the choices aren't really clear, but just there to make you feel better that you had a reasoning behind the decision.

But oddly enough, the Protestant background comes into play... As faith alone in the belief in Jesus is considered the height of Protestant understanding of salvation, so too does one's faith in respect for the universal law as the arbiter of "moral worth" for Kant. However, again, this might be seen as not enough, as we can never know if the decision itself was morally good, only our faith in our belief in the decision's intent.

Moliere

But my point was that maybe one cannot discern this is "a good thing"
...
Now, this EXTREMELY minor, but that's the point.. Everyday living is unclear and full of contradictions and hard to discern values that often compete. — schopenhauer1

Sure.

In fact, his notion that people should do things to maintain a society because then we wouldn't be alive to enact our free will in the first place, assumes a certain goal that doesn't seem to itself have justification. "Well don't you want to live in a society so you can carry out your ends?" can be answered, "No, not if it means that suffering exists!" — schopenhauer1

Not want to, it's your duty too -- even in misery, you have a duty to not commit suicide, by kant. So even if the anti-natalist demonstrates that hedonism is satisfied this will not move the deontologist who is fairly easy to imagine having a duty to preserve life, given the Christian trappings.

Everyday living is unclear and full of contradictions and hard to discern values that often compete. Just following one version of an imperfect duty might override another version of an imperfect duty. — schopenhauer1

Yes.

Now, it looks like you are prepared to say that Kant thinks that as long as we are following this imperfect duty out of respect for universal law, then it is all good. But then, how is the universalizable principle useful to tell us what to actually do? It becomes impotent. — schopenhauer1

I don't think his ethic tells us what to actually do. That's a feature of it because it's based in human freedom. Given human freedom, these are the conditions of acting morally.

Now he'll say that most people do not act morally, but out of inclination, but hence the need for things like immortality so we may perfect ourselves into the beings we have the potential to become. "What to actually do" is up to us, insofar that we respect the moral law -- at least if we are going to act ethically according to Kant's theory of ethics.

I take it seriously as an ethic that we should understand, but I'm not defending it or anything like that. I'd say that it has a time and a place -- such as when we have principles, lines in the sand which we draw which we will not cross because that's just the right thing to do.

It's in this sense that I think it's fairly simple to understand what discerning "a good thing" is -- it's what people do because it's a good thing to do, rather than from self-interest or vice.

People will disagree on that "good thing", of course -- but still there are some people who hold principles because they think they are good, for all that. Whether they follow them or not, I believe this is the sort of thing Kant means.

schopenhauer1

Not want to, it's your duty too -- even in misery, you have a duty to not commit suicide, by kant. So even if the anti-natalist demonstrates that hedonism is satisfied this will not move the deontologist who is fairly easy to imagine having a duty to preserve life, given the Christian trappings. — Moliere

About that, I think the second formulation and the "not causing suffering" go together, so can be uncoupled by the, as you say, "Christian trappings" of "preserve life".

Most deontological ethics revolve around dignity. I think autonomy, non-malfeasance, non-paternalism, etc. fall under this ethic, and leads to one that is negative ethics. A positive ethics, "We must live for X cause/objective", becomes a violation of the respect of someone's dignity.

Moliere

Most deontological ethics revolve around dignity. I think autonomy, non-malfeasance, non-paternalism, etc. fall under this ethic, and leads to one that is negative ethics. A positive ethics, "We must live for X cause/objective", becomes a violation of the respect of someone's dignity. — schopenhauer1

How's that?

Suppose the maxim "Feed the hungry" -- sounds like a positive duty in that it's not limiting what one should do but is a maxim a person feels they ought perform. If everyone followed that maxim then it would not defeat itself. Where's the violation of dignity in feeding the hungry?

schopenhauer1

Where's the violation of dignity in feeding the hungry? — Moliere

It's more complicated I should say. All things being equal, certainly feeding the hungry is recognizing dignity. But if you save a person after putting them into harm, that would not be recognizing dignity. So, if you could have prevented the harm to someone, but instead did things that allowed harm, so that you can justify it by taking care of the problem afterwards, that would not be respecting someone's dignity. So it is a matter of preventative over palliative if possible, not bypassing preventative with the justification of palliative.

Moliere

All things being equal, certainly feeding the hungry is recognizing dignity. But if you save a person after putting them into harm, that would not be recognizing dignity. So, if you could have prevented the harm to someone, but instead did things that allowed harm, so that you can justify it by taking care of the problem afterwards, that would not be respecting someone's dignity. So it is a matter of preventative over palliative if possible, not bypassing preventative with the justification of palliative. — schopenhauer1

Only if we must always have a maxim in order to make a decision -- but given that Kant believes we usually follow our inclination, rather than a moral maxim, we could just admit that there's no maxim here to making a choice.

In its application, and examples of conflict -- I think that's where we can start seeing how Kant's philosophy sets up the ideas that lead to existential themes.

Kant's ethic is protestant

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