Perhaps mess and muddle is an inescapable part of human life? And then, the attempt to escape also becomes an inescapable part of human life. Perhaps the best thing to do is to embrace mess and muddle - but then, what would become of philosophy? — Ludwig V

I think philosophy is the embracing of mess and muddle.

Well, the first half of that is a bit unorthodox. — Ludwig V

Notice, that for Berkeley "matter" is presented as a concept which would commonly be used to account for the supposed independent existence of the things (noumena). However, he shows that "matter" is really an unnecessary supposition, it is not actually required to be assumed as part of the independent thing to understand its independent existence. This implies that "matter" is actually a concept use to account for the sense appearance of things (phenomena).

Look at it like this. He shows that if we take "matter" out of the thing, we lose nothing from our conceptions of independent things. That is because our conceptions are formal (in the Aristotelian sense of form). Nevertheless, regardless of what Berkeley shows, we find that "matter" is indispensable to the understanding of our sensations of things. This is because we sense things as active, changing, and Aristotle introduced "matter" as the means for understanding the potential for change.

Incidentally, Hume seems to reverse this perspective in his critique of skepticism. He represents sense perception as consisting of instances of changeless states of being, with activity or change being inferred as what occurs between these describable instances or states of sensation. If this is reality, then the forms of things are what we perceive through sensation, and "matter" is added by the mind to account for what happens to the independent things between these instances of sensation.

In each case, "matter" maintains its Aristotelian base as the potential for change, and the unintelligible aspect of reality. Berkeley, like Kant (with space and time) positions matter as something a priori, created within the human body or mind, as a necessary condition for sense perception, but not necessary for the independent existence of things. Hume turns this around and leaves matter as an a posteriori concept created by the mind in order to understand the independent existence of things which are sensed, rather than as necessary for the sense appearance of things. This he does in his effort to quell skepticism. But Hume misrepresents sensation as consisting of instances, or states of being, rather than consisting of continuous activity. So Hume's attack on skepticism is supported by falsity.

Perhaps so. However, I've always thought that Kant essentially accepts Berkeley, especially his argument that the distinction between primary and secondary qualities doesn't hold up, so that time and space are mind-dependent, as well as colour, etc. Including matter in that argument makes sense. Once you have accepted the distinction between reality and appearance, ideas and things, phenomena and noumena, that conclusion is more or less inevitable. The only way out is to reject, or at least recast, the distinction. — Ludwig V

Why reject it though, when it seems to be completely consistent with how I experience things? Time and space are not the properties of any things, nor are they in any way a part of the form of a thing, they are the basis for the conceptual tools by which we understand the activities of things. And what we sense is these activities, while the mind distinguishes things, as aspects of the sensations which appear to maintain sameness. Whether this sameness, continuity, which appears within our sensations of activity, and is constitutive of being and existence, is real or not is the object of skepticism.

I'm glad you enjoy my efforts. I find mutual enjoyment is by far the best basis for an interesting discussion.
However, I would have to take issue with the title of the post of yours that you cited. But I'll read it nonetheless. I'm not sure I can contribute much to the discussion there, but we'll see.

That's the death knell of Cartesian doubt.

Notice, that for Berkeley "matter" is presented as a concept which would commonly be used to account for the supposed independent existence of the things (noumena). However, he shows that "matter" is really an unnecessary supposition, it is not actually required to be assumed as part of the independent thing to understand its independent existence. This implies that "matter" is actually a concept use to account for the sense appearance of things (phenomena). — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm afraid I'm not quite on board with this. It makes sense on its own terms. I thought matter was posited to account for things persisting through change, and that in any case, for Aristotle, if not others, the object of perception of things is their form (or maybe perceptible form?). But I don't recognize Berkeley here.
For Berkeley, the mind-independent existence of anything is ruled out by "esse" is "percipi". That principle is why he rules out matter as not merely unnecessary but impossible.
He is embarrassed by two problems. First, he realizes that I never perceive myself and second he recognizes that some of our ideas have a cause that is not me. So he introduces a concept of a "notion" which is just like an idea, but applies to ideas of things that we don't perceive. So he provides for my existence and then introduces the idea - sorry, notion - of God, which provides a cause of ideas that is not me. (He also slips in the existence of other minds, which creates even more confusion.) This manoeuvre also allows him to deny that he is denying the existence of anything; he makes much more of this in the Dialogues, which, of course, he wrote later and so, one suspects, he takes into account public reaction to the Treatise. I'm confused about whether the ideas produced by God exist in His Mind, my mind or both but they certainly depend on a mind. So it is clear that nothing exists that is not mind-dependent, even though some things exist independently of my mind.

He shows that if we take "matter" out of the thing, we lose nothing from our conceptions of independent things. That is because our conceptions are formal (in the Aristotelian sense of form). Nevertheless, regardless of what Berkeley shows, we find that "matter" is indispensable to the understanding of our sensations of things. This is because we sense things as active, changing, and Aristotle introduced "matter" as the means for understanding the potential for change. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not sure who "he" is here. But Berkeley certainly dispenses with matter altogether. It has no place in his world. God supplies all that is needed to explain our sensations of things, and explains change. I'm not sure whether his concept of ideas matches the idea of forms, but it certainly seems possible.

In each case, "matter" maintains its Aristotelian base as the potential for change, and the unintelligible aspect of reality. Berkeley, like Kant (with space and time) positions matter as something a priori, created within the human body or mind, as a necessary condition for sense perception, but not necessary for the independent existence of things. — Metaphysician Undercover

I suppose he would have to accept that the idea of matter can exist in a mind. But I don't think Berkeley's idea of ideas includes the potential for change. They are posited as inert and inactive, which Berkeley things rules out any causal relations between them - causal changes as we experience them are created and maintained by God. So far as I can see, he recognizes only one possibility for change - minds.

Hume turns this around and leaves matter as an a posteriori concept created by the mind in order to understand the independent existence of things which are sensed, rather than as necessary for the sense appearance of things. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure about this at all. I agree that, for Hume, relations between ideas are created (by association) in our minds. I found him curiously silent on Berkeley's issue. I have the impression that the existence of external, mind-independent objects is not explicitly ruled out. My speculation is the Hume did not want to get caught up in Berkeley.

Why reject it (sc. the distinction between phenomena and noumena) though, when it seems to be completely consistent with how I experience things? — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, "reject" is perhaps too strong and too simple. How could I not recognize the difference between appearance and reality? Whether it is consistent with how I experience things is one issue.
But our senses tell us about the world we live in, so long as we are suitably critical of what they seem to be telling us. Somehow they have become a VR headset which is an obstacle to our knowing that the world is "really" like and probably feeding us nothing but lies. It's a fantasy and the granddaddy of conspiracy theories. (OK, that's a caricature. It's only meant to show the direction of travel.)

It looks to me as if you (or is it Kant?) are trying to read Berkeley without God. Berkeley's work is as much theology as philosophy, so it is rather awkward for philosophers to deal with.

...second he [Berkley] recognizes that some of our ideas have a cause that is not me. — Ludwig V

If it is not too much trouble could you expand upon this? I'm wondering how Berkeley might distinguish between an idea having a cause "that is not me" and an idea having a cause that is me, but of a sort of causality that Berkley doesn't understand.

Certainly.

You may think me lazy, but here are some extracts from the Treatise that should (I hope) explain what you're asking about.

On the cause(s) of ideas:-

26. CAUSE OF IDEAS.--We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. There is therefore some cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination of ideas, is clear from the preceding section. It must therefore be a substance; but it has been shown that there is no corporeal or material substance: it remains therefore that the CAUSE OF IDEAS is an incorporeal active substance or Spirit.

28. I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain and grounded on experience; but when we think of unthinking agents or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves with words.

29. IDEAS OF SENSATION DIFFER FROM THOSE OF REFLECTION OR MEMORY.--But, whatever power I may have over MY OWN thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will. When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is THEREFORE SOME OTHER WILL OR SPIRIT that PRODUCES THEM.

33. OF REAL THINGS AND IDEAS OR CHIMERAS.--The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature are called REAL THINGS; and those excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed IDEAS, or IMAGES OF THINGS, which they copy and represent. But then our sensations, be they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless IDEAS, that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. The ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to be more (1)STRONG, (2)ORDERLY, and (3)COHERENT than the creatures of the mind; but this is no argument that they exist without the mind. They are also (4)LESS DEPENDENT ON THE SPIRIT [Note: Vide sect. xxix.--Note.], or thinking substance which perceives them, in that they are excited by the will of another and more powerful spirit; yet still they are IDEAS, and certainly no IDEA, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it.

It would not be unfair to say that Berkeley is not very articulate about his notion of causality. He maintains that something that is "inert" cannot cause (or be affected by) anything. The only agent of change he recognizes is a mind. The passage in bold in section 28 above is more or less all he has to say about this. This section explains why (sort of):-

27. NO IDEA OF SPIRIT.--A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being--as it perceives ideas it is called the UNDERSTANDING, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the WILL. Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit; for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert (vide sect. 25), they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or LIKENESS, that which acts. A little attention will make it plain to any one, that to have an idea which shall be like that active principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature of SPIRIT, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived, BUT ONLY BY THE EFFECTS WHICH IT PRODUCETH. If any man shall doubt of the truth of what is here delivered, let him but reflect and try if he can frame the idea of any power or active being, and whether he has ideas of two principal powers, marked by the names WILL and UNDERSTANDING, distinct from each other as well as from a third idea of Substance or Being in general, with a relative notion of its supporting or being the subject of the aforesaid powers--which is signified by the name SOUL or SPIRIT. This is what some hold; but, so far as I can see, the words WILL [Note: "Understanding, mind."--Edit 1710.], SOUL, SPIRIT, do not stand for different ideas, or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something which is very different from ideas, and which, being an agent, cannot be like unto, or represented by, any idea whatsoever. Though it must be owned at the same time that we have some notion of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind: such as willing, loving, hating--inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning of these words.

The passage in bold in section 28 above is more or less all he has to say about how a mind does what it does.

I take it that you mean by "energetic" the concept of energy that is defined by physics? Which, by definition, studies what is physical?
Perhaps St. Augustine's remark about time applies to matter, as well. — Ludwig V

We experience our own efforts all the time. We know energy from the inside, so to speak, and the idea of an interaction that does not involve energy, energy exchange, is inconceivable. So, I start from there, physics is merely an elaboration and formalization of that understanding. Speaking of basics, have you never heard of the four fundamental forces?

For my money, it is the neglect of the elementary point that both "substantial" and "real" do not have a determinate sense outside the context of their use. — Ludwig V

I passed this over before, and I should have made the point that this is a truism that applies to all terms whatsoever. There are no terms that have determinate senses outside the contexts of their use, which makes your point seem somewhat moot.

I'm afraid I'm not quite on board with this. It makes sense on its own terms. I thought matter was posited to account for things persisting through change, and that in any case, for Aristotle, if not others, the object of perception of things is their form (or maybe perceptible form?). But I don't recognize Berkeley here.
For Berkeley, the mind-independent existence of anything is ruled out by "esse" is "percipi". That principle is why he rules out matter as not merely unnecessary but impossible. — Ludwig V

I find this to be a bit scrambled but I'll see what I can do to sort it out with my understanding of Berkeley. First, I do not think that Berkeley could, even if he tried, prove that matter is impossible. The materialist, he explains, assumes" matter" to account for the continued existence of bodies when not being perceived. This is 'the need' for "matter". Berkely avoids this need with the assumption of God. Instead of being material, bodies can exist independently of human minds, as ideas, by being in the mind of God.

I believe that the notion of mind-independence is a bit misleading when interpreting Berkeley. Things not apprehended by my mind, may still exist independently of my mind, if they are apprehended by your mind or someone else's, as you acknowledge. So things not apprehended by any human mind might still be apprehended by God's mind. All things are mind dependent as things, and this makes "matter" in the sense described, completely unnecessary. It doesn't prove that "matter" is impossible, and I can show you how matter must be allowed, in through the back door.

Berkeley allows that separate people have separate minds, and God's mind is separate from human minds. But I do not think that he adequately addresses the issue of what provides for the separation between one mind and another. So we need a concept like "matter" to provide for the separation between minds.

As for Aristotle's concept of matter, it is primarily defined in his physics, as you say, as what persists through change. However, since the form of the thing is what actually changes, then the matter is said to provide the potential for change. That's how matter escapes the law of excluded middle, as potential, what neither is nor is not. And this is why it is the aspect of the world which is unintelligible to us. So the supposed underlying aspect of a thing which persists through change, matter, is completely unintelligible to us.

Not sure who "he" is here. But Berkeley certainly dispenses with matter altogether. It has no place in his world. God supplies all that is needed to explain our sensations of things, and explains change. I'm not sure whether his concept of ideas matches the idea of forms, but it certainly seems possible. — Ludwig V

Yes, I agree Berkeley dispenses with matter, as unnecessary, but not as disproven. And, as I explained above, his way of dispensing of it leaves a hole in our understanding of reality, what separates one mind from another mind, and human minds from God's mind. So he leaves the back door open, for matter to take on a new position in his form of idealism. Therefore dualism is not avoided.

I'm not sure about this at all. I agree that, for Hume, relations between ideas are created (by association) in our minds. I found him curiously silent on Berkeley's issue. I have the impression that the existence of external, mind-independent objects is not explicitly ruled out. My speculation is the Hume did not want to get caught up in Berkeley. — Ludwig V

I believe the principal difference between Hume and Berkeley is that Hume didn't believe in God. This is why he turned things around, as I described. He had to put sensations, sense impressions, as prior to ideas, because the independent things could not be conceived of as existing as ideas. Ideas are derived from sense impressions, so that there is a sort of separation between these two, whereas Berkeley saw no need to make such a distinction.

Well, "reject" is perhaps too strong and too simple. How could I not recognize the difference between appearance and reality? Whether it is consistent with how I experience things is one issue.
But our senses tell us about the world we live in, so long as we are suitably critical of what they seem to be telling us. Somehow they have become a VR headset which is an obstacle to our knowing that the world is "really" like and probably feeding us nothing but lies. It's a fantasy and the granddaddy of conspiracy theories. (OK, that's a caricature. It's only meant to show the direction of travel.) — Ludwig V

This is where we completely differ. How can you possibly distinguish between appearance and reality? Once you accept that there is such a distinction to be made, you plunge yourself into a quagmire because you need to provide principles by which you would distinguish between the two. But anything produced would be a principle, and not something sensed. So being "suitably critical" of what our senses tell us really means nothing more than being skeptical. And I guess you might describe the skeptical position as "the senses are feeding us nothing but lies", but really it's just that they don't show us the way reality truly is. And I believe science has already proven this, so where's the big problem with skepticism?

I'm wondering how Berkeley might distinguish between an idea having a cause "that is not me" and an idea having a cause that is me, but of a sort of causality that Berkley doesn't understand. — wonderer1

This is the issue I refer to above, the separation between one mind and another mind, between human minds and God's mind. Berkeley provides no good principles to account for this separation, and that allows us to bring "matter" in through the back door, as that which separates individual minds, and keeps a distinction between God's mind and human minds.

I think Midgley makes a profound point. Below, from that "article" you referenced, I pasted a snippet. She may have been compelled by her locus in History, to cloak it in a domestic gown, but she was presenting a meaningful hypothesis.

"I am quite sure of is that for anybody living intimately with them as a genuine member of a family...their consciousness would be every bit as certain as his own...Philosophers have generally talked for instance as though it were obvious that one consciousness went to one body, as though each person were a closed system...I wonder whether they would have said the same if they had been frequently pregnant and suckling... if in a word they had got used to the idea that their bodies were by no means exclusively their own?" --M. Midgley

Her point, I take it, to be that we do not [contra Descartes] have to infer the existence of the same consciousness in others. She was beyond Descartes, the subject, "I", and phenomenal perception. She locates her proof in the organic being, human being, the animal; in its organic bonding with kin. There you don't have to meditate, reflect, analyze to know other is real, you are the other. And the "problem" with post Cartesian explorations of what can we know, is it limited itself to what can we know via an exercise of Language? As if that had a monopoly on truth. Why not bonding as a source for the truth that we are not utterly isolated in our consciousness? Or is philosophy not about truth, but about it within a restricted framework?

I think Midgley makes a profound point. — ENOAH

I agree with you. However, @Fooloso4's points about the way she makes her point are also important. The issue crops up all the time in reading texts from the past - and the present. Her ideas about marriage, family, maturity were pretty much conventional, though not uncontested, at the time and still exist. We need to be able to acknowledge both sides of this, though I haven't worked out how to do so properly.

Her point, I take it, to be that we do not [contra Descartes] have to infer the existence of the same consciousness in others. She was beyond Descartes, the subject, "I", and phenomenal perception. — ENOAH

Yes, quite so.

Why not bonding as a source for the truth that we are not utterly isolated in our consciousness? — ENOAH

Why not indeed? But let us not be hypnotized by a one bonding, but recognize the many different bonds there are in human lives - and how they arise in ways that we interact with, as opposed to merely observe, each other - and how we distinguish between people and non-people at the same time.

Or is philosophy not about truth, but about it within a restricted framework? — ENOAH

.. so truth within a restricted framework is not really truth?
Briefly -
For my money, "the sky is blue" is true because of the system of colours, not in spite of it. The objectivity of truths shows up in the way that a truth formulated in one system will show up in other systems. The easy example is the way that arithmetical truths show up in any number system.
In Wittgenstein's thought, this point is closely linked to colour exclusion problem (SEP). He says

225. What I hold fast to is not one proposition but a nest of propositions.

On Certainty 225.

I find this to be a bit scrambled but I'll see what I can do to sort it out with my understanding of Berkeley. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was expounding, not evaluating, so I'm able to agree with your critique in many ways, though I'm not particularly wedded to Aristotelianism.

As for Aristotle's concept of matter, it is primarily defined in his physics, as you say, as what persists through change. However, since the form of the thing is what actually changes, then the matter is said to provide the potential for change. That's how matter escapes the law of excluded middle, as potential, what neither is nor is not. And this is why it is the aspect of the world which is unintelligible to us. So the supposed underlying aspect of a thing which persists through change, matter, is completely unintelligible to us. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. But, for me, the unintelligibility of matter is not a conclusion, but a problem. If you were to present this conclusion to Berkeley, he would conclude that matter didn't exist, and I would not be able to explain why he is wrong.

Berkeley allows that separate people have separate minds, and God's mind is separate from human minds. But I do not think that he adequately addresses the issue of what provides for the separation between one mind and another. So we need a concept like "matter" to provide for the separation between minds. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. I don't think there is a coherent idea of immaterial minds.

I believe the principal difference between Hume and Berkeley is that Hume didn't believe in God. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm sure you know about the controversy about Hume's atheism. I don't think there is a determinate answer about what he "really" believed. But the Enquiry is perfectly clear. He rejects rational arguments for God's existence and Christianity, but believes in them on faith, which he acknowledges is a miracle.

How can you possibly distinguish between appearance and reality? Once you accept that there is such a distinction to be made, you plunge yourself into a quagmire because you need to provide principles by which you would distinguish between the two. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't express myself clearly. There are ordinary uses of "appear" and "real" that are perfectly in order. The stick in water appears to be bent, but isn't "really". The sun disappears behind the moon, but still exists. But when we posit a world of "appearances" (or "experiences") that exist independently of the entities that they are appearances of, we are seriously mistaken.

We experience our own efforts all the time. We know energy from the inside, so to speak, and the idea of an interaction that does not involve energy, energy exchange, is inconceivable. So, I start from there, physics is merely an elaboration and formalization of that understanding. Speaking of basics, have you never heard of the four fundamental forces? — Janus

Yes, I know that understanding of causation exists - I've seen it one of Hacker's books - I forget which. I am increasingly sympathetic, but have not read enough about it to be sure what I think of it. Your conclusion from that experience that an interaction that does not involve energy is inconceivable seems a bit quick to me. I have heard of the four fundamental forces, but I've forgotten what they are, I'm afraid.

I passed this over before, and I should have made the point that this is a truism that applies to all terms whatsoever. There are no terms that have determinate senses outside the contexts of their use, which makes your point seem somewhat moot. — Janus

I'm glad we are in agreement about this. But philosophers seem to have a hard time with it, as, for example, in the argument about first causes vs infinite causes. Rorty described it as Truth vs truth.

so truth within a restricted framework is not really truth?
Briefly -
For my money, "the sky is blue" is true because of the system of colours, — Ludwig V

Well said...within this framework.

Are you suggesting another framework?
There's an interesting discussion to be had about translation between languages/cultures of colour-words, including which words are colour-words and which are not. The classic locus in philosophy for this is the translation of "snow" into the language(s) of people who live north of the Arctic Circle. But they are extremely limited. Few philosophers are polyglot enough to enjoy that kind of thing. Which is a great pity. (I have some access to four, but almost certainly not the depth and fluency that one would need to do it well.)

The point now, is that for Aristotle, "to subsist", therefore to be substance, is to have form. And, form does not require matter, so this validates the substantial existence of immaterial forms, i.e. the subsistence of immaterial forms. — Metaphysician Undercover

Understood. I thought you were disagreeing. Thanks.

Are you suggesting another framework?
There's an interesting discussion to be had about translation between languages/cultures — Ludwig V

I wasn't. I was recognizing that we are within a framework, within a framework.

However your discussion above is also interesting.

If, on the other hand, I were suggesting another framework, I would respectfully say your discussion above is not what I would consider another framework. Rather, it too, is within this framework. Or, from your position, probably a framework within.

Anyway, the other framework I'm suggesting, is, in a manner of speaking, a framework without. That is, not in the way so called truth "works" itself out in language, which, afterall is a construction, perhaps the meta framework, but still, not the framework "without." The latter being before/beyond/outside of Language, which I would now identify as the constructed world, the world within a framework of becoming, to a world of organic presence, a world of (human) being. That's why the bonding Midgley referenced is uniquely significant--family, mates, offspring--that's where you find consciousness, and you find that we are one. Thats where Descartes neglected to look.

If, on the other hand, I were suggesting another framework, I would respectfully say your discussion above is not what I would consider another framework. Rather, it too, is within this framework. Or, from your position, probably a framework within. — ENOAH

"Framework", just like "language-game" and even "Language" and "language" and "dialect" are most at home in an approach that looks for structures. And then we rightly want to expand our view and so we want to develop an overall structure (or Structure). But all these concepts are what I think of as jelly-fish concepts - almost infinitely plastic. So I'm quite content to set up a structure in a particular context for a particular purpose, without aspiring to any totalizing Structure. That annoys almost everyone, but it works for me.

The latter being before/beyond/outside of Language, which I would now identify as the constructed world, the world within a framework of becoming, to a world of organic presence, a world of (human) being. — ENOAH

OK. So now we can add "world" to the list of jelly-fish concepts. To adopt your spatial metaphor, our problem is that Language endlessly points beyond itself, while at the same time preventing us from ever quite getting there. Perhaps then I should have said "seems to point beyond itself". My preferred tactic is to turn the problem upside-down, by reflecting that language was developed from whatever existed before it and is a product of whatever existed before it. It must therefore be useful within those worlds. It is language that needs to take its place in the world, not the other way about. What may be even more important is that we are all born without language and need to develop a great deal of understanding of the world in order to be able to learn it. (I began to work this out in another thread - "on the matter of epistemology and ontology" - I don't know if you were involved in that.)

That's why the bonding Midgley referenced is uniquely significant--family, mates, offspring--that's where you find consciousness, and you find that we are one. — ENOAH

Yes and no. For the ancient Romans "familiaris" meant "of a house, of a household, belonging to a family, household, domestic, private". On a generous interpretation of "family", I'll buy this. One reason for doing so is that, whatever our domestic arrangements, we are all born and brought up and, for me, the people involved in that are my family, and so everyone has a family of some sort. It does imply that the consciousness of creatures that don't grow up in that way becomes moot - even if they are sentient. In ethics, that might become problematic.

You may think me lazy, but here are some extracts from the Treatise that should (I hope) explain what you're asking about. — Ludwig V

Thanks! Such a citation is just what I was hoping for.

I find it interesting to find out about the insights of philosophers with regard to thinking, when those philosophers didn't have the advantage of modern neuroscience in making sense of what is going on.

Of course I think Berkeley went off the rails with idealism, but I can appreciate the attempt at making sense of things.

Yes. But, for me, the unintelligibility of matter is not a conclusion, but a problem. If you were to present this conclusion to Berkeley, he would conclude that matter didn't exist, and I would not be able to explain why he is wrong. — Ludwig V

I can tell you why matter doesn't exist, in a very simple and straight forward way. "Matter" is an Aristotelian concept, and the conceptual structure is arranged so that the form of a thing is what has existence. Matter, as the potential of a thing, simply does not exist, and that's why it's so easy for Berkeley to argue this, and why it seems to make logical sense, what he argues, even though intuitively we would expect otherwise. So it's really not a matter of "why he is wrong", he's not wrong. The real question is why do our intuitions lead us toward believing that he must be wrong. And the answer to this, is that we've grown up being exposed to a common usage of "matter", which propagates a faulty intuition. The faulty intuition is that matter inheres within the independent thing, supporting its unperceived (independent) existence. The intuition if faulty because "matter" is really just a concept, used to account for the apparent persistence or continuity of the object, while the true nature of the supposed persistence and continuity of the object is really an unknown. So "matter" is not something inhering within the object, as our basic education leads us to believe, it is just a concept used to stand in for this unknown aspect of the object.

From this perspective, the unintelligibility of matter is not a problem but rather a solution to a problem. The problem is that the human intellect is not omniscient, it is deficient and lacking in the capacity to understand the complete reality, especially what is commonly represented as the continuous existence of the separate, or independent object. That there is an unintelligible aspect of reality, in itself, is only a problem to the philosophically minded, who have a desire to know the complete reality. But this mindset, this desire to know, pervades through all the sciences as they work to probe the unknown, and attempt to expand the overall body of knowledge. To be integrated into the body of knowledge, the new knowledge must be made consistent with the existing body. The unintelligible lurks as that which cannot be made consistent.

There are two distinct approaches to the unintelligible. The simple approach is to hide the unintelligible within the knowledge, as vagueness, ambiguity, rendering a knowledge which has a level of certainty that is compromised overall. This is the approach of "formalism". It dismisses the importance of content (subject matter, which is the unintelligible), but in doing this it allows the unintelligible content to inhere within the form. This compromises the resulting knowledge because the unintelligible permeates the entirety and there are no principles to distinguish the intelligible aspects from the unintelligible, allowing fallibility into the whole body of knowledge. The solution to this problem is to provide a clear separation of the form (as intelligible) from the content (as unintelligible matter), right from the outset. This leaves an outlined realm of "the unintelligible" as distinct and separate from the body of "the intelligible", as knowledge, allowing for the process of skepticism to analyze "the intelligible", the existing body of knowledge, in a way which would determine why this existing body of knowledge renders specific aspects of reality as incompatible, unintelligible. That is why designating matter as "the unintelligible" is really not a problem but a solution to the problem.

I'm sure you know about the controversy about Hume's atheism. I don't think there is a determinate answer about what he "really" believed. But the Enquiry is perfectly clear. He rejects rational arguments for God's existence and Christianity, but believes in them on faith, which he acknowledges is a miracle. — Ludwig V

Yes, this is the point. Hume does not allow "God" as a principle or premise for any logical proceedings, he would dismiss this as unsound. Therefore he would not be able to accept Berkeley's use of God to support the continued existence of objects when not being perceived by a human being. So, he turns things around (whether intentionally or not is irrelevant), as I tried to explain. The continuous existence of objects is not taken for granted by Hume as it is by Berkeley.

Berkeley portrays perception as the sensation of continuously existing objects, and God supports that continuity when humans aren't looking. So continuity is inherent within perception. But for Hume, perception consists of instances, distinct impressions, which he makes compatible with distinct ideas. This puts continuity as something which happens between distinct perceptual impressions. So continuity becomes a big problem for Hume. How does a perceptual impression at one moment link up, or connect to an impression at another moment? It is not reason which does this associating, because the rational mind works with distinct ideas, and the relating of them, one to another. The relating of sense impressions is a sort of natural, intuitive process which is not an act of reason. This is why he classes all the aspects of temporal continuity, induction and causation, as something other than reason.

What I said earlier though, is that Hume has this wrong, because sense perception really consists of the perception of activity, which in itself is a representation of temporal continuity. So really Berkeley's representation of sensation as continuously existing objects, therefore active and changing objects is a more true representation. Then the real problem, or breakdown, is between the reasoning mind which deals with distinct ideas, and sense perception which gives us continuity. Hume's representation, which makes sensation consist of distinct perceptions, in order to establish consistency between the mind's distinct ideas, and sense perception, is a false premise, designed to bridge this problem, this breakdown between the mind and the senses.

I didn't express myself clearly. There are ordinary uses of "appear" and "real" that are perfectly in order. The stick in water appears to be bent, but isn't "really". — Ludwig V

This is exactly the point. That the stick really isn't bent needs to be supported with principles. Now we are into logic, premises like refraction, etc., and sense perception is relegated to being unreliable. So we have no grounds to accept that what sense perception gives us is in any way "real", it is unreliable. And the skeptic is completely justified.

But when we posit a world of "appearances" (or "experiences") that exist independently of the entities that they are appearances of, we are seriously mistaken. — Ludwig V

Why would you say this? The "appearances" are what sense perception provides to the mind. The mind determines that these appearances are often faulty and misleading, like the bent stick example. If the mind can prove that the appearances are sometimes faulty and misleading, then why not accept the possibility that the appearances are always faulty and misleading? The appearances are a creation of the human body, it creates them with its nervous system, and they are a form of representation. Consider other forms of representation now, like language, signs and symbols. The signs and symbols are created in a completely different context from when they are later applied. So there is no reason not to think that the appearances (like signs and symbols) exist within a realm (the mind) which is independent from the things which it applies them to. Consider dreaming for example, the mind has a whole arsenal of images (appearances) which are independent, and which it can apply.

I find it interesting to find out about the insights of philosophers with regard to thinking, when those philosophers didn't have the advantage of modern neuroscience in making sense of what is going on. — wonderer1

It seems to me that neuroscience (and psychology) have changed the game. It has been pretty obvious for a long time (over a century, I would say) that this would happen. But now we are facing the opening up of the reality and peering anxiously into the dark. I say that because there is a widespread tendency to speak as if we know it all already or to speculate wildly on what might be revealed. Both very human traits, but still not helpful.

It seems to me that neuroscience (and psychology) have changed the game. It has been pretty obvious for a long time (over a century, I would say) that this would happen. But now we are facing the opening up of the reality and peering anxiously into the dark. I say that because there is a widespread tendency to speak as if we know it all already or to speculate wildly on what might be revealed. Both very human traits, but still not helpful. — Ludwig V

:up:

It does imply that the consciousness of creatures that don't grow up in that way becomes moot - even if they are sentient. In ethics, that might become problematic. — Ludwig V

You meant to say "doesnt". Of course, it doesn't. I don't think anyone intended bonding was the source of consciousness, only that it was a place Descartes overlooked when he was formulating his isolated "I am."

I do remember you from Epistemology and Ontology. I'm pretty sure I found both language and "Language," to cause barriers there too.

Doesn't it always? Unlike, say, organic bonding.

In a forum like this, pages of space and hours of time might be required for us to truly have mutual understanding--I might post "language is a barrier"; you might return with, oh really? Doesn't it bring us together? And so on and so on and so on.

What I say, you could endlessly critique; then, in turn what you say, if not I, I am certain someone. And so on and so on.

That was Descarte's "problem." (And Aquinas and Augustine and Aurelius and Aristotle all the way back with the exception of a certain Socrates we might be able to extract out of Plato). And we have inherited that problem. That is, that you cannot arrive at certainty with language processing in our minds. You cannot weave straw into gold.

But you can with bonding, for example, and so, ...here we go again

Yes. Language works best when there is a personal relationship as a context for it.

Yes, I did mean "doesn't".

I admire your patient circumspection. I admit I am a bit prone to jump to conclusions. What I may or may not be able to conceive is not necessarily an adequate guide to what is conceivable or inconceivable tout court. How do we measure conceivability?

I agree with you. However, Fooloso4's points about the way she makes her point are also important. The issue crops up all the time in reading texts from the past - and the present. Her ideas about marriage, family, maturity were pretty much conventional, though not uncontested, at the time and still exist. We need to be able to acknowledge both sides of this, though I haven't worked out how to do so properly. — Ludwig V

Nice.

I feel the same.

Including how to work out these points properly. The "meat" of the sandwich-article, to interpret the speech that way, was what I mostly skipped over and @Fooloso4 has criticized well.

I admire your patient circumspection. I admit I am a bit prone to jump to conclusions. What I may or may not be able to conceive is not necessarily an adequate guide to what is conceivable or inconceivable tout court. How do we measure conceivability? — Janus

Cutting out the dithering and getting on with it has much to be said for it. I'm quite good and patience and circumspection, I suppose, but I'm absolutely lousy at getting on with it.

Many people, including some eminent professorial philosophers, say they can conceive of things that are, to me, plainly inconceivable. One more bedrock of philosophy crumbles into dust.

"Matter" is an Aristotelian concept, and the conceptual structure is arranged so that the form of a thing is what has existence. Matter, as the potential of a thing, simply does not exist, and that's why it's so easy for Berkeley to argue this, and why it seems to make logical sense, what he argues, even though intuitively we would expect otherwise. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, that's exactly how Berkeley presents his argument - officially - and why he thinks he can maintain that he doesn't deny the existence of anything that exists. (Notice how ambiguous that is - he doesn't deny the existence of anything that exists, but then he doesn't think that matter exists.)
His book was met with widespread ridicule, as the anecdote about Dr. Johnson illustrates. Another illustration of that ridicule is the name given to his doctrine ("immaterialism"). In case you hadn't noticed, it is a pun. His text is full of references to philosophical ideas being laughed at.
I don't know whether he didn't really know what he thought or he was upset by all the ridicule, he equivocates, oscillating between presenting his immaterialism as common sense (especially in the Dialogues and as a technical dispute within philosophy and between presenting his doctrine as a revolution in thought and as requiring no significant changes at all.

I find it interesting to find out about the insights of philosophers with regard to thinking, when those philosophers didn't have the advantage of modern neuroscience in making sense of what is going on. — wonderer1

I remember when philosophers managed quite well without neuroscience, even though it was clearly beginning. It wasn't really taken on board until this century, I would say.

I find it interesting to find out about the insights of philosophers with regard to thinking, when those philosophers didn't have the advantage of modern neuroscience in making sense of what is going on. — wonderer1

Don’t you think that is just a tad ‘scientistic’?

Have you ever read anything about the well-known book The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Bennett and Hacker?

I will add, two of my direct family owe their health and well-being to neuroscience. I’m not at all sceptical about its medical and therapeutic benefits. But I’m profoundly sceptical about its relevance to philosophy per se.

I think Midgley makes a profound point. — ENOAH

Cheers. The ideas she expresses were also found in others of that period. There was a general realisation that doubt cannot be the whole of philosophical method.

I find it interesting to find out about the insights of philosophers with regard to thinking, when those philosophers didn't have the advantage of modern neuroscience in making sense of what is going on.
— wonderer1

Don’t you think that is just a tad ‘scientistic’? — Wayfarer

It's a fact about me that I am interested in that sort of thing. You'd need to explain what you mean by "scientistic" for me to know how to reply to that.

Have you ever read anything about the well-known book The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Bennett and Hacker? — Wayfarer

I've read some Amazon reviews of it.