. Unfortunately, some posters on this forum hold the materialistic worldview of Scientism, which dismisses Metaphysical reasoning as groundless — Gnomon

If the worldview of Scientism dismisses metaphysical reasoning as groundless then I'd say that physicalism is groundless, since physicalism is a belief arrived at by metaphysical reasoning.

As such it would be a poor argument for physicalism.

Descartes idea of efficient causation is worth taking a look at. Mental circumstance can be traced to brain state but any change in mental circumstance will change brain state. So mental circumstance is driving brain state. It's a difficult idea to explain. Anyone, please take a try at it if you can do better or explain if you think it's something else. — Mark Nyquist

I believe that comment is based on the review I mentioned, which says

The only thesis of Descartes that withstood critical objection was his claim that “explanation at the neurophysiological level will be in terms of efficient causation” (p.27). In this respect, Bennett and Hacker remind us that “Descartes contributed substantially to advances in neurophysiology and visual theory” (p.27). — Review of Phil. Foundations of Neuroscience

I believe the point here is that Descartes pursued and encouraged the study of cause-and-effect relationships in medicine and anatomy, which is relevant to neurophysiology and visual theory; like others of his day, Descartes was a polymath, with very broad interests, including medicine. But just above that passage, they also make the point 'Descartes reconceived the soul “not as the principle of life, but as the principle of thought or consciousness” (p. 26), a thesis which led to the idea that the mind was separate from the body in all respects." This is what they believe has had negative consequences, which I agree with; it reduces the state of being to a 'thinking thing', the very existence of which is impossible to demonstrate objectively. Yes, I know that I am, because I am; but what am I, an ethereal thing somehow attached to the body?

Whereas the Aristotelian idea that was displaced, was that the soul was like the animating principle of the body (literally 'the soul is the form of the body' where 'form' is like 'principle'.) It's a very different kind of metaphor, a different kind of consciousness, even.

Scientists study particular things, but Philosophers study general & holistic concepts. That approach is what came to be known as "Metaphysics". Literally, "in addition to physical Reality" (i.e. Ideality), not necessarily super-natural, or un-real. Unfortunately, Catholic theology tainted that aspect of Philosophy by association with dubious religious dogma. — Gnomon

Thanks for the mention! That essay is yet to get any kind of attention (a solitary clap) but I felt it needed saying.

This division is a consequence of the cultural dialectic between reason (so-called) and faith (so-called). Deep historical currents percolating beneath the surface which underlie the culture wars we're experiencing. I still say that many earnest advocates of scientific reductionism are animated by the fear of religion, which is why I refer to Thomas Nagel's essay on that topic so frequently.

Catholic theology absorbed much of what was profound and noble in the ancient tradition, and then tied it to the oath of fealty to the Church, so that with the rejection of the Church, much of ancient philosophy is rejected along with it. Hence the flatland of secular culture, dominated by relativism, scepticism and instrumental utility. Reconciling that has been my major interest.

If the worldview of Scientism dismisses metaphysical reasoning as groundless then I'd say that physicalism is groundless, since physicalism is a belief arrived at by metaphysical reasoning.
As such it would be a poor argument for physicalism. — Moliere

Ironically, all universal -isms --- including Materialism, Physicalism, Naturalism, and Idealism --- are beliefs based on Metaphysical induction. And they are groundless, in the sense that universals are not empirically derived. So, their value is only in that they distinguish one philosophical worldview from another.

Hence, Physicalism is differentiated from Materialism in that it implies more than one fundamental element : matter and energy. The essential rock of Scientism is the empirical scientific method, which grounds Physics, but not Philosophy. Idealism is founded on the mushy terrain of Concepts, which distinguishes that belief system from those grounded on Percepts. The non-empirical -isms can only be justified by pure logical reasoning, which Kant identified with Metaphysical Philosophy. :smile:


"All our knowledge begins with the senses, proceeds then to the understanding, and ends with reason. There is nothing higher than reason. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind." ___ Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason

I was just reading the Phaedo for a class and it hit me that Plato's argument that the soul cannot be analogous to a harmony is literally the same argument against strong emergence that is still giving physicalists a headache 2,000+ years later.

His initial arguments for the soul not being caused by the body in the way that a lyre causes a harmony all have key weaknesses. But given Plato has just had Socrates give a warning to the effect of "don't despise wisdom just because it turns out that some arguments you thought were good actually turn out to have huge flaws," I am pretty sure Plato leads with bad arguments on purpose (you always find new stuff in these).

Socrates' last argument is that the soul/mind cannot be like a harmony because the soul sometimes rules over the body. That is, mind sometimes causes the body to act. But how can a harmony cause an instrument to act a certain way? Simple answer: it can't. A harmony cannot cause the strings to vibrate different ways because the harmony is the vibration of the strings. In the terms of modern physics, we would say that any effect on the lyre caused by the sound waves it generates (the harmony) can ultimately be traced back to the strings itself. If the analogy were true, the harmony/mind must be causally inefficacious.

This is a killer argument. It is really just variants on this argument that leads to physicalists having to posit epiphenomenalism or eliminativism. But for Plato (and most people) it is prima facie unreasonable to say the mind has no causal powers vis-a-vis the body.

This argument still seems very relevant today because I would think that most people who embrace computational theory of mind or integrated information theory very much would like to compare the mind to a harmony or melody. It is an "emergent informational process." But for that emergence to be causally efficacious, you need some sort of "strong emergence" that gets around Plato's trap, and that is hard to come by.

Hence the flatland of secular culture, dominated by relativism, scepticism and instrumental utility. Reconciling that has been my major interest. — Wayfarer

"Here he comes to save the day!" It's super-mensch to the rescue of dystopian society! :joke:

Mensch : a person of integrity and honor.
Perhaps a heroic philosopher?
Super-mensch the Reconciler?

please spare the Nietszche refs. I hate Nietszche. :rage:

Many well-read participants here will read one or two statements from another and be reminded of some historical position or another simply by the appearance of a few key words that have been used in past. It's as if one or two words or phrases always serve as prima facie evidence for concluding that the user shares whatever position those few words reminded them of. Then they go one to use this crutch of misunderstanding to disregard the other. It seems more and more apparent to me that you've done something very similar to that, here in this thread, with me. No judgment here, just observation...

Unfortunately, you seem convinced that you know what my position is. It's a shame that that's the case, because I do not think that you do. I've ignored, and I will continue to ignore the sentences that prove that clearly... to me, anyway. I'm just not interested in that sort of 'discussion'. Nor am I here to deliver a scathing critique of your contributions(which could most certainly be done). Nah, I'm much less likely to do such things in my 'old age'. I do not really see the point anymore, most of the time anyway. I'd much rather attempt to make headway. There is some agreement between us. That being said...



This needs attention...

But the problem is, you’re still regarding ‘it’ as a phenomena, as something that exists. But consciousness is not ‘something that exists’, it is the ground of experience. Now, certainly, consciousness can be treated as a phenomena, as something that can be studied and understood - that is what cognitive science and psychology deal with. But I think the ‘hard problem’ argument is not addressed to that - it is about the meaning of being (‘what it is like to be….’), which is not an objective phenomenon.
— Wayfarer

As you implied, the key to your differences with ↪creativesoul is in divergent definitions of "To Be / To Exist" — Gnomon

There, you were spot on. That seems an unbridgeable divide between Way and myself. He insists that consciousness does not exist, and to me... that makes no sense. On my view, everything spoken about exists. It's just a matter of how. Simply put: That which has an effect/affect exists(is real).

Emergence is what's going on when such knowledge is being formed.
— creativesoul
Yes, the awareness of physical emergence... — Gnomon

Here, you said "yes", but did not understand what you were agreeing to. I was claiming that that bit of knowledge was an emergent entity/thing. That was all I was saying at that time.


The following could prove fruitful...

I define the human Mind as the primary Function of the human Brain. Technically, a "function" is not a thing-in-itself, but a causal relationship between inputs & outputs, as in the information processing of a computer. The biological Brain is a machine, but the psychological Mind is a process, a function : the creation of Meaning — Gnomon

So, we seem to agree that minds are existentially dependent upon brains.

I'm curious to see if you'd be willing to unpack that last sentence. Notably, the last bit about "the creation of meaning". I ask, because it has long been my contention that academia has gotten that wrong, and that the academic (mis)conceptions of meaning(current conventional understanding regarding theories thereof according to the SEP) have led or helped lead to many a philosophical conundrum.

It's relevant here I think.

There, you were spot on. That seems an unbridgeable divide between Way and myself. He insists that consciousness does not exist, and to me... that makes no sense. — creativesoul

I get it, I really do! I'll have another go at it. What I'm saying, and it's an important qualification, is that consciousness does not exist as an object. We can, of course, speak of it as an object in the metaphorical sense - an 'object of discussion' - but the mind itself is not an object in the sense that all the objects we see and interact with are objects. I say that is why the 'eliminative materialists' can't acknowledge its reality - precisely because it's not objectively existent.

(There's another distinction that I make between 'what exists' and 'what is real', but it's a very difficult distinction to unpack. But what got me started on that was the distinction between intelligible objects, such as numbers and logical principles, and empirical objects, such as apples and chairs. I think that is preserved in the distinction between a posteriori and a priori knowledge although it's very much fallen out of favour in Anglo philosophy.

I'm of the view that there was at least an implicit distinction recognised between empirical and intellectual objects in pre-modern philosophy. So, empirical objects are phenomenally existent - that is, they appear as objects of sense (bearing in mind that 'phenomena' means 'what appears'.) But logical principles, numbers and the like are not 'phenomenal objects' in that sense - they are 'objects of thought' (which is nearer the original meaning of ‘noumenal’, pre-Kant). I'm of the view that this is an important epistemological distinction that has been lost in the transition to modernity. But it's the first point that is most relevant.)

I will add that there is a concept, derived originally from Indian philosophy, but now also found in the 'embodied cognition' movement, maybe because of Francisco Varela's incorporation of Buddhist principles in the book The Embodied Mind. An example of that is given in a talk by philosopher of science, Michel Bitbol, 'It is Never Known But It Is the Knower - Consciousness and the Blind Spot of Science' (link to Academia article.)

It should be kept in mind that Socrates, as he is about to die, is trying to convince his friends not to fear or despair death. It is significant that he does not avail himself of an argument used in the Apology - that death is like a endless dreamless sleep or annihilation. Here he argues that a good life will lead to a good death. The problem is that if the soul is the harmony of the body then the destruction of the body is the destruction of the soul. This I think is the main reason he rejects it.

For an in depth discussion of this and related issues see my threat on the Phaedo.

Socrates argues that the soul cannot be an attunement if the tuning existed prior to what is tuned. But there is an argument that Socrates neglects to pursue. The tuning of a lyre exists apart from and prior to any particular lyre. The tuning, the harmony, is an arrangement of frequencies that exists even when a particular lyre is not in tune. Although the tuning of a particular lyre does not endure once that lyre is destroyed, it does not follow that the attunement, the Harmony, is destroyed.

The same distinction holds for the soul. It does not follow from Socrates' argument for the imperishability of Soul that his soul or any other soul is imperishible. A body is alive when there is a proper harmony or arrangement of its parts. When that balance gets too far out of harmony life cannot be sustained.

But how can a harmony cause an instrument to act a certain way? — Count Timothy von Icarus

When the lyre is in tune it vibrates in a way that it does not when it is out of tune. With the proper tension it acts in a certain way that it does not when it is not in tune. In the same way a body that is out of tune will not function in the way it does when it is in tune.

... the harmony is the vibration of the strings. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The harmony is not the vibration. The strings will vibrate whether they are in harmony or not.
The harmony or ratio of frequencies is what causes the vibration of the strings to function in a certain way.

For an in depth discussion of this and related issues see my threat on the Phaedo. — Fooloso4

Is that a Freudian slip? ;-)

Socrates argues that the soul cannot be an attunement if the tuning existed prior to what is tuned. But there is an argument that Socrates neglects to pursue. The tuning of a lyre exists apart from and prior to any particular lyre. The tuning, the harmony, is an arrangement of frequencies that exists even when a particular lyre is not in tune. Although the tuning of a particular lyre does not endure once that lyre is destroyed, it does not follow that the attunement, the Harmony, is destroyed.

That's a good point.

The harmony is not the vibration. The strings will vibrate whether they are in harmony or not.
The harmony or ratio of frequencies is what causes the vibration of the strings to function in a certain way.

Also a good point. But I was speaking mainly in reference to his third argument, that the mind appears to control the body (at least to some extent), while a harmony can't control a lyre. I don't see in what way a harmony played on a lyre could be said to cause the lyre to change. The type of change going on in the lyre defines the harmony in its entirety. That's the part that ties back to physicalism best IMO. The comparison of an "in tune harmony," to an "in tune (virtuous) soul," is a red herring a think.

I do also think Plato weakens Socrates' argument by having him work with an analogy where the harmony/tuning is only analogous to "the proper way to tune a lyre." You can tune stringed instruments to many different keys, and this wouldn't have been news to the Greeks. But Socrates' earlier arguments re souls varying in degrees of virtue has to assume that there is only one "true" tuning. I assume this is an intentional weakness though. I am pretty sure the Pythagoreans also likened the soul/body relation to a melody, and that analogy doesn't run into the first road blocks Socrates throws up against it, since obviously melodies can vary in the qualities from one another.

For Platonists it could be.

The subject of neuroscience has come up here a few times in the last week or so and it seems relevant to physicalism so I was looking at the current University of Minnesota neuroscience programs.
At the research level there currently is a lot of cross disciplinary collaboration going on. Something new that I noticed was something called interventional psychiatry. I don't really know how to link it but if you search YouTube for UMN Interventional Psychiatry you should get a short video on that.

Minnesota has some big medical device makers in the state so this might be something we hear about more than most.

I get it, I really do! I'll have another go at it. What I'm saying, and it's an important qualification, is that consciousness does not exist as an object. We can, of course, speak of it as an object in the metaphorical sense - an 'object of discussion' - but the mind itself is not an object in the sense that all the objects we see and interact with are objects. I say that is why the 'eliminative materialists' can't acknowledge its reality - precisely because it's not objectively existent. — Wayfarer

Sounds about right to me. I'm neither a fan of object-oriented frameworks, nor of the object/subject distinction. I also find very little sensible use for the objective/subjective distinction, although Searle has recently convinced me that it may be rightfully applicable in certain contexts. There are several historical dichotomies that I've found lack the explanatory power necessary to take account of that which is neither one or the other, but rather... consist of both(and more when it comes to emergent things).

There's another distinction that I make between 'what exists' and 'what is real', but it's a very difficult distinction to unpack. But what got me started on that was the distinction between intelligible objects, such as numbers and logical principles, and empirical objects, such as apples and chairs. I think that is preserved in the distinction between a posteriori and a priori knowledge although it's very much fallen out of favour in Anglo philosophy. — Wayfarer

Yup. That's another set of pairs that I reject. I understand the taxonomy you're setting out enough to say that I'm not claiming that your use of "consciousness" and claiming that "consciousness does not exist" is incoherent. Seems to make sense according to your own taxonomy. I just lean towards Occam here and hold that everything that has an effect/affect exists. Consciousness causes both.

I'm of the view that there was at least an implicit distinction recognised between empirical and intellectual objects in pre-modern philosophy. So, empirical objects are phenomenally existent - that is, they appear as objects of sense (bearing in mind that 'phenomena' means 'what appears'.) But logical principles, numbers and the like are not 'phenomenal objects' in that sense - they are 'objects of thought'. I'm of the view that this is an important epistemological distinction that has been lost in the transition to modernity. But it's the first point that is most relevant.) — Wayfarer

"Object of thought" is exactly what come to my mind while reading the first paragraph of this reply.

I think we both hold that some things are physical. We also may agree that there are other things that do not seem to be physical in elemental constitution. Perhaps we may also agree that some things consist of both physical elements and non physical elements.

So, by my lights, that is to say that the dichotomy of physical/non physical is inadequate...

This argument still seems very relevant today because I would think that most people who embrace computational theory of mind or integrated information theory very much would like to compare the mind to a harmony or melody. It is an "emergent informational process." But for that emergence to be causally efficacious, you need some sort of "strong emergence" that gets around Plato's trap, and that is hard to come by. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't quite see how you think that "strong emergence" gets around Plato\s trap. Can you explain what you mean here?

That's a good point. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Foolos4 simply equivocates with "harmony". The primary definition of "harmony", the one Plato deals with is "the simultaneously sounded musical notes to produce chords and chord progressions, esp. as having a pleasing effect".

But Fool implies a "harmony" could exist without the instrument which plays the notes, by referring to "harmony" as if it meant a general principle of "tuning". This allows Fool to say that the "harmony" as the general principle by which the lyre is tuned, precedes the playing of the lyre. But this is a different meaning for "harmony" from the one that Plato is using, which is the common definition of "harmony", the simultaneously sounded musical notes having a pleasing effect. "Harmony" in this sense requires that the lyre be tuned already, and Plato is arguing against the soul as harmony, not as a principle of tuning.

. I also find very little sensible use for the objective/subjective distinction, although Searle has recently convinced me that it may be rightfully applicable in certain contexts — creativesoul

I find the distinction between object/objective and subject/subjective quite intelligible. The main issue in the context of the discussion of physicalism is the emphasis on objects and objectivity, and also on what is measurable. The basis of scientific method is the identification of the measurable attributes of objects. That is what has been referred to as the 'supremacy of quantity'. Whereas states of being are qualitative by nature - they're characterised by feeling (among other things).That is the whole 'hard problem' issue in a nutshell. I don't think it is unclear.

This argument still seems very relevant today because I would think that most people who embrace computational theory of mind or integrated information theory very much would like to compare the mind to a harmony or melody. It is an "emergent informational process." But for that emergence to be causally efficacious, you need some sort of "strong emergence" that gets around Plato's trap, and that is hard to come by. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Harmony or melody is not really an adequate metaphor, and as you say it implies epiphenomenalism. A much better one I have seen is virtual machine. Mind is to the brain as a virtual machine is to the underlying physical hardware. When the virtual machine is running, it is in control of some or all of the operations of the computer, even though everything it does is causally reducible to operations of the underlying hardware.

I don't quite see how you think that "strong emergence" gets around Plato\s trap. Can you explain what you mean here?

Strong emergence would show the analogy is simply wrong, as Plato is arguing, although it would be wrong in a different way. With strong emergence, we would have a new, fundemental and irreducible force in play. Such a force would seem to be causally efficacious, and so it shouldn't be a problem to say the mind causes the body to do things in the way that it appears to be a problem for a harmony to "cause" changes in the instrument that generates it.

But conceptually, I would argue this doesn't appear to make sense. The analogy breaks down because a lyre/harmony relation seems like a reducible one. That it is conceptually hard to see how this could ever work is sort of the point. Strong emergence isn't at all intuitive and this would seem to suggest that either something is fundementally wrong with the concept, or the concepts it is built on top of (substance/superveniance), or that there is something wrong with our intuition.

Either way, something seems wrong with our intuition. Both strong emergence and the idea that the mind is causally inefficacious both seem unreasonable, but we seem forced to choose one or the other (or reject the analogy).

For me, this is tough because I think the analogy is probably in some ways a good one, although "melody" would work better. But I would tend to want to locate the problem back at basic ontological distinction between things and processes being basic (putting Heraclitus over Parmenides).

But Fool implies a "harmony" could exist without the instrument which plays the notes, by referring to "harmony" as if it meant a general principle of "tuning". This allows Fool to say that the "harmony" as the general principle by which the lyre is tuned, precedes the playing of the lyre. But this is a different meaning for "harmony" from the one that Plato is using, which is the common definition of "harmony", the simultaneously sounded musical notes having a pleasing effect.

Is that so? I had noticed that the Center for Hellenic Studies text keeps a lot of the Greek original terms to avoid the connotations they have gained in English. It translates "harmonica," as "tuning." And Socrates certainly seems to use the term like it refers to a (specific) "tuning," rather than just a any harmony.

I don't know enough about the Greek to know if this is how the term was used. I have to think it isn't, simply because you can put any stringed instruments in tune in different ways, but maybe not. So, I think Fool's response is in line with how Socrates uses the term. The problem I see is that it seems possible that Plato is having Socrates use the term in a very limited and argumentatively weak way on purpose.

Given the advice that comes before, I think we are supposed to pick up, examine, and discard each of the first two (arguably three) reasons he gives for discarding the analogy, until we get to the last argument that parallels the problems of strong emergence. Likewise, Plato seems to save his best overall argument for the immortality of the soul for even later in the dialogue. I don't think this argument works, but figuring out why it fails required innovations in logic that weren't around for a very long time.

I find the distinction between object/objective and subject/subjective quite intelligible. — Wayfarer

In any relational environment, such must be the case. In order to dismiss the distinction, the conditions by which it is necessary must be dismissed, in which case there remains, regarding human intelligence, nothing.

Has there ever been a sufficiently explanatory thesis, in which human intelligence is not predicated on relations necessarily?

I find the distinction between object/objective and subject/subjective quite intelligible. — Wayfarer

There is more than one such distinction, between object and subject, because these words have multiple meanings. Consider the following:

What I'm saying, and it's an important qualification, is that consciousness does not exist as an object. We can, of course, speak of it as an object in the metaphorical sense - an 'object of discussion' - but the mind itself is not an object in the sense that all the objects we see and interact with are objects. — Wayfarer

The use of the phrase "object of discussion" is strictly speaking, incorrect, because what you are saying is really "subject of discussion". This type of sloppy usage is what leads to the problem you speak of, where consciousness is considered to be an "object", because it is taken to be an object of discussion rather than a subject of discussion.

This problem is actually pervasive with many modern logicians who prefer to ignore this subject/object distinction. In a common predication there is a subject and a predicate. The subject cannot be taken to be an object without category mistake. Some people will say that the word names an object, and so the proposition concerns the object. But this is false, because the word itself is the subject in this case, and there is a further correlation between the word and the object named. The reality of this separation must be maintained to maintain the possibility of mistaken identity.

Strong emergence would show the analogy is simply wrong, as Plato is arguing, although it would be wrong in a different way. With strong emergence, we would have a new, fundemental and irreducible force in play. Such a force would seem to be causally efficacious, and so it shouldn't be a problem to say the mind causes the body to do things in the way that it appears to be a problem for a harmony to "cause" changes in the instrument that generates it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is this "fundamental and irreducible force" 'the soul', as defined by Aristotle, 'the first actuality of a body having life potentially within it'?

But conceptually, I would argue this doesn't appear to make sense. The analogy breaks down because a lyre/harmony relation seems like a reducible one. That it is conceptually hard to see how this could ever work is sort of the point. Strong emergence isn't at all intuitive and this would seem to suggest that either something is fundementally wrong with the concept, or the concepts it is built on top of (substance/superveniance), or that there is something wrong with our intuition. — Count Timothy von Icarus

By this "strong emergence", is it the case that the material body is actually emergent, from that "force"? This would be consistent with the immaterial soul being prior to the material body, as the force from which the body emerges. Therefore it must be immaterial.

For me, this is tough because I think the analogy is probably in some ways a good one, although "melody" would work better. But I would tend to want to locate the problem back at basic ontological distinction between things and processes being basic (putting Heraclitus over Parmenides). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I believe that the simultaneity of the parts of the "harmony" is an important aspect, which ought not be replaced by "melody". It is very important to the concept of the material body of the living being, that the various parts exist in a unity of simultaneity, and this gives us the intuition of being "present". Being "present" is a very difficult but real aspect of being, and the difficulty manifests as the uncertainty principle in the Fourier transform when we try to break a harmony into its constituent parts at the present moment. The way that different notes coexist at the present moment is very perplexing, each requiring a different length of time to perceive due to differing wavelengths, and this is indicative of the difficulty in understanding the reality of passing time.

And Socrates certainly seems to use the term like it refers to a (specific) "tuning," rather than just a any harmony. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Actually, I admit that Plato is ambiguous with this term, translated as "harmony", and uses it in different ways in that text, depending on the translation, which is also very critical. Probably in his time, "tuning" was the more common usage for that word. However at the point when Socrates dismisses or refutes the idea that the soul is a harmony, it is very obvious that he uses "harmony" in the way which is more common to us, the way I defined. Obviously, that's what makes the argument work.

@Fooloso4 is very quick with quotes, so I'll wait for some reference then I'll show the ambiguity in Plato.

The problem I see is that it seems possible that Plato is having Socrates use the term in a very limited and argumentatively weak way on purpose. — Count Timothy von Icarus

In my opinion, Plato is having Socrates demonstrate the ambiguity of the term. People in that time would have claimed that the soul is like a harmony (I believe that's a Pythagorean principle). For those individuals who would believe that the soul is a prior "force" (like you describe in strong emergence) causing the unity of the body, as a sort of tuning, then this interpretation is apt. However, the physicalists/materialists of the time would have argued that a harmony is something produced from the "tuned" body, in the way I defined "harmony" above. So the principle, 'the soul is a harmony' is lost to ambiguity. It is a meaningless principle, because some would believe that this means that the soul is prior to the body as that "force" which produces the parts co-existing in harmony, while others would interpret "harmony" as what is produced by the tuned body. Therefore the stated principle supports two opposing perspectives, and requires analysis of the ambiguity in order to produce an adequate understanding.

Given the advice that comes before, I think we are supposed to pick up, examine, and discard each of the first two (arguably three) reasons he gives for discarding the analogy, until we get to the last argument that parallels the problems of strong emergence. Likewise, Plato seems to save his best overall argument for the immortality of the soul for even later in the dialogue. I don't think this argument works, but figuring out why it fails required innovations in logic that weren't around for a very long time. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I've read the passages a number of times, but my memory fails me now. If I remember correctly, Plato builds up to the argument with numerous mentions of "tuning". Then at the point of dismissing the position he argues against "harmony" (in our common usage as simultaneous notes produced by the instrument). This really leaves the aforementioned "tuning" unaddressed.

I would say the most compelling reason to be a physicalist is methodological and not ontological. We simply have only one valid methodological approach: naturalism.

Every advancement we have made into the truth has been empirical, even if it be done from an armchair, and never by educated guesses that are not grounded in empirical evidence. Likewise, it seems, historically speaking, that we assume something we don't understand is supernatural and then learn later it is perfectly natural--which I think counts in favor of methodological naturalism.

It might help to back up a bit to see what is at issue. Socrates defines death:

“ 'And that it is nothing but the separation of the soul from the body? And that being dead is this: the body's having come to be apart, separated from the soul, alone by Itself, and the soul's being apart, alone by itself, separated from the body? Death can't be anything else but that, can it?'”

(64c)

The framing of the problem is the problem. Body and soul are treated as if they are two things, with the former dependent on the latter. The attunement argument calls this distinction into question. The cause of life is not the soul. The cause of death is not its separation from the body. The soul is not some separate thing acting on the body, but rather a condition of the body.

I don't see in what way a harmony played on a lyre could be said to cause the lyre to change. — Count Timothy von Icarus

A lyre that is not in tune cannot play a tune in tune. The harmony is not what is played on the lyre it is the condition of the lyre, the proper tension of the strings in ratio to each other that allow it to play in harmony. A body that is not in tune cannot function properly. When it is far enough out of tune it cannot function at all.

But I was speaking mainly in reference to his third argument, that the mind appears to control the body (at least to some extent), while a harmony can't control a lyre. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Socrates final argument for rejecting the soul as an attunement is not an argument based on reason.
He uses Homer’s authority in support of his argument against attunement on the grounds that the soul controls or rules over the body. But the passage cited (Odyssey XX 17-18) is not a case of the soul controlling the body, but of the soul controlling its own anger. It is not a matter of one thing, a soul, acting on another, a body, but of one thing, self,control, a man directing his action toward himself.

Many well-read participants here will read one or two statements from another and be reminded of some historical position or another simply by the appearance of a few key words that have been used in past. — creativesoul

I doubt that many posters on this forum are quite so simple-minded as that. Our personal vocabularies contain categorized beliefs encapsulated in "key words". But the purpose of a discussion forum is for us to open-up those capsules in order to learn about other beliefs, and to add new terminology to better define our own beliefs. A few may assume these threads are legal arguments intended to reveal The Truth as God intended. But mostly, we are satisfied to get a step "Closer to Truth".

Key words, especially "-isms", encapsulate complex belief systems into simple generalizations, that we use to avoid Talmudic verbosity. Yet, they also allow us to quickly see the "key" (salience) to our disagreements. Then, we can explore the implicit meanings behind the symbolic words, looking for areas where our beliefs may overlap or divide. With logical leverage we may be able to open a path to reach some philosophical detente, if not total agreement. :smile:

Unfortunately, you seem convinced that you know what my position is. It's a shame that that's the case, because I do not think that you do. — creativesoul

No, I am not convinced of your position on Physicalism, because such a universal concept includes a plethora of unstated assumptions, that we need to work through in order to reach a more specific understanding. For example, Physicalism, Materialism, and Naturalism are related worldviews, that differ in a few details. If none of those terms are close to your position, is there another label that you would accept?

My own worldview does not fit into any of the traditional categories --- such as Realism or Idealism --- so I have coined new words & phrases & labels, intended to suggest a novel way of looking at the world. On this forum, to establish my own position --- without excessive verbiage --- I provide links to expand upon my brief remarks in the post. After only a few interchanges, do you think you "know my position"? Are you open to further communication? :cool:

As you implied, the key to your differences with ↪creativesoul is in divergent definitions of "To Be / To Exist" — Gnomon
There, you were spot on. That seems an unbridgeable divide between Way and myself. He insists that consciousness does not exist, and to me... that makes no sense. On my view, everything spoken about exists. It's just a matter of how. Simply put: That which has an effect/affect exists(is real). — creativesoul

I don't know where you got the idea that denies the existence of Consciousness. He does deny that Awareness is a physical object, but I assume you would agree with that. Your definition in terms of causation may be closer than you think to his, and to my own, understanding of both Physical and Metaphysical existence. Check-out Way's essay linked below, for his musings on "to be or to know". :wink:

*1. The Ligatures of Reason : logical, not physical, connections
This insight lead me to ponder what it means to say that number and phenomenal objects exist
in different ways. Until this time, it had never occurred to me that there might be different ways of existing; I had thought that things either exist, or they don’t. . . .
But then, I wondered, in what domain or sense do numbers exist? ‘Where’ are numbers? How can they be real? Perhaps, came the thought, they exist in an intelligible domain, of which cognition is an irreducible part,and so, accessible only by reason.
https://medium.com/@jonathan.shearman/the-ligatures-of-reason-66b775d443d1

Emergence is what's going on when such knowledge is being formed.
— creativesoul
Yes, the awareness of physical emergence... — Gnomon
Here, you said "yes", but did not understand what you were agreeing to. I was claiming that that bit of knowledge was an emergent entity/thing. That was all I was saying at that time. — creativesoul

I was agreeing to your reference to an action (what's going on) that results in the "knowledge" (awareness ; conceptualization) that something novel has emerged from the transaction. Your emphasis may have been on knowledge as a "thing" (objective or subjective?), but mine was on the emergence as a transformation of one "thing" into another "kind of thing" (subjective Idea). :nerd:

I define the human Mind as the primary Function of the human Brain. Technically, a "function" is not a thing-in-itself, but a causal relationship between inputs & outputs, as in the information processing of a computer. The biological Brain is a machine, but the psychological Mind is a process, a function : the creation of Meaning — Gnomon
So, we seem to agree that minds are existentially dependent upon brains. — creativesoul

Yes. As I said before, I am not aware of any free-floating minds (ghosts) in the real world. But, I do see the logical necessity for the Potential-to-evolve-Minds in the original "seed" of our contingent universe : popularly known as Big Bang, or Singularity, or God. However, you may not agree with that universalization of Mind Potential --- not as an entity, but as a Creative Cause. :grin:

Potential : the power to change statistical Possibility into physical Actuality

Has there ever been a sufficiently explanatory thesis, in which human intelligence is not predicated on relations necessarily? — Mww

No, I think it's fundamental. The reason it seems so opaque is because modernity is so thoroughly embedded in 'the objective consciousness' that it is hard to see it. That is one of the main points of phenomenology, of which Kant was one of the primary sources.

The use of the phrase "object of discussion" is strictly speaking, incorrect, because what you are saying is really "subject of discussion". This type of sloppy usage is what leads to the problem you speak of, where consciousness is considered to be an "object", because it is taken to be an object of discussion rather than a subject of discussion. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, kind of, but the meaning of the general category of 'object' is still abundantly obvious.

Every advancement we have made into the truth has been empirical, even if it be done from an armchair, and never by educated guesses that are not grounded in empirical evidence. — Bob Ross

A great many scientific discoveries are owed to empiricism, to be sure, but the sense in which that constitutes or amounts to 'truth' is a different matter. I think your sentiment would have been better expressed, 'scientific and technological progress has been grounded in empiricism'.

I don't think the direction this thread is headed is of much help in understanding physicalism, so I had walked away, but I will make a few comments by way of responding to you directly.

I don't think emergence can be well understood in either casual or evolutionary terms, but that rather it might better be understood as a different way of talking about something. See this post.

But it's not clear to me from what you have said, whether you accept or reject a preference for monolithic explanations.

SO I'm not at all sure where this leaves us.

Well, kind of, but the meaning of the general category of 'object' is still abundantly obvious. — Wayfarer

How can you say this in light of what I presented? If "object" is supposed to have the same meaning when referring to a physical thing which we can sense, pick up, move around, etc., and also when referring to a subject of discussion, like 'the weather' or 'American politics', which you metaphorically call an "object of discussion", then how would "object" be defined, in an abundantly obvious way?

Suppose we say an "object" is something apprehensible, either through the means of sensation, or directly to the intellect. This could formulate the general category "object". But you know as well as I know, that there is a huge separation between these two types of objects, outlined in Plato's Republic by the categories of the divided line. Now Kant came along and said that one of these two types of objects is not even apprehensible to the mind anyway. So the proposed definition, "something apprehensible" is rendered unacceptable by Kant's metaphysics, and what was supposed to be abundantly obvious is now very confusing and unintelligible.

The tendency is to ignore Kant's metaphysics, and assume that an "object" is apprehensible. But this places the two distinct types of objects together in the same category. The problem is that some objects are inherently unknowable, while others are inherently knowable, and we've denied, or ignored the metaphysical principle which would distinguish between these two. This produces a significant epistemological problem. Mistakes inhere within our knowledge due to the fact that some objects are inherently unknowable. But the knowable and unknowable have been so thoroughly mixed to together through the use of this "general category of 'object", that the skeptic must doubt all supposed "objects of knowledge" to expose where the elements of unintelligibility are hidden.

The better view is information exists as brain state which is reduced to physical matter and communication is possible by physical signals. No brain external information. — Mark Nyquist

:up:

I was just reading the Phaedo for a class and it hit me that Plato's argument that the soul cannot be analogous to a harmony is literally the same argument against strong emergence that is still giving physicalists a headache 2,000+ years later. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The Platonic concept of Body/Soul integrity, as a harmonious interaction, is new to me. So I googled it. As an analogy to pleasing musical synchrony*1, such essential consonance is posited by most religious & philosophical traditions : e.g Taoism. But from the perspective of modern Physicalism, such non-mechanical notions may be dismissed as romantic nonsense.

However, while my own personal worldview does not use the obsolete term "Soul" --- in the sense of an independent ghost --- the unity of Body & Mind is implicit. So, I see now that "Person"*2 can be described in terms of Body/Mind harmony, as defined in the 20th century sciences of Holism*3 and Systems theory*4. A System is a collection of independent parts (holons) that work together, in harmony, to form a new unity, with new functions. Hence, the human body/mind is an animated & enminded system that can't be separated into parts without killing the Life and extinguishing the Mind. Since Life & Mind go together like a flock of birds, eliminating one or the other will not result in a philosophical zombie, but in a corpse. :smile:


*1. What is Synchrony in music?
Musical synchrony increases a sense of shared intentionality and decreases the experience of self-other distinction [21,22,23,24], and can relate to a sense of communal identity
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8946180/

*2. Person :
A person is a being who has certain capacities or attributes such as reason, morality, consciousness or self-consciousness,
Note --- That the "Being" --- more than a Thing --- is also a physical body is implicit, but not stated explicitly in the definition.

*3. Holism ; Holon :
Philosophically, a whole system is a collection of parts (holons) that possesses properties not found in the parts. That something extra is an Emergent quality that was latent (unmanifest) in the parts. For example, when atoms of hydrogen & oxygen gases combine in a specific ratio, the molecule has properties of water, such as wetness, that are not found in the gases. A Holon is something that is simultaneously a whole and a part — A system of entangled things that has a function in a hierarchy of systems.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page11.html

*4. What is holistic science? :
Holistic Science is a new and emerging science of systems and wholes, qualities and values. It allows us to look at the social, economic and ecological issues of the 21st Century in a new light. It helps us to come to understandings that go beyond the limits of our current scientific paradigm.
https://www.masterscompare.co.uk/masters-courses/holistic-science-23096/24594/


A HARMONY OF BIRDS

The harmony is not the vibration. The strings will vibrate whether they are in harmony or not.
The harmony or ratio of frequencies is what causes the vibration of the strings to function in a certain way. — Fooloso4

Sympathetic vibration tells me this isn't the whole story.

Instruments have been designed in a way (John McLaughlin's 13-string guitar when playing with Shakti comes to mind) specifically so that a harmony in the strings played, causes the strings not played to vibrate sympathetically. I believe sitar behaves this wY too.