I still think that their history makes them quite different from Jordanians, Egyptians or the Lebanese. As I said, Swedes and Finns are both Europeans. Both are majority Christians and share a common past. Yet for example the Swedish speaking Finns do not consider themselves Swedes, but Finns who just happen to talk Swedish. (And btw. this has been a huge reason why there isn't any rift between these two ethnic groups in Finland)Yet, to distinguish Palestinians as a specific nation within the wider Arab ethnic group, Palestinians should also be able to see themselves as distinct from other Arabs, not simply as Arabs living in Palestine fighting against the Jews. — neomac
And how was it shown in 1945-1991? Yes, there is a history of Ukraine, but so has Palestine even a longer history. And Ukrainian nationalism emerged only in the 19th Century. And do notice that Palestinians had the Arab revolt in 1936-1939 against the British, where actually the Jewish fought alongside the British and gained military experience and competence (the Haganah just didn't sporadically emerge from refugees from Europe). And prior to that they were part of the Ottoman Empire, just as everybody else.This is a poor analogy. Independent Ukraine is 33 years old, Ukrainian nationalism and sentiment has definitely a longer history, much longer than the Palestinian nationalism. — neomac
There is an understandable motive for the Israeli skepticism about Palestinian nationalism. It's quite similar to the skepticism of Ukrainian nationalism by the Russians.Ordinary you don't give credence to the enemy you are fighting and his objectives. Actually it's quite natural. And this goes vice versa: the talk of Israel as an "colonial enterprise" is a way to diss Israel.I simply get to the plausible roots of Israelis’ skepticism about Palestinian nationalism. — neomac
This is well said. Actually it reminds me of what Noah Hariri said: Israelis and Palestinians could easily live together, but not with the narratives they tell themselves. For a one state solution the problem is basically Zionism and democracy. If the state of Israel has more non-Jews than Jews, what kind of homeland for the Jews is it?That’s not my argument, though. My argument is that Palestinians and Israelis have to fight for their right to the land if their demands are incompatible, because there is no way to consistently ground both demands on the same justifying narrative. — neomac
In 1948 yes, the neighbors didn't care a shit about Palestinians. But now I think it's different: nobody wants to be responsible of 7 million Palestinians. So OK for them to have their own country...as it's Israeli territory, anyway.What I care to focus on is to what extent Palestinians can see themselves as a distinct nation from the larger Arab community. I think the way they have been treated by other Arab governments and people may have contributed to a reciprocal estrangement which reinforced Palestinian Nationalism. — neomac
Yet, to distinguish Palestinians as a specific nation within the wider Arab ethnic group, Palestinians should also be able to see themselves as distinct from other Arabs, not simply as Arabs living in Palestine fighting against the Jews. — neomac
I still think that their history makes them quite different from Jordanians, Egyptians or the Lebanese. As I said, Swedes and Finns are both Europeans. Both are majority Christians and share a common past. Yet for example the Swedish speaking Finns do not consider themselves Swedes, but Finns who just happen to talk Swedish. (And btw. this has been a huge reason why there isn't any rift between these two ethnic groups in Finland)
And let's remember that Pan-Arabism was tried and it crashed. Just ask the Syrians how well did that experiment go with the Egyptians having a one-Pan Arab state. And the relations between the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) member states who all are also members of the Arab League show how brittle these relationships are. — ssu
This is a poor analogy. Independent Ukraine is 33 years old, Ukrainian nationalism and sentiment has definitely a longer history, much longer than the Palestinian nationalism. — neomac
And how was it shown in 1945-1991? Yes, there is a history of Ukraine, but so has Palestine even a longer history. And Ukrainian nationalism emerged only in the 19th Century. And do notice that Palestinians had the Arab revolt in 1936-1939 against the British, where actually the Jewish fought alongside the British and gained military experience and competence (the Haganah just didn't sporadically emerge from refugees from Europe). And prior to that they were part of the Ottoman Empire, just as everybody else. — ssu
There is an understandable motive for the Israeli skepticism about Palestinian nationalism. It's quite similar to the skepticism of Ukrainian nationalism by the Russians.Ordinary you don't give credence to the enemy you are fighting and his objectives. Actually it's quite natural. And this goes vice versa: the talk of Israel as an "colonial enterprise" is a way to diss Israel. — ssu
In 1948 yes, the neighbors didn't care a shit about Palestinians. But now I think it's different: nobody wants to be responsible of 7 million Palestinians. So OK for them to have their own country...as it's Israeli territory, anyway. — ssu
And Israel's first backer was actually the Soviet Union. At the birth of the state it was quite leftist and the US wasn't actually supporting it (the FBI was searching for Jewish arms smugglers, for example). Hence one of the first aircraft IAF had were Czech built Me-109s (Avia S-199).In other words, Arafat with his nationalist narrative managed to emerge thanks to the USSR financial, military, intelligence and propaganda aid. — neomac
Much older? At least Ukrainian identity is now molded to a new level. But how much some Bohdan Khmelnytsky was an Ukrainian nationalist is an interesting question (especially when he allied with Russia). Present nationalism is a quite late idea, yet to think that nationalism didn't exist prior to the 19th Century is wrong.The historical Ukrainian nationalism is much older than Palestinian nationalism there is no question about it. — neomac
All right, so it’s not that you do not see. You do not see anything new. Even though foreign policies can be inherently controversial, especially if motivated by aggressive hegemonic ambitions, maybe the Gulf War was the least controversial among them.
There have been tensions between the US and the EU about economics.
Now we are talking divergence about security needs, military alliance, wars, genocides on top of the economic tensions. That’s the reason of concern especially if power balance wrt aggressive competitors is at stake as you too pointed out.
How angry do you think Putin would have been if Ukraine had joined NATO a few years back?
If Ukraine had joined NATO before now, there would be a war between Russia and NATO now.
— Punshhh
I don’t find this counterfactual evidently true. It can argue that if Ukraine had joined NATO previously, Russia would have not tried to aggress it the way it did
You seem to be conflating “superpower status” with “the unipolar world”. I haven’t once mentioned a unipolar U.S. I’m working from the assumption that that is over now and we have competing superpowers. Therefore the U.S. will rely on a strong partner in the EU to fend off potential challengers and maintain the status quo.I can appreciate your effort to clarify your views, but I still find your claims a bit misleading. On one side you support the idea that the US will keep its superpower status on the other the vulnerabilities of the US and the power balance against the US may increase for the US if the EU is weak.
So even if the US preserves a superpower status versus other superpowers in a one-to-one comparison, still you are talking about a scenario in which the unipolar world with the US on top of it is over and power balancing alliances are needed. Besides a weak EU would tilt the power balance AGAINST the US.
I don’t see this. The Middle Eastern countries are incapable of reaching such a stature and control of the region is not of any importance In the power balance between U.S. and China. The times when gulf oil was of great importance are over, what else do they have to offer?(other than money laundering)Besides if one is reasoning in terms of alliance also an alliance between Russia, China and the Middle-Eastern countries can tilt the power balance at the expense of the US and EU alliance
Yes, I know, but I’m talking about changes, or pivot here, between superpowers. As you seem to dislike the notion that the Ukraine war is pivotal in Europe, Russia and by extension the U.S. and China.So I wouldn’t discount this factor when talking about the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
If Ukraine had joined NATO before now, there would be a war between Russia and NATO now.
— Punshhh
I don’t find this counterfactual evidently true. It can be argued that if Ukraine had joined NATO previously, Russia would have not tried to aggress it the way it did
How angry do you think Putin would have been if Ukraine had joined NATO a few years back? — Punshhh
I can appreciate your effort to clarify your views, but I still find your claims a bit misleading. On one side you support the idea that the US will keep its superpower status on the other the vulnerabilities of the US and the power balance against the US may increase for the US if the EU is weak.
So even if the US preserves a superpower status versus other superpowers in a one-to-one comparison, still you are talking about a scenario in which the unipolar world with the US on top of it is over and power balancing alliances are needed. Besides a weak EU would tilt the power balance AGAINST the US.
You seem to be conflating “superpower status” with “the unipolar world”. I haven’t once mentioned a unipolar U.S. I’m working from the assumption that that is over now and we have competing superpowers. Therefore the U.S. will rely on a strong partner in the EU to fend off potential challengers and maintain the status quo. — Punshhh
Besides if one is reasoning in terms of alliance also an alliance between Russia, China and the Middle-Eastern countries can tilt the power balance at the expense of the US and EU alliance
I don’t see this. The Middle Eastern countries are incapable of reaching such a stature and control of the region is not of any importance In the power balance between U.S. and China. The times when gulf oil was of great importance are over, what else do they have to offer?(other than money laundering) — Punshhh
Still I expect the region to become an inhospitable wasteland of failed states once climate change bites. — Punshhh
As you seem to dislike the notion that the Ukraine war is pivotal in Europe, Russia and by extension the U.S. and China. — Punshhh
But how much some Bohdan Khmelnytsky was an Ukrainian nationalist is an interesting question (especially when he allied with Russia). — ssu
But here's the real question to you. The Zionist idea of Israel is very young. And so is the idea of independent Palestine. But the age of the idea doesn't matter, it's how many people genuinely believe in that cause. There is absolutely no prestige, no larger credibility or justification on this age issue. This is just the nonsensical debate that parties who want to thrash the other side in the Palestine/Israel debate. I don't understand at all the reasoning for this debate or why should it be important. The Palestinians do want an independent state from Israel. The Israelis don't want a two state solution.
We've actually seen just now a coming and going of one idea, an Islamic Caliphate in the form of ISIS/ISIL/IS/Daesh come, emerge and be squashed in the region. This isn't anything new, actually. Hence likely that the region hasn't seen the end of new nation forming. Likely in the year 2424 the map can be totally different from now. And those states will trace their glorious history back to our time and beyond to older history. — ssu
Perhaps I may have asked the question in a difficult manner.if all that matters is what people believe, how is it possible that the age of certain ideas which are part of people’s belief systems and, actually, help justify and identify such belief systems doesn’t matter? — neomac
Umm... they did recognize Israel. At least the PA did. (Do you know the Oslo peace accords?)Finally, if Palestinians do want an independent state from Israel while not recognising Israel, then also Palestinians don't want a two state solution. — neomac
Following the Oslo I Accord in 1993, the Palestinian Authority and Israel conditionally recognized each other's right to govern specific areas of the country.
Not sure if that’s relevant: Putin may have been furious and still deterred.
That’s unrealistic, you’re taking it back to a point where Russia was weak compared to now. Putin has been agitating in Ukraine for a long time. If Ukraine had been fast tracked into NATO that would have blown up on the eastern front.Especially in the firs years of his Presidential mandate, imagine during the Chechen war.
Your whole argument about U.S. looking to weaken the EU, rather than form a constructive alliance, (apart from it being a flawed argument) only makes sense from the assumption that the U.S. is in a unipolar position and doesn’t require that alliance.How am I conflating “superpower status” with “the unipolar world”, if I’m intentionally stressing their difference, and what you wrote is again a paraphrase of what I just claimed to have understood from your views?
Good luck (for this alliance) in holding all that together. Just more failed states. The only reason the Gulf states have their current prosperity and security is due to implicit support from the U.S. (the West) in return for oil. That oil will shortly become less important with the transition to net zero. By the way, Russia has the same problem with oil becoming a stranded asset.Other than oil, money, terrorism, control over commercial routes, criminal business, immigration, exporting islamism in Asia, Africa and the West, maybe nothing. That’s however may be enough to help a Russia-China alliance against a US and EU alliance, even more so with a weak EU.
Now you’re getting the picture.It seems a good location for Mad Max style movies
Actually I’m more skeptical about the idea that whatever happens in the Middle East, it won’t play any decisive contribution in the power balance of major hegemonic powers.
What larger death tolls?Also what do you think about the much larger death tolls elsewhere in the world that receive virtually zero attention and zero mass protests? — Moses
Not sure if that’s relevant: Putin may have been furious and still deterred.
↪neomac
Are you sure about that? — Punshhh
Especially in the firs years of his Presidential mandate, imagine during the Chechen war.
That’s unrealistic, you’re taking it back to a point where Russia was weak compared to now. Putin has been agitating in Ukraine for a long time. If Ukraine had been fast tracked into NATO that would have blown up on the eastern front. — Punshhh
How am I conflating “superpower status” with “the unipolar world”, if I’m intentionally stressing their difference, and what you wrote is again a paraphrase of what I just claimed to have understood from your views?
Your whole argument about U.S. looking to weaken the EU, rather than form a constructive alliance, (apart from it being a flawed argument) only makes sense from the assumption that the U.S. is in a unipolar position and doesn’t require that alliance.
I thought it was accepted knowledge that the U.S. isn’t in a unipolar position. — Punshhh
Other than oil, money, terrorism, control over commercial routes, criminal business, immigration, exporting islamism in Asia, Africa and the West, maybe nothing. That’s however may be enough to help a Russia-China alliance against a US and EU alliance, even more so with a weak EU.
Good luck (for this alliance) in holding all that together. Just more failed states. The only reason the Gulf states have their current prosperity and security is due to implicit support from the U.S. (the West) in return for oil. That oil will shortly become less important with the transition to net zero. By the way, Russia has the same problem with oil becoming a stranded asset. — Punshhh
Actually I’m more skeptical about the idea that whatever happens in the Middle East, it won’t play any decisive contribution in the power balance of major hegemonic powers.
So points 2 and 5, wouldn’t happen? Are you sure about that? Or that on the other side of the picture, that this could happen if Russia had lost in Ukraine and sleeked off with her tail between her legs?
(2, U.S. will be obliged to support EU, and be drawn into EU wars with Russia.)
(5, EU are vulnerable to Russia picking off states, pre-occupying EU while China can threaten U.S. play one off against the other.) — Punshhh
Do historical aspects justify more or is it the will of the people? Which justifies more?
As having studied history I understand the role of history here quite well: history is usually used to push an agenda by focusing and giving importance to the details that makes the agenda important. Thus history is usually done from a national point of view that justifies the existing state and all little details that have made it so. If history is a tool for this, it still is a tool. Existence of a state and a desire for an independent state is a lot more. — “ssu
Finally, if Palestinians do want an independent state from Israel while not recognising Israel, then also Palestinians don't want a two state solution. — neomac
Umm... they did recognize Israel. At least the PA did. (Do you know the Oslo peace accords?)
Following the Oslo I Accord in 1993, the Palestinian Authority and Israel conditionally recognized each other's right to govern specific areas of the country.
This is the reason why Netanyahu just loved so much Hamas that he even financially supported them. For him the Palestinian that cannot be negotiated with is the Palestinian that he wants to have. Far more easy to ethnically cleanse when the other side are "human animals".
(And naturally many Israelis want to uphold the idea that they cannot negotiate with the Palestinians, that Palestinians just want to drive them to the sea. Or something like that.) — “ssu
Question - would you be upset if Israel killed 15k Palestinians but they were all Hamas? What are your thoughts on the dead Hamas fighters? — Moses
Also what do you think about the much larger death tolls elsewhere in the world that receive virtually zero attention and zero mass protests? — Moses
aspects of China — Mikie
Not comparable. China isn’t murdering thousands with US support /weapons. — Mikie
Well said.The shortest answer I feel comfortable to give is that I take “justification” as a normative claim which one appeals to in order to ground beliefs so that they do not appear arbitrary. Therefore, the will of the people needs to be grounded on a justifying system of beliefs, which is what I think we normally refer to when talking about “the narrative”, in order to not appear arbitrary, especially to those who do not share such will or worse have to lose. — neomac
Actually I think it was really close when the Cold War ended. Palestinians had angered the Gulf states by siding with Saddam and as the Cold War ended, Israel thought once the Cold War ended and the Soviet threat evaporated, the US wouldn't care much of it. Hence all the drive from Madrid talks to Oslo Accords.One might wish to say that both Israelis and Palestinians may find an agreement for a peaceful however unjust resolution (since narratives remain incompatible) but, so far, they didn’t manage to. — neomac
To guarantee peace, you have to have a functioning state. Egypt is one. Even Jordan is one. Yet Lebanon is a failed state. Syria has become one.Whatever agreement decision makers may have found at some point, they weren’t able to enforce them on either sides. — neomac
What larger death tolls?
War in Ukraine has larger death tolls, but it hasn't such high amounts of civilian deaths or death of children. And let's remember how few people are in Gaza and that this war has been going on for a shorter period time (aside how long the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been going on). Sudan has 46 million people.
Question for you, Moses: Would you be OK if the Israeli army continued it's fight against Hamas, but did allow freely food to be transported to the civilian population (which would be naturally inspected)?
The US did this in similar battles it fought in Iraq, even if it clearly understood that some of the food would end up in the bellies of the enemy combatants, yet decided that to starve civilians would be more counterproductive. And it tried to kill the insurgents by other means than hunger. As the US fought Al Qaede and Isis, it did also try to look after the civilian population when the battle was still ongoing. Or is there something wrong in the way the US did it? — ssu
Which is here talking, Gaza Health ministry (the remnants of it) or the IDF?Gaza Health ministry has revised the death tolls downwards to ~22k with 13k of those being Hamas according to the IDF by the way. — BitconnectCarlos
That tells everything.I would treat palestinians like an enemy population. — BitconnectCarlos
For me the enemy is always the enemy combatants, fighters or servicemen. Legal or illegal. Not the civilians. — ssu
For me the enemy is always the enemy combatants, fighters or servicemen. Legal or illegal. Not the civilians. — ssu
Palestinians are not the enemy, but I do see them as an enemy population in the same way that a highly pro-nazi town in 1945 would have been. The citizens themselves aren't inherently evil and deserving of death, but I would be very cautious of them. — BitconnectCarlos
October 7th was a blessing for Likud. It finally provided them with a reaction that was hideous enough to use as pretext for their long-desired ethnic cleansing. So it goes. — Mikie
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