1. its ideological roots are in pan-arabism and pan-islamism, both of which are broader ideologies than the idea of a Palestinian nation-state — neomac

I think that Palestines and Palestinians ideological roots have more to do with how the "Jewish Palestinians", the Israelis have gone with their own nation building. — “ssu

As I've said, Palestinian aspirations are reinforced how Isreal treats them, starting from the thing that Israel never was for them in any way. — “ssu

Sure, I also already acknowledged that the conflict with the Jewish colonisers and Israel shaped Palestinian Nationalism. Yet, to distinguish Palestinians as a specific nation within the wider Arab ethnic group, Palestinians should also be able to see themselves as distinct from other Arabs, not simply as Arabs living in Palestine fighting against the Jews. And my understanding is that until Arafat the pan-Arabist views were dominant (e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Nationalist_Movement, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2009/7/13/the-nakba-catalyst-for-pan-arabism). Besides as long as Saddam Hussain was there and depicted himself as a pan-arabist leader (https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA240117.pdf, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ba%27ath_Party), Arafat’s call for Palestinian nationalism seemed locked with a regional power game bigger than the Palestinian cause (https://www.aljazeera.com/program/plo-history-of-a-revolution/2009/8/22/arafats-costly-gulf-war-choice). This may be seen as a necessary compromise to serve the Palestinian nationalism, even more so with the strategic alliance with Iran (which replaced Saddam Hussein) and contributed to somehow estrange the Palestinian cause from the Arab world. However the rise of Hamas as an extremist and islamist fringe off-shooting from the pan-islamist Muslim Brotherhood with tighter financial and military ties with Hezbollah and the pan-islamist Khomeini (as Khaled Mashal declared in 2007 “Hamas is the spiritual son of Khomeini” https://israel-alma.org/2022/10/18/hamass-role-in-irans-grand-strategy-of-multi-front-attack-on-israel/), make Hamas’ nationalist ideology look more compromised, although at the same time I believe Hamas has greater autonomy from Iran than the shiite Hezbollah.

Independent Ukraine is only 33 years old. And many Russians are totally confident about the utter artificiality of the country as you are of the Palestinians...when compared to the Israelis. — “ssu

This is a poor analogy. Independent Ukraine is 33 years old, Ukrainian nationalism and sentiment has definitely a longer history, much longer than the Palestinian nationalism. Besides the historical Ukrainian nationalism is also about refusing to be identified with the Russians (as an ethnic group), while Palestinian nationalism defined in opposition to Zionism was not about refusing to be identified with the Arabs (as an ethnic group), at least not at the beginning. In any case, I do not believe in the “utter artificiality of the Palestinians”, not even “when compared to the Israelis”, reason why I didn’t express myself in these terms. I simply get to the plausible roots of Israelis’ skepticism about Palestinian nationalism. Yet I also questioned the excesses of such skepticism on several grounds: 1. All nations are “artificial” as cultural products 2. The short history of Palestinian nationalism doesn’t make it deeply felt and bloody conflict with Israel made it sure that Palestinian feelings sedimented in Palestinians’ hearts 3. Palestinian nationalism is not only grounded in the opposition to Israel, but also in how the predicament of the Palestinians has estranged them from the Arab world enough to give greater credibility to their nation-state aspirations. 4. Zionism as a colonialist enterprise run mainly by non-indigenous European jews has its own degree of artificiality.

Yet it's very typical in a world made of nation states, people think that there must be something wrong with the people that don't have their own country. Either they are weak, incapable or not actually genuine. This silly argumentation on who has more moral right to the land where they now live and have lived for generations shows this. — “ssu

That’s not my argument, though. My argument is that Palestinians and Israelis have to fight for their right to the land if their demands are incompatible, because there is no way to consistently ground both demands on the same justifying narrative. Notice also the following ideological asymmetry between Palestinians and Israelis: even when Palestinians claim to acknowledge Israel statehood (in favour of a two state solution), this is not grounded in a change of their anti-Zionist narrative about Israel. On the other side the more original and secular Zionist narrative was compelled since the beginning by the Palestinian Arabs as majoritarian indigenous people to Palestine, so it was more amenable to a compromise than Netanyahu’s approach.

I think however that there are other factors that Israel can’t discount: 1. How the Arab states’ questionable attitude toward the Palestinians (and Palestinian refugees) may reinforce the Palestinians’ aspirations to a distinctive Palestinian nation-state. — neomac

Yet is it questionable that Arabs now see Palestinians differently from them? Finns and Swedes are surely European, even Nordic, but two different countries and people still. Are Palestinians then Jordanians? — “ssu

What I care to focus on is to what extent Palestinians can see themselves as a distinct nation from the larger Arab community. I think the way they have been treated by other Arab governments and people may have contributed to a reciprocal estrangement which reinforced Palestinian Nationalism.

Which is more pro-Israeli and which would be more neutral? Just asking. — “ssu

It doesn’t matter if it is pro-Israeli to me, it matters if you have more compelling counter-arguments on the merit of what the article is arguing.

What is the present Europe is happy about? — neomac

Hmm... prosperity, peace, integration. When compared to Middle East, which is the more happy story?

What is so confusing in calling for “pivot to Asia” by American ‘pivot-people'? — neomac

Because the US is already there in SE Asia. So continuously repeating about "turning to Asia" that focus isn't here but there. What is message you try to say here? That's the thing confusing. — “ssu

It’s not me who is calling for “pivot to Asia”, but US administrations and advisors.

U.S. President Barack Obama's East Asia Strategy (2009–2017), also known as the Pivot to Asia, represented a significant shift in the foreign policy of the United States since the 2010s. It shifted the country's focus away from the Middle Eastern and European sphere and allowed it to invest heavily and build relationships in East Asian and Southeast Asian countries, especially countries which are in close proximity to the People's Republic of China (PRC) either economically, geographically or politically to counter its rise as a rival superpower.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_Asian_foreign_policy_of_the_Barack_Obama_administration

Ideally Biden would support it:
https://www.npr.org/2021/10/06/1043329242/long-promised-and-often-delayed-the-pivot-to-asia-takes-shape-under-biden

But there are thorny issues with that: https://thediplomat.com/2024/03/the-lost-decade-of-the-us-pivot-to-asia/

Besides it’s not me to introduce the idea of “pivotal” (vs “distraction”), but Punshhh.
I find such distinction potentially misleading for reasons I’ve argued.

Yet, to distinguish Palestinians as a specific nation within the wider Arab ethnic group, Palestinians should also be able to see themselves as distinct from other Arabs, not simply as Arabs living in Palestine fighting against the Jews. — neomac

I still think that their history makes them quite different from Jordanians, Egyptians or the Lebanese. As I said, Swedes and Finns are both Europeans. Both are majority Christians and share a common past. Yet for example the Swedish speaking Finns do not consider themselves Swedes, but Finns who just happen to talk Swedish. (And btw. this has been a huge reason why there isn't any rift between these two ethnic groups in Finland)

And let's remember that Pan-Arabism was tried and it crashed. Just ask the Syrians how well did that experiment go with the Egyptians having a one-Pan Arab state. And the relations between the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) member states who all are also members of the Arab League show how brittle these relationships are.

This is a poor analogy. Independent Ukraine is 33 years old, Ukrainian nationalism and sentiment has definitely a longer history, much longer than the Palestinian nationalism. — neomac

And how was it shown in 1945-1991? Yes, there is a history of Ukraine, but so has Palestine even a longer history. And Ukrainian nationalism emerged only in the 19th Century. And do notice that Palestinians had the Arab revolt in 1936-1939 against the British, where actually the Jewish fought alongside the British and gained military experience and competence (the Haganah just didn't sporadically emerge from refugees from Europe). And prior to that they were part of the Ottoman Empire, just as everybody else.

I simply get to the plausible roots of Israelis’ skepticism about Palestinian nationalism. — neomac

There is an understandable motive for the Israeli skepticism about Palestinian nationalism. It's quite similar to the skepticism of Ukrainian nationalism by the Russians.Ordinary you don't give credence to the enemy you are fighting and his objectives. Actually it's quite natural. And this goes vice versa: the talk of Israel as an "colonial enterprise" is a way to diss Israel.

Yet as you mentioned about the state of Israel and Zionism, it's actually the Israeli's themselves that give credence to having a very young state. Yet I think the Israelis have the right for their country just as the Japanese or the French have for their own. It isn't about how long your nation has existed.

That’s not my argument, though. My argument is that Palestinians and Israelis have to fight for their right to the land if their demands are incompatible, because there is no way to consistently ground both demands on the same justifying narrative. — neomac

This is well said. Actually it reminds me of what Noah Hariri said: Israelis and Palestinians could easily live together, but not with the narratives they tell themselves. For a one state solution the problem is basically Zionism and democracy. If the state of Israel has more non-Jews than Jews, what kind of homeland for the Jews is it?

What I care to focus on is to what extent Palestinians can see themselves as a distinct nation from the larger Arab community. I think the way they have been treated by other Arab governments and people may have contributed to a reciprocal estrangement which reinforced Palestinian Nationalism. — neomac

In 1948 yes, the neighbors didn't care a shit about Palestinians. But now I think it's different: nobody wants to be responsible of 7 million Palestinians. So OK for them to have their own country...as it's Israeli territory, anyway.

Yet, to distinguish Palestinians as a specific nation within the wider Arab ethnic group, Palestinians should also be able to see themselves as distinct from other Arabs, not simply as Arabs living in Palestine fighting against the Jews. — neomac

I still think that their history makes them quite different from Jordanians, Egyptians or the Lebanese. As I said, Swedes and Finns are both Europeans. Both are majority Christians and share a common past. Yet for example the Swedish speaking Finns do not consider themselves Swedes, but Finns who just happen to talk Swedish. (And btw. this has been a huge reason why there isn't any rift between these two ethnic groups in Finland)
And let's remember that Pan-Arabism was tried and it crashed. Just ask the Syrians how well did that experiment go with the Egyptians having a one-Pan Arab state. And the relations between the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) member states who all are also members of the Arab League show how brittle these relationships are. — ssu

This is a poor analogy. Independent Ukraine is 33 years old, Ukrainian nationalism and sentiment has definitely a longer history, much longer than the Palestinian nationalism. — neomac

And how was it shown in 1945-1991? Yes, there is a history of Ukraine, but so has Palestine even a longer history. And Ukrainian nationalism emerged only in the 19th Century. And do notice that Palestinians had the Arab revolt in 1936-1939 against the British, where actually the Jewish fought alongside the British and gained military experience and competence (the Haganah just didn't sporadically emerge from refugees from Europe). And prior to that they were part of the Ottoman Empire, just as everybody else. — ssu

I have no problems to acknowledge that historical circumstances are often more messy than narratives and ideas about them suggest. Yet to the extent such narratives and ideas inspire collective political consciousness and action they can play some explanatory role. My understanding is that Palestinian nationalism promoting 1. a national identity uniting all Palestinian Arabs in Palestine in a distinctive manner within the rest of the Arab community, and 2. dedicated nation-state institutions to represent such people didn’t become predominant until Arafat. And this didn’t happen just because the pan-arabist project failed and the treatment of the Palestinians prior to 1967 (like the Gazans under the Egyptian rule and the West Bankers under the Jordan rule) wasn’t that brotherly, but also because the USSR was pushing national liberation movements in the Third World to fight American imperialism (Israel being one expression of it). In other words, Arafat with his nationalist narrative managed to emerge thanks to the USSR financial, military, intelligence and propaganda aid. So much so that, back then, it became clear in the West that Arafat accounted for an essential undercover operative for the KGB for years to come (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestine%E2%80%93Russia_relations).

There is an understandable motive for the Israeli skepticism about Palestinian nationalism. It's quite similar to the skepticism of Ukrainian nationalism by the Russians.Ordinary you don't give credence to the enemy you are fighting and his objectives. Actually it's quite natural. And this goes vice versa: the talk of Israel as an "colonial enterprise" is a way to diss Israel. — ssu

I don’t discount the psychological factor you are pointing out, but I’m talking about something else. The historical Ukrainian nationalism is much older than Palestinian nationalism there is no question about it. Here Timothy Snyder: Ukraine has a very old national idea, actually. The idea of Ukraine goes back into the 17th century at least. And one can talk about the history of Ukraine which is much older than that. The Ukrainian national movement comes from the 19th century and really it was a quite typical European national movement - anti-imperial, focused on the people as the subjects of of history.Ukraine, unlike other East European nations, was unable to establish a state in the early 20th century after the First World War. Its statehood only really emerges in a durable way after 1991. https://www.weforum.org/podcasts/radio-davos/episodes/ukraines-history-and-why-it-matters/
Of course the historical Ukrainian nationalism got politically updated when it merged with the Western idea of the nation-state as much as the Jewish national identity which stems from biblical times but got politically updated when it merged with the Western idea of the nation-state. Palestinian nationalism has its historical roots in Arab nationalism, and only after 1967 it redefined itself as a function of a Palestinian nation-state. To the extent people use history as a source of legitimacy for their political claims (Palestinians and Israelis do resort to historical arguments to support their rights to the land) we can’t ignore the history of such political claims either.

In 1948 yes, the neighbors didn't care a shit about Palestinians. But now I think it's different: nobody wants to be responsible of 7 million Palestinians. So OK for them to have their own country...as it's Israeli territory, anyway. — ssu

Mmm… not sure about that:
https://www.reddit.com/r/Bolehland/comments/17939xb/can_someone_explain_why_he_said_palestinians/?rdt=61460

In other words, Arafat with his nationalist narrative managed to emerge thanks to the USSR financial, military, intelligence and propaganda aid. — neomac

And Israel's first backer was actually the Soviet Union. At the birth of the state it was quite leftist and the US wasn't actually supporting it (the FBI was searching for Jewish arms smugglers, for example). Hence one of the first aircraft IAF had were Czech built Me-109s (Avia S-199).

The historical Ukrainian nationalism is much older than Palestinian nationalism there is no question about it. — neomac

Much older? At least Ukrainian identity is now molded to a new level. But how much some Bohdan Khmelnytsky was an Ukrainian nationalist is an interesting question (especially when he allied with Russia). Present nationalism is a quite late idea, yet to think that nationalism didn't exist prior to the 19th Century is wrong.

But here's the real question to you. The Zionist idea of Israel is very young. And so is the idea of independent Palestine. But the age of the idea doesn't matter, it's how many people genuinely believe in that cause. There is absolutely no prestige, no larger credibility or justification on this age issue. This is just the nonsensical debate that parties who want to thrash the other side in the Palestine/Israel debate. I don't understand at all the reasoning for this debate or why should it be important. The Palestinians do want an independent state from Israel. The Israelis don't want a two state solution.

We've actually seen just now a coming and going of one idea, an Islamic Caliphate in the form of ISIS/ISIL/IS/Daesh come, emerge and be squashed in the region. This isn't anything new, actually. Hence likely that the region hasn't seen the end of new nation forming. Likely in the year 2424 the map can be totally different from now. And those states will trace their glorious history back to our time and beyond to older history.

All right, so it’s not that you do not see. You do not see anything new. Even though foreign policies can be inherently controversial, especially if motivated by aggressive hegemonic ambitions, maybe the Gulf War was the least controversial among them.

There have been tensions between the US and the EU about economics.
Now we are talking divergence about security needs, military alliance, wars, genocides on top of the economic tensions. That’s the reason of concern especially if power balance wrt aggressive competitors is at stake as you too pointed out.

Controversial enough to threaten the alliance, to threaten U.S. support for and trust in a powerful EU.

If Ukraine had joined NATO before now, there would be a war between Russia and NATO now.
— Punshhh

I don’t find this counterfactual evidently true. It can argue that if Ukraine had joined NATO previously, Russia would have not tried to aggress it the way it did

How angry do you think Putin would have been if Ukraine had joined NATO a few years back?

I can appreciate your effort to clarify your views, but I still find your claims a bit misleading. On one side you support the idea that the US will keep its superpower status on the other the vulnerabilities of the US and the power balance against the US may increase for the US if the EU is weak.
So even if the US preserves a superpower status versus other superpowers in a one-to-one comparison, still you are talking about a scenario in which the unipolar world with the US on top of it is over and power balancing alliances are needed. Besides a weak EU would tilt the power balance AGAINST the US.

You seem to be conflating “superpower status” with “the unipolar world”. I haven’t once mentioned a unipolar U.S. I’m working from the assumption that that is over now and we have competing superpowers. Therefore the U.S. will rely on a strong partner in the EU to fend off potential challengers and maintain the status quo.

Besides if one is reasoning in terms of alliance also an alliance between Russia, China and the Middle-Eastern countries can tilt the power balance at the expense of the US and EU alliance

I don’t see this. The Middle Eastern countries are incapable of reaching such a stature and control of the region is not of any importance In the power balance between U.S. and China. The times when gulf oil was of great importance are over, what else do they have to offer?(other than money laundering)

Still I expect the region to become an inhospitable wasteland of failed states once climate change bites.

So I wouldn’t discount this factor when talking about the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Yes, I know, but I’m talking about changes, or pivot here, between superpowers. As you seem to dislike the notion that the Ukraine war is pivotal in Europe, Russia and by extension the U.S. and China.

If Ukraine had joined NATO before now, there would be a war between Russia and NATO now.
— Punshhh

I don’t find this counterfactual evidently true. It can be argued that if Ukraine had joined NATO previously, Russia would have not tried to aggress it the way it did

How angry do you think Putin would have been if Ukraine had joined NATO a few years back? — Punshhh

Not sure if that’s relevant: Putin may have been furious and still deterred. Especially in the firs years of his Presidential mandate, imagine during the Chechen war.

I can appreciate your effort to clarify your views, but I still find your claims a bit misleading. On one side you support the idea that the US will keep its superpower status on the other the vulnerabilities of the US and the power balance against the US may increase for the US if the EU is weak.
So even if the US preserves a superpower status versus other superpowers in a one-to-one comparison, still you are talking about a scenario in which the unipolar world with the US on top of it is over and power balancing alliances are needed. Besides a weak EU would tilt the power balance AGAINST the US.

You seem to be conflating “superpower status” with “the unipolar world”. I haven’t once mentioned a unipolar U.S. I’m working from the assumption that that is over now and we have competing superpowers. Therefore the U.S. will rely on a strong partner in the EU to fend off potential challengers and maintain the status quo. — Punshhh

How am I conflating “superpower status” with “the unipolar world”, if I’m intentionally stressing their difference, and what you wrote is again a paraphrase of what I just claimed to have understood from your views?

Besides if one is reasoning in terms of alliance also an alliance between Russia, China and the Middle-Eastern countries can tilt the power balance at the expense of the US and EU alliance

I don’t see this. The Middle Eastern countries are incapable of reaching such a stature and control of the region is not of any importance In the power balance between U.S. and China. The times when gulf oil was of great importance are over, what else do they have to offer?(other than money laundering) — Punshhh

Other than oil, money, terrorism, control over commercial routes, criminal business, immigration, exporting Islamism in Asia, Africa and the West, good dates, and carpets, maybe not much. That however may be enough to help a Russia-China alliance against a US and EU alliance, even more so with a weak EU.

Still I expect the region to become an inhospitable wasteland of failed states once climate change bites. — Punshhh

It seems a good location for Mad Max style movies

As you seem to dislike the notion that the Ukraine war is pivotal in Europe, Russia and by extension the U.S. and China. — Punshhh

Actually I’m more skeptical about the idea that whatever happens in the Middle East, it won’t play any decisive contribution in the power balance of major hegemonic powers.

But how much some Bohdan Khmelnytsky was an Ukrainian nationalist is an interesting question (especially when he allied with Russia). — ssu

My understanding is that back then Poland was perceived to be the oppressor and Russia the convenient protector. Unfortunately such an alliance didn’t play as expected, i.e. in favour of the Cossack state’s independence, because it lost progressively sovereignty, autonomy and then it got Russified (especially, the local elites), despite following resistance.

But here's the real question to you. The Zionist idea of Israel is very young. And so is the idea of independent Palestine. But the age of the idea doesn't matter, it's how many people genuinely believe in that cause. There is absolutely no prestige, no larger credibility or justification on this age issue. This is just the nonsensical debate that parties who want to thrash the other side in the Palestine/Israel debate. I don't understand at all the reasoning for this debate or why should it be important. The Palestinians do want an independent state from Israel. The Israelis don't want a two state solution.

We've actually seen just now a coming and going of one idea, an Islamic Caliphate in the form of ISIS/ISIL/IS/Daesh come, emerge and be squashed in the region. This isn't anything new, actually. Hence likely that the region hasn't seen the end of new nation forming. Likely in the year 2424 the map can be totally different from now. And those states will trace their glorious history back to our time and beyond to older history. — ssu

Despite your initial announcement, I don’t see any question.
Besides you are making claims that do not add up to me: if all that matters is what people believe, how is it possible that the age of certain ideas which are part of people’s belief systems and, actually, help justify and identify such belief systems doesn’t matter?
Finally, if Palestinians do want an independent state from Israel while not recognising Israel, then also Palestinians don't want a two state solution.

if all that matters is what people believe, how is it possible that the age of certain ideas which are part of people’s belief systems and, actually, help justify and identify such belief systems doesn’t matter? — neomac

Perhaps I may have asked the question in a difficult manner.

Do historical aspects justify more or is it the will of the people? Which justifies more?

As having studied history I understand the role of history here quite well: history is usually used to push an agenda by focusing and giving importance to the details that makes the agenda important. Thus history is usually done from a national point of view that justifies the existing state and all little details that have made it so. If history is a tool for this, it still is a tool. Existence of a state and a desire for an independent state is a lot more.

Finally, if Palestinians do want an independent state from Israel while not recognising Israel, then also Palestinians don't want a two state solution. — neomac

Umm... they did recognize Israel. At least the PA did. (Do you know the Oslo peace accords?)

Following the Oslo I Accord in 1993, the Palestinian Authority and Israel conditionally recognized each other's right to govern specific areas of the country.

This is the reason why Netanyahu just loved so much Hamas that he even financially supported them. For him the Palestinian that cannot be negotiated with is the Palestinian that he wants to have. Far more easy to ethnically cleanse when the other side are "human animals".

(And naturally many Israelis want to uphold the idea that they cannot negotiate with the Palestinians, that Palestinians just want to drive them to the sea. Or something like that.)

Not sure if that’s relevant: Putin may have been furious and still deterred.

Are you sure about that?

Especially in the firs years of his Presidential mandate, imagine during the Chechen war.

That’s unrealistic, you’re taking it back to a point where Russia was weak compared to now. Putin has been agitating in Ukraine for a long time. If Ukraine had been fast tracked into NATO that would have blown up on the eastern front.

How am I conflating “superpower status” with “the unipolar world”, if I’m intentionally stressing their difference, and what you wrote is again a paraphrase of what I just claimed to have understood from your views?

Your whole argument about U.S. looking to weaken the EU, rather than form a constructive alliance, (apart from it being a flawed argument) only makes sense from the assumption that the U.S. is in a unipolar position and doesn’t require that alliance.

I thought it was accepted knowledge that the U.S. isn’t in a unipolar position.

Other than oil, money, terrorism, control over commercial routes, criminal business, immigration, exporting islamism in Asia, Africa and the West, maybe nothing. That’s however may be enough to help a Russia-China alliance against a US and EU alliance, even more so with a weak EU.

Good luck (for this alliance) in holding all that together. Just more failed states. The only reason the Gulf states have their current prosperity and security is due to implicit support from the U.S. (the West) in return for oil. That oil will shortly become less important with the transition to net zero. By the way, Russia has the same problem with oil becoming a stranded asset.

It seems a good location for Mad Max style movies

Now you’re getting the picture.

Actually I’m more skeptical about the idea that whatever happens in the Middle East, it won’t play any decisive contribution in the power balance of major hegemonic powers.

So points 2 and 5, wouldn’t happen? Are you sure about that? Or that on the other side of the picture, that this could happen if Russia had lost in Ukraine and sleeked off with her tail between her legs?
(2, U.S. will be obliged to support EU, and be drawn into EU wars with Russia.)
(5, EU are vulnerable to Russia picking off states, pre-occupying EU while China can threaten U.S. play one off against the other.)

Thousands more dead, protests in Israel itself, and the world easily recognizing how horrid this genocide really is…

And through it all, the apologists on this thread keep fighting the good fight. Because “hamas.” Oh how complicated it all is!

Except when sub-humans do things. That’s easy to condemn, because they have bad intentions.

Unlike real, sophisticated humans, who might kill 100 times more babies, but have very good intentions. Also “Human shields” and so forth. Nothing to condemn there.

This is one of your more reasonable posts.

Question - would you be upset if Israel killed 15k Palestinians but they were all Hamas? What are your thoughts on the dead Hamas fighters?

Also what do you think about the much larger death tolls elsewhere in the world that receive virtually zero attention and zero mass protests?

Also what do you think about the much larger death tolls elsewhere in the world that receive virtually zero attention and zero mass protests? — Moses

What larger death tolls?

War in Ukraine has larger death tolls, but it hasn't such high amounts of civilian deaths or death of children. And let's remember how few people are in Gaza and that this war has been going on for a shorter period time (aside how long the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been going on). Sudan has 46 million people.

Question for you, Moses: Would you be OK if the Israeli army continued it's fight against Hamas, but did allow freely food to be transported to the civilian population (which would be naturally inspected)?

The US did this in similar battles it fought in Iraq, even if it clearly understood that some of the food would end up in the bellies of the enemy combatants, yet decided that to starve civilians would be more counterproductive. And it tried to kill the insurgents by other means than hunger. As the US fought Al Qaede and Isis, it did also try to look after the civilian population when the battle was still ongoing. Or is there something wrong in the way the US did it?

Not sure if that’s relevant: Putin may have been furious and still deterred.

↪neomac

Are you sure about that? — Punshhh

I’m sure that I’m “not sure if that’s relevant”.

Especially in the firs years of his Presidential mandate, imagine during the Chechen war.

That’s unrealistic, you’re taking it back to a point where Russia was weak compared to now. Putin has been agitating in Ukraine for a long time. If Ukraine had been fast tracked into NATO that would have blown up on the eastern front. — Punshhh

If you are reasoning in terms of counterfactuals, I can do the same. There were US political advisors pushing for NATO enlargement (including Ukraine) way before Putin (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-105shrg46832/html/CHRG-105shrg46832.htm) and “relations between Ukraine and NATO were formally established in 1992, when Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council after regaining its independence, later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine%E2%80%93NATO_relations). So my counterfactual is not arbitrary.
On the other side if we are talking about starting from the current conflict, it would be certainly problematic for political and strategic reasons wrt NATO and wrt Putin, still I think Putin would have big problems to start a war against NATO if the non occupied part of Ukraine was successfully fast tracked into NATO (like Finland), as Putin is even having problems to end the conflict in South and East Ukraine.

How am I conflating “superpower status” with “the unipolar world”, if I’m intentionally stressing their difference, and what you wrote is again a paraphrase of what I just claimed to have understood from your views?

Your whole argument about U.S. looking to weaken the EU, rather than form a constructive alliance, (apart from it being a flawed argument) only makes sense from the assumption that the U.S. is in a unipolar position and doesn’t require that alliance.

I thought it was accepted knowledge that the U.S. isn’t in a unipolar position. — Punshhh

First, I was trying to understand your views, so I made explicit what I thought it was left implicit in your argument. And the point is that if the superpower status of the US in one-to-one comparison still holds in the current non-unipolar world, I’m not sure the US will preserve its superpower status so defined in the next decades if certain strategic alliances are necessary for the US to keep its superpower status: technological gap is already decreasing, military projection is already grown unsustainable, monetary dominance is challenged or worked around, and reputational costs are mostly against the US. So the US power projection as world power can be severely damaged in the longer run.
Second, if the US needs a strong EU as an ally to sustain its power projection wrt rival alliances, I don’t think it will evidently succeed either because a strong EU will never materialise, and if it will materialise it still will at best balance not overwhelm rival alliances, even more so, if the contribution of Middle-Eastern regional powers can weigh in.
Third, to be more precise, my whole argument is “the more the European strategic interest diverges from the US national interest and the European partnership turns unexploitable by the US, the more the US may be compelled to make Europe unexploitable to its hegemonic competitors too.” The point is that the combination of persisting EU vulnerabilities plus incumbent weakening of the US leadership, Europe will turn into a more disputable area for hegemonic competition among the US and other rival hegemonic powers, and this could threaten both NATO and EU project.

Other than oil, money, terrorism, control over commercial routes, criminal business, immigration, exporting islamism in Asia, Africa and the West, maybe nothing. That’s however may be enough to help a Russia-China alliance against a US and EU alliance, even more so with a weak EU.

Good luck (for this alliance) in holding all that together. Just more failed states. The only reason the Gulf states have their current prosperity and security is due to implicit support from the U.S. (the West) in return for oil. That oil will shortly become less important with the transition to net zero. By the way, Russia has the same problem with oil becoming a stranded asset. — Punshhh

Concerning the Middle East, I find at least the leaderships of regional powers like Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia, enough aware of their geopolitical role and strength, despite rivalries and vulnerabilities. They are open to balance the US hegemony in cooperation with Russia and China. They try to develop their sphere of influence even beyond the Middle East in Asia and Africa. And even though they will exploit their oil as a main source of revenues, they are already planning for a post-oil transition (https://www.forbesmiddleeast.com/lists/the-middle-easts-sustainable-100/, https://www.dw.com/en/how-the-gulf-region-is-planning-for-a-life-after-oil/a-67067995, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10668-021-01424-x). Besides, even though they compete for regional hegemony, yet the most acute and local problems they have to face coming from Islamism, environmental challenges, growing population (https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/05/why-the-world-s-fastest-growing-populations-are-in-the-middle-east-and-africa/), plus the mediation of greater powers, like China, may also solicit greater cooperation among them to face shared future challenges, including the threats of a multipolar world like hawkish non-middle eastern hegemonic powers.

Actually I’m more skeptical about the idea that whatever happens in the Middle East, it won’t play any decisive contribution in the power balance of major hegemonic powers.


So points 2 and 5, wouldn’t happen? Are you sure about that? Or that on the other side of the picture, that this could happen if Russia had lost in Ukraine and sleeked off with her tail between her legs?
(2, U.S. will be obliged to support EU, and be drawn into EU wars with Russia.)
(5, EU are vulnerable to Russia picking off states, pre-occupying EU while China can threaten U.S. play one off against the other.) — Punshhh

There is some logic into the 2 hypothetical scenarios you have described but given the current circumstances I’m less certain about their likelihood. And the end of the Ukrainian war may look more messy than an uncontroversial victory or loss.

Do historical aspects justify more or is it the will of the people? Which justifies more?

As having studied history I understand the role of history here quite well: history is usually used to push an agenda by focusing and giving importance to the details that makes the agenda important. Thus history is usually done from a national point of view that justifies the existing state and all little details that have made it so. If history is a tool for this, it still is a tool. Existence of a state and a desire for an independent state is a lot more. — “ssu

Your question intrigues me because it’s the kind of core question where apparently meaning looks so intuitive, and yet all sorts of ambiguities show up at a second thought. The shortest answer I feel comfortable to give is that I take “justification” as a normative claim which one appeals to in order to ground beliefs so that they do not appear arbitrary. Therefore, the will of the people needs to be grounded on a justifying system of beliefs, which is what I think we normally refer to when talking about “the narrative”, in order to not appear arbitrary, especially to those who do not share such will or worse have to lose. On the other side, the justifying belief system is also what helps identify whom the people are we are referring to when talking about the will of “the people” (also across generations). And this turns particularly problematic when sovereignty over a territory and the popular representativity of political decision makers are disputed. If a specific narrative justifying the right to land is what politically qualifies Palestinians as Palestinians vs Israelis as Israelis, discounting such a narrative would make the demand for a Israeli and Palestinian nation-state arbitrary. While taking it into account would make both demands incompatible. One might wish to say that both Israelis and Palestinians may find an agreement for a peaceful however unjust resolution (since narratives remain incompatible) but, so far, they didn’t manage to. On both sides there were/are elements strong enough to boycott such a resolution again in light of incompatible narratives. Invoking third party actors as mediators, instead of fixing the conflict, may be useless or worsen the situation, since also third party actors may be in conflict among themselves also due to incompatible narratives.

Finally, if Palestinians do want an independent state from Israel while not recognising Israel, then also Palestinians don't want a two state solution. — neomac

Umm... they did recognize Israel. At least the PA did. (Do you know the Oslo peace accords?)

Following the Oslo I Accord in 1993, the Palestinian Authority and Israel conditionally recognized each other's right to govern specific areas of the country.


This is the reason why Netanyahu just loved so much Hamas that he even financially supported them. For him the Palestinian that cannot be negotiated with is the Palestinian that he wants to have. Far more easy to ethnically cleanse when the other side are "human animals".

(And naturally many Israelis want to uphold the idea that they cannot negotiate with the Palestinians, that Palestinians just want to drive them to the sea. Or something like that.) — “ssu

We have discussed that already. Whatever agreement decision makers may have found at some point, they weren’t able to enforce them on either sides. The legal implications of such failures are also disputed. What we may still do, before drawing our conclusions in light of our moral standards and political leaning, is to assess the impact of Palestine and Israeli’s approach to their strategic goals in terms of efficacy. What we are seeing is that the Palestinians are bearing the greater material and human costs wrt the Israelis so far. While Israel resisted also foreign pressure and persisting resistance (Hamas keeps firing rockets against Israel, and holding Israeli hostages), so far. Which one is getting closer to its strategic goal?

Question - would you be upset if Israel killed 15k Palestinians but they were all Hamas? What are your thoughts on the dead Hamas fighters? — Moses

If they were all Hamas fighters who engaged in murder on October 7th? I wouldn’t be upset, no. It wouldn’t change the causes of those actions, however.

Also what do you think about the much larger death tolls elsewhere in the world that receive virtually zero attention and zero mass protests? — Moses

Like what, exactly? Because I see nothing comparable to what Israel is doing. If you look at Sudan, or Congo, or Haiti, or aspects of China/India/Central America, or Yemen, or repression in Saudi Arabia, etc., there’s a lot we should be paying attention to.

The level of US involvement is what especially motivates me, however — as it’s the country I live in and can perhaps mildly influence. They’re currently providing the weapons and financial support that’s contributing to this genocide. I want that to stop, at a minimum.

https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/chinese-genocide-of-uyghurs-in-xinjiang-continues

aspects of China — Mikie

:up: Not comparable. China isn’t murdering thousands with US support /weapons.

Still should be paid attention to and condemned.

But really this is just given to divert attention and responsibility from Gaza. “But hey, what about all the OTHER bad things happening in the world?”

Pretty pathetic, really.

Not comparable. China isn’t murdering thousands with US support /weapons. — Mikie

Ah, I see. So U.S. consumers aren't supporting China when they buy hundreds of billions of cheap Chinese crap every year? You get so worked up about genocide, I would have figured you'd be in favor of a boycott of a country actively engaged in it.

The shortest answer I feel comfortable to give is that I take “justification” as a normative claim which one appeals to in order to ground beliefs so that they do not appear arbitrary. Therefore, the will of the people needs to be grounded on a justifying system of beliefs, which is what I think we normally refer to when talking about “the narrative”, in order to not appear arbitrary, especially to those who do not share such will or worse have to lose. — neomac

Well said.

And here we find the problem that the narratives diverge so much that they simply don't meet. At all. Nor there's any willingness to listen to other sides narrative.

One might wish to say that both Israelis and Palestinians may find an agreement for a peaceful however unjust resolution (since narratives remain incompatible) but, so far, they didn’t manage to. — neomac

Actually I think it was really close when the Cold War ended. Palestinians had angered the Gulf states by siding with Saddam and as the Cold War ended, Israel thought once the Cold War ended and the Soviet threat evaporated, the US wouldn't care much of it. Hence all the drive from Madrid talks to Oslo Accords.

But then Likud and Netanyahu understood that the US-Israeli relationship and the very successful lobby it has is also a domestic issue in the US, not a foreign policy issue. And the Arabs came back to give aid like Qatar to Hamas. So why make that "unjust" lousy negotiated peace?

The Israeli Palestinian situation is a reminder that for example in Northern Ireland they really can be happy about the Good Friday agreement. "The Troubles" could have continued even to this day.

Whatever agreement decision makers may have found at some point, they weren’t able to enforce them on either sides. — neomac

To guarantee peace, you have to have a functioning state. Egypt is one. Even Jordan is one. Yet Lebanon is a failed state. Syria has become one.

Above all, Israel would need a reason to make a peace agreement. It doesn't have any, Likud's objective of a state from the river to the sea is already quite close. And extreme Zionists can believe that they are getting there, settlement after settlement. Hamas can also look at the Oslo Accords as utter failure. Both sides can reassure themselves of the wickedness of the other side.

But really this is just given to divert attention and responsibility from Gaza. “But hey, what about all the OTHER bad things happening in the world?” — Mikie

So U.S. consumers aren't supporting China when they buy hundreds of billions of cheap Chinese crap every year? — RogueAI

:ok:

Perfection.

It's downright painful to watch Netanyahu dig Israel's grave with the West's tacit approval.

What larger death tolls?

War in Ukraine has larger death tolls, but it hasn't such high amounts of civilian deaths or death of children. And let's remember how few people are in Gaza and that this war has been going on for a shorter period time (aside how long the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been going on). Sudan has 46 million people.

Question for you, Moses: Would you be OK if the Israeli army continued it's fight against Hamas, but did allow freely food to be transported to the civilian population (which would be naturally inspected)?

The US did this in similar battles it fought in Iraq, even if it clearly understood that some of the food would end up in the bellies of the enemy combatants, yet decided that to starve civilians would be more counterproductive. And it tried to kill the insurgents by other means than hunger. As the US fought Al Qaede and Isis, it did also try to look after the civilian population when the battle was still ongoing. Or is there something wrong in the way the US did it? — ssu

Congo, Syria, Sudan, Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan. Gaza Health ministry has revised the death tolls downwards to ~22k with 13k of those being Hamas according to the IDF by the way. So roughly 8-9k civilians dead and keep in mind Hamas's rockets often malfunction and end up hitting their own populace.

I don't have any problem in principle with aid. The issue of obviously distribution. It is being taken by Hamas which resells it as a much higher price and will waste much of it. Last time I checked there was a several hundred truck log jam in the region regarding aid trucks. Israel can let the trucks in, which it is has, but distribution run by the UN is a different matter.

I definitely don't think Israel is trying to starve Gaza. Sources internal to Gaza have much more control over distribution patterns than Israel -- an outside government. And if ~70% of Afghani civilians supported al-Qaeda I think the US's treatment would have been very different. I would treat palestinians like an enemy population -- not abusively, but with definite caution. On 10/7 many of the perpetrators were regular palestinian civilians presented with an opportunity. I would be extremely weary of this population.

Let’s take the absurd number of Hamas fighters killed at face value. 40,000 - 13,000. I’m no math genius, but 27,000 more to go?

At this rate, given that the total number of innocents dead is probably closer to 100,000 or more, looks like Israel’s goal of ethnic cleansing will be seen through to the very end, international condemnation be damned.

They deserve to be a pariah at this point. Even the dopey US — the provider of the weapons — is slowly waking up thanks to the breaking away from mainstream media propaganda.

Gaza Health ministry has revised the death tolls downwards to ~22k with 13k of those being Hamas according to the IDF by the way. — BitconnectCarlos

Which is here talking, Gaza Health ministry (the remnants of it) or the IDF?

I would treat palestinians like an enemy population. — BitconnectCarlos

That tells everything.

For me the enemy is always the enemy combatants, fighters or servicemen. Legal or illegal. Not the civilians.

But I guess some here on even a Philosophy Forum think otherwise.

For me the enemy is always the enemy combatants, fighters or servicemen. Legal or illegal. Not the civilians. — ssu

True, but Israel can’t always be sure. I think their attitude is exactly the one that’s been adopted for decades: the entire population is the enemy. No need to question why — like the fact that Gaza is a concentration camp. That’s irrelevant history.

October 7th was a blessing for Likud. It finally provided them with a reaction that was hideous enough to use as pretext for their long-desired ethnic cleansing. So it goes.

We smash you over the head for decades, and now we’re going to murder you for lashing out. Lashing out with the wrong intentions in your heart is immoral, after all. Only Israel knows how to APPROPRIATELY murder babies.

For me the enemy is always the enemy combatants, fighters or servicemen. Legal or illegal. Not the civilians. — ssu

Suppose the Nordon Bombsight actually worked with 90% accuracy and that 90% of bombs dropped on German munitions plants, aircraft factories, oil/ballbearing production, etc. actually hit their targets.

Under those conditions, would you have opposed strategic bombing of German war industries?

Did you hear about the 14 year Israeli shepherd boy abducted and murdered in the West Bank yesterday? Righteous palestinian rage, am I right? Those Jews Israelis have no right to that land! The Israelis smash us and oppress us for decades, what's the harm in one abduction and murder? Who even cares?

BuT wE aRe OpPrEsSeD

Does Israel have a right to pursue the killers or no? If yes Israeli may end up killing more than 1, if no then you proclaim Israel has no right to self defense. You have no good response to this one.

Are you an American, Mikie? Would you be a fair target for a terrorist angry at America's actions?

The Gaza Health ministry only has data -- names, ages, etc. on 22k of the 33k claimed. Israel claims to have killed 13k hamas.

Palestinians are not the enemy, but I do see them as an enemy population in the same way that a highly pro-nazi town in 1945 would have been. The citizens themselves aren't inherently evil and deserving of death, but I would be very cautious of them. This is just based on statistics -- 70% of palestinians sympathize with the 10/7 attacks. Israel still allows the transport of aid and medical treatment to palestinians. Israel can provide aid but the reality leaves one skeptical of "winning hearts and minds." Yet Israel is and should treat them with basic decency. Soldiers who blasted Jewish prayers over a loudspeaker of a defeated city were reprimanded.

Palestinians are not the enemy, but I do see them as an enemy population in the same way that a highly pro-nazi town in 1945 would have been. The citizens themselves aren't inherently evil and deserving of death, but I would be very cautious of them. — BitconnectCarlos

:100:

October 7th was a blessing for Likud. It finally provided them with a reaction that was hideous enough to use as pretext for their long-desired ethnic cleansing. So it goes. — Mikie

On October 7th Bibi realised he lost the game: Israel will become a target in the great power struggle between 'the West' and BRICS, there will be no rapprochement in the Middle-East, and it's a matter of time until US power wanes and Arab / BRICS takes over the region, at which point Israel will be at the mercy of its historical enemies.

I think that's why Bibi's initial reaction to the attack was so extreme. This was certainly no blessing.